IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Joseph Caffey, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No 1268 C.D. 2017

: Submitted: February 2, 2018

Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board (City of Philadelphia), :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION

BY JUDGE SIMPSON FILED: April 12, 2018

This is an appeal of a denial of a delayed firefighter cancer claim 

brought under Section 108(r) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act),

1 one of the 

provisions of the 2011 amendments to the Act known as Act 46,2 which, among other 

 

1 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, added by the Act of July 7, 2011, P.L. 251, 

77 P.S. §27.1(r). Specifically, Section 108(r) recognizes “[c]ancer suffered by a firefighter which 

is caused by exposure to a known carcinogen which is recognized as a Group 1 carcinogen by the 

International Agency for Research on Cancer,” as a compensable occupational disease under the 

Act. Id.

2

In addition to adding Section 108(r), the Act of July 7, 2011, P.L. 251 (Act 46), added 

Section 301(f) of the Act, 77 P.S. §414, which established standards for cancer claims under 

Section 108(r). Section 301(f) limits cancer claims to firefighters who can show four or more 

years of continuous firefighting service and the absence of cancer prior to that service. Further, 

Section 301(f), in conjunction with Section 108(r), requires that a firefighter be diagnosed with a 

type of cancer caused by exposure to a known Group 1 carcinogen. See City of Phila. Fire Dep’t 

v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Sladek), 144 A.3d 1101 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016), appeal granted, 167 

A.3d 307 (Pa. 2017). Section 301(f) also requires that a claim under Section 108(r) be filed within 

600 weeks of a firefighter’s last date of exposure to a Group 1 carcinogen. However, if a firefighter 

files his claim within 300 weeks of his last date of workplace exposure and establishes that his 

type of cancer is an occupational disease, Section 301(f) provides a presumption that his workplace 

exposure caused his cancer. Sladek.

 
2

things, added cancer to the list of occupational diseases for individuals employed as 

firefighters. The main question is whether the claimant’s right to pursue a medicalonly claim was extinguished prior to the 2011 effective date of Act 46, which 

generally broadened compensability for cancer caused to firefighters. For the 

reasons that follow, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.

In particular, Joseph Caffey (Claimant), petitions for review of an order 

of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) affirming an order denying 

his claim for medical benefits for bladder cancer caused by occupational exposure 

to known carcinogens during his employment as a firefighter for the City of 

Philadelphia (Employer). Claimant contends the Board erred in determining that 

newly-added Section 108(r) does not apply to Claimant’s bladder cancer, which his 

doctors diagnosed and removed in 2009. In particular, Claimant asserts the Board 

erred in relying on our recent decision in City of Warren v. Workers’ Compensation 

Appeal Board (Haines), 156 A.3d 371 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 170 A.3d 1039 

(Pa. 2017). 

I. Background

A. Medical-Only Claim Petition

In March 2013, Claimant filed a claim petition alleging that he 

sustained an occupational disease in the nature of bladder cancer as a result of 

exposures to IARC (International Agency for Research on Cancer) Group 1

carcinogens while working as a firefighter for Employer. Claimant alleged a date of 
3

“injury” of December 12, 2003, his last day of work as a firefighter.3 Claimant

sought only medical benefits. Employer filed a timely answer denying Claimant’s 

material allegations.

B. Evidence

Before the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ), Claimant testified on 

his own behalf. The WCJ accepted Claimant’s testimony as credible in its entirety. 

WCJ’s Op., 1/26/16, Finding of Fact (F.F.) No. 8. Claimant joined Employer’s Fire 

Department in June 1972. F.F. No. 1a. When hired, Claimant underwent and passed 

a physical examination. Id. Claimant was not treating for any type of cancer. Id. 

In March 1998, Employer promoted Claimant to Lieutenant. At that time, he passed 

another physical examination. Id.

During his 31-year career, Claimant fought all different types of fires, 

from grass fires to multi-alarm fires. F.F. No. 1d. Firefighting involves different 

phases, including forcible entry, search and rescue, ventilation, fire suppression and 

overhaul. F.F. No. 1e. Firefighters are exposed to smoke during all phases. Id. 

After fighting a fire, Claimant would be covered in black soot with “black snot 

coming out of his nose.” F.F. No. 1g.

