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CHINA IN AFRICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JUNE 4, 2008 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin, Chairman

BILL NELSON, Florida 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Christensen, Thomas J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 

and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC ............................. 4 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 8 

Economy, Elizabeth C., Director of Asia Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY ............................................................................................ 25 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 27 

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator From Wisconsin .................................... 1 

Isakson, Hon. Johnny, U.S. Senator From Georgia .............................................. 3 

Morrison, J. Stephen, Executive Director, Africa Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC ............................................. 30 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 32 

Swan, James, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC .......................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 8 

APPENDIX—Additional Material Submitted for the Record 

RESPONDING TO CHINA IN AFRICA, by David Shinn and Joshua Eisenman ....... 49 

(III)

(1) 

CHINA IN AFRICA: 

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 4, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russ Feingold, 

chairman of the subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Feingold, Nelson, Casey, Webb, Lugar, and 

Isakson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN 

Senator FEINGOLD. We’ll call the committee to order. Thank you 

all for being here. The hearing will come to order. 

I have had the privilege of traveling to Africa many times over 

the 16 years that I’ve served in this subcommittee, and I’ve often 

noted the tangible, prominent signs of China’s activities on the continent—new roads, sometimes ornate government buildings, crowdpleasing soccer stadiums, and the growing numbers of Chinese-run 

factories and retailers. 

Through its no-strings-attached approach and ability to deploy 

state-owned assets, China has rapidly increased its trade, investment, and influence in many sub-Saharan African countries in recent years. I’m pleased to hold this hearing to further examine this 

issue as China makes its interest in Africa abundantly clear and 

as other emerging economies follow its lead. 

Two years ago, China held the Beijing Summit of the Forum on 

China-Africa Cooperation, which served as a clear indication of 

China’s commitment to this part of the world. With leaders of 48 

African countries—including Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir and 

Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe—in attendance, Chinese President Hu 

Jintao noted that China wants to be Africa’s partner and pledged 

to double his country’s assistance to the continent by 2009 through 

a raft of new loans, development projects in health, education, and 

agriculture, and debt cancellations. 

The 2006 Sino-African Summit sparked concern in some Western 

countries, where donors feared their efforts to improve economic 

and political governance would be undermined by China’s 

unconditioned support. 

Now, in theory, there should be no problem with this type of increased cooperation and engagement. It is no secret that many AfVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:15 Dec 15, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\45811.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
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rican nations are in great need of assistance when it comes to 

building infrastructure and strengthening their economies. However, this engagement does become more problematic when it appears, and often is, devoid of the critical underpinnings that help 

build robust, open societies. 

To this end, it has not gone unnoticed that as the Chinese identify and seize development and investment opportunities across Africa, they are doing so to help secure their own economic objectives, 

but often without concern for national political dynamics and the 

consequences their engagement may have on local populations. 

Nonetheless, the United States must not fall into the trap of believing that, simply because China is willing to provide a package 

of assistance, enter into some partnership, or make some investment, we need to try to beat the Chinese to the punch. In some 

cases, it may not be economically feasible or prudent for American 

companies to compete with Chinese state-subsidized firms. In 

many other instances, loosening or abandoning historic U.S. standards for democracy, governance, and human rights to seize an opportunity would weaken our most potent and unique leverage: Our 

fundamental values. Compromising these principles will leave us 

with less influence, over the long term, and limit our ability to 

build lasting, productive partnerships for the pursuit of shared objectives on the continent. 

Where the Chinese are providing critical infrastructure development, we should not attempt to compete with or obstruct these efforts, but rather, we should seek to empower African governments 

and communities to demand internationally recognized standards 

with respect to the environment, human rights, and product quality. 

There are times, however, when China’s actions need to be condemned—for example, when they sell weapons to Sudan that could 

be used to prolong the conflict in Darfur, or build new power plants 

that support Robert Mugabe’s repressive regime in Zimbabwe. We, 

as an international community, should not tolerate such reckless 

behavior, as it undermines global efforts to bring peace and security to these countries. We should be clear about the need to uphold 

international norms and responsibilities and not provide soft loans 

as a substitute. 

So, in sum, I believe that the appropriate response to China’s rising role in Africa is more United States engagement with both Africans and Chinese to show that we acknowledge the growing strategic importance of this continent and are committed, over the long 

term, to its stability, development, and prosperity. 

This morning’s hearing will explore these issues in great depth— 

what China is doing in African countries, why, and how, as well 

as what implications this has for African and Western countries, 

particularly the United States. 

On our first panel, we will hear from the Deputy Assistant Secretaries of State responsible for East Asia and Africa, respectively. 

Tom Christensen will offer historical context for China’s economic, 

commercial, and political engagement on the African Continent and 

insights from ongoing United States-China senior dialogue. James 

Swan will follow with an Africa-focused analysis of how Chinese acVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:15 Dec 15, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\45811.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
3 

tivities on the continent affect countries and United States interests there. 

Our second panel will offer expert analysis, again from both the 

Chinese and African viewpoints. Dr. Elizabeth Economy, the senior 

fellow and director for Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, has written widely on Chinese domestic and foreign policy 

and United States-China relations. She will offer insights on the 

motivations behind China’s growing involvement in Africa and the 

challenges this presents for China, African countries, and the 

United States. Next, Steve Morrison, the executive director of the 

Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who has recently returned from one of many trips to China to 

discuss that country’s Africa policy, will assess where Chinese and 

United States interests converge in Africa, where they clash, and 

what this means for United States foreign policy. 

Thank you all for being here today. I am looking forward to your 

testimony and engaging with you in a discussion of this timely and 

complex issue. 

At this time, I will invite my esteemed colleague and the ranking 

member of the subcommittee, Senator Isakson, to make his opening 

remarks. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, thank you, Senator Feingold. And at the 

risk—so I won’t be redundant, I would just like to echo, verbatim, 

the comments that you made with regard to Africa and China and 

the very importance of the United States relationship. 

I just returned, in January, from a trip to Africa, and saw firsthand both increased Chinese investment in its embassies and engagement in Africa, as well as great efforts on behalf of the United 

States of America in many countries in Africa, as well. Africa is of 

critical interest to the United States, not just strategically, not just 

because of its assets, because of its great future. The promise of Africa is obviously ahead of it. The American people have made a tremendous investment in the AIDS initiative, the Millennium Challenge account and other investments in Africa to improve the quality of life. 

And I echo again what Chairman Feingold said with regard to 

my disappointment with some of the engagements of the Chinese 

in places like the Sudan and Darfur, where they’ve had some engagement, without any strings attached. That’s not in the best interest either of those countries or of humanity. 

So, I welcome our esteemed guests for being here today. I look 

forward to the information we learn from them, and I thank the 

chairman for calling this hearing. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Senator Isakson. 

We’ll begin with the first panel. 

Mr. Christensen. Thank you. 

4 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS J. CHRISTENSEN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC 

AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you. The Department welcomes the opportunity to address the implications of China’s engagement in Africa and the implications of that engagement for U.S. foreign policy. 

My colleague, Jim Swan and I, have submitted lengthy written 

testimony, and we’ll make some brief comments this morning. 

We believe China has multiple goals in its Africa policy, much 

like many nations who trade and invest in Africa, but we believe 

that three major objectives stand out over the last several years in 

China’s policy toward Africa. First, to secure supplies of natural resources and markets for Chinese exports in Africa. Second, to increase China’s power and prestige on the international stage as a 

leader of the developing world. And third, to compete with Taiwan 

for diplomatic recognition by African states. 

I’d say, at the outset, that China’s role has been, for the most 

part, in our perspective, a positive one. On an abstract level, China’s own domestic economic reforms and opening up to the outside 

world provide a good example for some of the more insulated economies on the continent. And on a more concrete level, we believe 

that China’s investment in infrastructure and in building businesses in Africa provide positive results for the African people. 

We neither perceive nor seek a zero-sum competition with the 

Chinese in Africa. In fact, as elsewhere in the world, we’re encouraging China to do more in Africa, albeit in coordination with the 

United States, major donors, and international institutions, like 

the IMF and World Bank. 

To date, we believe that Chinese aid and investment policies are 

not transparent, and generally lack the conditionality that’s been 

attached by leading donors and international institutions. Conditionality is designed to encourage good governance, and we believe 

that good governance in Africa is the foundation of sustained economic development. We believe we share the views of most economic development experts in pushing that approach. 

We engage the Chinese on their Africa policy in all our major 

dialogues, including the Strategic Economic Dialogue led by Secretary Paulson, at Treasury, and the Senior Dialogue on security 

and political affairs, led by Deputy Secretary of State John 

Negroponte. At the State Department, we also have a regional subdialogue on African affairs, led by Assistant Secretary Jendayi 

Frazer and her Chinese counterpart, Assistant Foreign Minister 

Zhai Jun. We also have dialogues on Sudan with our special envoy, 

Ambassador Williamson, and his Chinese counterpart, Ambassador 

Liu Guijin. 

We plan to start a very important dialogue, this fall, on assistance policy in general, of which Africa policy will be an important 

part. And that will be led by Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance 

Henrietta Fore and her counterparts in the Chinese Ministry of 

Commerce. 

I would like to say something about China’s own efforts in Africa 

to date, where they have pushed their agenda through various 

channels. Senator Feingold mentioned the most prominent one, the 

5 

Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, a large summit held every 3 

years, most recently in November 2006. 

China’s engagement in Africa has grown very quickly, and 

there’s no doubt that this is an impressive rate of increase, but we 

should keep things in perspective. First of all, China’s aid to Africa 

is somewhere between $1–$2 billion a year. It’s not very transparent, but that’s the best estimate we can come up with. This is 

significantly lower than figures for United States aid of $5 to $6 

billion a year, and European aid, which is upwards of $18 billion 

a year. 

In terms of investment, China’s total investment stock to date in 

Africa amounts to about 1 percent of the total stock, according to 

our latest figures, which come from 2006. This is several times less 

than the U.S. stock. 

And to put things in perspective in the energy sector, which has 

drawn a lot of attention in the scholarly community and among 

pundits, we believe that China’s overall production in Africa is 

about one-third of the total production of one U.S. firm— 

ExxonMobil. So, I think we need to keep those figures in perspective, even as we appreciate the growth rates in China’s activities. 

So, what’s our task, moving forward, from a U.S. Government 

policy perspective? We’re trying to encourage better aid and investment practices that will not only better assist African development, 

but will actually help China’s own reputation on the continent. So, 

we don’t believe we’re asking China to do anything for our benefit; 

we believe we’re asking China to do something that will actually 

assist China, as well, over the long term if they put the proper conditionality on their assistance programs and on their investments, 

if they’re more transparent, and if they encourage good governance. 

We first need to better understand China’s own policies. There’s 

a tendency in the United States to ascribe to China a great deal 

of grand strategizing and integration within the Chinese Government on Africa policy, yet we are under the impression that this 

view is not accurate. We believe that there are multiple Chinese 

Government agencies involved in aid and investment to Africa; and 

that these agencies are not particularly well coordinated at this 

time. Relevant agencies include the Ministry of Commerce, the 

Ministry of Finance, the National Development and Reform Commission, as well as state-owned enterprises involved in investment 

and assistance programs. And we would like to get a better handle 

on exactly what China is doing there, so that we can try to assist 

the Chinese Government in making better choices and in coordinating its own policies toward Africa in a positive direction. 

So, we hope to learn more in our dialogues about the nature of 

China’s activity, and to steer them, again, in a direction that 

makes China’s policies more compatible with the leading donors, 

with the United States, and with international institutions. 

While many are concerned about competition between the United 

States and China in Africa, I’d like to point out that our own economic activity and aid programs to Africa have grown very quickly 

this decade, just as China’s have. I think this underscores the point 

that there is no zero-sum competition between the United States 

and China in Africa. We will continue to work with the Chinese to 

try and help make their policies, investments, and assistance proVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:15 Dec 15, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\45811.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
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grams in Africa more effective for the long-term. The best way to 

do that is to have the Chinese and others encourage African governments to adopt good-governance practices and create the foundations for long-term stability. 

The ultimate goal of U.S. foreign policy in Africa is to create a 

better environment and better prospects for the future for Africans, 

not to compete with the Chinese for influence. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Christensen. 

Mr. Swan. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES SWAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. SWAN. Mr. Chairman, Senator Isakson, thank you very much 

for the opportunity to testify this morning. 

My colleague obviously has presented much of the background 

with respect to China’s motivations in Africa and the nature of the 

United States dialogue with the Chinese on African issues. 

I want to stress that China’s engagement with Africa is not new. 

Beijing initiated bilateral assistance to Africa in 1956, and, as you 

mentioned in your opening remarks, Senator, on the continent 

there is no place where there is not a gleaming showplace that has 

been built by the Chinese. 

Estimates of Chinese development assistance this decade, again, are in the range of $1 to $2 billion a year, which is significantly 

overshadowed by the over $30 billion in assistance from the European Union, the United States, and multilateral institutions. 

But, there’s no question that China’s economic and commercial 

engagement in Africa has increased dramatically and been diversified in the last several years. Bilateral trade rose from about $10 

billion in 2000 to some $70 billion in 2007, and China is now Africa’s second largest trading partner, after the United States. 

As my colleague mentioned, China’s direct investment stock, albeit starting from quite a low base of less than half a billion dollars, has ballooned to some $2.5 billion over the last 3 years, and 

it continues to grow. And Africa is becoming a more important export market for Chinese consumer goods. 

China’s increased economic and commercial activity in Africa 

raises a variety of issues that Chinese and American and outside 

experts, but also Africans themselves, are examining. Among the 

primary concerns—and some of these have already been touched 

upon, Mr. Chairman—are that the influx of low-cost goods from 

China will undercut local industries as they develop in Africa; that 

Chinese infrastructure projects and other investments underutilize 

indigenous labor, finance, and resources, and oftentimes ignore 

labor and environmental standards; and, finally and perhaps most 

importantly, that China’s assistance efforts in Africa, which emphasize no strings and eschew conditionality that is typical of 

Western donor programs, is going to endanger progress that has 

been achieved in promoting good governance and market reform in 

Africa. 

In our view, Africans themselves ultimately will largely shape 

the terms of their relations with China, and it is apparent that, 

7 

while welcoming increased Chinese engagement, Africans are also 

increasingly signaling the importance to them of business practices 

and investments that reinforce African Union and New Partnership 

for African Development principles on good governance and transparency. 

My colleague spoke about the methods that we have for seniorlevel dialogue with the Chinese, both on global issues and on African issues, and I have spoken about some of the concerns that we 

have with respect to China’s engagement in Africa, but I also want 

to speak briefly about a number of areas that we believe could benefit from additional cooperation and burden-sharing between us 

and the Chinese. 

For example, with some 1,500 Chinese peacekeepers and military 

and police and other observers serving on peacekeeping missions 

throughout the continent, we think that China could play a growing role in partnering on post-conflict security-sector reform on the 

continent. And we’ve seen some initial efforts at collaboration with 

the Chinese. One example is Liberia, where we’ve collaborated in 

trying to improve bases for the newly created Liberian military. 

And this is an example, frankly, where very close collaboration between our embassies in the field has been critical to moving forward on this project. 

Let me, in my brief time remaining, say a word about our engagement with China on Sudan. It’s been mentioned by the chairman and others. 

Our dialogue with the Chinese on Darfur continues and is producing results. After years of acting primarily to protect Khartoum 

from international pressure, since late 2006 China is showing an 

increased willingness to engage with the international community 

on Darfur and to apply diplomatic pressure on the Government of 

Sudan to change its behavior. China voted for the Security Council 

resolution that created the hybrid United Nations-African Union 

mission in Darfur. It has contributed engineering corps to this mission, interestingly, making China the first non-African troop-contributing country to deploy in Darfur. And China has become somewhat more involved in responding to the humanitarian crisis in 

Darfur. 

We’ve welcomed these positive trends in Chinese policy on 

Sudan, but we’ve also told the Chinese, frankly, that we think they 

could do a lot more. The Sudanese Government continues to use violence against civilians and rebels in Darfur, and to renege on key 

elements of the UNAMID deployment. 

China, as we’ve discussed, has significant influence with the Government of Sudan, and we’ve asked China to exercise that leverage 

to pressure Khartoum to work toward a negotiated settlement in 

Darfur. 

Elsewhere on the continent, we’ve pushed the Chinese Government to reconsider its close military relations with repressive regimes. Perceptions of Chinese support for African leaders, such as 

Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, harm China’s public profile and detract from its ability to play the role of a responsible stakeholder 

in Africa. 

The recent case of an allegedly routine arms shipment set to arrive 2 weeks after the March elections in Zimbabwe was recalled 

8 

due to international and, importantly, regional pressure on the 

Chinese. 

Finally, as we look for opportunities in our relationship with 

China in Africa, we note that there may be some possibilities in 

nonsecurity sectors such as health and agriculture. For example, 

China and the United States are pursuing potentially complementary programs to eradicate malaria, polio, and other endemic diseases, and we have encouraged our embassy teams across the continent to identify potential areas of cooperation with the Chinese 

and to engage with them to try to promote the benefit of the African population. 

