*Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-20859

Summary Calendar

 

FLOYD GIBSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

THE METHODIST HOSPITAL,

Defendant-Appellee.

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(CA-H-96-1605)

 

January 21, 1997

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Floyd Gibson appeals the district court’s dismissal of his

Title VII claim for failure to file suit within ninety days of

receipt of his right-to-sue letter from the EEOC as required by 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

The district court applied the correct rule of law. “[T]he

giving of notice to the claimant at the address designated by him

suffices to start the ninety-day period unless the claimant,
2

through no fault of his own, failed to receive the right-to-sue

letter or unless, for some other equitable reason, the statute

should be tolled until he actually receives notice.” Espinoza v.

Missouri Pacific RR. Co., 754 F.2d 1247, 1250 (5th Cir. 1985).

Under this rule, the statutory period can begin to run even if the

claimant does not actually receive the letter. Id. Gibson argues

that his case fits within the tolling portion of the rule. Because

he changed residences in February of 1995, Gibson insists, it was

not his fault that he never actually received the letter, which was

delivered to Gibson’s record address by certified mail on February

4 and February 9. He notified the EEOC by telephone of his new

address within a week of moving, and the EEOC failed to mention

that it had recently sent his right-to-sue letter.

Gibson had plenty of opportunity to develop this argument

below. His affidavit, however, states merely that he moved

“[a]round the middle part of February 1995.” Even if the ninth day

is already in a month’s “middle part,” the fourth day is not. It

is undisputed, therefore, that the letter was actually delivered to

an address on file where Gibson resided. On these facts, the

district court did not clearly err when it found that Gibson was at

fault for failing to receive the letter. See Hill v. John Chezik

Imports, 869 F.2d 1122, 1124 (8th Cir. 1989) (“Generally, the

ninety-day filing period begins to run on the day the right to sue

letter is received at the most recent address that a plaintiff has

provided the EEOC. In the instant case, Hill could easily have
3

informed the EEOC of her new address.”); Ringgold v. National

Maintenance Corp., 796 F.2d 769, 770 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam)

(“We hold that the 90-day period of limitation . . . begins to run

on the date that the EEOC right-to-sue letter is delivered to the

offices of formally designated counsel or to the claimant.”);

Hunter v. Stephenson Roofing, Inc., 790 F.2d 472, 475 (6th Cir.

1986) (“[P]laintiff’s ninety day time period began to run five days

after the date the EEOC mailed plaintiff’s right-to-sue letter to

his address of record.” (footnote omitted)); Thomas v. Exxon,

U.S.A., 943 F. Supp. 751, 757 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (“[T]o extend the

filing period based on a claim that the letter was not actually

received by Thomas until December 28, 1993, five days after her

daughter acknowledged receipt, would serve to foster a

‘“manipulable open-ended time extension which would render the

statutory limitation meaningless.”’” (quoting Law v. Hercules,

Inc., 713 F.2d 691, 693 (11th Cir. 1983))); Griffin v. Prince

William Hosp. Corp., 716 F. Supp. 919, 921 (E.D. Va. 1989)

(“[S]ensibly settled authority confirms that the EEOC is entitled

to rely on the address plaintiff furnished and to start the running

of the 90 day period by sending the right-to-sue letter to that

address.”).

AFFIRMED.