1

USAID/Somalia 

Operational Plan 

FY 2006 

June 2, 2006 
2

Please Note: 

The attached RESULTS INFORMATION is from the FY 2006 Operational Plan and was assembled 

and analyzed by the country or USAID operating unit identified on the cover page. 

The Operational Plan is a "pre-decisional" USAID document and does not reflect results stemming 

from formal USAID review(s) of this document. 

Related document information can be obtained from: 

USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse 

8403 Colesville Road, Suite 210 

Silver Spring, MD 20910 

Telephone: (301) 562-0641 

Fax: (301) 588-7787 

Email: docorder@dec.cdie.org 

Internet: http://www.dec.org 

Portions released on or after July 1, 2006 
3

Program Performance Summary FY 2005: A. Program Performance Summary 

Program Narrative (FY 2005): 

Somalia has been without a central government since 1991, and after numerous failed attempts at statebuilding, the 2004 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-led peace process in Kenya 

achieved a breakthrough by endorsing a five-year interim Transitional Federal Government (TFG). 

President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was elected in October 2004 and he appointed Ali Mohamed Ghedi as 

Prime Minister. The President, Prime Minister and MPs reflect a delicate balance of representatives 

across most clans and sub-clans. Given this balance among competing and mutually suspicious groups, 

the current situation is extremely fragile and sharp divisions have emerged within the TFG that threaten to 

destroy the nascent process. The apparent main point of contention is the location of the seat of the new 

government, but there is also controversy over a national security and stabilization plan and a national 

reconciliation plan. 

During the 1990s Somalia slipped down the list of UNDPs Global Human Development Index of least 

developed countries from 123 to 172 out of 174; it has not been ranked since 1997 because the 

destruction and looting of nearly all infrastructure during the civil war made statistical data inadequate. 

Somalia has been the site of continuous humanitarian operations since 1990. Even in years of good 

rainfall, strong harvests and reduced conflict, the country is chronically vulnerable to epidemics and food 

shortfalls. The social costs of war and 14 years without governance have been enormous. Somalia’s 

human development indicators are among the lowest in the world. Life expectancy is 47 years; the 

mortality rate for children under five is 224 per 1,000; primary school enrollment is less that 20 percent; 

and GNP per capita is $226. Chronic food insecurity and extraordinarily high malnutrition levels persist 

throughout the country, even in populations that are relatively food secure. Currently, around a quarter of 

the "under-five" population is experiencing levels of acute overall malnutrition and in parts of Gedo and 

Juba regions malnutrition rates are above 20 percent. 

While most of south-central Somalia displays high levels of criminality, sporadic armed conflict, lack of 

economic recovery, and population displacement, most of northern Somalia, by contrast, has experienced 

impressive political development and economic recovery, with substantial return and investment from the 

diaspora. The most successful of these regions is Somaliland which has completed a formal transition to 

elective democracy and now has in place a constitution that was overwhelmingly approved by popular 

referendum, democratically elected municipal governments, a president, and a parliament. Puntland has 

also made progress in peace and development and is in the process of moving towards local council 

elections. The impressive achievements of Somaliland and Puntland in ending conflict, professionalizing 

their security forces, removing weapons from public places, and moving ahead with democratization 

demonstrate that Somalis are capable of drawing on positive sources of resilience, making peace and 

turning to positive politics and business. These successes, albeit limited geographically could serve as a 

foundation and example for similar accomplishments elsewhere in the country. 

US national interests are clear: stability and security will not be achieved in the greater Horn of Africa 

region without putting an end to conflict and Somali support for extremism and terrorism. The paramount 

goal of US policy is to encourage the return of Somalia to the international community as a legitimate and 

reliable member that will not serve as a harbor for terrorism. The US and donor partners provide an 

alternative to extremism in Somalia through humanitarian assistance and support for long-term economic, 

social and democratic development, but these contributions are modest compared to the overwhelming 

needs. 

Donor Relations: The international community agreed in Stockholm in October 2004 that the UN should 

lead coordination and cooperation of the international community with respect to Somalia and with the 

TFG. A Declaration of Principles was approved and a Coordination and Monitoring Committee (CMC) 

was established. In addition, the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB), founded in the mid 1990s, 

continues to meet and address donor specific issues. It is envisioned that the SACB and CMC structures 

will merge, although a separate entity for coordination with Somaliland will need to be crafted. USAID will 

continue to be an active participant within the CMC and SACB and to provide support to the Secretariat 

serving both. 
4

At the request of the TFG and the international community, the United Nations and the World Bank have 

launched a Somali Joint Needs Assessment (JNA), in partnership with Somali counterparts. The JNA is 

currently underway and will lead to a Reconstruction and Development Program aimed at serving as a 

platform for Somali authorities and the international community to discuss and agree on priorities for 

support over the coming five years. The JNA is expected to lead to a donor’s conference to be held in 

2006 in Europe. 

