UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

GILBERT E. SLOOP,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 98-2440

ABTCO, INCORPORATED,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of North Carolina, at Statesville.

Richard L. Voorhees, Chief District Judge.

(CA-96-83-5-V)

Submitted: February 9, 1999

Decided: May 6, 1999

Before NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Robert M. Elliot, ELLIOT, PISHKO, GELBIN & MORGAN, P.A.,

Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Steven J. Fishman,

Thomas A. Pinch, THE FISHMAN GROUP, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Gilbert Sloop appeals from the district court's grant of summary

judgment in favor of his former employer, ABTCO. The district court

found that Sloop's absence from work during his involuntary civil

commitment for detoxification was due to his use of alcohol and not

covered by the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C.A.

§§ 2601-2654 (West 1999). It thus concluded that ABTCO's termination of Sloop's employment did not violate the FMLA. Finding no

error, we affirm.

This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. See

United States v. Kanasco, Ltd., 123 F.3d 209, 210 (4th Cir. 1997).

The moving party must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue

of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The facts

are considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

The uncontroverted evidence before the district court established

that Sloop had been an alcoholic since his teenage years. He was able

to avoid alcohol during his first twenty-two years of working at the

plant that ABTCO now owns. When ABTCO bought the plant, however, Sloop was demoted and shortly thereafter succumbed to his

desire to have a drink. Within three weeks, he was given three weeks

of paid leave by ABTCO for in-patient substance abuse treatment.

Following this residential treatment, Sloop returned to work.

Thereafter, Sloop relapsed on different occasions over the next eighteen months and entered New River Area Detoxification Center six

times, causing him to miss sixteen days from work. Sloop readily

admitted the cause for his absences to his supervisor, Alfred Wagoner, and ABTCO's Human Resources manager, Will Swift. In June

of 1993 and January of 1994, following two periods of absence due

to detoxification, Sloop was warned that his absences due to his

relapses were unacceptable and that any recurrence of this problem

would result in termination. After returning to work following the

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January 1994 detox, Sloop claimed that he sought and ABTCO

denied leave to undergo residential treatment.1

In July 1994, Sloop began drinking alcohol again. On July 4, 1994,

after he became abusive towards his wife, she called the police and

had him involuntarily committed to the detox center. Drs. Bundy and

Belford certified to the District Court of Wilkes County that involuntary commitment was necessary. Sloop's wife called Wagoner and

Swift to relate that Sloop would not be at work for several weeks and

that he would be undergoing residential substance abuse treatment.

Sloop's wife asked Swift if Sloop could use his leave and reminded

Swift that Sloop had accrued two weeks of vacation leave. According

to Sloop's wife, Swift stated that he would have to discuss the matter

with company officials.

On July 7, 1994, Swift called Sloop's wife and told her that Sloop

was terminated effective July 5, 1994 for being absent due to his

excessive drinking. Sloop was in the detox center until July 12, when

the state court judge committed Sloop to a residential treatment facility.

Sloop brought this action against ABTCO alleging that he was discharged in violation of the FMLA. Both parties conceded that Sloop

was an employee covered by the FMLA, see 29 U.S.C.A. §

2611(2)(A), and that ABTCO, an employer of more than fifty persons, was covered by the Act, see 29 U.S.C.A. § 2611(4). However,

ABTCO argued that Sloop's absence was due to his use of alcohol

and therefore not covered by the FMLA. Both ABTCO and Sloop

moved for summary judgment.

The district court, adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation

made pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1998),

granted ABTCO's motion for summary judgment. The district court

found that Sloop was "treated" (for purposes of the FMLA) at the

detox center because his condition was evaluated by two physicians

who determined that he was dangerous to himself and others and

should be involuntarily committed. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.114

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1 ABTCO denies this claim. Resolution of this issue is not necessary as

Sloop does not assert a claim for this incident.