We’ll continue to pursue these opportunities with the Chinese 

while also seeking to influence their actions on African issues to 

encourage good governance, democracy, human rights, and transparency, issues that we would like to see play a yet more prominent role in Chinese policy toward Africa. 

Thank you, Senator. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Christensen and Mr. Swan 

follows:] 

PREPARED JOINT STATEMENT OF JAMES SWAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, 

BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS AND THOMAS J. CHRISTENSEN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 

WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Isakson, and members of the committee, thank you for the 

opportunity to address the subject of China’s growing engagement with Africa and 

its ramifications for U.S. foreign policy. 

China’s growing presence in Africa has generated significant discussion during the 

last several years. This attention reflects the reality that China has important and 

growing interests in Africa, including access to resources and markets, development 

of diplomatic ties, and Chinese claims of leadership in developing world. These objectives are not inherently incompatible with U.S. priorities and, in fact, may offer 

important opportunities for the continent. In general, we see China’s growing activity on the continent as a potentially positive force for economic development there, 

which is a goal we share with China and many others. As President Bush has said, 

we do not see a ‘‘zero-sum’’ competition with China for influence in Africa. Nor do 

we see evidence that China’s commercial or diplomatic activities in Africa are aimed 

at diminishing U.S. influence on the continent. 

As Deputy Secretary Negroponte recently noted in testimony before the full Senate Foreign Relations Committee, policy differences in some areas should come as 

no surprise given the two countries’ very different demographic and economic conditions, histories, and political systems. Our goal, as with other areas of the world, 

is to engage Chinese officials to try to define and expand a common agenda for 

Africa that ultimately will serve both our national interests and maximize the benefit Africa derives from U.S. and Chinese economic investment in the continent. We 

are actively looking for areas of complementarity and cooperation with the Chinese, 

while engaging at multiple levels on differences in approach to specific issues. 

Our regular high-level dialogues with China include the ‘‘Senior Dialogue’’ led by 

Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte, which focuses on political and security issues 

and the Treasury-led ‘‘Strategic Economic Dialogue,’’ which addresses bilateral and 

global economic issues. We also plan to begin this autumn a bilateral dialogue on 

development assistance led by the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance Henrietta 

Fore and her counterpart in China’s Ministry of Commerce. 

The State Department holds a regional subdialogue on Africa as part of the 

United States-China Senior Dialogue on security and political affairs. The subdialogue is led on our side by Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer. In addition to these 

formal dialogues, Assistant Secretary Frazer talks with her Chinese counterparts on 

an ongoing basis on a variety of issues, most recently hosting China’s Special Representative Liu Guijin in May. Special Envoy to Sudan Richard Williamson also regularly communicates with Ambassador Liu on Sudan. In September 2007, Ambassador Ruth Davis, Chief of Staff of the Bureau of African Affairs, traveled to China 

for a series of high-level meetings and public appearances aimed at explaining 

9 

United States-Africa relations. And, of course, our diplomats in Africa are in regular 

contact with their Chinese counterparts on the full range of issues on the continent. 

CHINA IN AFRICA

China’s engagement with Africa is not new. Beijing initiated bilateral assistance 

to Africa in 1956 and, by its own account, has funded over 800 projects between 

1957 and 2008. There are few capitals in Africa where China has not built a showpiece building, from a national sports stadium to a gleaming new ministry headquarters. Estimates of Chinese development assistance to Africa in this decade vary, 

but tend to fall around $1–$2 billion per year. This amount is still relatively modest 

in comparison to the annual contributions of $18 billion (including debt relief) provided by the European Union (EU) and member countries, $9 billion from multilateral institutions, and about $5 billion from the United States Government. 

China’s economic and commercial engagement in Africa has dramatically increased and diversified during the last several years. Bilateral trade rose from $10 

billion in 2000 to $70 billion in 2007, and China is now Africa’s second largest trading partner after the United States. Africa ran an overall trade surplus with China 

between 2004 and 2006, as it did with the United States, and it is clear that China, 

like the United States, has become an important source of both export revenue and 

investment for the continent. China’s direct investment in Africa increased from 

$491 million in 2003 to over $2.5 billion 3 years later and continues to grow. Africa 

is also becoming an important export market for Chinese consumer goods. Small, 

private Chinese investors have invested millions of dollars into opening enterprises 

in Africa that operate in textiles, light manufacturing, construction and agriculture. 

Recent media attention has focused on high-profile Chinese investments in Africa, 

such as the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China’s October 2007 purchase of 

a 20-percent stake in South Africa’s Standard Bank, or a $9 billion loan and investment package for Congo that will be repaid in cobalt and copper from Congolese 

mines. 

China’s economic and commercial engagement in Africa should be understood in 

a broad context. Its activity has increased dramatically in recent years, but started 

from a relatively low base. As of 2006, the value of China’s trade with Africa was 

lower than with the Middle East or Latin America and was a minute percentage 

of its trade with the rest of Asia. On the investment side, China’s investment flow 

into Africa constituted only 2.9 percent of its global outward direct investment. China’s total direct investment stock in Africa accounted for only 1 percent of global 

foreign direct investment in Africa. 

The composition of China’s involvement in Africa has changed greatly over the 

past decade. Whereas the foundation for China’s early interaction with Africa was 

the promotion of a shared leftist, anticolonial ideology, the common ground now is 

mostly a convergence of economic interests in a global trading system. In many 

ways, China’s successful embrace of market-based economics and openness to most 

aspects of globalization can be a positive example for African nations. There also 

have been significant increases in two-way tourism, academic and nongovernmental 

exchanges, and diplomatic initiatives. China has even modeled many of its engagement programs after very successful U.S. exchanges on the continent. For example, 

historically, the United States has identified young emerging political and economic 

African leaders for exchange programs in the United States under something known 

as the ‘‘international visitors program.’’ China is now doing the same thing—identifying Members of Parliament, local entrepreneurs, and well-placed government officials in such key ministries as Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, and Trade and Commerce for training and exchange programs in Beijing. China also funds trips by local 

traders and businesspeople to Africa to source Chinese consumer products. It funds 

sports teams and provides equipment for aspiring African Olympians. Since the year 

2000, China’s primary public relations vehicle for promoting its African presence is 

the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which is held every 3 years. 

China’s increased economic and commercial activity in Africa raises a variety of 

issues that African, Chinese, and other international experts are examining. Some 

Africans worry that the influx of low-cost goods from China undercuts local industry. We also hear concerns that Chinese infrastructure projects underutilize indigenous labor, finance, and resources. Chinese projects often employ imported Chinese 

workers and utilize imported raw materials. Observers have warned that China’s 

assistance efforts in Africa, which emphasize ‘‘no strings’’ and are not predicated on 

the same kinds of conditionality as other countries’ aid programs, could endanger 

progress in promoting good governance and market reform in Africa. As Chinese 

companies’ presence on the continent expands, they will increasingly be expected to 

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ernment would like to engage the Chinese on how their economic policies in Africa 

can help produce better results for sustainable economic development if they conform to the international community’s broader initiatives for Africa. We remain 

steadfast in our belief that strong democratic institutions and protection of fundamental human rights are the foundations for sustainable economic growth. 

We remain concerned with a general lack of transparency regarding China’s foreign assistance practices in Africa, and are encouraging Beijing to more fully engage 

with other major bilateral and multilateral actors to ensure that aid supports the 

efforts of responsible African governments to be responsive to their people’s needs. 

As the U.S. and other creditor countries implement the enhanced Heavily-Indebted 

Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and provide debt relief to qualifying countries, 

transparency is key to understanding how creditors’ assistance packages fit with a 

borrowing country’s debt sustainability framework developed with the International 

Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. By its reluctance to coordinate with groups 

like the IMF and World Bank, we believe China misses an opportunity to make the 

most of its aid, loans, and investment in Africa. On occasion, it appears that China’s 

policies serve to undercut the efforts of others to use investment and development 

assistance to produce improved governance, which almost all credible research about 

development point to as essential to long-term, stable economic growth. 

The international community has expressed similar concerns about the Chinese 

use of foreign assistance as a trade tool, as when African governments grant favorable treatment to Chinese project bids because such bids are tied directly to Chinese 

Government development assistance packages. It is in China’s interest to demonstrate to the international community that its policies in Africa are not driven 

solely by the desire to secure natural resources and access to markets and access 

to major infrastructure projects, and that the Chinese Government is committed to 

improving the long-term welfare of people across the continent. 

When discussing China’s presence in Africa, it is important to highlight that China’s economy has become increasingly diversified and has numerous public and private economic actors that influence the African market. Chinese companies are 

active in financial markets, telecommunications, manufacturing, textiles, agro-business, and a variety of extractive industries. For example, we must distinguish between Chinese energy companies’ pursuit of exploration agreements and the Chinese Government’s Africa policy. Certainly the Chinese Ministries of Commerce and 

Foreign Affairs promote access to natural resources and export markets for Chinese 

firms as part of their policies. But observers sometimes ascribe too much coordination and grand strategizing to the Chinese leadership’s policies toward the developing world. There are often exaggerated charges that Chinese firms’ activities or 

investment decisions are coordinated by the Chinese Government as some sort of 

strategic gambit in the high-stakes game of global energy security. In reality, Chinese firms compete for profitable projects not only with more technologically and politically savvy international firms, but also with each other. 

Contrary to what many assume, China’s large oil companies are not dominant 

players in Africa’s energy industry. With the important exception of Sudan, where 

the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) is the major operator, Chinese oil 

companies are relatively minor players in Africa. In 2006, total output by all Chinese producers was approximately one-third of a single U.S. firm’s (ExxonMobil) 

African production. Some energy assets now held by Chinese companies were in the 

past run by international oil companies that found more profitable opportunities 

elsewhere in Africa. 

Africans themselves will, of course, largely shape the terms of their relations with 

China. While welcoming increased Chinese engagement, Africans have also signaled 

the importance of business practices that reinforce African Union and New Partnership for African Development principles on good governance. Chinese labor, environmental and quality-control standards have drawn extra scrutiny from many Africans. In Zambia, for example, anti-Chinese sentiment became an important election 

issue in 2005 when the opposition mobilized voters from the country’s copper belt 

following a deadly explosion at a Chinese-owned copper mine. 

UNITED STATES-CHINA ENGAGEMENT

Within the context of our senior- and policy-level discussions with the Chinese, 

we have identified a number of areas that would benefit from additional cooperation 

and burden-sharing. For example, with 1,452 Chinese military, police, and observers 

serving on peacekeeping missions throughout Africa, China could play a greater role 

in coordinating with us on post-conflict security sector reform activities and in 

equipping and supporting African peacekeepers. In Liberia, for example, China has 

contributed to the U.S.-led rebuilding of that nation’s army. The U.S. Government 

11 

trained staff and refurbished the Ministry of Defense headquarters while China provided vehicles and computer equipment. The United States is in the process of recruiting, vetting, training, and equipping a 2,000-man army and has rebuilt three 

military bases around Monrovia. China is providing some specialty training and is 

rebuilding at least one base up-country. Good communication between the U.S. and 

Chinese Embassies on the ground has helped each party identify areas for inputs. 

We want to build on that success elsewhere in Africa. 

Our dialogue on Darfur is ongoing and is producing important results. After years 

of acting primarily to protect Khartoum from international pressure, since late 2006 

China has shown an increased willingness to engage with the international community on Darfur, and has applied diplomatic pressure on the Government of Sudan 

to change its behavior, as well as to engage in a political process for a peaceful negotiation to the Darfur conflict. China voted for UNSC Resolution 1769 that created 

the hybrid United Nations African Mission in Darfur, but has at times acquiesced 

in the Government of Sudan’s opposition to its full implementation. China has 

pledged up to 300 military engineers, of whom 140 have been dispatched, making 

China the first non-African Troop Contributing Country to deploy in Darfur. China 

has also become more involved in responding to the humanitarian crisis, providing 

some direct assistance and donating $1.8 million U.S. dollars to the Darfur region 

and the African Union Special Mission. 

We have welcomed this positive change in Chinese policy, but have also told 

China frankly that it could do a lot more. The Sudanese Government continues to 

use violence against civilians and rebels in Darfur, and renege on key elements of 

the UNAMID deployment. China enjoys significant influence with the Government 

of Sudan due to its investments in the country’s energy sector, and we have asked 

China to exercise its leverage to pressure Khartoum to work toward a negotiated 

solution in Darfur. 

We have also asked the Chinese Government to halt its companies’ substantial 

arms trade with Sudan because of the likelihood that some Chinese-origin armaments are being used by the Sudanese Government in Darfur, in contravention of 

UNSCR 1591. The proliferation of lethal conventional weapons in Africa contributes 

to instability and endangers China’s long-term interests on the continent. In the 

same spirit we have pushed the Chinese Government to reconsider the wisdom of 

retaining close military relations with repressive regimes on the continent. Perceptions of Chinese support of African leaders such as Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, who 

rule through guns and intimidation, harms China’s image and undermines it ability 

to play the role of responsible stakeholder in Africa’s affairs. 

In nonsecurity areas such as health, China and the United States are pursuing 

potentially complementary programs to eradicate malaria, polio, and other endemic 

diseases. In agriculture, the U.S. and Chinese Ambassadors in Ethiopia arranged 

exchanges to observe demonstration farms each country had built to increase agricultural capacity. The U.S. and Chinese Ambassadors in Angola have also agreed 

to identify a joint development project in the agriculture sector. We have encouraged 

our Embassy country teams all over Africa to identify potential areas of cooperation 

in the multiple sectors and engage with Chinese counterparts to the benefit of African populations. 

The State Department has also attempted to bring Chinese, United States, and 

African civil society together by supporting conferences and symposiums. For example, the NGO Vital Voices held a summit for African Women in Cape Town, South 

Africa, in January 2007, in which a small contingent of Chinese women participated. A followup symposium for Chinese and African women entrepreneurs in 

Shanghai was held in September 2007 to further cooperation. 

CONCLUSION

International concerns about China’s increasing commercial and diplomatic presence in Africa must be considered within the wider context of questions about the 

ramifications of China’s rise as a global economic and political actor. These questions are particularly acute because of our bilateral trade deficit with China and the 

perception that China’s growing demand for natural resources is contributing upward pressure on global commodity prices during a potential global economic slowdown. 

But the big questions for the United States in discussions of China-in-Africa are 

not based in concerns about the United States-China bilateral economic relationship 

but rather in our foreign policy priorities for Africa, which are promoting democracy, 

human rights, political stability, good governance, and sustainable economic development to improve the health, education, and living standards of the continent’s 

population. China already is making a substantial contribution to the continent’s 

12 

economic development, and we believe that it can play an even more important role 

in the future. In that spirit, we engage at multiple levels to influence Chinese actions on issues such as good governance, human rights, and transparency—issues 

that we believe should play as prominent a role in Chinese Africa policy as in ours. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thanks, Mr. Swan, and to the panel. 

We’ve been joined by the ranking member of the committee, Senator Lugar, who, of course, has a very long career and is very devoted to all the issues that come up with regard to Africa, and Senator Bob Casey, Pennsylvania, who, of course, is a new colleague, 

but this time last week Senator Casey and I were in India, holding 

meetings with top Indian officials. And I would just note that India 

has significant involvement in Africa, as well, and that is the subject of some interest, as well, even though the focus today is on 

China and Africa. 

Let me begin with 7-minute rounds. 

Thank you for your remarks. I’m glad to hear that the State Department appreciates both the potential for cooperation with the 

Chinese in some areas, as well as the need for more concerted efforts to change current Chinese policy in others. 

I agree that China’s commercial and diplomatic activities in Africa are not aimed at diminishing U.S. influence on the continent, 

but, of course, as you’ve both suggested, if repressive rulers or abusive militaries know they can rely on Chinese support, that will undermine efforts of the international community to bring about reform through isolation or conditional assistance. 

Now, Mr. Swan, as you pointed out, China’s arms sales to Sudan 

are an excellent example of the Chinese Government directly 

defying the will of the international community, as expressed in 

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1591. I appreciate that you have 

asked the Chinese to halt such sales. What more can the United 

States do to hold China accountable for its violation of international law and norms? 

Mr. SWAN. Thank you, Senator. 

The Security Council resolution prohibits arms shipments into 

Darfur, and the concern that we have raised with the Chinese is 

that their sales to Sudan, in general, pose the risk that those armaments could be transferred to Darfur and add to the instability 

in that region. This is an issue that obviously we continue to raise 

with the Chinese. We have a very active dialogue with them on 

Sudan issues. The special envoy for Sudan, Richard Williamson, is 

in frequent contact with his counterpart. His predecessor as special 

envoy also met frequently with his Chinese counterpart, and, indeed, traveled to Beijing on, I believe, twice for consultations on 

these issues. So, on the whole range of subjects related to how to 

influence Sudanese behavior with respect to Darfur, we are working very closely with the Chinese. 

Obviously, there are other vehicles for us to continue to engage 

the Chinese on this subject. We are in frequent contact with them 

through the Security Council, which, of course, is active not only 

on Sudan issues, but on other peace and security issues throughout 

the continent. So, this issue is going to remain very much at the 

top of our agenda with the Chinese. 

