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1

37–322 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–44]

HEARING

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED

PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FOR MILITARY SPACE

ACTIVITIES

HEARING HELD

MARCH 23, 2007

(II)

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California, Chairman

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas

RICK LARSEN, Washington

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama

ADRIENNE RAMSAY, Professional Staff Member

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member

JASON HAGADORN, Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2007

Page

HEARING:

Friday, March 23, 2007, Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization

Act—Budget Request for Military Space Activities ........................................... 1

APPENDIX:

Friday, March 23, 2007 ........................................................................................... 33

FRIDAY, MARCH 23, 2007

FISCAL YEAR 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—

BUDGET REQUEST FOR MILITARY SPACE ACTIVITIES

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Everett, Hon. Terry, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Member, Strategic Forces Subcommittee .................................................................................. 3

Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., a Representative from California, Chairman, Strategic Forces Subcommittee ..................................................................................... 1

WITNESSES

Chilton, General Kevin P., Commander, Air Force Space Command ................. 12

Kerr, Dr. Donald M., Director, National Reconnaissance Office ......................... 8

Sega, Dr. Ronald M., Under Secretary of the Air Force ....................................... 5

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Chilton, General Kevin P. ................................................................................ 67

Kerr, Dr. Donald M. ......................................................................................... 54

Sega, Dr. Ronald M. ......................................................................................... 37

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Mr. Bartlett ....................................................................................................... 104

Mr. Everett ........................................................................................................ 99

(1)

FISCAL YEAR 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR MILITARY SPACE

ACTIVITIES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE,

Washington, DC, Friday, March 23, 2007.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:00 a.m., in room

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ellen Tauscher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Ms. TAUSCHER. The hearing will come to order.

The Strategic Forces Subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on national security space activities from the Under Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. Ronald Sega; the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Dr. Donald Kerr; and the

Commander of Air Force Space Command, General Kevin P.

Chilton.

I want to thank each of our distinguished witnesses for being

here today.

This hearing is a very important opportunity for the subcommittee to consider the posture of our Nation’s space assets and to reflect on a recent event that has exposed the fragility of these systems. I am speaking of China’s test of a direct-ascent, kinetic kill

anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) on January 11, 2007.

The Chinese aimed this weapon at one of their own aging weather satellites and destroyed the target—creating a debris field of

thousands of lethal objects. This debris will remain in low-earth

orbit (LEO) and threaten satellites, the Space Shuttle, and the

International Space Station, for several decades.

The question now is: How should we respond?

The United States has been at this crossroads before. In the late

1980’s, the former Soviet Union and the United States unofficially

agreed to halt the development of weapons that target space assets.

This understanding arose, in large measure, from concerns about

the persistent debris fields created by a U.S. direct-ascent ASAT

test.

I am mindful of the head of United States Strategic Command

(USSTRATCOM), General Cartwright’s comments before the full

committee Wednesday, that not every problem in space requires a

solution in space, as well as his concern about a possible arms race

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in space. And I would appreciate your comments about his concerns.

However, today I would like to focus more narrowly on the status

of our current space assets. I want to make sure that my subcommittee, as well as the Department of Defense (DOD), are doing

everything we need to ensure that our warfighters retain the advantage of space-based systems, and that this advantage is not degraded by the Chinese test or other future attacks.

Future attacks might not come just from the likes of a kinetic

kill ASAT, but also from ground-based lasers and electronic

jammers. It is also possible that an enemy might directly attack

the ground-based components or communications links used by satellites. Our satellite capabilities may be vulnerable to attacks

through cyberspace, as well.

One of the most basic requirements for protecting our satellites,

which I am concerned has not been emphasized sufficiently, is to

know their current status and to understand the threats they face.

Today, I would ask the witnesses to address what we can do to

improve security as well as the situational awareness of our assets

on-orbit.

With an aging legacy generation of systems on-orbit, the national

security space community has been struggling to develop and field

a new generation of systems for the past decade.

Many of these systems have been plagued by inaccurate cost estimates and optimistic predictions of technical maturity. Some of the

programs have been required to be recertified as ‘‘critical to national security’’ after reaching Nunn-McCurdy statutory limits on

cost overruns.

Two programs that breached this statutory cap recently were

Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)-High and National Polar Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS).

I would like to know if our witnesses are concerned that other

programs in the space portfolio might breach this statutory cap this

year.

More generally, I am concerned that the space acquisition system

is broken, and I would ask our witnesses to discuss steps that we

can take to fix the process.

I am very well aware of the benefits space-based assets provide

to the warfighter, and I am committed to maintaining these capabilities without any gaps. Yet over the past few years, Congress

slowed the development of selected systems through the budget

process.

This has been due to concerns about the pace of these new programs and an emphasis on ‘‘transformational systems’’ designed to

skip a technological generation.

I would like to ask our witnesses today to address the relative

merit of proceeding with some of these new systems at a time when

we are becoming more aware of our shortfalls in the areas of Space

Situational Awareness (SSA) and the protection of our current assets.

While we have many questions, I want to assure you that the

Congress is committed to working with the Department and the intelligence community (IC) to put our national security space programs on an affordable, sustainable track—one which accounts for

3

the change in the threat environment and will protect our

warfighters and the American people.

Before we proceed, I would like to remind my colleagues and the

witnesses that we are in open session and to take care to keep our

questions and answers unclassified.

With that, I would like to thank the witnesses again for being

here today, and I look forward to your testimony.

As I told our witnesses, we are expecting some votes on the floor

and perhaps as soon as the next half-an-hour, and then perhaps

some votes later in the morning. And we would just suspend our

testimony and questioning until we can come back and finish it.

Now, I would like to recognize my very good friend and my colleague, the distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. Everett, and offer

him the time that he chooses for any comments he would like to

have.

Mr. Everett, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF HON. TERRY EVERETT, A REPRESENTATIVE

FROM ALABAMA, RANKING MEMBER, STRATEGIC FORCES

SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. Thank

you for your leadership in calling this meeting. It is extremely important. And I join you in welcoming our guests.

We thank you for your service and your leadership in the space

community.

Space is complex and requires our Nation’s best and brightest.

Please relay our gratitude to the men and women in your respective organizations for their dedication and hard work and the sacrifices that they make.

I have had a chance to talk with General Chilton about the reliance our troops have on space. He made the comment that once

you have it, you expect it. I think he is right on the mark.

And I believe that, as the threat grows, our military capabilities

advance on land and sea and air, cyberspace, and we must keep—

and in space itself—and we must keep pace. Space capabilities are

essential for nearly every military operation our forces undertake.

They also heavily contribute to our economy. In 2006, space capabilities contributed roughly $97 billion to the global economy. And

the annual growth is about seven percent a year. The Global Positioning System (GPS) industry alone contributed roughly $30 billion.

This is why the sustainment and modernization of our space capabilities and the infrastructure is so important. With much of the

baby boomer aerospace workforce beginning to retire, we must also

ensure that their expertise is passed on to younger generations.

I am deeply troubled by the Chinese ASAT satellite test that occurred in January. While we have discussed these threats in great

depth in classified briefings, I have a few comments to make here.

The test clearly sent a message that China has the ability to hold

our military and commercial satellites at risk. But it is not the only

threat to space.

As I have discussed in previous sessions, we must also pay attention to other threats, such as STRATCOM and GPS-jamming laVerDate 22-MAR-2001 14:03 Dec 08, 2008 Jkt 037322 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-44\082290.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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sers, orbital debris, space weather, and the threats to our ground

stations.

We must place emphasis on increasing our Space Situational

Awareness—something we have talked about often—and developing a comprehensive strategy for the protection of our space assets.

I also believe we must think strategically about the long-term implication these threats have on our Nation’s space architecture.

I look forward to hearing our witnesses’ thoughts on this.

The fiscal year 2008 budget request reflects a great deal of

thought and hard work, and we recognize the fiscal responsibilities

under which this budget was crafted. However, we have a responsibility to address some of the important issues that I would ask

our witnesses to discuss on the stand today.

Second, I would like to highlight a few areas that I am specifically interested in hearing about today.

Progress in space acquisition. We seem to repeat the same concerns about cost growth and program delays year after year. A

Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) study, commissioned

last year by this subcommittee, found that cost growth is due to the

tendency to start programs before knowing whether requirements

can be achieved within the available resources.

Have we turned the corner on such programs as SBIRS-High,

Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)—and Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)?

The newer programs, such as Transformational Communications

Satellite (TSAT), GPS–3 and Space Radar—what confidence do you

have that the acquisition strategies are executable, the technology

can be matured and the resource requirements are adequately understood?

Finally, the implementation status of the operational responses

phase, the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) program office,

which Mr. Secretary, as you know, myself and Mr. Reyes saw the

14th Air Force stand up out there last year. And ORS was a key

legislative provision for this subcommittee in last year’s bill.

Dr. Kerr, I am specifically interested in hearing about the following: NRO’s efforts to improve its space acquisition—the concerns I

outlined for Dr. Sega are equally applicable to your organization;

your thoughts on how NRO is providing support to the warfighting

community and areas where you believe this can be improved.

And General Chilton, I would like to hear your thoughts on

progress in our Nation’s space cadre and your efforts to recruit,

train and manage to the career path of our talented space professionals; the space capability needs and priorities of the combatant

commander and our forces in the field; your thoughts on the operational integration of space.

Finding new and better ways to leverage our space assets is critical to today’s battle. Initiatives such as ORS give us hope that we

can find innovative ways to acquire and afford new space systems

at a much lower cost.

Also, how space intelligence and SSA can be better integrated

with space satellite operations, providing near real-time support to

military users.

Finally, gentlemen, I would like to hear from each of you on efforts to enhance black and white space integration. Also, please disVerDate 22-MAR-2001 14:03 Dec 08, 2008 Jkt 037322 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-44\082290.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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cuss what contributions you and your organizations have made to

improving interagency collaboration across national security space.

Again, thank you for being here with us today. Your work is

critically important to our Nation. And I again thank our chairman

for calling this important hearing.

Thank you.

Ms. TAUSCHER. I thank the ranking member.

He has brought a lot of expertise and time to this effort, and I

thank him for the questions that he has embedded in his statement.

Dr. Sega, Dr. Kerr, General Chilton, first let me thank you and

your staff for the comprehensive statements that you not only submitted on time, but really provided us with a chance to get, I think,

at the learning curve that we intended to.

Your statements will be submitted to the record. If you could

summarize as best you can in five minutes or so what the salient

points of these statements are and perhaps begin to answer some

of the questions that the ranking member and I have put forward

in our statements, that would be great. And then, when members

arrive, we will begin our questioning and answering.

So, I will start with Dr. Sega. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF DR. RONALD M. SEGA, UNDER SECRETARY OF

THE AIR FORCE

Dr. SEGA. And thank you.

Madam Chair, Congressman Everett and distinguished members

of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today as the

Under Secretary of the Air Force and Department of Defense Executive Agent for Space to discuss a topic that is vital to our Nation

and national security space.

I thank you for submitting the statement for the record.

Ms. TAUSCHER. You are welcome.

Dr. SEGA. Over the last year we continued to focus on three

areas that I discussed with the committee last year: integration

across national security space, as well as with air, land, sea, and

cyberspace; getting back to basics in our acquisition of space programs; and the importance of ensuring the vitality and proficiency

of our space professionals and our science and engineering workforce.