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(a)(2)(i)(A), 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(b). However, the court found that

Sloop's absence from work was due to his use or consumption of

alcohol during the July 4, 1994, weekend, not due to the court-ordered

residential treatment ordered seven days later. 2 Thus, his absence,

though later culminating in residential treatment, was not covered due

to a regulation promulgated pursuant to the FMLA. See 29 C.F.R.

§ 825.114(d).3

On appeal, Sloop claims that, because the district court found that

he was suffering from a serious medical condition requiring continuing treatment, he was entitled to coverage under the express provisions of the regulation. However, the evidence supports the district

court's finding that Sloop was unable to work due to his drinking.

Sloop was due at work on July 5, 1994 at 7:00 a.m. The medical

records provided by the detox center reflect that his blood alcohol was

.05 on July 5. Sloop was not admitted to the detox center until after

2:00 p.m. on July 5, 1994. Thus, the district court properly found that

Sloop was not able to attend work on July 5, 1994, not because of his

treatment, but because of his heavy consumption of alcohol.4

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2 The district court also opined that Sloop arguably did not provide

proper notice or demonstrate that more favorable treatment was granted

employees not exercising FMLA rights. Because we find that summary

judgment was properly granted on the basis that Sloop's leave was due

to his use of alcohol, rather than his treatment, we express no opinion on

the viability of these grounds.

3 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(d) provides that "[s]ubstance abuse may be a

serious health condition if the conditions of this section [enumerating

what is a `serious health condition'] are met. However, FMLA leave may

only be taken for treatment for substance abuse by a health care provider

or by a provider of health care services on referral by a health care provider. On the other hand, absence because of the employee's use of the

substance, rather than for treatment, does not qualify for FMLA leave."

(emphasis added).

4 On appeal, Sloop argues that because the effective date of his termination was July 6, that July 5 is irrelevant. Though his superiors did not

make a decision until July 7, 1994, and then arbitrarily chose July 6 for

the effective date, Swift's uncontroverted testimony establishes that

Sloop was fired for disregarding the previous warnings to not miss work

due to binge drinking. The unexcused absence began on July 5, and

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Sloop also claims that the district court's interpretation of 29

C.F.R. § 825.114(d) conflicts with the provisions of the FMLA guaranteeing unpaid leave for treatment of this serious health condition.

See 29 U.S.C.A. § 2612(a). We disagree.

The FMLA does not explicitly state whether alcoholism is a health

condition even covered by the statute. Instead, when the FMLA was

passed, Congress delegated to the Department of Labor the responsibility of defining FMLA's broad terms. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 2654.

Thus, when interpreting the FMLA, we give controlling weight to

regulations that speak to issues on which the statute is silent unless

such regulations are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to

the statute. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).

Other than Sloop's bare allegation that the exclusion of treatment

necessitated by the use of alcohol from the coverage of the FMLA is

contrary to the intent of Congress, Sloop fails to demonstrate why

controlling weight should not be accorded 29 C.F.R.§ 825.114(d).

There is no evidence that Congress intended the FMLA to cover medical leave precipitated by substance abuse without regard for the personal responsibility of the employee. To the contrary, Congress

intended that the FMLA be "`based on the same principle[s] as . . .

other labor laws that establish minimum standards for employment.'"

Manuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp., 66 F.3d 758, 763 (5th Cir. 1995)

(quoting a Senate report). Viewing alcoholism in the context of labor

laws such as the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, this Court has recognized that while alcoholic employees in

an at-will employment context are protected from adverse employment actions based upon their medical condition, the misconduct arising from their use of alcohol has never been protected. See Little v.

Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1 F.3d 255, 259 (4th Cir. 1993)

(Rehabilitation Act). Finding that this regulation, as correctly inter-

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hence is relevant for determining whether Sloop was entitled to leave

starting the first day he was unable to report. Sloop's argument that his

July 5 absence was excused by Wagoner is unavailing. Swift's warning

letters and his deposition testimony make clear that Swift had the greater

decision-making ability under the leave policy.

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preted by the district court, is a permissible construction of the

FMLA, we give it controlling weight.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to ABTCO and its denial of Sloop's motion for summary judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court

and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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