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42–276 PDF 2009

S. HRG. 109–1032 

OVERSEEING THE ONGOING REBUILDING AND 

RESTORATION EFFORTS OF HURRICANE AND 

FLOOD PROTECTION BY THE ARMY CORPS 

OF ENGINEERS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 18, 2006—NEW ORLEANS, LA 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://access.gpo.gov/congress.senate 
COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JAMES M. JEFFORDS, Vermont 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

ANDREW WHEELER, Majority Staff Director 

KEN CONNOLLY, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

APRIL 18, 2006—NEW ORLEANS, LA 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

David, Vitter Hon., U.S. Senator from the State of Louisiana ........................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Drennen, Mark C., president and ceo, Greater New Orleans, Inc. ..................... 25 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 62 

Dufrechou, Carlton, executive director, Lake Pontchartrain Basin Foundation 35 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 73 

Response to an additional question from Senator Jeffords ........................... 74 

Hitchings, Daniel H., P.E., Regional Business Director, Mississippi Valley 

Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ............................................................ 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 49 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Jeffords ............................. 51 

Jackson, Thomas L., P.E., F.ASCE, D. WRE, past president, American Society 

of Civil Engineers and senior vice president, DMJM Harris (Ret.) ................. 33 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 70 

Kerner, Timothy P., Mayor, Town of Jean Lafitte and vice president, West 

Jefferson Levee District, Jefferson Parish, LA .................................................. 23 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 57 

Link, Lewis E., Ph.D., director, Interagency Performance Evaluation Task 

Force ...................................................................................................................... 32 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 63 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Jeffords ............................. 67 

Rousselle, Benny, president, Plaquemines Parish Government .......................... 21 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 56 

Response to an additional question from Senator Jeffords ........................... 57 

Smith, Hon. William Clifford, member, Mississippi River Commission, Civil 

Works, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ............................................................... 19 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 53 

Woodley, Hon. John Paul, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil 

Works, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ............................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 43 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Jeffords ............................. 47 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL 

Statements: 

Heerden, Ivor van, Ph.D. Head, State of Louisiana Forensic Data Gathering 

Team Director ....................................................................................................... 89 

Mlakar, Paul F., Ph.D., P.E. Senior Research Scientist, U.S. Army Research 

and Development Center ..................................................................................... 84 

Nicholson, Peter, Ph.D., P.E. Associate Professor of Civil and Environmental 

Engineering and Graduate Program Chair ....................................................... 96 

Resonthal, Sandy, Founder Levees.org .................................................................. 79 

Seed, Raymond B., Ph.D. Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering ... 80 

(1) 

OVERSEEING THE ONGOING REBUILDING 

AND RESTORATION EFFORTS OF HURRICANE AND FLOOD PROTECTION BY THE 

ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 

TUESDAY, APRIL 18, 2006 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 

New Orleans, LA 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o’clock a.m., Louisiana Supreme Court, Supreme Court Chambers, 400 Royal 

Street, New Orleans, LA, 70130, Hon. David Vitter presiding. 

Present: Senator Vitter, Senator Landrieu, and Representative 

Jefferson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID VITTER, U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 

Senator VITTER. Good morning. I want to thank all of you for 

being here. 

I thought this field hearing of the Senate Committee, which has 

oversight and responsibility over the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, was very important, particularly as we are approaching the 

next hurricane season, which starts in early June. Clearly, since 

Katrina and Rita, all of us at the Federal level have had our hands 

full in terms of emergency levee and other hurricane protection 

work. Constant oversight and communication with the corps has 

been a very important part of this. So this hearing is a continuation of that ongoing communication and oversight. 

Katrina was an enormously devastating and significant event, as 

everyone knows. It was the largest natural disaster in the Nation’s 

history, unparalleled in so many ways. In addition, it truly was a 

man-made disaster, because major catastrophic flooding in New Orleans also occurred because of levee breaches that were related to 

serious design flaws. 

I think that last point is particularly important as we move forward. We have to move forward to correct those mistakes through 

proper design, engineering and oversight. But we also need to do 

it in a very quick, expedited way, knowing that the next hurricane 

season is right around the corner. So again, that’s what this hearing is all about. 

We have several panels, and I am going to run through the outline of the hearing briefly, then we will get to our first panel. Panel 

one of three panels is composed of representatives of the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers, in particular, the Assistant Secretary, civilian 
2 

leader of the corps, and Dan Hitchings, the Director of Task Force 

HOPE, which is all of the emergency levee and related work following Hurricane Katrina. We will hear from them and have dialog 

and questions about the progress and the status of that ongoing 

work. 

Panel two is comprised of four representatives from impacted 

areas, folks in the immediate area of southeast Louisiana, who 

serve in various capacities, who live in all of these impacted areas. 

I will introduce them individually when we get to that panel. And 

panel three is composed of outside, independent engineering and 

environmental experts. Personally, I think one of the most important lessons of Katrina, particularly as it relates to levee work and 

the Corps of Engineers, is that we all need to come together and 

bring whatever outside, independent expertise is possible to bear 

on this ongoing work in an efficient way. Too often, in my opinion, 

the corps has been insulated and isolated in terms of some of their 

processes and work. And this independent expertise is crucial in 

order to build consensus and get things done right. 

I believe it is being built into the process in at least an informal 

way with regard to various studies that have been going on since 

Katrina. And there are many, many different studies. Secretary 

Rumsfeld authorized the American Society of Civil Engineers to 

convene an external review panel to provide independent oversight. 

In addition, there is the IPET, which is the direct study authorized by the Army and by the DOD. Then there are many other outside, independent groups, environmental and engineering groups, 

that have done oversight, unofficial oversight, if you will, and 

brought their expertise to bear. 

As we move on, I believe it is essential to systematize that outside, independent expertise, to make sure it is built into the process and organized in an ongoing way. And panel three will represent three significant outside and independent experts to talk 

about how we move forward in that way. 

With that overview, let’s start with our first panel. This first 

panel is the Corps of Engineers, specifically the Honorable John 

Paul Woodley, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, 

the civilian leader of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; and Mr. 

Daniel Hitchings, Director of Task Force HOPE, and the Regional 

Business Director for the Mississippi Valley Division, the leader of 

the immediate emergency work going on, particularly in southeast 

Louisiana. 

I thank you both for being here. I know you have already submitted full written statements for the record that will be included 

in the record, the entire written statement. I would ask for purposes of this hearing that you summarize those 5 minute speeches, 

then we will proceed to questions and discussions. 

Secretary Woodley. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Vitter follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID VITTER, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF LOUISIANA

Good Morning. Thank you all for coming this morning for this very important 

Senate Environment and Public Works Committee field hearing to oversee the ongoing rebuilding and restoration efforts of hurricane and flood protection by the Army 

Corps of Engineers’ in preparation for next hurricane season and also examine developing a comprehensive approach to hurricane protection in Louisiana. 
3 

I am holding this hearing today as a member of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee because the next hurricane season that begins on June 1st is 

only 44 days away and Louisianans are relying on adequate, if not stronger, hurricane protection to be in place. 

Just 71⁄2 months ago, Louisiana and the other Gulf States experienced the most 

destructive natural disaster in our Nation’s history when Hurricane Katrina struck 

the Gulf Coast. Only a few weeks later, Hurricane Rita further devastated Louisiana. Tragically, Hurricane Katrina left over 1,100 people dead with thousands 

more still missing. Thousands of Louisianans lost their homes, their jobs, their communities, and sadly too many lost their lives or the lives of loved ones. 

In addition to the millions displaced and hundreds of thousands unemployed as 

a result of Hurricane Katrina, virtually every American has been impacted and still 

feels the repercussions of this extraordinary disaster through paying higher prices 

for energy bills and gas at the pump. Hurricane Katrina represents one of the first 

times in history where a major metropolitan area was evacuated and its economic 

activity virtually ceased. We must make sure this devastation absolutely never happens again and that is why I am holding this hearing today to ensure progress has 

been made with the restoration and rebuilding of hurricane protection so we are 

ready for this hurricane season. 

The issue that makes this event even more extraordinary—more unique—is that 

it was not entirely a natural disaster. The major destruction during Hurricane 

Katrina was man-made. Our Federal levees failed and others were simply too low 

and not built up to standard. Both of these man-made failures could have been prevented. We can not afford for these fatal failures to happen again. This is why I 

have already introduced several pieces of legislation to help get us where we need 

to be by June 1st for the next hurricane season. 

I recently introduced the ‘‘Louisiana Emergency Needs Corps of Engineers Authorization Act,’’ which would give the Corps of Engineers the full Congressional authorization it needs now to begin construction on projects such as installing permanent pumping stations that will ensure stronger hurricane protection for south Louisiana. 

Congress has been very helpful in quickly approving emergency legislation needed 

to address the urgent needs of Louisiana. Now, additional urgent action is needed. 

In many cases, the problems are not a result of money or technological hurdles. The 

Corps of Engineers has informed us where the weak areas and design flaws are located and what needs to be improved. We know the solution. The problem is authority. We are unable to implement the fix because of technical changes to the law. 

That is it. That is the single issue preventing improvements to problems affecting 

less than 5 percent of our hurricane protection system. You are only as strong as 

your weakest link and Congress can fix this weak link. 

We were unprepared for Hurricane Katrina at the local, State and Federal level. 

There is no question. Now, we better understand the weaknesses. We know the solutions. Our Nation can not afford to be unprepared again. 

Congress needs to move forward now and pass legislation before this next hurricane season begins so the Corps of Engineers has the full Congressional authority 

it needs to rebuild our levees. I believe the corps needs that are included in the Supplemental Appropriations bill are crucial to moving forward with stronger hurricane 

protection that is needed now. 

The Corps of Engineers has been working hard to restore and rebuild hurricane 

protection in Louisiana. Today, we will hear an update on the Corps of Engineers’ 

progress from both Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works—the Honorable 

John Paul Woodley, Jr. and Mr. Daniel Hitchings who served as Director of the 

Task Force Hope after Hurricane Katrina struck. 

The Corps of Engineers’ also commissioned the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force (IPET) to obtain the facts by collecting, analyzing, testing and modeling data and information on the performance of the New Orleans hurricane protection system during Hurricane Katrina. I look forward to hearing from Dr. Lewis 

Link, the Director of IPET, who is here today to provide an update on IPET’s findings. 

In addition to IPET, there are several ongoing independent investigations examining and analyzing the ongoing restoration of hurricane protection. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld authorized the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) 

to convene an external review panel to provide independent oversight and conduct 

continuing expert review of the work performed by IPET. I look forward to hearing 

from Mr. Thomas Jackson who is a member of the External Review Panel. 

IPET and ASCE’s external review panel are made up of independent panels of national experts drawn from the public, private sectors and academia. I believe having 

independent experts are valuable to have involved throughout the corps process and 
4 

play an important role during the restoration and rebuilding of hurricane protection 

in South Louisiana. I recently introduced the ‘Louisiana Hurricane and Flood Protection Council Act’ that calls for a Council of independent experts who would work 

with the corps throughout the process from design to construction. The Council 

would also take a comprehensive approach to corps projects and determine ways to 

integrate projects that would allow for more efficiency, be more cost effective and 

save taxpayers money and also ensure projects are implemented in a timely manner. 

Today, we will also hear from locals who will share their perspective on impacts 

from Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita and why it is very important for hurricane protection to be restored by this next hurricane season for their communities, 

businesses and neighbors to return home to New Orleans and the surrounding parishes. Restoration of hurricane and flood protection that incorporates better, smarter 

designs is a key factor for Louisianans and businesses when deciding whether or 

not to return to the Greater New Orleans area. Louisianans who want to return 

home are looking for certainty that a stronger, more advanced levee system is in 

place before they rebuild their lives in the same area again. Thank you and I look 

forward to hearing from the witnesses. 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. JOHN PAUL WOODLEY, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR CIVIL WORKS, UNITED 

STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 

Mr. WOODLEY. Thank you, Senator. I want to express my appreciation and that of the Administration for your leadership in holding this very important hearing, and in the oversight and wisdom 

that you have been providing, both before this incident and since, 

as we work to foster the reconstruction of the civil works in and 

around Southeast Louisiana, and the recovery of this area and its 

economy. 

I am very honored to be here to testify before the committee in 

preparation for the next hurricane season. I am joined today, as 

you stated, by Mr. Dan Hitchings, Director of the Corps of Engineers Task Force HOPE. We also have Dr. Lewis E. Link, the 

Project Director for the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task 

Force, who will appear on a later panel. 

The corps is on schedule to repair the damaged levees and flood 

walls to their pre-storm condition by June 1st, the beginning of the 

hurricane season in 2006. Last year, I enlisted the National Academies of Science and Engineering to assemble a multi-disciplinary 

panel to assist in the forensic investigation of the performance of 

corps’ projects during Hurricane Katrina. The Chief of Engineers, 

at the same time, established an Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force, known as the IPET, to provide credible and objective scientific and engineering facts to answer questions about the 

performance of the New Orleans hurricane and flood protection 

system. As you mentioned, Senator, the American Society of Civil 

Engineers provided external peer review of IPET activities through 

an external review panel. 

The corps is immediately acting to incorporate findings of all 

these studies into both its interim repair and the long-term planning for future work. A draft performance evaluation report for the 

IPET is scheduled for June 1, 2006. The National Academies Committee on New Orleans Regional Hurricane Projects will perform 

independent review of the final draft IPET and ASCE final reports. 

I expect to receive the National Academies report in September 

2006. The final IPET report will be released shortly thereafter, and 
5 

I have asked the National Academies to review and provide comments on the final IPET report. 

At the same time, on a parallel path with IPET and National 

Academies studies, Congress authorized and appropriated funds for 

a 2-year, $20 million Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration 

Project Analysis and Design, to identify options for increasing the 

level of hurricane storm protection for New Orleans and coastal 

Louisiana. The interim report is due in June 2006, and the final 

report recommendations and alternatives due at the end of 2007. 

Immediately after the hurricane, President Bush committed to 

helping New Orleans rebuild, reconstruction of its hurricane protection system. In supplemental appropriations to date, Congress 

and the President have provided $2.08 billion to repair and restore 

the levee system to its designed height. 

In February of this year, I submitted a proposal for a supplemental appropriation to strengthen and improve the hurricane protection for greater New Orleans. The repairs and rebuilding activities that are now underway will make the flood control and personal protection system better than it was immediately prior to 

Hurricane Katrina. The additional measures that I proposed in 

February will result in a system significantly better and stronger 

than before. These measures are estimated to cost $1.46 billion, 

and have yet to be authorized and funded. If appropriated in 2006, 

these measures can be completed in 2010. 

In the weeks since my February recommendation, new information has been developed that has caused us to recommend additional modifications to the system, first, because of the findings of 

the IPET, and second because new post-Katrina weather data informs us that the statistically determined 100-year storm is a more 

powerful storm than the storm for which the existing hurricane 

protection system was designed. We are working now to provide additional information to allow Congress to consider the options for 

providing that 100-year level of protection. 

Thank you, Senator, for this opportunity. I would certainly be delighted to respond now and later to all your questions and concerns. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

We also have, as I mentioned, Dan Hitchings, Director of Task 

Force HOPE. 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL H. HITCHINGS, P.E., REGIONAL BUSINESS DIRECTOR, MISSISSIPPI VALLEY DIVISION, U.S. ARMY 

CORPS OF ENGINEERS 

Mr. HITCHINGS. Thank you, Senator Vitter, for the opportunity to 

testify before the committee today. My written testimony today provides a summary of the hurricane protection system and authorized 

and funded work that is ongoing to reestablish a hurricane protection system before the start of the next summer’s hurricane season. 

We are engaged in a number of activities, starting first with the 

repair. The Corps of Engineers is well on its way to accomplishing 

the initial goal of repairing the damaged portions of the protection 

system and is committed to completing the reconstruction by 1 

June. All work is currently on schedule. There is no indication that 

we are going to have any difficulty in restoring the protection by 
6 

that period of time. Extensive onsite investigation and sampling 

and laboratory testing is performed to ensure only quality materials are being used. 

The second element that we have going on relates to restoration 

of undamaged and subsided areas. The corps continues to conduct 

both surface and subsurface investigations of the remaining 

undamaged portion of the system in the New Orleans area to determine exactly what needs to be done to strengthen those. As Secretary Woodley referred to the IPET findings, we recently became 

aware of a situation where we now question the integrity of the 

floodwall system. So we have to do further investigation to ensure 

that that is capable of performing as designed and in any place 

that it is not, to take action to ensure that it does have the ability 

to meet its design intent. 

So essentially what we are doing will result in a full restoration 

of the hurricane protection system to its authorized levels. We also 

are funded to complete the unconstructed portions of authorized 

projects. That primarily is in the West Bank and Vicinity project, 

also in the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity project, mostly in the 

St. Charles Parish area. At the end of all of that work, the entire 

system will be constructed as authorized, to its authorized level. 

This concludes my statement. I have some additional graphics to 

support any questions you may ask. And I am ready to take those 

questions. Thank you. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you very much, Dan. We will get on to 

discussion and questions. 

Secretary Woodley, as you know, recently General Carl Strock, 

Chief of Engineers with the corps, testified before a Senate Committee to the effect that the breaches in the levees of the outflow 

canals were due largely to design flaws under the responsibility of 

the Corps of Engineers. Do you disagree with his testimony on that 

point in any way? 

Mr. WOODLEY. No, sir, I do not. I think that I would reserve any 

further comment on my part until receipt and review of the independently reviewed investigation that is intended to fully answer 

that question. But based on what I know today, I know of no reason to differ with the testimony provided by General Strock. 

Senator VITTER. Based on that, would you agree that that places 

on the Federal Government, and specifically the corps, a rather extraordinary responsibility in terms of response, given that that 

means that perhaps 70 percent of the catastrophic flooding in New 

Orleans was essentially man-made, not an act of nature? 

Mr. WOODLEY. Actually, Senator, I think that our responsibility 

for response is the same under either condition. Our responsibility 

for response is great and enormous, regardless of whether the 

works performed as designed or whether they did not perform as 

design. 

Senator VITTER. I guess I am particularly thinking of something 

that may be outside the Corps of Engineers’ purview, which is compensating for uninsured losses of homes that suffered from catastrophic flooding because of the design failure. It seems to me there 

might be a different responsibility there, if it were an act of God 

versus a mistake, essentially, of the Federal Government. That is 

the distinction I am drawing. 
7 

So again, the question is, would you agree that General Strock’s 

testimony on the design failures at issue places on the Federal 

Government broadly perhaps an extraordinary responsibility? 

Mr. WOODLEY. I would say the responsibility is essentially the 

same, regardless. The responsibility is great and grave. The precise 

nature of it and the course it should take is a matter for the 

gravest deliberation by the Administration and by Congress. I 

know that our response in the Corps of Engineers has been very 

substantial, and been, I believe, reflects that sense of responsibility. 

Senator VITTER. As you know, the next hurricane season is 

quickly approaching. It starts in early June. How would you describe to residents in the area the levee and hurricane protection 

system that we will have by that time, as compared to what it was 

the day before Hurricane Katrina? 

Mr. WOODLEY. I believe that I would describe it as better and 

more capable of withstanding and protecting against catastrophic 

flooding than the system that we had prior to Hurricane Katrina. 

I would also say that an event the size of Hurricane Katrina would 

result in a certain amount of flooding within the city and that a 

storm of that size should be a matter of grave concern and should 

be detected on a path that would take it in or near the city. 

Senator VITTER. With regard to the protection we will have by 

early June, what would the corps’ expectation be if Katrina were 

replayed exactly as it happened, specifically with regard to levee 

breaches? Clearly there was overtopping. I assume there would still 

be overtopping if Katrina were replayed this hurricane season. But 

specifically with regard to breaches, which of course was the biggest problem and caused the most damage, what would the corps’ 

expectation be of how the system would withstand an exact repeat 

of Hurricane Katrina? 

Mr. WOODLEY. Senator, without modeling the event, and I believe it’s fair to say that we have not modeled it, I can only respond 

in a very general way. We believe that many of the works in place 

would be overtopped. So there would be flooding resulting from 

that overtopping. 

We believe, however, that the system that we are placing in 

place along the shore of Lake Pontchartrain, in which we are closing the outfall valves with gated closure structures where the canals enter Lake Pontchartrain, removes much of the vulnerability 

to breach in that area. We believe that we would like to, we are 

recommending improvements in armoring that are not going to be 

in place as of 1 June that would give additional protection to some 

of the more vulnerable places in the levees where, for instance, 

utilities cross the levees or railroads cross the levees, or navigation 

structures cross the levees. So we will have a better system in 

place, but I believe it is fair to say that we will not have a system 

in place to prevent flooding in all cases if a storm the size of 

Katrina were to strike New Orleans or its vicinity. 

Senator VITTER. Dan, let me ask the same question of you with 

regard to a repeat of Katrina, specifically on the issue of breaches. 

It might be useful, I don’t want to suggest an answer, but if it’s 

useful to distinguish between different areas east of the Industrial 
8 

Canal, west of the Industrial Canal, anything like that, please do 

so. What would be your response? 

Mr. HITCHINGS. My response is in full agreement with what Mr. 

Woodley described here. If I could put a map up of, map No. 3, to 

help illustrate some of these areas more specifically, and highlight 

what we have done to prevent the type of breaching that occurred 

in those areas. 

This is a map that shows the overall area of Orleans Parish, including these areas here in the lower 9th Ward, St. Bernard Parish, then Plaquemines Parish, continuing in these two areas. We 

experienced breaching on the canals as a result, not of overtopping, 

but of a failure of a mechanism that supported those structures in 

that particular area. We also experienced flooding and breaches 

along the west side of the Industrial Canal. 

The corrective actions we have taken, as Mr. Woodley described, 

closing off those canals, will prevent surge from entering the canals. We do not anticipate that we will have any breaches in those 

areas as a result of that. 

On the Industrial Canal west bank, we have also taken corrective action, one, by repairing all the breaches, and what we put 

back in there is a stronger structure than it was. But on those 

unbreached portions, where it scoured behind them significantly, 

we are putting in scour protection to prevent the undermining of 

those structures should they be overtopped again. 

Along the St. Bernard levee portion, along the MRGO, those 

damaged portions are being reconstructed, significantly better than 

they were before. The materials that we are using are entirely 

glazed, and they are much stronger and more resistant to erosion. 

Overtopping of those would in fact result in some scouring. In the 

absence of their erosion protection, any armoring, we do not anticipate that it would result in breaching, just in some scouring of 

those areas. That’s also true for the New Orleans East area that 

was damaged in here. 

We did have overtopping all along the levees in New Orleans 

East. And again, that would occur, but we do not anticipate any 

breaches. 

Plaquemines Parish, very similar. All the breaches that were in 

that area, we did reconstruct all those using better, more high 

quality materials than before. Significant overtopping in 

Plaquemines Parish occurred during the storm, but again, we do 

not anticipate that we would have any breaches. 

The resultant flooding is an important point to recognize. Preliminary calculations that are being refined at this point indicate 

that surge that came out of the Industrial Canal area, perhaps 

even without the breaches, still would have resulted in significant 

flooding in this portion of Orleans Parish. The East Bank, New Orleans East area and St. Bernard Parish and Plaquemines Parish 

will also experience the significant flooding levels. 

Senator VITTER. If I could interrupt for a second, and you are 

welcome to finish your response in a minute. But something you 

just said confused me, talking about surge around the outflow canals. It is my understanding that those levee walls were never 

overtopped. 

Mr. HITCHINGS. That is correct. 
9 

Senator VITTER. So if they hadn’t breached, there may have been 

rain water backed up. Is that what you are talking about? 

Mr. HITCHINGS. No, I am talking about the fact that along the 

west side of the Industrial Canal—— 

Senator VITTER. Oh, that was overtopped. 

Mr. HITCHINGS [continuing]. Those flood walls were significantly 

overtopped, by as much as 2 feet, for a period of up to 6 hours. The 

volume of water that came into there was significant. We are in the 

process now of actually doing refined calculations to show what 

would have happened had there been no breaches. Certainly as we 

get that information available, we will share it with you and the 

public as well. 

But it is important to recognize that a repeat of Katrina doesn’t 

mean that those areas, even if we had no breaches, would have the 

flooding; it’s very important for everyone to understand. 

Senator VITTER. But as I understand it, correct me if I am wrong, 

you are basically saying, yes, overtopping, no to breaches. 

Mr. HITCHINGS. That is correct. 

Senator VITTER. In terms of the type of flooding you would have, 

I assume you would agree, that is a huge difference between flooding, perhaps as we had in East Jefferson, which was significant, 

particularly if it is your home, but it was not 12 feet of water or 

9 feet of water. 

Mr. HITCHINGS. Yes. Even if the volume of water ended up being 

the same, the character of the flooding, probably most dramatically 

shown in the Lower 9th Ward area, where houses were swept off 

their foundations, and literally blocks of houses destroyed, overtopping may not have caused that kind of devastation. The phrase has 

been used, characterizing that as a catastrophic damage. You 

would still have significant damage from the flooding, just from the 

water rising, but you would not expect to see the same type of damage as you described. 

Senator VITTER. On the levees, on the west side of the Industrial 

Canal, what will the height be on June 1st, compared to the height 

the day before Katrina? 

Mr. HITCHINGS. Well, those areas that were damaged will be restored to approximately 15 feet. Some of the areas were as low as 

121⁄2 feet. Those undamaged portions will be the same height that 

they were the day before Katrina. 

Senator VITTER. I thought your present work included heightening of undamaged sections of the levee system. 

Mr. HITCHINGS. Yes, it does, but not by the 1st of June. 

Senator VITTER. When will that work be accomplished by? 

Mr. HITCHINGS. Well, there are two parts to that question. We 

are restoring all of the levees and floodwalls in these areas. That 

will be done September 2007. Particularly in the Industrial Canal 

area, we have two choices for how to address that problem. The 

first choice is to raise those existing floodwalls. In most cases, that 

would require complete replacement of those, and we would, since 

they have to be at a higher height, we would most likely replace 

them with T walls. Now, that is an option that is perfectly technically viable to accomplish, at a cost estimated at around $400 

million. 
10 

What we have proposed, and have presented before Congress, 

would be to put a floodgate at Seabrook to isolate that area from 

Lake Pontchartrain, and then also a floodgate here just above the 

confluence of GIWW and the MRGO that would again isolate this 

area. That is a slightly less costly solution, but it is a much better 

technical solution, because it eliminates the flood threat in those 

areas, by preventing surge from entering. 

The disadvantage is that work will take longer to complete and 

could take as long as 2010. 

Senator VITTER. Secretary Woodley, one of the things we have 

been talking about, including here today, is oversight, suggestions, 

input by outside independent experts. Report three of the IPET, 

commissioned by the Secretary of Defense, will be released only by 

June, and the final report is due in the fall after the hurricane season. 

Clearly, there is an issue of how you balance doing things thoroughly and doing things timely. What are your views on that balance, No. 1? No. 2, what are your views on incorporating, on an ongoing and institutionalized basis, the thoughts and input and suggestions of outside independent experts? 

Mr. WOODLEY. Senator, that is something that the corps is very 

open to and is very interested in having that outside, external, 

independent review of our formulation procedures and of our design procedures. I think that our experience with that has been 

very good. 

In the IPET process, we are doing this in a very continual way. 

It is not a question of one report being done and then that report 

being reviewed. We are having interim reviews by the independent 

groups having them work very closely and provide their ideas and 

input to the IPET as that work proceeds. Dr. Link will discuss that 

in greater detail when he testifies in a subsequent panel. I think 

we are having a very good experience with that, and I believe that 

it would be something that ought to be incorporated in our procedures going forward. 

Senator VITTER. So you have no objection to the basic concept of 

institutionalizing outside, independent expert suggestions and review? 