I am pleased to report that we have made progress in all these

areas and are starting to see the benefits of this approach. In fact,

at this time, there is no Nunn-McCurdy breach in our space systems, nor do we foresee a Nunn-McCurdy breach this year in our

space programs.

I would like to highlight that we are working very hard to ensure

continuity of service and some key capabilities. These include: missile warning; strategic communications; and position, navigation

and timing.

The global rate of change of technology in the 21st century and

the number of nations directly engaged in space continues to increase. The capacity to contest space operations and capability is

also growing, as evidenced by the recent use of a kinetic ASAT

weapon.

6

As a result, we can no longer consider space to be a safe haven

or sanctuary, and Space Situational Awareness, as was pointed out,

has become increasingly important.

To enable us to better understand the activity in space is the key

element of us supporting and protecting our space capabilities.

ORS also has become more critically important to us. It provides

an opportunity for us to gain the ability to reconstitute quickly or

augment existing satellite constellations.

We have had several achievements across the DOD space portfolio in the last year. On March 8, 2007, we accomplished our 50th

consecutive successful operational launch of national security space

satellites. It is a national record. It far exceeds our previous record

of 42 set in the years 1968 to 1971.

We have made significant progress in Space-Based Infrared, the

SBIRS program. The first Highly Elliptical Orbit—HEO–1—SBIRS

payload was successfully launched last year and has met or exceeded all on-orbit performance expectations.

Several key tests were also conducted in the first SBIRS geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) satellite payload and spacecraft—in

preparation for launch in 2008.

Continue to emphasize the integration collaboration, not only

across the national space community, but also across functional

areas, such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR),

and among DOD entities and other Government agencies, industry,

academia, and Congress.

Our goal is to create partnerships. We believe they are essential

to delivering requirements on cost and on schedule and ensuring

appropriate funding stability for these programs.

We have continued to refine and implement the back-to-basics

initiative, as we discussed last year; promoting renewed emphasis

on increasing discipline in the development and stabilization requirements and resources; improving systems engineering practices

and management; improving standards and increasing the in-plant

presence of our workforce; and implementing a more deliberate acquisition planning strategy.

We have also established a goal of funding to a cost estimated

80 percent confidence, to help ensure space program success.

The back-to-basics approach is focused on mission success and

our space acquisition programs and is divided into four charts. I

refer to the chart here.

The foundational piece is science and technology. And the next

development in technology is technology development, systems development and then system production.

It is in the systems production where we are reducing risk, so

that we bring technologies on more mature. The acquisition cycle

time should be reduced, and we believe cost and schedule risk is

reduced.

The next generation is systems development, which is key and

very, very important to prepare for the next generation of a capability and the next generation’s development in science and technology.

Let me give you one example of how this is working on a major

acquisition program. One is GPS–3A.

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Through our requirements process, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has validated the block approach to the GPS–

3A satellite. It is important that we go beyond 2F to add another

frequency, L1C, compatible with Galileo, and additional power for

anti-jam in the M-Code, approximately a factor of 10 in power, and

a growth path forward for 3B and 3C.

Three-B will have crosslinks and additional capabilities. We will

work on them in parallel with developing the 3A satellite. When

that has matured, we will insert them and develop the 3B satellite

constellation.

In parallel with that, another generation, the spot beam is necessary for us doing the technology development work, which will

then mature to systems development and become the additional capability in GPS block 3C.

Meanwhile, the fundamentals of clocks, for example, needs to be

part of our science and technology program. So it is an investment

portfolio to assure us that we have position, navigation and timing

capability for our country going forward. So, this is what you see

in the budget today.

In July, Congressmen Everett and Reyes witnessed the standup

of the space development and test wing. That is in our product center, Space & Missiles System Center (SMC). And they do the systems development and the system production.

There, across the street from the Air Force research laboratory

that does science and technology and technology development, so

we can accelerate from an idea to a fielded system. And that is

kind of a core for our ORS work in Albuquerque.

Our example of that was the TacSat–2 satellite. Went out to see

that activity on Wallops Island a few days before it actually

launched. We made a decision to buy a Minotaur booster for that

satellite just seven months prior to it actually launching.

The team was from the Air Force, Army, Navy and National Air

& Space Administration (NASA). And it is on-orbit and doing well.

So, that is our first in a series of TacSat satellites. Part of ORS

and our ORS budget, as you see, has gone up significantly from our

2007 request to 2008.

The next capability I would like to talk very briefly about is that

of missile warning, missile defense, technical intelligence and battle space characterization—SBIRS.

Now, as we work on SBIRS—think of that in this block one approach—what follows SBIRS? That is the AIRSS program—Alternative Infrared Satellite System program—where we have let contracts for the technology development work in terms of the focal

point arrays and electronics that are fundamental to that satellite,

as well as some system definition work that is here.

In an investment portfolio strategy, we not only are looking at

today’s but tomorrow’s solutions, to continue the capability onorbit.

So, that is the approach that we have used—back-to-basics block

approach.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Dr. Sega, we have to go vote. And coming back

and forth, I think we will probably restart around 9:40. If we can

get back before that, we will. But we have to go vote, and we will

8

get a sense for whether we will have any future votes in the next

hour or so.

So, we will be back as fast as we can. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you so much. I am sorry that we had to

interrupt the proceedings for votes, but that is the other part of our

job that we have to do.

Dr. Sega, you wanted to continue, please?

Dr. SEGA. Thank you.

And I will just make one last point. That is with respect to workforce.

I think it is the finest in the world. We do have some more experienced personnel, who will soon be eligible to retire. So we are

working hard to attract and retain the technically skilled people to

ensure we have the appropriate technical foundation and essential

skill sets available to accomplish our space missions.

The National Defense Education program continues to provide

the opportunities for scholarships for math, science, engineering

and foreign language, with a focus on critical skills and critical people.

That was requested and funded at $10 million in 2006, $20 million in 2007, and we are requesting $44 million. It is a small but

important part of our efforts.

You will hear more of the National Space Security Institute led

by General Chilton. That is serving us well, also.

So, in conclusion, our Nation continues to depend on its space capabilities. It is an integral part of military power, industrial capability and economic vitality.

We must continue to ensure the continuity of services in critical

areas such as missile warning, strategic communications and position, navigation and timing.

We continue to focus on integration, America’s space efforts,

back-to-basics approach to space acquisition, and a continuing emphasis on strengthening America’s professionals—space professionals—and our science and engineering workforce.

So, initial application of our strategy over the past year has

shown promising results, as we continue toward securing our Nation’s space capabilities for the future.

I look forward to continuing working with the committee, and

thank you for your continued support of national security space.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Sega can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]

Ms. TAUSCHER. You are welcome, Dr. Sega.

Dr. Kerr, please. Once again, your testimony has been put into

the record. If you could summarize, we would appreciate it. Thank

you.

STATEMENT OF DR. DONALD M. KERR, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL

RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

Dr. KERR. Madam Chair and Mr. Everett, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you again this year.

As you know, the NRO is a joint Department of Defense and intelligence community organization. And we are involved in the reVerDate 22-MAR-2001 14:03 Dec 08, 2008 Jkt 037322 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-44\082290.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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search, development, acquisition, launch and operation of overhead

reconnaissance systems.

They are integral to military operations. We support battle space

preparation, precision targeting, wide area surveillance, blue force

tracking and battle damage assessment, as well as providing near

real-time support to ongoing tactical operations.

And the definition for near real-time is seconds to minutes, unlike past history where it might be months.

Simply put, the NRO systems provide the United States with a

distinct asymmetric advantage in a world that is in fact defined by

rapidly changing targets and threats.

The NRO’s performance since 9/11 has demonstrated that overhead systems—designed, in some cases, for a very different era and

against a different problem set—can be adapted to collect against

small fleeting targets with dramatic success.

Since the NRO’s inception in 1961, our mission has been to build

and fly the most technical, most versatile and most enduring reconnaissance spacecraft in the world.

These systems are required to provide national intelligence 24

hours a day, 7 days a week and, of course, 365 days a year. And

they, of course, must adapt every day to the challenges before us.

We initially developed these systems during the height of the

Cold War, in the analog era. And yet, they continue today in the

digital age against targets that did not exist when the Soviet Union

was America’s principal strategic threat.

One of these systems last year celebrated its 25th anniversary.

It has been to a few wars, built with specifications for the Cold

War, supported the conflict in the Falklands, Gulf I, the invasion

of Afghanistan and the continuing Pak-Afghan border area work

and, of course, now Iraq.

It is remarkable that the developers did their job as well as they

did. It is even more remarkable that those on the ground dealt

with the effects of aging, so that that spacecraft still contributes to

our national security today.

So, 25 years and counting is something we are very proud of.

A few other brief examples of what we bring in terms of operationally responsive capabilities. Our entire overhead constellation

supports combat search and rescue when it is needed. And that is

truly a real-time capability, one that has led to the rescue of many

downed airmen over recent years.

It also helped us to identify technical solutions to counter the use

of improved explosive devices (IEDs)—another trying area for the

United States.

And closer to the user, we have developed Web-based tools now

transferred to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency that allows people worldwide to access libraries, as well as current data

in support of their tactical operations.

It is important to make note of the fact that we are not a selftasking organization. That would be dangerous. We work with our

mission partners. The functional manager for signals intelligence

(SIGINT) is my colleague, the director of the National Security

Agency (NSA). In parallel for imagery, it is Admiral Murrett at

NGA.

10

And so, other than things like blue force tracking, where we go

direct to the user, it is always as part of the larger national capability.

One of the important factors, as well, because we operate in

space we can provide global situational awareness to the national

leadership, even when other intelligence capabilities have been focused on particular regional conflicts. And so, that is an important

and continuing part of what we do.

We, too, are focused on acquisition excellence, and I will mention

a few of the things that at least give us a sense that we are making

progress in that area.

With regard to becoming operationally responsive in space, we

are doing that principally on the ground. This is where we can best

respond, because we can do it in a period of weeks and not longer.

And there are remarkable steps that have been made to make the

SIGINT system, as well as imagery, more responsive through better processing and delivery on the ground to the users.

I have also consolidated our ground system development efforts

into a single integrated program that links to a commitment to

have an integrated ground architecture shared by NGA, NSA, DIA,

as well as the NRO.

And we are well along in setting that architecture in place.

Pieces of it already exist in Iraq in support of the conflict there.

This year’s budget also includes the first jointly funded approach

to Space Radar. It is a pleasure to be able to report that the intelligence community and the Department of Defense, I think have

reached a way forward, where both will be contributing to the development of this very important program.

The funds have been transferred to the NRO military intelligence

program, and more importantly, the merging funds.

There is a single program manager. And so, while he is drawing

on resources from both the intelligence community and the Department of Defense, there is no confusion about who has the responsibility for that program; it is Major General Tom Sheridan.

Last August, you are aware that the President signed the new

National Space Policy. The NRO was a member of the interagency

team that developed the policy, and we are working with the other

team members, including Dr. Sega and General Chilton at the

table, to move that forward, as well.

With regard to what we are doing in, call it the infrastructure

for our space program, the Air Force and the NRO are working together to improve the career development of our space professionals.

With Space Command, we have created an Air Force-NRO space

assignment advisory board to track the careers of space professionals to ensure that they are provided the job experiences, as

well as the education and training, necessary for their professional

advancement.

