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33–585 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 109–85]

THE IRREGULAR WARFARE ROADMAP

HEARING

BEFORE THE

TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND

CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HEARING HELD

SEPTEMBER 27, 2006

(II)

TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

SUBCOMMITTEE

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey, Chairman

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

JOE WILSON, South Carolina

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky

JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada

JEFF MILLER, Florida

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts

ADAM SMITH, Washington

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island

RICK LARSEN, Washington

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia

CYNTHIA MCKINNEY, Georgia

ALEX KUGAJEVSKY, Professional Staff Member

BILL NATTER, Professional Staff Member

BRIAN ANDERSON, Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2006

Page

HEARING:

Wednesday, September 27, 2006, The Irregular Warfare Roadmap ................... 1

APPENDIX:

Wednesday, September 27, 2006 ............................................................................ 23

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2006

THE IRREGULAR WARFARE ROADMAP

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Saxton, Hon. Jim, a Representative from New Jersey, Chairman, Terrorism,

Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee ................................. 1

Smith, Hon. Adam a Representative from Washington, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee ................................................. 2

WITNESSES

Mancuso, Mario, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict ................................. 4

Mannon, Brig. Gen. Otis G., Deputy Director, Special Operations, J–3, Joint

Staff, U.S. Air Force ............................................................................................. 7

Olson, Vice Adm. Eric T., Deputy Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Navy .................................................................................................. 3

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Mancuso, Mario ................................................................................................ 28

Mannon, Brig. Gen. Otis G. ............................................................................. 42

Olson, Vice Adm. Eric T. .................................................................................. 37

Saxton, Hon. Jim .............................................................................................. 27

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 53

(1)

THE IRREGULAR WARFARE ROADMAP

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 27, 2006.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:30 p.m., in room

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Saxton (chairman

of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SAXTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY, CHAIRMAN, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. SAXTON. The stenographer is ready, so if we could all take

our seats. The Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional

Threats and Capabilities meets today to discuss the Department of

Defense Irregular Warfare Roadmap. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, marked the engagement of the United States in

a very different form of warfare than has been the focus of strategic military planning during the Cold War. The global war on terror is defined by its long-term and irregular nature, and it requires

an approach that does not solely focus on conventional capabilities

or direct action missions to kill or capture terrorists and their supporters.

Recognizing the irregular nature of the global war on terror, the

Department of Defense is taking measures to adapt to this new

threat environment and to focus on building and improving our

military irregular warfare capability by expanding Special Operations Forces, shifting conventional forces toward irregular warfare

and significantly developing an Irregular Warfare Roadmap.

The roadmap will guide the implementation of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review recommendations as well as provide an important tool for the department to continue refinement of its approach to the global war on terror.

At the end of the hearing, we should walk away with a good understanding of where the Department of Defense is developing the

Irregular Warfare Roadmap, what impacts the roadmap will have

on policy, planning and research decisions and what operational activities and issues can be expected in the conduct of the irregular

warfare campaign.

As a committee, we must remain focused on the strategic objectives of this war, and irregular warfare will prove to be a deciding

factor in the global war on terror.

Today we have a great panel: Mr. Mancuso, Deputy Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Special Operations in Combating TerrorVerDate 22-MAR-2001 06:54 Sep 24, 2008 Jkt 033585 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\109-85\270260.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
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ism, Office of the Assistant Secretary For Defense of Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict; Vice Admiral Eric Olson, U.S.

Navy, Deputy Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command; and

Brigadier General O.G. Mannon, U.S. Air Force, Deputy Director,

Special Operations, Joint Staff.

We look forward to your testimony as we represent the key—as

you represent the key players in the development of the Irregular

Warfare Roadmap as well as those who will be most closely involved in the roadmap’s implementation.

Before I proceed, let me yield to the ranking member for—Mr.

Smith is the ranking member today.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Saxton can be found in the Appendix on page 27.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM

WASHINGTON, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. SMITH. Sitting in for Mr. Meehan who had a family situation

to deal with today, so I appreciate the opportunity, and I thank the

Chairman and join him in welcoming our witnesses and look forward to their testimony.

Particularly I want to thank the Chairman for having the hearing on this incredibly important subject. It is titled irregular warfare, but at this point, it is pretty much regular warfare for us. It

is what we are doing now in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere

and learning how to deal with all that entails is critical to our victory in the war on terror. And as with all warfare, it is always different than the last one. It is just a matter of how it is different.

So learning those differences I think is critically important, and

it is worth saying that, at this point, we still have work to do, without question. We have not had the success we would even have

liked in Iraq or even Afghanistan and elsewhere, so we need to continue to learn lessons and move forward and get better at it to understand the dynamics of the irregular warfare that we face.

And with that said, I am very confident that we can figure it out

as a Nation. We have met many new challenges, things we didn’t

expect. That is the normal way of life, unfortunately. Things come

that you didn’t expect. It is a matter of how quickly you change

and adapt to them in order to deal with the new challenges, and

that is what the military and our country faces right now in dealing with the brand of warfare that we face.

It is going to be a very long war. We need to figure out the new

dynamics, adapt and do our best to contend with them. I am confident that we will.

I will look forward to hearing from our witnesses and asking

questions as well to learn how we are doing and how we can do

better. I have a longer statement for the record which I will submit, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SAXTON. Without objection. Thank you very much, Mr.

Smith.

Admiral, the floor is yours sir.

3

STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. ERIC T. OLSON, DEPUTY COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, U.S. NAVY

Admiral OLSON. Sir, I have submitted a statement for the record.

With your permission, I will not read that but instead make a few

separate comments regarding irregular warfare. I think it is important that we understand what irregular warfare is, in part at least,

and what it is not.

So I will focus my opening remarks on that.

Chairman Saxton, Congressman Smith and distinguished members, I am pleased to be here before you today. I am pleased to join

my colleagues, General Mannon and Mr. Mancuso, in doing so.

Irregular warfare is a relatively new term. It is without doctrinal

history in the Department of Defense lexicon. The working definition of irregular warfare, which we will discuss today, was approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense during the development

of the Irregular Warfare Roadmap, which is still a work in

progress.

The key words in the working definition of irregular warfare are

that irregular warfare is a form of warfare. It is not a list of units

that conduct irregular warfare. It is not a list of capabilities for irregular warfare. It is not a list of weapons systems for irregular

warfare.

Instead, it is more an approach. It is a set of activities. It is what

we do with the capability and with the units and the systems, not

those things themselves.

Irregular warfare does include aspects of insurgency and counter

insurgency, guerrilla warfare, unconventional warfare asymmetrical warfare and much more. There can be irregular warfare activities conducted in a regular or a major warfare campaign. Irregular warfare activities may include direct action and indirect action

approaches.