Mr. WOODLEY. No objection whatsoever. I think that it should be, 

it has to be carefully designed so that it does not unreasonably 

take up time and become overly expensive. I believe that that type 

of concern is fully capable of being met. 

Senator VITTER. Do you have any specific reactions, pro or con, 

to my particular bill in that regard, in how my particular bill goes 

about designing such a system of institutionalizing outside, independent expertise? 

Mr. WOODLEY. I don’t have the details where I can go into it with 

you right now, Senator. But I believe that your proposal is a very 

constructive one and certainly one that we within the Administration are looking at very carefully. 

Senator VITTER. OK. I have asked for some time now various 

folks in the Administration for some specific input or reaction to 

the legislation. When could I expect that? 
11 

Mr. WOODLEY. I didn’t realize that we had that due to you, Senator. So I will get on it and get it back to you as soon as possible. 

By the end of the month, would that be acceptable? 

Senator VITTER. OK. 

We are joined by Congressman Jefferson, and I welcome him and 

turn to him for any questions he might have, and then I will have 

some wrap-up questions. 

Mr. JEFFERSON. Thank you, Senator Vitter. I thank you for holding this hearing. 

I want to ask one question to follow up on what you were asking, 

with respect to the outside investigations or look-sees or whatever. 

Is there any substantial disagreement, or let me ask it a different 

way. Is there now full agreement? If there isn’t, then you might tell 

me where there are areas of disagreement between the work that 

the corps has done to review its own work along the levees before 

Katrina and after, and the work of the outside, various outside 

agencies. Are there disagreements now between you and them, or 

is there now a coming-together about what happened? 

Mr. WOODLEY. I would have to ask Dr. Link to discuss exactly 

what his interactions have been with the other groups. I don’t 

know that we have in hand the reports from the other groups that 

would allow us to make precise comparisons between them. I do 

know that the IPET work, I believe, that Dr. Link will say, has 

made some very important discoveries and will give us a very 

sound understanding of what the performance of the works were in 

the event. 

You have to remember that the event was extremely complex. 

What is true of one section of the works is not necessarily true of 

another section. So you have to be very careful when you describe 

what took place and how the different types of structures responded to the forces that they were exposed to. So given that, 

there might be one area or another where there is not full agreement. 

My impression though is that at the end of the day, the scientists 

and engineers will come together with a strong consensus on what 

took place and a new understanding of the kind of engineering and 

design that needs to be accomplished in order to provide flood damage reduction structures in which the public will have full confidence. 

Mr. JEFFERSON. I remember starting out there seemed to be wide 

disagreements between the corps and the outside groups. Are you 

saying that that has narrowed over time and you expect it to narrow even more, to the point where there will be agreement? 

Mr. WOODLEY. Yes, sir. Let me say that I think the wide disagreements appear to have been more of a matter of perception 

than reality. I think the apparent discrepancies were based on describing, one group describing what took place at one portion of the 

event and another one focusing on what happened at another portion of the event. They were not necessarily at odds, but they appeared to be, because the full explanation was not understood by 

both sides. 

Mr. JEFFERSON. When do you think you might have a veto point 

where you can make these comparisons and let us know exactly 
12 

what happened there, based on what your work involved and what 

the work of the outside entities involved? 

Mr. WOODLEY. We will have a final draft report from the IPET. 

The leader of that group is here and will testify later today, Dr. 

Link. That report will be on the 1st of June and it will still be subject to a review process, but it won’t be private. It will be fully 

available. It will still be subject to a review, external, independent 

review process by the National Academy of Science and Engineering. So we will hold it, it will be open for that. I believe that based 

upon the process that we have, that on the 1st of June we will have 

a product in which we will have considerable confidence. 

Mr. JEFFERSON. OK, let me ask you one other thing. Although 

the answer to the question that Senator Vitter asked about when 

the raising of the levees will be completed and other sections, other 

than the ones that were damaged in Katrina, destroyed in Katrina, 

and the outside is—what did you say, 2010? 

Mr. HITCHINGS. It will be 2010 before all improvements—— 

Mr. JEFFERSON. Yes, before then. With that being the case, obviously all this won’t happen in 2010 at one time. Along the way, you 

will be getting things done. How have you prioritized how you will 

get the work done along the stretch of things that will be done between now and 2010? 

Mr. HITCHINGS. That is a very good question. In fact, there really 

is no prioritization to it. All the work will be done nearly concurrently, subject to authority and funding. Right now we have funding available to begin work on the raising and completing of those 

projects, and for getting those scheduled. Some of them will start 

sooner than others, because in some cases, we have all of the engineering completed, plans and specs ready, we can go out with a 

contract very quickly. Other ones will take a little bit more time 

to do some subsurface investigation and get the science ready. 

So that is the only difference you will see in scheduling, because 

we are planning to do all the work concurrently, very much like the 

repair work is going at the present time. We have 59 contractors 

engaged in the repair work. We expect similar type of work on the 

restoration. 

Mr. JEFFERSON. The repair work is being driven by the June 1st 

date and the need to fix the breaches. But the rest of it you are 

going to have to be able to plan out. The procedures are based on 

authorization and appropriation and all that. I mean, somehow or 

the other, in the Congress, we are going to be driven by your recommendation as to what should be authorized first or appropriated 

for first, and that sort of thing. So you operate on this cost benefit 

ratio all the time. 

I am just trying to figure, well, that will drive how you prioritize 

what part of the levee you start on, and based on what the costs 

and benefits are to the outcomes. I know you can’t carry all that 

at the same time along the same way. It has to be started somewhere and end somewhere. I am just trying to figure out what your 

considerations are, if you have any. 

Mr. HITCHINGS. Again, I will just state, as I had before, we plan 

to start every area that we have funding for—— 

Mr. JEFFERSON. At the same time? 
13 

Mr. HITCHINGS. At the same time, as quickly as we can. As I 

said, some of them will lag others, because some require more engineering. Those portions, those six elements of additional improvements that are subject to authorization and funding, the request 

that the Administration made was for authorization and funding of 

those completed. If that occurs, then we will start work on those 

just as quickly as that money is available. Again, we will work on 

all of those concurrently. 

Mr. JEFFERSON. So you aren’t going to be concerned about how 

much the loss might be here or there, you’re simply just going to 

work on the, if one levee just covers open area and another deals 

with a large population and huge property at risk, you won’t make 

a determination prioritized based on that? 

Mr. HITCHINGS. Well, we haven’t had to, because we haven’t been 

resource constrained, either by money or contractors and resources. 

If we were faced with that, either because of money or that there 

are not enough contractors to start all the work at the same time, 

we would engage in a dialog with State and local authorities to 

identify which of the areas we should start first and which ones to 

apply the money to. 

But up until this point, and this is unique in my career in working with the Corps of Engineers, we have not been resource constrained. 

Mr. JEFFERSON. Well, not only are you not resource constrained 

in terms of money, but with respect to the capabilities of the people 

to do the work, there’s enough folks out there to get that done, too, 

within your organization and outside? 

Mr. HITCHINGS. Absolutely. We are reaching out not only to the 

35,000 people we have as the resources of the corps available, as 

well as the private sector, and they are very heavily engaged in 

this. So other than the time it takes to do some things, there really 

isn’t any constraint on getting it done. 

Mr. JEFFERSON. Thank you. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Congressman. 

Let me go back for some wrap-up questions. One issue that has 

gotten a lot of attention since the storm, and on which I think 

there is a lot of consensus, is the importance of armoring the levees 

to make them stronger, so that even if they are overtopped, they 

don’t breach. The corps has proposed doing selective armoring, and 

I am concerned about how selective it is going to be. That is why 

I got another $130 million added in the Senate bill to beef up the 

amount of armoring we can do. 

What armoring is being currently planned? What will be done by 

early June. 

Mr. HITCHINGS. The armoring basically consists of a couple of 

components. I am going to ask to put up another chart, chart 11. 

It wasn’t intended for this purpose, but it will allow us to see those 

areas that we are looking at. 

The first area is transitions. Transitions are any place where we 

are going from earthen levee to some other type of structure. That 

is everywhere. It is Plaquemines Parish, it is Orleans Parish. As 

you know, there are flood walls that go to levees and there are road 

crossings and railroad crossings and flood gates and all of these 
14 

things. Every time there is a connection of those, we have found 

weaknesses, just based on the experience. 

So we are in fact going ahead and armoring and strengthening 

those at this time. We are looking then to the undamaged areas 

and doing the same thing, so we don’t experience that. 

The other portion of the armoring, just so it shows on this map, 

is the longest MRGO levee where we sustained the worst damage. 

Then also here in New Orleans East, all along the GIWW. So we 

are proposing to armor these places, because these are the areas 

that not only sustained the most damage as a result of Katrina, 

but would be expected to sustain more damage in the future, because of the Gulf surge and wave effect that hit this, and the overtopping. We have an investigation underway with leading scientists 

to help us to find exactly what type of armoring would be best suited for this situation. But those are the areas. 

So basically, it is all the transitions, no matter where they are 

in the project. Then this section of levee going here that has Gulf 

exposure and this section of levee here that has Gulf exposure. 

Senator VITTER. Isn’t it fair to say that with few exceptions, armoring the entire system, if done in a technically proper way, 

would significantly strengthen the protection offered, because it 

would guard against breaches? 

Mr. HITCHINGS. It certainly would improve the performance of 

those, if they were exposed to the type of attack that would cause 

that. But we experienced significant overtopping, for example, 

along the GIWW to Barataria and virtually no breaches in that. 

The water came over nearly at the same height there as it did 

other places. But because of the character of the overtopping, it did 

not tear those levees up. 

So while you certainly could strengthen the levees everywhere by 

armoring, in many cases you wouldn’t really get much of a return 

on that investment, because the levees wouldn’t be threatened by 

the overtopping itself. 

Senator VITTER. Another specific issue I am very concerned about 

is the pumping capacity in the outflow canals, once these temporary gates are installed. The idea is to put temporary gates 

where the three outflow canals in Orleans Parish meet Lake Pontchartrain, and to close those gates if a large storm is approaching. 

But of course, that means that you cannot remove rain water 

from the city without having pumps to go over the gates. And so 

having enough pumping capacity to go over the gates is important, 

unless you want to get flooded from rainwater during the storm. 

As I understand it, the pumping, the temporary pumping capacity planned in this scenario for the 17th Street Canal in particular 

is well under the capacity, at least on paper, in the city on that 

same canal. What is being done to increase that pumping capacity 

in time for the next hurricane season? 

Mr. HITCHINGS. Thanks for asking that question. If I could have 

charts 17 and 18 on the board. Basically, chart 17 will show what 

the structures are that we are proposing, and then also on chart 

18, will give you an overview of the progress on what the plan is. 

Chart 17, basically these numbers here represent the current 

percentage complete on those closure structures and pumping capacity. So we’re 25 percent on the canal for 17th Street, 32 percent 
15 

in Orleans and 24 percent complete here. This graphic gives you 

some idea of what the concept is for these closure structures. We 

would have a temporary gated structure across the canal that 

would normally be open. And only in the event of an anticipated 

storm surge would that be closed. And then these temporary 

pumps would be engaged once the gates are closed, to allow the 

pumping to continue up in there and then discharge the water 

downstream of that. 

As you noted, the current schedule for that results in a significantly deficient pumping capacity. Over here on this chart, it says 

on June 1 we expect to have 1,000 cubic feet per second of capacity 

installed. By the end of June, basically in July, I believe that says 

2,800 CFS that we expect to have at that location. And we are evaluating concepts so that we can make a decision on how best to 

match the capacity of these pump stations. Right now the concepts 

that we are looking at would allow us to have, by the end of September, 6,200 CFS, which essentially matches the flow capacity of 

that upstream pump station during high surge times. 

So we are looking at this proposal right now. We have been coordinating with the Orleans Parish Sewer and Water Board and 

also Jefferson Parish to come up with a concept to met the pumping demand of the outflow canal to protect the integrity of the 

structure in the most cost-effective way. So we’re targeting to have 

6,200 CFS available here by 30 September, 2,200 on Orleans and 

then 4,300 on London Avenue Canal. I noted that September 30 is 

well into the hurricane season, but that is as quickly as those 

pumps can be produced in those locations. 

Senator VITTER. You read my mind. Clearly 30 September is well 

into the season. Why can’t some other capacity like truly temporary 

pumps, that you have designed, at least in the picture, is what 

most people would call a permanent looking construction, why can’t 

some other truly temporary pumps be used to get that capacity up 

for the entirety of the season? 

Mr. HITCHINGS. Well, we are looking at every option available to 

provide that pumping capacity. There are no other systems, no 

other temporary pumping capacity that we can identify that is 

going to allow us to do that. We have been working with the local 

businesses, looking at different concepts of barge thrusters, for example, as a way of moving the water out of those canals. We just 

haven’t come up with anything that is technically feasible. 

Senator VITTER. Well, for instance, right after Katrina, in the 

weeks after Katrina, when the city had to be dewatered, there were 

truly temporary pumps brought in, and within days they were 

pumping major amounts of water out of the city. So why couldn’t 

something like that be used or be on standby to increase this capacity for the beginning of the hurricane season? 

Mr. HITCHINGS. And that is possible to do that. However, I will 

note that at the peak of our unwatering effort, we had 160 temporary pumps operating. The total capacity of those 160 pumps was 

1,000 cubic feet per second. So while it looked like a lot of water, 

compared to the capacity of what these existing pump stations and 

what these temporary pumps are going to be, it is much, much 

larger. I am not sure that those temporary pumps would have 

much of a significant impact. 
16 

Senator VITTER. So with regard to this problem, what is the status of the plan in conjunction with Jefferson Parish and other local 

sponsors to capture some significant amount of water before it even 

gets to the 17th Street Canal, in particular, in the Metarie Playground, the Metarie Country Club area? 

Mr. HITCHINGS. Jefferson Parish was working on this, moving 

forward with it. And we have looked at opportunities to use that 

as part of an integrated solution that provides the most cost-effective portion. And we are making recommendations to our headquarters this week to look at that. 

At the present time, it looks like we can more cost-effectively accomplish this pumping that we need to by putting all of the pumps 

at the outfall canals. This increment, while it is effective and does 

accomplish it, is more expensive per cubic foot per second than putting pumps up in this location. 

Senator VITTER. But it could be done before September 30th? 

Mr. HITCHINGS. It is my understanding that they are working on 

that right now. 

Senator VITTER. Is the corps supporting that work, including 

through funding? 

Mr. HITCHINGS. We certainly don’t object to them doing the work. 

Senator VITTER. That wasn’t my question. 

Mr. HITCHINGS. I know that. 

Senator VITTER. Is the corps paying for that work to any extent? 

Mr. HITCHINGS. We have not made a decision on that at this 

point, whether or not we would recommend paying for that work. 

Senator VITTER. Is the corps considering paying for that work? 

Mr. HITCHINGS. That is being proposed as an alternative in the 

recommendation that we sent forward, although not part of the 

most cost-effective solution. 

Senator VITTER. Well, again, let me just repeat the concern of 

timing, which is obviously significant with the next hurricane season starting. 

Final question. There has been ongoing discussion and disagreement about what the corps has authorization to do right now and 

what it doesn’t have authorization to do. What are the main categories of work that you have planned that we are talking about 

between now and 2010, the main, big categories that you do not believe you have current authorization to do? 

Mr. WOODLEY. Senator, we believe that we have authorization to 

accomplish all the work that was included in the last supplemental 

appropriation. I believe that we do not consider ourselves to have 

authorization at the present time to do any other work. 

Senator VITTER. And what are the main categories of that other 

work that you are asking for authorization for? 

Mr. WOODLEY. That includes the permanent pump stations, the 

armoring of the levees, the things that—— 

Senator VITTER. Is that pretty much the list thus far? 

Mr. HITCHINGS. That is the list that is the $1.46 billion that is 

in the proposal that has been submitted to Congress by the Administration. Those are the six elements in that at the current recommended funding levels. 

Senator VITTER. Now, on that list is selective armoring. I am confused. Surely you think you have authorization for that now. No? 
17 

Mr. HITCHINGS. No, we do not. 

Senator VITTER. You don’t have authorization for selective 

armor? 

Mr. HITCHINGS. That is correct. 

Senator VITTER. Well, this is a continuation of our debate. But 

let me just point out that as you know, in December, Congress 

passed significant legislation including what is in my opinion extremely broad authorization language. It allows for ‘‘the repair or 

restoration of any flood control work threatened or destroyed by 

flood, including the strengthening, raising, extending or other 

modification thereof as may be necessary in the direction of the 

Chief of Engineers.’’ 

Why doesn’t that cover selective armoring? 

Mr. HITCHINGS. I am not sure that I am in a position that I could 

answer that. We certainly could research it, and Mr. Woodley may 

have some comments. 

Mr. WOODLEY. Senator, I agree that is very broad language. But 

I think that we have, we are seeking the explicit authorization for 

the particular work that we are proposing. The very general language like that certainly can be used in some cases, but as you 

know, we generally have a strong preference for very specific authorizations from Congress before we undertake work. 

Senator VITTER. Well, let me just point out that these are extraordinary circumstances, and it is an emergency situation with 

the next hurricane season right around the corner. So I would suggest that preferences aren’t as important as getting the work done 

quickly and correctly. Again, this is extremely broad language. 

And I really think the corps is just kicking the can down the road 

on some of these issues to say that it doesn’t have present authorization. I don’t know why armoring isn’t strengthening. I don’t 

know why even the permanent pump stations isn’t a modification 

of the present system that is necessary in the discretion of the 

Chief of Engineers. I don’t know why any of these things aren’t covered by this authorization language. 

All right. Congressman Jefferson, any final questions? 

Mr. JEFFERSON. Well, just back to, you asked an authorization 

question with respect to the money that was in the supplemental 

in December. With respect to the most recent discussions about the 

$4.1 billion, that is a matter that you need authorization for, is it 

not? 

Mr. WOODLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. JEFFERSON. We have been told that if a request simply is 

made from the White House, as opposed to the Congress having to 

act on a request, that that would be sufficient to, for FEMA to have 

authority to do what it needs to do with respect to issuing the ultimate maps. Is that your understanding of what needs to be done, 

or does there need to be a specific authorization from the Congress 

to do that? 

Mr. WOODLEY. Under FEMA’s regulations, the commitment on 

the part of the Administration is sufficient to allow their regulatory 

action to proceed with respect to the base flood elevations. I would 

say that certainly if the Congress explicitly rejected that at some 

point then the FEMA may have to reconsider that. But I think that 

is an unlikely eventuality. 
18 

Mr. JEFFERSON. But absent a specific rejection, are you saying 

there is no authorization by the Congress needed, all that needs to 

be done is a request from the White House and things can move 

continually from there? 

Mr. WOODLEY. With respect to the regulatory requirements for 

establishment of base flood elevations, yes, sir, that is correct. 

Mr. JEFFERSON. Is it your Agency’s provence to urge the White 

House to make this recommendation to the Congress? 

Mr. WOODLEY. Yes, sir. We work with the Administration—— 

Mr. JEFFERSON. Have you done so? 

Mr. WOODLEY [continuing]. To make these recommendations to 

bring them forward. We certainly are working—— 

Mr. JEFFERSON. But you haven’t done so yet? 

Mr. WOODLEY. We will be doing so very soon. 

Mr. JEFFERSON. How soon do you think? 

Mr. WOODLEY. Very soon. I don’t know exactly what the timing 

is on it. 

Mr. JEFFERSON. Weeks? 

Mr. WOODLEY. I would expect to see it very soon. 

Mr. JEFFERSON. That would mean weeks, I guess, then? 

Mr. WOODLEY. It may be a matter of weeks, yes, sir. 

Mr. JEFFERSON. We have heard Mr. Powell say that he has gotten assurances that if his grandchildren were to live behind these 

levees, they would be secure, they needn’t worry about the levees 

ever breaching, they could worry about a little overtopping here 

and there that could be handled by the pumps, if we get them in 

place. But do you feel the same way that he feels about this? Because what we are trying to do here is give our people assurances 

that they can come back and feel it is safe to live in relative security, recognizing that there is always some danger of overtopping. 

But with respect to breaching, we can tell our people, can we not, 

that they can come back and rebuild without fear of these areas 

breaching again? 

Mr. WOODLEY. If the work requested is authorized and appropriated and completed, then we will have a system in place that 

is designed to, although it may experience overtopping in a major 

event, catastrophic event, that it would be designed not to experience catastrophic flooding as a result of breaches. So the answer 

to your question is yes. 

Mr. JEFFERSON. Now, when you say catastrophic event, are you 

talking about a category what storm? 

Mr. WOODLEY. I am talking about any storm that produced a 

storm surge that was higher than the elevation of the storm damage reduction works themselves, so that it put water from, either 

from the Gulf or from Lake Pontchartrain, over the top of the 

works. 

Mr. JEFFERSON. We have talked so much about these categories, 

though, just to have the public have an understanding, would it be 

a Category 3 or Category 4 storm? Are we talking about that we 

could expect no breaching from that? 

Mr. WOODLEY. A Category 3 storm, depending on its characteristics, how quickly it moved and what direction it came from, could 

very well produce very high storm surges. A Category 5 storm, depending on its direction and its speed, could possibly not produce 
19 

such high storm surges. So we will, our plan is to, once we have 

a design in place and we understand the nature of the works that 

are in place, what we would undertake to do would be to model it 

using our modeling capabilities, model a variety of storms against 

these works. Then at that point we would be in a position to answer that question in terms of what type of storms, what characteristics would speed, wind speed, barometric pressure and all those 

things would we expect to see overtopping. As of today, I cannot 

answer your question. 

Mr. JEFFERSON. OK. I was going to ask one last thing, with respect to the coastal erosion issues. When we talk about hurricane 

protection, we are talking about a hurricane protection system. Are 

you recommending, apart from what we were talking about with 

the levees and the drainage pumps, a total system-wide approach 

to this that will include wetlands restoration, coastal restoration, 

that sort of thing? 

Mr. WOODLEY. Absolutely. We have asked to jump start that, in 

the last request, with a $100 million appropriation that would 

allow us to immediately begin work on those elements of the LCA, 

or Louisiana Coastal Area plan, which has been recommended by 

the Chief of Engineers, and I believe transmitted to Congress, that 

would have the greatest likelihood in producing wetlands benefits 

that would intercept storm surges from the direction of the Gulf of 

Mexico. 

Mr. JEFFERSON. Thank you. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you both very much. We are going to 

move on to our second and third panels. But I really encourage you 

all to stay for that discussion and that testimony. Thank you for 

being here. 

Mr. WOODLEY. Senator, we will. I apologize, but I do have a conference call with OMB at noon, local time, if I may be excused at 

that time. But I am delighted to, and certainly intend to stay until 

I absolutely have to go. 

Senator VITTER. Sure. Thank you. 

Now we will invite our second panel up. I will be introducing 

them as they come forward to the witness panel. 

This panel again is focused on folks in local affected areas, their 

perspective and their input. We have William Clifford Smith, who 

is a Louisiana member of the Mississippi River Commission, and 

is a civil engineer from Houma, LA. We have the Honorable Benny 

Rousselle, President of Plaquemines Parish, and the Honorable 

Timothy Kerner, Mayor of the Town of Jean Lafitte, in Jefferson 

Parish, LA. We also have Mark Drennen, President and CEO of 

Greater New Orleans, Inc., a leading business economic development organization. 

Welcome to you all. We will go in that order with 5 minutes 

each, and then we will have questions and discussion. 

Mr. SMITH. 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. WILLIAM CLIFFORD SMITH, MEMBER, MISSISSIPPI RIVER COMMISSION, CIVIL WORKS, U.S. 

ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Senator. 
20 

Good morning, Senator and staff and Congressman Jefferson. 

Thank you for holding this hearing. I am very pleased that you 

want to investigate a comprehensive approach to hurricane protection. But I am frustrated and confused. I am here to tell you that 

a comprehensive approach is not only desirable, but is necessary 

for the survival of our coast and its economy, community and culture. A proactive approach to avoiding the type of destruction and 

devastation experienced through Hurricanes Katrina and Rita is 

long overdue. 

We in Terrebonne Parish have been working on such an approach for our region for over 15 years. The obsolete and frustrating authorization, appropriation and permitting process that 

has evolved in this country represents almost insurmountable barriers. Fifteen years ago, in conjunction with the State of Louisiana 

and the Corps of Engineers, we began to develop a hurricane protection system for Terrebonne Parish. We completed a feasibility 

study in 2002, which cost over $10 million, of which 50 percent was 

paid by local interest. It was approved by the Chief of Engineers. 

This project, known as Morganza to the Gulf Hurricane Protection 

Plan, has a positive cost benefit ratio and has been waiting on congressional authorization since 2002. 

The local citizens have been taxing themselves for the last 4 

years to raise the local share with the State in the event that a 

Federal project is ever authorized and funded. As a matter of fact, 

with local and State funds and no Federal help, we have just begun 

building a $17 million segment of this project in accordance with 

the feasibility report and with the hopes of ultimately receiving 

credit on a Federal project. The project, when totally completed, 

would provide Category 3 protection for approximately 200,000 citizens in Terrebonne and Lafourche Parishes, and approximately $8 

billion worth of public and private infrastructure. 

I know that I am blessed, because the worst natural disaster to 

hit America, Hurricane Katrina, was to the east of where I live. 

Even though the wind blew out of the north at 100 miles an hour, 

we received minimum damage and inconvenience. Within 30 days, 

Hurricane Rita hit southwest Louisiana and the wind blew 40 

miles an hour out of the south. We had more water in my parish 

than I have ever seen. Thankfully, my home, my business, my investment had minimum damages, so again, I was blessed. 

Because we live so close to the disaster area, especially New Orleans gas operations in the Gulf of Mexico that were devastated by 

Katrina and Rita, my community’s economy is the most prosperous 

that I have observed. All of this is because the oil and gas companies are doing everything possible to get back in production, because of demand and prices for their product. I have, as a civil engineer and land surveyor, who has lived near the water in this 

coastal area all my life, I see my coastline washing away into the 

Gulf of Mexico. I believe if a storm of 100 miles an hour winds hits 

my community from the south, there could be there 10 to 15 feet 

of water in the vicinity of Houma. 

During my lifetime, over 400,000 acres of land have been lost between my community and the Gulf of Mexico. This buffer that protected my community from hurricanes for over 200 years is erod-
21 

ing. One of the most productive estuary areas in the world is being 

lost as I speak to you. 

I tell everyone in my community to go look at Chalmette and St. 

Bernard Parish. Chalmette is about 20 miles further inland from 

the Gulf than my community of Houma, as shown on the attached 

sketch. I believe that it is a matter of time before my community 

experiences the fate of Chalmette and St. Bernard Parish. 

As horrible as the hurricanes were last year, one good thing that 

resulted is the recognition that the wetlands and estuary areas, in 

and of themselves, significantly provide hurricane protection that 

must be restored and rebuilt. This is surely the case, particularly 

in my area, because our wetlands have historically protected not 

only my parish, but much of LaFourche, St. Charles, Jefferson and 

Orleans, in addition to being the most productive estuaries on 

earth. 

I believe as a civilian member of the Mississippi River Commission, this restoration of our wetlands can be accomplished by managing the resources of the Mississippi River and its tributaries. The 

survival of our area depends upon you. Please authorize and fund 

the Morganza to the Gulf Protection Project and the Louisiana 

Coastal Area Project for the restoration of the national, great coastal area. 

Thank you for your time. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Mr. Smith. 

President Rousselle. 

STATEMENT OF BENNY ROUSSELLE, PRESIDENT, 

PLAQUEMINES PARISH GOVERNMENT 

Mr. ROUSSELLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. 