We have also teamed with Space Command in training space

professionals across the Government at the Non-proliferation and

National Security Institute (NNSI), which I am sure General

Chilton will speak more about.

Finally, locally, we have teamed with and contracted with two

local universities to offer additional educational opportunities to

11

both military and civilian employees of the NRO—not just at the

certificate level, but at the master’s level—in engineering, administration or public management, to make it portable, something they

can take with them in their careers.

Improving our acquisition processes has been the focus for me

since I took over the NRO in July of 2005. We have abandoned ‘‘acquisition reform,’’ as it once was known, and we are making

progress that is measurable.

Two quick points in that regard.

As part of the President’s management agenda and the Government Performance and Results Act, OMB evaluates at least one of

our major programs every year. In the last evaluation, our communications directorate received a grade of 81, the highest of all of the

intelligence community agencies, and compared very well with the

best across the Government.

Second, our mission integration and development program—the

MIND—was recognized last October by the Department of Defense

and the National Defense Industrial Association, as one of the Department’s top five programs.

The National Space Policy also includes interagency partnerships

as a key feature. This is a natural for the NRO, since we are already a joint venture.

Besides the routine interactions with our mission partners, we

also have more formal venues, like the Space Partnership Council,

which includes Air Force Space Command, U.S. Strategic Command, the defense executive agent for space sitting next to me, Director of Defense Research & Engineering (DDR&E) and DARPA.

This council addresses broad issues across the infrastructure that

supports us all. And so, concerns about EELV, communications and

the like, are what comes to the table, and we do actually occasionally take action, which is the best part of it.

I also have a deputy director for mission support. It is his job,

in fact, to deal with warfighter needs. He is responsible for the 47

representatives that we have in the various commands and theaters, and it is to help users best employ the capabilities that we

are responsible for.

In addition, he is the deputy commander of the Joint Functional

Component for Space under U.S. Strategic Command.

Interestingly enough, General Shelton, who is also 14th Air

Force, is the commander. General Horne, U.S. Army, is the first

Army flag officer to serve at the NRO, and will be the deputy for

that position.

Science and technology, of course, is key to our future, as it is

the broader Department of Defense. The NRO has had an advanced

science and technology directorate for many, many years. That is

where we invest in the enabling technologies that sustain our ability to deliver the capabilities that we have.

One final message that you might particularly appreciate is the

importance we put on sound financial management. Since fiscal

year 2000, we have undergone annual financial audits by independent public auditors.

In fiscal year 2003, we received a clean audit opinion—the first

in the intelligence community.

12

Now for the bad news. We have not been able to repeat it, and

for a very interesting reason. We cannot demonstrate a valuation

and depreciation model for on-orbit systems to the satisfaction of

the auditors. [Laughter.]

Ms. TAUSCHER. Do they want to do due diligence? [Laughter.]

Dr. KERR. That is right. We will be glad to send them, if we can

afford it. But we——

[Laughter.]

Ms. TAUSCHER. That may be a good idea.

Dr. KERR. We are working with the Financial Accountability

Standards Board (FASB).

Ms. TAUSCHER. Right, FASB.

Dr. KERR. And we are—the FASB—and doing so with NASA and

others in the intelligence community, because there are a number

of systems the U.S. Government buys and puts in places where

they cannot be recovered. And so, we need it acknowledged in an

appropriate way to deal with that problem.

So, we are focused on proper funds management. We have had

no criticism for that, only how we depreciate satellites. And so, we

are still the only member of the intelligence community that has

ever gotten an unqualified opinion.

So, Madam Chair, we appreciate this opportunity to be with you

and answer your questions. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kerr can be found in the Appendix on page 54.]

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you very much, Dr. Kerr. I very much appreciate your comments about putting some auditors—and perhaps

we will send them with a lawyer or two into orbit. [Laughter.]

General Chilton, I was thrilled to come to your command last

month. Let me thank you and the airmen and all the joint military

staff that you have there. It was a phenomenally impressive opportunity for me to be there and to meet with you and see your facilities and to get a briefing there.

So, we would love to hear your testimony. And obviously, your

testimony has been submitted to the record. And if you can give us

a brief synopsis of it, we would appreciate it.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL KEVIN P. CHILTON, COMMANDER,

AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND

General CHILTON. Happy to. Thank you, Madam Chair, for your

kind words. And, of course, you and all the members of the committee are always welcome to come visit at Air Force Space Command.

We are proud of what we do out there, particularly of our men and

women who serve out there.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you.

General CHILTON. Madam Chair, Representative Everett and distinguished members of the committee, it is truly a privilege for me

to be with you all today.

And I am also proud to join the table here with my good friends,

Dr. Kerr and Dr. Sega, two great leaders on our national security

space team.

I am also proud to have with us today a member of Air Force

Space Command. Colonel Jay Raymond is one of our space leaders,

and he is seated right here.

13

Jay, thank you.

He is a commander out at Vandenberg Air Force Base, of the

group out there.

But what I wanted to highlight is that Jay has recently returned

from a deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), where he

served as the Director of Space Forces in the Combined Air Operations Center under the command of Lieutenant General Gary

North. And this is where the rubber meets the road on air and

space integration.

And Jay was in charge and leading over 100 joint folks, bringing

space effect to our warriors all over the Central Command

(CENTCOM) area of operations (AO).

And the true power that this integration brings is that, not only

was he there bringing his expertise and the team of the joint fight

there, he had the ability to reach back to 14th Air Force at Vandenberg Air Force Base California, where General Willie Shelton

leads, as Dr. Kerr said, not only 14th Air Force, but the Joint

Functional Component Command for Space that works directly for

STRATCOM.

And through that relationship, we bring space from the joint

space capabilities directly into the air operations center and to the

Joint Forces commander over there, now Admiral Fallon.

It is a powerful linkage. Jay did a super job over there, and he

learned a lot about air and space integration and he has brought

that back.

Currently over there, we have a colonel who had served for Dr.

Kerr in a leadership role in the NRO—an airman who knows the

NRO business very well, and he is over there now, bringing that

integrated force forward.

So, we are working and teaming together to make sure that we

leverage all of our space capabilities and our support to the combatant commanders. And we do not just do it in CENTCOM. We

do it for every regional combatant commander around the world.

Today, I am proud to represent that team of airmen in Air Force

Space Command that provide these capabilities day in and day out,

to not only STRATCOM, but every combatant commander. Over

40,000 people—active duty, Guard, Reserve, civil servants and a

tremendous contractor team that is in the fight with us, 7 days a

week, 365 days a year.

And what are they bringing? They are bringing missile warning

with our Digital Signal Processing (DSP) constellation. They are

enabling missile defense by providing the first reaction and the

first response for a launch against this country, not only with our

space-based system, but with our radar systems.

They are providing space surveillance with our electrical-optical

systems scattered around the world, as well as our radars and our

one space-based satellite.

They are providing critical position, navigation and timing—one

of the things that Representative Everett said we have come to

take for granted, not only in our society, but the way we fight—

that is absolutely essential to the way we fight today.

They are providing environmental monitoring to the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program. And as General Moseley says, men

and women of Air Force Space Command are the backstop for our

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Nation’s ultimate defense, as they stand strong every day with our

intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force in the northern tier

states—always ready, always prepared.

In the satellite communications area, our Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) constellations, our MILSTAR constellation, our global broadcast satellite system—all have airmen

from Air Force Space Command’s fingers on them. They are making sure that they deliver the capabilities that are required around

the world today.

And none of this happens without the professionals that we have

in both the Patrick Air Force Base in Florida and Vandenberg Air

Force Base in California, that take care of our gateways to space

for America and launch those satellite systems into orbit.

It is a team squarely focused on enabling the joint fight every

day. To win the war today and, just as importantly, though, to prepare for future conflicts and make sure we stay strong and out in

front as a nation.

And you will see this reflected in the investments in this budget

this year in just about every area that I have chronicled.

In missile warning we are moving forward with the SBIRS constellation. In space surveillance, space-based space surveillance satellite program, as well as a new investment program in integrated

Space Situational Awareness, which is very important.

Position, navigation and timing, we are advancing the ball with

GPS 2RM launches, 2F is coming on board, and we are laying the

groundwork for GPS 3, that will provide critical capability to our

warriors in the future.

Strategic deterrence, from nosecone to rocket engine, we are upgrading the ICBM fleet, and it is going to be with us beyond 2025,

because of the investments we are making today in that system.

And we are providing a more secure system, because of the investments that we are continuing to make in our launch facilities.

And in satellite communication is probably the most dramatic

that we can think of, as we move to wideband global satellite

launches this year, which in a single satellite will exceed the capability of the entire DSCS constellation, AEHF satellite and the

TSAT program, which will be absolutely essential to keep us on the

cutting edge in the future.

All of these systems support our vision at Air Force Space Command to become the acknowledged experts and leaders in launching, fielding, and employing space power for America for the 21st

century.

To guide our investments along this path, we have four priorities

that we stay focused on.

First, we absolutely must preserve and expand our ability to deliver space effects to the joint fight. We stay focused on the needs

of the Combatant Command (COCOM) today, not only the

regionals, but the STRATCOM commander as he operates and defends our space assets. But we also are committed to look to the

future, to make sure we stay out in front.

Second, we remain focused on providing a safe and secure nuclear deterrent for this Nation. Of all the balls we juggle in Air

Force Space Command, I remind our folks most of them are tennis

15

balls that will bounce if we drop them. This is a crystal ball. We

stay focused—very focused—on this responsibility.

Third, we are committed to developing, fielding and sustaining

dominant space capabilities for this country on time and on cost.

And with SMC under our umbrella in Air Force Space Command,

we are working to make sure we can do that, and are good shepherds of the taxpayers’ investment.

Finally, and certainly not least importantly but underpinning our

efforts, we are focused on attracting, developing, training and retaining the expertise necessary to meet the challenges of the future. Our investments in the NSSI has been mentioned—the National Security Space Institute—our investments in education.

It goes beyond that, though, and goes into examining policies for

accessions. It goes into recruiting. It goes into getting young folks

excited about joining Air Force Space Command. And I can’t think

of a more exciting place to work than this command.

In closing, I would just, as our chief of staff has said in his testimony that, as he looks at air forces historically, where air forces

across history have failed is when they have failed to correct slowly

to declining relative capabilities.

Our space capabilities are too integral to the fight today. We understand that. And we cannot allow adversaries to eclipse our

asymmetric advantage, particularly as Dr. Kerr talked about.

We realize the importance of investing today to get what we need

for tomorrow. And we also realize we absolutely must be successful

every day. And what we do is, we operate these systems for the

fight.

With your help, we stand ready to solve the challenges of the future. And I am honored, as I said, to appear before this distinguished subcommittee. I appreciate the great support you give the

men and women of Air Force Space Command, and I look forward

to addressing the questions that you put before us today.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Chilton can be found in the

Appendix on page 67.]

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you very much, General.

And, gentlemen, thank you very much for comprehensive submitted testimony and your verbal testimony.

The committee is generally, obviously, concerned about many different issues, but what we are looking at is to have a sense of the

scope of the opportunity to improve security and awareness of our

assets on-orbit.

And I think that we are looking at and questioning and pushing

to find out what kind of seams we have, both institutionally and

in space, because our responsibility is to the warfighter.