Also, Claimant suffered daily exposure to diesel fuel emissions at the 

fire stations. F.F. No. 1b. The diesel fumes from the trucks on the first floor would 

 

3 The claim petition was filed less than 600 weeks after Claimant’s last day of work. As 

discussed in more detail below, if Claimant’s medical-only claim was still viable, this filing would 

not run afoul of Act 46’s new 600-week statute of repose for firefighter cancer claims set forth in 

Section 301(f) of the Act, 77 P.S. §414. See City of Warren v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.

(Haines), 156 A.3d 371 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 170 A.3d 1039 (Pa. 2017).
4

penetrate the second floor of the station, including the kitchen area. Id. As a result, 

the walls and the ceilings needed weekly cleaning. Id. 

Claimant spent his last day in a firehouse on December 12, 2003. F.F. 

No. 1h. He fought his last fire around Thanksgiving in November 2003. Id. He 

retired after his last day of work, and he made no claims for disability thereafter.

In March 2009, a doctor diagnosed Claimant with bladder cancer. F.F. 

No. 1i. Claimant’s doctors promptly removed the cancer from his bladder, and 

Claimant underwent a bladder rinse for six weeks. Id. As discussed below, the 

diagnosis and surgery occurred less than 300 weeks after Claimant’s last exposure 

at work in December 2003. After his surgery, Claimant continued to see Dr. Meir 

Daller, his urologist in Florida, every six months. Id. A primary question is whether 

these events beginning in March 2009 satisfy the 300-week occupational disease 

statute of repose that pre-existed the enactment of Act 46 and was found at Section 

301(c)(2) of the Act, 77 P.S. §411(2). If so, Claimant’s claim for medical benefits 

may not have expired prior to the passage of Act 46 in July 2011.

After the General Assembly passed Act 46 in July 2011, which 

recognized cancer as an occupational disease for firefighters who suffered exposure 

to IARC Group 1 carcinogens, Claimant contacted his union to have his case 

investigated. F.F. No. 1k. Thereafter, in 2013, Claimant received a letter from 

counsel and a medical report from Dr. Barry L. Singer (Claimant’s Expert), a 

physician board certified in internal medicine, hematology and medical oncology. 
5

This is the first time a doctor told Claimant that his cancer was related to his fire 

service exposures. Id. 

In support of his claim petition, Claimant submitted, in addition to other

medical evidence, two global depositions and two reports from his Expert. F.F. Nos.

4, 5. In sum, Claimant’s Expert offered testimony which, if accepted, could support 

an award of medical benefits. 

In opposition to the claim petition, Employer submitted the deposition 

testimony of Dr. Tee L. Guidotti (Employer’s Expert), a physician board certified in 

internal medicine, pulmonary medicine and occupational medicine. Briefly, 

Employer’s Expert opined there is insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that, 

as a matter of general causation, firefighting causes cancer. F.F. No. 7i. Therefore, 

Employer’s Expert did not offer an opinion as to the specific causation of any 

firefighter’s cancer. Id. Nonetheless, Employer’s Expert opined that bladder, 

kidney and testes cancer, non-Hodgkins lymphoma, eustemia, and brain and lung 

cancer in nonsmokers should be presumed work-related for firefighters. Id.

Employer also submitted a medical report from Dr. Howard M. Sandler 

(Dr. Sandler), a physician specializing in occupational and environmental medicine. 

F.F. No. 7a. Ultimately, Dr. Sandler opined that Claimant’s bladder cancer was not 

causally related to any possible exposures that occurred during his firefighting 

career. F.F. No. 7h. 
6

Notably, the WCJ made no credibility determinations regarding the 

parties’ medical evidence. Rather, the WCJ found that Claimant’s last day of 

exposure occurred in November 2003, and he last worked as a firefighter on 

December 12, 2003. F.F. No. 9. The WCJ then noted the pre-Act 46 version of 

Section 301(c)(2) of the Act, 77 P.S. §411(2), remained in effect until Act 46’s 

effective date in July 2011. F.F. No. 10. Under the prior, controlling version of 

Section 301(c)(2), Claimant’s claim for benefits must have manifested within 300 

weeks of his last date of employment. Id. Because Claimant’s claim did not 

manifest within that period, the WCJ determined that it was barred. Id. To that end, 

the WCJ observed, “there is no retroactivity clause or other clause in Act 46 to 

resurrect Claimant’s claim ....” Id. Consequently, in Conclusion of Law No. 2, the 