I represent the people of Plaquemines Parish, a relatively small 

community located on the Gulf Coast of Louisiana, south of New 

Orleans. 

Plaquemines Parish is small in size and population, yet it provides multi-million dollar revenues for North America. The Parish’s 

oil, gas and fishery industries provide an economic impact that not 

only Louisiana enjoys, but for the entire United States. The Naval 

Air Station’s Joint Reserve Base, representing all five branches of 

the U.S. Armed Forces and the U.S. Coast Guard, is located in 

Plaquemines Parish. 

Two prominent scientific research centers are located in 

Plaquemines Parish as well. Tulane University’s F. Edward Hebert 

Research Center focuses on environmental, biological and medical 

research activities. The Louisiana State University’s Citrus Research Station obtains produce research data on citrus specimens 

and small fruit. 

Plaquemines Parish is also the home of the Conoco Phillips Alliance Refinery, one of the last grassroots refineries built in the 

United States. The refinery processes crude oil and receives domestic crude oil by pipeline and international crudes via the Louisiana 

Offshore Oil Port. Approximately 600 employees and contractors 

operate and maintain the refinery. The refinery started operations 

in 1971, and remains one of the country’s most efficient and modern refineries. 
22 

The Chevron Oronite Oak Point Plant in Plaquemines Parish is 

one of the largest and most advanced producers of high-quality 

blended fuel and lubricant additives in the world. The plant occupies 100 acres in the Parish and has more than 410 employees. 

More than 30 unique additive components and intermediates are 

manufactured at the plant and more than 300 packages are blended at the site for customer requirements. 

Southeast Louisiana is a major oil and gas producing region, 

with an energy industry that accounts for $93 billion in revenue to 

the Louisiana economy and the employment of more than 62,000 

people. In 2001, Plaquemines Parish produced more than 21 million barrels of crude oil from the more than 23,000 wells, more 

than any other parish in the State. In addition, Plaquemines Parish also produced more than 146 million cubic feet of natural gas. 

The mouth of the Mississippi River is in Plaquemines Parish. 

Through this gateway to the Mississippi River Valley passes 92 

percent of the Nation’s agricultural exports, as well as coal, petroleum products, iron and steel, rubber and chemicals. The mouth of 

the Mississippi River is served by five ports, including the ports of 

Plaquemines, St. Bernard, New Orleans, South Louisiana and 

Baton Rouge. These ports handle a significant portion of the Nation’s cargo. In fact, annual U.S. tonnage reports consistently rank 

the Port of South Louisiana first in tonnage shipped, while the 

Ports of New Orleans and Baton Rouge rank fourth and sixth. The 

ports also serve as America’s cargo gateway to Latin America, and 

with potentially opening of the Seapoint facility, they are expected 

to become critical to our trade. 

The Parish of Plaquemines jutting out into the Gulf of Mexico 

was the first to be hit by Hurricane Katrina. Just a few short 

weeks afterwards, it received the backlash of Hurricane Rita. In 

both instances, Plaquemines Parish was inundated by waters that 

flooded and washed away practically all businesses, homes and 

structures on the east bank and southernmost points of the Parish. 

Our only protection was levees, both Federal and non-Federal, that 

suffered tremendous soil loss, and in some instances, collapsed. 

Unlike other parishes that need levee protection in some areas 

of their parish, Plaquemines is bordered by levees on all sides. We 

rely heavily on our levees year-round for daily protection. We have 

been dependent on the Corps of Engineers to provide us with protection for our Federal levees. However, Plaquemines Parish has 

allocated substantial local dollars for Federal and non-Federal levees. This does not include the time and labor spent by employees 

to maintain both the Federal and non-Federal levees. In order to 

provide adequate levee protection in Plaquemines Parish, we must 

get all our levees funded under a Federal system. 

However, levee systems are not and cannot be the lone solution. 

There must be a move to restore America’s wetlands. They are an 

important part of our economy, our culture and our environment. 

Louisiana boasts the Nation’s largest shrimp fishery and second 

largest commercial fishing industry, only second to Alaska. Some 

of the largest commercial fishing ports in the country are in the 

Southeast Louisiana corridor. Fishermen working out of these ports 

land between 350 million and 495 million pounds of saltwater fish 
23 

each year and about 22 million pounds of freshwater fish, the largest freshwater harvest in the Nation. 

The wetlands surrounding Plaquemines Parish are the spawning 

ground and nurseries for much of the Nation’s most desirable seafood: shrimp, oysters, crab, catfish and red drum. Without wetlands 

protection and restoration, Louisiana’s seafood industry and the 

Nation’s seafood populations are vulnerable. 

Parts of Plaquemines Parish are designed as essential habitat for 

brown shrimp, white shrimp and red drum by the Gulf of Mexico 

Fishery Management Council. America’s wetlands also provide natural flood control, natural hurricane protection and natural filtration systems to protect water quality. In fact, America’s wetlands 

located in Louisiana have been called the hardest working, the 

most productive and the greatest wetlands on earth. 

But these wetlands are disappearing at the rate of 40 square 

miles a year. That is 80 percent of the Nation’s total coastal wetland loss occurring in the Nation’s most important and productive 

wetlands. Without protection, these wetlands are not only vulnerable, they are gone. 

The southern portion of Plaquemines Parish and its east bank 

population now stands at 10 percent pre-Katrina numbers. Our 

residents and businesses are waiting for adequate levee protection 

and coastal restoration. Plaquemines Parish is not a heavily populated area. Louisiana in general is not a heavily populated State. 

But consider this: these small numbers of people make up nearly 

100 percent of the workers in the Nation’s second largest seafood 

industry and comprise the work force of one of the Nation’s most 

important oil and gas-producing regions. They service three of the 

Nation’s busiest ports and form a unique and priceless part of 

America’s cultural heritage. 

Today I am asking that you invest in the maintenance of all 

levee systems in Plaquemines Parish. I am also asking you to invest and dedicate funding to our wetlands and nature’s hurricane 

protection system. 

We respectfully request that you don’t turn your back on the levees and the vanishing wetlands of our Parish and State. These levees and wetlands present a priceless opportunity to act locally to 

reap enormous global benefits. Without protection, we are all vulnerable. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Mr. Rousselle. 

Mayor Kerner. 

STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY P. KERNER, MAYOR, TOWN OF JEAN 

LAFITTE AND VICE PRESIDENT, WEST JEFFERSON LEVEE 

DISTRICT, JEFFERSON PARISH, LA 

Mayor KERNER. Good morning. My name is Timothy Kerner, 

Mayor of the Town of Jean Lafitte and Vice President of the West 

Jefferson Levee District. I am here to speak on behalf of the citizens of Jefferson Parish. 

Hurricane Katrina made landfall on August 29, 2005, causing 

tremendous flooding damage over large portions of southeastern 

Louisiana. The event focused great attention on its impact upon 

the flood protection systems throughout the area. 
24 

However, Hurricane Katrina was not the only catastrophe to hit 

southeastern Louisiana. In late September of 2005, Hurricane Rita, 

while on a path to making landfall near the Louisiana/Texas border, brought catastrophic tidal inundation to the communities of 

Crown Point, Lafitte and Barataria as it passed south of Jefferson 

Parish, Louisiana. 

The flooding overtopped and in some instances destroyed existing 

levee systems that heretofore had provided a limited level of protection in these areas. Because of the extent of damage, the rehabilitation of these levee systems is beyond the financial capability 

of the West Jefferson Levee District. As such, we are requesting 

your review of and subsequent approval for funding the repair of 

those damaged levee systems and for the construction of new levees 

as may be needed to protect the citizens of lower Jefferson Parish. 

We understand that the repair and construction of levee systems, 

both Federal and non-Federal, located in other communities in and 

around the New Orleans metropolitan area that were damaged or 

destroyed by Hurricane Katrina have been included in congressional appropriations to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. In earlier supplemental appropriation legislation, the non-Federal levees 

located in the Parishes of St. Bernard and Plaquemines were addressed, and we understand that in the most recent supplemental 

appropriation bills that was just passed by the Senate Committee, 

the non-Federal levee in the Terrebonne Parish has also been addressed. Unfortunately, the non-Federal levees in Lafitte, Crown 

Point and Barataria were not addressed. 

Currently we have the following projects in the continuing authority program, Section 205 with the Corps of Engineers: Crown 

Point, Rosethorn, Lafitte, Fisher School Basin, Pailet, and Boose 

Bayou. All these projects are authorized by the Federal Government. In each project, the corps is limited to spending $7 million 

per project, with a 65 percent Federal and a 35 percent non-Federal match. We are requesting legislation to increase the Federal 

funding to $50 million per project, because the cost will far exceed 

the $7 million limit. We are also asking for a reduction in the nonFederal cost share to 10 percent. 

We are also asking to change our non-Federal levels to Federal 

levees to waiver the cost to benefit ratio for the following projects: 

Lower Lafitte, Lower Barataria, Jones Point, Lower and Upper 

Highway 45 Evacuation Routes. Although the locations will protect 

homes, they will more importantly provide evacuation routes. 

In closing, the Town of Jean Lafitte’s 1990 census shows a 45.5 

percent growth, in 2000, a 57.5 percent growth. This area has a 

long history of providing goods and services for the country. 

Barataria Bay is one of the largest shellfish producing areas in the 

State of Louisiana. We provide the rest of the country with fish, 

crab, oysters, shrimp and crawfish. We also have hundreds of active wells that help fuel automobiles and heat homes and many 

other things. 

But we are also paying the price, because those canals cut by the 

oil companies allow the floodwaters to devastate our community 

time and time again. We also are a buffer zone for the 250,000 people that live on the West Bank of Jefferson Parish. And Senator, 

my family was elected in my area in 1880. It is not just a job for 
25 

me. I love the people I represent, and I want to do the best job I 

possibly can. 

Right now, I am venting out the insides of homes, I have crews 

doing that, I have other people that are coming in and finishing the 

insides of homes and putting roofs on people’s houses that can’t afford. We also in some cases are building homes for people that can’t 

afford it. I am doing the best I can with what I need to provide for 

those people’s living protection. I am asking you today to please, 

please help me and consider my community. Thank you. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Mr. Mayor, for all your work. 

Mr. DRENNEN. 

STATEMENT OF MARK C. DRENNEN, PRESIDENT AND CEO, 

GREATER NEW ORLEANS, INC. 

Mr. DRENNEN. Senator Vitter, Congressman Jefferson, thank you 

very much for this opportunity. 

As you both know, GNO, Inc. is a regional economic development 

agency with a mission to grow the economy. It started 21⁄2 years 

ago. Certainly our mission remains the same, but our goals and 

tactics have changed, like everybody’s. 

What I want to share with you today is how fragile the economy 

in our region is right now and how critical it is that the levee protection be successful. I am concerned about a couple comments I 

heard this morning already in response to some of your questions. 

The very clear language, Senator Vitter, that you added to the Federal law authorizing what seems to, I think anybody that heard 

you, authorizing the armoring of the levees, and there seems to be 

a lack of clarity in the corps as to whether or not that gives them 

the authority to do what needs to be done. 

I am concerned about comments about no priorities, when certainly with my background, we could never count on all the money 

being there, so we had to set priorities. The comments about no 

modeling, in response to Senator Vitter, one of your questions. I am 

hoping I misunderstood or lack understanding, but some of those 

responses concern me. 

We appreciate very much what you have done in getting money 

for our levees, getting money for housing. That was important, the 

GO Zone legislation. We are going to be asking you for some modifications to the GO Zone legislation, because it is a great economic 

tool for us. However, we are concerned in the devastated areas that 

the timeframes may not allow us to utilize some of that low interest money. We are going to be, again, suggesting some extensions 

of times to use that as our economy comes back. 

We know in our region over 80 percent of the large businesses 

are back. That is good news. We know that bank deposits are up 

significantly. That is good news. But what it means is people are 

holding on to their insurance money until they get some clarity as 

to what they can and can’t do with it. We know that we have seen 

some important government reforms. I think those are going to 

happen even more so in this session. Some of the colleges are reopened. That is all great news. 

However, there are a lot of things out there that are not healthy, 

and a breach in a levee is going to cause us severe problems that 
26 

we may not come back from. I am absolutely confident that over 

the next 10 years, we will be a better region if the levees hold. 

But let me talk about some of the fragility out there, if that is 

the correct word. The tourists and conventioneers have not come 

back. They will not come back unless we as a State are able to utilize a lot of the CDBG money to market ourselves nationally. Because the national marketing with $10 million, $15 million is not 

going to be enough, and we are going to have to get $100 million. 

The money that we have asked for in CDBG money that has not 

come through yet for grants for small businesses is extremely important, not only in the tourism industry, but in a lot of other 

small businesses. We modeled our request after what happened at 

New York City. They were very successful in bringing back their 

economy because they had CDBG money for infrastructure, they 

had it for economic development. The amount after we spend 

money on housing that we are going to have is not nearly enough 

to recover. So tourism, convention business are not back and will 

not be back unless we can put significant money into it. 

Our private hospitals in the region are losing money every time 

an uninsured patient walks in their door. Normally, as a business, 

you want people to come in. East Jeff, West Jeff, Oshner, are suffering, losing money every month because they are not getting reimbursed by the State for 100 percent of the costs of the people we 

used to take care of in the charity hospitals. And all the labor that 

has come in uninsured, they are not getting reimbursed for. They 

are having serious problems. 

There is an insurance crisis that I think we are all beginning to 

wake up to. In some parts of the region, you can’t get insurance. 

Other parts, the insurance costs are going to make it very difficult 

to come back, for people to invest. Another very fragile area is 

going to be the utility costs. If Entergy New Orleans isn’t able to 

latch onto some CDBG money, like was again done in New York 

City, they are going to have to increase rates that again, are so 

much that it is going to make the recovery of our economy very difficult. 

We don’t even talk about the infrastructure damage. Think about 

the sewerage and water board here and the damage that has been 

done underground, the utility structure, the roads. The list goes on 

and on. We are going to have to get money for infrastructure investments, again, like New York City did. MRGO, we are going to 

shut down MRGO, how are we going to move all those businesses. 

We can’t, for the hundreds of millions that have been invested 

there, there has to be a solution to that. 

Loans that are being proposed for businesses are good for some 

businesses, low interest loans. But most businesses have already, 

small and medium, have already extended their personal credit 

cards, second mortgages on their house, and just borrowing more 

money to get out of their problems is not going to be sufficient. We 

are going to have to get some grant money for businesses that have 

very clear business plans and have a good chance of survival to 

help them get through this. 

Now, what is the solution to all this? It is what Senator Vitter, 

Congressman Jefferson, your predecessors have been talking about 

for years. And that is, we as a region, as a State, want to take care 
27 

of ourselves. And we could do that if we could get 50 percent of the 

royalty payments of offshore oil and gas production. That would 

give us sufficient money to borrow money to immediately invest in 

all these things that we have been talking about. Other than that, 

we are going to have to continue to go to Washington asking for 

more CDBG money to repair our basic infrastructures that are so 

necessary for the recovery of the economy in this region. 

Again, thank you. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you very much. 

Now we will get to questions and discussions. 

Mr. Smith, I am glad you focused on the Lafourche-Terrebonne 

area. Because my great concern, like yours, is that that area, we 

are talking about Greater New Orleans. And a major protection 

system, which in some ways is inadequate, and yet we move to 

Lafourche and Terrebonne, we are talking about little or no protection system whatsoever. So if a storm comparable to Katrina or a 

lot less went 50 miles west, there would be clearly devastation 

there, as you outlined. 

That is why the Morganza to the Gulf project, as you mentioned, 

is so important. That is why I introduced a bill to fast track that, 

included it within the WRDA bill which we are trying to move. The 

entire project included about $40 million to funds in the Senate 

emergency appropriations bill for Terrebonne in particular. 

Would you talk about the importance of that project, and in particular, an analysis of that cost, which is significant, but what the 

cost might be of a Katrina that hits Lafourche and Terrebonne 

head on in terms of FEMA response and everything else? 

Mr. SMITH. Well, Senator, of course for us, a storm that would 

be west, that would hit the coast west of us would be absolutely 

devastating. Again, there were 400,000 acres of land between 

where I live in Houma, LA and the Gulf of Mexico when I was born 

that is not there today. And historically, that was our hurricane 

protection. And that has gone away because of coastal erosion, subsidence, saltwater intrusion and what have you. 

So therefore, we are proposing, and have been proposing for over 

15 years, this hurricane protection levee system that encompasses 

about 72 miles in length. But it would protect not only the inhabited areas primarily in Terrebonne Parish, but also it would protect 

a vast area of wetlands that is deteriorating as we speak. Again, 

that is about 120,000 people living in Terrebonne today, and about 

$8 billion worth of infrastructure, both public and private infrastructure, in the community. Again, as Plaquemines and the other 

coastal areas, we are a big producing area of seafood. And of 

course, oil and gas activities. 

So of course, a storm that would devastate our area, similar to 

what Katrina did primarily to St. Bernard, Plaquemines, and particularly Chalmette, Louisiana, would be absolutely devastating. 

Even in Rita, we had 10,000 homes flooded in Terrebonne and 

Lower Terrebonne Parish. We probably have about 40,000 homes 

in Terrebonne Parish. Again, a storm to the west would probably 

devastate and flood that entire area. 

Again, remember, we are 65 miles, Houma is 65 miles southwest 

of New Orleans, approximately 30 miles north of the Gulf of Mexico. And I tell everybody, about two or three inches above the 
28 

water. And the water is rising. We are also getting closer to the 

Gulf as every day goes by. 

It is kind of mind boggling, though, that we live above sea level. 

Generally the people in Terrebonne and Lafourche Parish live 

above sea level, not below sea level, like the majority of the metropolitan areas of New Orleans. But we live very close to the Gulf 

of Mexico. I see every day on my way to my office, and I actually 

live a little north of Houma, I see the tidal flow every day in the 

natural bayous and streams in the area. 

So it is just a matter of time, very frankly, although we have all 

these wonderful programs proposed, all these wonderful projects, 

and we try to be in the process of authorization and funding, I 

think it is just a matter of time that we are going to have a disaster if we don’t do some major protection. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you. 

President Rousselle and Mayor Kerner, I know one of several big 

issues for both of you are converting non-Federal levees in your 

areas to Federal ones. The corps has proposed some of that, particularly on the West Bank of Plaquemines. It did not propose 

doing it in other areas, including on the East Bank of Plaquemines, 

including in areas that directly impact you, Mayor. 

I disagree with that. I have proposed and actually included in 

the Senate legislation conversion of virtually all of that to Federal 

levees. Could both of you talk about the importance of that work 

to the protection of your citizens? 

Mr. ROUSSELLE. Thank you, Senator Vitter. I want to thank you 

for including that in there. 

The problem that we have is that we have ring levees completely 

around us. If you do not include those local levees and those privately owned levees in the Federal system, you have a hole in the 

system. And in our case, for instance, on the West Bank, the water 

would come in and inundate the hurricane evacuation route, leaving our parish cut in half. And to us, the Administration hopefully 

will write that letter requesting that that funding be accessed, if 

it is indeed appropriated through the entire process. Right now, I 

understand that the $60 million is hard money and that the balance is not there unless the Administration requests it. 

But it is like having a hole in the system without putting all of 

those levees in. Currently we are on hold right now, we are working on those locally owned levees on the East Bank. The corps is 

in the process of issuing a contract to put them up to pre-Katrina 

standards. But that is as far as that goes, and I don’t think it will 

take a whole lot more to bring them up to a Federal standard. But 

we are really on hold right now. We are participating with stockpiling mud, dirt, but the project, I have received a letter from the 

corps to tell us not to do any more work on them until they can 

issue the contract. 

So it is imperative that we include these systems, these levees. 

For instance, the refinery. The refinery is just now getting back up 

to capacity. That refinery had several feet of water in it, because 

it is not protected by a Federal levee. So we are hoping that these 

Federal levee issues will go away and be included. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you. Mayor. 
29 

Mayor Kerner. There are so many reasons. It would allow us to 

receive Federal funding, it would take the cost to benefit ratio out 

of the picture, because in some of my areas, they will never meet 

the cost to benefit ratio. And the same thing President Rousselle 

said, in my area, I have Lower Goose Bayou that would have a ring 

levee system, then further down in Lafitte, no, it wouldn’t have 

one. Goose Bayou North, no levee system. And in the town of Jean 

Lafitte, a levee system. The middle of the town of Jean Lafitte, no 

levee system. The [inaudible] area in the town, a levee system. 

Barataria, a levee system. Lower Barataria, no levee system. 

Crown Point, on the east end, a levee system. Right up at the West 

End, no levee system. 

So what you have is maybe five ring levees and another five 

areas with no levee system, no evacuation routes. You would have 

one area dry and another area would be flooded. 

So I would love to—Mr. Rousselle just sent me a note on 

Donaldsonville to the Gulf. Yes, that would actually help my area. 

It would, the levee from Donaldsonville to Plaquemines Parish and 

it would catch the Town of Jean Lafitte and also Crown Point, and 

we are trying to get it to go a little further south to catch the 

Lower Barataria. 

But back to the non-Federal levees, it would mean everything in 

the world to my area, because like Mr. Rousselle said, you would 

have a completed levee system, one levee system and not a couple 

of ring levees that would be left out when other places would be 

flooded, you wouldn’t have evacuation routes. 

Senator VITTER. Thanks. 

Mark, you mentioned, a number of crucial business issues, but 

I want to focus, since this hearing is about levees and flood protection, related issues on that. To generalize what would you say the 

level of confidence of the business community is in our ongoing 

hurricane and flood protection work? 

Mr. DRENNEN. Senator, I would say it was high enough that 

most of the major businesses decided to come back. Again, the 

number that I have seen from some bankers is over 80 percent of 

the large businesses are here and others are coming back. So I 

think there is a good enough level of confidence that they made 

those decisions. 

The point I was trying to make is a lot of that is very fragile, 

and they won’t come back a second time. So we absolutely have to 

get the levees right. 

Senator VITTER. Apart from 50 percent royalty sharing, which 

would be a huge breakthrough, what in your mind are important 

benchmarks which we need to meet over time to retain and grow 

that confidence level? 

Mr. DRENNEN. Just as it relates to levees? 

Senator VITTER. Yes. 

Mr. DRENNEN. I think if the business community believes that 

the planning is underway for Category 5 protection and that we 

have a source of money to implement Coastal 2050 and to begin to 

restore the wetlands that that is enough to give them confidence. 

Senator VITTER. I thank you. 

Congressman 
30 

Mr. Jefferson. Thank you. I will just limit my questions to Mr. 

Drennen. I think Senator Vitter covered the other issues with the 

officials and with Mr. Smith. 

You mentioned the GO Zone legislation and the time line issues. 

I was very much involved with that, as you know. And I am very 

interested to know what specific things you would like to see us do 

to address the time line questions. We have had some recommendations from you. But are you able to speak to that today, or would 

you rather submit that at a later time? 

Mr. DRENNEN. I can speak to one, because we have talked about 

it fairly substantially. I would like to submit the others to you in 

writing. We still have a request out to our colleagues to put a comprehensive list together. 

But the big one we know of is that a lot of the investment that can take place with the $7.9 billion in low interest loans will be 

taking place in areas of the State that were not devastated by the 

hurricanes, because they are up and able and ready to make application and begin building. You saw the First Aid Bond Commission 

meeting, where all the projects were in Baton Rouge. We all love 

Baton Rouge and that is our capital, but we need that money down 

in this region. Right now, the State has set aside half of the money, $4 billion, 

to be used in the most heavily damaged regions. And that is good 

news. Is that enough? We have no idea at this point, because there 

aren’t applications being made in our region. And we don’t think 

they are going to be made until we are able to get further along 

recovery. 

So the request is going to be to extend the GO Zone legislation 

to 2010 in the most heavily devastated areas, again because we are 

a few years behind the other parts of the State. 

Mr. JEFFERSON. Is there a need to tailor this, to make this relief 

more targeted? You seem to be suggesting that we didn’t target it 

well enough. 

Mr. DRENNEN. Well, we don’t know yet how much demand there 

is going to be. My answer to you would be, the State of Louisiana 

needs these low interest loans. It is good for the whole State. It is 

certainly good for the 31 parishes that are impacted by it. 

But if it turns out $4 billion is not enough in the severely devastated region, then we have made a mistake. But again, we don’t 

have enough feeling yet to know whether or not $4 billion is going 

to be enough. And we don’t know when the applications are going 

to start being made. 

Mr. JEFFERSON. How confident do you think the business community is, or anyone is, with respect to the guidelines that have 

just been issued by FEMA and the corps with respect to rebuilding? 

Mr. DRENNEN. There is still a lot of confusion as to exactly what 

it means. There is still a lot of confusion out there as to how you 

are going to bring back whole neighborhoods. There are a lot of 

people in the business community that are still looking at the 

Baker bill to see how it might be tailored to make it more locally 

oriented. 

The biggest concern we hear is where you have whole neighborhoods that are devastated. How is the State of Louisiana, the LRA, 
31 

going to go about redeveloping whole communities, when what is 

involved is the basic infrastructure of those communities, from 

roads to sewer lines to utility poles? Who is going to have the 

money to come in and raise it, raise the ground? How are you going 

to keep from having one house raised four feet and another one two 

feet, and the four foot house flooding the two foot house? 

So again, there is still a lot of confusion and unanswered questions as we speak today. 

Mr. JEFFERSON. You mentioned in just one part of your testimony with respect to the insurance issues and local government financing, can you give me a little better feel for what we are facing 

with respect to insurance questions out there with the business 

people? 

Mr. DRENNEN. Yes. We have talked, for example, and Benny 

Rousselle will probably know this better than I, but there are some 

areas in his parish where they don’t have utility lines and may not 

be getting them. How do you get an ice house, where the fishermen 

are, without utilities? So we have heard stories about in some 

areas you can’t get insurance at all. In other areas, the costs that 

are being quoted are so high that nobody could afford to get coverage. 

Mr. JEFFERSON. With respect to the Federal responsibility, what 

do you think we could do or should do with respect to these issues? 

Mr. DRENNEN. That is a tough question. Because I don’t—whether this is a State solution or a Federal solution, I am not an expert 

on it yet. I know at every meeting I have been in the last month, 

it is becoming more and more of an issue, as people see the levees 

issue begin to solidify, the housing begin to solidify, now they are 

beginning to find out how difficult it is to get insurance. 

So at our level, we are going to be meeting with Jim Donlan 

soon, to talk about what ideas he has. But again, if insurance costs 

are too high to be competitive, then it is going to be very difficult 

for our economy to come back. 

Senator VITTER. OK, thank you, Congressman. 

We are joined by Senator Landrieu. I want to welcome her and 

thank her for being here. She has asked that her comments be 

given during the third panel, so I will excuse you all and thank you 

all very much for being here. 

As the third panel comes up, I will begin to introduce them. And 

again, this panel is focused on outside independent engineer and 

environmental expertise and how we institutionalize that with this 

very important, ongoing Corps of Engineers work. 

We have on the third panel Dr. Lewis E. Link, Director of the 

Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force established by the 

Secretary of Defense; Mr. Thomas Jackson, Member of the American Society of Civil Engineers External Review panel, and a 

former president of the society; and Mr. Carlton Dufrechou, Executive Director of the Lake Pontchartrain Basin Foundation, a leading environmental group in Louisiana. 

Welcome to all of you. As with the previous panels, we will invite 

5 minutes of testimony, and of course, your entire written testimony will be submitted and made a part of the written record. 

Then after your 5 minutes each, we will have questions and discussion. 
32 

Dr. LINK. 

STATEMENT OF LEWIS E. LINK, PH.D., DIRECTOR, 

INTERAGENCY PERFORMANCE EVALUATION TASK FORCE 

Mr. LINK. Thank you, sir. 