I would like to point out that, at the last Assistant Secretary 

level meeting with her counterpart in the PRC Government last 

13 

March, Sudan was very much on the agenda, and, indeed, as part 

of those discussions, our Assistant Secretary emphasized the importance of a Chinese contribution to proceeding with the heavy 

support package as a bridge to deployment of UNAMID. And partly 

as a result of those conversations, we did see the Chinese commit 

to a deployment of 400 engineers to Darfur, of which I believe 

about 140 are currently in place in Darfur. We also pressed, during 

those conversations, for the Chinese to take a greater interest in 

the humanitarian situation in Darfur, and, as a consequence partly 

of those conversations, Assistant Secretary Frazer’s counterpart, 

Zhai Jun, personally traveled to Darfur as part of a multilateral 

humanitarian mission, and we’ve subsequently seen some modest 

contributions from the Chinese in the humanitarian sector in 

Darfur. So, our engagement is showing results, in terms of influencing Chinese behavior, and, on the full range of issues related to 

Sudan, we will continue to try to exercise that pressure. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. 

Let me get Mr. Christensen’s view. Why aren’t we doing more to 

hold the Chinese Government accountable for its irresponsible policies in Sudan, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere, where its economic ties 

seem to trump wider governance and security objectives? And 

what, in your view, are our points of leverage here? 

Mr. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you very much. 

I think it’s an excellent question, and, as Jim Swan just pointed 

out, we have been engaging the Chinese on these issues for some 

time. I started this job in July 2006, and at that time China’s policy on Sudan, in particular, was about as bad as one could imagine, 

where they were basically telling the international community, ‘‘If 

you want to put pressure on Sudan, you have to come through 

China; China will stand in the way and protect Khartoum.’’ And 

it really has evolved quite a bit in that period, from July 2006 to 

the present, to include deployment of engineering troops, et cetera. 

And we believe that our dialogue system and basically holding 

China to account for its reputation around the world for its policies 

has been effective in getting China to move in a positive direction. 

On the issue of arms sales, we’re not at all satisfied, obviously, 

with the policy. And one of the things we’re trying to drive home 

to the Chinese is that there’s more to being a responsible stakeholder in the world than following the letter of the law in U.N. Security Council resolutions. So, if you look at 1591, China can come 

back and say, ‘‘Well, we’re selling weapons to Khartoum, we’re not 

selling weapons to the Darfur region.’’ But, China needs to recognize that selling weapons to Khartoum at this time, while Khartoum is involved in the activities in the Darfur region that it’s involved in, is a negative outcome for the international community, 

for humanitarianism, and also for China’s own reputation on the 

international stage. 

In the case of Zimbabwe, you saw China get a lot of pushback, 

again, not just from the United States and the EU, but also from 

regional actors, about its arms sales to Zimbabwe, particularly just 

after just after the election debacle there. I think that sends a message to China, that they need to learn, over time and through these 

types of dialogues, that it’s really their own interests that are on 

the line when they adopt these policies because their reputation is 

14 

harmed. And they do seem to care quite a bit about their reputation. 

Senator FEINGOLD. As you both know, today is the 19th anniversary of the infamous Tiananmen Square massacre. On that note, 

one issue that was glaringly absent from your testimonies is China’s poor human rights record, which we see reflected in its activities in Africa. 

Mr. Christensen, I understand that after being stalled for a number of years, the United States-China Human Rights Dialogue was 

restarted last week in Beijing, and that you were a participant in 

these discussions. I’m curious why this dialogue was reopened now, 

despite no observable progress with respect to human rights. In 

fact, China has recently violated its own promises to improve its 

record in advance of the summer’s Beijing Olympics. So, what was 

the impetus for this meeting? And what were the intended 

deliverables from the meeting? 

Mr. CHRISTENSEN. The meeting was agreed upon this February 

by Secretary Rice and Chinese Foreign Minister Jang Jiechi. They 

talked at great length about the importance of human rights and 

why restarting the dialogue was a good way to try to push the ball 

forward on this issue. 

In terms of the types of topics that we dealt with in the dialogue, 

it was precisely the types of topics that you raised, Senator: freedom-of-the-press issues that are supposed to be linked to the Olympics—China’s implementation of its own commitments in January 

2007 to open up China to the foreign press corps. We’re urging 

China to abide by those commitments, to implement them around 

the country, and also to apply those commitments, after the Olympics, to foreign and Chinese journalists. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Just a quick followup. Were any of these 

deliverables achieved? 

Mr. CHRISTENSEN. We’ll have to see whether they’re achieved. 

The nature of these dialogues is that we present our concerns and 

our analysis of trends in China, and then we wait to see how the 

Chinese Government responds. We deal with programmatic issues, 

like freedom of the press, rule of law, the court system, and various 

laws that have been passed. We also deal with specific lists of dissidents and prisoners, and issues like the Tiananmen prisoners. 

Then we have to wait and see. 

The way we present this to the Chinese, to get at the question 

of what might move the Chinese, is, to say that we are committed 

to the idea that China should have a successful Olympics. That’s 

something the United States would like to see. The President has 

committed to go to the Olympics. For the Olympics to be successful, 

however, China has to show progress, not just on the economic 

front, but on the social and human rights fronts as well. That’s the 

approach that we’ve taken. I think it’s an approach that leads the 

Chinese to listen to our concerns in a more attentive fashion because they know that when we raise these human rights concerns 

that we wish China well. We want China to adopt these reforms, 

because we think it’ll make China stronger and more stable. 

I think that’s the spirit of the dialogue. We hope that the dialogue will produce results. We think this type of dialogue is the 

15 

way to go. And we’re glad that it’s been restarted after a 6-year hiatus. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, sir. 

Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have not traveled to Africa nearly as extensively as the chairman has, but I’ve traveled there a little bit, and I know the issue 

of the no-strings-attached approach of China, versus the United 

States approach; we focus on human rights, we focus on democracy, 

we focus on infrastructure. 

I was in Equatorial Guinea in January. They have a newfound 

wealth, in terms of natural gas in abundance. And I noted with interest that they were building hospitals. They brought the Israeli 

Government in to build and staff hospitals. They were building facilities. They were really investing not only in their infrastructure, 

but their people, which is, of course, what we would like to see 

every countrydo. Is there a move—as Africa is beginning to prosper 

in certain areas, is there a movement—a positive movement toward 

what we seek, which is helping the people, reinvesting in the people in the country, and human rights? Do you see a trend going 

that way and away from the old Africa? 

Mr. SWAN. Thanks very much for the question, Senator. 

Yes; overall, I think our Government is Afro-optimistic. I think 

that we believe that there is a very strong and positive future for 

the continent, and that we’ve seen tremendous progress in Africa 

in recent years, with some unfortunate exceptions—— 

Senator ISAKSON. Right. 

Mr. SWAN Overall, certainly we’ve seen high levels of economic 

growth, averaging more than 5 percent for the continent in recent 

years. We have seen a wave of democratic reform on the continent, 

from fewer than five countries that were classified by Freedom 

House as free in the late 1980s, to a majority, at this point. So, 

we’re seeing steady progress on the continent in a whole variety of 

areas. 

Equatorial Guinea is a unique example, in many ways, because 

of the very rapid increase in its wealth as a consequence of the oil 

discoveries, oil discoveries that were primarily undertaken by U.S. 

private-sector firms when a number of other governments, 

parastatals, and private foreign companies were not interested in 

Equatorial Guinea. So, I think this is an example of a strong and 

successful private-sector-led investment in Africa. 

And as I hope you noted, Senator, while you were there, although 

we are starting from quite a small base, in terms of our own presence, our post in Malabo was closed for a number of years, but we 

have a very dynamic Ambassador there now who is building up a 

staff. We have identified a new property, and look forward to construction of a new embassy in the coming years, and are very actively engaged with the Equatoguineans. 

There is also an innovative program there, the Social Development Fund, in which the United States is actually helping the 

Equatoguineans and the Equatoguinean government in determining how best to manage its own social investment programs 

within Equatorial Guinea to ensure maximum benefit to its people. 

16 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, on that subject, Ambassador Johnson is 

doing a great job. And I had enjoyed meeting with him. The Chinese are building a huge embassy compound there. And the 

Equatoguineans gave the United States a good site. I want to commend you—if you had anything to do with it—moving forward, by 

a year, the funding for both the residence, as well as the embassy, 

which I think is going to be critically important. This is not to compete with China or anybody else, but because a lot of the European 

countries are doing the same thing, as well, and we have a tremendous American investment—private investment in Equatorial 

Guinea. 

One comment you made, I was interested in. You said, ‘‘Some Africans worry that the influx of low-cost goods from China undercuts 

local industry.’’ Did you say that, Mr. Swan? 

Mr. SWAN. I did. 

Senator ISAKSON. OK. What took me was that I would have 

thought that, as China being at the level of development they are, 

and Africa the level they are, that the reverse would be true. But, 

are the Chinese able to produce and sell in Africa, products cheaper 

than Africans could do it themselves? 

Mr. SWAN. In some sectors and for some commodities, yes. I 

mean, one sees throughout Africa small, inexpensive mass-produced Chinese plastic goods. And because of the scale of production 

in China—I’d defer to others who know more about the Chinese 

economy, certainly than I do—but, because the Chinese scale of 

production is so massive, their ability to tap into worldwide distribution chains so good, while many African countries are still at 

a nascent stage, in terms of industrialization and manufacturing 

production, this has been an issue. 

In South Africa, for example, which does have an active manufacturing sector, the threat from very inexpensive Chinese imports 

has been an issue in the labor sector there. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, I guess one great target for investment 

would be in business and manufacturing expertise. The United 

States has to get them competitive, in and of themselves, in Africa. 

Last question. Mr. Christensen, you made an interesting comment also. You said they had three goals—China had three main 

goals in Africa. One was the natural resources, which the majority 

of their imports from Africa are natural resources; enhanced power 

and prestige; and then you said ‘‘to compete with the image of Taiwan and China.’’ Did you say that? 

Mr. CHRISTENSEN. To compete for diplomatic recognition from Africa—— 

Senator ISAKSON. What is Taiwan’s presence in Africa? 

Mr. CHRISTENSEN. Currently, four African nations that recognize 

the Republic of China—Taiwan’s official name—instead of the PRC. 

Senator ISAKSON. OK. That was very interesting. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I appreciate you calling this hearing, and enjoyed our time in India the 

last couple of days, and it’s good to be home. Thank you so much. 

I wanted to return to the discussion about Darfur—and also 

want to say, to Mr. Swan and Mr. Christensen, thank you for your 

17 

testimony today, and your public service—I wanted to return to 

some of the questions that Senator Feingold raised with regard to 

Darfur. In particular, let me also just quickly review what was in 

the testimony, as it pertains to Darfur and China. 

All is good news. I don’t mean to downplay or undercount what 

we reviewed here. But, five or six things were mentioned. Engage 

with the international community—that’s good news. Diplomatic 

pressure—good news. Resolution 1716—that’s good. Three hundred 

military engineers—good news; 1.8 million bucks—not a lot of 

money, frankly, but some good news. 

But also, I think it’s important to make sure we’re on the same 

page, in terms of what the reality is. Let me ask—Mr. Swan might 

be the one to answer this. Does China continue to sell aircraft, 

weapons, and police equipment to the Khartoum regime? 

Mr. SWAN. I don’t know when the last sale would have taken 

place, but my understanding is there has been no commitment by 

the Chinese not to continue arms sales to Sudan. But, I don’t know 

exactly when the last sale might have taken place. 

Senator CASEY. But, you have no evidence that there’s been any 

diminution in that, or the cessation of that kind of commercial activity, we’ll call it. 

Mr. SWAN. No; I don’t think we have any indication of a cessation 

of that activity, that’s correct. 

Senator CASEY. And that’s obviously very troubling. And, Mr. 

Christensen, you raised this issue, and it’s an important one to remember, that despite all of the progress—and I know that progress 

doesn’t come by accident—it didn’t happen because they woke up 

one morning and decided to do it; I realize our Government and 

people like you have been working on this. So, we appreciate that. 

And I think that has to continue. And I think people are going to 

be watching carefully—or watching closely, I should say, the 

progress of that effort to ask the Chinese Government to do what 

it can do, because of the influence that they have on the Sudanese 

Government. 

Let me also—in terms of what they’re not doing—let me go back 

to a discussion about their noninterference policy. It seems that 

their noninterference policy is in place, but there’s a—there’s a big 

neon sign—asterisk when it comes to Taiwan. It’s, ‘‘Noninterference, except you’ve got to do this, that, and the other thing with 

regard to Taiwan.’’ And just in terms of their credibility in the 

international community, do you think that exception, or that asterisk on the policy, don’t you think that compromises their ability 

to—or compromises their credibility, I should say, in the international community? 

Mr. CHRISTENSEN. I think I can answer that. People say that 

there are no strings attached to Chinese aid and Chinese investment. Actually, there is clearly one string attached, which is 

whether the country in question recognizes the Mainland or recognizes Taiwan. That does affect their policies. 

I think that, in general, there are optimistic trends in crossStrait relations that may, we hope, lead to a more expansive and 

open policy on the Mainland toward Taiwan and cross-Strait relations, and also toward Taiwan and the international community, to 

provide Taiwan more international space. We have pushed for that 

18 

consistently as part of our policy. In cases where statehood is a requirement, the United States doesn’t seek Taiwan’s membership in 

international organizations, but we do support observer status and 

meaningful participation. In other cases, where statehood is not a 

requirement, we support Taiwan’s full membership and active 

membership. 

We’re hopeful that the warming trends in cross-Strait relations 

will lead the government in Beijing to realize that it’s in the longterm interest of stability across the Strait and in the long-term interests of the international community for Taiwan to play the full 

role that it can play on the international stage. 

Senator CASEY. Mr. Christensen, before, in response to—I’m not 

sure what question it was—you mentioned the awareness or the 

sensitivity that the Chinese have to their reputation, or how 

they’re viewed. Tell us more about that. In terms of—in a general 

sense, but specifically in terms of, for example, the Darfur policy. 

I’m thinking about psychology here as much as anything, but tell 

us more about that, in terms of how we can foster that. 

Mr. CHRISTENSEN. Yes, I think psychology is important here. 

China clearly, as part of its overall policy toward the international 

community, wants to improve it’s prestige and reputation abroad. 

That’s been a consistent goal for decades. What we need to do is 

to convince the PRC that the best way to improve that reputation 

and to improve its prestige is to coordinate its activities with the 

international community. That’s the whole foundation of our approach of saying, ‘‘China, we want you to do more on the international stage, we want you to have a higher profile, we want you 

to have more influence, but we want you to do that by becoming 

a responsible stakeholder.’’ 

We think that this approach has produced results, not just in 

Sudan, but in other countries, as well, and it’s a process of debate 

within China. There’s not a monolithic view within the Chinese 

Government on how China should pursue its foreign policy. We 

want the right people to win those debates. 

One of the things we try to do is point out when China takes actions that we think are irresponsible, such as the arms sales to 

Sudan, but we also try to point out, in a positive and very public 

way, when China does the right thing, like committing to send 300 

engineering troops to the UNAMID peacekeeping force, 140 of 

whom are deployed. And they’re under threat, to be frank. There 

are groups in Sudan that don’t want those Chinese forces there. 

And they’ve kept them in place, and they are building infrastructure. 

Ultimately, we won’t be satisfied in Darfur until that large 

peacekeeping force is in there and the people are safe, so we urge 

China to do more than it has in the past. But, when it does the 

right thing, we’re very quick and very public in our congratulations 

of China for doing the right thing. 

We think that’s the way to go, in general, with China. A lot of 

people in China think that we’re trying to contain China and keep 

it down, but, in fact in many ways, we’re doing the opposite by encouraging China to do more on the international stage, albeit in coordination with the international community, the United States, 

19 

and the European Union, in order to achieve stability and longterm economic development. 

Thank you. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Senator Casey. 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join Senator 

Casey in congratulating you and Senator Isakson for this timely 

meeting, and, likewise, the energy you give to issues of Africa. 

A group in Washington, called the Africa Society, held its fourth 

annual meeting honoring a specific ambassador from an African 

country this year. The ambassador nominated and heard was the 

distinguished Ambassador from Angola. And I mention her because, during her remarks to a large group of Americans and Africans, she mentioned Angola is now the seventh largest supplier of 

oil to the United States. This came as a revelation to many, that, 

first of all, there was that much oil being produced in Angola, and 

that we were as dependent upon Angola as we are, as a matter of 

fact. It also brought to the fore that a civil war occurred in Angola 

for well over two decades, terminating somewhere around 2002– 

2003, and, in some respects, the United States was perceived on 

the wrong side of how that turned out. 

Now, this is not all bad, from our idealism; we were on the side, 

we felt, of human rights and of trying to diminish what we felt 

were Communist influences from other countries. But, at the same 

time, the Angolans are pointing out, this has required very special 

emphasis on our part, not as a rectifying our position, but of more 

engaged diplomacy with Angola to bridge gaps that are important, 

with an important country. 

Now, I mention all of this because two of our staff members from 

the committee, Michael Phelan and Neil Brown, went to five African countries during the recent recess, and their observations jibe 

with what I learned during this Africa Society dinner, which also 

included about 20 other ambassadors from African countries. I had 

a very rich dialogue both before and after the speech by the Angolan. 