But irregular warfare is certainly not just about a range of military actions or military options. One tends to think about irregular

warfare as something other than direct force-on-force confrontation

between uniformed armies extending to other less kinetic actions

by the Department of Defense, and that is true.

But it is also important to know that irregular warfare activities

include many of those activities that are squarely in the domain of

other agencies of our government and in the domain of coalition

forces and coalition nations in a global campaign.

Irregular warfare is clearly bigger than the Department of Defense, and although the Department of Defense (DOD) does have

a key role in leading and conducting many irregular warfare activities, it is certainly not confined to DOD. And even within the Department of Defense, irregular warfare is much bigger than the

United States Special Operations Command, although United

States Special Operations Command has a history and a culture

and a maturity of thought and actions that make Special Operations Command uniquely suited to leading Defense Department

efforts in many of the areas of irregular warfare.

The nine core activities of Special Operations Forces have significant overlap with the activities of an irregular warfare campaign,

those being: counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;

combating terrorism; direct-action special reconnaissance; unconVerDate 22-MAR-2001 06:54 Sep 24, 2008 Jkt 033585 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\109-85\270260.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
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ventional warfare; foreign internal defense; civil affairs; psychological operations; and informational operations; and synchronizing

Department of Defense activities for the global war on terror. But

irregular warfare activities, of course, include activities beyond the

range of Special Operations activities.

And just to be clear, the Irregular Warfare Roadmap that we are

addressing today is not a campaign plan or a guiding document for

the global war on terror. It does not lay out the Department of Defense’s total approach to irregular warfare. It is one of eight roadmaps under development, some of which have been approved and

some not yet, that will serve as implementing documents to follow

through on decisions made during the Quadrennial Defense Review. And the real purpose of the irregular warfare is to provide

resourcing guidance to the services and the Special Operations

Command within the Department of Defense as we go forward to

implement the QDR decisions.

It represents a sub set of the universe of irregular warfare activity and, again, remains a work in progress.

Sir, that concludes my opening remarks.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Olson can be found in the

Appendix on page 37.]

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much. Secretary Mancuso can we

get your remarks next please? Thanks and thank you for being.

STATEMENT OF MARIO MANCUSO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND COMBATING TERRORISM, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOWINTENSITY CONFLICT

Secretary MANCUSO. Thank you. It is my pleasure, sir.

Chairman Saxton, Congressman Smith and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting us here today to

present you with an update on where the Department of Defense

is regarding irregular warfare.

As the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) stated, the

United States is involved in a long war. This war is irregular in

its nature, and our enemies are not traditional conventional military forces but rather dispersed global terrorist networks that exploit Islam to advance radical political ends.

Three factors have intensified the danger of this irregular war

challenge: the rise of virulent extremist ideologies; the absence of

effective governance in many areas of the world; and the potential

of these enemies to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

Irregular warfare is a form of warfare and has a long history.

Unlike traditional warfare, which focuses on defeating an adversary’s military forces, the focus of irregular warfare is on the legitimacy of the relevant political authority.

Irregular warfare favors indirect approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other elements of national power

to erode an adversary’s power, influence and will.

Irregular warfare will likely be the dominant force of conflict our

Nation faces over the next two decades. The global war on terror

and irregular war in the most fundamental sense will require the

U.S. military to adopt nontraditional and indirect approaches.

5

And while we must maintain our ability to deal with traditional

threats, our Armed Forces must rebalance to adjust to this changing national security environment. Our experience thus far on the

war on terrorism underscores the need to reorient our military

forces to be able to project power through indirect approaches on

a global scale and for an indefinite period.

The future security environment will challenge traditional U.S.

advantages. The U.S. and its partners are likely to face state and

non-state adversaries that employ irregular warfare as their primary form of warfare. Strategic policy and operational and other

factors may preclude and constrain our Armed Forces from conducting conventional military campaigns against them. This problem will be exacerbated by nuclear-armed hostile states with sophisticated anti-access capabilities that may preclude direct military options.

These situations will require or favor an-all-of-government effort,

including an irregular military approach using indirect and often

nontraditional methods and means to achieve U.S. strategic objectives.

Moreover, even when the use of direct conventional military confrontation is feasible, the U.S. Government may seek the use of indirect approaches instead. The offensive use of irregular warfare

will likely become an increasingly attractive strategic option and

preferred form of warfare for the United States to meet its challenges and achieve its objectives.

Our Armed Forces will therefore require sufficient capability and

capacity to wage protracted irregular warfare on a regional and

global scale and for an indefinite period. The U.S. has a long history of waging irregular warfare. But our experience has been on

limited engagements for limited periods of time, normally in association with conventional military operations.

What differentiates irregular warfare from more conventional

warfare is its emphasis on the use of irregular forces generally and

the other indirect nonconventional methods and means to subvert,

attrite and exhaust an adversary or render him irrelevant to the

host population rather than on defeating him through direct means

on the battlefield.

Unlike conventional warfare, irregular warfare is an armed political struggle for control or influence over and the support of an indigenous population.

The President’s recently released National Strategy for Combating Terrorism provides the vision for defeating terrorism and winning this kind of war. The war on terrorism is both a battle of arms

and a battle of ideas.

This war will require us to meet and fight our terrorist enemies

in the irregular warfare battle space while promoting freedom and

human dignity as alternatives to the terrorist ideology of oppression and totalitarian rule.

The strategy will require the application and integration of all

elements of national power and influence. The military must be

resourced to rebalance the force to permit victory in this type of

war. Specifically, we must improve the capability of our general

purpose forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations and to partVerDate 22-MAR-2001 06:54 Sep 24, 2008 Jkt 033585 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\109-85\270260.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
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ner with and train foreign forces to defeat insurgencies and terrorist organizations.

Our Special Operations Forces must also rebalance to devote a

greater degree of effort to counterterrorism operations, defeating

terrorist networks and combating the threat of weapons of mass

destruction (WMD) proliferation.

The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism

describes the approach the Department of Defense will take to fulfill its role within the larger national strategy for combating terrorism and provides the Secretary of Defense’s strategic framework for

the application of the military instrument of national power in the

global war on terror.

This plan established six military strategic objectives to permit

development of the Defense Department’s campaign plan for the

global war on terror. The six objectives are and remain: denying

terrorists the resources they need to operate and survive; enabling

partner nations to counter terrorist threats; denying weapons of

mass destruction technology to our enemies and increasing our capacity for consequence management; defeating terrorist organizations and networks; countering state and non-state support for terrorism in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies and

partner nations; and countering ideological support for terrorism.

As noted in the 2005 QDR, the Department of Defense must rebalance its forces to support the National Military Strategic Plan.

