SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1605-16T4

JUAN VILLALOBOS,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD,

Respondent.

__________________________________

Argued May 30, 2018 – Decided June 12, 2018

Before Judges Fisher, Moynihan and Natali.

On appeal from the Civil Service Commission, 

CSC Docket No. 2015-3042.

Sanford R. Oxfeld argued the cause for 

appellant (Oxfeld Cohen, PC, attorneys; 

Sanford R. Oxfeld, of counsel; John Branigan, 

on the brief).

Gregory R. Bueno, Deputy Attorney General,

argued the cause for respondent New Jersey 

State Parole Board (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney 

General, attorney; Melissa Dutton Schaffer, 

Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; 

Gregory R. Bueno and Suzanne Davies, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-1605-16T4

for respondent New Jersey Civil Service 

Commission (Debra A. Allen, Deputy Attorney 

General, on the statement in lieu of brief).

PER CURIAM

Juan Villalobos appeals from a final determination of the 

Civil Service Commission (Commission) terminating his position as 

a senior parole officer with the New Jersey State Parole Board 

(Board) for misappropriating union funds. The Commission adopted 

the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). We affirm.

Because ALJ Thomas R. Betancourt comprehensively detailed the 

relevant factual and procedural history in his written opinion,

we briefly recount those facts necessary to provide context for 

our decision.

Villalobos was a parole officer with the Board from 1994 to

2013. During that period, he also held numerous executive 

positions with his union, Police Benevolent Association (PBA) 

Local 326, including recording secretary, vice-president, 

president and state delegate. On December 9, 2013, the Bergen 

County Prosecutor charged Villalobos with theft by deception for 

improperly withdrawing $5270 in union funds to pay personal legal 

expenses related to his divorce and current family members'

immigration issues. 

The next day, the Board issued an initial Preliminary Notice 

of Disciplinary Action (PNDA) and suspended Villalobos with pay 
3 A-1605-16T4

pending a Loudermill1 hearing for conduct unbecoming a public 

employee in violation of N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3. The PNDA identified 

the specific criminal and administrative charges and notified 

Villalobos that he was in "jeopardy of removal" because of his 

"indictment"2 by the Bergen County Prosecutor. 

Less than a week later, Villalobos participated in a

Loudermill hearing. The hearing officer issued a written decision 

the same day. Like the PNDA, the decision detailed the charges 

and informed Villalobos that he was at risk of being removed from 

his employment with the Board. He also concluded that there was 

sufficient evidence to suspend Villalobos with pay pending a formal 

disciplinary hearing. Villalobos was served with a copy of the 

hearing officer's decision.

Villalobos was accepted into the Bergen County Pretrial 

Intervention (PTI) Program and ordered to repay the 

misappropriated funds. He was granted an early release of PTI and 

his record was expunged. 

The Board issued a second PNDA on September 2, 2014. 

Villalobos was again notified that he was charged with conduct 

 

1 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985).

2 As criminal proceedings were initiated by summons and complaint, 

the PNDA's reference to an indictment was in error. 
4 A-1605-16T4

unbecoming a public employee and that he could lose his job because

of the charges that led to his arrest.

Next, the Board held a formal disciplinary hearing. The 

hearing officer concluded Villalobos' conduct was unbecoming of a 

public employee in violation of N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6), (11), and 

recommended Villalobos be terminated from his position as a parole 

officer. The Board issued a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action 

(FNDA) affirming the conduct unbecoming charge and Villalobos' 

firing. Villalobos appealed his termination and the matter was 

transferred to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) as a 

contested case.

The ALJ presided over a five-day hearing. He considered 

testimony from twelve witnesses and examined documentary evidence 

introduced by the parties including five unauthorized checks that 

formed the basis of the charges. 

The ALJ determined that four of the checks — nos. 2016, 2017, 

2560 and 2937 — were issued from 2008 to 2010 to Anayancy R. 

Hausman, Esq., an immigration attorney working with Villalobos' 

current wife's family. The last check at issue — no. 2612 — was 

issued on January 6, 2010, in the amount of $3000 and made payable 

to Charles C. Abut, Esq., Villalobos' divorce mediator.