Our responsibility to protect the United States, our citizens, our

assets and our allies is significant. And in partnership with you,

we feel as if we have not only great Americans in the Joint Command working very hard, but as Dr. Kerr mentioned and as Dr.

Sega has mentioned in the past, too, we have some of the finest scientific minds.

And how do we make sure that we have both the kind of operational institutions, the kinds of flexibility, the kind of robustness

16

we have in our institutions that do not leave us either with seams

in the institutions or eventually seams in space?

So, I guess the question that I have to begin is, are we investing

enough in Space Situational Awareness capabilities that are needed to deter and defend and recover from possible threats against

our safe assets and their related ground infrastructures?

What are the greatest needs we have in these areas?

And how do you see the organizational roles and responsibilities

being divided or shared, both during creation of architecture, development of the concept of operations and the fielding of capabilities?

And I think that should go to you first, perhaps, Dr. Sega, but

I would be interested in both of you, General Chilton and Dr. Kerr

adding on if you can.

Dr. SEGA. First, that is a very important question.

We lay the foundation for some of the options, starting in 2001.

And at that time, I was director of defense research and engineering.

And we made a conscious effort in the science and technology

foundation to increase the investment in space, and increase it in

the area that includes Space Situational Awareness and protection.

And the budget doubled in space, and it was around a half-billion

a year, and went to over $1 billion a year. And we are now seeing

the results of that investment in terms of the capability to do such

things as Space Situational Awareness.

The TACSAT–2 experiment satellite launched in December is

one example; XSS–11 is also another example.

But in terms of providing a sensory capability and bringing it together and making it make sense, I think the foundational pieces

are coming into play.

So, we have been, I think, in the correct direction. The question

is, have we gone fast enough at this point, knowing what we know

now to provide that.

We also have in the National Space Policy, situational awareness

is clearly brought up, where the roles of the Department of Defense

and the intelligence community are laid out, and the importance of

Space Situational Awareness is there, as well.

It includes not only a terrestrial component, but a space component. So it needs to be viewed as a system.

And more and more, as we look at space in general, all the parts

should also be participating in our increased awareness of what is

in space.

As we put the budget together, we looked at continuity of service

and made sure that we had those key areas. Missile warning, strategic communications and position, navigation and timing were examples I gave there. There are others.

And so, we have laid out a direction that is good. We also said

that there were additional dollars available, and that Space Situational Awareness was our first choice, and that in that list of selfawareness, Space Situational Awareness was on top of that.

Some of the activities that we have in the budget, it would be

possible to accelerate those, but I believe our direction was solid.

Our foundation has been laid.

And I will at that point turn it over.

General CHILTON. Thank you.

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Madam Chair, first of all, I think one place where we do not have

a seam for sure, is a clear understanding of the combatant commander’s role and responsibility in this. And General Cartwright,

who we merged U.S. space into STRATCOM and called it

STRATCOM, it still has the U.S. space mission in there. And he

appreciates that and he is leading that effort.

One of the great things that has happened this past year is the

standup of JFCC–SPACE as a separate command. I had the good

fortune to be the previous JFCC–SPACE and Global Strike commander.

And so, I have been paying attention to the needs of General

Shelton out at 14th Air Force for well over a year, and asking what

it is that we need, what do you need as your number one priority.

And it has been improved Space Situational Awareness.

It is a fundamental thing that every commander—land, sea or

air—needs first before you do anything else. You need to understand the environment, who the good guys are, who the bad guys

are, who the neutrals are, and then what people are doing in that

environment.

One of the key elements in that, if something goes wrong, is to

be able to attribute what caused the malfunction. So, if it is a mechanical malfunction or an electrical malfunction with a satellite,

you need to know that. If it is something caused by the space environment that you operate in, you need to know that.

And if someone is messing with your satellite, you need to know

that and be able to attribute it fast.

And so, these are kind of the key elements of Space Situational

Awareness.

Recognizing this need, even last fall as we were working on the

budget and we laid in the integrated Space Situational Awareness

line, and those are the beginning steps as we start to meet the

needs of the combatant commander, as represented through General Shelton.

Some of the steps we have also taken is to integrate the first

space control squader, now in his command and control facility out

in Vandenberg, and break some of the linkages that we had with

the Cold War mentality of how we surveilled space, and allow us

to upgrade systems like our Space Defense Operations Center

(SPADOC) computer, that was designed and built in 1991, and it

is still operating today.

We need to move that technology forward and give General

Shelton the tools he needs.

Besides that, I would say the other challenge I put before our

Space Command team—and this kind of goes in line with what Dr.

Kerr talked about, how his satellites—a lot of his satellites were

designed to address a Cold War threat. The same with our space

surveillance systems that are set around the world today, both our

radars and optical systems.

I have challenged our team at Air Force Space Command to take

a clean-sheet look at the future. How would you lay this out, given

what we know today? It is not just a Soviet threat we are worried

about. There are other potential threats, many more players in the

domain, a lot more debris.

18

How would you lay this out? And we are well into that work

right now to lay out our future needs.

The final thing I would say is that, as we look at all the investment programs, including improving the fusion capability of data

that we have coming in today, we are taking some operations and

maintenance risk to pay some of those bills.

And that might be an area where we have to keep our eye on

it and could use some help in sustaining our current levels as we

implement new systems to take us to the point that we need to be.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Dr. Kerr, do you have anything to add?

Dr. KERR. Just a couple of points to supplement what you have

heard.

We have been operating in space under threat for many, many

years, starting with the co-orbital ASAT fielded by the Soviet

Union.

Protection is part of our programs traditionally. It is getting even

more emphasis today. We look at things like how do we distribute

value differently, in order to be more robust.

At the operating level, we are very well integrated with what

General Chilton just talked about. As I mentioned earlier, we provide the deputy commander for JFCC–SPACE.

Importantly, the JSPOC—the Joint Space Operations Center in

California—is linked to our NROC and their backup capabilities for

each other. And we have recently expanded our facility and reequipped it for that responsibility.

Importantly, we started out working closely with Space Command, because to some great degree they have had clear responsibility in this area for developing capabilities for space surveillance—SSA, if you will.

To that team has come STRATCOM. And so, the three organizations are working very closely on how different capabilities can be

linked to deal with today’s problem, rather than yesterday’s problem, and will continue to do that.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you.

Happy to yield to the Ranking Member, Mr. Everett.

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, chairman.

What are our gaps in SSA? Clearly, we need to know the Chinese

ASAT—we need to know who did that, when they did it, that kind

of thing.

Do you see any gaps that we have in Space Situational Awareness?

General CHILTON. Representative Everett, if I could take that

one on.

We have a satellite airborne now called the Midcourse Space Experiment (MSX) satellite. It was put up as an experiment to actually look at others things. The technology is back in the late 1990’s.

What we found as we operated that satellite, is that it had a

great capability to surveil the geosynchronous belt and help us in

keeping track of objects out at great distances from the Earth.

The radars that we have today do a pretty good job of surveilling

in the low-altitude orbital environment.

As we look to the satellites in the higher altitudes, we find that

there is an area that I think we need to continue to focus on improving our capabilities, which is why the space-based space surVerDate 22-MAR-2001 14:03 Dec 08, 2008 Jkt 037322 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-44\082290.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
19

veillance system, which you will see in our budget this year, is—

and has been in the past—is so important to us to get airborne on

time, because MSX is starting to fade in its ability to continue to

do its mission.

So, I would say we need to expand—continue to expand—our

focus on space surveillance, not only to the low-altitude areas

where we clearly have seen that we are vulnerable, but also to the

higher altitude areas and beyond. And this is an area that we are

focusing on.

Dr. SEGA. And consistent with the need to have SBSS, the spacebased surveillance system, to be in space, we have approached it

in the same manner, in this block approach.

So we are not taking on too much in the first block, block 10, and

getting capability on-orbit with confidence in terms of our schedule,

and the resources needed, and then moving on to a block 20. It is

for this need, applying the approach so the acquisition cycle time

is reduced.

Mr. EVERETT. Anything to add, Dr. Kerr?

Dr. KERR. Just one point. If there is any area where there is a

clear gap, it is good intelligence about what other countries are

doing relative to space control and space surveillance.

And over the years, some of that capability, particularly on the

analytic side, has diminished substantially. So, building hardware,

building concept of operations (CONOPS), absent some better foundation of understanding of what we are building them for, is a

risky thing. And that part needs attention, too.

General CHILTON. I would echo those comments, sir.

And in line with the question you had asked earlier about intelligence and what we are doing on that, I think in the Air Force,

with General Deptula taking over the A–2 and increasing that to

a three-star level function, I have had many discussions with him

about the importance of focusing our intelligence again to the heavens, as we did during the Cold War.

After the Cold War ended, we took down a lot of that capability,

because the threat had gone away. And that capability I am mostly

talking about is the human capital that we had paying attention

to intelligence analysis of the space environment.

And we are starting again to build—and it will take time—that

expertise, both in the Air Force at National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), as well, and also, in our management of

the space cadre, which was another question you asked earlier.

My intention is to expand our management and oversight of that

beyond just our space operators and our acquisition professionals,

but to also include intelligence and communications specialists in

our Air Force, and make sure we are tracking their growth and

make sure we are growing the right intelligence expertise we need

for today and tomorrow, as well as the right communications expertise we need to support our space endeavors in the future.

Mr. EVERETT. I appreciate that. I hate to see so many of our

young people coming out of the academy who want to be pilots and

spend a great deal of their time—the rest of their life, maybe—piloting a Global Hawk rather than get in an aircraft. Anyway, SATCOM. This year we buy about $400 million from

commercial satellites to do communications. And about 80 percent

20

of our Iraqi Freedom military SATCOM requirements come from

commercial.

Would you explain all that and how it concerns with down-theroad TSAT, and more quickly, the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)?

General CHILTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. EVERETT. And also, I think the Advanced Extremely High

Frequency would give us 100 times more than we get now?

General CHILTON. Ten times, sir.

Mr. EVERETT. Ten times.

General CHILTON. Ten times.

Mr. EVERETT. And TSAT?

General CHILTON. About another 10 times, so close to 100.

So, you are right. The demand, the need for global satellite communications, particularly force secured to support our warfighters,

continues to grow.

And we recognize those requirements. We are listening to the

users out there who are demanding them.

And that is why it is so important to field the Wide-Band Global

System that, as I said, one satellite will replace the capability of

the entire DSCS constellation, and AEHF, with about a 10-fold increase in capacity and capability over MILSTAR, and the TSAT.

With regard to your comments on the 80 percent, the fact that

today about 80 percent of our satellite communication is leased,

again, this is under the COCOM’s purview and how that is managed.

But it is not something that I think you want to ever drive down

to a zero number. And I like to use the analogy of the civilian reserve air fleet that we have, the CRAF, and how we utilize that

for airlift in crisis.

Day in and day out, we have relationships with the airlines, that

they are flying their airlines supporting civilian traffic.

But you will notice, when we get to crisis and the time comes,

we activate the CRAF and we bring them on board. And you will

see most of our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines deploying to

theater in DC–10’s. And you will see them going in 747s that are

part of the airline industry.

I kind of in my mind equate the balance that we have to strike

with military capabilities, just like we have military transport in

the CRAF. On military satellite communications, we have got to

make sure we size it right for what you have got to have to fight.