WCJ determined:

[Claimant] has not met his burden of proof on the 

pending Claim Petition. Act 46 of 2011 amending Section 

108(r) of the Act requires that the cancer be caused by the 

exposure to a known carcinogen. However, pursuant to 

the version of Section 301(c)(2) in effect at the time of 

Claimant’s retirement and until July 7, 2011, the date Act 

46 amending such section became enacted, Claimant’s 

claim for benefits must have manifested within 300 weeks 

of his last date of employment. As such, under the thencontrolling Section 301(c)(2), Claimant’s claim was 

barred. As there is no retroactivity clause or other clause 

in Act 46 to resurrect Claimant’s claim, same is barred.

 

WCJ’s Op., Conclusion of Law No. 2 (emphasis in original).

Claimant appealed to the Board. Citing our decision in Haines as 

controlling, the Board reasoned (with emphasis added):
7

Because Act 46 could not be applied retroactively, 

the Haines Court held that Section 301(c)(2) governed the 

limitation of the decedent’s occupational disease claim. 

To satisfy the limitation in Section 301[(c)(2)] a 

claimant’s disability or death must occur within 300 weeks 

of last exposure to a hazard. Haines. There, the claimant 

filed a fatal claim petition on January 17, 2012. The 

decedent last fought a fire on December 25, 2002, retired 

on February 2, 2003 and died on August 18, 2009. 

Assuming that December 25, 2002 was the date of the 

decedent’s last exposure to a hazard, he died 

approximately 347 weeks after his last date of exposure. 

The court stated that his death did not occur within 300 

weeks after his last date of exposure to a hazard, nor did 

he establish that he suffered a disability within that time 

period. It held that under Section 301(c)(2), his right to 

seek compensation for his cancer had extinguished before 

Act 46 was enacted. Thus, his claim was barred.

Claimant alleges a date of injury of December 12, 

2003 and credibly testified that his last day at the firehouse 

was December 12, 2003 and he was exposed to diesel fuel 

emissions up until that time. However, this matter does 

not involve a death claim. Also, this matter does not 

involve disability. Claimant presented no evidence of 

disability, he did not allege disability or identify a date of 

any alleged disability, and the WCJ did not find the 

occurrence of work-related disability. Again, to satisfy the 

limitation in Section 301(c)(2), a claimant[’]s disability or 

death must occur within 300 weeks of last exposure to a 

hazard. Haines.

That did not happen here.

Claimant nevertheless argues that the Act 46 

amendments apply to his claim because he filed his Claim 

Petition after the effective date of the amendments. 

However, the claimant in Haines filed the fatal claim 

petition after the passage of Act 46 and that was not 

dispositive. The Haines Court specifically determined that 

Act 46’s provisions could not be applied retroactively and 

established a new statute of repose for occupational 

disease claims brought under Section 108(r) only where 
8

the right to bring the claim had not previously expired 

under Section 301[(c)(2).] This is binding precedent. 

Given the aforementioned, we reject Claimant’s assertion 

of error. In light of our disposition, we need not address 

any arguments concerning the sufficiency of the medical 

evidence. 

 

Bd. Op., 8/30/17, at 5-8. In accord with Haines, the Board affirmed the WCJ’s 

determination denying Claimant’s claim petition. Claimant petitions for review.4

II. Discussion

A. Applicability of Haines

1. Argument

Claimant contends the Board erred in determining that Haines is 

controlling given the circumstances in the present case. More specifically, Claimant 

asserts he did not know that he had the ability to bring an occupational disease claim 

for his bladder cancer until he received his Expert’s February 2013 report. Relying 

on the discovery rule, Claimant maintains the three-year statute of limitations in 

Section 315 of the Act, 77 P.S. §602, began to run at the time he learned, through a 

medical diagnosis, that he suffered from an occupational disease. Price v. 

Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Metallurgical Res.), 626 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1993); City 

of Phila. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Sites), 889 A.2d 129 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). 

Therefore, Claimant argues the record supports his entitlement to benefits for an 

occupational disease under either the catchall provision in Section 108(n), 77 P.S. 