Before the ALJ, Villalobos defended his conduct not by 

claiming the disputed funds were appropriately related to union 
5 A-1605-16T4

business — he conceded the money was used for personal legal 

expenses — rather, he maintained the checks were authorized and

issued consistent with then existing PBA Local 326 practices and 

procedures. Two witnesses played a critical role at trial on this 

central point: Villalobos and Kenneth Metallides, a senior parole 

officer and former PBA Local 326 treasurer. 

Metallides testified that PBA Local 326 maintained general, 

political action committee, and annuity accounts. He stated that 

the union's regular and ordinary practice required checks

exceeding $500 issued from the union's accounts to be presented 

to the executive board for approval and signed by the treasurer

and either the president or the state delegate. Metallides stated

that it was his practice as treasurer to leave behind both signed 

and unsigned blank checks when he went on vacation. In December 

2009, he left signed, blank checks with Villalobos, but expected 

that they would be used for "[u]nion expenses or [u]nion 

expenditures" and only in an emergency.

Metallides testified that upon returning from vacation in 

January, he noticed that Villalobos had issued multiple checks in 

his absence, including check no. 2612, a pre-signed check that 

Villalobos co-signed. According to Metallides, check no. 2612 was 

disbursed contrary to union policies as it was issued without his 

or the board's approval. 
6 A-1605-16T4

Metallides testified that he emailed Villalobos concerning

check no. 2612 and other checks written from the general account 

and asked for documentation supporting the expenditures. He also 

verbally asked Villalobos for clarification as to the purpose of 

check no. 2612. Villalobos responded that check no. 2612 related 

to an arbitration. Metallides understood Villalobos' explanation 

to mean that the check was a union expenditure for an arbitrator, 

a common practice. 

Villalobos testified that the checks at issue were approved 

in a manner consistent with PBA Local 326's practices and that 

check no. 2612 was a loan. He confirmed that if a member requests 

funds from the union's accounts, the item was placed on the meeting 

agenda for discussion and vote. If approved, a check was issued 

and the transaction noted in the meeting minutes. He also 

maintained that the minutes would confirm the board authorized the 

expenditures reflected in the checks.3

Villalobos disputed Metallides' testimony that he regularly

left blank, signed checks behind when he went on vacation. He 

stated that Metallides knowingly signed the disputed checks and 

maintained check no. 2612 was presented to the executive board for 

 

3 Neither party offered into evidence any of the board minutes.
7 A-1605-16T4

approval. Villalobos denied having received the email from 

Metallides inquiring into checks written from the general account. 

In his written decision, the ALJ determined that the Board 

met its burden of proof by a preponderance of the competent and 

credible evidence. He characterized Metallides' testimony as 

"compelling" and found him to be an "extremely credible" witness. 

The ALJ specifically deemed his testimony regarding leaving signed 

blank checks in his office while on vacation "very credible." 

Conversely, the ALJ did not believe Villalobos. He

characterized his testimony as "disingenuous" and observed that 

he did not respond directly to questions but rather "seemed to 

spin [his] answers." The ALJ based his adverse credibility 

findings in part on Villalobos' "not believable" testimony that 

he failed to receive Metallides' email regarding check no. 2612. 

He further concluded that Villalobos' testimony that the $3000 

check was brought to the attention of the board "defie[d]

credulity" as Metallides was on vacation at the time the check was 

issued and no executive meeting was scheduled.

The ALJ considered Villalobos' conduct in the context of his 

status as a law enforcement officer which required Villalobos to 

be held "to a higher standard." In affirming the decision of the 

hearing officer, the ALJ substantiated the charge of conduct 

unbecoming a public official warranting termination:
8 A-1605-16T4

It is abundantly clear from the record that 

[Villalobos] used [PBA Local] 326's account 

to pay personal legal expenses related to his 

divorce and for the family of his future wife. 

[Villalobos] was appropriately charged with 

theft by deception in violation of N.J.S.A. 

2C:20-4. Notwithstanding that [Villalobos]

entered into PTI, received early termination 

of PTI and had the record expunged, the 

underlying fact that [he] misused union funds 

is more than sufficient to sustain a finding 

of conduct unbecoming a public employee. It 

is also a sustained charge[] that warrants a 

penalty of removal.