Challenges: The current TFG split reflects deep and enduring fault-lines that were not properly 

addressed during the Nairobi peace talks in 2004. Friction between the leaders of the transitional federal 

institutions is exacerbated by their refusal to meet face-to-face, with the president and prime minister 

based in Jowhar, and the speaker of parliament and ministers based in Mogadishu. If the TFG were to 

move towards national unity, its biggest challenge will be establishment of its legitimacy, acceptance, and 

capacity to provide security and governance throughout Somalia. The TFG will need to carefully balance 

authority and power dynamics with regard to the regions of Puntland and Somaliland as well as bring into 

the fold various opposition leaders and potential spoilers. The TFG is faced with enormous hurdles and it 

remains to be seen whether this latest experience in government reestablishment will succeed. 

International efforts to restore central government to Somalia have generally been high-level, 

extraterritorial affairs, and “peace-building” on the ground has largely been left to Somali civic and 

traditional leaders with limited linkage to the high-level efforts. Decisions about control of economic 

infrastructure such as ports and airports, and the sharing of revenues between central and local 

governments are potentially explosive. Other issues such as demobilization and reintegration of militia 

and ex-combatants may be less politically charged but will require collaboration between state and local 

leadership. 

There continues to be a disturbing build-up in militia firepower and recruitment. This increased 

militarization of both sides results in a severely elevated threat of widespread violence in Somalia. An 

outbreak of armed conflict will have direct and widespread negative implications on food and livelihood 

security, one that may easily lead Somalia into a humanitarian crisis of the proportions experienced ten 

years ago that hit television screens across the world. This is compounded by the huge spate of piracy 

along the Somali coast that is restricting delivery of humanitarian assistance. 

The declining export earnings following a livestock ban imposed in September 2000 by countries in the 

Arabian Peninsula because of inadequate animal health control systems and certification procedures 

remains a concern. This has particularly affected the nomadic pastoral population that makes up 

approximately 44 percent of the Somali population. Another concern is the severe environmental 

degradation resulting from the combined effects of poverty and post-war breakdown of natural resource 

management that continues to dramatically undermine food security. While there are many cases of 

environmental degradation (e.g., fishing exploitation, water contamination, etc.), charcoal production 

(especially for export) is of particular concern due to the widespread deforestation of the main livestock 

fodder tree. 

P.L. 480 Title II Program 

PL 480 food resources make up the bulk of USAID's program in Somalia and contribute to USAID’s 

objective for improved infrastructure for productive services as well as USAID’s objective to target food 

aid at vulnerable groups. The majority of food assistance is targeted at the drought-affected population, 

where an estimated one million people are food insecure due to several consecutive years of drought and 

failed harvests, as well as continued conflict and displacement. CARE and WFP are our Title II 

implementing partners. 

Key Achievements: The FY 2005 USAID Somalia program recorded important achievements, despite an 

increasingly insecure environment that prohibited access to much of the country. 
5

1) Strengthened Civil Society: USAID continued to achieve impressive results through its support to Civil 

Society Organizations (CSOs) to improve institutional capacity and deliver services to selected 

communities, although modest funding enabled only program implementation in Somaliland. USAID met 

its targets through strengthening ten Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to better contribute to good 

governance in Somaliland by improving their institutional capacity and ability to deliver essential services 

to selected communities in collaboration with local authorities. Through the provision of sub-grants to 

eight CSOs, USAID improved maternal health and child survival in four communities in Awdal, Sahil and 

Togdheer regions of Somaliland. USAID influenced policy change through support to two umbrella 

organizations focused on public advocacy for greater democratic space and participation by women in the 

political arena and also focused on spearheading a campaign for the adoption of an NGO code of 

conduct by parliament. Through support to political party development in Somaliland, USAID 

contributed to successful parliamentary elections and enhanced the democratization process. USAID 

improved community-based reconciliation efforts throughout Somalia by supporting a multi-donor effort 

that engaged a broad cross-section of Somali people in public discussion and a range of conflict 

mitigation initiatives. 

2) Productive Livelihoods: This objective focused on basic education, urban water rehabilitation and 

developing alternative and renewable energy. Fifteen schools were rehabilitated, increasing enrollment 

by 648 students; and scholarships were provided to nineteen girls from three different regions of 

Somaliland to attend a teacher education college. School rehabilitation, coupled with water and health 

interventions were conducted in targeted communities, with the focus of encouraging parents to send girls 

to school, and the scholarship recipients to return to their respective communities to teach. A four-and-ahalf year urban water project that increased access to potable water for some 250,000 people was 

completed along with a study of alternate water sources for Hargeisa city that provided the Somaliland 

authorities with viable options for future water supply. To stimulate economic diversification, USAID 

promoted access to alternative and renewable energy technologies as well as safe, efficient use of 

conventional energy sources in northern Somalia. USAID support to marketing and technical services in 

the energy sector led to a total of $406,290 invested privately in the renewable energy sector, including 

$250,000 that was invested in the set up of a wind pump manufacturing plant in Hargeisa, Somaliland. 

These activities have stimulated investment, increased human resource capacity, and strengthened and 

developed local structures to manage and support both alternative and conventional energy resources. 

3) Humanitarian Assistance: USAID provided curative care including health education and monitoring in 

high-risk cholera outbreak zones which contributed to the prevention of an outbreak for the first time in 

ten years. USAID provided malnourished children with life-saving emergency nutritional support in areas 

acutely affected by chronic food insecurity, drought and conflict. Nutritional surveillance was 

strengthened through ongoing training and support at 150 health facilities throughout Somalia that led to 

better targeting of vulnerable groups. Through the rehabilitation of water supply systems, USAID 

provided 456,500 people in 177 rural communities in central and southern Somalia increased access to 

potable water. USAID supported the provision of emergency vaccinations to children under-five years of 

age to prevent the transmission of communicable childhood diseases. USAID improved the quality and 

availability of health care services by ensuring the timely delivery of essential drugs to maternal and child 

health centers; eighty nine percent of targeted health workers received drugs on time. 

Gender: Women are the focal point of provision of services to households, especially in times of conflict 

and crisis. Somali clan structure and practice often relegates women to a minor role in community 

deliberations about resources when nearly all policymakers and decision-makers may be men. This is an 

important constraint to effective design and implementation of development programs but also affects the 

delivery of emergency and humanitarian relief, especially where the targeted beneficiaries are women 

and children. 

USAID addressed gender concerns in its institutional strengthening to ensure that CSOs are gendersensitive in their internal organization and operation, and secondly, that CSOs programs are gender 

sensitive, have a positive impact on both genders, do no harm to any gender, and do not reinforce 

institutionalized gender-biased practices. USAID Somalia employed the following approaches to improve 

gender integration during institutional development for CSOs: targeting civil society organizations 
6

representing the interests of women, promoting women in leadership positions, and encouraging gender 

balance in positions of decision making. USAID provided CSOs with technical support in developing and 

implementing gender-sensitive programs, including M&E frameworks. USAID’s education program has a 

special emphasis on increasing opportunities for Somali girls and humanitarian assistance targets 

Somalis most vulnerable, which includes women and girls. 
7

FY 2006 Program 

SO: 649-007 Reinforce Congflict-Mitigation Capacity 

Mitigate Conflict and Support Peace 

Mitigate Conflict and Support Peace ($100,000 DA). USAID will provide funds to support the United 

Nation's multi-donor Somalia Coordination Secretariat which facilitates the development of policy and 

operational coordination for peace, reconciliation, and development activities. Support includes 

modalities to work with the emerging transitional government institutions. Principal contractors and 

grantees: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (prime). 

Strengthen Civil Society 

Strengthen Civil Society ($1,000,000 DA). USAID will reinforce the capacity of Somali civil society to 

provide basic social services as a means of promoting peace and mitigating conflict. Workshops and 

other events to encourage local communities to peacefully resolve problems rather than resorting to 

violence will also be held. USAID will provide training and small grants to grassroots civil society 

organizations to promote community development and will support civil society networks across the 

country to bolster civil society’s collaboration with existing local authorities with the aim of reducing the 

influence of violent extremism. USAID will target women and youth groups in its programming and will 

provide support for peace media. Principal contractors and grantees: CARE (prime) and others to be 

determined. 

Activities notified under this strategic objective are part of a new strategy statement that is pending 

approval. Should funding levels or activities included in this data sheet change substantially once the 

strategy statement is approved, a new notification will be submitted prior to the obligation of any funds. 