 

4 Our review is limited to determining whether the WCJ’s findings of fact were supported 

by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed or whether constitutional rights 

were violated. Phoenixville Hosp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Shoap), 81 A.3d 830 (Pa. 

2013).
9

§27.1(n), or the firefighter’s cancer provision in Section 108(r) of the Act, 77 P.S. 

§27.1(r).

Relying on Sites, Claimant further contends he is entitled to the newly 

added presumption of compensability in Section 301(f) of the Act, which provides 

(with emphasis added):

Compensation pursuant to cancer suffered by a firefighter 

shall only be to those firefighters who have served four or 

more years in continuous firefighting duties, who can 

establish direct exposure to a carcinogen referred to in 

section 108(r) relating to cancer by a firefighter and have 

successfully passed a physical examination prior to 

asserting a claim under this subsection or prior to engaging 

in firefighting duties and the examination failed to reveal 

any evidence of the condition of cancer. The presumption 

of this subsection may be rebutted by substantial 

competent evidence that shows that the firefighter’s cancer 

was not caused by the occupation of firefighting. ... 

Notwithstanding the limitation under subsection (c)(2) 

with respect to disability or death resulting from an 

occupational disease having to occur within three hundred 

weeks after the last date of employment in an occupation 

or industry to which a claimant was exposed to the hazards 

of disease, claims filed pursuant to cancer suffered by the 

firefighter under section 108(r) may be made within six 

hundred weeks after the last date of employment in an 

occupation or industry to which a claimant was exposed to 

the hazards of the disease. The presumption provided for 

under this subsection shall only apply to claims made 

within the first three hundred weeks. 

 

77 P.S. §414.
10

Our decision in Sites dealt with a 2001 amendment to Section 108 of 

the Act, which added Subsection (m.1), 77 P.S. §27.1(m.1)5identifying as an 

occupational disease Hepatitis C occurring in firefighters and other rescue personnel. 

Subsection (m.1) established a rebuttable presumption recognizing a diagnosis of 

Hepatitis C as an occupational disease for these personnel.

The City of Philadelphia, as the employer in Sites, argued that the 2001 

amendment did not apply to a claim made after the passage of the amendment based 

on exposures that occurred prior to the change in the law. This Court rejected that 

argument, noting Section 108(m.1) was the law at the time the claimant filed his 

claim petition and that the statute of limitations had not yet expired. As such, we 

determined the Board properly applied both Section 108(m), which predated the 

2001 amendment, and the newly added Section 108(m.1), which included a 

presumption of compensability, to the claim petition. See Sites, 889 A.2d at 140.

As further support, Claimant cites City of Philadelphia v. Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board (Cospelich), 893 A.2d 171 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006), 

wherein this Court, applying Sites, held that a firefighter (who contracted Hepatitis 

C before the 2001 amendment but filed his claim after the amendment) stated a valid 

claim for an occupational disease under both Sections 108(m) and 108(m.1) of the 

Act. In addition, we rejected the employer’s argument that the WCJ erred in 

awarding the claimant reimbursement of medical expenses because he did not prove 

a disability. In so doing, we recognized that a claimant suffering an occupational 

 

5 Added by the Act of December 20, 2001, P.L. 967.
11

disease was entitled to medical benefits relating to his disease despite not having 

incurred a loss of earnings. See Cospelich, 893 A.2d at 177-79. 

Citing Cospelich and Sites, Claimant asserts he has a right to pursue his 

claim petition for medical benefits not only under Sections 108(n) and 301(c)(2) of 

the Act, but also under the newly added provisions in Sections 108(r) and 301(f) of 

the Act. Therefore, Claimant maintains the Board erred in affirming the denial of 

his claim.

