ELIZABETH A. BROWN 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

13Y-S • \ 

DEPUTY CLERK ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART, 

REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

No. 83412 

No. 84077 

FILED 

SEP 1 5 2022 

CRAIG A. MUELLER, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

CRISTINA A. HINDS, 

Res ondent. 

CRISTINA A. HINDS, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

CRAIG A. MUELLER, 

Res e ondent. 

These are consolidated appeals from district court orders 

denying a motion to set aside or modify a divorce decree and marital 

settlement agreement and denying a request for attorney fees and costs. 

Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Court Division, Clark County; 

Rebecca Burton, Judge.' 

Respondent/appellant Cristina Hinds filed for divorce from 

appellant/respondent Craig Mueller in 2018. On June 20, 2019, during 

Cristina's deposition, the parties reached a marital settlement agreement 

(MSA) concerning the division of community property and placed the terms 

of that agreement on the record pursuant to EDCR 7.50 (requiring 

agreements to be in writing or "entered in the minutes in the form of an 

order" to be effective). On July 28 and 29, 2019, the parties signed the 

'Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument 

is not warranted in this matter. 

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written MSA, and, on July 29, 2019, the district court entered a stipulated 

decree of divorce, incorporating the MSA. 

A few months later, Cristina moved to hold Craig in contempt 

of court, largely due to his failure to make the property equalization 

payment provided in the MSA. Craig opposed and filed a countermotion 

seeking to set aside or modify the MSA. Throughout the litigation, both 

parties made multiple requests for an award of attorney fees and costs as 

sanctions and pursuant to the MSA's provision entitling the prevailing 

party to reasonable attorney fees and costs for any action to enforce or 

interpret the MSA. At some point, Cristina conceded that, after the parties 

reached a settlement but before they signed the written MSA, she had taken 

$36,871 from a joint account that the MSA awarded to Craig. She then 

agreed that Craig should be entitled to an offset from the property 

equalization payment in that amount. After an evidentiary hearing, the 

district court granted Cristina's request to enforce the MSA's property 

equalization payment requirement subject to the offset, denied each of 

Craig's requests, and ordered that Cristina should be awarded her attorney 

fees and costs from the date she agreed to the offset. The district court set 

a 15-day deadline for Cristina to submit a memorandum of fees and costs; 

Cristina filed her memorandum one day late and the district court entered 

an order declining to award any fees or costs. Both parties now appeal. 

In Docket No. 83412, Craig appeals frorn the district court's 

order denying his request to modify or set aside the MSA. We first reject 

Craig's argument that the MSA was not a valid, binding contract due to lack 

of material terms or mutual assent. See Grisham v. Grisham, 128 Nev. 679, 

685, 289 P.3d 230, 234-35 (2012) (providing that "a stipulated settlement 

agreement requires mutual assent" and must include material terms which 

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are "[ lsufficiently certain and definite for a court to ascertain what is 

required of the respective parties" (internal citation and quotation marks 

omitted)). The record contains substantial evidence that the parties agreed 

to all material terms at the time of Cristina's deposition, including a 

division of assets and the amount of the community property equalization 

award.2 See May v. Anderson, 121 Nev. 668, 672-73, 119 P.3d 1254, 1257 

(2005) (explaining that, when determining whether a contract exists, this 

court will "defer to the district court's findings unless they are clearly 

erroneous or not based on substantial evidence"). Moreover, both parties 

affirmed under oath at that deposition that all material terms had been 

addressed and that they intended the agreement to be enforceable pursuant 

to EDCR 7.50. And, because the MSA was already a binding agreement 

before Cristina withdrew the money from their joint account, we agree with 

the district court that Craig failed to prove that Cristina fraudulently 

induced him to enter into the MSA. See J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Lehrer 

McGovern Bovis, Inc., 120 Nev. 227, 290-91, 89 P.3d 1009, 1018 (2004) 

(listing elements to prove fraudulent inducement and holding that a party 

must prove by clear and convincing evidence that they justifiably relied 

upon a misrepresentation by the other party which was intended to induce 

them to enter into a contract); Havas v. Alger, 85 Nev. 627, 631, 461 P.2d 

857, 860 (1969) ("Fraud is never presumed; it must be clearly and 

satisfactorily proved."). 