On November 15, 2016, the Commission adopted the ALJ's findings 

of fact and conclusions of law.

On appeal, Villalobos contends the decision of the Commission 

was not supported by a preponderance of the competent and credible 

evidence and that he was not sufficiently put on notice of the 

charges against him. We disagree.

Appellate review of an administrative agency decision is 

limited. In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007). A strong 

presumption of reasonableness attaches to the Commission's 

decision. In re Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App. Div.

2001). Appellant has the burden to demonstrate grounds for 

reversal. McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 

563 (App. Div. 2002).

Appellate courts generally defer to final agency actions, 

only "reversing those actions if they are 'arbitrary, capricious 
9 A-1605-16T4

or unreasonable or [if the action] is not supported by substantial 

credible evidence in the record as a whole.'" N.J. Soc'y for the 

Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric., 196 N.J. 

366, 384-85 (2008) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 

571, 579-80 (1980) (alteration in original)). Under the arbitrary, 

capricious, and unreasonable standard, our scope of review is 

guided by three major inquiries: (1) whether the agency's decision 

conforms with the relevant law; (2) whether the decision is 

supported by substantial credible evidence in the record; and (3) 

whether in applying the law to the facts, the administrative agency 

clearly erred in reaching its conclusion. In re Stallworth, 208 

N.J. 182, 194 (2011).

When an agency decision satisfies such criteria, we accord 

substantial deference to the agency's fact-finding and legal 

conclusions, acknowledging the agency's "expertise and superior 

knowledge of a particular field." Circus Liquors, Inc. v. 

Governing Body of Middletown Twp., 199 N.J. 1, 10 (2009) (quoting 

Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992)). 

We will not substitute our judgment for the agency's even though 

we might have reached a different conclusion. Stallworth, 208 

N.J. at 194; see also In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999).

Our deference to agency decisions "applies to the review of 

disciplinary sanctions as well." Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 28. "In 
10 A-1605-16T4

light of the deference owed to such determinations, when reviewing 

administrative sanctions, 'the test . . . is whether such 

punishment is so disproportionate to the offense, in light of all 

the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness.'" 

Id. at 28-29 (quoting In re Polk, 90 N.J. 550, 578 (1982)).

After thoroughly reviewing the record in light of the legal 

principles and the standard of review, we are satisfied that the 

Commission's decision was not arbitrary, capricious or

unreasonable and was supported by substantial credible evidence 

in the record. According deference to the ALJ's credibility 

determinations, there is substantial evidence in the record to 

support the ALJ's factual findings and legal conclusions, which 

the Commission adopted. Further, we conclude the penalty of 

termination of a public officer who misappropriates union funds 

for personal use was not so wide of the mark to justify our 

substitution of the Commission's judgment. See In re Carter, 191 

N.J. 474, 485 (2007) (recognizing that appellate courts have upheld 

the removal of public officials "where the acts charged, with or 

without any prior discipline, have warranted the imposition of 

that sanction"). 

With respect to Villalobos' claim that he received inadequate 

notice of the charges, the ALJ correctly concluded that the initial

PNDA adequately informed Villalobos of the charges and the Board's 
11 A-1605-16T4

incorrect characterization of the summons and complaint as an 

"indictment" did not render the notice deficient. Specifically, 

the PNDA outlined Villalobos' criminal and administrative charges 

and notified him that he was in jeopardy of being fired. Further, 

the ALJ astutely noted that Villalobos received a second PNDA and

participated in a Loudermill hearing. Both the second PNDA and 

the decision stemming from the Loudermill hearing indicated that 

Villalobos could be dismissed as a parole officer as a result of 

his alleged criminal behavior. The notice here was significantly 

more detailed than that provided to the public employee in Town 

of West New York v. Bock, 38 N.J. 500 (1962). In that case, the 

PNDA did not advise the employee of the penalty of removal and the 

Commission considered actions outside the scope of the charges 

listed in the PNDA. 

In light of the information contained in the multiple PNDAs 

and presented at the Loudermill hearing, the ALJ appropriately 

determined that Villalobos was provided with sufficient notice of 

the charges to prepare a defense and was given all the process he 

was due. See Bock, 38 N.J. at 520-21.

To the extent not addressed, Villalobos' remaining arguments

lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. 

R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.