And, essentially, what they are pointing out is, as you have, that 

the Chinese presence has been highly visible for a long time, for 

decades now, a very high visibility, and not by chance. The Chinese 

have attempted to enhance that visibility. 

Now, I suppose, second, they observed, at least in the embassies 

that they visited, that there was little systematic policy engagement between the United States diplomats there and the Chinese. 

Now, this is differentiated from the occasional partnership or place 

in which we find a cooperative element. But, in terms of persons 

in the embassy and resources in the embassy assigned to an alliance or a—more of a coming together with the Chinese, this suffers, perhaps, as both of you know better than most, from the lack 

of resources in some of these embassies. And I compliment both of 

you for your advocacy within the Department. It’s not easy. 

Or, to state it another way, there is also a feeling on the part 

of these African ambassadors that I talked to, quite apart from observation of our staff, that high-level visitations by United States 

20 

officials in Africa clearly are well behind those of the Chinese, for 

example. Maybe other countries. But, the Chinese frequently devote pretty high-level folks to have high-level dialogue. 

Now, we do the best we can with resourceful ambassadors in the 

field, and with yourselves, as you move through there. And I don’t 

diminish your importance. But, at the same time, I would just suggest that this, you might say, is a subject that’s beyond my 

paygrade. You know, the Secretary has to decide who goes and who 

doesn’t, and so forth. I just observe that, as we’re discussing, today, 

the role of China there, pretty high profile for a long time, and sort 

of embedded in a good number of these situations, and with some 

pretty stringent objectives, as they look at it, that are useful for 

them, as well as for the African countries—been mutually helpful— 

and, I would say, even in the oil business. The observation of the 

ambassadors, as well as our staff, is that the Chinese have not 

been invidious to our interests. If anything, the Chinese investment 

in the oil business has made available more oil in the world markets than would have been the case without their investment. So 

that it’s a sophisticated process as to who is doing what. 

My only question—and I raise it in this way—is, How can we elevate the interest, in our own government, in the African nations to 

a point where resources are available, that the requests come initially from the Department for these situations? And, second, organizationally, how can the embassies be configured in ways in which 

we are more likely to have systemic cooperation with the Chinese— 

sort of, week in, month out—so that—because I think that’s doable—in part, because of some breakthroughs, maybe, elsewhere in 

the Six- Power Talks with North Korea, which have nothing to do 

with the Chinese specifically, but, as all of you know, brought together our diplomats at various levels with Chinese diplomats in 

ways that have led to cooperation elsewhere in the world, including 

Africa. 

Do you have any general comments as to how the situation can 

be enhanced? 

Mr. SWAN. Certainly. Thank you very much, Senator. 

With respect to the level of engagement that we have with the 

Chinese in Africa, first of all, I think we are seeing that increase. 

My own observation, personally from the field, is that in recent 

years we’ve seen a new breed of Chinese diplomat, if I may put it 

that way, on the continent, often with a lot of regional area expertise, often with very good local language skills, and seemingly 

much more interested in exchange and dialogue with us. And I 

know that our posts in the field, our embassies, are acutely aware 

of the heightened interest in China in Africa. We frequently ask 

them to take the pulse of what’s happening in those relationships. 

I know that when I am out in the field personally, I try to see 

my Chinese colleagues. I was in Chad not too long ago, and made 

a point of seeing the Chinese Ambassador there for his perspective 

on developments in Chad. And so, I think there is a serious effort 

to move in that direction. 

But, I take your point, absolutely, sir, that this is an important 

issue, and we need to continue to look to ways to step up our engagement on it. 

21 

If I might just say a word with respect to a more general premise 

of the question, I think, it’s that United States engagement in Africa, of course, has increased and is quite robust, at this point. As 

someone from the Africa Bureau, of course, I would be enthusiastic 

about seeing it increased yet further. But, obviously, there are 

questions of global priorities that have to be addressed by others. 

But, certainly we’ve seen United States assistance bilaterally increase to $51⁄2 billion; we’ve got the Millennium Challenge Corporation program—8 of the 16 countries that have signed a Millennium 

Challenge Compacts are in Africa; it’s about 3 billion dollars’ worth 

of Millennium Challenge programs; very dynamic and expansive 

PEPFAR, President’s Emergency Program for AIDS Relief, on the 

continent at the $30 billion commitment level; a $1.2 billion 

multiyear President’s Malaria Initiative and other programs. So, I 

think that there is a very active engagement there. 

We also have been very involved in certain areas in which perhaps others are less willing to be—the patient and painstaking diplomatic work to help resolve conflicts. I think the United States has 

been very actively promoting peace on the continent, from Liberia 

to Democratic Republic of the Congo to the North-South Sudan 

Peace Agreement. So, I think there is very active U.S. engagement 

on that front as well. 

In terms of high-level visits, President Bush was there in February and was, I think, extraordinarily well received in Tanzania, 

in Rwanda, in Benin, in Ghana, and in Liberia. And, I think, as 

you look at African responses, African attitudes toward the United 

States, remain very, very favorable. And I think that that is a testimony to the level of engagement that we’ve had. 

That said, I support, absolutely, contining on a trajectory that 

leads to deeper engagement. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you. 

Mr. CHRISTENSEN. If I could just add a couple of things, Senator. 

I think your question is an excellent one, and I would just point 

out that, in the case of Angola, it is a major energy supplier for 

China—in fact, it’s the largest energy supplier in sub-Saharan Africa for China, much bigger than Sudan. China has big interests in 

Angola. China has invested a lot in Angola and has given assistance to Angola. 

One of the things we have tried to do through our Ambassador 

in Angola is reach out to the Chinese in Angola to see if we can 

do joint projects on agricultural development. This is right along 

the lines of the thrust of your question. 

We don’t know where this is going to head. It’s a new proposal. 

But, we think it’s the right kind of proposal. 

And I’ll just say, as a China specialist—so I can make my own 

special advocacy for China specialists—I’m an academic; I’m in the 

government temporarily—I think it’s very important for the Nation 

to have lots of China specialists, to have people who speak Chinese. 

I think it’s good for the U.S. Government to have China specialists 

deployed not just in China, but deployed increasingly in other 

places, so that they can engage their Chinese counterparts in 

places like Southeast Asia, Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere. 

If more resources were put in that direction, I think it would be 

welcome and it would be a good idea. 

22 

Thank you. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you. 

Thank you both. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I’m pleased to see such good attendance for 

this hearing. 

I’d turn now to Senator Nelson. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for your public service. 

I want to follow up more on the cooperation of the Chinese with 

us. And, Mr. Christensen, you state in your testimony, ‘‘We also 

plan to begin, this autumn, a bilateral dialogue on development assistance, led by Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance Henrietta Fore 

and her counterpart in China’s Ministry of Commerce.’’ And the 

last time that Secretary Negroponte was here, I asked him what 

the United States was doing to get China to cooperate—specifically, 

that question was to the Sudan. And he said the State Department 

had proposed dialogues on assistance with China. Have the Chinese agreed to discuss their assistance programs in Africa with us? 

Mr. CHRISTENSEN. Yes, sir. We had a very good visit. I traveled 

with the Deputy Secretary in May, and we met with the Ministry 

of Commerce during that trip, and we discussed the assistance dialogue. The Chinese were very receptive to the idea, the only problem being that they have this small event, the Olympics, coming 

up in a hurry, and they’re also tied down in relief work in Burma 

and their own earthquake problems, which are quite severe, as you 

know. So, they decided that it was probably best to have these 

meetings sometime after the Olympics. 

They were quite positive in their discussions with us about this 

idea. They seemed to want to engage. And we had a very good 

meeting with one of their vice ministers in the Ministry of Commerce, and we look forward to that dialogue. It will be about more 

than just Africa, but obviously Africa will feature prominently in 

that dialogue. 

Senator BILL NELSON. And in that dialogue will it be the position, the policy of the United States Government that, in the dialogue, that the Chinese position of no-strings-attached approach is 

not going to be good, because it helps prop up some of these brutal 

regimes? 

Mr. CHRISTENSEN. Yes, sir. When we approach the Chinese on 

these issues, we try to drive home why these good-governance programs, at the heart of which is this conditionality, are important 

for long-term development in Africa. For either intentional or unintentional reasons, some Chinese assistance programs which have 

no strings attached pull in the opposite direction, and a big part 

of our dialogue system is simply convincing them that it’s in their 

interest to have good governance in Africa, to have transparency, 

to have accountability in Africa. We believe, as they invest more 

and more in Africa, they’re going to increasingly come to this conclusion, that they have a stake in stability and good governance 

there. They’ve run into some real problems in Africa with their investments. They’ve had kidnappings of Chinese workers; they’ve 

had some contractual problems. I think, over time, partially 

through our dialogue and partially through their own experience, 

they will come to different conclusions about the nature of noVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:15 Dec 15, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\45811.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
23 

strings-attached investment. That will be very much at the front 

and center of our approach when we address them, as it has been 

in the past, in the Senior Dialogue and in the Strategic Economic 

Dialogue. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Have you seen any evidence that they’re 

changing their attitude about their no-strings-attached policy? 

Mr. CHRISTENSEN. I wouldn’t say that we have evidence that 

they’ve changed, on a principled level, the no-strings-attached policy. However, we do see some evidence that they have run into 

problems in Africa that have forced them to adjust their behavior 

toward certain countries, that they’ve pulled back some business 

deals, they’ve had some problems recently in Zimbabwe, like everybody else, because of the nature of the regime there. We’re hopeful 

that the Chinese Government will draw the proper conclusions 

from those lessons that the best way forward over the long term 

is to have good governance in those countries. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, speaking of Zimbabwe, they want to 

sell weapons to Zimbabwe. What’s their lesson in Zimbabwe? 

Mr. CHRISTENSEN. Well, here’s a good example. They do sell 

weapons to Zimbabwe, and we have real concerns over that. Recently, there was a shipment to Zimbabwe, just following the election debacle there, and the international community and, I think, 

even more important still, local governments and local actors in Africa resisted that arms transfer at that time, and it’s our understanding that the shipment of arms, which was worth over a million dollars, we believe, in arms, was sent back to China. They had 

trouble unloading the shipments in South Africa. Other countries 

said the shipments were unwelcome. The international community, 

including the United States, expressed concerns about the transfer 

of weapons at this time, given the civil strife in Zimbabwe, and the 

Chinese recalled that shipment. Whether that will become a pattern or not, we will see, but we think that the recall of that shipment was a good decision. 

Senator BILL NELSON. This kind of approach to aid assistance in 

Africa by China, is this buying them long-term political support 

among the African nations? 

Mr. CHRISTENSEN. I think, as with many countries’ experience in 

the past, China’s record on this is mixed. I think that governments 

in Africa are obviously more comfortable with unconditional aid 

than conditional aid, but I think that China has run into some 

reputational problems in Africa as a result of its economic engagement. There have been, as I said, some attacks on Chinese projects 

in countries like Nigeria. There have also been problems for China 

in electoral politics in countries like Zambia. And we think that 

China is running into some of the problems that former investors 

and outside economic actors have run into in Africa. I think they’ve 

run into some that are particular to China at this time, which is 

that many people in Africa seem to appreciate the fact that the 

international community, the United States, the major donors, the 

international institutions, support good governance as part of these 

assistance programs. Our own reputation in sub-Saharan Africa, I 

understand—Mr. Swan can speak more authoritatively—is quite 

24 

high, and we have kept a very strict conditionality on our assistance. 

So, hopefully—— 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, what—— 

Mr. CHRISTENSEN. I am hopeful that China will study that lesson, will care about its own reputation, as it does around the world, 

and will draw the right conclusions from that experience. 

Senator BILL NELSON. What about debt forgiveness? Are they 

going to work with other nations in the forgiveness of debt among 

African countries? 

Mr. CHRISTENSEN. That’s one of the areas where we want to see 

coordination. It’s very important, because we have debt-forgiveness 

programs, and we don’t want Chinese money to pour in just after 

that and to undercut some of the efforts at, again, producing good 

governance and better institutional decisions on the parts of these 

governments. 

But, again, I think I should turn to Mr. Swan, here. I’m getting 

a little bit in over my head, in terms of the African reality. 

Mr. SWAN. With your permission, Mr. Chairman. 

I would just like to pick up on a couple of points that my colleague mentioned, to stress again, it’s not just those outside Africa 

who are concerned about the Chinese actions in Africa. It’s fundamentally and primarily Africans themselves who have concerns 

about the direction of some of these no-strings-attached policies 

and nontransparent-assistance practices. And we’ve certainly seen 

concerns raised in a number of countries over the fact that a nostrings-attached policy, a lack of attention to good governance, is, 

indeed, contrary to principles that have now been agreed by the African Union itself as an institution, is contrary to the overall direction of the New Partnership for African Development, which includes governance and other criteria as a key element in economic 

development in Africa. 

So, I think what we’re seeing is a growing level of African concern, as well, to ensure that the Chinese behave and perform responsibly in Africa. 

Similarly, on the issue of debts and nontransparency, we’ve seen 

an example recently in the Congo, where a significant Chinese offer 

of a loan has attracted attention within the Congolese Parliament. 

It’s obviously attracted attention more broadly within the Congo. 

And so, I think we’re going to see more of that with it not only 

being other donors concerned about how China’s loan practices may 

influence debt relief, but the populations and the political leadership within these countries also have those same questions and will 

insist on a greater level of transparency. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank the first panel very much, and we’ll 

now turn to the second panel. 

[Pause.] 

Senator FEINGOLD. Dr. Economy, would you please begin with 

your testimony? 

25 

STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, DIRECTOR OF ASIA 

STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEW YORK, NY 

Dr. ECONOMY. Thank you. Three brief points, focusing my remarks on the China component of the equation, and then I’ll certainly welcome questions. 

The first point I want to make is really just that China’s Africa 

strategy is part of a much broader global strategy that we find in 

Southeast Asia, as well as in Latin America, to secure resources, 

as Tom earlier mentioned, to limit Taiwan’s international space, 

and, I think, really, as a hedge against any potential U.S. political 

or military challenge. This makes the job of addressing China in 

Africa more difficult in some ways, because what we’re really talking about are the fundamentals of Chinese foreign policy, not simply China’s engagement with several individual countries in Africa. 

But, I also think it offers the United States a wider range of political partners so that when we’re talking about something like illegal logging, for example, we’re not simply talking about Mozambique or Gabon, but also Indonesia and Brazil. This offers the 

United States broader opportunities, in terms of the forums for discussion and negotiation with the Chinese. 

In the past few years, I’ve attended a couple of conferences in 

South Africa that have focused all of their attention, really, on this 

issue of China in Africa. The picture that has emerged, at least in 

my mind, is clearly a very mixed one, and some of what I’ve seen 

and heard has been mentioned already. But, Chinese investment, 

its infrastructure development in Africa, its educational assistance, 

its technical assistance, are very much welcomed, and often, at 

least in these conferences, they’re discussed in the context of filling 

a gap that the United States and the European Union are not, in 

fact, addressing. At the same time, there is a lot of concern voiced 

among many of these academics who are at these conferences over 

the lack of transparency, over the environmental and labor conditions and practices of Chinese multinationals, over the competition 

from Chinese manufacturers, the loss of potential jobs with African 

labor, the export of Chinese labor to Africa, and China’s reluctance 

to engage in broader good governance and regional security issues. 

I think the good news is that over the past few years the Chinese 

have become highly sensitive, highly attuned to these complaints, 

and some officials and scholars are beginning to rethink part of 

their approach to Africa, and that means that there is an opportunity for the United States to assist. 

But, I do think it’s important to recognize that cooperation with 

China is hard, and that, no matter the number of dialogues, the 

Chinese are often very content to have dialogues or 10-year frameworks for dialogue that don’t actually require change in behavior, 

so that sometimes it’s necessary to hold Chinese feet to the fire. 

Dialogue can only take us so far. 

But, I do think there are a few things that we can do to maximize our chances of success in working with China. 

The first is to address those issues which the Chinese themselves 

have recognized as necessary to reform. For example, corporate social responsibility. I think this is key for the Chinese at this point. 

It addresses several issues of governance on the ground, where 

there have been many protests in Africa concerning Chinese behavVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:15 Dec 15, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\45811.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
26 

ior. You now have officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 

China, in the Ministry of Environment, certainly you have NGOs 

in China—to a lesser extent, people in the State Forestry Administration—who are quite interested in seeing Chinese companies 

adopt better environmental and labor practices. 

Unfortunately, for the most part, these institutions have less 

power, because corporate social responsibility is overseen by the 

Ministry of Commerce, which has no experience in this area, and 

not so much interest. 

Nonetheless, we’ve seen the Chinese taking up to 200 companies 

to the Global Compact, to the United Nations, to talk about corporate social responsibility. I think there’s opportunity in the strategy economic dialogue to address this issue. So, looking forward, 

it’s an area where the kinds of reputational issues that Deputy Assistant Secretary Christensen raised earlier, come to the fore for 

the Chinese. They’re very concerned, for example, in the Ministry 

of Foreign Affairs, about this kind of backlash on the Chinese reputation due to the poor practices of Chinese companies. 

