PRESENT: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, and 

Kinser, JJ., and Gordon, Retired Justice 

FALLS CHURCH CONSTRUCTION 

COMPANY, ET AL. 

v. Record No. 962627 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 

 October 31, 1997 

ROBERT C. LAIDLER 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 In this appeal, we consider whether an employee's 

intentional concealment of a material fact on an employment 

application bars his receipt of workers' compensation benefits 

for a work-related injury. 

 Falls Church Construction Company (the Company) hired Robert 

C. Laidler in June 1992. Prior to his employment, Laidler 

completed a job application which required that he state whether 

he had ever been "charged or convicted of a felony or any crime." 

 In response to this question, Laidler wrote "No." Approximately 

eight weeks later, the Company fired Laidler for absenteeism. 

 In May 1993, the Company rehired Laidler and, according to 

its policy, requested that he complete a second employment 

application that was identical to the first application. Laidler 

failed to respond to several questions on the second application, 

including the question concerning his prior criminal record. 

 The Company's human resources representative, Beverly Ann 

Spaulding, reviewed Laidler's first employment application and 

did not ask Laidler to complete the unanswered questions in the 

second application. After noting that all the completed answers 

in the second application were the same as those in the first 

application, Spaulding assumed that the answer in the first 
application regarding Laidler's criminal record remained the 

same. 

 In July 1993, Laidler sustained a work-related lumbar strain 

while employed by the Company and, pursuant to an agreement by 

the parties, the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission 

(Commission) entered an order providing for payment of temporary 

total disability benefits during certain periods in 1993. 

Laidler filed a change of condition application in March 1994, 

alleging that he was entitled to a resumption of disability 

benefits. 

 In answers to interrogatories filed in that proceeding, 

Laidler disclosed that he was convicted of breaking and entering 

in 1978 and had "served" two years probation. The Company 

defended Laidler's claim for a resumption of benefits on the 

ground that he had materially misrepresented his criminal record 

in his second job application. 

 At a hearing in January 1995, Spaulding testified that 

Laidler would not have been rehired if the Company had known 

about his criminal record. Spaulding further stated that, if the 

Company had learned of Laidler's criminal record prior to his 

injury, that fact would have been ground for his termination. 

Spaulding explained that the Company performed a large amount of 

work under government contracts and, therefore, it was 

particularly important that the Company's employees be 

trustworthy. 

 Laidler testified that, although he had been charged with 

breaking and entering, he was convicted of the misdemeanor 
offense of "unlawful entry." Laidler admitted, however, that his 

response on the first employment application to the question 

about his criminal record was false. 

 The Commission held that the Company had not met its burden 

of proving that it relied on Laidler's misrepresentation in 

rehiring him. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's 

decision, holding that the record supported both the Commission's 

"implicit credibility finding" which rejected Spaulding's 

testimony, and the Commission's ultimate conclusion that the 

Company failed to prove reliance on Laidler's misrepresentation. 

 In its appeal to this Court, the Company argues that the 

Court of Appeals' decision is contrary to that of Marval Poultry 

Co. v. Johnson, 224 Va. 597, 601, 299 S.E.2d 343, 346 (1983). 

The Company asserts that the holding in Marval eliminated the 

requirement that an employer seeking to bar an employee's receipt 

of workers' compensation based on his false representation in an 

employment application prove reliance on the misrepresentation 

and a causal connection between the misrepresentation and the 

work-related injury. Thus, the Company contends that proof of a 

misrepresentation alone will bar a claimant from receiving 

workers' compensation benefits. Alternatively, the Company 

contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the 

Company failed to prove it relied on Laidler's misrepresentation 

in rehiring him. We disagree with both arguments. 