And it is nice to have a flex capability, where you can utilize the

commercial satellite industry where you are able to.

But back to your original point, the growth in demand is increasing for secure and protected satellite communications for our

warfighters. And that is why it is so important to stay the course

on these new satellites we are developing and launching today.

Dr. SEGA. If I could continue on that.

The commercial satellite providers are important to us. It is part

of a balance, and I hope optimized push going forward.

We have a commercial SATCOM CEO meeting annually. And we

had that recently. And so that we are better able to work with

them and share information and so forth.

21

But communication does come, as General Chilton said, in different forms and for different reasons. Commercial folks can provide part of it, and we provide some of the upcoming wideband

communications with WDS—Wideband Global Satcom—system.

And that will be launched this summer. And it is another program

that is meeting those milestones.

It is ready to go and we are looking at the launch vehicle now

and putting that part together and getting the first WGS out here

in the summer, and then six to nine months later the next one and

then finally the next one.

And we also executed the contract on widebands four and five

over the last year. So, that is the wideband part.

But this protected communications base is MILSTAR and then

AEHF and then to TSAT.

And TSAT approaches the problem in a different way, a 21st century way. It not only will do the protected piece, but will also serve

our many, many users that want this capacity through an Internet

protocol based—a network, if you will, in space.

And so, we have a processor router on that. We communicate it

at high bandwidth that the users are needing with lasers as we

move forward. And there are also the high-band needs of our platforms that need ISR.

So, strategic communications, the Internet-based protocol for

multiple users in that high bandwidth is what we are going for

with TSAT.

And so, we have it broken down. We are doing the technology

maturity in a methodical way in a block approach to provide 21st

century capability, and staying in tune with the industrial base.

If we would go back and do an AEHF–4, for example, the parts—

there is a parts obsolescence and non-recurring kind of engineering

as you move forward in time. Especially in the communications

area, the rate of change is high.

And so, to tap back into an industrial base with something that

is from the past, we have to assess it and see how much it is really

going to cost, as in some pieces you are starting over, because the

parts are no longer available, or the design is not appropriate as

we go forward.

So, that is a balance. And we have looked at that pretty carefully.

Mr. EVERETT. I understand it is both the commercial and DOD

for our current military communications with SATCOM. But do we

need that much of a reserve? Do we need to continue spending

$400 million a year? Or is there some magic number below that,

so we can keep a healthy commercial capability out there?

General CHILTON. Sir, I do not know the answer to what the

right balance is, economic from a business case is.

I think we do need to have participation from the commercial

satellite industry. I think that is healthy that we utilize that.

And again, I would reiterate the point that we do need to pay

attention to the specific military requirements that are needed by

Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines, and how we bring those capabilities to bear through our secure and protected satellites in the

bandwidths that Dr. Sega has talked about.

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, Madam Chair.

22

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, ranking member.

At this time I am pleased to yield five minutes to the gentleman

from Iowa, Mr. Loebsack.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Madam Chair.

I just have some—I guess I want to pursue this question of intelligence a little bit. I mean, this is a request for—this is a budget

hearing. And you all know that we are in a highly constrained

budgetary environment at the moment, have been for a number of

years.

I am new to the Congress. One of the first things I learned when

I got here budgets here are strapped—was just how constrained we

are at the Federal level.

And I would be asking the same kinds of questions, I guess. But

do we really need what people are asking, whether I was on this

committee or a committee having to do with domestic, whatever

the case may be.

But I have stated before that, for me at least, we have got to line

up whatever it is that we are going to be spending, or expending,

on the military with the threats that are out there.

And correct me if I am wrong, but what I got from what you just

said a little while ago was that we have real problems with intelligence in terms of whether we have enough intelligence—human

capability, in particular, you mentioned—to determine exactly what

those threats are out there.

And I guess, I do not know that you can give me any kind of

numbers, but I have a real concern that we develop weapon systems for which there are no threats, because that would be a waste

of our money, obviously, if that were the case.

How confident can we be that, you know, what you folks want

to do in fact will be directed toward threats, given the concerns

that you have all expressed about our intelligence capabilities?

How also—I guess, what are the chances that we do not know

what some of the threats are, and therefore, we are not providing

you enough in that sense, to take care of the threats that we do

not even know about perhaps?

Whoever wants to take that on.

Dr. KERR. Well, since I was the first of the three of us to raise

it——

Mr. LOEBSACK. Yes, you were. You were. Thank you.

Dr. KERR [continuing]. Let me take the first cut.

From my own experience, I know how far, particularly in the all

source analytic world, we have gone from capabilities that existed

10 to 15 years ago in terms of numbers of analysts, to what we had

a year or so ago and they are now starting to build up from.

But I guess, to put it in numeric terms rather than a headcount,

which I cannot do, we probably went to a point of having probably

ten percent of what we once had in the area of looking at threats

to space systems.

As General Chilton properly pointed out, NASIC remains a

strong capability focused largely on the military intelligence side of

it. Where it has fallen down substantially is in the all source end

of it.

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It also would be unfair of me not to point out that your colleague,

Mr. Reyes, hears this in quite a different setting, and it is a concern that has been broadly expressed.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Anyone else?

General CHILTON. I did not want to characterize that there was

a deficiency in our knowledge of the threats. I think we are pretty

understanding of the threats.

It was a deficiency in the human capital and focus we have put

there. That is just a reality, as Dr. Kerr pointed out, as a result

of our drawdown after the Cold War.

It is a new day and we need to be looking forward and growing

the right expertise as we move forward in this area, and putting

the focus on it that it deserves. And I am confident we are doing

that. But this is not something you fix overnight.

Dr. SEGA. But from probably a perspective looking out a little bit

further, one of the things we can guarantee, I think, in the 21st

century is, the rate of change of technology will increase. The technology will be available around the word.

And so, with that rate of change, we also have to look forward

and make sure that we understand that and we also stay on the

leading edge and we provide options as we go forward.

And so, one of the areas that we intend to have to move quickly

and have agility and provide some of those options is the ORS,

with some of the smaller satellite activities that we will kind of understand the technologies, with their opportunities to see how they

work.

We will also give ourselves potentially additional options going

forward in terms of operations. But we are at the beginning stage.

We are also recognizing we are in an environment that is going

to have a high rate of change going forward.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you very much. I will yield back the rest

of my time.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Loebsack.

I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Trent,

five minutes. Mr. Trent? Franks. [Laughter.]

Mr. FRANKS. I get that all the time. Thank you.

Well, thank you, Madam Chair. And I thank all of you for being

here, as always. You know, you are our front line of freedom, and

we appreciate you very, very much.

I know that General Obering is not here, but any time that you

have the kind of success related to missile defense or the Air

Force’s participation, as you did last week in the ABL test, that is

a cause for celebration for everyone. And so, I congratulate you in

that regard.

General Chilton, I think that I want to, if I can, take a little page

out of the chairwoman’s book here and just revisit the critical nature of what you do to give us Space Situational Awareness, because I know that there are some differences of opinion in this

committee in terms of priorities on how to go forward in a lot of

areas.

But the one thing that should be a common commitment on the

part of all of us, is to know what is happening in our world. To

know who might be a potential adversary, to be able to prevent

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misunderstandings—to know what is happening is critically important.

And I just believe that anything that we do will have as its foundation much of what you are doing. And so, I guess, if I could ask

you, if there was any one thing that this committee could do to ensure that your effort to give us a good picture of what is happening

in the world and Space Situational Awareness, what would that

be?

General CHILTON. Thank you, sir, and thank you for your support for the men and women of Air Force Space Command.

It would be sustaining our investment in the path that we are

on today.

We identified, as I mentioned with my experience as JFCC–

SPACE, this need and deficiencies more than a year ago. And we

have laid them into the funding streams now.

It runs the gamut. It runs the gamut from the intelligence side

so that we can be predictive and we have got the right analysts,

to the data collection side, which are our sensors that we deploy

around the world and in space, like the space-based space surveillance systems, to taking that data and that information and bringing it into General Shelton’s Joint Space or Operations Center and

fusing that, so he does not have to look at spreadsheets to fuse

things in his brain, but we present that data correctly, so that he

can quickly make decisions and provide good advice and counsel to

General Cartwright as the combatant commander for operations

there.

It will also, this situational awareness, help us better support regional warfighters around the world. So, in the integrated Space

Situational Awareness program which we have in this budget, will

help to take the data that we bring in and fuse that in a fashion

in our command and control center that General Shelton has.

And it does not stop there, sir. It goes right—and once you are

smart, now you have got to be able to command and control your

forces. And we have investment planned in those areas, too, so that

he can send his orders out and the folks that operating the systems

out in the field can respond to them in an appropriate fashion.

But it runs that gamut.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, gentlemen. Your cooperation with

the intelligence community and all the other people that you have

got to interface with is pretty much a model for the services, and

certainly for the U.S. Government in general, and we appreciate

that very much.

Dr. Sega, I know you have seen the bumper sticker a lot of times

in your business, that one nuclear blast can ruin your whole day.

And we appreciate very much that you are trying to figure out

ways to prevent that from ever being something that we would see

come to reality.

And I know that your challenge oftentimes is to make sure that

we are investing in the kind of systems that will provide deterrent

to nations in the future, like China, so that they decide not to build

certain, perhaps offensive capabilities against us, simply because

they do not think it is a good investment anymore, and also, the

ability to have a tactical response, if something really does occur.

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So, I ask you the same question. What can we do in this committee to be able to continue to equip you to do both?

Dr. SEGA. Sir, let me answer it from the perspective of the space

systems, and then I will hand it off for probably a broader look.

One of my roles in the past was the chair of the Radiation Hardened Oversight Council, the RHOC, as the director of defense research and engineering, when we looked at paths forward for providing radiation-hardened components.

In our protected systems that we are counting on, we do provide

our requirements and we design and build the systems with radhardened components, such as the strategic communications—

MILSTAR, AEHF and then TSAT—and things like missile warning

for SBIRS-High.

So, we are increasing the capability of our systems to operate in

these environments.

In addition to that, looking at an option for more rapid reconstitution, and that goes to a bit on the ORS effort, potential future

capability of reconstitution.

And so, we have efforts in providing protection on the satellites,

as well as to look at options for potential reconstitution. And we

hope it never, of course—that never is needed.

General CHILTON. I would just say, sir, as I mentioned earlier,

we are taking some risk in our sustainment of our current systems

out there in our O&M. And that would be an area that we could

use some help on.

You know, we have talked about missile defense, the first alert

for missile defense is the Air Force Space Command’s systems that

we deliver with DSP, now SBIRS, within our mid-course tracking

as provided by our radar systems and the upgrade of those systems

that are so important to us. And sustaining those systems are very

important to us, as well.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. TAUSCHER. You are welcome, Mr. Franks.

I am happy to yield now five minutes to the gentleman from

Texas, Mr. Reyes, who is also the Chairman of the Intelligence

Committee.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Madam Chair.

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

I think Dr. Kerr and I have seen each other every day this week

in some form or another, and mostly working on issues of this type.

It occurs to me as I sat here listening to both your testimony and

the questions, you know, everything that we do in this arena is so

expensive. And one of the fundamental concerns about this investment is that it may not be balanced to what should be the biggest

priority.