I think, too, one of the things that perhaps was missing in the 

earlier discussion is an opportunity to work with China in a multilateral context. We have a lot of bilateral dialogues going, but it 

seems to me that we have to consider China in a broader context, 

because, in many respects, that’s where you get the most bang for 

the buck, when it comes to China. 

So, first, I think that means engaging India—and this was raised 

by Mr. Chairman because India is following on the heels of China, 

and is going to pose many, if not all, of the same challenges to the 

region. It’s far behind, still, in terms of level of its trade, et cetera, 

but has similar issues on sovereignty that the Chinese have. So, 

we’re going to have to engage India. China’s not going to trade off 

its short-term economic gain if it thinks that India is somehow 

going to be advantaged by this. 

The EU already has a trilateral dialogue with Africa. Japan is 

becoming much more engaged in Africa. It has, now, what it’s calling ‘‘rare metals diplomacy.’’ So, I think that bringing all of these 

forces together to talk to China will be important. 

And then, I think one of the things that was coming through earlier in the discussion, too, is that Africa itself, in many respects, 

has the greatest leverage, both because it holds what China 

wants—namely, the commodities and the reputation. To a large extent, China feels free to disregard the United States. They will call 

it containment, or they’ll say we, ourselves, are not having best 

practices. So, I think that it’s important to remember that Africa 

probably holds greater leverage on many of these issues than the 

United States does. 

In my last 34 seconds, I’ll just say that one thing that struck me, 

again, at these meetings in which I’ve participated in Africa, is 

that, while they will complain about China, they certainly complain 

as much about the United States. And, while I don’t focus on U.S. 

policy in Africa, I’ll just note that some of the complaints, such as 

an overwhelming focus by theUnited States on antiterrorism 

issues, not listening to the needs of Africa, a lack of, high-level diplomatic attention, et cetera—are very much the same kinds of complaints that I hear when I travel in Southeast Asia, as well. So, it 

27 

seems to me there’s the possibility that, on a few issues, we might 

want to be taking a page out of China’s playbook in thinking about 

the way that they engage more broadly strategically and deeply. 

I’ll stop there. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Economy follows:] 

DR. ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, C.V. STARR SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR, ASIA

STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEW YORK, NY 

THE LANDSCAPE OF CHINA IN AFRICA

China’s active diplomatic, economic and military engagement in Africa dates back 

more than a half century. Yet over the past decade, the relationship between China 

and much of Africa has expanded so rapidly that both sides—not to mention the rest 

of the world—have been left struggling to understand the new rules of engagement. 

Why Africa matters to China is no mystery. China’s top priority is acquiring access to the natural resources—copper, timber and oil, among them—that are plentiful in Africa and critical to China’s future economic development. China currently 

accounts for approximately one-fourth of world demand for zinc, iron and steel, lead, 

copper, and aluminum. Africa also offers a growing market for inexpensive Chinese 

consumer goods, such as textiles and electronics. Politically, African countries often 

play a pivotal role in support of China’s broader interests: Supporting its case 

against greater international recognition for Taiwan (although this may become less 

important given the recent warming in Taiwan-PRC ties) and protecting it from censure in various human rights fora. 

On all fronts, the relationship between China and Africa is exploding with activ- ity. During 2001–2007, trade between China and Africa jumped from $8.92 billion 

to a reported $73 billion; China anticipates that bilateral trade will reach $100 billion by 2010. More than 800 Chinese companies are formally registered to do business in Africa and have officially invested $12 billion. Much of this investment is 

tied into larger investment, aid and loan packages structured by the Chinese Government, such as a recently inked $9 billion deal with Congo exchanging resource 

rights to copper, cobalt, and nickel mines for extensive assistance in infrastructure 

development. The Congo deal also typifies China’s strategic thinking about the region: It will develop a special economic zone in Congo that will be the hub of an 

industrial distribution system linking Congo by rail and highway to Zambia and Angola, all of which will benefit China’s export capacity. 

China’s economic activity is matched and supported by an extraordinary level of 

diplomatic initiative. There is an endless stream of highly polished diplomatic forays 

by China’s top leaders to Africa, the establishment of an Africa+China institution, 

the Forum on China Africa Cooperation, and China maintains the largest number 

of embassies, consulates, and diplomats in Africa of any country. China is also expending significant energy in its cultural and educational diplomacy, establishing 11 

Confucius institutes to promote Chinese language and culture throughout Africa 

and promoting a wide range of student, medical, and technical exchanges. 

In contrast to its expansive economic and political efforts, China is only gradually 

expanding its military role and influence in Africa. As of 2006, there were only 15 

permanent military attache ́s and 26 bilateral mil-to-mil exchanges. China’s only permanent military dialogue is with South Africa. 

For the United States, China’s engagement in Africa poses a clear challenge to 

America’s stated commitment to promoting good governance in the region and, according to some U.S. businesses, to American competitiveness. Importantly, China’s 

‘‘go out’’ strategy is a global not merely a regional one. China in Africa looks very 

much like China in Southeast Asia and Latin America, suggesting that any U.S. response to China’s growing role in Africa will have broader applicability throughout 

much of the developing world. Second, while China is clearly at the forefront of redefining how outside powers engage in other regions of the world, India, and in 

some cases, Russia are close behind. Thus, a U.S. strategy designed to meet the 

challenges or take advantage of the opportunities posed by China’s Africa initiatives 

should account for the future challenges and opportunities posed by other rising 

global powers. 

EMERGING CHALLENGES FOR CHINA IN AFRICA

China’s initiatives in Africa have generally been heralded by senior African officials and businesspeople for their focus on providing Africa with what it needs— 

namely no-strings investment and infrastructure. At the same time, there is a growing sense of disquiet among some African governments and sectors of civil society 

28 

concerning how China does business, including rampant corruption, poor environmental and labor standards, the influx of hundreds of thousands of Chinese workers, and, perhaps most importantly in some instances, a perceived mismatch between China’s oft-stated principles of noninterference and not mixing business with 

politics and African interests in better governance and regional security. 

• Inequitable Trade and Investment Deals.—African officials raise several concerns on the trade and investment front: (1) China imports primarily raw commodities from Africa, but exports finished textiles and electronics. Ghanaian 

Trade Minister Alan Kyerematen has argued that Africa needs to be far more 

aggressive in identifying market opportunities for finished products in China. 

(2) China’s extraction of resources to benefit its continued industrial development will prevent African industry from developing. (3) China is undermining 

domestic industries in textiles and wood processing (e.g. while timber-rich countries export finished wood products to Europe and the United States, Chinese 

imports are 85 percent logs). 

• The Export of Chinese Labor to Africa.—An estimated 750,000–1,000,000 Chinese now reside in Africa; Chinese infrastructure deals often mandate up to 70 

percent Chinese labor. As a result, Africans complain that they receive little 

benefit from these large deals. In addition, within African cities and towns, Chinese often establish their own restaurants, small hotels/dormitories, and stores 

to serve the needs of the Chinese workers, thereby limiting the value of the new 

labor to the local economy. 

• Corruption.—Complaints about Chinese corruption arise from both government 

and nongovernmental actors. Both raise the issue of the significant role Chinese 

companies play in illegal logging and mining, depriving both locals and the government of legal revenues. As Richard Behar reported in a series of articles in 

Fast Company, the Government of Congo, for example, revealed that as much 

as 75 percent of the minerals such as copper and cobalt are illegally exported 

via black market miners, many of whom are indentured to Chinese middlemen 

and financiers, who then smuggle the minerals to China on cargo ships via 

South Africa or Tanzania. Nongovernmental actors are also concerned about the 

lack of transparency in China’s back-room, large-scale aid/trade and investment 

projects, believing that much of the potential economic windfall is siphoned off 

by senior government leaders in their own countries. 

• Poor Labor and Safety Standards.—Chinese extractive resource industries in 

Africa have earned a reputation for weak labor and safety standards, as well 

as low levels of pay; a situation reflected within China itself. (More than 300 

people die every day in China because of unsafe working conditions.) Cheng 

Siwei, vice chairman of the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s 

Congress, has warned that the lack of CSR by Chinese companies operating 

abroad is harming China’s reputation. (In at least one case, in Zambia, the 

issue of Chinese business practices became an issue in the national election.) 

• Environmental Degradation.—Chinese companies’ CSR deficit extends to their 

environmental practices. Mining companies have come under fire in Zambia for 

groundwater contamination and failure to undertake mandated environmental 

impact assessments. The Chinese oil company, Sinopec, lost its drilling rights 

in Gabon for its environmentally unsound practices in a national park. Chinese 

timber exporters are funding extensive illegal logging in Mozambique and 

Gabon. (Between 70–90 percent of all exports are illegal.) International and domestic environmental nongovernmental organizations have also condemned poor 

environmental practices surrounding Chinese dam construction in Sudan and 

now Mozambique. 

• Regional Governance Concerns.—China has generally trumpeted its principles 

of sovereignty, noninterference, and not mixing business with politics as a 

strong selling point in its relations with Africa. Increasingly, however, African 

leaders have begun to pressure China to play a more responsible role in regional security affairs. They have called on China to cease arms sales to 

Zimbabwe, for example, arguing that they are fueling an already highly explosive situation. The African Union has also argued for intervention in the case 

of humanitarian disasters, as well as supporting democracy, and has called on 

China to be supportive of its efforts. 

CHINA’S NEW THINKING

Chinese officials in Africa and scholars who work on relations between China and 

Africa are highly attuned to these emerging problems. In speeches, writings and private discussions, these diplomats and scholars suggest that while overall they feel 

their Africa strategy is quite successful and should stay the course, some aspects 

29 

will require adjustment. Some of the lines of continuity and potential change include 

the following: 

• Continue and Expand Economic, Technical and Educational Ties.—In 2006, 

Chinese President Hu Jintao set forth an eight-point proposal to support future 

African development, including $5 billion to support Chinese business investment in Africa, $5 billion in preferential loans and credits to establish Sino-African trade and economic zones, the doubling of 2006 levels of assistance by 2009, 

expanding the range of tariff-free items Beijing will import from Africa from 

190–440 before the end of 2009, and the provision of technical assistance. China 

will also increase the number of government scholarships for African students 

from 2000 to 4000. (Some scholars argue that much of African elites’ commitment to multiparty democratic values, etc., comes from studying in the West 

and that China should similarly stress its political and economic comparative 

advantages through educational opportunities.) • Overseas Development Assistance.—There has been some debate within China 

over the lack of untied aid to Africa between those who believe Beijing needs 

to increase its efforts in this area while others argue that Western-style aid 

projects are not effective. One scholar has suggested that Chinese aid projects 

allow Africans their dignity and are more stable and equal than those offered 

by the West. • Gradual Reform of Sovereignty Principles.—As the African Union has begun to 

push China to do more to ensure regional security, China is very gradually assuming a more responsible role (largely through its support of U.N. peacekeeping missions). China’s official position remains that it is limited in what it 

can and should do as an outsider, that sovereignty must be respected and that 

with regard to human rights, China, as is true of other countries, has its own 

human rights problems and shouldn’t criticize others. Still, there is now discussion within Beijing about how to adjust to the AU’s belief in conditional intervention. • Develop a System of Corporate Social Responsibility.—Raising the labor, safety, 

and environmental standards of Chinese companies in Africa has become a top 

priority for Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, who believe that these corporations are seriously damaging China’s reputation. (In some cases, MOFA officials 

must establish a temporary residence in areas where Chinese companies are 

based in order to help with community relations.) This will be a challenging 

task: Chinese companies have no tradition of CSR and introducing it in Africa 

will come only after they address the problem domestically; responsibility for 

CSR rests with the Ministry of Commerce, which has no experience in these 

issues; increasingly, the Chinese companies going to Africa are not simply the 

large state-owned enterprises with financial and political ties to Beijing but 

rather smaller enterprises from the provinces or private entrepreneurs over 

whom Beijing has virtually no leverage. 

• Rethink Security Interests.—China has only low-level and limited military engagement with most of Africa. Several factors are prompting a growing interest 

in a broader security engagement: The safety of Chinese workers, who have 

been abducted and killed in Southern Sudan, Nigeria, Zambia, Ethiopia, and 

Chad; the increasing presence of India, which has a strong and growing naval 

presence in maritime shipping lanes; concern over the security of China’s supply 

lines; and the U.S.’s AFRICOM initiative, which some Chinese military experts 

argue is directed at China’s growing role in the region. 

POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

China’s successes and its emerging challenges offer the United States the opportunity to increase its own engagement in the political and economic development of 

Africa. There are several avenues the United States could pursue in conjunction 

with China and/or Africa to enhance the U.S. role: 

• Cooperate with China on issues of corporate social responsibility. China’s newfound desire to improve the reputation of its businesses operating in Africa provides both the United States and African countries the opportunity to press 

Chinese state-owned enterprises to join the Extractive Industries Resource Initiative and/or other global corporate governance efforts such as the Global Compact. The United States could also use its Strategic Economic and Political 

Dialogues with China to advance cooperation on areas of joint concern, such as 

illegal logging and mining safety. 

• Take advantage of growing Chinese Government concern over the security and 

stability of African states and the Chinese citizens who reside there to engage 

in broad security cooperation. This might include in some instances joint supVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:15 Dec 15, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\45811.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
30 

port for police and military; most certainly it should include the advancement 

of international standards on transparency and good governance. 

• Assist Africa in taking a page from China’s own economic development playbook. Throughout China’s economic takeoff, the country’s leaders have ensured 

that Western assistance and investment benefited Chinese companies and Chinese workers, with domestic labor and sourcing requirements. In addition, they 

insisted on broad corporate social responsibility, with multinationals required to 

fund infrastructure such as roads, schools and hotels, as part of the price of 

doing business. 

• Recognize that Africa’s leverage with China is often greater than that of the 

United States. China can often dismiss U.S. pressure by pointing to shortcomings in America’s own governance and human rights practices or by claiming that the United States is simply trying to contain China. Africa, however, 

provides China with both resources and international legitimacy. There are significant costs to China’s reputation when it ignores Africa’s requests for good 

corporate governance or support for regional security. 

• Ensure that America’s Africa strategy is meeting Africa’s perceived needs as 

well as those of the United States. China gets high marks across the developing 

world for listening to the interests of its prospective partners. Moreover, its 

broad and deep diplomatic and economic engagement ensures that even as it 

falls short in meeting African expectations and needs, it is constantly reassessing and adapting its policies. The United States could likely benefit from 

the type of broader and deeper political/economic and strategic integration that 

China’s political and business leaders have brought to their Africa strategy. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you for your testimony, Doctor. 

Dr. Morrison. 

STATEMENT OF J. STEPHEN MORRISON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND 

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. MORRISON. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold, for the 

opportunity to be here today. 

I’m going to offer a few focused remarks that look beyond my 

prepared testimony. 

First has to do with China’s evolving approach on Africa. There’s 

been some discussion earlier about the scope and scale of its assistance. I think we need to acknowledge, out front, that this is not 

just another donor. China will surpass the United States as the 

lead premier trading partner with Africa no earlier—no later than 

2010. When concessionary financing is being put on the table on 

the order of $50 billion for Nigeria, this is a different reality and 

a different order of engagement. 

There is a reassessment, an internal reassessment ongoing within China right now with respect to its approaches to Africa, and 

that is a multisectoral and long-term approach that’s going on. We 

don’t understand it very well. They’re reexamining their approaches on health, the way that they deal with human rights advocates and media within Africa. Corporate social responsibility is 

a source of active internal debate. We need to know more about 

that. 

I think that you can look at the Darfur instance and make the 

case that China’s foreign policy engagement did respond, in terms 

of appointing an envoy, dispatching the envoy into Darfur repeatedly, and engaging a much broader spectrum of players than would 

have been the habit before that. That’s positive. 

There are very serious interagency difficulties within the Chinese 

approach, and embarrassing episodes like the arms sale to 

Zimbabwe. The Foreign Affairs Ministry struggles, I believe, to get 

31 

its arms, in the case of Sudan, around the policy with respect to 

Sudan, as against the interests of oil and the security alliance with 

Sudan. 

The Olympics are a huge factor right now, heightened sensitivities on Darfur, quite a bit of outrage internally within the government over some of the actions; for instance, the decision by Steven 

Spielberg to step down as the director. These are issues that became very emotional and incendiary issues, and there’s a—the debate, I sense, with respect to Darfur, has crept into an area of, sort 

of, backlash of Chinese nationalism that we saw also around Tibet 

and we’ve seen in some other issues, and in which a sort of sovereign interest and sovereign pride has crept into the discussions, 

that earlier, around Darfur, could be much more confined. I think 

we’re going to have to wait until the other side of the Olympics to 

be able to really begin to seriously reengage around some of these, 

although many of these pressing matters on Darfur require immediate attention, obviously. 

The Africa policy that the Chinese pursue, I believe, will enter 

a period of accelerated reassessment, this fall, in the lead-up to the 

next FOCAC Summit, in Cairo, which will be at the end of 2009. 

That’s not that far off. So, you can expect, I believe, to see some 

interesting developments that will be rolled out in that November—October-November-December timeframe, whenever they actually hold that Cairo meeting. 

On United States-Chinese collaboration, I think there is a general consensus around no-zero-sum competition, points of tension 

that need to be managed, shared interests. However—and the subdialogue that was created, I think you could be very helpful in trying to ensure that that subdialogue is carried forward into the next 

administration. 