2. Analysis

a. 300-Week Statute of Repose

Section 301(c) of the Act imposes a time limit upon a claimant’s ability 

to present an occupational disease claim. The operative time-limit language of 300 

weeks in Section 301(c)(2) pre-existed and was essentially unchanged by the 

passage of Act 46. That language provides (with emphasis added):

(2) The terms ‘injury,’ ‘personal injury,’ and ‘injury 

arising in the course of his employment,’ as used in this 

act, shall include, unless the context clearly requires 

otherwise, occupational disease as defined in section 108 

of this act: Provided, That whenever occupational disease 

is the basis for compensation, for disability or death under 

this act, it shall apply only to disability or death resulting 

from such disease and occurring within three hundred 

weeks after the last date of employment in an occupation 

or industry to which he was exposed to hazards of such 

disease. And provided further, That if the employe’s 

compensable disability has occurred within such period, 

his subsequent death as a result of the disease shall 

likewise be compensable.
12

77 P.S. §411(2).6

 

We read this language as requiring some significant, objective 

manifestation of the occupational disease within 300 weeks of the last date of 

exposure at work. If there is a claim for disability or death, which is not the case 

here, disability or death must occur within the 300-week period. The statutory 

language does not explicitly address medical benefits, but in context there is no 

reason to believe the General Assembly intended to withhold medical benefits, 

where some significant, objective manifestation of the occupational disease occurred 

within the 300-week period. This conclusion is supported by the statutory language 

declaring compensability for a subsequent death where only disability occurred 

within the 300-week period. We respectfully disagree with the WCJ and the Board 

to the extent they reached a different legal conclusion.

Here, Claimant’s cancer was diagnosed, and he underwent significant 

surgery and follow-up treatment within the 300-week period. Also, he incurred 

some medical bills within the 300-week period. Because he was retired, he could

not make a disability claim. Thankfully, he did not die. But there is no reason to 

believe that the General Assembly intended that occupational disease-related 

medical benefits should be denied under these circumstances. We therefore 

 

6 Nevertheless, as noted above, Act 46 created a new time limitation which applies only to 

firefighter cancer claims. Haines. Instead of the 300 weeks that applies to all other occupational 

diseases, a claim filed under new Section 108(r), 77 P.S. §27.1(r) (defining cancer suffered by a 

firefighter), may be made within 600 weeks after the last date of exposure to the hazards of the 

disease. Id. Both the prior 300-week time limitation for occupational disease claims and the new 

600-week time limitation for firefighter cancer claims are statutes of repose. Id.
13

conclude that Claimant’s rights were not extinguished by the operation of the preAct 46 300-week statute of repose in Section 301(c)(2).

b. Haines

In Haines, a recent en banc decision, we addressed the issue of whether 

the Act 46 amendments were intended to apply prospectively or retroactively. 

Ultimately, we held that Section 301(f) of the Act, 77 P.S. §414, which established 

a new 600-week statute of repose for firefighter cancer claims, did not have a 

retroactive effect. Thus, for occupational diseases occurring before the effective 

date of Act 46 in July 2011, a claimant must satisfy the 300-week limitation period 

of pre-existing Section 301(c)(2). Because the claimant in Haines raised a death

claim, and neither death nor disability occurred within 300 weeks of the decedent’s 

last date of employment, the claim could not satisfy the limitation language in 

Section 301(c)(2). Accordingly, the occupational disease claim was extinguished 

before the passage of the new 600-week period of repose under Act 46, and it could 

not be revived by that legislation.

Relying on Haines, Employer contends Claimant failed to establish 

either disability or death within the 300-week period in Section 301(c)(2). Employer 

therefore argues the WCJ properly denied Claimant’s claim petition.

We disagree. Because in this case there was a cancer diagnosis and a 

significant, objective manifestation of the occurrence of Claimant’s cancer (surgery) 

within the statutory period, and because some medical bills were actually incurred 
14

within the statutory period, we conclude that the decision in Haines does not control 

this case.

Further, because Claimant’s bladder cancer occurred within 300 weeks 

of his last exposure to a work hazard in December 2003, he is entitled to medical 

benefits, regardless of any disability, if he can prove he sustained an occupational 

disease under the catchall provision in Section 108(n) of the Act. Cospelich. In 

other words, on this issue Haines is distinguishable on the basis that Claimant is not 

seeking death or disability benefits for a loss of earnings.

c. Other Issues

Moreover, because Claimant alleges he sustained an occupational 

disease under Section 108(n) within 300 weeks of his last exposure to the hazards of 

the disease, and where he filed his claim petition within 600 weeks (11.5 years) of 

his alleged last direct exposure to carcinogens in December 2003, Claimant may also 

assert a firefighter’s cancer claim for medical benefits under Sections 108(r) and 

301(f) of the Act. Cospelich; Sites. In other words, we conclude that Claimant 

satisfied both the pre-Act 46 occupational disease statute of repose of 300 weeks and 

the post-Act 46 statute of repose of 600 weeks. Because Claimant’s cancer 

constituted an occupational disease prior to the Act 46 amendments, Section 301(f) 

is not being applied retroactively. Cospelich; Sites.