Being a nation at war right now, the overriding priority is getting intelligence to the warfighter.

There are some that are concerned that, as we invest heavily in

our ability to continue a space presence, and certainly the threat

against our assets after the Chinese ASAT is of concern to all of

us.

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But is our portfolio in balance in terms of supporting the

warfighter? Because it appears that it is overly weighted toward

transformational issues and our long-term policy to be able to

maximize our presence in space.

But, again, in your opinion, are we in the right balance, or are

we in an imbalance at this point in time in what should be our primary priority, and that is giving the warfighter the kind of intelligence that they need in combat?

General CHILTON. Well, Representative Reyes, first of all, it is

good to see you again, sir.

Mr. REYES. Please. Good to see you.

General CHILTON. If I could, I am going to defer some of the intelligence portions of your question to Dr. Kerr.

But I think, if we look back from 1991 and Desert Storm to

where we are today, and how we conduct combat operations today

in the global war on terror (GWOT) and in any contingency to include such things as hurricane relief and disaster in the United

States of America, and our country, we have become very, very dependent on the capabilities that we bring from space today to conduct those operations.

I love the story that General Dodgen used to tell about asking

the young soldier, do you need space today to fight? And the story

is, he says, no, all I need is my rifle, my box of ammunition and

that little black box over there that tells me where I am.

Mr. REYES. Right. [Laughter.]

General CHILTON. Well, that is a perfect example of just how we

have taken space and made it a part of our fabric, whether it be

position, navigation and timing, which has found its way into not

only just telling you where you are at, but also into the timing that

is critical to the operation of our communications systems, our Nation’s banking systems, et cetera, let alone the economy.

When we look at global communications, the Global Hawk, the

Predator—all these things that are in the fight today that are providing real-time intelligence to the warfighter in the field and are

helping them find IEDs and helping them to accomplish their mission today—they all rely on satellite communications.

And what they are screaming for is more of that capability. And

that means it is going to require more satellite bandwidth to support.

Most folks do not think about that other step that is required to

do that. So, I think we are on the right track there in the communications growth that we have in the program today and in moving

forward on GPS constellation.

Missile defense—if you talk to the combatant commanders over

in Korea today, and you ask them how worried they are about the

North Korean threat and their missile arsenal over there, and in

other AORs, too, you will find how focused they are on early warning and detection and tracking of those threats. And that is exactly

where we are spending our capital in regards to upgrading the DSP

program to the SBIRS program.

So——

Mr. REYES. If I could interrupt you, because that is an important

point.

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As we deal with the transformation process, particularly in the

Army for Future Combat Systems (FCS), is that what the combatant commanders are telling you? First of all, what they need on the

short term, what their vision is for long-term support from space.

I am kind of curious, because I think they are all related.

General CHILTON. They are, sir.

They have short-term needs, and we are delivering those today

with our space capabilities, but they have long-term needs, too.

And the growth in airborne ISR, the growth in Space Radar as

that comes along onboard, which they are all asking for and requiring, and the data rates that will be required to support that will

require increases in our satellite communication constellations.

And the com-on-the-move requirements of SCS that you brought

up, and the vision the Army has for how they will build and communicate in the future on the battlefield is an important part of

the transformational satellite system, TSAT.

So, we are chartered not only to look at, and we pay very close

attention today in our flexibility and how we support today’s fight.

But we have to be looking to the future, as well.

And as I said before, I think all the things we are investing in

have become so much a part of the fabric of the way we fight and

the way we think about fighting in the future, that we have a good,

balanced investment in this area.

Dr. KERR. Let me follow-on, on another piece of the answer to

you, Mr. Reyes.

I mentioned earlier the fact that we are now supporting real-time

warfighters on the ground. The even better part of that is that we

have been able at some of the ground facilities to bring overhead

collection capability together with airborne collection capability and

make that immediately available.

One way to dramatize it for you is that I have seen a young operator with national feeds available, UAV feeds and manned airborne

feeds with 20 chats open simultaneously to people on the ground

in Iraq.

And so, this linguist was adding value to the feeds, and then she

was passing it on immediately to those who could use it on the

ground for either targeting or protection.

Dr. SEGA. And if I could add one further point.

As was mentioned by General Chilton, the needs today that come

from space, such as from GPS, the position, navigation and timing

aspects and communications, those satellites do not live forever.

And we do not have an option in space to have a depot to put another wing or new engines, or something, on the system.

And so, there is a continuity of service that we need to consider.

And GPS, as I gave the example earlier, sustains the constellation.

We currently have 30 satellites in there. And that number

helps—those numbers of satellites—for folks getting a signal in an

urban environment and in a canyon.

But many of the satellites are quite old and they need to be replaced. We need to replace it with what is available with technology, and also address some of these new needs.

The folks on the ground need a GPS system to operate, and anticipating some jammed environment—that occurred a bit in OIF.

28

And so we add power, principally for the folks on the ground in

terms of anti-jam with the next generation GPS.

But continuity of service for continuing that today into the future

is clearer, I think, from PNT and communications, as well as missile warning and along with that, a more capable satellite that will

help the battle space characterization and tactical intelligence, as

well.

Mr. REYES. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Chairman Reyes.

I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from Ohio,

Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to thank you for

your continued efforts in this committee. I have enjoyed working

with you.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you.

Mr. TURNER. And the amount that we are learning is a great

deal of help to all of us.

Dr. Sega, Dr. Kerr, General, I want to thank you for your work,

knowing that your importance in trying to maintain and grow our

superiority, and also the important issues of having to defend what

is a significant strategic vulnerability of ours.

When you look at our vulnerability for space assets, I liken it

somewhat to a cookie jar that you put on the top shelf, only your

adversary keeps getting taller. You keep having to determine what

height and what location you need to place the cookie jar in order

to defend it.

And in looking at that, it seems that intelligence, obviously, is an

important theme throughout everything that you are undertaking,

especially in the area of defending our space assets.

And I wondered if you could speak for a moment—and I have a

follow-up question to this—on the adequacy of the intelligence that

you are currently receiving, whether or not you believe that the intelligence is currently sufficient for the countermeasures that you

may need, and whether or not this is an area where, in order to

develop our defensive measures, that you need more intelligence in

support.

General CHILTON. Sir, we have talked a little bit—thank you for

your question—we talked a little bit earlier about where we are

and where we need to go with regard to our analysis and ability

to analyze intelligence and focus in this area.

Now, perfect intelligence never exists. Ultimately, what we are

after is not only determining capabilities of a potential adversary,

but also intent. And that takes a lot of study and time.

And there has been some recent activities that we are all aware

of that makes one wonder what the true intent of people are when

they do that. And it is in this area, in particular, that as we grow

our intelligence expertise and focus in space, that will be very beneficial to us as warfighters to understand that—not only capabilities, but intent.

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Sega, I know that in some of the briefings that

we have had, you have called on NASIC at Wright-Patterson Air

Force Base to help provide us information about their work.

29

And I have grown increasingly concerned that the Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA, is looking at actually lessening or diffusing

the amount of resources that might be available.

We have a limited amount of resources, and instead of bolstering

them, if we look at dividing them, our effectiveness can be diminished significantly.

So, my question to you and to others is that—you know, my understanding is that NASIC has, with the resources that they have,

has been a very high performer.

And do you have concerns as to whether or not we are meeting

the needs at the level of support that we need for intel?

Dr. SEGA. I can only address it from my perspective of my interaction with NASIC. And they are doing an outstanding job and

very, very professional.

With respect to the interaction with the DIA, I would like to

refer that to them, if I could. But we are in full support of the information and the work and the folks that have been providing

that for us. And that helps in terms of understanding the investment portfolio going ahead, is the information you have and the intelligence.

So, they have done a great job from my perspective. And I would

either refer to someone else for the answer now, or take it for the

record to go into your question further.

Mr. TURNER. Sure. Are there others who would like to comment?

Dr. KERR. I would echo the support for the work that NASIC’s

done. It has been outstanding.

General Chilton mentioned the issue of intent. And nothing has

dramatized the problem we have with that more than the Chinese

ASAT test, where it may appear, based on the public information

that even the Chinese Government itself had different arms with

different intent.

And so, that is where the all source analytic capabilities of DIA

and CIA become so important. And that is really where we need

to focus some attention.

General CHILTON. Sir, if I could just add, one area where we do

have control in Air Force Space Command and, I think, great influence on the Air Force. One is with the A–2, General Deptula as I

mentioned before, he is increasing resources focused on space intelligence for the Air Force.

Additionally, though, as I mentioned earlier, as one of our key

rules in Air Force Space Command is making sure we have the

right talent in the Air Force Space Command for the future.

And you look at General Shelton and he is running an air operations there in Space Operations Center there out at the JSPOC

at Vandenberg Air Force Base.

And a critical element of his decision-making and supporting the

warfighter, General Cartwright, is rooted in his intelligence shop

and division out there and the work that they do.

And we are starting to pay attention now how we raise intelligence officers in the United States Air Force in a fashion that,

when they achieve the rank of colonel or lieutenant colonel, or as

an analyst, we want to raise them specifically to go into those

areas to support space. It does not mean they will spend the whole

time in space.

30

But if we have got someone that is passing through and has had

an opportunity to study and be an intel analyst in space, today we

do not capture that very well in our assignment process, and we

are working to fix that and bring them into a career-wide management to make sure General Shelton has what he needs to support

his operation as the JFCC–SPACE.

Dr. SEGA. And just one last point. The value we see in NASIC

is so high that we have them come in monthly and present topics

for our community here in the Washington, D.C. area. So they

come back on a monthly basis, at least, and work through topic

after topic.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, gentlemen.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Turner, I just wanted to let you know that

your support for NASIC is a committee support. We appreciate that

your advocacy is on behalf of what could be seen as a parochial interest, but it is a committee shared support.

And Mr. Everett, who also sits on Intel, I have just talked to

Chairman Reyes about doing a classified hearing on all source. Perhaps Dr. Kerr and others would be involved in it.

But we do have a crossover between our subcommittee responsibilities and had two responsibilities in this area, so we will be

scheduling a classified briefing as soon as we can get it up on a

calendar.

Thank you for your interest and your support.

Dr. Bartlett has joined us, and we are happy to see him. Dr.

Bartlett is a member of the full committee, and I think he has a

question.

I am happy to yield you five minutes.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much for permitting me to join

you.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Of course.

Mr. BARTLETT. Gentlemen, welcome.

Dr. Sega, good to see you again.

When the Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Commission questioned

two Russian generals, they told the Commission that the Soviets

had developed, and the Russians now have, EMP-enhanced weapons that would produce 200 kilovolts per meter at the centers,

which would be about 100 kilovolts per meter at the margins of our

country, and, of course, equivalent intensity in space.

If this is true, can you tell us in this setting if our MILSTAR satellites would survive this radiation?

General CHILTON. Sir, I do not think this is the appropriate setting to discuss capabilities and/or vulnerabilities, specifically. But

I will say that our MILSTAR satellite system and the AEHF systems are designed to provide the communications that the President needs in time of nuclear conflict.

Mr. BARTLETT. Beyond these fairly limited systems intended for

command and control, essentially, what other space assets do we

have that are EMP-hardened?

Is the answer ‘‘little or none’’?