Senator Vitter, Senator Landrieu, it is a pleasure to be here. I 

am Ed Link, I am on the faculty of the University of Maryland in 

the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering. And as 

you stated, the Project Director for IPET. 

IPET is an accumulation of expertise, about 150 people from government, State and Federal, academia and industry, who have basically dropped what they were doing prior to Katrina and devoted 

themselves to this very, very important task. That task is to discover the facts about the behavior of the flood protection system 

during Katrina and to use those facts to build back a more resistant, more capable system. I am very delighted to represent those 

people today in this testimony. 

One of the unique parts of the IPET activity has been the participation of the peer review process with the American Society of 

Civil Engineers and the National Research Council. I can’t tell you 

how valuable it has been, and you spoke, Senator, earlier about 

independent review. The ability to have a team of experts from 

ASCE looking over our shoulder continuously, and giving us advice 

and guidelines on how to best solve these very complex problems 

has been a very positive component of the success that we have 

had in understanding what really happened during the storm. 

I would like to highlight a few things that we have learned. And 

first of all, all that we are learning is going in several places simultaneously. First, it is going to Task Force Guardian. And in fact, 

there are 20 people from Task Force Guardian embedded in the 

IPET Task Force. It gives us a direct connection to critical knowledge that we need, and also a direct connection back to the folks 

that are involved in designing and constructing the repairs and reconstitution of protection. 

Second, we are providing information to the public. We have a 

public web site that right now has over 3,900 documents on it, including the reports of all of our analysis and the fundamental data 

that has been used in those analyses. And third, we are providing 

information to the corps and other interested individuals with regard to future policy and practice in engineering. And that is a role 

I think that the American Society of Civil Engineers and the National Academies Committee will play in being able to interpret 

what we have been able to determine from our analysis and provide some really good insights on how we can be better engineers 

in the future, how we can consider some of these complex situations more effectively. 

Some of the things that have been I think most important in our 

inputs to Task Force Guardian is, first, establishing a new reference system for the Southeast Louisiana area. As you are well 

aware, the geology of this area makes it very vulnerable to differential settlement and differential subsidence. We were able to 

accelerate work of NOAA and the corps to create that new reference and to establish the exact elevations of all the critical con-
33 

trol structures, so that now we do know exactly how far below authorized levels these structures are. 

We have also been able to determine the failure mechanisms for 

the breaches. And through understanding those mechanisms, to 

provide insight to the assessment of the non-damaged areas of the 

levees and floodwalls, to assisting and understanding what needs 

to be done for those sections to guarantee their vitality during the 

next hurricane season. 

In addition to that, we are correlating the losses that occurred 

from Katrina to the flooding exposure and developing a risk and reliability analysis that will allow you to look at the relative vulnerability of, within a given parish or between parishes, after the repairs are made, what the risk level will be at that time. That information will be very useful for examining future alternatives. 

I want to thank you for the opportunity to be here and I would 

be very pleased to answer any questions that you have. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Doctor. Thanks for all your work 

and to colleagues’ work. 

Mr. JACKSON. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS L. JACKSON, P.E., F. ASCE, D. WRE, 

PAST PRESIDENT, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS 

AND SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, DMJM HARRIS (RET.) 

Mr. JACKSON. Thank you, Senator Vitter, Senator Landrieu. 

Good morning. My name is Tom Jackson and I am pleased to appear before you today on behalf of the American Society of Civil 

Engineers as you examine the current status of the reconstruction 

of the New Orleans levees. I am a past president of the ASCE and 

currently serve on ASCE’s external review panel, or ERP. I might 

add parenthetically I am also a lifelong resident of New Orleans 

and Jefferson Parish. So I am very familiar with this area and the 

problems in storm protection that we have had over the years. 

The role of ERP, which is composed of 14 specialists who possess 

a range of technical expertise, is to provide an objective, independent technical review of the work being performed by the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers Interagency Performance Evaluation 

Task Force, or IPET, on the flood control levees in the New Orleans 

area following Hurricane Katrina. 

As engineers, our paramount concern is for the safety, health 

and welfare of the public. I would like to repeat that, because it 

is very important. As engineers, our paramount responsibility is for 

the safety, health and protection of the public. Today there appear 

to be a number of key lessons learned, which must be taken into 

account by Task Force Guardian in any analysis that looks to develop a system that will protect this area from a Category 4 or 5 

hurricane. 

While the ERP’s immediate attention is focused on three main 

areas of potential lessons learned, first we are concerned about an 

apparent aggressive design approach which may not have been 

warranted for a water holding structure of this importance. It appears that at nearly every step of the way, the envelope was 

pushed. Let me explain. 

The target factor of safety was apparently 1.3 for design, which 

may be on the low side for structures whose facilities and failures 
34 

were capable of causing death and widespread destruction. Against 

this backdrop, quite optimistic soil strengths were selected despite 

one, the fact that the local geology suggested that conditions would 

be highly variable, even over relatively short distances. For example, for the 17th Street Canal failures, variation in soil strengths 

led to factors of safety about 20 to 30 percent higher just north or 

just south of the failure zone. 

No. 2, the fact that the soil conditions and strengths were taken 

from widely spaced borings that were concentrated along the center 

line of the levees. No. 3, the fact that soil strengths in the back 

yards were not adjusted to account for the reduction in overburdened pressures. 

In addition, the forces on the wall did not apparently include the 

possibility that full hydrostatic loads could develop through the formation of a simple gap on the flood side of the wall, moving away 

from the canal embankment, as water in the canal rose above normal levees. Second, there may have been problems associated with 

handoffs during the design process, or interfaces between key players in the design. For example, were potential limitations in soil 

strength clearly communicated between the geotechnical team and 

the floodwall design team? Were concerns about hydrostatic loading 

on the wall clearly communicated and considered? 

Third, how was the corps’ quality assurance/quality control process followed during the design? For a structure of this importance, 

techniques such as independent peer review or use of border consultants had been used, would the performance have been different? 

These concerns merit an in-depth assessment to document the 

lessons and to provide for ways to move forward and incorporate 

these lessons learned. The ERP will continue to be looking into 

these matters. The ERP is currently in the midst of a detailed review of IPET Report Number Two. On March 23, 2006, we delivered a letter to General Strock, Chief of Engineers, which noted 

several key concerns that the ERP has identified at this stage of 

its performance evaluation. 

Based on our current findings, the ERP recommends the following actions to be undertaken with urgency for levees and 

floodwalls, and in New Orleans and perhaps elsewhere in the Nation. A, all I-walls should be reevaluated for current design loading 

assuming a water-filled gap along the flood side of the wall. B, all 

levees underlain by soft soil should be reevaluated for current design loadings accounting for reduced sheer strength of soil in areas 

at or beyond the toe of the levee. 

C, all levees and floodwalls should be reevaluated to identify 

those areas where the questionable degree of conservatism inherent 

in the design process and those sections of concern reanalyzed for 

current design loadings employing an appropriate degree of conservatism. D, a risk-based approach toward defining the design 

hurricane conditions is needed. We advise the corps to proceed as 

quickly as possible toward redefining standard project hurricane 

using principles and practices similar to those used in establishing 

the potential catastrophic natural disasters such as earthquakes 

and other flooding. E, external peer review is an important component of design practice for all critical life-safety structures. We rec-
35 

ommend that the steps described above receive external peer review throughout the design process. 

In closing, the ERP will continue evaluating IPET’s Report Number Two and will issue its own report in the coming weeks. We note 

that in a letter to ERP dated April 7th, General Strock expressed 

the corps’ gratitude for the ERP’s insightful comments and recommendations, and states that the corps is looking forward to receiving ERP’s review comments following. 

Thank you. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Mr. Jackson. 

Mr. DUFRECHOU. 

STATEMENT OF CARLTON DUFRECHOU, EXECUTIVE 

DIRECTOR, LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN BASIN FOUNDATION 

Mr. DUFRECHOU. Senator Vitter, Senator Landrieu, it is good to 

see you both. And to some of the prior speakers, on behalf of Pontchartrain Basin Foundation and everyone in Southeast Louisiana, 

thank you for your efforts to secure royalties from the oil and gas 

operations in the Gulf to try to preserve our entire region. 

It is an honor for me as an engineer by education to be seated 

with Dr. Link and Mr. Jackson this morning. As I was preparing 

my statement, I was trying to be as brief as possible, and I remembered a quote, I believe it was by Professor Einstein some time ago, 

and I am paraphrasing it, that today’s problems cannot be solved 

with yesterday’s thinking. 

While I certainly and the Pontchartrain Basin Foundation supports all of the work currently underway by the Corps of Engineers 

to strengthen our levee system, levees alone won’t work. Katrina 

was not a direct hit on the metropolitan area, it missed us. And 

yet the impacts were horrific. The corps Civil Works process that 

we have in the United States, unfortunately, in the past has been 

myopic. Hurricane protection works were considered by themselves. 

And the first line of defense for our region, Senator Vitter and 

Senator Landrieu, as you both have said repeatedly, has been our 

coast. And our coast unfortunately has all but been forgotten about 

until very, very recently. We applaud the work of the agencies to 

restore the levees. I would like the record to show that I have the 

utmost respect for all the workers with the Corps of Engineers, 

they are some of the finest, most dedicated people I have ever met. 

However, I believe that the Corps Civil Works process we have 

right now is limiting. It does not include the big picture. While certainly we need stronger and better levees, the best protection we 

can hope for in the future is the same degree of protection that we 

have right now, in the near term, levees that will protect us from 

a Category 2 or 3 storm. That is not sufficient. That will mean, as 

Mr. Drennen addressed earlier about the economic impacts to our 

area, everyone in this region, and by far they are the best of the 

best that are back, that are trying to bring the metropolitan region 

back, they are all going to be prepared to evacuate of once or twice 

a year, whenever a Category 3 storm is near our coast. That is 

going to be an added economic burden, not only to the businesses, 

but to everyone who is here. 

I guess where I am going with this, Senators, is that while certainly the LCA is a good first step, it is not enough. Hurricane pro-
36 

tection for the future has to include the coast as an integral part. 

Further than that, we have to get beyond doing navigation works, 

transportation works, hurricane protection and coastal works independently. They all have to be integrated, in our opinion. 

The highest priority must be hurricane protection works. It has 

to supersede everything else. Here, in the Pontchartrain Basin, 

until half a century ago, we had a substantial coast. In 1965, Hurricane Betsy, a Category 3 storm, hit the area. While 40 years 

later, Katrina, was a larger storm and more powerful storm in the 

Gulf, once Katrina reached the latitude of New Orleans, it was basically a Category 3 hurricane like Betsy. During Hurricane Betsy, 

I was 9 years old. We had 5-to 6-foot levees on the lake front. My 

folks and I lived on Bellaire Drive. There was no floodwall behind 

our house then to protect us from the adjacent 17th Street Canal. 

There was only a little mound of a levee. But those levees held during Betsy. Some other areas of the city, St. Bernard Parish, unfortunately, the 9th Ward were flooded, many believe because of the 

Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, which not coincidentally, was completed that same year. 

To be comprehensive, we have to look at the big picture. We have 

to consider channels, like the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet. While 

Many people believe the MRGO caused flooding in Hurricane 

Betsy, I am here to tell you today, what the MRGO did more than 

that was it completely altered the hydrology and ecology of our 

coast for the long term. It more than anything else has acted as 

a cancer, progressively eating away at our coastal wetlands for the 

last half century. And it is still causing damages today. It is a clear 

and present danger. And as long as channels like the MRGO are 

there, we can build levees higher and higher and stronger and 

stronger, but the coast will continue to vanish and the Gulf continue to encroach on us, and we will always be at risk. 

Senators we need your guidance and help. Right now, the Corps 

of Engineers is in a quandary. They have a congressionally authorized channel to maintain—the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, and 

we are also asking them to restore our coast and help us with hurricane protection. They have two sets of orders. About the only 

thing they can do is try to rebuild the levees to the status quo to 

stay within their box. We have to expand their box, and we certainly need gentlemen like Dr. Lewis and Mr. Jackson and others 

that have been here this morning, to assist. 

Please, in the near term, consider de-authorization of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet to help to prevent the catastrophes that 

we have had, that we have experienced recently. Beyond that, 

make decisions based on the big picture. Integrate coastal restoration and hurricane protection efforts. The Corps of Engineers is a 

unique entity. They can do magnificent work. But we have to 

change their box. We have to expand it. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you this morning. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you very much. 

We will follow up with questions and discussion. 

Dr. LINK AND MR. Jackson, your committee’s work has been very 

important post-Katrina, in this very crucial stage. What are your 

thoughts about how we institutionalize that type of outside, inde-
37 

pendent peer review and input on an ongoing basis in terms of this 

work in Louisiana and perhaps more work more generally? 

Mr. JACKSON. Senator, I would say that the Federal law has to 

determine those projects where peer review must take place. I 

would think that the corps should, beyond that, look at individual 

projects that they may want to do, even beyond whatever the Federal law requires. 

I have done work, design work for the Corps of Engineers in 

Vicksburg and the New Orleans District, and I understand the 

corps thinking pretty well. However, I understand it a lot better 

today, considering the last several months, than I ever did. 

The corps as an institution is a very powerful group. They employ extremely valuable scientists and engineers to both determine 

what needs to be done and to determine how to do it. However, the 

corps as an institution, and I would say that it falls into the category of many large institutions, it is bound up within its own 

rules. As you talked earlier about authorization the corps’ interpretation, I think, of authorization that has gone on over the years has 

been a very, very extremely tight rein on what the corps should do. 

As a matter of fact, I made comments to the corps that perhaps 

the engineers, the professional design engineers within the corps 

sometimes need to stand up and say, that won’t adequately protect 

the public, and I won’t participate. That is a very drastic step for 

a person in an organization that has the U.S. Army in front of 

them. During wartime, they are shot. 

However, I believe that we need to get to a point where those engineers have the support of an external group, on important issues 

where life and extensive property result. We have in ERP been constant in our push of the IPET. They have done very wonderful 

work. And you saw today a lot of discussion about peer review. You 

saw today a lot of discussion about most of the issues that we in 

ERP, probably not as an original thought. But the power of an external organization to be able to say these kinds of things, and for 

people like yourselves to listen, is something that we must incorporate in future work by the corps and other Federal agencies. 

Senator VITTER. Dr. Link? 

Mr. LINK. Yes, sir, thank you. I think there are several key aspects to this. The independent peer review does exist in the engineering profession, of course. I think we can certainly take advantage of expanding on what is already there in the way of doing consulting boards and independent panels. One of the things that I 

have learned, especially in this experience with the Task Force, is 

the power of partnering. 

I think we have created a unique kind of relationship between 

the Task Force and the panel of experts in ASCE that has allowed 

us to interact continuously. It is not that the typical or traditional, 

where the Task Force does something and then hands it off for an 

independent review that is disassociated with the Task Force. We 

are actually learning from each other as we go along, and yet maintaining that very critical external position that the panel has. 

But there is a lot of power in partnering. And I think we should 

try to figure out a way to factor that in, so that it is not two groups 

sitting on two sides of a wall. The diversity of ideas and the rich-
38 

ness of the analysis that results from bringing those people together in a unique way, I think, is very, very powerful. 

Senator VITTER. Let me just say I would endorse that idea, too. 

Also for an additional reason, besides everything you mentioned, is 

the last thing we need to come out of this is for the normal corps 

process to take even longer than it does now. The typical corps 

projects is 11, 13 years before you put a shovel in the ground. So 

the last thing we need is a method of peer review that just adds 

years onto that rather than shortening that process. And your general notion of partnering avoids having the corps do 5 years of 

work and then have peer review out of the blue that finds major 

disagreements with it. 

Mr. LINK. Yes, sir, I think you are right on. It is very critical to 

have the interaction from the first step, not when the plan is complete, but in the formulation of the plan. It is a much, much more 

productive environment. 

Both the ASCE panel and the National Research Council panel 

have told the Task Force that we can’t get our job done in the time 

allotted. But in fact we are. And it is primarily because of the 

partnering and the acceleration, the ability to not do the traditional 

step by step process, but by doing the partnering process. 

Senator VITTER. And Carlton, a related question. I completely 

agree with your comments about using a more integrated approach, 

that we don’t have these separate smokestacks labeled maritime, 

environmental, levee protection. It all needs to relate. 

How do we institutionalize that more integrate approach? 

Mr. DUFRECHOU. Senator, it is going to be a challenge. It won’t 

happen overnight. I think it is going to take some courageous leadership from you, Senator Vitter, and Senator Landrieu, to put the 

direction out there that, guys, enough is enough. We can’t have it 

the way we used to have it any more. Not only is the time line too 

long, but we have to have the big picture in everything we do down 

here. 

And certainly, Dr. Link and Mr. Jackson are excellent assistants 

to make this process work. There are many organizations throughout the area, the Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana, Pontchartrain Basin Foundation, Barataria-Terrebonne National Estuarine Program, who have independent plans that they know are already prepared on the coast. Certainly we have it for Pontchartrain. We know the ten coastal elements that, once we get 

those back, we will have sustainable coasts again which will act as 

the buffers for storm surges. 

I would suggest to you, sir, that the leadership has to come from 

you. As much as we can help at the local level, and the public is 

certainly behind you with this, the Corps of Engineers is, well, it 

is an entity like no other in the world that can do a variety of 

work. It is also a dinosaur. And gentleman, I don’t mean that in 

a derogatory fashion. But the process, unfortunately, it has become 

process driven all too often instead of outcome driven. 

I guess if there is one thing I can leave with you, it is, we have 

to be outcome driven. And the outcome for us is not Category 3 protection, but it is long-term sustainable hurricane protection for decades to come. 
39 

Senator VITTER. I have taken a stab at this idea in proposed legislation of a corps council, merging the corps with outside, independent environmental and engineering experts. If my office hasn’t 

already, we are going to get the three of you and others a copy of 

that bill. I would invite very active and aggressive critique and 

input in terms of that legislation. 

Mr. DUFRECHOU. Senator, if I might add, we did get an opportunity to look at that with David Dawes in your local office. It is 

a tremendous first step. It is exactly where we need to go. And that 

could be the catalyst for the change that we need. 

Senator VITTER. I would invite all of you and your colleagues to 

offer whatever critique, changes, input you think are appropriate. 

I would love to see those. 

Senator Landrieu. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you. And let me thank you, Senator 

Vitter, for putting all these excellent panels together, and for your 

continued focus through your efforts on the EPW Committee to 

tackle not just one, but several very complicated issues to move us 

forward. 

I am pleased to have co-sponsored Senator Vitter’s legislation, 

and our offices have worked very closely as we try to get as much 

input as we can to forge ahead. It is going to be a tough issue to 

put before Congress. But we are determined to do that, and to force 

to consider an alternative way, since we represent the State and 

the region that has been the unfortunate beneficiary of the status 

quo. We need to see some changes. 

Let me ask you, Mr. Jackson, if you would elaborate a minute, 

I think I agree with what you were saying about the corps’ inability 

sometimes to hit the mark on their authorizations. But could you 

elaborate a little bit more about what you said to make sure that 

I am hearing, you said sometimes it is hard for the corps to meet 

their total authorizations, or sometimes it is hard for them to—I 

don’t know what word you used. 

Mr. JACKSON. I think where I was going with the comment is 

that, and my wife is the lawyer, so I guess that allows me to talk 

about lawyers. So excuse me, Senator Vitter. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Go ahead. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. JACKSON. I think sometimes that the corps is a large Agency 

with a lot of Federal oversight. And it appears to me that they tend 

to have a habit of getting buried into the exact meaning of a congressional request to authorize projects. I think Senator Vitter’s 

questions earlier today relative to armoring the levees and whether 

or not the corps had authorization, is a perfect example. 

I had an experience with the corps many years ago when we 

were designing the pumping stations along the lake front in Jefferson Parish. And the New Orleans District Corps had taken the position that their authorization for hurricane protection went to either side of the pumping stations, and they had no responsibility 

for storm protection across the pumping stations. And of course, we 

were looking for them to accept their responsibility to help in the 

funding for those very expensive stations. 

At that time, we approached Congress to try to more clearly define that authorization, and the New Orleans District re-inter-
40 

preted their authorization. And then, without any additional congressional action, and assumed responsibility. 

I think that is counterproductive to the goals of what the corps 

is trying to do for this community. While they have done many, 

many great things, and continue to do so, I think it is counterproductive, if you will, for the corps to get tied up in wording that 

I don’t believe that you as Senators of the U.S. Congress intend in 

the request. I am sure that all these controls are built in so that 

the corps won’t start spending money in areas that the Congress 

has not approved. So there has to be some line of balance. I agree 

with Senator Vitter’s comments earlier that these are different 

times. And to try to split hairs, if you will, on wording in a bill as 

to whether or not there is authorization, and put things on hold, 

is not good for the people of this community. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you. 

Let me change course and just ask you, I know you have done 

a lot of work with the National Organization of Civil Engineers. 

That particular organization, several years before Katrina and 

Rita, had been very critical and issued a report, I am not sure if 

the title was ‘‘A Nation At Risk’’, that was maybe our education report. But something similar to that, in terms of the lack of overall 

investment from the Federal Government in civil works, generally. 

Mr. JACKSON. Yes. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Could you comment as to if that is the position of the organization today, the National Association, that the 

lack of investments is causing our Nation to be extremely vulnerable in certain areas and could you elaborate on that particular 

finding? 

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, Senator. ASCE, as I think both of you know, 

puts out a report card on the Nation’s infrastructure every 3 years, 

and they update it on an annual basis. It is a very simple thing 

to understand, you either get an A or an F or somewhere in between. 

So we do this on a national basis. It is not something that ASCE 

dreams up on their own. The information basically comes from Federal organizations, such as the corps, the Federal Highway Administration and other Federal agencies, which address what the needs 

are versus what is being done. 

We also encourage all of our State sections and branches to do 

local report cards on the Nation’s infrastructure. The grades that 

ASCE has been giving to the Nation’s infrastructure are in the 

range of Cs and Ds. As a matter of fact, there have been a lot of 

comments by individuals looking at it that you would be very 

ashamed to bring such a report card home to Mom and Dad. 

So there needs to be significant investment in the Nation’s infrastructure in the future. We have ignored the needs over the years. 

I know it is expensive, and I know it takes not only a commitment 

of the U.S. Congress, it takes a commitment of every individual in 

this country. However, like the transmission repairman says on 

TV, you pay me now or you pay me later. 

Senator LANDRIEU. The last report I looked at actually I thought 

had a D or a D- for civil works overall. Do you remember what the 

percentage relative to the GDP over time or any kind of data that 

you could leave, if not, you could submit it to the record, in terms 
41 

of the trend of investments. Has it decreased 100 percent over 2 

decades or 200 percent? Or has it just remained flat for the last 

40 years? How do you all talk about it when you are trying to describe it to the country? 

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, Senator, I would be very happy to have that 

information provided for your office and also for Senator Vitter, 

rather than me trying to recall. I remembered things a lot better 

25 or 30 years ago than I do today. 

[The referenced information can be found on page 105.] 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you. If you would submit that for the 

record, because I think for the conversation at hand, it is a crucial 

set of data that we need for the country to realize that it is a shortchanging of funding over time that has been a very insidious pattern of underfunding that has resulted in this kind of disaster. 

Let me, if I could, direct a question to Dr. Link. You talked about 

risk and vulnerability. We are in the position now of defending, of 

course, a great city and a great region, and the two of us try to do 

our best at it each day since this has happened. But it has not gone 

without notice. Today, in the front page of either the Times or the 

Post was a discussion about the marking of the 100th anniversary 

of the San Francisco earthquake. There was a small group of survivors that of course were quite young children, some infants when 

that occurred 100 years ago. It was interesting, there are few survivors still. 

Does your organization do an assessment of other communities 

that are so positioned? You know, our colleagues continue to say, 

well, why are you building below sea level? We are trying to explain that we came here to run the greatest port system in North 

America. But why did they build San Francisco on a fault line, 

even after 1906? They rebuilt it after it completely collapsed. Why 

are we building Phoenix in the middle of a desert? Why are we developing communities in Utah that have no access to fresh water 

and continue to grow, L.A. being one? Why do we do that? And if 

we are, why does it make New Orleans either less or better? 

In terms of our commitment to build on this particular piece of 

land, do you have an assessment of the vulnerabilities of other 

major communities, ranking them? Are we at the top of the list, in 

the middle of the list? Are we that much different from others relative to the threats that they may be in line for? 

Mr. LINK. Senator Landrieu, I think your questions are very important, I wish I had the list. I think we should ask Tom to come 

up with a report card on that. But we have been basically taking 

the risk and reliability concepts that were developed for earthquake analysis, and specifically used by the Federal agencies for 

dam safety. We have been trying to apply them to the more complicated area of hurricane protection. Particularly in the complex 

situation here in New Orleans. 

It is interesting, about a week ago, I gave a keynote address in 

California to a number of consulting engineering companies. Some 

of them had the feeling that New Orleans was protected better 

than they are in the central valley and on the delta. Of course, I 

explained that that wasn’t the case. 

But there is a lot of misperception about risk. What we are trying to do here is identify relative levels of vulnerability, depending 
42 

on where you are and one of the unique things that will come out 

of our work is basically an understanding of potential flooding and 

potential losses as a function of zip code, not for all of Plaquemines 

Parish or not for a lumped analysis of Orleans Parish, but for every 

zip code in every census block. 

So the possibility of a failure of a particular reach or a particular 

section of structure can be correlated to the probability of flooding 

and the probability of different kinds of losses. That is pretty 

unique. I don’t know of any other area where that has been done 

before. But I think New Orleans is the prototype for that type of 

an analysis or for that kind of a product to give decisionmakers a 

richer set of information to understand what is causing the vulnerability. 

If I am building in a particular location or I want to develop that 

location and I have a certain risk of flooding and losses, what is 

causing that? This product will allow you to understand the primary causes of vulnerability and to examine alternative ways of 

buying down that risk. I don’t know of any product like that in any 

other community. I think from this perspective, that this is a new 

application of risk. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Senator Vitter has been generous in the time, 

but I will just follow up with this one comment. I think that exercise is going to be very helpful, and I most certainly don’t mind us 

being the prototype or the model. Clearly, the Nation, and international attention, is focused right here. 

But I don’t want it to be presented in a way that we are the only 

model. Because I keep saying that this is a national challenge. It 

is a challenge to New Orleans and south Louisiana, but we are not 

the only community challenged. There are rural areas, there are 

urban areas that have great challenges, whether it is earthquakes 

or fires or floods or tsunamis or hurricanes coming closer to very 

highly populated areas like New York from the Atlantic. 

This country had better get about the business of getting our systems in much better place to deal with it, both preventing it and 

dealing with it once these natural disasters do occur. There is no 

way to prevent them, but there is a much better way to deal with 

it. 

Mr. Dufrechou, I have a question for you, but I will submit it for 

the record, and I thank Senator Vitter for his generosity. 

Mr. DUFRECHOU. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator VITTER. A final question. Mr. Jackson, you listed several 

very specific findings or lessons learned of your peer review work, 

your association’s peer review work. Dr. Link, you all have come 

up with similar findings. How would the two of you grade the corps 

in its incorporation of those very specific findings and lessons 

learned into the corps’ present ongoing work in the area? 

Mr. JACKSON. Our observation is that the corps has already effected several and has plans to effect the remainder. So our evaluation of the corps’ response is an absolute A. 

Mr. LINK. I feel the same way. We have had multiple meetings 

with the Task Force Guardian and the New Orleans District folks. 

We literally have people from the Task Force here every week 

working together, taking the lessons learned and applying them, 

even before we put them on the web page, as soon as we have dis-
43 

covered something. We are here working it with the District and 

it is being applied. 