The Department of Defense has established an aggressive time

line for implementing the approximately 30 tasks over the next

year in order to improve our ability to conduct irregular warfare,

known as the Irregular Warfare Roadmap, as Admiral Olson mentioned. The focus of this roadmap is enhancing irregular warfare

capabilities and capacities throughout the entire Department. A

companion effort entitled, Building Partnership Capacity Roadmap,

addresses interagency and multinational initiatives related to irregular warfare.

Both of these roadmaps are complemented by the Department of

Defense directive 3000.05 which directs the Department to improve

its capabilities to conduct stability operations.

The Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap has begun to provide

senior leadership with a mechanism to advance high-priority issues

for decision through the fiscal year 2008 to 2013 Defense program.

The roadmap will transform the department through the implementation of five major initiatives: one, changing the way we manage people necessary to support irregular warfare; two, rebalancing

our general purpose forces to better support irregular warfare;

three, increasing our Special Operations Forces capabilities and capacity to support irregular warfare; four, increasing our capacity to

conduct counter network operations; and five, redesigning our joint

and service education and training programs to conduct irregular

warfare.

The assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and

low intensity conflict is fully committed to supporting the Irregular

Warfare Roadmap and identifying and addressing capability and

capacity shortfalls related to irregular warfare in coordination with

U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Joint Staff.

7

In addition, we are identifying and requesting assistance to address legal authorities related to irregular warfare specifically section 2067 and section 1208 of Title 10 which provides the legal authority for U.S. military personnel to train and equip foreign forces

supporting the war on terrorism.

Throughout our history, U.S. Military Forces, Active Duty, Reserves and National Guard, have adapted to engage new threats to

our Nation.

The 2005 QDR identified the capability and capacity shortfalls

that must be addressed to meet the full range of challenges to the

United States, irregular, conventional, disruptive and catastrophic.

The Irregular Warfare Roadmap in particular represents a concerted effort to transform how we manage and train our forces and

to rebalance our general purpose forces and Special Operations

Forces to meet the irregular warfare challenge.

Chairman Saxton, Congressman Smith, distinguished members,

thank you again for your interest in and support of our irregular

warfare initiatives. I am honored to appear before you today, before

this distinguished committee, and at the appropriate time, I would

be happy and delighted to answer your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Mancuso can be found in

the Appendix on page 28.]

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Secretary thank you, very much.

General, the floor is yours sir.

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. OTIS G. MANNON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, SPECIAL OPERATIONS, J–3, JOINT STAFF, U.S. AIR

FORCE

General MANNON. Good afternoon, and thank you, Chairman

Saxton. Chairman Saxton, Congressman Smith, distinguished

Committee members. Thank you for inviting us here today to

present you with additional information concerning the Irregular

Warfare Roadmap.

For most of the 20th century, we knew who our enemies were

and where they lived. They had armies, navies and air forces to attack with recognized capitals and populations to put at risk. However, in the 21st century, as we have already alluded to, we face

a different enemy, an enemy defined by a complex network of ideologically driven extremists who will attempt to engage us not only

far away from our shores but at home as well.

Future efforts in the long war on terror include many operations

characterized by irregular warfare, operations in which the enemy

is not a regular military force of a nation-state. As we are all

aware, we are engaged in a global conflict, and our efforts confronting the enemy must also be global in nature. These operations will

occur on multiple fronts and cannot be limited to primarily military

activities.

The Department of Defense’s 2006 QDR describes the Department’s efforts to shift emphasis from a focus on major conventional

combat operations to multiple irregular operations.

Secretary Rumsfeld emphasized the QDR was not in itself an end

state; particular emphasis will continue in several critical areas

through the development of following roadmaps.

8

The purpose of the Irregular Warfare Roadmap is to facilitate

implementation of 2006 QDR decisions regarding DOD capabilities

and capacity to conduct and support protracted irregular warfare.

The Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap converts the broad

policy objectives established during the QDR into actionable tasks.

It also provides the Department’s senior leadership with a mechanism to advance high-priority irregular warfare issues for program

decisions through the fiscal year 2008–2013 Future Years Defense

Program as well as establishing an oversight and management

process for implementing irregular warfare initiatives.

The execution roadmap addresses the need to develop an increased capabilities and capacities throughout the Department by

grouping lists in five broad subject areas of reliance of operation.

Mr. Mancuso referred to those five areas, so I will not repeat those

at this point.

Today, we must cope not only with the threats produced by the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology

among nation-states but also with threats posed by individual terrorists and terrorist networks with global reach.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review was a crucial step forward in addressing the challenges posed by these new threats. By

providing a method for continuous assessment and refinement, the

Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap serves as a primary means

for implementing those forward-thinking decisions.

Chairman Saxton, committee members, thank you for your interest in and support of the Department’s Irregular Warfare Roadmap. We stand here ready to answer your questions.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Mannon can be found in the

Appendix on page 42.]

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, General.

Let me just take care of a little housekeeping item here. After

consultation with the minority, I now ask unanimous consent that

Mr. Taylor, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, be

allowed to participate in today’s subcommittee hearing and be authorized to question witnesses. Mr. Taylor will be recognized at the

conclusion of the questions by members of the subcommittee.

Thank you.

Mr. Smith, would you like to lead off?

Mr. SMITH. Certainly. Thank you. I appreciate the information.

I am most interested in getting down to some of the specifics in

terms of how all of this is working in the various places we are trying to deploy, obviously more in Iraq and Afghanistan, our two

most prominent places. And we are struggling in both in varying

degrees in terms of reducing violence and getting a stable government in place and, frankly, winning support of the people broadly

in both of those countries for support of those governments. You

can disagree with that assessment if you like.

But if you don’t, how are we doing? How can we do better? How

can we get to the point where we start to see success in Iraq, and

I guess the other important question overarching all of this is,

what is the metric of success? Because that is something that, as

a policy maker, I am wrestling with now, is we have 140,000 U.S.

troops in Iraq.

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How are they making the situation better? There hasn’t been a

lot of evidence of that, frankly, in the last, well, certainly year,

maybe longer. And if not, you know, that certainly shows some

weaknesses in what we can do.

Is there a way to change it to start having more success? To boil

that all down, what is the measure of success focusing on Iraq and

Afghanistan? Why haven’t we done better, you know, hitting those

metrics? And what is the plan to get there, to get to the point? And

overarching all of that is my assumption that success is, you know,

having a stable government that you know is at least not directly

hostile to us.

If you can take a stab at that and how unconventional warfare

is playing out and how we can do better at it, that would be very

helpful.

Secretary MANCUSO. Sir, thank you for the question.

To begin with, what I would like to say is the Irregular Warfare

Roadmap is more broadly about how we can get better and how we

can institutionalize some of the best practices. So as we think

about the roadmap, it is not tied to—it is certainly not tied to Iraq

and Afghanistan directly, nor is it tied to any particular operation.

It is tied really to the future and our ambitions for it.

Mr. SMITH. Certainly, and I understand that. But that is indicative. And I don’t wish to limit it just to that; I think it does have

those broad applications that you mentioned, but getting into the

specific helps us understand better how it is going to apply elsewhere.

Secretary MANCUSO. Yes, sir. But in one sense, it is tied in a

very important way, and that is the best practices that we have developed; the insights that our troops on the ground have developed

in fighting a protracted irregular warfare in places like Iraq and

Afghanistan have been folded up into our process as we think

about it.

So in that sense, Iraq and Afghanistan, not only are they important missions in and of themselves, but they are important classrooms. And I don’t mean to diminish those missions by describing

them as such for the future as the Department builds up its capability and capacity to do that.

But to get to your metric of success, clearly a free, democratic

and secure Iraq is important. We believe we are making very, very

good progress. Clearly, it is a difficult mission. But in terms of the

broader metrics and how we succeed in the global war on

terror——

Mr. SMITH. Focus on the progress piece of that; where we are

making very, very good progress, that would be a good place to go

for metrics. What is the metrics of your assessment of that

progress? Where is it that this is getting better; that is getting better? What is the progress you discussed specifically?

Secretary MANCUSO. Sir, I am not sure I am the best person

equipped to talk about Iraq generally. I have a fairly narrow—an

important but narrow portfolio on our counterterrorism Special Operations. So I would be happy to go into that. I could take that

question for the record and get back to you.

Mr. SMITH. That would be helpful. Yes, that would be helpful if

you can do that.

10

Secretary MANCUSO. Yes, I would certainly do that. Thank you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 53.]

Mr. SMITH. I thought you were going to go into some of those

metrics for success.

Secretary MANCUSO. I can do that.

Our strategic end state is essentially impacting our enemy’s ability to act globally and catastrophically—the enemy, as I use it, is

al Qaeda and the affiliated movement—and to ensure that its ability to act locally in venues is outweighed by the capacity and willingness of our partners to defeat them.

That sounds grand, and it sounds nebulous, but we are well on

the way of breaking up a global threat, emulsifying it, if you will,

and then focusing in on our partners and allies in equipping them

and ensuring that they are equipped to defeat the local threat, to

keep it contained. That is the strategic end state. Are we there yet?

No, we are not.

But we are making progress as we are engaged throughout the

world and throughout the entire global war on terror.

Mr. SMITH. Admiral, General, if either one of you had anything

to add to that?

Admiral OLSON. Sir, I think you have honed in very quickly on

the somewhat nebulous nature of irregular warfare. The desired

end state is an environment that is inhospitable to terrorism and

terrorist activity.

And there are different approaches to getting there that will

have different measures of success. Clearly, in terms of the direct

approach, that being disrupting terrorist activity and preventing

the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction, I think the

metrics of effectiveness of a terrorist network clearly would show

success.

We are aware of the removal, either by death or capture, of several of the leaders of al Qaeda in Iraq. We are aware that their infrastructure has been disrupted to the point that it is less effective

over time.

But the longer-term actions that will ultimately be decisive in a

terrorist campaign, those being partner issues, nation capacity, an

atmosphere, an environment that does not provide tacit or active

support to terrorist activity, the metrics for those are a little bit,

are quite a bit different. And in some ways, the direct action activities do not support and in some cases may even work against the

metrics of the indirect approach.

Mr. SMITH. Absolutely. Let me take one final stab.

I appreciate your forbearance, Mr. Chairman.

Sort of getting the population on your side is one of the key parts

of irregular warfare. You know then they are cooperating with you

when it is no longer popular to be an insurgent. You sort of—

hearts and minds, not to be cliche. But that is what we are talking

about. And that is where, when I look at what has happened in

Iraq and to a lesser extent in Afghanistan, I wouldn’t be happy

with the outcome if I was you—and I am not happy with the outcome being me—it seems like we haven’t done a lot of, you know,

we haven’t had a lot of success in terms of getting the population

to believe that we are the good guys and the guys we are fighting

11

are the bad guys. And that is where you get into the irregular aspect of it. That is where you get beyond, okay, there is a bunch of

terrorists, we have to go blow them up; to, how do we work with

the population to get them to see that we are working in a more

positive direction? We haven’t been terribly successful at that. I am

going to try one more time to try to drag you into the specific here

because I would think that, given what you do learning specific lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan, would be right at the top of the

list in understanding how to do better both there and elsewhere.

So in terms of getting the population to see us as the better, we

have not done that very well. What have we learned in terms of

how we can do that better, either there or elsewhere?

Admiral OLSON. I will take that first, sir. I couldn’t tell who you

were addressing that to.

Mr. SMITH. Any one of the three of you that thinks he has a good

and answer is fine, so.

Admiral OLSON. I think the attitude of the people, particularly

in Iraq but not only in Iraq, depends to a large degree on the stability of the environment in which they live.

The stability of the environment in which they live is largely determined by the development, the effectiveness of an Iraqi government, self rule, and the training and effectiveness of Iraqi police

and military units so that they can ensure stability and safety in

the populace.

Those are longer-term efforts than capturing and killing terrorists. And as those efforts are underway with, in a robust way with

great vigor, we are still in a situation where we need to capture

and kill a certain number of violent extremist organization leaders.

And I think it is undeniable that the activities in the direct action approach may work against some of the activities in the indirect approach and then, therefore, create an environment that,

again, where the metrics of the direct approach are more easily

measurable than the metrics in the indirect approach.

Clearly, we understand that—the lessons learned are that stability contributes to success. So the efforts are to create a stable environment, and that is occurring in many ways.

There are partner nation-building activities across Iraq and Afghanistan that will ultimately be decisive in the global war on terror.

Secretary MANCUSO. Congressman Smith, I would like to add

something. You described Iraq. In many—first, what I would like

to say is, I am not sure I agree with your assessment of how the

local population feels toward U.S. forces. That is not to say that the

situation is not complex. But I think it is highly variable depending

clearly upon who you talk to and what part of the country you are

in. But in that respect, that entire debate is off stage left because

in terms of an irregular warfare paradigm, what is most important

is not what the Iraqis think of us but what they think of their own

government, a sovereign government of Iraq that is in the process

of standing up—that has stood up but is in the process of maturing

versus those who would destroy that government. And I think in

this complex battle, it is clear that the Iraqi people have a greater

faith in their government. But to underscore something that AdmiVerDate 22-MAR-2001 06:54 Sep 24, 2008 Jkt 033585 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\109-85\270260.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
12

ral Olson said, stability is key. And that is the variable that will

be decisive over the longer term.

And it is our contention that as the government matures, as it

is better able to provide security, that that internal dynamic between the insurgency and the government to state it very, very succinctly, that dynamic will improve in favor of a free, democratic

and secure Iraq.

In terms of what we have learned from the dynamic, we really

learned that the world is a complex place; that irregular warfare

clearly favors indirect approaches, which is precisely why, wherever possible, we work with the host nation. We work with partner

countries because it is their country. They know it better, and it

just works better.

Mr. SAXTON. We are going to go to Mr. Hayes in just a minute,

but on the way there, one aspect of indirect warfare is training people to be our partners. And I wonder if whoever wants to take this

question could just comment on our progress in carrying out the

mission of getting, particularly in Iraq but perhaps also in Afghanistan, the indigenous people trained up. We hear numbers. Sometimes we hear some assessments.

What is your assessment of how we are doing with regard to the

Iraqi military and the Iraqi police force?

Secretary MANCUSO. Sir, I don’t have the most recent numbers.

The last time I checked, the general trend was positive. It was not

going as quickly as we would like, but we were generally on schedule. I can get back with the specific response, and we will get numbers to you. And we can take that for the record.

Admiral OLSON. I don’t have specific numbers either, but I think

we can generally feel pretty good about the training activity that

is taking place and its effectiveness. I will say that it may not be

going as quickly as we would have hoped, but I don’t think we

knew how quickly we should expect it to go.

But we are nonstop working very closely with selected Iraqi

forces and of course, the forces of the Army and the Marine Corps

mostly, but all services are also working with Iraq and Afghanistan

on a much larger scale than we are. It is just a different segment

of the force.

And I think, anecdotally but also measurably, we have shifted in

many areas, many locations, those forces with which we have

worked the longest; we have shifted from leading them on the target to following them on the target. We have shifted from planning

their operations to watching them plan their own operations. And

so the members of Special Operations—which I can address specifically—who are out there doing that, they are proud of what they

are doing, and they feel—they believe that they have good reason

to think that the Iraqis in particular and the Afghanis are showing

great success over time.

General MANNON. Sir, one other lesson that we have learned

that may be a valid point here is the fact that the ability of the

United States Military to train and equip indigenous forces, that

we need the help of the interagency community, and we outstrip

their ability to support us. So that is one of the lessons that we

found and that the Irregular Warfare Roadmap intends to at least

improve on so that we can move forward faster.

13

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

Mr. Hayes.

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for being here.

Admiral, following up on Mr. Smith’s question, which was certainly a good one, could you describe for us the conditions in

Fallujah today and Fallujah a year or 18 months ago? I think there

is dramatic progress that has occurred there. I can’t describe it too

accurately, but if you are familiar, status now versus status back

then, Admiral Olson.

Admiral OLSON. Sir, I would rather take that for the record. I

haven’t been to Fallujah lately. I would be reporting second- or

third-hand information, and therefore, in the in the interests of

being accurate, I would like to confirm that with people who I

think would give a better report.

Mr. HAYES. Fair enough. I don’t want to put you on the spot, but

I know there are dramatic changes from—significant stability has

occurred there or is what is happening there versus the extreme instability not that long ago. It is difficult—people at home, people

in Washington, they want a yard stick. They want to be able to

measure where are we on the yard stick. It is so hard to do. Again,

going forward, people, even though we here get to see and hear

things that are extremely reassuring, anything you all can do to

help us get the message out clearly and accurately that progress

being made, and it is difficult. You have the challenge of—we don’t

do body counts. I think that is wise, but again, kind of a hypothetical but actual situation when we were in control of the southern part of Afghanistan; I was over there recently; been there a

number of times. U.S. Forces view the enemy and General Boykin

refers to the enemy as a worldwide insurgency. It is not just a localized insurgency. What the insurgents have done against U.S.

Forces because of their capabilities is to embed themselves anywhere they can and hide in the civilian population; Baghdad,

places like that.

Is there a significance to the fact, again looking for a sign of

progress, that once the U.S. Forces turned over that part of Afghanistan to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), all of a

sudden the tactics at least temporary changed where significant

forces came out in the open and chose to engage our coalition partners, NATO, as opposed to really sticking with the insurgency as

long as we were there. That seems to me to be again a sign of

where we are and where we are going. They have done that. They

have been countered successfully.

Is it positive? Is it constructive? To comment on that, General

Mannon or Admiral Olson.

General MANNON. Sir, in a general statement, I would say that

with regard to your question concerning Afghanistan and the transition, the enemy has reacted like all enemies during that transition period and attempted to exploit a perceived seam. As a result

of that, we have had reasonable success in the—again, not getting

to a body count—but in pursuing the enemy, by supporting our coalition forces through air power, and we have been able to turn that

back around, and we have also seen some indications at this level

14

that they may be changing the way in which they want to approach

the fight in Afghanistan.

Mr. HAYES. Admiral Olson, comment, again this is from having

been there with Ray, talking to General Richardson of NATO, who

is anxious to get in the fight; it is good news, want us to maintain

the assets, air, to support them, and they have done a very good

job. Seems like the enemy changed their tactics. Now they are

going back because of the success being had there, and not to say

it is not a tough fight.

Admiral OLSON. Sir, the circle of operation against the terrorist

threat is to isolate the threat, defeat the threat and then prevent

the reemergence of that threat. I think we have been successful in

many places in isolating the threat and defeating the threat where

we have isolated it. Preventing the reemergence of it is a continuous effort. And we will see flare ups in different regions where we

see a reemergence of the threat which we need to isolate and then

defeat it again.

We see that in Anbar province in Iraq. We see it a little bit in

Oruzgan province in Afghanistan. And it is so thus far that is why

I was uncomfortable upfront speaking with confidence because I

don’t know exactly where we are in this reemergence of the threat.

When we—when we defeat the threat, we often don’t know that we

have defeated it forever.

So it requires continuous pressure in some of these areas.

Obviously, we have reason to feel good about success in Fallujah

today. It is a much more stable environment than it was a year

ago, as you alluded.

What I don’t know well enough is what the potential for reemergence for a threat is in Fallujah and how much we are going to be

able to shift our focus into other regions, sir.

Mr. HAYES. I think I see a red light, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

I will——

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And Mr. Mancuso, are we going to expect to see in the 2008

budget proposal some language from you all regarding section 1206

and 1208 of title 10?

Secretary MANCUSO. We expect that language, yes. The answer

is, yes.

Mr. LARSEN. For something more long-term as opposed to, we

usually end up getting filed in appropriations as opposed to over

here in authorization.

Secretary MANCUSO. We can get back to you.

Mr. LARSEN. But we should expect to see language, some language?

Secretary MANCUSO. 1206 and 1208, that is correct, sir.

Mr. LARSEN. Are we also going to see in the 2008 budget proposal some specific initiatives to reflect the five principles that are

laid out in your testimony, and, Major—I am sorry, General

Mannon’s testimony?

Secretary MANCUSO. Sir, there are specific initiatives, but they

are internal. Once again, these execution roadmaps are guidance

internal to the Department except with regard to building partnerVerDate 22-MAR-2001 06:54 Sep 24, 2008 Jkt 033585 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\109-85\270260.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
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ship capacity, which partly relates to the Department but more importantly relates outward in the interagency and multinationally.

But those initiatives will be internal to us.

But the end state will be to improve the capability and the capacity for us and the interagency——

Mr. LARSEN. We will look at the 2008 budget proposal which is

the first year the 2008 to 2013 fit up the year that you talked

about, how are we going to be able to assess next February when

we do the budget whether or not the budget proposal is reflecting

this, reflecting the roadmap?

Secretary MANCUSO. Excuse me.

Mr. LARSEN. Stop the clock, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary MANCUSO. I have just been told by my subject matter

expert here—excuse me—what will be reflected is a request for authority which is what I referenced but not a request for additional

funding. To the extent that IW issues will be addressed, they will

be addressed internally inside the Department and will not otherwise be reflected in the budget document.

Mr. LARSEN. I understand that, and I guess I will make a point,

Mr. Chairman, that if we are going to continue to show some interest in this as a committee, we probably want to show some interest

in the internal discussions of the Department to be sure that stays

on track as well and reflective of the kinds of interest we have here

on committee.

The—seems to me, moving forward, on Irregular Warfare Roadmap, your definitions have to be pretty firm. And General Mannon,

on page 3 of your testimony, on the bottom you say, increasingly

sophisticated irregular methods, such as terrorism and insurgency,

challenge U.S. security interests.

And I guess for you, General, and for you, Admiral, how are you

going to pick which—I had a couple of questions. How do we pick

which terrorists to engage? How do we pick which insurgencies to

care about? And are you going to aggressively fight within the

DOD bureaucracy to ensure that we have an accurate definition of

what a terrorist is and what an insurgency is, because not all terrorists are insurgents and not all insurgents are terrorists? And it

seems to me the definition of what these folks are will have a very

important impact on what you do and where we send you.

General, you are first. I will decide for you.

General MANNON. Thank you. Sir, we have, for approximately 4

months now since the roadmap was signed and released with the

proposed definition, we have worked between SOCOM, the Interagency and Office of the Secretary of Defense to address where to

put our efforts, our priority of efforts based on intelligence assessments as well as operational assessments of how to tie all the proper pieces together, the various interagency pieces, to go forward

and to take our limited assets and put them where they need to

be placed.

So we are not completely there yet, but we have made some reasonable progress in my estimation with regard to a listing of or a

priority of effort in various areas of the world as well as various

organizations.

Mr. LARSEN. Admiral, do you have any comments with regard to

how we define, how we put a definition on these two terms? Or are

16

there other terms we may use when we make decisions about

where we send our folks?

Admiral OLSON. Sir, the terms are being defined. Some of them

are doctrinally defined already. Terms like irregular warfare, we

have a working definition; I assume that that or something very

close to it will become the doctrinal definition before long.

In the meantime, we have a fairly sophisticated process for rank

ordering, you know, the priority of efforts for the Department of

Defense with respect to the global war on terror. Under the global

war on terror campaign plan, there is a complex matrix by which

countries, regions are identified for resourcing efforts, some of them

because they are nations with adversaries, some because they are

partner nations with which we want to develop a stronger relationship and build more capacity.

This list is recommended by Special Operations Command

through the Joint Staffs of the Department of Defense for approval.

And once that list is approved, then it becomes a factor in

prioritizing the resourcing effort.

I feel pretty good about the level of sophistication of the list. I

feel pretty good about the fidelity of the list. I feel pretty good

about how much in concert that list seems to be within DOD and

across the interagency environment. And it is a driver for application of resources in 2008 and beyond.

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Chairman, if I could make two points and conclude time. Thank you.

The first point I want to make is with regards to Iraq. It seems

the terms terrorist and insurgents get interchanged quite a bit.

And the insurgency is something that is very much homegrown.

The terrorism is something that is very much the foreign fighter.

They may use the same tactics, but their goals end up being very

different. And how we approach them may be the same, but they

have very different goals in mind, and so what we end up doing

with them in the end may have an impact on what happens in

Iraq, good or bad. I am just trying to make a point that we have

to be discerning in how we approach these. And I want to hear

from you that we are being discerning.

The second point I want to make about the government in Iraq

is that, yes, there are folks who want to take that government

down, including some of the people in the government. This whole

fight over federalism in Iraq is in part a fight about whether or not

to have a centralized government in Iraq or to have three governments in Iraq. And we are spending, our military is spending time

in Iraq keeping the country from falling apart, and our State Department is spending all this time trying to keep that government

together in one piece. And that is where we are spending so much

time focusing on those things that we can’t focus on getting the

other things done in Iraq that we need to get done.

General MANNON. Congressman Larsen, let me make explicit

what I hope was implicit: We are discerning in terms of our strategies with respect to sort of the homegrown component of the insurgency versus al Qaeda-affiliated, for lack of a better term, terrorists.

And that clearly is fully accounted for. We think about it all the

time.

17

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you. I haven’t asked my questions yet, but,

Gene, if you want to go ahead; I am going to be a bit longer, so

why don’t you go ahead.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank our witnesses.

Couple of things I would like clarification from, particularly since

one of the many things our special operators do is understand the

hearts and minds of people who are on our side, the people who

might be on our side and the people who aren’t on our side.

And I think it is kind of in the lessons learned category not only

for this conflict but for future conflicts. Let’s start with the palaces.

I have had a special operator tell me early on that he just thought

that the American occupation of the palaces was just incredibly

counterproductive; that those palaces had come to be associated

with evil because they were part of the Hussein network. And

when you move into that palace, you get associated with that evil.

And as you think about it, as we watched the polling shift of the

Iraqis coming to think of us at first as liberators but then later on

as occupiers, to what extent does the occupation by General Casey

of the water palace and I guess the 4th Infantry Division (ID) from

time to time has stayed at the palace up near the River, and other

military units in the palaces, what does that do presently? Or is

there something I am missing? Is it sending a message that we are

in control here, and we are going to occupy any place we want? Or

is there something subliminal there that I’m missing because I see

it as counterproductive.

Second part is Abu Ghraib. I remember when our Nation happily

produced Zogby polls, professional pollster that showed that the

Iraqis overwhelmingly were in favor of the American presence

there.

Somewhere around December of 2004, we quit getting those

polls. And I remember asking when I was in Baghdad, and I believe the chairman was with me, January of 2005, hadn’t seen

those polls for a while, what is the number? And they were kind

of sheepish around the table and finally someone said, 80 percent.

I said, damn, we are still running at 80 percent favorable, and he

said, no, 80 percent unfavorable. The timeline, if I recall, the information about Abu Ghraib came out around Spring of 2004, so this

would have been a good 12 months after that or close to it.

Again, am I missing something? Because I would think that what

happened there was counterproductive, or is there something about

the minds of the folks in that part of the world where it actually

helped our case to do that. I am asking this in the form of a question because, to a certain extent, that is kind of the debate that is

going on on the House floor today.

I don’t give a flip about terrorists. I don’t give a flip about enemies of the United States, but I realize each of you people in uniform is a potential prisoner; that something could go wrong, and

you could get captured. And I sure as heck wouldn’t want any of

you mistreated or held to a lower standard because of what is happening or what is perceived is happening. And so these are very

sincere questions. Am I missing something? Do we gain any sort

of advantage by being in the water palace? Did what happened at

Abu Ghraib in any way help our case? And to what extent do the

18

conventional forces, if the answer to the first thing is counterproductive, to what extent is the regular force listening? And to

what extent do we see to it that that mistake is not made again?

Secretary MANCUSO. Sir, I will start with your last question first.

We are all listening. We understand that—and I started my comments by saying the global war on terror is an irregular war in a

fundamental sense. Well, the war in Iraq is irregular in the sense

that it is about all instruments of national power, including for example, information.

And so starting with the fact that we are all listening, I would

like to say, of course, instances—well, real or perceived instances

of abuse that were contrary to policy by individual soldiers, clearly

that did not help us, and in fact, it hurt. But at the same time,

the many instances of good work done by the large majority of our

forces every day in multiple parts of the world including Iraq and

all parts of Iraq, that also counts for something. I can’t gauge the

precise impact, what the tradeoff is, but there is no doubt in my

mind that those specific instances hurt us but also that the incredible good that our forces are doing and doing every day in Iraq help

us, and thank goodness for them.

With respect to your question about occupying the palaces, I

would be in no position to assess. I think that is certainly an important point to consider.

Mr. TAYLOR. If I may, sir, in fairness, and again, I walked in

kind of late, but I take it that you are a political appointee who

is responsible for that segment of the United States Military.

Secretary MANCUSO. I am a political appointee responsible for

the Special Operations and combating terrorism.

Mr. TAYLOR. There may be instances where the only U.S. troops

who are sent somewhere will be special operators, future conflict.

So if a future conflict comes along and a likely place to billet special operators is the palace, what do you tell those guys? Because

I think we have made a blunder. I didn’t think of this, but the guy

who brought it to my attention made a pretty convincing argument

that moving into those palaces was a blunder. I have come to agree

with that. So are we learning anything?

If the only people dispatched to an area are special operators,

therefore, they would be under your direction, what would you tell

them?

Secretary MANCUSO. Well, what I would say is this: First of all,

I recognize that there might be severe policy and strategic impacts

to operational decisions. Clearly, there is no question but that that

is true. And with respect to your example of palaces, in general, do

I think that is likely a bad idea? Probably. But there are operational tradeoffs that a bureaucrat essentially sitting in Washington is frankly not empowered to make in the sense that I don’t

have entire situational awareness.

Now while I would say, in general, that is a bad idea to sit in

a palace, if there is a commander on the ground that has a full battle picture and has to make a tradeoff between bad optics versus

bad security, that is a decision that I think we owe to our troops

on the ground.

I was prior service; I am actually a combat veteran of Iraq myself. We had a dictum when I was a soldier: Mission first, people

19

always. And as a bureaucrat sitting in Washington, while I can

generally agree with the optics piece, I would not feel comfortable

telling that on-the-ground commander to make that tradeoff from

Washington.

Mr. SAXTON. Gene, we are going to have votes between quarter

of and 4.

Admiral OLSON. Can I quickly address that question? I can address it solely as Special Operations Command, and it is all right

for special operators not to occupy palaces but to live, eat, breath,

work with the local populations in which they serve. And as I have

traveled around the theater, I have visited Special Operations

Forces in a number of remote outposts where they are the only

Americans for miles around and where they are sharing their compounds with their Iraqi or Afghan counterparts. Many of these are

in high-risk locations, and as they are defending against mortar attacks each night, they are out each day building bridges across rivers and building schools and broadcasting on radio stations that

they man themselves and running patrols to ensure the security of

their compound along the way.

I visited one palace occupied by Special Operations soldiers. It

was in a corner of Baghdad and a corner of the Baghdad international airport. It is a palace that was occupied because it was the

highest terrain around, and in an unstable environment, it was the

best place from which to defend oneself, and a couple miles down

the road from that compound, most of the forces assigned to that

mission are living and working with their Iraqi counterparts, the

Iraqi special operations forces and operating with them each night,

coming back and eating with them in their chow halls.

I don’t think we in Special Operations would consider occupying

a compound to be a wise move. It may be the operationally sound

move for a period of time. It may be the expedient move for security, but the goal will always be to move out of the palaces and be

out with the people. That is how Special Operations typically

works, sir.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Admiral.

Mr. Secretary, I believe—and I believe that perhaps you believe

as well—that irregular warfare will be the dominant or at least one

of the dominant forms of conflict for the foreseeable future. Assuming that we are successful in dealing with al Qaeda, what do you

see our Nation facing in terms of continued irregular warfare

threats?

Secretary MANCUSO. Mr. Chairman, when we talk about irregular warfare, we often think in terms of terrorist networks and that

is clearly the most urgent, pressing manifestation of the problem.

But irregular warfare is not limited to non-state adversaries in

terms of using it. States, hostile states in some instances, hostile

states armed with nuclear weapons or WMDs, rather, more generally could use irregular warfare against us, and so the United

States not only has, in my view, not only has to be in a position

to defend against irregular warfare used by non-state actors; we

also have to be in a position to defend against irregular warfare

used by states and be able to counter and use irregular warfare

consistent with international law and U.S. law against both nonstate actors and state actors as well.

20

Mr. SAXTON. I assume that you are thinking of Iran and

Hezbollah.

Secretary MANCUSO. Sir, I wasn’t actually thinking of any particular country but countries that are hostile to the United States,

particularly countries that might have weapons of mass destruction

or intentions of having weapons of mass destruction, IW may give

us more strategic choices and flex in terms of how we might deal

with them.

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Secretary, you described the need for an all-out

government effort, not just a military approach. How are we coordinating a truly national effort in conducting irregular warfare in

order to comply with all forms of national power at this time?