General CHILTON. Well, we certainly work to harden the secure

communications that were required to conduct those type of operVerDate 22-MAR-2001 14:03 Dec 08, 2008 Jkt 037322 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-44\082290.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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ations in a nuclear environment—nuclear war—as you have alluded to, sir.

Mr. BARTLETT. What percent would you say of our total military

communications moves over EMP-hardened satellites?

General CHILTON. Sir, I would have to take that question for the

record.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 104.]

Mr. BARTLETT. Is it something like the five percent level or less?

General CHILTON. Again, sir——

Mr. BARTLETT. Would that be a fair——

General CHILTON. I would have to take that for the record, sir.

But we will get an answer for you.

Mr. BARTLETT. Dr. Sega, you mentioned that we have plans to

reconstitute in the event that we lost satellites.

If we lost our satellites as the result of an EMP event, it is my

understanding that all of the unhardened satellites—which essentially is all of the satellites, except the few that were mentioned—

would be gone from prompt effects if they were line-of-sight, and

the other satellites would decay quickly as a result of the Van

Allen Belts being pumped up—which if, in fact, the Russian generals are correct, that they have a weapon that would produce 200

kilovolts per meter, would be quite some enhancement of the Van

Allen Belts.

The only way we could really reconstitute, then, would be with

EMP-hardened satellites, would it not? Because if we launched a

new satellite it would similarly, rapidly decay, because of the

pumped up Van Allen Belts. True?

Dr. SEGA. A thorough discussion is appropriate probably more in

a closed session. But let me clarify the reconstitution piece.

We are just at the first stages of doing tactical satellite experiments in terms of rapid reconstitution. So, we are on that path, but

we are a ways away from looking at that option in an operational

sense.

The effects that we look at in space are several-fold. And then

on the ground, as you mentioned, the EMP is a strong electromagnetic wave, there is also the issue of particles, which would be

different than the effect that you mentioned.

And so, as we look at the design of satellites and the needs of

the warfighter and the potential environments they need to operate

in, we do need to consider all these different aspects. And I will

leave it at that.

Mr. BARTLETT. If I use a physiological analysis of where I think

we are, I think that we are sufficiently hardened so that, if I was

representative of our military capability, my brain and spinal cord

would work, but my arms and legs would not.

And I am not sure what good signals would do me running

around in my brain and spinal cord, if I had no arms and legs.

And I think this is a reasonable analogy as to what our military

would look like after a robust EMP lay-down. I think that we

would have little or no warfighting capability remaining, other

than nuclear.

Is that incorrect?

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General CHILTON. Sir, again, I do not think we want to get into

discussions on capabilities and vulnerabilities here. But I do not—

when you start talking a nuclear conflict here, I think we are talking about a different level than what we have been talking about

here today.

Mr. BARTLETT. I want to thank you very much for permitting me

to come. And I would—if you would welcome me to your closed

hearing, I would be pleased to come there, too. Thank you very

much.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Not only that, Dr. Bartlett, what I am going to

offer you is, if your military legislative assistant (MLA) would be

willing to work with Ms. Ramsay for questions for the record, I

think that is a better forum and a better, more classified opportunity for us to deal with these issues.

And, of course, we will invite you to subsequent classified hearings on these issues, and I appreciate that you have a significant

interest in this area, and we share that interest.

Thank you very much.

Gentlemen, the committee generally, and the ranking member

and I, specifically, have concerns about black and white space coordination and other issues.

And I am going to yield to the ranking member to make an offer.

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.

I do have concerns that we are not looking closely enough at the

emergence of black and white space. And I particularly think that

Secretary Teets did a great job when he was here in trying to get

us down that path.

I think Space Radar may be a good idea—I mean, a good example of that.

It seems to me that—Dr. Kerr, I heard what you said about it

being a joint effort now. But I would make the suggestion that the

IC tried to kill Space Radar with 1,000 different cuts.

I am also interested in the merging of black and white space

where possible. Where is the NSSO in this?

And I understand again this year that DOD and the Air Force

have cut any funding of personnel at NSSO.

So, what I would like to do, and the chairman has kindly offered

that we invite Dr. Sega and Dr. Kerr—and perhaps a couple of others—back for a hearing on this a little later.

Ms. TAUSCHER. In a more classified setting.

Mr. EVERETT. When we have a more classified setting.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Ms. TAUSCHER. I thank the ranking member.

And let me thank our staff for doing such a great job.

Gentlemen, I know that you have lots of people behind the scenes

that enable you to have such significant testimony before us. We

want to thank them, too.

We want to thank you for your service to the country, and I

think we are going to be seeing you sooner than we expected. That

is a good thing for everyone. Thank you for all of your hard work.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:00 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. EVERETT

Mr. EVERETT. Please describe your view on the current state of ‘‘black and white’’

space integration and what should be done in this area in the future. Consider the

areas of organization and management, S&T, acquisition, operations, and personnel,

at a minimum.

Dr. SEGA and General CHILTON. I would characterize our integration efforts as

collaborative and cooperative. While space is our common operations environment,

we have distinct missions; however, we can leverage each others’ expertise and resources to meet mission objectives. Last year the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and

the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) signed a memorandum

that recognized the potential benefits of sharing expertise, best practices and lessons

learned in developing, acquiring, fielding and operating modern space systems.

We have integrated organizationally; for example, Mr. Bruce Wilson, our Deputy

Director for Air, Space and Information Operations was a senior civilian member

of the NRO, while Major General Tom Sheridan, the Deputy Director of the NRO

is an Air Force general officer who came from Air Force Space Command. This is

a great first step to improving formal interagency collaboration and long-range planning.

Acquisition and Science & Technology (S&T) are additional areas where we are

working jointly, and where we can continue to break new ground in areas of mutual

benefit. For example, as Dr. Kerr testified, the President’s Budget contained the

first jointly funded approach to Space Radar consolidated under single program

management. In addition, the NRO Deputy Director for Advanced Systems and

Technology participates in the AFSPC S&T process that develops space programming guidance for the Air Force. This collaborative approach to space acquisition

and S&T maximizes our resources on common spacecraft issues, and is where I foresee greater cooperation in the future.

With respect to personnel and operations, we continue to work across service

boundaries and with the NRO to get the right person with the right expertise in

the right position to lead in the joint space environment. The Air Force provides

nearly half of the NRO’s workforce, while the Navy, Army and Marines also provide

technical and support staff. We have created a joint space assignment advisory

board to track the careers of space professionals to ensure that they are provided

the job experiences, as well as the education and training, necessary for their professional advancement.

Mr. EVERETT. What specific organization and management mechanisms are in

place to address ‘‘black and white’’ space integration issues? What forum(s) exist for

decision-making on issues across ‘‘black and white’’ space?

Dr. SEGA and General CHILTON. The mission of the National Security Space Office

(NSSO) is to enable National Security Space decision-making. Two NSSO guiding

principles are to embrace cross-community, ‘‘joint’’ DoD and Intelligence Community

(IC) perspectives and serve the needs of the Secretary of Defense and the Director

of National Intelligence. One product of the NSSO supporting acquisitions was the

creation of the National Security Space (NSS) Acquisition Policy 03–01 which establishes a common guidance for DoD and IC space programs.

An Air Force-National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) memorandum signed on 7

June 2006 defined several management mechanisms to enable integration. As a result, the Deputy Director of our Air, Space and Information Operations Directorate

is now a senior civilian member of the NRO. Similarly, the Deputy Director of the

NRO is an Air Force general officer who came from Air Force Space Command.

We have several forums such as the Space Partnership Council, which includes

senior representatives of Air Force Space Command, NRO, U.S. Strategic Command,

the DoD Executive Agent for Space, NASA, CIA, and Defense Research & Engineering (DDR&E) organizations, as well as AFSPC S&T Councils, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Days with AFSPC, and AFSPC–NRO Focus Days

that provide agency leaders the means to discuss and reach agreement on collaborative efforts.

Mr. EVERETT. Who or what organization or management construct is responsible

for overseeing the protection/defense of U.S. space assets? What processes are in

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place to address and enforce space protection within individual space acquisition

programs and across the enterprise?

Dr. SEGA and General CHILTON. The United States Air Force is responsible to the

DoD and the Nation to provide capabilities to ‘‘. . . defend the United States

against air and space attack... and to establish local air and space

superiority . . ..’’ These mission critical roles and missions are based on specialized

competencies within the USAF and are fully consistent with U.S. Space Policy and

DoD Directive 5100.1.

The Air Force will fulfill its responsibility to the Nation by developing, operating

and sustaining a space architecture that will preserve space capabilities with increased space protection; as well as the ability to augment and restore critical military space missions when needed.

Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) is well positioned as the DoD principal force

provider and integrator to ensure DoD space protection capabilities. In this role,

AFSPC partners with all Services, DoD agencies and U.S. Government organizations. Established DoD processes will be used to plan, program and budget required

activities.

Mr. EVERETT. What metrics currently exist to identify and track military space

personnel and their experience? Do you know if an officer with a space technical

or operations background is filling a space technical or operations billet? Please provide any statistics in this area to the subcommittee.

General CHILTON. In my role as the Space Professional Functional Authority

(SPFA), I am responsible for the health of the Air Force Space Professional Community. We established an SPFA Advisory Council to assist in this effort by providing

recommendations and guidance on policy directly impacting personnel development.

During a recent meeting, the Advisory Council gave preliminary approval to a number of metrics designed to track the health of the Space Professional Community

and the effectiveness of the Air Force Space Professional Development Program

(SPDP).

The Space Professional Management Office (SPMO) documents and tracks education, training and experience qualifications for each Air Force Space Professional

in the Space Professional Development Database. The SPMO also tracks education,

training and experience requirements for each space manpower billet in the Air

Force. The education, training and experience criteria equate to one of three SPDP

Certification Levels, which are also tracked in the database. Experience is documented using Space Professional Experience Codes (SPEC), ten alphanumeric codes

that provide details on the type and amount of experience each individual possesses

or each space billet requires. This data forms the baseline for a series of metrics.

Yes, we do have the capability to know if an officer with a space technical or operations background is filling a space technical or operations billet. A broad set of

metrics compares the inventory of Space Professionals versus space manpower requirements—comparing ‘‘supply’’ (people) and ‘‘demand’’ (position requirements).

These metrics can be focused on particular areas, depending on the type of assessment, i.e., Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC), SPDP Certification Level, and SPECs.

For example, a metric can be used to assess the inventory of space operations

(AFSC 13S) officers, at a particular SPDP Certification Level, with specific SPEC

experience versus Air Force position requirements in the same categories. These

metrics allow the SPMO to assess the adequacy of the personnel inventory to meet

mission requirements—current and future. The metrics are also used in a variety

of data analysis applications.

Another metric compares individual skills versus position requirements for key

leadership positions: wing, group and squadron commander. These metrics, expressed as a percentage, illustrate the number of key leaders who possess all the

requirements for the position they occupy. A notional example: the commander of

the 2nd Space Operations Squadron (2 SOPS) would be required to have (1) operations and (2) acquisition experience in the Satellite Operations SPEC, as well as

specific experience in (3) Precision Navigation and Timing. Given these requirements, an individual selected for the 2 SOPS command position who does not have

acquisition experience would meet 66% of the requirements. This metric confirms

the right people are being assigned to the right jobs, enables inventory assessment

to ensure an adequate pool of candidates for the 2 SOPS commander position, and

validates position requirements.

Metrics focused on space education, a key element of SPDD, provide feedback on

the ability to meet requirements in this arena. One metric measures the ability of

the National Security Space Institute (NSSI) to fulfill space professional education

requirements (e.g., Space 200—required for mid-grade Space Professionals) by comparing NSSI student capacity, annual student requirements and the number of students who completed the course during that year. Additional metrics track the numVerDate 22-MAR-2001 14:03 Dec 08, 2008 Jkt 037322 PO 00000 Frm 00104 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\110-44\082290.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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ber of available Space Professionals who possess specific educational credentials,

e.g., space academic certificates, master’s degrees and NSSI Advanced Courses versus billet educational requirements.

We assess whether an officer with a space technical or operations background is

filling a space technical or operations billet is done, as discussed above, by comparing the individual officer’s qualifications documented in the Space Professional Development Database against the requirements for the technical/operations billet.

In addition to the metrics reviewed by General Chilton and the Advisory Council,

the SPMO routinely develops data on various characteristics of the Space Professional Community that provide insights into mission capabilities. Examples are provided below.

Notes:

1. A–J denotes Mission code

A: Satellite systems, B: Nuclear, C: Spacelift, D: Warning, E: Space Control, F: Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, G: Kinetic Effects, H: Space Warning

C2, I: Space Test, Evaluation, Education and Training, J: Space Staff

2. Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC)

13S: Space Operations (officer)

61S: Scientist

62E: Engineer

63A: Program Manager

1C6: Space Operations (enlisted)

Officer Billets by SPEC/Rank

ABCDEFGH I J Total

LT 140 322 49 24 35 43 4 3 7 74 701

CPT 418 561 231 185 183 327 12 118 168 233 2436

MAJ 231 209 116 166 136 318 53 183 174 385 1971

LTC 128 107 77 84 77 234 56 61 93 261 1178

COL 26 33 32 19 14 50 14 16 14 86 304

GEN 1 4 1 0 1 3 4 2 0 18 34

944 1236 506 478 446 975 143 383 456 1057 6624

Officer Billets by AFSC

Officer 13S 61S 62E 63A Other Total

LT 446 22 125 89 19 701

CPT 1300 97 527 332 180 2436

MAJ 1040 59 347 306 219 1971

LTC 507 36 182 278 175 1178

COL 84 3 17 53 147 304

GEN 0 0 0 0 34 34

3377 217 1198 1058 774 6624

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SPEC vs. Experience (in years)

ABCDEFGH I I J

Any 2782 3360 1427 1650 1550 1395 476 860 3807 970 2342

>3 1463 2405 626 628 638 718 162 318 434 256 670

>6 211 724 86 137 156 223 21 24 52 23 107

>9 20 249 23 35 44 63 2 1 9 2 21

>15 0 31 1 2 4 5 0 0 1 0 1

Officer Billets by AFSC

Officer

13S 3377

61S 217

62E 1198

63A 1058

Other 774

6624

Officer/Enlisted Space Pros by

AFSC

Officer

13S 3413

61S 363

62E 1686

63A 1186

Other 460 7108

Enlisted

1C6 896

Other 385 1281

8389

Mr. EVERETT. With respect to the newer space acquisition programs like TSAT,

Space Radar, and GPS–III, what specific criteria will be used (e.g., technology readiness levels, affordability), and at what point in the acquisition cycle, to determine

whether these programs should continue to move forward or an alternative solution

pursued? Similarly, what criteria are used to determine whether existing programs

should be continued or a new approach pursued?

Dr. SEGA. National Security Space (NSS) Acquisition Policy 03–01 provides acquisition process guidance for the combined space activities of the DoD and National

Intelligence Community (IC). National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Directive 7 describes a similar acquisition process for the IC portion of the NSS team.

The NSS Acquisition Process is a streamlined, tailored method for the DoD Space

Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) to use in the executive management and oversight of the DoD space programs under his authority. The process includes unamVerDate 22-MAR-2001 14:03 Dec 08, 2008 Jkt 037322 PO 00000 Frm 00106 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\110-44\082290.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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biguous acquisition phases, decision points based on program maturity with focused

program assessments, and periodic reports and reviews. Key Decision Points (KDPs)

are points in the acquisition timeline of a DoD Space program expressly used to address the questions you have raised. The DoD Space MDA convenes a Defense Space

Acquisition Board (DSAB) for each KDP to obtain advice and information necessary

to do a thorough evaluation of the program. Each DSAB reviews areas to revalidate

warfighter requirements and mission need, the DoD and/or other appropriate components support for the program, assess the program life cycle financial requirements, and ultimately determine if the program should continue into the next

phase, be redirected, or terminated. The standard required to begin development is

that critical technologies be demonstrated in a relevant environment. The TSAT,

Space Radar, and GPS III programs are all implementing significant Phase A system engineering activities and technology maturation plans to inform their planned

KDP–B milestones. In preparation for these milestones each of these programs will

undergo rigorous assessments in regard to technology readiness, affordability and

a myriad of other factors. This will include an independent assessment of cost to

understand affordability and a technology maturity assessment to understand technology readiness. These assessments must provide sufficient knowledge to the appropriate milestone decision authorities so that an informed decision can be made

as to the future plans of these acquisitions to include alternative approaches if needed.

Mr. EVERETT. What specific space surveillance commercial/foreign entity (CFE)

services are funded in the Fiscal Year 2008 request and what are the Air Force’s

plans for implementing the CFE program on an ongoing basis? Are the resources

available to enable both the completion of the pilot program and its full implementation thereafter?

Dr. SEGA and General CHILTON. The existing CFE Pilot Program (also known as

the spacetrack.org website) which provides basic information on unclassified cataloged space objects is not funded in the Fiscal Year 2008 request; however, AFSPC’s

intent is to allocate available funding from other requirements in the Space Situational Awareness program to maintain the program at its current level of service.

AFSPC plans to evolve the existing CFE pilot program from a basic website to

an improved operational capability that provides advanced services (conjunction assessment, launch screening, anomaly resolution, etc.) to a wide variety of customers

to include Commercial, Allied, Public and Foreign Interests.

No resources are available within the budget for full implementation of the program. Although we support the Presidents Budget, the 2008 unfunded priority list

includes a request for funds to improve reliability and operationalize the existing

CFE Pilot Program.

Mr. EVERETT. Please describe your view on the current state of ‘‘black and white’’

space integration and what should be done in this area in the future. Consider the

areas of organization and management, S&T, acquisition, operations and personnel,

at a minimum.

Dr. KERR. I do not look at ‘‘black and white’’ space integration as an end in itself,

because space is the place from which we perform our mission; but it is not our mission.

It is critical, however, that the Air Force and the NRO (as well as other U.S. organizations with space programs) continually examine what we need to meet our mission requirements and that we work closely to align and coordinate programs and

capabilities whenever the result will be a more efficient and effective capability for

our Nation. Below are several examples where the NRO has worked closely with

others with the result that we all have stronger space programs.

• The NRO and Air Force reaffirmed our strong relationship on 7 June 2006,

with a joint Statement of Intent, signed by Gen. Mosley and myself. This

agreement bolstered the ties and reaffirms collaborative approaches between

the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence. The NRO’s

workforce, composed of approximately 50% Air Force personnel and more

than 40% CIA employees, serves as the ultimate exemplar for joint and integrated activities. The NRO and our partner agencies have cooperated to advance the nation’s space interests in several areas: EELV, Space Radar, the

Space Partnership Council, and STRATCOM’s Joint Forces Component Commander for Space (JFCC-Space).

• One key acquisition and operational example involves the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) agreement between the Air Force (as DoD’s executive agent for launch) and the NRO. EELV is a true partnership—there is

a 30/70 split between the NRO and Air Force on all launch costs. The NRO

and the Air Force use the same launch bases and range support assets. The

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Air Force’s Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) provides booster verification process and the NRO funds 50% of SMC launch related Aerospace

Corp technical expertise. Additionally, NRO communications teams support

all EELV missions (NRO, Air Force and commercial launches). This partnership helps ensure mission success through unfettered sharing of EELV performance data.

• The Space Radar program stands out as a future operational system where

the NRO and Air Force have devised an integrated effort to achieve persistent

surveillance capabilities for the nation. The Program Executive Officer, Air

Force Major General Torn Sheridan, who also serves as NRO Deputy Director, and his NRO/CIA Deputy Program Executive Officer are following Intelligence Community and DoD guidance to jointly produce spacecraft and develop ground infrastructure to operate Space Radar with funds now consolidated into the military and national intelligence budget. Managing the SR

Program within the NRO MIP portfolio also strengthens efforts to integrate

SR budgets and efforts into the classified NGA and NRO ground architectures

to ensure an end-to-end capability is developed.

• More recently, the NRO intensified cooperative efforts with our mission partners regarding Space Situational Awareness. The NRO and STRATCOM exchanged senior leaders to support the JFCC-Space, BGEN Jeff Horne, the

NRO’s Deputy Director for Mission Support is dual-hatted as the Deputy

JFCC-Space. Finally, tighter integration has been achieved by the initiation

of backup command and control capabilities between STRATCOM’s Joint

Space Operations Center (JSpOC) and the NRO’s Operations Center (NROC).

Mr. EVERETT. What specific organization and management mechanisms are in

place to address ‘‘black and white’’ space integration issues? What forum(s) exist for

decision-making on issues across ‘‘black and white’’ space?

Dr. KERR. As mentioned earlier, the NRO works closely with others to ensure that

we are developing systems and capabilities that best meet the needs of our nations.

This goes well beyond the NRO and the Air Force, to include many other parties.

• The NRO is a member of the Space Partnership Council. This council provides coordination between Air Force Space Command, USSTRATCOM, the

NRO, NASA and DARPA. The council considers broad issues, including

science and technology development, involving the nation’s space programs

and allows senior leadership to responsively address issues that impact the

nation’s space program as a whole. This council meets twice a year, April and

December.

• NRO/AS&T meets regularly with other research and development organizations, such as DARPA, National Labs and others, to collaborate on new technologies and to support each other in our mutual research.

• The NRO participates in the NASA/NRO working group to answer questions

of shared architecture and resources,

Mr. EVERETT. Who or what organization or management construct is responsible

for overseeing the protection/defense of U.S. space assets? What processes are in

place to address and enforce space protection within individual space acquisition

programs and across the enterprise?

Dr. KERR. The Intelligence Community and Department of Defense have traditionally supported one another in the analysis and mitigation of threats to our space

systems. Primarily, STRATCOM, in their role as JFCC-Space, is responsible for the

defense of our space assets. As previously stated, the NRO’s Operations Center

(NROC) and the 14th AF’s Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) jointly provide

Space Situational Awareness data to the space community to ensure we collectively

have the most current threat data.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT

Mr. BARTLETT. What percent would you say of our total military communications

moves over EMP-hardened satellites?

General CHILTON. In total, approximately 85% of our military-owned SATCOM capacity is EMP-hardened. Of DoD-owned SATCOM systems on orbit (UHF FollowOn [UFO], the Defense Satellite Communications System, and Milstar), only UFO

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satellites were not intended to operate in an EMP environment. None of the commercial capacity we lease is EMP hardened. Adding commercial SATCOM to our

total communication capacity reduces the percent of the EMP-hardened SATCOM

for military use to 13–14 percent.

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