Very little has been achieved, in concrete terms, but a consensus 

is being formed that this is valuable. We should preserve that and 

move that forward. 

I also think that the consensus that exists, and what we—and 

the cooperation that we’ve seen on Darfur recently between the 

United States and China, in getting to the U.N. Security Council 

resolution, this is very fragile, and could be easily reversed, and I’ll 

explain in a moment what I mean by that. 

The Chinese changed, in 2006 and 2007, with respect to Darfur, 

partly because they wanted—they were concerned about their— 

how their behavior within the Security Council itself was being 

seen; and Kofi Annan’s argument that, ‘‘If you’re going to be a 

member of this group and be influential, you have—you cannot be 

isolated, you need to move forward,’’ was a convincing one. I think 

there were lots of reputational damages being inflicted internally 

within their own elite, within every Western embassy, protests of 

all sorts, of all forms, and within the African political community. 

I think we’ve seen a slowdown lately in that cooperation. I see a 

hardening of position with respect to Darfur, less interest in helping move forward a deployment of non-African troops into Darfur, 

less interest in helping overcome some of the slowing tactics that 

we see Khartoum enacting. There seems to be a position that there 

needs to be some—on the Chinese part—a need for some kind of 

longer term new thinking on this. I’m not sure where that goes. 

32 

There hasn’t been any discussion around the JEM attack upon 

Khartoum and Omdurman. This, in my mind, was a dramatic moment. It revealed the degree to which the conflict in Darfur has become regionalized between N’Djamena and Khartoum. It shook this 

regime. There has been debate within the Security Council about 

the possibility of a Security Council-led initiative to try to broker 

an end to proxy border warfare between Khartoum and N’Djamena. 

It hasn’t gone very far. However, that’s another opening where you 

could see greater cooperation. 

Within the CPA, the North-South Peace Accord, there is dramatic tension today, and, I think, as we look forward, in the next 

2 years, towards the election in 2009 and the possibility of the referendum that’s called for in 2011, we can expect continued tension 

and conflict between the North and the South. We have a terrible 

problem in Abia today that’s unresolved. And, I think, when you 

look at the Chinese and the United States position, we’re allied on 

opposite sides of the table on that. When you look at the interests 

that the Chinese have with respect to oil, arms, political alliance 

with Khartoum, opposition to a cessation within the South; you 

look at the United States position, which is sanctions, which alignment with the South, which is coding Khartoum as a genocide regime, on the list of State Sponsors of Terror—the potential for a 

polarization and divergence of approaches as the CPA moves forward in the next 2 years is very, very high, and we need to keep 

that in our minds and be thinking about that. 

There are some other cases in which there could be greater collaboration or thinking. Nigeria being one, Angola being another. 

On AFRICOM—just one closing comment on AFRICOM—the 

Chinese seem to be taking a quiet wait-and-see approach on 

AFRICOM. They are resistant to cooperating directly with us on 

peacekeeping. This issue was raised by Jim Swan. I support that 

idea. They do not see AFRICOM, I do not believe, as a threat to 

their interests or as motivated by Chinese entry and—they see this 

as a—an important United States initiative that’s been beset by 

some difficulties around mandate, partnerships, and building legitimacy, and winning support within Africa. However, I would argue 

that there are openings in which the Chinese and the Americans 

could begin dialogue and exchanges on creating peacekeeping support within Africa. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you—— 

Dr. MORRISON. Thank—— 

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Doctor. 

Dr. MORRISON. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Morrison follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. J. STEPHEN MORRISON, DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM, 

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC 

INTRODUCTION

Senators Feingold and Isakson, I am very grateful for the opportunity to speak 

today at this timely hearing. 

In late 2006, CSIS and the China Institute for International Studies (CIIS) hosted 

a conference in Beijing that examined the scope, characteristics, and drivers of China’s engagement in Africa. The results were detailed in the CSIS conference report, 

‘‘China’s Expanding Role in Africa: Implications for the United States.’’ In your invitation letter, Senator Feingold, you cited the conclusions of that report and asked 

33 

that I comment on new, emerging evidence and thinking on China’s role in Africa, 

based on CSIS’s ongoing work, and the implications these developments may have 

for U.S. policy. 

To answer Senator Feingold’s question, I will base my remarks largely on a subsequent major CSIS conference, held in Washington, December 5–6, 2007, in collaboration with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and CIIS. 

It featured senior leaders and expert analysts from China, the United States, 

Kenya, Nigeria, Angola, Swaziland, and Uganda. It solicited a range of African 

views on the impacts of Chinese engagement in Africa, and sought to identify concrete areas for future United States-Chinese-African collaboration. The full conference report will be available on the CSIS Web site at the end of this week. 

CHINA’S EXPANSIVE ENGAGEMENT IN KENYA, ANGOLA, AND NIGERIA

At the December 2007 conference, commissioned papers were tabled that examined in depth China’s engagement in Kenya, Angola, and Nigeria. The authors, experts from the three focal countries, each drew on extensive in-country interviews. 

It was our view that this type of informed, ground-level analysis has been largely 

absent from most discussions of China’s expanding role in Africa. Interestingly, 

while the authors varied considerably in their approach and focus, all three described a largely positive and pragmatic relationship with China, and emphasized 

that engagement is maturing as country capacities and priorities evolve. The three 

country studies are contained in the full conference report. 

Michael Chege, UNDP advisor to Kenya’s Ministry of Planning and National Development, argues that China’s resounding economic entry into Africa has been 

poorly served by most literature on the subject, which often depicts African economies under threat of malevolent Chinese investment strategies and a flood of cheap 

manufactured goods. In the Kenyan instance, the Chinese-Kenyan relationship has 

by-and-large been mutually beneficial. 

Chege challenges the assertions that increased imports from China have harmed 

the Kenyan economy, arguing that Kenya’s manufacturing output has risen and become more diversified while imports from China have been rising to record levels. 

Chinese construction firms are not inherently detrimental to Kenyan interests; they 

are a leading source of employment, and create infrastructure at lower costs, making Kenya’s economy more competitive overall. The study finds that most Kenyans 

are pleased with the transportation networks Chinese firms have provided, despite 

widespread criticism of inferior Chinese construction. 

China’s share of Kenya’s external development assistance has increased dramatically, from .08 percent of total assistance in 2002 to 13 percent in 2005. In Kenya, 

there is no single predominant oil or other natural resource base. Accordingly, China’s investments are spread across multiple other sectors. 

Kenya will need to carefully manage its bilateral relationship if it is to be successful in the long term. Kenya continues to struggle to boost the volume of its exports 

to China in the face of a large surplus in China’s favor, and it will continue to be 

tested when Chinese businesses engage in poor environmental practices or illegal 

activity. Protectionism or limiting its cooperation with China will only harm Kenya 

in the long run. Chege argues that Kenya’s competent technocratic cadre and business sector have thus far been able to manage the relationship to Kenya’s benefit. 

The larger enduring challenge, in his view, is for Kenya to come to terms with evolving global competition. 

Indira Campos and Alex Vines, research assistant and head of the Africa Program 

at Chatham House, respectively, describe in their analysis a largely pragmatic relationship between Angola and China, which the Angolan Government has leveraged 

to meet the country’s urgent reconstruction priorities. Angola has benefited from 

large quantities of Chinese financing when concessional funding from international 

institutions, like the IMF, was not available. Chinese financial and technical assistance has kick-started over 100 projects in the areas of energy, water, health, education, telecommunications, fisheries, and public works enabling Angola to become 

one of the most fast-growing economies in sub-Saharan Africa in a span of 5 years. 

The China-Angola relationship is unique in the China-Africa context in that Angola 

inconsistently runs a large trade surplus with China, owing to the rapid rise of Chinese oil importation. 

In Angola there is a clear quid pro quo: China’s desire for natural resources as 

against Angola’s stark development needs. Crude oil represents over 95 percent of 

all Angolan exports, and it is also China’s main Angolan import. Over the last 6 

years, China has been the second-largest importer of oil from Angola behind the 

United States, consuming roughly 9.3 to 30 percent of Angola’s total oil exports. Despite the U.S. lead in the imports of Angolan oil, since 2002 Angola oil exports to 

34 

China have increased seven-fold, compared to only 3.5 times to the United States. 

However, Angolan oil production is still dominated by Western companies such as 

ChevronTexaco, Total, BP, and ExxonMobil. 

Despite rising Chinese investment, Angolan officials insist that China is only one 

of several major external partners, and they remain wary of becoming beholden to 

any single external partner or resource. This pattern is visible when looking at the 

origins of Angola’s imports over the years: China’s share has increased significantly, 

but so have the shares of India, South Africa, and Brazil. Similarly, Angola exports 

over the years have significantly diversified. 

Angola is acutely aware of many of the challenges it faces in its relationship with 

China. It acknowledges that it is often unable to utilize local capacity to fill the 

mandated 30-percent Angolan workforce quota for infrastructure projects under Chinese credit lines. It has established a mechanism whereby it reinvests 5 percent of 

its oil proceeds into the nonoil sector. It seeks to improve its relations with Western 

institutions by agreeing to pay, on an accelerated basis, the bulk of its debt of $2.5 

billion owed to Paris Club creditors and seeks greater foreign direct investment by 

claiming to have eased its investment laws. It has also responded to Western criticisms of opaqueness in its Chinese credit lines by issuing a statement in Luanda 

in October 2007 clarifying the Angolan terms for use of those funds. Although this 

is a welcome development, Vines and Campos argue that more disclosure on the 

part of the Angolans is needed. 

As Angola continues developing its relationship with China, controversial issues 

such as local content and employment may intensify over time, and tensions may 

rise over the slow pace of implementation and relative decision-power in the relationship. However, Angolan officials appear confident that their efforts to diversify 

donors and diversify investment into nonoil sectors will succeed in the long term. 

Professor Pat Utomi, a political economist and senior faculty member at the Lagos 

Business School-Pan African University, details in his analysis an increasingly complex, rapidly evolving relationship between Nigeria and China. He makes the case 

that Nigerian perspectives on that engagement, even within the government itself, 

are far from uniform. Utomi’s study explains that many career foreign affairs officers and politicians feel that a China-Nigeria partnership could offer greater benefits than collaboration with the West, but that there were many areas of the relationship that needed increased attention and improvement: The risk of heightened 

dependence on China and often weak official Nigerian leverage in the relationship; 

quality of project implementation, and uncertainty over technology transfer. Nigeria’s private business community also exhibited mixed feelings about Chinese business incursions into Nigeria. Businessmen welcomed trading with a lower cost 

economy, securing financing from Chinese partners, and learning from Chinese 

manufacturers and business models, but worried that Chinese firms might be benefiting in greater proportions than Nigerian businessmen. 

In order to combat some of these challenges, Utomi calls for expanded debate 

within the Nigerian Government and across the business, academic, and civil society 

communities on how best to optimize Western and Chinese engagement. He argues 

that Nigerian policymakers, including national and local officials, are not setting 

policies that will have the strongest possible impact on Nigeria’s long-term economic 

growth for the widest array of its citizens. To overcome this challenge, strong pressure must be placed on Nigerian leaders to effectively balance U.S. and Chinese engagement to maximize African growth and opportunity. 

EMERGING THEMES

Several important cross-cutting themes emerged from the discussions held at 

CSIS on December 5–6, 2007. 

Correct for exaggerations: First, there was a widely held view that much of the 

rhetoric surrounding China’s engagement in Africa has been overblown, particularly 

the emphasis on negative impacts in terms of internal governance, business and 

donor practices, and environment, and the potential for a major clash with U.S. 

strategic interests. This is fueled by generalized uncertainty as China’s engagement 

rapidly expands, and in part by concern about African capacities to manage and 

shape this engagement to their countries’ ultimate benefit. While serious tensions 

and challenges were acknowledged, on balance there was a shared sentiment that 

there are several areas in which United States, African, and Chinese interests intersect and where greater collaborative efforts can yield positive results. 

Need for African leadership: Second, there was a strong consensus that both African state and nongovernmental interests need to play a more proactive role in shaping and directing United States-Chinese cooperation. African states are too often 

discussed as the scene in which United States-Chinese strategic competition playVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:15 Dec 15, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\45811.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
35 

outs, and African interests are frequently cast also as passive recipients of potential 

cooperative development or security assistance. If African governments assert themselves strategically, they will leverage competition to their countries’ long-term benefit and set priorities for cooperative efforts. 

African diversity: Third, there is no single ‘‘African’’ perspective on China’s engagement in Africa. Africa features a wide diversity of actors and interests, across 

countries, across sectors, between governmental and nongovernmental actors, and 

within African governments themselves. In many countries that have enlarged the 

political space for civil society, these various interests and perspectives have become 

increasingly influential, and the demands on African governments for competent 

and accountable management will likely continue to increase. A priority for the 

international community should be to build the capacity of nongovernmental entities—the business sector, civil society, and the media—to engage their governments 

on a strategy to manage increasing external competition and opportunities for 

cooperation. 

Multiplicity of Chinese interests: Fourth, China itself is not a monolithic entity, 

and Chinese engagement, contrary to popular rhetoric, is often not directed from 

Beijing. The number and types of Chinese actors engaged in Africa are rapidly diversifying, including diplomatic representatives, state-owned enterprises, private enterprises and individual families, each driven by different interests, and different 

modus operandi. There are instances where Chinese national interests and those of 

state-owned enterprises appear increasingly independent of one another. To maximize opportunities for cooperation at multiple levels, both U.S. and African actors 

will need a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of these realities. 

Early United States-China dialogue: Fifth, there have been tentative steps toward 

United States-Chinese dialogue and cooperation in Africa, conducted at the Assistant Secretary level; in the case of Sudan, between special envoys and in actions 

taken in the U.N. Security Council; and in the case of Liberia, generated through 

innovative cooperation on the ground. These have yielded concrete gains on Darfur 

and Liberia security sector reform. Especially important has been Chinese diplomatic leadership in the U.N. Security Council and its pressures upon Khartoum. 

These were essential to the U.N. Security Council authorization in July 2007 of the 

deployment of the 26,000-person joint UN/AU peace operation to Darfur. Much more 

effort, backed by high-level commitments on both sides, will however be needed to 

sustain the peace efforts in Darfur and address the worsening crisis within the 

Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the North-South war in Sudan in January 2005. 

There is opportunity for United States-Chinese project cooperation in less politically sensitive areas like agriculture and health. There is a case for active United 

States-Chinese cooperation on peacekeeping in Africa, but resistance from both sides 

remains strong, and U.S. statutory limits (for instance, a provision contained in the 

National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2000 barring cooperation with the People’s Liberation Army except for humanitarian purposes). 

There is need for continued dialogue on areas of disagreement and tension: Most 

importantly, human rights, governance, donor lending and debt terms, business 

practices, and environmental standards, for example. In each of these areas, African 

regional organizations and nongovernmental players could facilitate debate and create a greater African voice. Across the board, stronger leadership from African interests is needed to drive these efforts forward on a sustained basis. 

Transnational expert networks: The final cross-cutting conclusion is that much 

analysis concentrates too narrowly on government-to-government engagement in 

discussion of United States-China-Africa relations. Greater priority is needed to 

strengthen nongovernmental, policy-focused, transnational networks. Universities, 

research institutes, and advocacy groups, environmental and health policy organizations, could play a powerful role in promoting corporate social responsibility, environmental stewardship, and community development. 

ENERGY SECURITY

China is sensitive to being lectured on ‘‘gobbling up’’ Africa’s oil supplies. There 

is often exaggeration of the scope of Chinese energy engagement in Africa, frequently portrayed as a zero-sum ‘‘scramble’’ for African energy resources. China’s 

demand for oil resources is indeed rising steeply, but in absolute terms China remains a relatively small player in African oil exploration. Today Africa accounts for 

30 percent of China’s overall oil imports (oil imports constitute 30 percent of China’s 

total energy consumption) and Africa’s share of oil imports is certainly set to rise. 

Given projected Chinese energy demands, China, like the United States and the rest 

of the world, has a long-term interest in both oil conservation and the development 

36 

of alternative energy sources. At present however, total Chinese oil consumption is 

one third that of the United States. Further, China’s share of total African oil production is approximately 9 percent, versus Europe’s share of 33 percent or the U.S. 

share of 32 percent. 

The Chinese argue that China’s investment in upstream oil exploration and production should not be considered threatening, but in fact be welcomed since it expands global supplies. It is important to recognize that China frequently chooses not 

to ship African equity oil back to China. Logistically, it is easier to ship West African oil to markets in Europe and North America, and, commercially, the incentive 

is to choose those markets which fetch the best price. Although approximately half 

of China’s equity oil production worldwide come from Africa (approximately 300,000 

of 600,000 barrels per day, of which 225,000 barrels derive from Sudan), the majority of that equity production is not shipped to China but sold in the global market. 

China, like the United States, will continue to rely overwhelmingly on the open 

market for years to come. 