Secretary MANCUSO. Very aggressively. We are—first of all, the

Department of Defense recognizes—and I said this on my testimony, sir, and I will reiterate it because it is such an important

point—that, in most instances, the lion’s share of the burden in

terms of irregular warfare is not uniquely military; it is other. It

is information, diplomacy. It is the other elements of national

power. And what we at the Department of Defense recognize is

that it is incumbent upon us to work with our interagency partners

and with our partners and allies throughout the world to develop

their capacity along with their instruments of national power to get

the job done.

This is manifested concretely in things like the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). It is manifested concretely in

interagency working groups. We haven’t mastered the puzzle yet.

We don’t have the answer. We have recognized the problem, and

we are moving with all deliberate speed to implement the right solution.

But our institutional plumbing, Mr. Chairman, as you know very

well, wasn’t geared to addressing these kinds of threats, and so

right now we are in the process of having—sort of changing our

plumbing, if you will, being able to face all of the threats and being

able to hedge against uncertainty in a national security environment across—interagency and with our partners and allies.

Mr. SAXTON. You mentioned in that answer building partner capacity a couple of times. Can you describe the linkage between the

Irregular Warfare Roadmap and Building Partner Capacity Roadmap?

Secretary MANCUSO. We think about it inside the Department of

Defense, sir, as sort of opposite sides of the same coin but I would

like to define what I mean by building partnership capacity and

what we more generally understand.

When we talk in terms of building partnership capacity, it at the

most basic level means developing the capacity of our partners to

do discrete tasks, but there is also a second and perhaps more important sense that we talk about building partnership capacity;

that is in terms of not just building the capacity of our partners

to do things but to build the capacity of the partnership, relationships with our partners and allies throughout the world. And that

is what we are focused on.

So, in the Department of Defense, when we work with our partners and allies, of course, we are focused on transferring skill sets

because we want to empower them to do things that we would othVerDate 22-MAR-2001 06:54 Sep 24, 2008 Jkt 033585 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\109-85\270260.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
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erwise be called to do and out of the fact that we are mindful that

terrorism is a collective threat and they themselves in their societies are under siege as well.

But we also remember as we migrate these skill sets, we are also

mindful of the fact that, as we do that, we are building relationships which institutionally over time will make us much more effective in the global war on terror, and we have certainly seen tremendous progress on that front as well.

In terms of numbers, in terms of when we ask about discrete

things, what are we doing in different countries? That is an important part of the question, but the other part is, how are we getting

along, if you will? How are we developing more organic relationships? And we are working on that, too, and that is critically important.

Mr. SAXTON. Let me ask you this, let me put it this way, we have

relationships with Saudi Arabia. We have relationships with Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emerate (UAE), Egypt. Let me ask you

this, did the statement made by the Iranian president recently

that—or was it the Hezbollah leader—that they are next going to

concentrate on posing threats to Israel and the Gulf states, and

does that create an opportunity for us to change or to enhance our

partnerships with some countries?

Secretary MANCUSO. Well, we certainly think that, as the rest of

the world, particularly in the Middle East, recognizes that this

threat is not unique to the United States, that it is in fact a threat

shared across cultures, across geographies, that any opportunity,

particularly a statement to that effect—I am not quite sure which

statement specifically you are referring to—that might underscore

the fact that the threat is collective, that creates opportunities for

us; opportunities to work together with other countries in the region and opportunities to ensure that we build a kind of better ecosystem, better partnership to combat terrorism.

Mr. SAXTON. I believe the statement I was referring may have

been Nazrallah, and he said, we are next going to attack Israel and

the Gulf states. When I saw that headline, I thought, what an opportunity to create and enhance relationships with Gulf states in

particular.

Secretary MANCUSO. Mr. Chairman, I would not want to get into

sort of classified information, but what I would suggest is a statement to that effect is likely not an effective growth strategy for

Hezbollah.

Mr. SAXTON. Admiral, you offered a definition of irregular warfare as a form of warfare that focuses on undermining or subverting the credibility, legitimacy of a political authority in question.

How would you define the political authority that we are combating

in the global war on terror?

Admiral OLSON. Sir, the working definition of irregular warfare

was a definition arrived at by a committee approved by the Deputy

Secretary of Defense. I think that irregular warfare best describes

the actions that we are countering, but we have applied it to use

those counteractions themselves and lumped it all under the term

irregular warfare, which can both be offensive and defensive under

the new definition. I think the irregular warfare that is taking

place in Iraq is clearly trying to counter the emergence of a legitiVerDate 22-MAR-2001 06:54 Sep 24, 2008 Jkt 033585 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\109-85\270260.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
22

mate government in Iraq; same thing in Afghanistan. Our efforts

to counter those irregular warfare activities against those governments are also irregular warfare activities.

Mr. SAXTON. Were you going to say something?

I have no more questions.

At this point I want to thank you for being here. We are going

to have a series of votes here very soon. I want to just say that the

definition of progress for all of us is different, and we believe that

the changes that—I believe, I don’t speak for others, that the

changes that SOCOM has made and the understandings it has developed in how to fight an irregular war are very significant pieces

of progress and I want to thank you for, each of you, for your leadership and what you do. You are performing a great service to our

country in a very difficult time and thank you for being here today.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

SEPTEMBER 27, 2006

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

SEPTEMBER 27, 2006

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

SEPTEMBER 27, 2006

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH

Mr. SMITH. Focus on the progress piece of that; where we are making very, very

good progress, that would be a good place to go for metrics. What is the metrics of

your assessment of that progress? Where is it that this is getting better? What is

the progress you discussed specifically?

Secretary MANCUSO. The Department of Defense (DOD) has developed an assessment process to measure progress in the global war on terror (GWOT). The purpose

of the assessment is to examine the efficacy of DOD’s strategy for prosecuting the

GWOT.

The GWOT Assessment is a measurement tool comprised of discrete metrics,

which are derived from the six military strategic objectives for the GWOT, outlined

in the National Military Strategic Plan for the war on terror.

The six military strategic objectives are:

• Deny terrorist the resources they need to operate and survive

• Enable partner nations to counter terrorism

• Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials, and

maintain capacity for consequence management

• Defeat terrorists and their organizations

• Counter state and non-state support for terrorism in coordination with other

US government agencies and partner nations

• Contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support

for terrorism

The DOD develops GWOT action plans to address shortfalls derived from the assessments findings. Currently there are 25 GWOT Action Plans, which track the

progress of policy, legislative and resourcing issues and identify factors that inhibit

the successful prosecution of the GWOT.

In addition to this testimony, DOD is in the process of preparing a formal GWOT

Assessment for Congress. This assessment is due March 1, 2007.

In regard to Iraq, specific metrics are being developed, in line with the President’s

strategy, to measure the performance of the Iraqi military and government. The

military commitments will make up the initial assessment of Iraqi performance and

its ability to reduce the cycle of violence. Included in the security assessment will

be Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) focusing on political and economic progress.

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