United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 10-3629

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United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

 v. * District Court for the Eastern

* District of Missouri.

Sean James Dace, *

* 

Appellant. *

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Submitted: October 17, 2011

Filed: November 7, 2011

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Before RILEY, Chief Judge, LOKEN and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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RILEY, Chief Judge.

Sean Dace pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to conspiracy to

manufacture in excess of 50 grams of methamphetamine, in violation of

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, as well as possession of pseudoephedrine knowing

and having reasonable cause to believe it would be used to manufacture

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2). The district court1

 sentenced

Dace to concurrent terms of 105 months imprisonment, below the advisory United

1

The Honorable Carol E. Jackson, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.
States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. or Guidelines) range of 121-151 months, and

four years of supervised release. Dace appeals, arguing the district court

“procedurally erred in failing to adequately explain” why it denied “Dace’s motion for

downward departure based on overstated criminal history and failing to address”

certain of his arguments for a downward variance. Dace also contends his sentence

“is unreasonable because the [district] court did not fully consider the § 3553(a)

factors.” We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In accordance with the plea agreement, the presentence investigation report

(PSR) assigned Dace a base offense level of 32, a total offense level of 29, and a

criminal history category of IV, resulting in the advisory Guideline range of 121-151

months. Neither Dace nor the government objected to the PSR. At sentencing, Dace

claimed his criminal history was overstated because (1) two of his convictions were

old and only counted because the present conspiracy dates back to 2006; (2) he had

not been convicted of a felony since 1990; (3) all of his felony convictions were

alcohol- or theft-related; and (4) he has improved his lifestyle since those convictions. 

Dace also requested a variance because the Guidelines overestimate the amount of

methamphetamine Dace could have made from the pseudoephedrine he possessed (the

drug quantity argument), see U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1, 2D1.11; U.S.S.G. App. C, Vol. II,

Amend. 625 (effective Nov. 1, 2001) (presuming fifty percent of pseudoephedrine can

be turned into methamphetamine), and his “personal history and characteristics . . .

make[]him less likely to recidivate.” The district court found Dace’s criminal history

was not overstated, yet varied the sentence downward to 105 months because of

Dace’s impoverished childhood and history of substance abuse.

II. DISCUSSION

In reviewing a challenge to a sentence, we “must first ensure that the district

court committed no significant procedural error.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,

51 (2007). In assessing possible procedural error, “we review a district court’s factual

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findings for clear error and its interpretation and application of the guidelines de

novo.” United States v. Bryant, 606 F.3d 912, 918 (8th Cir. 2010). If we discover no

procedural error, we “then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence

imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.

Dace first argues the district court procedurally erred by failing to explain

adequately why it denied “Dace’s motion for downward departure based on overstated

criminal history.” Because Dace did not specifically object at the sentencing hearing

to the adequacy of the district court’s explanation, we review for plain error. See

United States v. Townsend, 618 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2010). Dace fails to show any

plain error because the district judge adequately considered and then rejected each of

Dace’s arguments for a downward departure. See id.

Dace also contends the district court procedurally erred by failing to address his

drug quantity argument and his proposition that his advisory Guideline range was

unduly severe because his offenses all stemmed from his addictions. District courts

generally have discretion to decide whether to respond to every argument. See Rita

v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). The district court was justified in relying

on “the Commission’s own reasoning that a Guidelines sentence is a proper sentence.” 

Id. at 357. And the district court explicitly considered Dace’s argument that his

criminal history was overstated because his offenses all stemmed from his addictions. 

The district court did not err.

Finally, Dace maintains his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the

district court failed to assess individually each § 3553(a) factor by not “adequately

consider[ing] the minor criminal history, substance abuse addiction and the family

circumstances of Mr. Dace when considering a variance from the advisory guideline

range.” The district court expressly weighed all of the factors Dace mentions against

the seriousness of the offense, highlighting Dace’s “culpability in this offense as well

as the length of time [Dace was] involved in this conspiracy and the role that [Dace]

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played in this conspiracy.” The district court did not abuse its discretion simply by

weighing these factors differently than Dace would do. See United States v. Bridges,

569 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir. 2009). 

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm.2

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2

Because we conclude the district court did not err or otherwise abuse its

discretion, we do not address the government’s plea agreement appeal waiver issue.

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