So for the people from outside the corps on the Task Force, this 

has been really very gratifying to see this work being used right 

away. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you all very much. I want to thank all 

the witnesses. I want to also thank everyone who has attended. We 

have many leaders here today. I want to recognize Sandy Rosenthal, who is the leader of Levees.org, an organization formed after 

Hurricane Katrina to ensure better, stronger and smarter hurricane protection for the greater New Orleans area. I know Senator 

Landrieu and I both support all of those goals of the organization. 

I also want to thank the Louisiana Supreme Court for hosting us 

today. We have Justice Kimble with us and want to thank the entire Court for their gracious role in hosting us in this fine building. 

I also want to thank the entire Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works. We have several staffers who came down 

from Washington to be with us today to work on this hearing on 

both the majority and minority side. They have taken a very active 

role in this corps and related oversight. So I want to thank the entire committee and the committee staff. 

With that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

[Additional statements submitted for the record follow:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN PAUL WOODLEY, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

FOR CIVIL WORKS, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am John Paul 

Woodley, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works). I am honored to testify 

before your committee today on the preparation for next hurricane season in Louisiana. I am joined today by Mr. Dan Hitchings, Director of the Corps of Engineers’ 

Task Force Hope. 

My testimony today will update the Committee on rebuilding and restoration of 

hurricane and flood protection system by the Army Corps of Engineers. I will provide an update on measures to strengthen the system that the Administration and 

Congress are working to authorize and fund; on measures required to certify and 

further enhance the system to the standard for a 100-year storm; and on analyses 

being conducted for a greater levels of protection for southern Louisiana. Mr. 

Hitchings will provide a summary of the damage to the hurricane protection system 

and describe authorized and funded efforts now underway to re-establish an intact 

hurricane protection system before the start of this summer’s hurricane season. 

The damage to the hurricane protection system by Hurricane Katrina was calamitous. Sixty percent (169 of 350 miles) of the earthen levees and concrete floodwall 

systems and 87 percent (66 of 76) of the existing pump stations were damaged. The 

Corps is on schedule to repair the damaged levees and floodwalls to their pre-storm 

condition by June 1, the beginning of the hurricane season. 

MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN THE SYSTEM

I believe it is important for the Committee and the public to fully understand the 

efforts we are making to gain the information needed to inform prudent decisions 

for hurricane protection for New Orleans and the Louisiana coastal areas. Following 

landfall of Hurricane Katrina on 29 August 2005, Secretary of Defense, Donald H. 

Rumsfeld, directed the Secretary of the Army, Dr. Francis J. Harvey, to convene an 

independent panel of national experts under the direction of the National Academies 

to evaluate the performance of hurricane protection systems in New Orleans and 

the surrounding areas. I directed the National Academies to assemble a multidisciplinary (e.g., engineering, atmospheric sciences, etc.) panel drawn from the public 

and private sectors and academia. The purpose of the panel is to assist the office 

of the Assistant Secretary for Civil Works (ASA (CW)) in conducting a forensic in-
44 

vestigation of the performance of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) projects 

during Hurricane Katrina. 

The Chief of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers formally established the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force (IPET) on October 10, 2005, to provide 

credible and objective scientific and engineering facts to answer questions about the 

performance of the New Orleans hurricane and flood protection system during Hurricane Katrina. The IPET is examining and providing forensic analysis on the performance of the entire storm damage reduction system in New Orleans, helping us 

to understand the failures that occurred, to understand other components of the system that may have been degraded in their capacity to protect against future storms, 

and to understand where the system performed successfully. The IPET is developing 

information on risk and reliability of the system as it will be after the corps completes the repairs. The corps is immediately acting to incorporate findings into both 

its interim repair and its long term work. 

The American Society of Civil Engineers is providing external peer review of IPET 

activities—referred to as the External Review Report (ERP). Both the corps IPET 

and the ASCE ERP teams are comprised of some of the Nation’s most highly regarded engineers and scientists from Government (Federal, State, and local agencies), academia and private industry. These experts are using some of the most advanced scientific and engineering methods and tools in their comprehensive study. 

The National Academies Committee on New Orleans Regional Hurricane Projects 

is performing an independent review of the IPET and ASCE reports and will issue 

separate findings and recommendations to me. The findings of the National Academies panel will be subject to peer review process before being released under the 

imprimatur of the National Academies of Science. 

The IPET product will include four reports. IPET Report 1, publicly released on 

10 Jan 2006, provided the strategy for implementing their performance evaluation 

and provided interim status. IPET Report 2, released in March, provided a progress 

report on implementation with interim results. IPET Report 3, scheduled for June 

1, 2006, will be a final draft report on the performance evaluation of the hurricane 

protection system. Following a review by both the ASCE ERP and the National 

Academies, a final report will be released in the fall of 2006. 

The IPET Reports are reviewed by the ASCE External Review Panel and the National Academies Committee. All comments pertaining to IPET will be addressed in 

future IPET reports. National Academies review comments on IPET reports are provided directly to the Department of the Army. ASCE review comments on IPET reports are provided to LTG Carl Strock, Chief of Engineers. 

The National Academies review of the IPET work will produce several reports. A 

preliminary letter report was issued February 21, 2006, to ASA (CW) providing an 

assessment of IPET Report 1. An interim report will be issued near the midpoint 

of their study (tentatively 1 June 2006) with the comprehensive report evaluating 

the final draft IPET and ERP reports scheduled to be released tentatively in September 2006. The National Academies review of the final IPET report will be prepared about 90 days after the final IPET report is released. 

At the same time, on a parallel path with the IPET and National Academies studies, Congress authorized and appropriated funds for a 2-year, $20 million Louisiana 

Coastal Protection and Restoration Project (LACPR) analysis and design to identify 

options for increasing the level of hurricane storm protection for New Orleans and 

coastal Louisiana. Planning and organization for this study is now underway. It will 

incorporate all information developed by other studies. As directed, the corps is preparing an interim report due in June 2006, with a final report of recommendations 

and alternatives due December 30, 2007. We trust that the State will fully comply 

with the statutory conditions that will enable this study to proceed to completion. 

The LACPR study has been referred to as the ‘‘Category 5’’ study, but I caution 

the committee and the public about the use of such terminology and measures when 

making decisions about the kinds and size of structures to build for storm protection. Storm category classifications, which are based on sustained wind velocities, 

are general categorizations best used to inform the general public about the expected level of destructiveness associated with a storm so that individuals and officials can make decisions about how to protect themselves and their property, such 

as whether or not to evacuate. Storm protection levees and similar structures are 

now designed to specific storm surge and wave criteria based on the modeled effects 

of a statistically-selected ‘‘design storm.’’ While sustained wind velocity is one measure that has an effect on surge and wave heights, many other factors are critically 

important, as well. These include storm characteristics such as forward speed, radius, barometric pressure, tidal factors, the bottom depth in front of levees, and 

more. A storm of Category 5 wind velocity characteristics could well be less destructive to a storm protection system than would a storm with Category 3 wind velocity 
45 

if those other factors were unfavorable. The Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Project will incorporate all these factors to study the means to provide a 

higher level of protection. 

Immediately after the hurricane, the Administration committed to helping New 

Orleans rebuild, and to the reconstruction of its hurricane protection system. In supplemental appropriations to date, Congress and the President have provided $2.08 

Billion to repair and restore the levee system to its design height. 

In February, I wrote the Congress with a proposal for a fourth supplemental funding to construct measures that would strengthen and improve the hurricane protection for greater New Orleans. Such measures include additional structural protections that would address the main causes of he catastrophic flooding during Hurricane Katrina, as well as measures to begin to restore the coastal wetlands that help 

to protect New Orleans from hurricane-generated storm surge. While the repairs 

and rebuilding activities that are now underway will make the flood control and 

hurricane protection system better than it was immediately prior to Hurricane 

Katrina, the additional measures that I proposed in February will result in a system 

significantly better and stronger than it ever has been before. The proposal includes: 

• Construct state-of-the-art pump stations and floodgates at the outfall ends of 

three drainage canals (17th Street, Orleans Avenue, and London Avenue) to reduce 

exposure of the interior of the city to surge from Lake Pontchartrain. Closing the 

lakefront of the outfall canals will prevent a storm surge from entering the canals 

when the gates are closed while still allowing interior drainage waters to be pumped 

into Lake Pontchartrain. 

• Strengthen protection along the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal (IHNC) 

through two navigable closure structures at to-be-determined locations on the Industrial Canal at Seabrook near Lake Pontchartrain and west of the intersection of the 

Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (GIWW) and the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO). 

Placing navigable gated structures on the Industrial Canal at Seabrook and west 

of the intersection of the GIWW and MRGO will allow ship traffic to move freely 

when open, but would protect the IHNC from major storm events when closed. 

There are about 20 miles of floodwall that will be isolated by the permanent pump 

stations and the navigable gates at Seabrook and GIWW. 

• Storm-proof authorized pump stations in Jefferson and Orleans Parishes. 

Storm-proofing pump stations will allow them to function through the fiercest 

storms by hardening them, raising critical equipment and providing emergency 

power and fuel systems. 

• Armor critical elements of the hurricane protection system. The corps will selectively armor critical elements in the system such as transitions from levees to walls 

and from levees or walls to structures, penetrations, crossings, and the like, and 

also some levee segments that are most exposed to surge. Armoring levees means 

strengthening them—applying materials to make levees resistant to wave-wash and 

scour that can occur during overtopping; 

• Incorporate a non-Federal levee on the West Bank of the Mississippi River in 

Plaquemines Parish into the existing Federal levee system to protect an evacuation 

route. The incorporation of non-Federal levees will allow the corps to improve them 

to the same standard heights and design as other area Federal Hurricane Protection 

levees in Plaquemines Parish and offer increased protection for both residents and 

state Highway 23, a major hurricane evacuation route. 

• Reduce the impact of storm surge in areas east of the city by reversing wetland 

losses in areas affected by navigation channels, oil and gas channels or other channels and modifying the Caernarvon Freshwater Diversion structure or its operation. 

When the main surge arrives, the basins can then hold more floodwater, thus reducing the high water and potential flooding. Restoring coastal ecosystems, such as barrier islands and marshlands increases the natural lines of defense against hurricane-induced storm surge. 

These measures, estimated to cost $1.46 billion are yet to be authorized and funded. If funds are appropriated in FY2006, these measures can be completed in 2010. 

MEASURES REQUIRED TO CERTIFY AND FURTHER ENHANCE THE SYSTEM TO THE

STANDARD FOR A 100-YEAR FLOOD

In the weeks since my February recommendation, new information has been developed that has caused us to recommend additional modifications to the system. 

The new recommendations are primarily the result of two new pieces of information. 

First, the IPET study informs us that any I-walls in the system need to be carefully 

examined and in many cases may need to be replaced. Second, new, post-Katrina 

weather data developed by the National Weather Service informs us that the statis-
46 

tically-determined ‘‘100-year’’ storm is a more powerful storm than the storm for 

which the existing hurricane protection system was designed. 

On April 12, 2006, Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding Donald Powell, 

along with U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Commander Lt. Gen. Carl Strock, FEMA 

Director of Mitigation and Administrator of the National Flood Insurance Program 

(NFIP) David Maurstad, and FEMA Deputy Director for Gulf Coast Recovery Gil 

Jamieson, announced the release of advisory flood data for New Orleans and the 

majority of the surrounding area. The flood advisories will inform residents how to 

reduce or mitigate flood risks as they begin reconstruction, and will provide guidance to communities for better and stronger rebuilding. The Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA) has stated that for residents to be eligible for its State Homeowner 

Assistance plan, all reconstruction work must meet or exceed the latest available 

FEMA advisory base flood elevations and meet the legal requirements of the State 

Uniform Construction Code. FEMA has previously stated that these advisories must 

be used for any rebuilding projects using certain FEMA grant dollars, meaning that 

the FEMA advisories apply to both public infrastructure projects as well as mitigation requirements. 

The flood advisories are based on the assumption that the rebuilt hurricane protection system will be sufficient to withstand the newly established 100-year storm, 

which is a requirement of FEMA’s National Flood Insurance Program. Since the 

Corps is not able to certify the existing and authorized levee design heights for the 

new more powerful 100-year storm, the levees will have to be raised in many areas 

to meet the new standard. The Administration is discussing with Congress the timing of a formal request for additional authorization and funding to certify and further enhance the majority of the levee system. 

The estimated additional cost to raise and enhance the entire New Orleans area 

levee system, including Plaquemines Parish, enough to provide100-year protection 

is estimated at $4.1 billion, in addition to the $1.46 billion I recommended in February. The additional work for certification of the system includes raising levee 

heights, in some cases as much as 7 feet, and to upgrade or replace the remaining 

existing I-walls with T-walls. We plan to begin working with Congress immediately 

to provide $2.5 billion to address improvements in all of the New Orleans system 

except for lower Plaquemines. The $2.5 billion will provide 100-year protection to 

about 98 percent of the population in the New Orleans area. Providing similar protection to the area of lower Plaquemines, which was home to 2 percent of the area’s 

population, is estimated to cost a total of $1.6 billion. Before committing to that 

funding request, the Administration is awaiting the results of the corps’ further 

analysis that will provide additional insight into the technical challenges of protecting such a narrow strip of land; whether certifying the levees there exacerbates 

an already challenging environmental situation (i.e., sinking and wetlands erosion); 

and whether such improvements would be economically justified. 

ANALYSES INTO A GREATER LEVEL OF PROTECTION FOR SOUTHERN LOUISIANA

Longer term, as I previously mentioned, the corps is identifying and analyzing the 

options for higher levels of protection. The preliminary report of the Louisiana 

Coastal Protection and Restoration Project is scheduled to be completed in June of 

this year and a final report will be completed in December 2007, as provided for 

in law. 

CLOSING

Mr. Chairman, the rebuilding and redesign of the greater New Orleans hurricane 

protection system is one of the most ambitious civil works projects ever undertaken 

and I applaud the efforts of the men and women of the Corps of Engineers, many 

of whom were personally impacted by the hurricanes that devastated the Gulf 

Coast. The commitment and selfless service that they are demonstrating by meeting 

our June first goal is a testament to the dedication of this organization. The amount 

of work underway is immense. It would ordinarily take years to do what we are 

doing in months. Work is being accelerated and compressed without jeopardizing the 

science, the engineering or the best construction practices. 

This concludes my statement. Again, I appreciate the opportunity to testify today. 

I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have. 
47 

RESPONSES BY JOHN PAUL WOODLEY JR., TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR JEFFORDS

Question 1. During the hearing, Congressman Jefferson asked several questions 

regarding the level of agreement between the Interagency Performance Evaluation 

Team (IPET) and the work of outside groups regarding the failure modes of the levees and floodwalls during Katrina. You responded that it was perception, not reality 

that there were wide disagreements, and that you would be able to respond more 

thoroughly after the June 1 IPET report was completed. Can you describe the level 

of agreement between the IPET and other groups regarding the failure modes of the 

levees and if there are disagreements, what they are, and how the corps intends 

to use each theory in its repair, design, and reconstruction of the hurricane protection system? 

Response. From September 2005 to 1 June 2006, USACE conducted investigations 

of the failure modes, integrated those lessons learned into new designs, and placed 

approximately $800 million of new walls and levees to close the breaches before the 

next hurricane season. As part of that effort, about 20 members of Task Force 

Guardian (TFG), the team who performed the design and construction, participated 

in the IPET studies. As lessons were learned and independently reviewed by the 

American Society of Civil Engineers, External Review Team, TFG integrated those 

lessons into the plans and specifications used to reconstruct the walls and levees. 

These lessons were finalized in design guidance in April 2006 which is being used 

to raise the levee system to the authorized level of protection by September 2007. 

Starting in January 2006, IPET posted its findings on a public website, https:// 

ipet.wes.army.mil, requested similar information from the other teams, and had 

members of the other teams visit the construction placement. The IPET received information from the National Science Foundation (NSF) sponsored Independent 

Levee Investigation Team (ILIT) in late May 2006 shortly before the completion of 

the 1 June construction deadline when the team posted its draft report at http:// 

www.ce.berkelev.edu/?new Orleans/. 

The ILIT report was not complete, and the appendices remain incomplete where 

IPET expects to find the detailed analyses. Based on the draft findings, there are 

divergent opinions as to the specific failure modes in the foundation soils. One issue 

that remains unclear is the level of independent technical review performed on the 

ILIT report that validates their findings. IPET plans to thoroughly review their 

final report, offer commentary, and seek discussions on any issues that need clarification. 

Also in May 2006, IPET received from the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST), Technical Note 1476 posted at http://www.nist.gov/public affairs/releases/hurricane report060906.htm. The IPET reviewed the NIST report and agreed 

with their findings, however; their work was based on observations and had limited 

technical analysis. 

Question 2. On Page 30 and 31 of the transcript, there is a series of questions 

and answers regarding the FEMA flood maps. Can you describe the current status 

of the FEMA advisories? Specifically, what do the advisories that have been issued 

require homeowners to do as structures are rebuilt? What is the relationship between the level of protection required to meet a 1- in 100-year storm as defined by 

the FEMA flood map process and the level of protection provided by the hurricane 

protection system as it stands today, June 9, 2006, and as it will stand after improvements and modifications scheduled to occur between now and 2010 are fully 

implemented? 

Response. Questions regarding FEMA advisories and FEMA policy and regulations are best addressed by FEMA officials. However, under current FEMA requirements, levees, floodwalls and appurtenant structures must be of sufficient height 

and strength to withstand the storm surge and waves associated with a 1- in 100- 

year storm without overtopping or failing. The current system is inadequate with 

respect to both height and strength. The height deficiencies are the result of three 

factors: (1) A better understanding of the frequency of storm surge and waves 

heights. This is a product of both the introduction of new data and improved modeling technology; (2) Subsidence, or the general settling of the ground in Southeast 

Louisiana; (3) More stringent criteria for wave overtopping. The original design permitted some overtopping by wave wash. 

The strength deficiencies are primarily the result of the extensive use of I-wall 

type floodwalls. During Katrina, floodwalls of this type failed in three locations. An 

evaluation by the Independent Performance Evaluation Task Force indicates that 

the failure was the result of a mechanism not taken into account in the design. As 

a result, the integrity of approximately 36 miles of floodwall is suspect. 
48 

Once the improvements and modifications scheduled to occur between now and 

2012 are fully implemented, the system, with the exception of levees in lower 

Plaquemines Parish, will meet all of the FEMA requirements. 

Question 3. What is the role of natural wetlands and coastal restoration in your 

vision for the long-term hurricane protection system in Southern Louisiana? 

Response. An integrated system of natural wetlands and coastal restoration, 

strong structural barriers and levees, and non-structural features provides multiple 

lines of defense to protect lives and property. Coastal ecological features form the 

outer line of defense against storm waves. Barrier island systems absorb waves from 

approaching storms and help limit the amount of water that enters estuaries in advance of tropical systems. Back-barrier marshes and coastal fringe wetlands act as 

tidal and wave buffers protecting inland features. Upper estuary forested systems 

provide further protection through wind and surge reduction. Forested ridges 

formed on old river and bayou banks also provide wave and wind reduction during 

storm events The lessons of Hurricane Katrina show the dangers of depending upon 

a single line of levee defenses located adjacent to densely populated areas. A better 

system approach would involve fighting storm surges on the outer fringe of populated areas with structural measures fronted by natural coastal protection features. 

There is growing consensus among scientists involved with Louisiana coastal protection and restoration that future hurricane protection projects for New Orleans and 

the Louisiana coast must include plans to sustain or enhance the wetland-dominated landscapes that surround the area. Althoughthese landscapes are widely recognized for their great value to the Nation for the natural resources and ecosystem 

services they provide, these wetlands also function to provide some level of protection from hurricane wave action and storm surge. 

Question 4. During the hearing, there was an extensive discussion regarding the 

degree to which the Army Corps of Engineers has authorization for selective armoring throughout the system. An unidentified piece of legislative language was quoted 

and an interpretation of that language was sought. Can you please provide a summary of your interpretation of the language discussed at the hearing, and your analysis of the degree to which the Army Corps can armor levees without additional authorization? 

Response. With funding and authority provided in the 4th Emergency Supplemental, no additional authority for armoring levees in the existing system is currently needed. The $170 million provided for selective armoring will be directed 

where the system is most vulnerable. These include areas with low-crest elevations, 

areas with weak or erodible levee soils, and transitions between levees with 

floodwalls. 

Question 5. During the hearing, you stated ‘‘the corps is open to and is very interested in having outside, external, independent review of our formulation procedures 

and four design procedures. I think that our experience with that has been very 

good.’’ Further, you stated that you would have no objection whatsoever to institutionalizing independent review. How would you propose institutionalizing independent peer review? 

Response. This would be a several step process. With its publication in May 2005 

of EC 1105-2-408 on Peer Review of Decision Documents, the corps has actually instituted peer review. The EC established within the corps several types of review. 

First, independent technical review, or ITR, will be conducted outside of the home 

district responsible for the feasibility study and would be performed or managed by 

the appropriate technical center of expertise. ITR is a critical examination by a 

qualified person or team that was not involved in the day-to-day technical work that 

supports the decision document. The corps has established six centers to manage 

ITR based on project purpose and located at its Division offices as follows: 

Inland Navigation (LRD) 

Deep Draft Navigation (SAD) 

Flood Damage Reduction (SPD) 

Hurricane and Storm Damage Reduction (NAD) 

Ecosystem Restoration (MVD) 

Water Management and Reallocation (SWD) 

External review has been added to the corps existing review process in special 

cases where the risk and magnitude of the proposed project are such that a critical 

examination by a qualified person or team outside of the corps and not involved in 

the day-to-day production of a technical product is necessary. External review will 

similarly be added in cases where information is based on novel methods, presents 

complex challenges for interpretation, contains precedent-setting methods or models, 

or presents conclusions that are likely to affect policy decisions that have a significant impact. External review may be conducted at the discretion of the Chief of En-
49 

gineers on any project he deems needs outside experts to review the technical aspects of a particular study. 

With respect to independent review, that is, review conducted by a panel of experts completely outside or disassociated from the Corps of Engineers, we support 

the general concepts as set forth in S. 728. Independent review in this case would 

be arranged with, for example, the National Academies of Science or a similar entity 

to provide expert review of scientific or technical information that could be associated with corps studies. However, until Congress provides the appropriate authority, 

we have no ability to fund such review on a 100 percent Federal basis. 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL H. HITCHINGS, P.E., REGIONAL BUSINESS DIRECTOR, 

MISSISSIPPI VALLEY DIVISION, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, I am Mr. Daniel 

Hitchings, Regional Business Director for the Mississippi Valley Division, U. S. 

Army Corps of Engineers. I am honored to be testifying before your Committee 

today, on the preparation for next hurricane season in Louisiana. I am joined today 

by the Honorable John Paul Woodley, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil 

Works). My testimony today will provide a summary of the damage to the hurricane 

protection system and authorized and funded efforts ongoing to re-establish an imperforate hurricane protection system before the start of this summer’s hurricane 

season. 

The damage to the hurricane protection system by Hurricane Katrina was calamitous. Sixty percent (169 of 350 miles) of the earthen levees and concrete floodwall 

systems and 87 percent (66 of 76) of the existing pump stations were damaged. We 

are on schedule to repair the damaged levees and floodwalls to their pre-storm condition by June 1, the beginning of the hurricane season. 

Orleans Parish 

The flood and hurricane protection system in Orleans Parish is divided into a 

western portion and eastern portion commonly referred to as Orleans East Bank 

and New Orleans East respectively. 

The Orleans East Bank portion consists of the Lake Pontchartrain Lakefront from 

the 17th St. Canal to the Inner Harbor Navigation Channel (IHNC) and then along 

the western bank of the IHNC to the Mississippi River. Within the Orleans East 

Bank boundaries of the Parish there are 26.2 miles of levees and floodwalls, 13 

pump stations, and 15 roadway floodgates. Significant damage occurred to 3.1 miles 

of levees and floodwalls and to all 13 pump stations. Specifically, the damages to 

the levees and floodwalls included: 

• 455 foot breach in the east side I-wall along 17th St. Canal; 

• Breaches on both the east side (425 feet) and west side (720 feet) I-wall along 

London Ave. Canal; 

• Two breaches on the west side of the IHNC both in the vicinity of France Road 

and Benefit Street; and 

• Intermittent minor scour along the other portions of the levee and floodwall protection 

The New Orleans East portion is bounded by the east bank of the IHNC, Lake 

Pontchartrain shoreline between the IHNC and Southpoint, the eastern boundary 

of the Bayou Savage National Wildlife Preserve, and the north and south banks of 

the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (GIWW). Within the New Orleans East boundaries 

of the Parish there are 49.4 miles of exterior levees and floodwalls, 9 miles of interior levees, 9 pump stations, and 7 Floodgates. Significant damage occurred to 7.6 

miles of exterior levees and floodwalls, 4 floodgates, and all 9 pump stations. Specifically, the damages to the levees and floodwalls included: 

• 12,750 feet of levee breach along the north bank of the GIWW between Michoud 

Canal and the CSX Railroad; 

• A floodwall breach at Pump Station 15 (800 feet) near the Maxent Levee; 

• A floodwall breach at the Air Products Hydrogen Plant near the Michoud Canal 

(300 feet); 

• Floodgate floodwall and adjacent levee damage at the CSX railroad crossing; 

• 2,000 feet of floodwall damage along the north bank of the GIWW between the 

IHNC and Paris Road; 

• Two breaches in the east side of the IHNC both located in the lower 9th ward 

neighborhood; 
50 

• Damage to 4 floodgates, floodwall, and minor levee damages from Bienvenue 

Control Structure to GIWW lock; and • Intermittent minor scour along the other portions of the levee and floodwall protection 

St. Bernard Parish 

The St. Bernard Parish hurricane protection system includes the levee/floodwall 

extending from the Bayou Bienvenue Control Structure, continuing along the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO) southeastly, then turns generally to the west, 

where it ties into the Mississippi River Levee at Caernarvon. There is a total of 25 

miles of levees in the Parish. Eight miles of hurricane protection levees were damaged. The most severely damaged levees are along the reach adjacent to the MRGO 

extending from the Bayou Bienvenue Control Structure to Verret. There was also 

scour on the Verret to Caernarvon levee and damage to the Bayou Dupre Control 

Structure, the Bayou Bienvenue Control Structure, and the Creedmore Structure. 

Plaquemines Parish 

The Plaquemines Parish Basin includes long, narrow strips of protected land on 

both sides of the Mississippi River between New Orleans and the Gulf of Mexico. 

The Mississippi River Levees (MRL) protect the Parish from floods coming down the 

river; protection from hurricane-induced tidal surges is achieved by the New Orleans to Venice (NOV) hurricane protection system. The NOV is a system of levees 

on the gulf side of the protected lands and additional berms and floodwalls on top 

of the MRL along the river. The distance between the gulf-side levees (back levees), 

and the MRL is less than a mile in most places. Altogether the Plaquemines Parish 

MRL and NOV systems include 162 miles of levee and 7 miles of floodwall. There 

are fifteen non-federal pump stations for interior drainage. All of the levees in 

Plaquemines Parish sustained damage from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. There 

was considerable crown and slope scour along the total length. The MRL slope pavement sustained damage from the hundreds of ships and barges that crashed upon 

it. There were also several distinct locations of severe damage, coinciding with pipeline crossings through the levee and with some floodwall sections. Five of the 6 

miles of NOV floodwall along the Mississippi River was damaged beyond repair. 

There were major breaches at sheet pile wing walls at two pump stations in the 

back levee. A major breach occurred at the Shell pipeline crossing near Nairn and 

the West Pointe a la Hache pipeline crossing was severely damaged. Wind and 

water damage from Katrina and Rita severely impacted nearly every structure within the east bank area of protection and on the west bank below Myrtle Grove (50 

miles above Venice). 