2To the extent that Craig argues on appeal that the MSA was not 

binding until they signed it in July 2019, he acknowledged in his pretrial 

brief that the MSA was a binding settlement when they agreed to its terms 

on June 20, 2019. 

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We also reject Craig's argument that the district court failed to 

adjudicate his pretrial motion pursuant to NRS 125.150(3) (concerning 

postjudgment motions to adjudicate community property omitted from the 

divorce decree by fraud or mistake).3 Substantial evidence supports the 

court's findings that there was a full and fair disclosure of all accounts when 

the parties reached their settlement, and that Craig failed to identify any 

community assets that were missing or omitted from the MSA. See Ogawa 

v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 668, 221 P.3d 699, 704 (2009) (providing that this 

court will give deference to and uphold a district court's factual findings if 

they are supported by substantial evidence). 

Substantial evidence also supports the district court's finding 

that Craig failed to provide credible evidence to support his claim that 

Cristina's act of withdrawing the money from their joint account made it 

impossible for him to perform under the MSA. See id. Craig argues that he 

needed that money to serve as collateral for a loan to make the property 

equalization payment, but he fails to point to anything in the record to show 

that he formally applied for a loan, or that he was denied a loan for want of 

those funds, and we will not reweigh the district court's credibility 

determination on appeal.4 See Ellis v. Caru,cci, 123 Nev. 145, 152, 161 P.3d 

3The record belies Craig's contention that the district court found he 

waived the right to bring a motion pursuant to NRS 125_150(3). Rather, the 

district court pointed out that, pursuant to the terms of the MSA, Craig 

waived the right to any further discovery and agreed to settle all claims in 

the divorce case. Cf. Davi.s v. Beling, 128 Nev. 301, 321, 278 P.3d 501, 515 

(2012) (explaining that "clear and unambiguous [language in a] contract 

will be enforced as written"). 

4While the parties agree they contemplated that Craig would have to 

obtain a loan to make the property equalization payment, they also agree 

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239, 244 (2007) (refusing to reweigh the district court's credibility 

determinations). Finally, we are not persuaded by Craig's arguments that 

he, not Cristina, was the prevailing party, as the district court granted 

Cristina's request to enforce the MSA and it denied each of Craig's 

requests.5 See Chowdhry v. NLVH, Inc., 109 Nev. 478, 485-86, 851 P.2d 

459, 464 (1993) ("A plaintiff may be considered the prevailing party for 

attorney's fee purposes if it succeeds on any significant issue in litigation 

which achieves some of the benefit sought in bringing the suit."). 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment in Docket No. 83412. 

In Docket No. 84077, Cristina appeals from the district court's 

order denying her motion for attorney fees and costs. Reviewing de novo, 

we conclude that the district court erred when it relied on NRCP 54(d)(2)(C) 

in denying Cristina's motion. See Pardee Homes of Nev. v. Wolfram, 135 

Nev. 173, 176, 444 P.3d 423, 425-26 (2019) (explaining that this court 

reviews attorney fees decisions de novo when the matter implicates 

questions of law). While the district court is correct that NRCP 54(d)(2)(C) 

prohibits it from extending the time for a party to file a motion for attorney 

fees after the thne to do so has expired, Cristina timely filed her motion for 

fees before trial. Because Cristina's motion for attorney fees and costs was 

timely filed, NRCP 54(d)(2)(C) did not constrain the district court's ability 

to extend the deadline for Cristina to file her supporting memorandum and 

that Craig obtaining the loan was not a condition precedent to him paying 

Cristina by the deadline set in the MSA. 

5We decline Cristina's request to impose sanctions on Craig for 

providing an inadequate appendix. 

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related documents.° See NRCP 54(d)(2)(C) ("The court may not extend the 

time for filing the motion after the time has expired." (emphasis added)). 

Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order denying Cristina her 

attorney fees and costs and remand for the court to consider whether to 

extend the deadline for Cristina to file her memorandum. Based on the 

foregoing, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED IN 

PART AND REVERSED IN PART AND REMAND this matter to the 

district court for proceedings consistent with this order.7

, C.J. 

Parraguirre 

J. 

Cadish 

, Sr.J. 

cc: Hon. Rebecca Burton, District Judge, Family Court Division 

Willick Law Group 

McAvoy Amaya & Revero, Attorneys 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

°Given our conclusion, we need not reach Cristina's remaining 

arguments. 

7The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the 

decision of this matter under a general order of assignment. 

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