Chinese state-owned companies operate with increasing independence from the 

Chinese state. It is largely a myth that the Chinese Central Government directs 

state-owned firms where to invest, or that these companies rely overwhelmingly on 

financial support from Beijing. State-owned companies act largely according to commercial versus geopolitical interests. Particularly in places like Sudan, where the 

reputational costs of Chinese investment have been considerable, there is increasing 

divergence between the interests of companies and the interests of the state, and 

uncertainty as to how energy security is achieved for China through support for 

state-owned companies. China’s actual imports from Sudan are less than 100,000 

barrels per day. The lead Chinese company, the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), has been doing well financially in its Sudan operations, but the 

Chinese Government has been the target of massive international criticism, for 

what, in a global context of 85 million barrels of production per day, is a paltry volume of oil imports from Sudan. 

Many African partners look to China for models of energy investment different 

from those of traditional Western companies. The latter have tended to operate in 

enclave-type settings, engaging a narrow elite, with weak connection to the rest of 

society or to other economic sectors. There is need in Nigeria, for example, to diversify away from the energy sector, and China through its multisectoral package deals 

appears engaged in a broader range of sectors, including critical infrastructure, that 

Western companies and donors shun. The Chinese development model is in its early 

stages in Africa, and positive long-term impacts on development and equity are not 

guaranteed. However, persistent disillusionment among Africans with Western commercial approaches has played to China’s advantage. 

There are several energy-related areas where United States, Chinese, and African 

interests intersect. 

Working together on addressing climate change and developing clean and sustainable energy sources will be at least as important as managing upstream investment. 

While this will be a long-term challenge, cooperative efforts should be given greater 

priority now. 

Ensuring the security of energy personnel, infrastructure, and transportation is 

a shared interest. Chinese workers are proving equally vulnerable to local conflict 

and violence as Western and often African interests, as demonstrated in attacks 

against oil workers in the Ogaden and Sudan and in hostage-taking in the Niger 

Delta. 

China’s principle of noninterference will be increasingly tested in unstable, conflicted settings, opening new opportunities for cooperation on conflict resolution and 

collective international pressure on governments in energy-producing states to invest in long-term stability and good governance. Should the Government of Nigeria 

become seriously engaged in addressing long-standing grievances in the Niger Delta, 

both the United States and China would have a shared interest in supporting an 

effective solution and each would bring special strengths to a potential resolution 

and reconstruction strategy. The protection of physical infrastructure and sealanes 

in West Africa’s Gulf of Guinea is also of increasing common interest, and the 

United States may look to China to play a more active and cooperative role in ensuring maritime security, building African coast guards and establishing control 

over rich coastal fisheries that are now often plundered through illicit industrial 

harvesting. 

Finally, transparency and reliable rules of engagement are ultimately in the interests of oil investors and energy-producing countries. Neither China nor the United 

States wish to be at the mercy of oil states or see market investment opportunities 

subordinated to narrow political calculations and unstable, poorly governed states. 

37 

AFRICA’S PUBLIC HEALTH

China and the United States have both rapidly expanded their public health initiatives in Africa, at a time when international attention more broadly in global 

public health is also expanding. HIV/AIDS, malaria, avian flu, and SARS have generated greater appreciation for the internationalization of health and the need for 

international health diplomacy and cooperation. Major government initiatives, along 

with the expansion of efforts by nongovernmental organizations, multilateral institutions, foundations, and faith-based organizations, offer new opportunities for collaboration to address African public health challenges. 

African challenges are many and there are ample areas for coordinated work. At 

least 300 million cases of acute malaria are diagnosed annually. Malaria kills over 

1 million people each year in Africa and is among the leading causes of death for 

children under five. More than 8 million new cases of tuberculosis are detected annually, and despite the availability effective treatment, those numbers continue to 

rise. Sub-Saharan Africa is home to 85 percent of the world’s HIV/AIDS cases, and 

the disease compounds other diseases and other developmental problems. New 

epidemics such as avian influenza could be devastating. And as Africa’s urban populations expand, alcohol, drug abuse, and chronic diseases like hypertension, heart 

disease, and diabetes are increasing as well. 

Structural challenges persist: The lack of trained health personnel and health infrastructure; weak interest internationally in tropical disease research; lack of African capacity, for example, in minimizing the influx and proliferation of counterfeit 

drugs. 

U.S. contributions to Africa’s health challenges have risen dramatically in recent 

years, enjoying strong bipartisan support that is likely to endure. By the end of the 

first 5-year phase of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in 

late 2008, the United States will have expended over $19 billion on global AIDS control, roughly 60 percent in Africa. To date, these efforts have been focused primarily 

on tackling specific infectious diseases—first and foremost HIV/AIDS—and targeting 

select focal countries. In fighting HIV, there is increasing recognition that long-term 

management will require greater support to building health systems, and PEPFAR’s 

next 5-year phase will almost certainly devote greater resources to the training of 

skilled personnel. President Bush has also launched a major $1.2 billion, 5-year initiative on malaria: In 2007 the United States spent $338 million on malaria efforts 

in Africa versus $1 million spent in 1997. Compared to HIV, control of malaria is 

more straightforward and affordable, with respect to the science of the disease as 

well as prevention and treatment. The challenge is to remain focused over time and 

to collaborate with partners to ensure maximum coverage. 

Chinese contributions to Africa are gradually increasing, and are an important 

component of China’s Africa policy overall. China will continue to send medical 

teams to Africa, increase cooperation with Africa on prevention and treatment and 

on research and application of traditional medicines. There are approximately 1,000 

Chinese medical workers in 38 countries in Africa; more than half of the doctors 

are senior physicians and surgeons. Together they have treated an estimated 170 

million patients suffering from various diseases. China has helped build numerous 

hospitals in Africa and has plans in the next 3 years to build 10 hospitals and 30 

malaria clinics in Africa. On training, the Chinese Ministry of Health provides 15 

courses each year to African participants, in the areas of HIV/AIDS, malaria, hospital management, and health reform. Malaria will remain a prominent focus of 

China’s health engagement. China’s expanding health engagement and efforts to 

link it to an international strategy are somewhat fresh issues. Through one promising initiative, the Ministry of Health has turned to global health experts at Peking 

University to help review existing Chinese programs, develop a long-term Chinese 

health strategy for Africa that updates the Chinese approach and ties it more effectively to African health outcomes, and identify opportunities for collaboration with 

the international community. These experts have recently concluded a summary review of all donor activities in the area of health in Africa. It is expected that reform 

of health approaches will take several years to formulate and execute. 

There are promising areas for public health cooperation between China, the 

United States and African countries, although currently there are bureaucratic 

obstacles to greater dialogue and joint projects. At a minimum, there is need for 

greater communication to avoid duplication of efforts and identify gaps. 

African countries should engage China and the United States on bilateral projects 

but also on multilateral efforts. Moreover, China could play a more active role in 

multilateral initiatives, building on its present substantial contributions to the 

board of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria, and its leadership of the 

World Health Organization. China and the United States bring complementary 

38 

strengths to the table: China places an emphasis on infrastructure and health systems, and the United States on treatment of specific diseases. African Government, 

with robust public health strategies in place, can push for cooperation in what they 

identify as priority areas. 

Collaboration on malaria is a particularly promising area in which to build cooperation, given the priority African governments attach to this disease and rising 

commitments by both the United States and China. It is also an area that could 

deliver significant, rapid returns and perhaps help encourage future cooperation in 

more complex health efforts. Despite China’s interest in malaria, the Chinese and 

other Asian governments were absent at the 2007 Roll Back Malaria Partnership 

Board meeting in Addis Ababa. China should be welcomed and encouraged to participate more fully in these and other multilateral global health fora. 

Cooperation on health will require greater political will—by the United States, 

China, and African governments—than currently exists. This will require senior 

leadership that supports innovation and flexibility in the field, and minimizes political obstacles to communication and favors joint initiatives. A future priority should 

be strengthening African capacities to address chronic diseases as well. Cooperation 

should not be limited to government-to-government engagement. Linking nongovernmental organizations, research institutes, faith-based organizations, and corporate interests in active partnerships should also be a priority. 

CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

While Chinese and United States firms have responded to growing pressures to 

pursue corporate social responsibility initiatives, these efforts often have had little 

meaningful impact on the ground and are often seen as exercises in public relations. 

Much more effort is needed to transfer adequate skills or resources to local African 

communities and provide for worker and community safety and environmental stewardship. 

It is in the area of environmental stewardship that Chinese engagement has been 

most problematic. The Chinese Government’s response to concerns over illegal logging has been quite limited. While China has signed resource-use agreements, it has 

not shown strong interest in upholding them. As an increasing number of non-stateowned companies are engaging in Africa, environmental enforcement will become an 

even more complex and conspicuous challenge. 

Ultimately, the responsibility to set terms for enforcing effective CSR falls to African host governments. Collusion between host governments and corporations often 

tilt CSR projects to benefit state, not community, interests. Communities often expect corporations to deliver services and resources that are more appropriately the 

responsibility of the government. Weak environmental laws and labor standards, 

high levels of corruption, and weak governance structures hamper effective CSR. 

Few African governments have mandated strict operational guidelines for foreign 

companies within their borders. Those that have, like Angola, which mandated that 

at least 30 percent of an international company’s workforce be Angolan nationals, 

have found these guidelines difficult to sustain. Violations of environmental laws or 

regulations are rarely pursued. 

There have been positive examples of corporate social responsibility in the health 

field, as the threat of HIV/AIDS has generated a number of successful public-private 

and community partnerships. There may be lessons upon which both Chinese and 

U.S. companies can build. 

On environmental issues, there has been positive, albeit very slow, acknowledgement of the long-term economic, developmental, and security costs of illegal logging 

and other harmful environmental practices. Until very recently, the United States 

and China appeared alike in regarding environmental issues as a second-tier priority, and solely the responsibility and problem of producing countries. This has 

begun to change, and nongovernmental groups and governments themselves have 

made more information available on the nexus among environmental degradation 

and conflict, food security, and long-term economic costs. 

When pressed, Chinese manufacturers have shown an ability to adjust quickly. 

In recent years, Chinese manufacturers eliminated the use of ramin wood very rapidly, following an international agreement to control its trade and a precipitous drop 

in U.S. demand. Similar progress was seen in the reduction of illegal trade in rhino 

horn. The United States and China are negotiating bilateral agreements to address 

illegal timber trade. 

Perhaps the most important challenge is for African governments to set up effective monitoring and enforcement structures, to establish regulations to protect African resources, and to develop African capacity for environmental governance. Here, 

pressure, information, and policy advice from nongovernmental actors can play a 

39 

critical role. Strengthening transnational networks of African, Chinese, United 

States, and international advocacy, policy, and research institutes should be a priority. 

BUILDING PEACEKEEPING CAPACITY

The idea of United States-China cooperation on security engagement in Africa is 

new, and just a few years ago such a discussion—even on the less politically sensitive issue of building peacekeeping capacity—would have been unlikely. However, 

both China and the United States are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of building African security capacity. U.S. and Chinese commitments in this 

area coincide with increased commitments by African states, regional and subregional organizations, and by international organizations. 

In recent years, there has been an unprecedented rise in global peacekeeping 

operations: Today, there are 15 U.N. peace operations, totaling 90,000 troops and 

another 26,000 police and other civilian personnel. Seventy percent of the U.N.’s operations, which run at $7.5 billion annually, are in Africa. An increasing number 

of deployments are peace enforcement operations in complex environments. Force 

generation and logistics are an enduring challenge. The United Nations has relied 

extensively on partnerships with African regional organizations, in integrated missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia, and now a hybrid operation with the African 

Union in Darfur. The African Union has set as a priority the standup of the African 

Stand-by Force—five regional brigades with rapid deployment capacity—and sought 

international support. 

Both China and the United States have an interest in protecting their citizens 

and their investments in Africa and in strengthening African capacities to manage 

conflict, including filling key gaps: Airlift capacity; communications; command and 

control capacities and surveillance. 

In the United States, higher commitments are seen in the establishment of the 

U.S. Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI), launched in 2004, and in 

2007 the establishment of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). Having U.S. military engagement in Africa coordinated within a single command may make cooperation with other donor states (and with African regional bodies) less difficult. 

China has an equal stake in African security and stability. Chinese entrepreneurs 

have been more willing than Western companies to go to dangerous and conflicted 

places, and have suffered economic and human losses at the hands of nonstate actors and reputational costs in international public opinion. Compared to U.S. and 

EU engagement, Chinese military involvement on the continent is limited, but growing. China has only 14 military attache ́s in Africa, out of the 107 it has globally. 

But China is increasing its U.N. peacekeeping commitments, contributing more 

forces to U.N. operations in Africa than any other permanent member of the U.N. 

Security Council, and often in interesting ways. In Liberia, for example, China has 

deployed 570 military engineers as part of UNAMIL, and these engineers are now 

working to rehabilitate the country’s roads in a joint effort with the World Bank 

and the Liberian Government. Engineers have been deployed as part of U.N. peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in Southern Sudan, and 

in Darfur. 

China’s growing involvement in peacekeeping is an important turning point to encourage enlargement of the base of external actors participating in building security 

capacity in Africa. Direct United States-Chinese cooperation in this arena may be 

some ways off but there may be promising opportunities in nontraditional security 

areas such as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. 

In some instances, informal cooperation and complementary approaches of the 

United States and China are already yielding results. In Liberia, the United StatesChina relationship has been positive and mutually reinforcing. The United States 

has taken the lead in the recruitment and training of the Liberian Armed Forces, 

which was entirely disbanded after the Liberian conflict, and in strengthening the 

management capacity of the Liberian Ministry of Defense’s civilian staff. China has 

been helpful in complementary ways: Assisting with hardware; refurbishing buildings; providing office equipment for the Ministry; and constructing facilities in the 

northern areas of the country. 

At present, improved United States-China communication and coordination of 

efforts—if direct cooperation for now is premature—is an important first step to 

strengthen efforts by the AU, sub-regional organizations, state forces, and the international community. But given the complexity of conflicts and the many challenges 

and costs ahead in building African security capacity, direct United States-China cooperation and higher levels of commitment will be needed in the future. 

40 

CONCLUSIONS

I thank you again for the opportunity to be here today, and look forward to our 

discussion of these topics. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank the panel. 

I’d ask unanimous consent that the statement of the chairman 

of the full committee, Senator Biden, be placed in the record. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM

DELAWARE

Today the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee examines China’s growing engagement with sub-Saharan Africa and its implications for U.S. policy. This hearing is a part of a series that the Foreign Relations Committee is holding to examine China’s emergence as a major power not only 

in Asia, but also in Africa and Latin America. Future hearings will examine the 

United States-China bilateral economic relationship, China’s internal political development, and other issues related to China’s growing soft and hard power. 

CHINA INVESTS IN AFRICA

China’s rapid economic growth has spurred a global search for markets for Chinese exports and for the raw materials to sustain China’s economic development. 

Chinese firms have been especially aggressive seeking energy resources to meet the 

nation’s mounting demand for oil. Nowhere is this more evident than in Africa. 

According to a recent Congressional Research Service study on China’s ‘‘soft 

power’’ requested by the Foreign Relations Committee, China’s imports from Africa 

are concentrated both in form and geographically. China mostly imports raw commodities—oil, iron ore, raw timber, cotton, and diamonds. Moreover, China conducts 

the vast majority of its Africa trade (almost 90 percent) with just seven countries 

(most of them rich in oil, ore, and diamonds)—Angola, South Africa, Sudan, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Nigeria. 

As China has scoured Africa for markets and resources, it has used soft credit, 

foreign assistance, investment, and security assistance (including both peacekeeping 

missions and arms sales) as tools to win influence. Although precise figures are hard 

to get, because China does not have a transparent foreign aid and security assistance structure, Chinese foreign aid to African nations runs somewhere in the neighborhood of $500 million/year. But this figure does not include various forms of assistance, including soft loans and state-funded development projects. The total aid 

package more likely is in the range of $1.5 billion per year, and Chinese President 

Hu Jin-tao has promised to double the 2006 foreign aid level for African nations by 

2009. 

KEEPING CHINA’S STAKE IN PERSPECTIVE

Still, it is important to put China’s overall economic position in Africa, including its foreign assistance posture, in perspective. In 2006, China imported $26 billion 

in goods and services from sub-Saharan Africa, while the United States imported 

$59 billion. The United States imported 45 billion dollars’ worth of oil from African 

states in 2006, compared with $19 billion for China. As for exports, in 2006 China 

exported $19 billion in goods and services to sub-Saharan Africa, compared with $12 

billion in U.S. exports to the region. 

With respect to development assistance, in 2006, the United States provided roughly $5 billion in aid to sub-Saharan African states. The United Kingdom and 

the European Union provided $4.7 and $3.5 billion, respectively. Japan provided 

more than $2.5 billion. In sum, the major OECD donors provided more than $20 

billion in aid to Africa, compared with less than $2 billion from China. 

All of this suggests to me that when considering the impact of China’s growing 

economic and political ties to Africa, we should not overlook our own considerable 

stake in the continent, and that of our close friends and allies. 

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

China’s growing engagement in Africa presents both opportunities and challenges 

for the United States. 

On the plus side, China’s investments and burgeoning trade are helping to fuel 

strong growth in several African states, bringing improvements in infrastructure 

41 

and quality of life to millions and bringing more energy resources into the international marketplace. China is pursuing a comprehensive engagement strategy 

under the umbrella of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, inaugurated in October 2000 in Beijing during a summit gathering of 45 African leaders. With the urging of African leaders, China is making significant investments in health care, 

human resource development, and agriculture. Chinese peacekeepers serve in almost every U.N. mission in Africa, including in Darfur, Sudan, where China is the 

only non-African nation to contribute forces. 