AUTHORIZED AND FUNDED EFFORTS

Repair: The Corps of Engineers is well on its way to accomplishing the initial goal 

of repairing the damaged portions of the hurricane protection system by the start 

of the next hurricane season. The Corps has awarded 59 reconstruction contracts 

and is committed to completing the $798 million reconstruction of the hurricane protection system to pre-Katrina levels by June 1. Information gained through an 

Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force (IPET) and various independent review panels is informing decisions on the repair of the existing authorized structures, including the replacement of damaged I-walls with L- or T-walls or with levee 

enlargements. The flood walls that failed are being replaced with new designs that 

use deeper sheet piles and are anchored with H-piles driven up to 80 feet into the 

ground. Only soil that meets the specifications is being used to rebuild the levees. 

Extensive on-site inspections, sampling and laboratory testing is performed to ensure only quality materials are being used. High quality clay soils from as far away 

as Mississippi are being brought in to ensure the levees are better and stronger. 

Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Project 

In Orleans East Bank, 17 separate construction projects have been completed or 

are underway to repair the damaged areas and to restore flood protection to prehurricane Katrina conditions. These projects represent an estimated $182.3 million 

in construction contracts. Work on the breaches is proceeding as scheduled. An analysis by the IPET has shown that the 17th Street canal levees and floodwalls will 

not perform reliably without major reconstruction and strengthening. Better protection at all three outfall canals will be provided by closing off the mouths of interior 

drainage canals at Lake Pontchartrain and replacing damaged I-walls with T-walls. 

The outfall canal closure plan includes installation of temporary gates and pumps 

by June, until a more permanent solution is authorized, funded and can be constructed. The temporary gates can be opened and closed to protect the canals from 
51 

storm-induced surges from Lake Pontchartrain. During most storm events, the gates 

will remain open and the existing pumps will be operated as intended to evacuate 

rainwater. The corps is working with local officials to optimize pumping capability 

when the gates are closed. The schedule for the temporary structures is very compressed. Contractors are using innovative construction techniques to deliver. Work 

along the Industrial Canal in Orleans Parish is progressing on schedule. 

In New Orleans East, 13 separate construction projects have been completed or are underway. These projects represent an estimated $66.8 million in construction 

contracts. Repairs for most of the structures in the area are on schedule. There is 

a delay in the floodwall repairs at Pump Station No. 15, but materials have been 

delivered and work is progressing. Modifications to the Citrus Back Levee are 

slightly delayed, but the contractor has an excellent history of meeting its schedule. 

Modifications to the floodgate at the CSX (L&N) Tracks are slightly delayed due to 

negotiations with the railroad. These negotiations have now been completed and a 

revised schedule is being developed. 

In St. Bernard Basin, which includes St. Bernard Parish and the Lower 9th Ward 

of Orleans Parish, 9 separate construction projects have been completed or are underway. These projects represent an estimated $69.3 million in construction contracts. Levee repairs are all on schedule. Work on both control structures is slightly 

behind schedule, but the schedule is being managed and the projects will be completed on time. 

New Orleans to Venice 

For the New Orleans to Venice project located in Plaquemines Parish, 20 separate 

construction projects have been completed or are underway. These projects represent an estimated $114.5 million in construction contracts. Half of these projects 

have been completed, including all of the MRL repairs. Recent completion of the 

Port Sulphur to Fort Jackson MRL repairs has provided full access for levee four 

enlargement projects that were previously delayed. These are areas where the New 

Orleans to Venice Hurricane Protection Project consists of additional berms and 

floodwalls on top of the MRL levees. 

Restoration of undamaged and subsided areas; Completion of un-constructed portions of authorized projects 

The corps continues to conduct both surface and subsurface inspections of the remaining 181 miles of the New Orleans-area levee system that was not visibly damaged by last year’s hurricanes, and is thoroughly inspecting all of the I-walls that 

were not damaged. By September 2007, the Corps plans to restore undamaged but 

subsided areas of the hurricane protection system to its authorized elevation. They 

will also complete un-constructed yet authorized portions of the New Orleans to 

Venice, West Bank and Vicinity, Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity, Grand Isle, and 

Larose to Golden Meadow hurricane protection projects and the Southeast Louisiana 

interior flood damage reduction project. 

In addition, we are re-assessing the reliability of all of the floodwalls in the system based on the findings of the IPET. These findings identified a failure mechanism that was not taken into account during design. If the proposed improvements 

that were described by 

Statement of Daniel H. Hitchings, PE, Regional Business Director, Mississippi 

Valley Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Mr. Woodley in his testimony are implemented, the length of floodwalls in the 

system will be reduced by about 20 miles. However, there are 36 miles of floodwalls 

that will remain in the system. Reevaluation may reveal that replacement or reinforcement of all or part of this length may be necessary. 

This concludes my statement. Again, I appreciate the opportunity to testify today. 

I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

RESPONSES BY DANIEL H. HITCHINGS TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR JEFFERDS

Question 1a. Can you describe the condition of the levees in New Orleans in terms 

of tree growth prior to Hurricane Katrina? 

Response. Prior to Katrina, the great majority of Federal levees in the New Orleans area were free of trees within the levee footprint. However, there were some 

reaches of the hurricane protection system where trees were located in, or immediately adjacent to, the levees. This was particularly evident along the levees and 

floodwalls located on the outfall canals in New Orleans where the Federal hurricane 

protection project was implemented on top of local levees in densely populated corridors with limited rights-of-way. 
52 

Corps policy prohibits tree growth that adversely affects the integrity of levees 

and floodwalls. However, corps guidance and national environmental policy also recognizes the esthetic and environmental value of trees and requires that acquisition 

of rights-of-way and the clearance of trees be kept to the minimum necessary for 

implementation of the project. Our post-Katrina review has identified inconsistent 

application of these policies, a problem that we are now addressing. 

Question 1b. What impact would a large root ball inside of a levee/floodwall have 

on the stability of the system? 

Response. Trees located on, or adjacent to, a levee or floodwall pose risks to the 

integrity of the system by providing a pathway for water to work its way into the 

levees. An overturned tree within the vicinity of project features could lead to instability of the flood protection by removing large amounts of soil from the levee as 

well as opening the way for a sliding failure or piping of water. In addition, large 

overturned trees could fall on and damage floodwalls. 

Question 1c. Were there any reports of tree removals in the time period immediately preceding Hurricane Katrina? 

Response. We are not aware of any such reports. However, it should be noted that 

the corps relies upon the local levee districts for operation and maintenance oversight of the project. 

Question 1d. What would the normal corps process be should such a report be received? 

Response. Our procedure would be to consult with the local project sponsor who 

has primary responsibility for operation and maintenance of the project to determine what actions, if any, were needed to address tree removals. 

Question 2. Can you describe the Army Corps protocols for tree removal, including 

which trees are cut down, which trees are removed by the roots and how levee stability is insured when a large root ball is removed? 

Response. In the interest of repair and rehabilitation of the Lake Pontchartrain, 

Louisiana, and Vicinity, Hurricane Protection project, we have developed a twophase approach to the removal of trees that endanger our floodwalls and levees. 

During the first phase, only trees within the levee section or immediately adjacent 

to floodwalls will be cut. These trees will be cut 41⁄2 feet above the ground with the 

tree stumps and roots to be removed after the current hurricane season has ended. 

The resulting holes will be backfilled with clay material and compacted to ensure 

the integrity of the levee. 

The second phase of the tree removal program will broaden the tree removal zone. 

We are currently reviewing our criteria for root-free and woody vegetation-free zones 

adjacent to levees and floodwalls. Changes in the criteria may result in the need 

to acquire additional rights-of-way. 

Question 3. Do you anticipate large numbers of levee reconstruction projects after 

tree removal in New Orleans is completed? 

Response. As described in response to question No. 2, the portions of levee sections that are impacted by the removal of trees will be immediately repaired to restore their structural integrity. We have developed initial estimates of trees requiring removal in phase I but are still developing estimates for the extent of tree removal and needed repairs for phase 2. 

Question 4. Can you clarify your understanding of why splash guards were not 

included in the original design of the New Orleans levee system at some or all locations? 

Response. The flood protection project was designed to protect against a certain 

storm event. Consideration was not given to protecting the project features against 

larger storms. 

Question 5. Can you describe what actions would need to be taken if a levee is 

armored today, and, in the future, it is determined that a levee raise would be necessary? 

Response. If the product selected to armor can be salvaged, it would. We have not 

completed our construction, economic, and reuse analyses on these products. ERDC 

recently completed Phase I of a two phase report. Phase I provided an initial evaluation of armoring and protection alternatives that are appropriate. Phase II will be 

initiated in July 2006 and will expand the range of alternatives and will engage 

manufactures and eminent engineers and scientists. 

Question 6. What is the role of natural wetlands and coastal restoration in your 

vision for the long-term hurricane protection system in southern Louisiana? 

Response. Coastal wetlands are an integral part of a viable coast that serves multiple purposes. One of the primary benefits of a viable, sustainable coast is that it 

provides the first line of defense against hurricane storm surges. Coastal restoration 
53 

features contribute to the overall hurricane protection system by providing storm 

surge reduction, levee protection buffers, wind shields, and long term operations and 

maintenance cost reductions. 

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM CLIFFORD SMITH, MEMBER, MISSISSIPPI RIVER

COMMISSION, CIVIL WORKS, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

Good morning Senators and staff. Thank you for holding this hearing. 

When I read the official notice for this meeting, I understand that its purpose is 

to oversee the ongoing rebuilding and restoration efforts of hurricane and flood protection by the Corps of Engineers in preparation for the 2006 hurricane season in 

Louisiana and to examine taking a comprehensive approach to hurricane protection. 

Since you are overseeing the ’’ongoing rebuilding and restoration efforts of hurricane and flood protection by the Corps of Engineers in preparation for next years 

hurricane season in Louisiana’’, I am here to respectfully inform you that there is 

no effort being expended to protect the approximately 150,000 citizens and the Nation’s economic engine in Terrebonne Parish, which suffered greater flooding from 

Hurricane Rita than it has ever suffered in my lifetime of 71 years. Over ten thousand homes were flooded by Rita, which made landfall approximately one hundred 

and fifty miles to the west of Terrebonne. 

I am very pleased that you want to investigate a ‘‘comprehensive approach to hurricane protection’’, but I am frustrated and confused. I am here to tell you that a 

comprehensive approach is not only desirable, but is necessary for the survival of 

our coast and its economy, communities and culture. A pro-active approach to avoiding the type of destruction and devastation experienced through Hurricanes Katrina 

and Rita is long overdue. 

We, in Terrebonne Parish, have been working on just such an approach for our 

region for over 15 years (that’s right...15 YEARS). The obsolete and frustrating authorization, appropriating and N.E.P.A. permitting processes that have evolved in 

this country, and the timing issues that are associated with them, present almost 

insurmountable barriers to resolving the complicated problems associated with implementing any comprehensive hurricane protection system. 

Fifteen years ago, in conjunction with the State of Louisiana and the Corps of Engineers, we began to develop a hurricane protection system for Terrebonne Parish. 

The State, our local Government, and the Corps of Engineers, completed a feasibility study in 2002 which cost over $10 million, of which 50 percent was paid by 

local interests. It was approved by the Chief of Engineers. This project, known as 

the Morganza to the Gulf Hurricane Protection Plan, has a positive cost benefit 

ratio, but has been waiting for Congressional authorization since 2002. As you all 

know, no Water Resource Development Act (W.R.D.A.) has passed the Congress 

since 2000, and this project has been in every proposed version since that time. 

The local citizens have been taxing themselves for the last four years to raise the 

local share with the state in the event that a federal project is ever authorized and 

funded. As a matter of fact, with local and state funds and no Federal help we have 

just begun building a $17 million segment of the project in accordance with the feasibility report and with the hope of ultimately receiving credit on a Federal project. 

This project will provide Category 3 protection for approximately 200,000 citizens 

in Terrebonne and Lafourche Parishes and approximately $8 billion of public and 

private infrastructure, if and when it is ever built...and if we don’t completely wash 

away before we get assistance from the Federal Government. 

During the past 6 months, when someone asks me how I am doing, I tell them 

I am confused. I know that I am blessed because the greatest natural disaster to 

hit America, Hurricane Katrina, was to the east of where I live. Even though the 

wind blew out of the north at 100 MPH, we received minimal damage and inconvenience, being without electricity for only 5 days. Within 30 days, Hurricane Rita hit 

southwest Louisiana, and the wind blew 40 MPH out of the south; we had more 

water in my parish than I have ever seen. Thankfully, my home and my business 

and investments had minimal damage so, again, I was blessed. 

Because we live so close to the disaster areas, especially the oil and gas operations 

in the Gulf of Mexico that were devastated by Katrina and Rita, my community’s 

economy is the most prosperous that I have ever observed. A year ago, I would have 

told you that Terrebonne Parish was benefiting from an economic boom second to 

none. Now, the economy is a spike on what we had. We have less than a 4 percent 

unemployment rate, a 10 percent increase in population over the last 10 years, and 

at least a 15 percent increase in population over the last 6 months. We have a sales 

tax increase of over 15 percent per year, with over a 30 percent increase being reflected over the last six months. All of this is because the oil and gas companies 

are doing everything possible to get back in production because of the demand and 
54 

prices for their products. We are blessed to be benefiting from circumstances not 

under our control. 

However, as a Civil Engineer and Land Surveyor who has lived near the water 

in this coastal area all my life, I am depressed because I see my coastline washing 

away into the Gulf of Mexico. I believe if a storm of 100 MPH wind hit my community from the south, there could be 10 to 15 feet of water in the vicinity of Houma. 

During my lifetime, over 400,000 acres of land have been lost between my community and the Gulf of Mexico. The buffer that protected my community from hurricanes for over 200 years is eroding. One of the most productive estuary areas in 

the world is being lost as I speak to you. It has been documented that 25 square 

miles of coastal Louisiana is being destroyed by erosion, subsidence, or sea level rise 

each and every year. The estimate is that we lost 100 to 125 square miles of the 

Louisiana coast during Hurricanes Rita and Katrina. This depresses me, and it 

should depress you. 

I tell everyone in my community to go look at Chalmette and St. Bernard Parish. 

Chalmette is about 20 miles further inland from the Gulf than my community of 

Houma, as shown on the attached sketch. Chalmette had two levees protecting 

them, and they both were overtopped. In my community, we have none. I believe 

it is just a matter of time before my community experiences the fate of Chalmette 

and St. Bernard Parish. 

I also am depressed when I hear all the effort and discussion in the New Orleans 

area and vicinity concerning protection from a Category 3 or Category 5 hurricane. 

Where I live, we have a Category 0 protection. Over the years my parish used local 

funds to construct drainage and tidal protection levees and pump stations to handle 

our deteriorating drainage problems caused by coastal erosion and 60 inches of annual rainfall. The levees protected areas that were flooded many times by previous 

hurricanes and tropical events, but they were destroyed by Rita. Again, using local 

funds, we are frantically attempting to rebuild some of our levees and drainage systems before the June 1st hurricane season. It is depressing because what we are 

building is not hurricane protection. 

As drastically as we need this project and as horrible as the hurricanes were last 

year, one good thing that resulted is the recognition that the wetlands and estuary 

area are, in and of themselves, significant hurricane protection systems that must 

be restored and rebuilt. This is surely the case, particularly in my area, because our 

wetlands have historically protected not only my parish but much of Lafourche, St. 

Charles, Jefferson, and Orleans, in addition to being the most productive estuary 

on earth. I believe, as a civilian member of the Mississippi River Commission, this 

restoration of our wetlands can be accomplished by managing the resources of the 

Mississippi River and its tributaries so that the fresh water, silt, and nutrients of 

the river can be utilized under controlled conditions to re-establish the wetlands. 

The survival of our area depends upon you. Please authorize and fund the 

Morganza to the Gulf Hurricane Protection Project and the Louisiana Coastal Area 

Project for the restoration of the nation’s great coastal area. 

Thank you for your time. 
55 
56 

STATEMENT OF BENNY ROUSSELLE, PRESIDENT, PLAQUEMINES PARISH GOVERNMENT

Thank you, Chairman and Members of the Committee. 

I am Benny Rousselle and I represent the people of Plaquemines Parish, a relatively small community located on the Gulf Coast of Louisiana, south of New Orleans. 

Plaquemines Parish is small in size and population, yet it provides multi-million 

dollar revenues for North America. The parish’s oil, gas and fishery industries provide an economic impact for not only Louisiana but for the entire United States. The 

Naval Air Station—Joint Reserve Base, representing all five branches of the U.S. 

Armed Forces and the U.S. Coast Guard is located in Plaquemines Parish. 

Two prominent scientific research centers are located in Plaquemines Parish. 

Tulane University’s F. Edward Hebert Research Center focuses on environmental, 

biological and medical research activities. The Louisiana State University’s Citrus 

Research Station obtains produce research data on citrus, vegetables and small 

fruit. 

Plaquemines Parish is also the home of the Conoco Phillips Alliance Refinery, one 

of the last grassroots refineries built in the United States. The refinery processes 

crude oil and receives domestic crude oil by pipeline and international crudes via 

the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port. Approximately 600 employees and contractors operate and maintain the refinery. The refinery started operations in 1971 and remains 

one of the country’s most efficient and modern refineries. 

The Chevron Oronite Oak Point Plant in Plaquemines Parish is one of the largest 

and most advanced producers of high-quality blended fuel and lubricant additives 

in the world. The plant occupies 100 acres in the parish and has more than 410 

employees. More than 30 unique additive components and intermediates are manufactured at the plant and more than 300 packages are blended at the site for customer requirements. 

Southeast Louisiana is a major oil and gas-producing region, with an energy industry that accounts for $93 billion in revenue to the Louisiana economy and the 

employment of more than 62,000 people. In 2001, Plaquemines Parish produced 

more than 21 million barrels of crude oil from more than 23,000 wells,—more than 

any other parish in the State. In addition, Plaquemines Parish also produced more 

than 146 million cubic feet of natural gas. 

The mouth of the Mississippi River is in Plaquemines Parish. Through this gateway to the Mississippi River Valley passes 92 percent of the Nation’s agricultural 

exports, as well as coal, petroleum products, iron and steel, rubber and chemicals. 

The mouth of the Mississippi River is served by five ports—including the Ports 

of Plaquemines, St. Bernard, New Orleans, South Louisiana and Baton Rouge. 

These ports handle a significant portion of the Nation’s cargo. In fact, annual U.S. 

tonnage reports consistently rank the Port of South Louisiana FIRST in tonnage 

shipped, while the ports of New Orleans and Baton Rouge rank fourth and sixth. 

The ports also serve as America’s cargo gateway to Latin America and, with the potential opening of the Seapoint facility, they are expected to become critical to our 

trade with China. 

The parish of Plaquemines jutting out into the Gulf of Mexico was the first to be 

hit by Hurricane Katrina. Just a few short weeks afterward it received the backlash 

of Hurricane Rita. In both instances, Plaquemines Parish was inundated by waters 

that flooded and washed away practically all businesses, homes and structures on 

the east bank and southernmost points. Our only protection was levees, both Federal and non-Federal, that suffered tremendous soil loss and in some instances, collapsed. 

Unlike other parishes that need levee protection in some areas of their parish, 

Plaquemines is bordered by levees on all sides. We rely heavily on our levees year 

round for daily protection. We have been dependent on the Corps of Engineers to 

provide us with protection for our Federal levees. However, Plaquemines Parish has 

allotted substantial local dollars for Federal and non-Federal levees. This does not 

include the time and labor spent by employees to maintain both the federal and 

non-Federal levees. In order to provide adequate levee protection of Plaquemines 

Parish we must have all of our levees funded under a Federal system. 

However, levee systems are not and cannot be the lone solution. There must be 

a move to restore America’s wetlands. They are an important part of our economy, 

our culture and our environment. 

Louisiana boasts the Nation’s largest shrimp fishery and second-largest commercial fishing industry (second only to Alaska). Some of the largest commercial fishing 

ports in the country are in the Southeast Louisiana corridor. Fishermen working out 

of these ports land between 350 million and 495 million pounds of saltwater fish 
57 

each year and about 22 million pounds of freshwater fish the largest freshwater harvest in the Nation. 

The wetlands surrounding Plaquemines Parish are the spawning grounds and 

nurseries for much of the Nation’s most desirable seafood: shrimp, oysters, crab, catfish and red drum. Without wetlands protection and restoration, the Louisiana seafood industry and the Nation’s seafood populations are vulnerable. 

Parts of Plaquemines Parish are designated as essential habitat for brown 

shrimp, white shrimp, and red drum by the Gulf of Mexico fishery Management 

Council. America’s wetlands also provide natural flood control, natural hurricane 

protection and natural filtration systems to protect water quality. In fact, America’s 

wetlands located in Louisiana have been called ‘‘the hardest-working,’’ ‘‘the most 

productive’’ and ‘‘the greatest wetlands on earth.’’ But these wetlands are disappearing at the rate of 40 square miles a year. That’s 80 percent of the Nation’s 

total coastal wetland loss occurring in the Nation’s most important and productive 

wetlands. Without protection, these wetlands are not only vulnerable. . . they’re 

gone. 

The southern portion of Plaquemines Parish and its east bank population now 

stands at 10 percent pre-Katrina numbers. Our residents and businesses are waiting for adequate levee protection and coastal restoration. Plaquemines Parish is not 

a heavily populated area. Louisiana, in general, is not a heavily populated State. 

But consider this: these small numbers of people make up nearly 100 percent of the 

workers in the Nation’s second-largest seafood industry. And comprise the workforce 

of one of the Nation’s most important oil and gas-producing regions. They service 

three of the nation’s busiest ports and form a unique and priceless part of America’s 

cultural heritage. 

Today I am asking that you invest in the maintenance of all levee systems in 

Plaquemines Parish. I am also asking you to invest and dedicate funding to our wetlands and nature’s hurricane protection system. 

We respectfully request that you don’t turn your back on the levees and the vanishing wetlands of our parish and State. These levees and wetlands present a priceless opportunity to act locally to reap enormous global benefits. Without protection, 

we’re all vulnerable. 

RESPONSE BY BENNY ROUSSELLE TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION FROM

SENATOR JEFFORDS

Question. I understand that the corps had plans to meet with you and others in 

Plaquemines Parish to determine what some options might be for a hurricane protection system that could involve concepts such as maximum protection for population and economic centers coupled with a protected hurricane evaluation route. 

Can you provide an update on what discussions have occurred, and what your opinion is of the concept I described here for hurricane protection in Plaquemines Parish? 

Response. I have met with the corps on two seperate occasions. I am currently 

waiting for a third meeting to learn what their final recommendation will be. I 

agree that we need a comprehensive plan that combines restoration of the barrier 

islands and maximum levee protection to best serve our area. 

STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY P. KERNER, MAYOR, TOWN OF JEAN LAFITTE AND VICE

PRESIDENT, WEST JEFFERSON LEVEE DISTRICT, JEFFERSON PARISH, LA 

Good morning, my name is Timothy Kerner, Mayor of the Town of Jean Lafitte 

and Vice-President of the West Jefferson Levee District. I am here to speak on behalf of the citizens of Jefferson Parish. 

Hurricane Katrina made landfall on August 29, 2005 causing tremendous flooding 

damage over large portions of southeastern Louisiana. The event focused great attention on its impact upon the flood protection systems throughout the area. 

However, Hurricane Katrina was not the only catastrophe to hit southeastern 

Louisiana. In late September of 2005, Hurricane Rita while on a path to making 

landfall near the Louisiana/Texas border brought catastrophic tidal inundation to 

the communities of Crown Point, Lafitte, and Barataria as it passed south of Jefferson Parish, LA. 

The flooding overtopped and in some instances destroyed existing levee systems 

that heretofore had provided a limited level of flood protection in ‘these areas. Because of the extent of damage, the rehabilitation of these levee systems is beyond 

the financial capability of the West Jefferson Levee District. As such, we are requesting your review of and subsequent approval for funding the repair of those 
58 

damaged levee systems and for the construction of new levees as may be needed 

to protect the citizens of lower Jefferson Parish. 

We understand that the repair and construction of levee systems, both Federal 

and non-Federal, located in other communities in and around the New Orleans metropolitan area that were damaged or destroyed by Hurricane Katrina have been included in Congressional appropriations to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. In earlier supplemental appropriation legislation the non-Federal levees located in the 

parishes of St. Bernard and Plaquemines were addressed, and we understand that 

in the most recent supplemental appropriations bill that just passed the Senate 

Committee, non-Federal levees in Terrebonne Parish have also been addressed. Unfortunately, damage to non-Federal levees in Jefferson Parish from Hurricane Rita 

have not been addressed leaving to local governmental entities, with limited resources, the sole responsibility for these levees. 

Prior to the recent area-wide devastation caused by the passages of Hurricane 

Katrina and Hurricane Rita, some efforts on the Federal level had been initiated. 

After being contacted for assistance by Jefferson Parish officials, the West Jefferson 

Levee District, and the Mayor of the Town of Jean Lafitte, Louisiana, the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers, as part of their Continuing Authorities Program, was already 

in the process of addressing tidal flood protection at several of the Crown Point, Lafitte, and Barataria sites. 

In each case the corps is limited to spending a maximum of $7 million per project 

with a 65 percent Federal and 35 percent non-Federal cost share requirement. As 

each of the below listed projects will far exceed that limit, we are requesting legislation to increase the Federal funding limit and to reduce the non-Federal cost share 

percentage. 

Existing studies: 

(1) Crown Point Basin Flood Protection 

(2) Rosethorn Basin Flood Protection 

(3) Lafitte, Fisher School Basin Flood Protection 

(4) Pailet Basin Flood Protection 

(5) Goose Bayou Basin Flood Protection 

New and requested construction: 

Recent events demonstrated that completion of the above mentioned projects 

would have prevented serious flooding in the areas that would have been served by 

the projects. However, evacuation was stopped due to high water across the roadway 

between the project locations. As such, we are requesting that projects be authorized 

sufficient to connect the proposed construction sites. To assure construction of the 

roadway evacuation routes, the cost to benefit ratio of 1:1 must be waived for the 

following projects. 

(6) Lower Lafitte Basin Flood Protection 

(7) Lower Barataria Basin 

(8) Jones Point Basin 

(9) Lower Highway 45 Evacuation Route 

(10) Upper Highway 45 Evacuation Route 

To assure sufficient action, legislation authorizing a larger Federal participation 

must be enacted by the Congress. To assist in that process we have included suggested language as an attachment to my testimony. 

Unfortunately, even the sites included in the Federal studies and authorized construction projects do not qualify under Federal legislation enacted for recovery from 

Hurricane Katrina. 

For this reason we are looking to the U.S. Congress for assistance in the repair 

of damaged levees and for assistance in funding the construction of new levees needed to provide safe corridors of evacuation when needed to protect our citizens in future flooding events such as recently experienced from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

As Mayor of the Town of Jean Lafitte I am critically interested in providing flood 

protection for all of the citizens living and working in the communities of Lafitte, 

Barataria, and Crown Point; but, I am also Vice-President of the West Jefferson 

Levee District so I am also concerned that those citizens living and working within 

the project boundaries of the West Bank Hurricane Protection Project receive the 

maximum flood protection benefit of this project. 