FY 2007 Program 

SO: 649-007 Reinforce Congflict-Mitigation Capacity 

Mitigate Conflict and Support Peace 

Mitigate Conflict and Support Peace ($100,000 DA). USAID will continue to provide funds to support the 

UNDP multi-donor Somalia Coordination Secretariat. Principal grantees and contractors: UNDP. 

Strengthen Civil Society 

Strengthen Civil Society ($1,471,000 DA). USAID will focus on the delivery of and accountability for 

social and economic development services and build the capacity of community leadership structures to 

effectively identify and monitor projects. USAID will continue to empower civil society to participate, 

accountably and transparently, in public decision-making. Institutional and leadership training and small 

grants to implement community-based development initiatives will be provided. USAID will target women 

and youth groups in its programming and will also provide support for polio prevention. USAID will 

strengthen media to emphasize tolerance and the peaceful resolution of conflict. Because of their long 

and rich oral tradition, Somalis are avid radio listeners, and radio broadcasts are the most effective 

means of reaching a largely illiterate population. The program will develop effective and broad-reaching 

radio programming and have a positive impact on promoting peace within Somalia. Principal contractors 

and grantees: CARE, UNDP (primes) and others to be determined. 

FY 2006 Program 

SO: 649-008 Improve Access to Essential Services 

Achieve Equitable Access to Quality Basic Education 
8

Achieve Equitable Access to Quality Basic Education ($945,000 DA). Education in a fragile state such as 

Somalia is an essential service that provides both short and long-term benefits. In the short-term 

providing education protects children, provides a stabilizing and positive force for families, and promotes 

conflict resolution. In the longer term, education equips children with basic skills and attitudes that will lay 

the foundations for Somalia’s social, political and economic development. USAID will implement 

innovative high quality radio education programs for primary school students and teachers in targeted 

areas of Somalia. Teacher training, curriculum development and programs to encourage girls to attend 

school will be undertaken. Principal contractors and grantees: Educational Development Center, Inc. 

(EDC) (prime). 

Activities notified under this strategic objective are part of a new strategy statement that is pending 

approval. Should funding levels or activities included in this data sheet change substantially once the 

strategy statement is approved, a new notification will be submitted prior to the obligation of any funds. 

FY 2007 Program 

SO: 649-008 Improve Access to Essential Services 

Achieve Equitable Access to Quality Basic Education 

Achieve Equitable Access to Quality Basic Education ($1,000,000 DA). USAID plans to improve access 

and quality of basic education through an innovative inter-active radio education program for primary 

school students and teachers in targeted areas of Somalia. USAID will undertake teacher training, 

curriculum development and programs to encourage girls to attend school. USAID will also improve 

access and quality through the rehabilitation of schools in targeted vulnerable communities, including the 

rehabilitation of water and sanitation facilities at schools. Principal contractors and grantees: Same as FY 

2006 and others to be determined. 
9

Results Framework 

649-004 Strengthened Capacity for Local Governance and Conflict Mitigation 

Program Title: Local Governance and Conflict Mitigation 

 IR 4.2: Increased Partnerships among Private sector, Public sector and Civil Society 

 IR 4.3: Enhanced Institutional Foundation for rule of Law 

 IR.4.1: Broader More effective Participation of Civil society Organizations in Local Governance 

649-005 Increased Opportunities for Productive Livelihoods 

Program Title: More Productive Livelihoods 

 IR 5.1: Improved Infrastructure and Services for Productive Enterprises 

 IR 5.2: Economic Targets of Opportunity Exploited 

 IR 5.3: Increased Productive Areas Where UXOs Are No Longer a Threat 

649-006 Critical Needs Met for Vulnerable Groups 

Program Title: Humanitarian Assistance 

 IR 6.1: Improved Quality and Availability of Health Care Services 

 IR 6.2: Increased access to Safe Water and Sanitation 

 IR 6.3: Effective Targeting and Delivery of Food Aid to Vulnerable Groups 

 IR 6.4: Improved Capacity for Disaster Preparedness and Response 

649-007 Reinforce Congflict-Mitigation Capacity 

Program Title: Reinforce Conflict-Mitigation Capacity 

 7.1: Strengthen civil society to promote peace, social and economic development and democratic 

governance 

 7.2: Strengthen the capacity of media to contribute to peace and good governance 

649-008 Improve Access to Essential Services 

Program Title: Improve Access to Essential Services 

 8.1: Improved access to quality basic education 

 8.2: Effective targeting and delivery of emergency assistance