On the negative side, China’s ‘‘no strings attached’’ attitude about foreign assistance has sometimes undermined efforts by the United States and other members 

of the international community to tie assistance to improvements in governance, 

protection of human rights, anticorruption initiatives, and the adoption of more sustainable environmental policies. This is particularly true in nations such as Angola, 

now China’s second largest supplier of oil after Saudi Arabia. Worse, China’s business ties and sales of military equipment to the Governments of Sudan and 

Zimbabwe directly contribute to the ability of these states to perpetrate atrocities 

against their own people. China’s reluctance to criticize these governments for their 

human rights abuses puts China out of step with much of the international community and at odds with U.S. and European Union sanctions. 

Which brings me to one of the core questions that I hope our witnesses can address during today’s hearing: How can the United States convince China to become 

a more responsible ‘‘stakeholder’’ in Africa, supporting, rather than undermining, 

international efforts to advance good governance and respect for human rights? 

Must China learn the hard way, as the United States did in Iran with the overthrow of the Shah, that there is often a heavy cost to be paid down the road if one 

ignores questions of human rights and good governance in the pursuit of oil? Or 

might we be able to bring China around by sharing our own experiences and urging 

China to join in our efforts? 

I look forward to reviewing the testimony of our witnesses. 

Senator FEINGOLD. And I’ll start with a 7-minute round. 

Dr. Morrison, I understand that you recently returned from a 

meeting in Beijing with the Director of China’s Sudan Policy. Do 

you agree with the State Department’s claim that their dialogue 

with the Chinese on this issue, ‘‘is producing important results’’? 

And what concrete changes in policy have been achieved, and what 

concerns remain? 

Dr. MORRISON. Senator, your question is what—the United 

States-Chinese dialogue and what has been achieved with respect 

to—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. State Department—— 

Dr. MORRISON [continuing]. Darfur? 

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Claims that, in their dialogue 

with the Chinese, is, ‘‘producing important results.’’ What concrete 

changes in policy have been achieved, and what concerns remain? 

Dr. MORRISON. I think the most important changes occurred in 

the latter part of 2006, up through 2007, and the greatest evidence 

was the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1731, from last July, that 

authorized the deployment of the 26,000-person force. That would 

not have happened if the Chinese had not intervened with Bashir 

and pushed for acceptance of that. 

Right now, the dialogue is centered around getting the Chinese 

to cooperate with respect to non—accelerated deployment of nonAfrican contingents, the Nepalese and the Thais and others, into 

Darfur, so that you can get those numbers up close to the 20,000 

troops needed. There’s only 9,200 on the ground today. And also 

appealing to them to pressure Khartoum on the go-slow bureaucratic delaying tactics that have been put forward. 

But, the Chinese, as I understand it, have been less responsive 

in this last phase, dating back to the, sort of, February-March peVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:15 Dec 15, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\45811.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
42 

riod here. And we’ve had—that’s what I meant, was—we’ve had 

this period of close alignment, convergence, and cooperation in the 

late 2006-through-2007, but I see a—the tightening up and a less 

cooperative relationship, of late. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Doctor. 

Dr. Economy, in general, what forms of influence have proven 

most effective in persuading the Chinese Government to change a 

particular policy or position? And what kind of leverage can the 

U.S. employ in this regard? 

Dr. ECONOMY. I think, overall, the greatest leverage that we 

have really, as I mentioned, stems through Africa itself, because 

China has declared itself the brother, the friend, the partner of Africa. It sees itself as a leader of the developing world. And, to the 

extent that the claims are made, or that requests are made to 

China to reform its policy—whether we’re talking about Sudan or 

Zimbabwe or Chad, or whether we’re talking about corporate social 

responsibility— when it comes from Africa, it is more meaningful 

than when it comes from the United States. 

U.S. leverage, I think, is greatest when it’s in concert with other 

powers, as Dr. Morrison mentioned, within the U.N. Security Council, when you have the full force coming down upon China, when 

China is outed as not being a responsible player. 

I think there is an element where quiet diplomacy can work, it’s 

a long process. And so, the kinds of dialogues that the State Department uses are very important. It’s a type of capacity-building, 

building understanding through dialogue. But, if you look at the 

trend, for example, in human rights dialogue with China, notwithstanding the 6-year hiatus, the results of that, in the larger scope 

of things, have been quite limited. 

So, again, I think that there has to be an element of calling to 

China to account publicly, in conjunction with this dialogue and capacity-building, and it’s most effective if it comes from those countries who matter most to China in the context, which, in this case, 

is Africa itself. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I’d appreciate if both of you would say a word 

about whether you believe that the current United States-China bilateral engagement, as described by our first panel, is sufficient 

and effective. 

Dr. Economy. 

Dr. ECONOMY. I think it’s an excellent start. In some respects, 

it’s very difficult to assess whether the U.S. engagement is sufficient and effective. What we’re talking about, when we’re talking 

about almost all of these issues with regard to United States engagement with China in Africa, are really fundamental problems 

within China itself. So, we’re talking about China’s export of its 

worst practices. Whether you’re talking about transparency, corporate social responsibility, corruption, issues of sovereignty, these 

are all things that are a challenge within China as well. It’s not 

simply China’s foreign policy, but it’s also China’s domestic policy 

that we’re talking about. What we’re trying to do, in essence, is 

have China reform the way it governs itself. 

Again, I think that there is a long-term aspect to this. I think, 

for the U.S. Government, it probably is the most constructive way 

of engaging China, but I think there’s an important role to be 

43 

played by Congress, by outside experts, by nongovernmental organizations, in ratcheting up the pressure. If you want to get China 

to change it’s renminbi strategy, it’s not all about Hank Paulson 

and the strategic economic dialogue. It might also be about the sets 

of resolutions emanating from Congress that place China under 

pressure and give it the sense that there will be consequences if 

China doesn’t take action. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Dr. Morrison. 

Dr. MORRISON. I have a sort of mixed response to that question. 

On the one hand, I think having multiple dialogues going, as they 

were articulated by Tom and by Jim, is very favorable, because 

you’ve got dialogues going on, on a variety of different issues at a 

variety of different political levels. That’s good. We’ve seen the Chinese are receptive to these dialogues, they’ve been responsive to 

them, they’ve engaged, they’ve broadened and deepened their engagement in this. That’s good. We’ve come around to understand 

that this is a long-term kind of dialogue. So, those are very positive. 

What I do think we’ve underestimated in looking at the opening 

of these dialogues is the way—is the resistance that we see on both 

sides. And the source—to some degree, the resistance have common 

sources. Both the United States and China are very preoccupied 

with their—with moving forward their expansive engagement in 

Africa, which is historic for both of them. So, they’re preoccupied. 

They also are very concerned about branding and sovereign identity, and they don’t want to dilute that. The Chinese are getting 

into Africa with an argument they are different from the West. 

They’re not a—you know, their motivations are not to dilute that 

line through too close an alignment of—or integration of their efforts with ours. We have to get smarter about how we frame this 

so that we can make this—the case that neither of us are going to 

dilute what we’re really trying to do here, in terms of promotion 

of comparative national interests. 

The United States has a certainly sensitivity also about this 

being—seeming a bit neocolonial. And I think that interest can be 

ameliorated to the degree that more and more African participants 

are integrating into these discussions. 

To the degree that these are China and Africa’s policymakers 

talking—I mean, China and the United States policymakers talking about Africa, it does have this odd outdated appearance to it, 

even while there may be important business to discuss. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. 

Dr. Economy, you noted that the Chinese get high marks 

throughout the developing world for addressing the fundamental 

economic investment and infrastructure needs of its prospective 

partner governments, something that the United States is not particularly known for. But, in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, would 

you say that meeting the needs of a government translates into 

meeting the needs of the people? What does China—to what extent 

does China really achieve that? 

Dr. ECONOMY. Well, I think that it’s probably a mixed bag. Earlier it was pointed out that we’re seeing a lot of Presidential palaces, maybe a cricket stadium, a new foreign affairs building in 

some countries. I think the people of Africa don’t necessarily recogVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:15 Dec 15, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\45811.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
44 

nize those things as contributing directly to benefit them, and there 

have been complaints, for example, in Namibia, about the fact that 

you can’t trace Chinese development assistance through the budget; you can find out how money is spent from every other country, 

except for China. So, I think that lack of transparency is of concern 

to many within civil society in Africa. 

I think, too, the issues of the labor, the export of Chinese labor, 

are raising concern within many countries. This was brought up to 

me, in fact, in South Africa by somebody from Sudan. He was, at 

one point, nominated to be the head of the Chinese-Sudanese People’s Friendship Association, back in the 1960s, and he remembered that the Chinese were very good about providing real technical assistance, and that they engaged with the Sudanese people. 

Now he doesn’t see that kind of transfer, real transfer of technical 

assistance, although it’s talked about, and that the Chinese tend to 

live in colonies, almost, where they have restaurants and hotels— 

little hotels and dormitories where the people stay, so that there 

doesn’t seem to be this kind of—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. Yeah, I’ve heard that—— 

Dr. ECONOMY [continuing]. Benefit to the local economy. 

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Same description many times in 

Africa. 

Dr. ECONOMY. Right. So, I think that there’s a mixed sense for 

what the infrastructure development brings. 

On the other hand, they’re building hospitals, contributing to 

universities, they’re training Africans in China, providing educational assistance. They have Confucius Centers. So, there are 

things that they are doing that the people perceive to be directly 

beneficial to them. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Morrison, at—toward the end of your printed testimony, in 

a paragraph that cites the establishment of the Global Peacekeeping Operation Initiative in 2004 and AFRICOM in 2007, you 

have a statement—you said, ‘‘Having U.S. military engagement in 

Africa coordinated within a single command may make cooperation 

with other donor states and with Africa regional bodies less difficult.’’ And then, in your verbal testimony, I heard a reference, 

‘‘prospectively to future peacekeeping initiatives,’’ vis-a-vis the 

United States and China. Would you—I heard you say they were 

taking a wait-see attitude with AFRICOM, and, on the other hand, 

I almost read this to be ‘‘they see that as somewhat positive.’’ 

Dr. MORRISON. Well, my point—my initial point there was having a more unified approach, institutionally within our own government, will make it potentially much easier for external partners to 

understand and relate to the United States, if it’s not divided 

among three different commands. 

So, I hope that clarifies the—— 

Senator ISAKSON. It does. 

Dr. MORRISON [continuing]. The point. 

I do think there are barriers to United States-China military cooperation in very benign ways in Africa, that would help support 

creating African peacekeeping capacity. We don’t invite Chinese to 

come to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies and the leadership 

45 

seminars. We don’t invite them to the ACOTA peacekeeping training exercises. We don’t have a dialogue at the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping with other Perm-5 members, around relative security strategies for supporting. One of the factors is that, 

in the FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Act, there’s a bar 

on China-United States military cooperation, with an exception for 

humanitarian operations. And this is a very sensitive issue. We 

could enlarge that—the opportunities and the incentives for cooperation if that were—if there were leadership and if there were 

some change, in that way. Chinese have over 2,000 of their troops 

deployed into U.N. peace operations globally; around 1,500 of those 

are in Chinese—I mean, in African peace operations. We have a 

very strong shared interest in building up African peacekeeping capacities. 

Senator ISAKSON. Dr. Economy, on the AFRICOM question, 

when—at the outset of your testimony, you said, ‘‘their global strategy’’—‘‘theirs’’ being China’s—vis-a-vis Africa, was ‘‘natural resources, Taiwan, and, third, America’s strategic interests.’’ And you 

directly refer to AFRICOM. How do you see the Chinese viewing 

AFRICOM? 

Dr. ECONOMY. I think—you know, Dr. Morrison mentioned that 

there’s not concern. My sense is—and this is really just from readings of Chinese literature, not from direct interviews with Chinese 

on this particular topic—is that, certainly within the military academies in China, there is exactly that concern, and it’s stated quite 

explicitly, that AFRICOM is, in fact, at least in part, directed or 

designed to assert United States influence in the face of rising Chinese engagement and development in Africa. So, I think that there 

is, certainly in the military in China, a sense that AFRICOM has 

a China component to it. But, it’s also true that the Chinese see 

that everywhere, so that no matter where you are, however the 

United States engages, they tend to see it as, in some way, directed 

at China. 

Senator ISAKSON. So, sort of a paranoia? 

Dr. ECONOMY. A little bit. But, some of it might, in fact, be justified. [Laughter.] 

Senator ISAKSON. How do you personally view AFRICOM? 

Dr. ECONOMY. You know, I don’t really have an opinion of 

AFRICOM, except to the extent that, again, it seems to me, from 

listening to people in Africa, that they would prefer a broader engagement by the United States, and that this, in some way, reinforces the sense that there’s a strong military component to it. But, 

some of what the Chinese do do on infrastructure and other things 

would also be welcome. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, the reason I mentioned that point is, I 

think that, perception wise, you’re right; but in reality, in my visit 

to Djibouti and just what I have seen, the U.S. military initiatives 

have been primarily in infrastructure, well-drilling, bridge-building, roads, and infrastructure, and not in military operations, but 

in engineering expertise, which I think Africa needs desperately. 

So, I think it has the potential to be a real positive for the country, 

but I do understand the paranoia and the fear. 

46 

Dr. Morrison, you made reference—you said, ‘‘China is not just 

another donor country, and, by 2010, their investment will surpass 

the United States.’’ 

Dr. MORRISON. Their level of trade—— 

Senator ISAKSON. Their level of trade. 

Dr. MORRISON [continuing]. With Africa. Their two-way trade 

with Africa will exceed that of the United States. The United 

States is the largest trade partner with Africa today, and China is 

rapidly approaching the point where it will overtake us. 

Senator ISAKSON. And most of what China buys is petroleum, energy, natural resources, is that not correct? 

Dr. MORRISON. Well, it’s a mixture of energy, timber, precious 

minerals and metals that are—that come from Africa, coal, other 

hard-rock minerals. And there’s an—there’s a sensitivity around 

the need to diversify that base of imports, because of what we 

heard earlier about the opposition from African manufacturing interests, just seeing a flooding of markets and the sensitivities 

around that. And places like South Africa, where your manufacturers are quite well organized, they’re quite vocal, and their unions 

are quite well organized. 

Senator ISAKSON. I have one last question, if I could find where 

I wrote my note. You talked about interagency, lack of coordination 

within China, and referred definitely to the arms shipment. I have 

always had the impression China was very coordinated in their effort, but you seemed to imply, in that, that maybe there was some 

interagency—between military and other functions in the Chinese 

Government, some lack of coordination. Did I mishear that, or—— 

Dr. MORRISON. No; that’s my strong impression. This—it’s a fairly opaque system, so—making categorical statements is a little 

dangerous, but in talking to different parts of the government 

about different sensitive policies, you don’t necessarily get the same 

answer. So, it’s not quite as much a command—a sort of centrist 

command system as you might expect. 

And I think that one of the dramas—one of the subdramas running through the Darfur question has been a reaction internally 

among foreign policy elites and opinion leaders within China, saying, ‘‘What are you doing, allowing our reputation to be dragged 

down so badly and damaged so badly in a country like Sudan, 

where, in the big picture, we really don’t have that much at stake, 

in terms of national interests, but we’re taking a hammering, globally, in terms of our image?’’ And it’s going to take—and it’s undermining all of the other progress that’s being made in trying to build 

the reputation that this is an ethical, rising superpower, which is 

the core of their agenda. And so, you had a debate going on. And 

we heard this—we heard this very loud and clear in 2006 and 

2007, in engaging with the Chinese. And that suggested to me that 

there’s an internal debate. 

It shouldn’t surprise us that there’s deep internal debates around 

many of these issues, and that, in the case of Sudan, it was the 

oil interests and the arms interests that got in—were the front 

edge of getting involved, and the policy oversight came much later 

and had to battle against that, I believe. That’s just one instance. 

47 

In the health sphere, we could talk a bit about the way that the 

health system is trying to coordinate and update its approaches, 

too. It’s not always all that centrally directed. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you very much. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. 

On the AFRICOM point—you know, I’ve been a supporter of the 

concept of AFRICOM, and Senator Isakson is right, much of what 

our military does, to the extent it does things in Africa, has to do 

with helping developing communities. The problem is, when it’s 

done by the military, and that’s the only thing people see, then we 

come to Africa with a military face, and only a military face. Without broader engagement, as Dr. Economy was suggesting, without 

broader commitment in many other areas, including public diplomacy, and more diplomacy per se, that allows others—Chinese or 

others—to characterize our intentions in a way that is not accurate. And that’s why it’s so important to get this right. 

But, I do thank the panels. Thank Senator Isakson for his commitment throughout the entire hearing and on this subcommittee. 

And I have to go to the Judiciary Committee, so that concludes 

the hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 11:14 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(49) 

A P P E N D I X 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responding to China in Africa 

by David Shinn and Joshua Eisenman 

JUNE 2008 

The American Foreign Policy Council 

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