When first authorized by congress in 1986 we were told by the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers that this project would provide flood protection against the Standard 

Project Hurricane, generally assumed to be a level of flood protection against a 

storm that might occur once in 300 to 500 years. Recent news releases have advised 

that the West Bank Project after constructed to its authorized elevation will not 

even provide flood protection to the 100 year level. To say that we were shocked 

by that information would be an understatement. 
59 

At this time, the 250,000 citizens of the west bank of Jefferson Parish, Algiers 

in Orleans Parish, and Belle Chasse, in Plaquemines Parish who are all relying on 

this project do not even receive the benefit of a completed system. Approximately 

20 miles of a total project length of 64 miles has not yet been constructed. While 

we have been advised that the corps now has funding sufficient to accelerate completion of the project, we are told, that won’t happen for at least 2 years. Even when 

finished, based on the new information, the project will still not provide the level 

of flood protection originally promised and authorized. 

The third supplemental appropriation legislation recently passed by Congress provided funding sufficient to accelerate the completion of the project no later than 

September 2007. That legislation mandated 100 percent of the cost of that construction to be borne by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Unfortunately, we are told 

by the corps that the legislation mandated that they assume all land acquisition duties, previously the responsibility of the non-Federal sponsor. As such, we are concerned, based upon our interaction with the Corps since Hurricane Katrina, that the 

corps’ procedures will significantly delay the start of project construction. 

The solution to that problem is for the West Jefferson Levee District to continue 

to provide the land acquisition services. However, we are told by the corps that legislation is required to direct the corps to allow the non-Federal sponsor to continue 

its land acquisition activities and to authorize it to reimburse the non-Federal sponsor (West Jefferson Levee District) for the cost of this responsibility. 

A press release by the corps recently advised that the West Bank project, although authorized by Congress to be constructed to the level of the Standard Project 

Hurricane (300- to 500-year frequency) did not now meet the new FEMA criterion 

for the 100-year frequency storm. 

Additional language, and funding, will be required directing the corps to construct 

the project sufficient to provide at least the FEMA 100-year flood protection, or better. 

Since its construction, the corps has continually been responsible for the operation 

and maintenance of the levees adjacent to the Algiers Canal, of the Gulf Intracoastal Water Way. The agreement for hurricane protection for the West Bank required non-Federal interests to assume the operation and maintenance responsibility for these levees after they were raised 2-feet. This requirement is onerous and 

should be eliminated. Language was put into previous WRDA legislation to handle 

this problem, but after the bill was passed by Congress, the corps took the position 

that the language was flawed and therefore unenforceable. 

In closing, let me finish by saying that the people of south Louisiana in general, 

and in particular Jefferson Parish, have a long history of providing many of the 

goods and services needed by the rest of our country. We have worked hard to provide much of the seafood, including fish, oysters, shrimp, and crawfish that is enjoyed by many throughout this great country. Our people toil, and our infrastructure 

supports the oil industry that helps fuel the automobiles, heat the homes, and power 

the industry that the rest of the country has come to rely on for their comfort and 

livelihood. The rivers, bayous, and channels that cut through our communities and 

allow the commerce of the country to flow smoothly to the many ports and locations 

throughout the nation, also bring the flood waters that have so devastated our 

homes and have given us great concern for the future. 

LEGISLATION NEEDED FOR THE WEST BANK HURRICANE PROTECTION PROJECT

1. Amend Section 328 of the Water Resource and Development Act of 1999 By 

striking ‘‘operation and maintenance’’ and inserting ‘‘operation, maintenance, repair, 

replacement and rehabilitation’’; and By striking’’ Algiers Channel’’ and inserting 

‘‘Algiers Lock and Canal Project Levees, including any enlargements, additions or 

structural improvements constructed upon the said Algiers Lock and Canal Project 

Levees as part of the West Bank and Vicinity, New Orleans, LA, Hurricane Protection Project.’’ 

2. Legislation is required to direct the corps to allow the non-Federal sponsor to 

continue its land acquisition activities and to reimburse the non-Federal sponsor 

(West Jefferson Levee District) for the cost of this responsibility. 

3. Additional language, and funding, will be required directing the Corps to construct the project sufficient to meet at least the FEMA 100-year flood declaration, 

or better. 
60 

LEGISLATION NEEDED FOR THE LAFITTE AREA OF JEFFERSON PARISH

1. MAXIMUM FEDERAL EXPENDITURE—The maximum amount of Federal 

Funds that may be expended for the project for flood control,——insert name of 

project——, Jefferson Parish Louisiana, is $15 million. 

2. COST SHARE—Non-Federal interests shall be required to provide all lands, 

easements, rights of way, affect relocation of impacted utilities/facilities, borrows, 

and spoil disposal easements and pay 10 percent of the project total cost. 

3. CREDITS—Credit shall be given to non-Federal interests towards its share of 

the project’s total cost for its provision of all in-kind services, lands, easements, 

rights of way, affect relocation of impacted utilities/facilities, borrows, and spoil disposal easements. The requirement for non-Federal interests to provide a minimum 

of 5 percent cash towards the project’s total cost is waived. Reimbursement of all 

non-Federal expenditures above the 10 percent maximum contribution is authorized. 

4. PROJECT COOPERATION AGREEMENT—The Secretary shall enter into a 

project cooperation agreement for the project as described to take into account the 

change in participation in the project as authorized under this legislation. 

5. PROJECT JUSTIFICATION—The minimum cost to benefit requirement of 1:1 

is waived for the purposes of this project. 
61 
62 

STATEMENT OF MARK C. DRENNEN, PRESIDENT AND CEO, GREATER

NEW ORLEANS, INC. 

In October 2005, the Southeast Louisiana Business Coalition, a group of business 

leaders from GNO, Inc., Downtown Development District, Jefferson Chamber of 

Commerce, New Orleans Chamber of Commerce, River Region Chamber of Commerce, Slidell Chamber of Commerce, St. Bernard Chamber of Commerce, West St. 

Tammany Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Louis Armstrong 

International Airport, all representing thousands of small, medium and large employers from the hardest hit areas of the New Orleans region united for three primary purposes: 

• to educate congress and Federal agencies as to the vital pre-Katrina national 

economic impact of the Southeast Louisiana region 

• to alert congress and Federal agencies about the severity of the devastation to 

the regional economy 

• to propose a post-Katrina congressional relief package. 

Critical to our message were some startling facts and figures. 

To date: 

• 80,000 businesses have been disrupted by the hurricane and are in severe risk 

of failure. 

• 438,000 new claims for unemployment have been filed since Hurricane Katrina. 

• The State of Louisiana anticipates $1 Billion in lost revenue for Fiscal Year 

2005/06. 

• 200,000 homes have been substantially damaged. 

• basic infrastructure necessary for economic recovery, including schools, hospitals, colleges and roads have been severely damaged or destroyed. 

• Tax bases for governmental operations have been lost. 

The Southeast Louisiana Business Coalition representing businesses from a variety of sectors, such as banking, law, information technology and telecommunications, and engineering requested critically needed help through appropriations requests, an economic stimulus package and a call for a federally appointed figure to 

direct recovery efforts. 

Appropriations requests include: 

• (Our top regional priority)—-essential infrastructure help on an aggressive 

schedule to rebuild the levees to real Category 3 strength to provide disaster mitigation, structural stability, and psychological reassurance for businesses and residents 

to return to the area. 

In addition, we respectfully request long term funding to implement plans developed by the Corp of Engineers and other experts to protect the area from a Category 

5 hurricane. 

• (Our second regional priority)—-the allocation of 25 percent to 50 percent of revenues derived from Louisiana offshore mineral production to implement our already 

developed coastal restoration plan. A significant contributor to the devastation 

caused by Katrina was the previous loss of much of our coastal wetlands, which are 

also vital to the national economy. 

• a grant program to provide vital immediate cash for businesses, similar to the 

recovery grants provided to Manhattan businesses, by Congress, following the September 11th disaster. 

• low interest loan programs for commercial and residential development similar 

to the post 9-11 plan for Manhattan. 

• funding to repair damages to key infrastructure for our ports, the airport and 

highways. 

• a comprehensive economic stimulus package authorizing various tax relief 

measures and incentives, including a combination of: 

-Relocation Tax Credits and Employment Credits targeted at stimulating 

business re-entry into the market at pre-Katrina employment levels 

-Accelerated Depreciation and Tax Exempt Bonds to provide an incentive 

for increased capital projects 

-Personal Tax Relief and Tax Credits for those in the affected region in 

order to entice back individuals, business owners and corporate managers. 

The Southeast Louisiana Business Coalition recommended that the President and 

Congress create a single regional board to be directed by a person of national prominence to coordinate the recovery and rebuilding efforts in Southeast Louisiana. The 

group believes that relief coordination must occur at the federal, state and local levels in order to maximize resources, execute effective planning, and expedite implementation for post-Katrina recovery. 
63 

We fully understand that Louisiana must take every action possible to help itself. 

With this in mind, our local Governments are proceeding with the development of 

action plans for recovery of their respective areas. Parish presidents and mayors are 

including business leaders in their recovery plans. Outside expertise from national 

groups such as the International Economic Development Council (IEDC), the U.S. 

Chamber of Commerce and American Institute of Architects (AIA) are actively involved. Governor Blanco convened special session of the Louisiana legislature to address budget issues and State incentive programs as well as convened the Louisiana 

Recovery Authority to coordinate the State efforts. 

We have convened a regional housing task force group to devise short and longterm solutions to this severe problem. Without housing for our citizens, we will be 

unable to provide a workforce to re-open our businesses. As recommendations are 

developed, we will share them with Congress. 

Almost eight (8) months have passed since the hurricane and some progress has 

been achieved. Congress has provided significant funding for levees and housing; 

Don Powell has been appointed; the GO Zone legislation is an important tool for future investment. 

Our major remaining problems are the following: housing for our workers with 

action slowed by funding shortages and FEMA flood control maps; lack of a trained 

workforce; escalating insurance costs or no insurance; local governments financial 

hardships leading to an inability to provide basic services; and lack of funding for 

economic development and infrastructure like provided to NYC. 

In conclusion, time is of the essence for our successful recovery. We request your 

thoughtful consideration of our proposed solutions. With the temporary assistance 

of the citizens of the United States, we will be successful. 

STATEMENT OF LEWIS E. LINK, PH.D., DIRECTOR, INTERAGENCY PERFORMANCE

EVALUATION TASK FORCE

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am Dr. Lewis E. 

Link, Senior Research Engineer in the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Maryland and Project Director, Interagency Performance 

Evaluation Task Force. It is with great respect and appreciation that I submit this 

testimony concerning the activities of the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task 

Force, IPET. The IPET was commissioned by the Chief of the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers shortly after Hurricane Katrina devastated southeast Louisiana and 

southern Mississippi. The task force was charged to determine the facts concerning 

the performance of the southeast Louisiana hurricane protection system during 

Katrina, to report those facts to the public and to quickly facilitate the integration 

of these facts into the repair and reconstitution of the hurricane protection system. 

To accomplish this mission, the IPET has assembled a broad array of national experts from federal and state agencies, academia and industry. More than 150 recognized experts from over 50 organizations comprise the IPET teams. Leadership is 

provided from within and external to the Corps of Engineers for each major task 

area. The American Society of Civil Engineers External Review Panel is providing 

direct peer review of IPET activities as we proceed. Also, the National Research 

Council Committee on New Orleans Regional Hurricane Protection Projects is providing strategic oversight and independent review of IPET work as well as information from other sources studying Katrina. 

IPET information and analysis is provided to the public through a public web site 

(https://IPET.wes.army.mil) that currently provides over 3,900 documents and reports on the New Orleans Hurricane Protection System and the IPET work. This 

web site is also used to solicit feedback and input from the public on IPET documents and for information needed such as eye-witness accounts of when specific 

breaching events occurred. IPET Report 1, Performance Evaluation Plan and Interim Status, posted on the web site on January 10, 2006, provides a detailed scope 

of work and plan for the IPET activities. IPET Report 2, Performance Evaluation 

Status and Interim Results, posted on the web site on March 10, 2006, provides the 

most recent documentation of the IPET analyses and the emerging results. The 

IPET final draft report, Report 3, Performance Evaluation of the New Orleans and 

Vicinity Hurricane Protection System, is scheduled to be available as a final draft 

on June 1, 2006. Following a review of this final draft report by both the ASCE ERP 

and the National Academies, a final IPET report will be released in the fall of 2006. 

The IPET effort has been directly tied to the efforts of Task Force Guardian, the 

Corps team managing the rapid repairs of the protection system, and other Corps 

elements. Over 20 individuals from Task Force Guardian and the New Orleans District participate in the various IPET teams, providing direct access to critical knowl-
64 

edge and information needed for the IPET analysis. This coordination also provides 

a direct pipeline to transfer emerging IPET results and lessons learned immediately 

into the design and construction of repairs to the Hurricane Protection System. The 

last section of this written testimony includes a summary of the types of products 

IPET has provided to Task Force Guardian. It is critical that these lessons learned 

are incorporated immediately into the design and construction process as they are 

established to ensure we have the optimum repair designs to address IPET identified problems. The IPET lessons learned are also being provided to the Corps to provide a basis for future design and construction to recover the system to authorized 

protection levels and to complete the authorized Hurricane Protection System. The 

IPET results and methods will also provide a basis for Corps Headquarters efforts 

to review and renew engineering policy and practice as well as providing a new level 

of capabilities for studying future alternative protection measures for New Orleans 

and the vicinity. IPET results will ultimately help provide better and stronger designs for future protection projects in Louisiana and possibly other protection systems nation wide. 

The following paragraphs describe the IPET efforts ongoing to answer the major 

questions that comprise the mission of the task force. 

1. Geodetic Datum: The complex geology of southeast Louisiana provides the additional challenge of variable and relatively rapid subsidence. To accomplish the IPET 

analysis, it was essential to have an up-to-date geodetic and water level reference 

system to accurately measure the vertical elevations of all significant structures relative to local mean sea level. IPET accelerated the efforts of the Corps and National 

Geodetic Survey to update the local and regional reference datum using Global Positioning System, or GPS, technology. IPET also established the accurate elevations 

of the levees, floodwalls, pumping stations and other relevant structures to support 

the performance analysis. This provided an accurate reference system for all entities 

working on the analysis and reconstruction of the hurricane protection system. It 

also provided an accurate definition of the heights of the protection system structures at the time of Katrina. These revised and accurate elevations will aid future 

work to achieve the original authorized levels of protection or to any new levels prescribed by future policy or congressional authorizations. They will also be used by 

the construction industry and others in southern Louisiana for projects that rely on 

correct elevations relative to the local water surface. 

2. Hurricane Protection System Characterization: The Hurricane Protection System is comprised of over 350 miles of levees and floodwalls. To understand the system’s performance, it is necessary to understand the design criteria, the design assumptions and the ‘‘as built’’ characteristics of the individual structures. To accomplish this, the IPET has done a systematic examination of the documents concerning 

design and construction of the system to include the Standard Project Hurricane 

definition, the translation of the Standard Project Hurricane into surge and wave 

levels to develop design elevations, the fundamental design of the structures and the 

intent of the designers and the character of the structures as built. These results 

are the fundamental inputs to the performance analysis. With the exception of some 

systematic differences in elevations due to broad misinterpretations of local mean 

sea level, to date, this comprehensive review and analysis has not found any significant disparities between the fundamental designs and the as-built character of the 

system. 

3. Storm Analysis: Katrina was a very large storm, generating perhaps the largest 

storm surge measured for the North American Continent and the largest waves on 

our continental coast measured by a NOAA buoy, approximately 55 feet. This created a hydrodynamic environment that was in some cases significantly greater than 

the Hurricane Protection System was designed to handle. This was particularly the 

case for the areas along the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet and the levees in 

Plaquemines Parish. The water elevations within the Inner Harbor Navigation 

Canal also exceeded the design levels. Coupled with the fact that many of these 

areas had actual levee elevations below authorized/design levels, resulted in significant overtopping of levees in these locations. Of particular significance was the fact 

that the waves striking the MRGO and Plaquemines levees had wave periods of up 

to three times the design criteria, essentially representing ocean waves, leading to 

much more wave run up and much more destructive force than anticipated by the 

original design. The IPET simulations of Katrina surge and wave levels were run 

on some of our Nation’s most powerful supercomputers are some of the most advanced modeling efforts in engineering. These simulations resulted in a high resolution definition of the surge water levels and wave environments experienced by each 

section of levee or floodwall as a function of time. IPET coupled these data with the 

definition of the times of the breaching events, which allow determination of the 

specific water levels and wave forces that the individual structures experienced dur-
65 

ing the breaching process. One of the primary lessons learned here was the need 

for very accurate wind information and very high resolution computer grids for accurately modeling the storm and the resulting surge and wave conditions in the vicinity of the actual structures. High water marks were used as the primary calibration for these modeling efforts. 

4. Performance Analysis: The IPET performance analysis uses a combination of 

approaches to achieve an understanding of the most likely breaching mechanisms 

for the individual breach sites. The approaches include detailed field investigations, 

finite element or other computer simulations, conventional seepage or stability analysis, and physical modeling, both in centrifuges and a 1:50-scale hydraulic model of 

the 17th Street Canal. The performance analysis of the 17th Street Canal breach, 

as reported in IPET Report 2, provides an example of the level of detail and analysis 

methods used. Additional finite element analysis has been accomplished for the 17th 

Street site that will be released in the near future. The detailed definition of the 

breaching mechanism is necessary to determine the appropriate repair and reconstruction needed to make these sections more resilient in the future and to determine how to assess the integrity of similar structures that were not severely damaged by Katrina. Similar analyses are being completed for the London Avenue and 

Inner Harbor Navigation Canal breach sites. A separate analysis is ongoing to understand the performance of the levee sections along MRGO and Plaquemines Parish, focusing on the surge and wave levels experienced, the degree of scour and erosion experienced, the character of the materials in the levee and their placement 

and the true elevation of each section. These results will be documented and reported within the next month. The breaching mechanisms, and the understanding 

of why other similar sections did not fail, are vitally important. This information 

is being directly input in the assessment of the remaining sections of the Hurricane 

Protection System and to define the probability of different levels of performance of 

different component structures for the IPET risk and reliability analysis. 

5. Consequences: The amount of flooding resulting from the overtopping and 

breaching of the system during Katrina is being modeled for each drainage area. 

This capability, along with the characterization of the performance of the pumping 

stations, provides an ability to examine other scenarios. An example of such a scenario is the extent of flooding if there had been no catastrophic breaching in the 

system. The losses experienced during and as a result of Katrina are being characterized on a zip code and census block basis. Economic (domestic and commercial), 

environmental, life and safety and historical/social losses are being characterized. 

This information will allow correlation of consequences to physical performance. The 

life and safety and economic losses are also being incorporated into the IPET risk 

and reliability assessment. The completed consequence products will be released in 

the IPET final report on June 1. 

6. Risk and Reliability: A risk and reliability assessment is being accomplished 

to provide a system—wide examination of the relative vulnerability of the various 

drainage basins (polders or parishes) to flooding and losses, given the condition and 

character of the components of the hurricane protection system on June 1. This 

work incorporates both stage—frequency and stage—damage relationships that offer 

the opportunity to examine risk individually at the zip code or census block level 

or consolidated up to sub basins, basins or polders, parish or system-wide levels. It 

also allows examination of the impact of changing the character of the protection 

for a given reach, providing a means to examine how alternative approaches to protection can reduce risk. The risk information for Katrina and for the repaired system as of June 1, 2006, will be provided for the East Bank Polders in the IPET final 

report. 

The vast bulk of the IPET analyses are expected to be completed on time and reported by June 1, 2006. The final draft of Report 3 will remain subject to revision 

until the final comments of the ASCE External Review Panel around July and the 

NRC Committee on New Orleans Regional Hurricane Protection Projects are received in September and incorporated into the report. 

I appreciate the opportunity to provide this information and pledge the continued 

dedication of the IPET efforts to the objective analysis of the performance of the 

hurricane protection system. We are all working toward the common goal of applying lessons learned to the repair, reconstruction and improvement of hurricane protection in New Orleans and southeast Louisiana. 

SUMMARY OF IPET PRODUCTS/SUPPORT PROVIDED TO TASK FORCE GUARDIAN AND TASK

FORCE HOPE AS OF 17 APRIL 2006

a. Data Repository—25 October 2005. The IPET Data Repository was established 

as an entry point for collecting information pertaining to the New Orleans and 
66 

Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Protection Projects that needs to be validated as factual. This repository supports both the IPET and TFH/TFG efforts by providing a 

database where information can be reviewed for accuracy and quality prior to posting the information on the IPET public website. 

b. Establishment of the IPET Public Website—2 November 2005. The IPET public 

website was established as a way to be fully transparent in effectively sharing factual information pertaining to the New Orleans and Southeast Louisiana Hurricane 

Protection Projects. The website provides a way to proactively communicate information that might otherwise require the public and TFG to process Freedom of Information Acts. 

c. Establishment of On-Line Team Workspace using Groove—22 September 2005. 

To enable IPET, ERP, and members of TFH/TFG with on-line workspaces to communicate and share information virtually, Groove software and technical support 

was provided by IPET. Through these virtual workspaces information can be effectively and efficiently shared. Groove is a primary tool used to bring the IPET, ERP, 

and TFH/TFG teams together in sharing knowledge and information required to accomplish their missions. 

d. Integration of the IPET Public Website and the TFH/TFG Electronic Bid Solicitation Websites—15 November 2005. As a way to more effectively enable public benefit from the historic and performance-related information on the IPET public 

website and the reconstruction plans and specifications on the TFH/TFG electronic 

bid solicitation website, electronic linkage was provided to facilitate integration of 

the two sites. 

e. ‘‘Summary of Field Observations Relevant to Flood Protection in New Orleans, 

LA’’—5 December 2005. This IPET review provided Task Force Guardian with a 

simple statement of concurrence or non-concurrence from the IPET floodwall and 

levee sub team and additional relevant discussion for each of the major findings in 

the ASCE/NSF report’s chapter eight, ‘‘Summary of Observations and Findings.’’ 

The additional discussion relates to the analysis being conducted by the IPET or 

others that would assist in applying the ASCE/NSF findings to the reconstruction 

of hurricane protection in New Orleans. 

f. ‘‘Preliminary Wave and Water Level Results for Hurricane Katrina’’—23 November 2005. This IPET report to TFH/TFG included observations from the IPET 

surge and wave sub team from a field trip and overflight of New Orleans and Southeast Louisiana. 

g. ‘‘Summary of IPET Numerical Model of Hurricane Katrina Surge and Wave 

Plans, Approach and Methods’’—19 December 2005. This PowerPoint presentation 

by the IPET surge and wave sub team provided TFH/TFG with an update on wave 

and water level results for Hurricane Katrina. Wave and water level results from 

fast-track simulations of upper Category 3 type storms on various storm tracks and 

a Standard Project Hurricane event were also provided. 

h. Review of Proposal to Float In and Sink a Barge to Close Canals by June 

2006—28 December 2005. The proposal included the use of existing large ship tunnel thrusters mounted on a barge with huge pumping capacities. Review determined 

that the closure plan does not have enough pumping capacity to match existing 

pumps during a hurricane. The impact of barges on levee and floodwall integrity 

was also examined in depth. 

i. Technical Support to TFG on the Analysis and Design of the Reconstruction 

Plans and Specifications for the Breaches—Continuous Support as Needed. Technical support continues to be provided to TFG on an as needed basis. As a minimum, monthly face-to-face meetings take place in New Orleans. This support includes geotechnical and structural consultations. These discussions also include reviews of plans and specifications for reconstruction features such as T-walls, Lwalls, I-walls, levees, and foundation investigations. 

j. Evaluation of Existing and As-Built Conditions at Canals—On-going. This evaluation includes concrete and steel material properties for reinforcement and sheet 

piles on the I-walls, as-built length of sheet piles, surveys, and foundation material 

properties and boring logs. 

k. Life-cycle Documentation of the Hurricane Protection System—On-going. This 

documentation includes a review of the design, construction, and operation and 

maintenance of the hurricane system. 

l. Verification of Current and Reconstructed Floodwall Elevations—November 

2005. Established a tidal gage in November 2005 at the 17th Street Canal to monitor current sea level relationships to the newest NAVD88 datum epoch (2004.65). 

Verified floodwall elevations on Lakefront outfall canals and IHNC relative to this 

latest tidal and vertical epoch. 
67 

m. LIDAR Ground Truthing—On-going. Currently performing ground-truthing 

surveys throughout the region to calibrate various LIDAR-based elevation models 

used by Task Force Guardian. 

n. Densification of Control Benchmarks—31 December 2005. IPET has established 

approximately 75 vertical benchmarks throughout the region. These control points 

are being used for Task Force Guardian construction activities. 

o. Establishment of GIS Team—2 February 2006. The ‘‘GIS Team’’ was established to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of the GIS resources within 

IPET, Task Force Guardian, Task Force Hope, and the New Orleans District. The 

GIS Team consists of members from each of the four teams and provides a way to 

integrate efforts and share information pertaining to the HPS. The GIS Team will 

also provide for a way to assure a smooth transition of IPET generated GIS information to the New Orleans District upon disbanding of IPET once its performance evaluation is completed. Significant IPET data sets shared with TFG in January and 

February 2006 include the digital elevation models, vertical datum survey data, 

geotechnical data, and photographs. 

p. Insight into probable cause of breaching at 17th Street Canal—Continuous ending March 2006. Information was shared with TFG on the probable cause of breaching at the 17th Street Canal. Recommendations were provided on considering the 

formation of a gap at the base of cantilever I-walls and shear strength variations 

between the centerline and inboard toe of levees used in combination with I-walls. 

q. Storm Surge and Wave analysis results for Katrina and historical storms—December 2005. Information pertaining to modeled Katrina storm surge and wave 

heights and periods for various locations along the HPS was provided to TFG. In 

addition, modeled surge and wave results from other historical storms were also 

provided. 

r. Review comments on canal closure structures—December 2005 and January 

2006. IPET review comments for the outfall canal closure structures were provided 

to aid in development of high quality P&S for the closure structures. 

s. Provided comments in IPET Report 2 regarding comparison of Hurricane 

Katrina wave and period conditions with design values—March 2006. Design wave 

conditions, particularly wave period, should be re-evaluated for the east-facing levees in east Orleans, St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes. 

t. Closure Structures Modeling—January-February 2006. IPET members at MVN 

performed modeling analysis of the closure structures on 17th Street, Orleans and 

London Ave Canals. 

u. MRGO White Paper—March 2006. Input on analysis of MRGO effect on storm 

propagation into metropolitan New Orleans and vicinity. 

v. Criteria for Assessment of I-Walls—March 2006 and ongoing-IPET members 

met with TFG to examine the results of performance analysis to date on 17th Street 

and London Avenue Canals. Criteria were developed to assess the integrity of the 

remaining sections of I-walls that were not severely damaged during Katrina. These 

criteria are currently being used determine the condition of non-damaged areas and 

to develop approaches to increase the resilience of these sections as necessary to increase protection for the next hurricane season. 

RESPONSES BY LEWIS E. LINK TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR JEFFORDS

Question 1. I have attached testimony provided to the Senate Homeland Security 

and Government Affairs Committee in 2005 regarding the potential causes of levee 

failures. 

[The referenced testimony can be found on page 96.] 

Can you describe how your findings in the IPET report differ from these findings, 

what data you used to draw your conclusions, and the main reasons why you 

reached the conclusions presented in the IPET report? Please provide any documents for the record that you believe are pertinent to the answer to this question. 

Response. 

FINDINGS

The referenced testimony (November 2005 to Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee concerning Katrina) reflects, with the exception of a few 

observations noted below, reasonable conclusions given the level of information 

available at the time. This statement is in reference to the written submissions only. 

It is important to note that this testimony was based on observations without the 

benefit of analysis. As such, many of the stipulations are general in nature, but lack 

the specific facts and depth of understanding necessary for effecting repairs or re-
68 

constitution of protection. That was the driving force for the initiation of the more 

in-depth analyses that the IPET and others pursued following the initial data gathering phase that this testimony represents. Those statements made during the testimony that are based on more complete information are inaccurate as follows: 

LSU-Comment about prior pushing, pulling, and pushing sheet piles at 17th 

Street Canal greatly weakening the soils: There is no evidence that this activity had 

any influence on soil strength. 

LSU-Comment about potential of a lateral flow of water under the piling from the 

canal contributed to the failure at 17th Street: There was no evidence of lateral 

water flow under the sheet pile. The clay soils under the sheet pile do not support 

water flow. 

LSU-Comment about levee wall segments adjacent to breach were not interlocked 

and a number seemingly sheared off their piling foundation: The floodwall interlocks 

were designed as water stops, not structural elements. They, in fact, performed beyond expectations with regard to separation. We found little or no evidence of the 

floodwalls shearing off the sheet piles. Numerous segments of wall and sheet pile 

were recovered at the breach sites and none demonstrated this behavior. 

LSU-Statement about ‘‘highly organic soil was used to create the levee embankment’’: The levee embankment was constructed of clay materials of reasonable quality. The clay embankment of the levee was constructed on a peat layer that 

underlies the region. 

LSU-Statement that sheet pile at 17th Street Canal should have been driven 60 

feet. below sea level: There is no basis for this statement. The clay soils at the site 

prevented under seepage which would have been the major reason for deeper sheet 

piles. Deeper sheet piles may have helped at the London Avenue breach sites which 

were built in sand. 

LSU-Comment concerning London Avenue Canal west breach stating that sheet 

piling on east side of breach were driven 26 feet and only 11.4 feet on west side: 

More accurate sheet pile measurements have been made and documented in the 

IPET report. The speculation of sheet piles being shorter than the specified by the 

design was shown to be false when a number of the sheet piles were pulled to confirm their measurements. All depths were in accordance with design specifications. 

IPET analyses were accomplished by a task force of experts from 25 Universities, 

23 private sector firms, and Government agencies. All IPET plans, processes and results were reviewed as they were developed by the American society of Civil Engineers External Review Panel, providing confidence in immediately putting findings 

and lessons learned to work in the repair and reconstitution of hurricane protection 

in New Orleans. As such, the IPET results have been reviewed and applied as they 

were developed and are essentially already in the ground in the repairs accomplished and imbedded in the processes being used to recover and complete the system and examine higher levels of protection. 

The following are more specific facts based on the in-depth IPET analyses and 

validated by the ASCE External Review Panel. These facts are documented in IPET 

Draft Final Report available as of 1 June at https://ipet.wes.army.mil. 

Hurricane Protection System 

Rapid and variable subsidence caused significant loss of intended levels of protection, in some locations greater than 2 feet. 

A mis-interpretation of the relationship between local mean sea level and the geodetic datum resulted in some structures being constructed below (at times between 

1 to 2 feet) the design elevations. 

With the exception of the structures constructed below design elevations due to 

mis-interpretation of the local datum, the structures were built largely as designed. 

Levees built with hydraulic fill were intended to use that material with a clay cap 

layer to provide erosion protection. The levees were not designed to withstand significant overtopping. All sheet piles sampled were driven to specified depths. All 

structural materials sampled were within specifications. 

Design methodologies used were typical for the time and local practice, as was the 

data used for the design. The designs were not conservative enough to deal with 

the unknown or unanticipated conditions and mechanisms. 

No changes to the original designs were made to accommodate re-definition of the 

hazard (1979) or discovery of datum changes (1984). 

The piecemeal design and construction of the protection system over a period of 

decades, yet unfinished, resulted in inconsistent levels of protection and prevented 

the composite of the hurricane protection structures and measures from performing 

as a system. 
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Storm 

Hurricane Katrina generated the largest storm surge measured in North America, 

which along with a severe wave environment, overwhelmed structures to the east 

and southeast of New Orleans. 

Katrina created the largest waves (55 feet) measured by a NOAA Buoy in the 

Gulf. 

The storm surge level varied considerably by location. The largest surge was experienced along the levees of St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes and the lowest 

along the south shore of Lake Pontchartrain. 

In many instances the combination of surge and waves far exceeded the design 

criteria for the structures. 

Wave heights, with a few exceptions, were comparable in amplitude to design assumptions. Wave periods, however, along the east side were about three times 

longer than that assumed for the designs. These long period waves dramatically increased wave run up and the duration of overtopping. 

Overtopping waves created high velocity water flow down the back sides of the 

levees creating large potential for erosion. Erosion potential on the back (protected) 

sides of the levees greatly exceeded that on the front (water facing) sides. 

Surge and wave conditions in the IHNC exceeded design levels. 

Surge and wave conditions within the drainage canals did not reach design levels. 

Performance 

Of the 50 major breaches, 46 were the result of overtopping and subsequent erosion of the levee itself, or the materials behind the floodwall causing instability and 

breaching. 

Structure elevations, lower than design intent due to subsidence, incompletion of 

the protection system and in some cases mis-interpretation of the local datum, 

added to the extent and impact of overtopping and breaching. 

Breaches in the levees primarily occurred due to erosion induced by the high velocities of waves overtopping the levees in areas with relatively thin clay caps over 

erodible (typically hydraulic fill) materials. Flow velocities were three times greater 

on the back sides of the levees than on the front (water facing) side. Erosion potential is directly proportional to velocity to the third power making the probability of 

erosion 27 times greater on the back (protected) side of the levee than on the front. 

There was little or no evidence of systemic erosion or breaching of levees from the 

water (front) side. 

Many levee sections that were built of erosion resistant materials were overtopped 

and did not breach. 

Four of the breaches occurred because of foundation failures, all involving I-walls 

and the deflection of the wall which compromised the stability of the levee floodwall 

structure leading to failure. These structures failed before water reached their design limits. The failure mechanism was not considered in the original design. 

A number of I-walls along the IHNC failed as a result of overtopping and erosion 

of soil materials behind them which reduced their stability. The overtopping in 

these areas was increased by the loss of protected elevation by subsidence. 

Transition areas from one type structure to another or between areas with different heights created weak spots and were prone to failure. 

The MRGO channel had little impact on the water levels experienced within the 

IHNC from Katrina. 

Flooding 

Flooding from Katrina covered almost 80 percent of New Orleans and vicinity. 

For Orleans and St. Bernard Parishes, approximately two-thirds of the flood volume entered the protected area through breaches. The remaining one-third was due 

to combination of rainfall and overtopping. 

Overall, breaching was the source of approximately half the total volume of flooding. 

Pump stations, due to their inoperability during the storm, contributed little to 

the reduction in flooding. Their inoperability after the storm considerably lengthened the time required for dewatering. 

Residential areas experienced the majority of the flooding. 

Consequences 

The most serious consequence of Katrina was the high number of fatalities, most 

associated with residential areas. 

While a large number of people were able to evacuate, the groups least likely to 

be able to do so on their own, the poor, elderly and disabled, were hardest hit. 
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1ASCE, founded in 1852, is the country’s oldest national civil engineering organization. It represents more than 139,000 civil engineers in private practice, government, industry, and academia who are dedicated to the advancement of the science and profession of civil engineering. 

ASCE is a 501(c) (3) non-profit educational and professional society. 

Approximately half of the direct property losses, excluding public infrastructure, 

can be associated with flooding from levee and floodwall breaches. 

Katrina caused over $20 billion in direct property damages, residential areas experienced 78 percent of the total. There was an additional $6 to $7 billion in losses 

to public infrastructure. 

Combined with the displacement of population, workforce and businesses, the impacts to infrastructure and affiliated public services will contribute to a slowed recovery. 

The flooding caused a breakdown in New Orleans’ social structure, a loss of cultural heritage, and dramatically altered the physical, economic, political, social and 

psychological character of the area. 

Risk 

The risk analysis is currently being reviewed and will be provided soon through 

the IPET website. This information will define the relative vulnerability of areas to 

future flooding and the sources of that vulnerability. It will also provide a systemwide analytical platform for assessing alternative approaches to providing higher 

levels of protection to the New Orleans area. The risk methodology and related information bases are being transitioned to be a component of the Louisiana Coastal 

Protection and Restoration Study. 

DATA AND RATIONALE

The data used to reach these findings are extensive and comprehensive. They 

have been organized and managed through an extensive information management 

effort that has acquired, evaluated, validated and maintained the information to ensure IPET analyses were using quality inputs. This repository was also the resource 

used to provide information for the IPET public web site which currently comprises 

well over 4,300 documents. Much of the data used in the analyses came from a wide 

variety of sources but none as significant as the extensive records of the corps New 

Orleans District and other Government offices. These data were used to drive models and analyses that generated new information that were input to the analyses 

for determining findings and lessons learned. The most advanced analytical methods 

and tools were used in the analyses, including the DOD’s most sophisticated super 

computers, the largest centrifuge in the world and the most capable hydrodynamic 

computer codes. It was common to take multiple and independent approaches to determine critical information such as the failure modes of the breach sites. Extensive 

field observations were commonly compared to detailed computer model results, 

physical modeling and experiments to ensure that the mechanisms identified were 

confirmed by multiple approaches. In addition, similar analyses were accomplished 

by separate groups to provide two perspectives on the results. This was the case for 

both the centrifuge and numerical stability analyses of floodwall performance. The 

redundancy in analysis was essential in that the results, following peer review by 

ASCE, were being directly applied to the repairs of the damaged sections of the hurricane protection system and to the evaluation of the undamaged sections to ensure 

their integrity for the coming hurricane season. I submit to the committee (CD attached), for incorporation into the record, the IPET Draft Final Report as documentation of the full details of the data and methods used to achieve and validate 

the IPET findings. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS L. JACKSON, P.E., F.ASCE, D. WRE, PAST PRESIDENT, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS AND SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, DMJM HARRIS

(RET.) 

Good morning. My name is Thomas Jackson, and I am pleased to appear before 

you today to testify on behalf of the American Society of Civil Engineers1 (ASCE) 

as you examine the current status of the reconstruction of New Orleans’ levees. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: 

I am a past president of ASCE and currently serve on ASCE’s External Review 

Panel, or ERP. The role of the ERP—which is composed of 14 specialists who possess a range of technical expertise—is to provide an objective, independent technical 

review of the Internal Performance Evaluation Team’s activities which is carrying 
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2Hurricane Katrina was a catastrophic storm that made landfall in the Gulf Coast near the 

Louisiana and Mississippi border with wind speeds near 150 mph. Flooding, not high winds, was 

the principal cause of damage in New Orleans following the failure of numerous levees in and 

around the city. For an analysis of the hurricane and its impact on the levee system in New 

Orleans, see THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS AND THE NATIONAL 

SCIENCE FOUNDATION, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE NEW 

ORLEANS LEVEE SYSTEMS IN HURRICANE KATRINA ON AUGUST 29, 2005 (Nov. 2, 

2005) at http://www.asce.org/files/pdf/katrina/teamdatareport1121.pdf. 

out an assessment of the performance of the flood-control levees in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina.2

As engineers, our paramount concern is for the safety, health, and welfare of the 

public. We have learned a great deal from the tragedy of New Orleans, lessons that 

we hope will allow us to prevent future loss of life and property in Louisiana and 

elsewhere. We support federal, state, and local agency efforts to ensure that all infrastructure systems are (1) robust, i.e., strong enough and reliable enough to do 

the job; (2) contain 

redundant systems to prevent total system failure; and (3) are resilient enough 

to allow them to be quickly repaired when the inevitable failures within large, interdependent systems do occur. 

Let me begin by saying that the lines of communication between the IPET and 

the ERP are functioning extremely well, and a good working relationship has been 

established. Since November, the ERP has provided the IPET with hundreds of comments, questions, and suggestions on a continuing basis. The IPET has considered 

all of the ERP’s comments and most have already been incorporated into the IPET’s 

work plan. We thank the IPET for its commitment to making good use of an independent review panel on a real-time basis to identify needed course corrections to 

ensure that the outcome is a robust, credible, and defensible performance evaluation. 

The ERP is currently in the midst of its detailed review of IPET Report 2. This 

review follows on two-and-one-half days of meetings with IPET at the Engineer Research and Development Center in Vicksburg a little over a month ago. On March 

23, 2006 we delivered a letter to General Strock, Chief of Engineers which noted 

several key concerns that the ERP has identified at this stage of the performance 

evaluation. 

In general, the ERP finds that Report 2 represents an important, technically 

sound body of work. We are favorably impressed with many aspects of the studies 

that have been made, including the piecing together of information to present a 

clear picture of the physical events during Hurricane Katrina. We generally concur 

with the technical data, methods of analysis, and technical findings presented in Report 2. The ERP notes that particularly good progress has been made in several key 

areas including: 

1. Defining the storm characteristics. 

2. Hydraulic modeling of storms. 

3. Linkage of eyewitness accounts, data, and computer modeling results. 

4. Definition of a datum and vertical elevation adjustments relative to local mean 

sea level. 

5. Investigation of failure mechanisms at the 17th Street Canal. 

Two key factors identified by IPET apparently played major roles in the 17th 

Street Canal failure: 

1 The formation of a gap between the sheetpile wall and the canal-side embankment as the water in the canal rose, which enabled development of full hydrostatic 

pressure against the wall. The formation of this water-filled gap was apparently not 

considered in design. 

2 The presence of low-strength clay in the backyards on the protected side of the 

floodwall. Strengths used in design were apparently obtained from samples taken 

near the centerline of the levee, which had the benefit of significantly more overburden pressure than the clay layer in the backyards. 

The ERP is looking forward to seeing the results of additional analyses, which are 

planned for the 17th Street Canal, including finite element modeling and additional 

centrifuge testing. The ERP is particularly encouraged by one of the key outcomes 

to date of the analysis of the failure at the 17th Street Canal—that is the development of a rational, analytical process that will enable a more reliable evaluation of 

the stability of other reaches of floodwall, particularly those that may show no outward signs of distress following Katrina and Rita. Clearly, the importance of hydrostatic loading and the need to adjust the strength of the clay to account for the effect of overburden pressure will be crucial to gaining confidence in the ability of 

other reaches of floodwall to withstand the loads that we saw during Katrina. 
72 

Since the recent meeting in Vicksburg, the ERP has taken the opportunity to review IPET Report 2 in greater detail. At this time, there appear to be a number 

of key lessons learned, which must be taken into account by Task Force Guardian, 

and in any analysis that looks to develop a system that will be able to withstand 

Category 4 or 5 hurricanes in the future. The ERP’s immediate attention is focused 

on three main areas of potential lessons learned. 

First, we are concerned about an apparent aggressive design approach, which may 

not have been warranted for a water-holding structure of this importance. It appears that at nearly every step of the way, the envelope was pushed. Let me explain. The target factor of safety was apparently 1.3 for design, which may be on 

the low side for structures whose failures were capable of causing death and widespread destruction. Against this backdrop, quite optimistic soil strengths were selected despite: 

1. The fact that the local geology suggested that conditions would be highly variable, even over relatively short distances. For example, the analysis of the 17th 

Street Canal failure suggests that natural variations in soils strengths lead to factors of safety about 20-30 percent higher just north and south of the failure zone. 

2. The fact that soil conditions and strengths were taken from widely spaced borings that were concentrated along the centerline of the levees. 

3. The fact that soil strengths in the backyards were not adjusted to account for 

the reduction in overburden pressures. 

In addition, the forces on the wall did not apparently include the possibility that 

full hydrostatic loads could develop through the formation of a simple gap caused 

by the wall moving away from canal-side embankment as the water in the canal 

rose above normal levels. 

Second, there may have been problems associated with handoffs during the design 

process, or at interfaces between key players in the design. For example, were potential limitations in soil strength clearly communicated between the geotechnical 

team and the floodwall design team? Were concerns about hydrostatic loading on 

the wall clearly communicated and considered? How would the system have performed if the sheetpiles had been driven to greater depths? 

Third, how was the corps’ quality assurance/quality control process followed during design? If, for a structure of this importance, techniques such as independent 

peer review or use of a Board of Consultants had been used, would the performance 

been different? 

These concerns merit in-depth assessment to document lessons learned and to 

provide for ways to move forward that incorporate those lessons learned. The ERP 

will be looking into these matters. 

In our review of IPET Report 1, the ERP commented on four critical areas that 

may go beyond IPET’s scope. The ERP is pleased that the Corps is making progress 

on two these issues. First, the organizational complexities and lack of centralized, 

comprehensive management at the local, state, and federal levels are apparently 

being addressed. Second, issues associated with treating the hurricane protection facilities as a complex and interdependent system are also apparently being addressed. For example, closing off the three drainage canals and moving the pump 

stations to Lake Pontchartrain is a step in the right direction. The 17th Street 

Canal failure analysis certainly strengthens case for doing so. 

The ERP is concerned that there has been apparently little progress on two other 

issues. First is protection from overtopping. The breaches were catastrophic, and 

some overtopping is far better than overtopping with breaching. The hurricane protection system needs to be resilient in a way that overtopping could occur without 

causing catastrophic failure. 

Second, the ERP remains concerned about the way the system was conceived and 

developed. For example, how were life safety and risk factored into the design methodology, such as selection of the factor of safety? It appears that for the 17th Street 

Canal failure section, decisions made at several stages of the design process were 

played too close to the margins. By this I mean that assumptions and decisions were 

apparently not as conservative as they should have been, particularly given the 

grave consequences of the levee failure. In the end, the design did not adequately 

account for the uncertainties and variabilities inherent in such a complex system. 

In summary, there are important lessons to be learned for flood protection systems in New Orleans and perhaps other cities and states. There are at least six key 

lessons to date: 

1. Design methodology and selection of factors of safety for critical structures— 

what is the appropriate value for levees in the future? 

2. Selection of soil strengths and accounting for variability. 

3. The importance of water and considerations of hydrostatic loading. 
73 

4. Selection of sheetpile depths. 

5. The need for clear communications at handoffs and interfaces. 

6. QA/QC procedures and peer review. 

Based on the findings discussed above, the ERP recommends the following actions 

be undertaken, with urgency, for levees and floodwalls in New Orleans and perhaps 

elsewhere in the Nation: 

A. All I-walls should be re-evaluated for current design loadings assuming a 

water-filled gap along the flood side of the wall. 

B. All levees underlain by soft soils should be reevaluated for current design loadings accounting for reduced shear strength of soil in areas at or beyond the toe of 

the levee. 

C. All levees and floodwalls should be reevaluated to identify those areas with a 

questionable degree of conservatism inherent in the design process, and those sections of concern reanalyzed for current design loadings employing an appropriate degree of conservatism. 

D. A risk-based approach toward defining the design hurricane conditions is needed. We advise the Corps to proceed as quickly as possible toward redefining the 

standard project hurricane using principles and practices similar to those used in 

establishing design criteria for other infrequent but potentially catastrophic natural 

disasters such as earthquakes and floods. 

E. External peer review is an important component of design practice for all critical life-safety structures. We recommend that the steps described above receive external peer review throughout the design process. 

In closing the ERP will continue evaluating IPET’s Report 2, and will issue its 

own report in the coming weeks.. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That concludes my testimony. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have. 

STATEMENT OF CARLTON DUFRECHOU, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN

BASIN FOUNDATION

Mr. Chairman, Senator Vitter, members of the Senate Environment and Public 

Works Committee, I am Carlton Dufrechou, the Executive Director of the Lake 

Pontchartrain Basin Foundation (LPBF). On behalf of the Pontchartrain Basin 

Foundation and the citizens of south east Louisiana, thank you for the opportunity 

to speak with you about sustainable hurricane protection for our region. 

The LPBF is a private, non-profit organization created by the Louisiana State 

Legislature in 1989, to coordinate the restoration and preservation of the water 

quality and habitats of the 10,000 square mile Pontchartrain Basin. Our primary 

role is to act as a spokesperson for Basin citizens and as a catalyst to develop and 

initiate restoration programs and activities. 

Personally, I am a native of New Orleans. My education is in engineering. Earlier 

in my career, I worked with the Corps of Engineers (COE) as a planner and project 

manager. Since 1992, I have been with the Lake Pontchartrain Basin Foundation. 

Some events and dates like September 11, 2001, are etched in our lives. One of 

those for me is Hurricane Betsy and 1965. In 1965, I was 9 years old. We lived on 

Bellaire Drive, just a few blocks from what 40 years later would become the infamous breach of the 17th Street Canal floodwall. In 1965, the floodwall did not exist. 

Only a small levee, one barely above my height then, paralleling the canal, protected our home. Our lakefront levees were not much higher. Betsy left me with 

many memories. I recall how, as the storm approached my father and uncle, an architect and engineer respectively, discussed the possibility of the levees being overtopped and flooding. I remember how we left our home and went to ride out the 

storm with my godfather who lived in an older and higher section of the city. I recall 

the darkness and howling winds and rains as we huddled in the center hallway that 

night. I remember the next morning when my dad returned from checking on our 

house and said that we could go home—that the levees had held in our neighborhood. I remember learning that others were not as fortunate-that much of St. Bernard and the 9th Ward had flooded—that the destruction and losses were tremendous. 

Over the next decades, to prevent a reoccurrence of Betsy’s devastation, levees are 

raised and floodwalls are built. Some were raised as high as 17 feet on the lakefront. This became the hurricane protection system for metro New Orleans. 

For the next 40 years, almost to the day, it seemed to work. 

Then another event like September 11 or the death of President Kennedy was 

etched in our lives-Hurricane Katrina. It directly impacted one million plus and indirectly impacted the economy of America. 
74 

Although while in the Gulf, Katrina was a geographically larger and more powerful storm than Betsy, much about the two storms was alike. Both crossed just east 

of New Orleans and both were Category 3 hurricanes as they passed the latitude 

of the city. But Katrina’s devastation was orders of magnitude greater than Betsy. 

There was one other very significant difference-our coast. Forty years ago it was 

still strong. 

Louisiana’s coast has always been the New Orleans region’s first line of defense 

against hurricanes. In recent years, we’ve recognized that more. Unfortunately, almost 40 years ago when our present hurricane protection system was designed, 

many did not. 

For our region to be sustainable, hurricane protection for the future must change. 

A major hurtle will be changing the way our agencies operate. Navigation and 

transportation projects have traditionally been developed and implemented independently from hurricane projection and coastal restoration. The result of this independent project development has been tragic for our region. The most conspicuous 

example in the Pontchartrain Basin is the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO). 

This deep draft navigation channel has drastically altered our coast. It cut a channel 40 miles long perpendicular to the coast breaching our natural lines of defense 

against hurricanes. The MRGO was completed in 1965, the same year as Hurricane 

Betsy. Many attribute flooding from Betsy to the MRGO. The MRGO did more. It 

changed the coastal hydrology and ecology. These changes acted like a cancer, progressively eating away at coastal wetlands. After 40 years of coastal disintegration, 

it is no coincidence that the impacts of Katrina were horrific to our region. The 

MRGO must go. 

Yet, our lead hurricane protection agency, the COE, is unable is act. The MRGO 

is a federally authorized project that Congress has directed the COE to maintain 

for deep draft ship operations. They have their orders and their hands are tied. Congress can change those orders by deauthorizing the MRGO. The MRGO is a clear 

and present danger to our region. Please deauthorize it immediately. 

We must consider the big picture for all future hurricane protection. We need 

stronger levees and floodwalls but they are not enough. Coastal restoration, our first 

line of defense, must be integrated into hurricane protection. Recognizing this, the 

Multiple Lines of Defense Strategy was developed. In the simplest terms, this strategy shows how natural features of our coast like barrier islands, marshes, and 

ridges compliment engineered features like levees to protect the greater New Orleans region from hurricanes. Applying this strategy, 10 coastal restoration project 

areas were identified. These are the 10 Pontchartrain Coastal Lines of Defense (attached). They include restoring the Chandeluer barrier islands, maintaining marsh 

land bridges, restoring natural ridges like Bayou La Loutre, reintroductions of Mississippi River water, and others. Our goal is to mimic nature by restoring the 

plumbing of the coast. The outcome is a self-sustaining coast. The total coast is $1 

billion. The investment is significant but it will secure the future of our region and 

secure continued economic benefits to America for perpetuity. 

We know what to do and we have the expertise. Stronger levees plus a stronger 

coast will provide the hurricane protection we desperately needed. 

RESPONSE BY CARLTON DUFRECHOU TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION FROM

SENATOR JEFFORDS

Question. In your written testimony, you discussed briefly the Multiple Lines of 

Defense Strategy and the 10 coastal restoration projects that are part of that strategy. Can you elaborate on each of these projects and how their implementation 

would provide additional hurricane protection? 

Response. 
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STATEMENT OF SANDY ROSENTHAL, FOUNDER, LEVEES.ORG

I am Sandy Rosenthal the Founder of Levees.Org. We are a non-partisan grassroots group formed in 2005 after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. We have over 3,200 

members and our website has hosted over 22,000 unique visitors. We say the destruction that the citizens of New Orleans and southern Louisiana suffered was due 

to disastrous design and planning mistakes by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 

We hold the corps accountable for what is inarguably the worse engineering disaster 

in American history. 

The IPET interim reports, ERP letter in response to IPET Interim Report No. 2 

and the NSF interim reports have all pointed to improper engineering by the 

USACOE which led to the breach at the 17th Street Canal at surge levels well 

below design heights. We expect similar findings to emerge as regards the two 

breaches at the London Ave Canal floodwall and the many breaches of the IHNC 

floodwalls. 

However, the problems with the USACOA and the Federal process of funding and 

building flood protection run much deeper than the technicality of engineering errors. 

The USACOE: 

• Designed to the wrong storm. The Standard Project Hurricane (SPH) was supposed to be the most severe storm reasonably characteristic of the region. In 1965 

the USACOA chose a 100 mph storm. By 1972 the National Weather Service had 

informed the corps that new data showed this standard was insufficient. The corps 

did nothing. 

• Used the wrong safety margin. The 1.3 safety margin is not appropriate for 

structures protecting the lives and property of a major city. The corps should have 

easily known this. 

• Used the wrong cost-benefit analysis. No value was given to life. Little value 

has given to protecting developed property. This is not how to protect thousands of 

lives and tens of billions of exposed property. 

• Failed to account for overtopping. This issue was obvious and is considered a 

basic issue in flood protection. Now, post-Katrina, the corps has made and urgent 

request for funds to protect the levees and floodwalls from scouring due to overtopping. But, where was the urgency these past 40 years? 

• Never finished the IHNC West floodwall. This floodwall was essential to the 

protection of the City of New Orleans west of the IHNC. It is incredible that 6 miles 

of critical floodwall was not completed in 40 years. It is probable that the failure 

to complete the IHNC floodwall protection doomed the City even if no breaches had 

occurred. The corps will say they were not fully funded to complete this project. 

Such an excuse is utter nonsense. The USACOA understood the importance of this 

project and should have been screening for full funding. 

As citizens of Louisiana, we have no faith in the USACOE. The corps confuses 

‘‘authorization’’ and ‘‘funding’’ with mission. They have no sense of urgency. And, 

it has become obvious that they engineer to the money available rather than to the 

reasonable engineering standards that are required to protect lives and property. 

There are four keys to reforming the USACOE and to providing adequate flood 

protection for the citizens of Southeast Louisiana. 

1. The corps must have a clearly defined mission. That mission should be flood 

protection for the lives and property of Louisiana’s citizens. 

2. The Corps must have a clear sense of urgency. 

3. All corps work must be subject to Peer Review. This review must be concurrent 

to prevent unnecessary delays. It must also be objective and challenging, not a comfortable relationship. 

4. A dedicated source of annual funding must be established. We suggest Louisiana’s flood protection should be funded from the royalties on the State’s onshore and 

offshore oil and gas production. This way, citizens’ safety is not subject to annual 

congressional budgetary review. 

Thank you for accepting our testimony on behalf of the citizens of Louisiana. 
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