 An employee's false representation in an employment 

application will bar a later claim for workers' compensation 

benefits if the employer proves that 1) the employee 
intentionally made a material false representation; 2) the 

employer relied on that misrepresentation; 3) the employer's 

reliance resulted in the consequent injury; and 4) there is a 

causal relationship between the injury in question and the 

misrepresentation. See, e.g., Billy v. Lopez, 17 Va. App. 1, 4, 

434 S.E.2d 908, 910 (1993); Grimes v. Shenandoah Valley Press, 12 

Va. App. 665, 667, 406 S.E.2d 407, 409 (1991); McDaniel v. 

Colonial Mechanical Corp., 3 Va. App. 408, 411-12, 350 S.E.2d 

225, 227 (1986); 3 Arthur Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation 

Law § 47.53 (1997). 

 As a threshold matter, we find no merit in the Company's 

argument that the Marval decision eliminated from the false 

representation defense the requirements that the employer 

establish reliance and a causal relationship between the 

misrepresentation and the work-related injury. Our holding in 

Marval did not address issues of reliance or causation. Rather, 

we held only that the justified termination of an employee for 

dishonesty barred his later claim for benefits under a change in 

condition application. 224 Va. at 601, 299 S.E.2d at 345. 

 In the present case, Laidler was not terminated from his 

employment after he was rehired in May 1993. The only issue 

before us is whether the Company established the defense of false 

representation, barring Laidler's claim for further compensation 

benefits. We conclude that the Company's failure to prove the 

element of reliance defeated its defense. 

 We agree with the Court of Appeals' determination that 

Laidler knowingly made a false representation about his criminal 
record in the second application by failing to answer the 

relevant question. The concealment of a material fact on an 

employment application constitutes the same misrepresentation as 

if the existence of the fact were expressly denied. See Virginia 

Natural Gas Co. v. Hamilton, 249 Va. 449, 455, 457 S.E.2d 17, 21 

(1995); Van Deusen v. Snead, 247 Va. 324, 328, 441 S.E.2d 207, 

209-10 (1994); Metrocall of Delaware v. Continental Cellular, 246 

Va. 365, 374, 437 S.E.2d 189, 193 (1993). The evidence showed 

that Laidler's concealment was intentional since he gave a false 

answer to the same question on the first application. Further, 

the false representation was material because it was highly 

relevant to Laidler's trustworthiness as an employee. 

 Since the Company established that Laidler misrepresented 

his criminal record on the second employment application, we next 

consider the element of reliance. We review the evidence of 

reliance in the context of the Court of Appeals' holding that 

credible evidence supported the Commission's ruling. We are 

guided by the principle that the Commission's findings of fact, 

if supported by credible evidence, are conclusive and binding on 

appeal. See Code § 65.2-706; Ivey v. Puckett Constr. Co., 230 

Va. 486, 488, 338 S.E.2d 640, 641 (1986). 

 We conclude that the record supports the Court of Appeals' 

determination. Laidler submitted the second job application 

almost one year after the date of his first application. The 

Company made no attempt to secure the information sought in the 

unanswered questions on the second application form. Instead, 

the Company assumed that Laidler's responses to those unanswered 
questions would be the same as those given on his earlier 

application. Thus, there was credible evidence that the 

Company's decision to rehire Laidler was not made in reliance on 

his misrepresentation in the second application, but was founded 

on its assumption that he had no criminal record when he 

submitted the second application.*T

 Since the Company failed to prove the reliance element of 

its false representation defense, we need not consider the 

remaining elements of that defense, including the issue whether 

there was a causal relationship between the injury and the 

misrepresentation. Thus, we do not address the requirements for 

establishing a causal relationship between an injury and a 

misrepresentation under a false representation defense. 

 Based on the above evidence, we conclude that the Court of 

Appeals properly affirmed the Commission's decision. See Code 

§ 65.2-706. Therefore, we will affirm the Court of Appeals' 

judgment. 

Affirmed.

 

 *We find no merit in the Company's argument that reliance 

was established by Laidler's statement before the Court of 

Appeals that the information provided in the second application 

was submitted "to be relied upon for his second period of 

employment." Evidence of Laidler's intent does not furnish proof 

that the Company actually relied on the misrepresentation in the 

second application.