However, because Claimant failed to file a claim petition within the 

first 300 weeks after his last date of exposure to the hazards of the disease, he is not 

entitled to the presumption of compensability in Section 301(f) of the Act. As we 
15

explained in Fargo v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (City of Philadelphia), 

148 A.3d 514, 520 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 168 A.3d 514 (Pa. 2016) (with 

emphasis added):

Section 301(f) sets forth a two-tiered limitations period for 

Section 108(r) claims distinct from the time limit in 

Section 301(c)(2). First, a claimant must file the claim 

within 300 weeks of the last date of work with exposure to 

a known Group 1 carcinogen; if the claimant fails to do so, 

he is not foreclosed from bringing a claim by Section 

301(f), but he loses the presumptions of Section 301(e)[7]

and 301(f). However, if the claimant does not file the 

claim until more than 600 weeks of last exposure, the 

claimant is foreclosed from bringing that claim in its 

entirety.

 

We also reject Employer’s contention that Claimant’s claim petition 

must be considered as filed exclusively under Act 46. If a claimant is entitled to 

relief under any section of the Act, his petition will be considered as filed under that 

section. Cospelich; Paxos v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Frankford-Quaker 

Grocery), 631 A.2d 826 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993).

B. Three-Year Statute of Limitations

However, at this point we cannot hold that Claimant’s claim is viable. 

That is because of the passage of time between his 2003 “injury,” defined as the last 

 

7 Section 301(e) of the Act, 77 P.S. §413, which applies to occupational diseases generally, 

provides (with emphasis added):

If it be shown that the employe, at or immediately before the date 

of disability, was employed in any occupation or industry in which 

the occupational disease is a hazard, it shall be presumed that the 

employe’s occupational disease arose out of and in the course of his 

employment, but this presumption shall not be conclusive.
16

date of his exposure, Section 301(c)(2) of the Act, 77 P.S. §411(2), and his 2013 

claim petition filing. In particular, Claimant must also satisfy the three-year statute 

of limitations in Section 315 of the Act, 77 P.S. §602 (requiring petitions to be filed 

within three years of “injury” or be barred).

Although Claimant filed his medical-only claim petition in March 

2013, he stated it was not until March 2013 that he first learned from a doctor that 

his bladder cancer was causally related to his fire service exposures. F.F. No. 1k. 

The WCJ accepted Claimant’s testimony as credible. F.F. No. 8. As such, Claimant 

may be entitled to a determination that he timely filed his claim petition under the 

discovery rule in Price. The discovery rule may apply to a statute of limitations, like 

Section 315 of the Act, but it does not apply to a statute of repose. See Fargo.

III. Conclusion

Having concluded Claimant may be entitled to a determination that he 

filed a timely claim petition for medical benefits under the discovery rule for an 

occupational disease allegedly occurring within 300 weeks of his last exposure to 

the hazards of the disease, we vacate the order of the Board and remand with the 

direction that the case be further remanded to the WCJ with the following

instructions. In accord with this opinion, the WCJ shall determine, based upon the 

existing record: (1) whether Claimant filed a timely claim petition for medical 

benefits for an occupational disease under Price and Cospelich; and, if so: (2)

whether Claimant met his burden of proving that he sustained an occupational 

disease, in the nature of bladder cancer, under either Sections 108(n) and 301(c)(2) 

of the Act, or Sections 108(r) and 301(f) of the Act. If Claimant can establish that 
17

he sustained an occupational disease under any applicable provisions of the Act, he 

is entitled to payment of his medical bills related to his occupational disease even 

though he did not suffer a loss in earnings. Cospelich. 

 

ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Joseph Caffey, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No 1268 C.D. 2017

:

Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board (City of Philadelphia), :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 12th, day of April, 2018, the order of the Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board is VACATED and this case is REMANDED with the 

direction that it be further remanded to the Workers’ Compensation Judge for further 

proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion.

Jurisdiction is relinquished.

 

ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge