UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4477

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ROBERT BOVE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, 

Jr., District Judge. (3:11-cr-00104-RJC-1)

Submitted: February 20, 2014 Decided: February 25, 2014

Before DUNCAN, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Marc L. Resnick, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Anne M. 

Tompkins, United States Attorney, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Robert Bove appeals his 135-month, below-Guidelines

sentence imposed after he pled guilty to one count each of 

transportation of visual depictions of minors engaged in 

sexually explicit conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A.

§ 2252(a)(1) (West Supp. 2013), and possession of visual 

depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(a)(4) (West Supp. 2013). Bove

argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because he 

asserts that the district court failed to duly consider his 

argument that his sentence should be lower based on his low 

recidivism risk. Bove also asserts that his sentence is 

substantively unreasonable because given his history and 

characteristics, a shorter sentence would have achieved the 

purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). Finding no error, we 

affirm.

Because Bove requested a sentence different than the 

one imposed, his claim was properly preserved, and this court 

reviews it for reasonableness under an abuse of discretion 

standard, reversing “unless . . . the error was harmless.” 

United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576, 578 (4th Cir. 2010) 

(“By drawing arguments from § 3553 for a sentence different than 

the one ultimately imposed, an aggrieved party sufficiently 

alerts the district court of its responsibility to render an 
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individualized explanation addressing those arguments, and thus 

preserves its claim.”).

This review requires consideration of both the 

procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence. Gall 

v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). This court must first 

assess whether the district court properly calculated the 

advisory Guidelines range, considered the § 3553(a) factors, 

analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and 

sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. at 49-50; see

Lynn, 592 F.3d at 576 (“[A]n individualized explanation must 

accompany every sentence.”); United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 

325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that the “individualized 

assessment . . . must provide a rationale tailored to the 

particular case at hand and [be] adequate to permit meaningful 

appellate review”) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). “Although a court need not necessarily issue a 

comprehensive, detailed opinion, the court’s explanation must 

nonetheless be sufficient ‘to satisfy the appellate court that 

the district court has considered the parties’ arguments and has 

a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking 

authority.’” United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 837 (4th 

Cir. 2010) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 

(2007)) (brackets omitted). 
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The district court’s explanation “need not be 

elaborate or lengthy,” however. Carter, 564 F.3d at 330. As 

this court has noted: “Gall was quite explicit that district 

courts should provide more significant justifications for major 

departures than for minor ones. But when a district court does 

not depart or vary at all, it may provide a less extensive, 

while still individualized, explanation.” United States v. 

Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 639 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal citations, 

quotation marks and brackets omitted). 

If there is no procedural error, we may then review 

the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, “tak[ing] into 

account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent 

of any variance from the Guidelines range.” United States v. 

Morace, 594 F.3d 340, 346 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). “In analyzing a sentence for 

substantive reasonableness, we consider the sentence under a 

deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, whereby we must defer 

to the trial court and can reverse a sentence only if it is 

unreasonable, even if the sentence would not have been the 

choice of the appellate court.” United States v. Yooho Weon, 

722 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). We apply a presumption of reasonableness to a 

sentence within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range. 

United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012).
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We reject Bove’s argument that his sentence is 

procedurally unreasonable and should be vacated because the 

district court allegedly failed to mention counsel’s argument 

that he presented a low risk of reoffending. This court may 

look to the entirety of Bove’s sentencing proceeding to 

determine whether the district court understood his argument for 

a reduced sentence but had reasons for rejecting that argument. 

See Rita, 551 U.S. at 344-45, 358-59. It is apparent from the 

record that the district court: (1) engaged in discussion about 

counsel’s arguments for a lesser sentence; (2) fully considered 

counsel’s arguments, including his argument that Bove’s low risk 

of reoffending required a lesser sentence; (3) rejected the 

argument that Bove’s alleged low recidivism risk required a 

lesser sentence; and (4) thoroughly considered and discussed the 

§ 3553(a) factors it believed justified Bove’s sentence. 

Accordingly, we find no procedural sentencing error by the 

district court. Cf. Lynn, 592 F.3d at 583-85 (finding 

reversible error where the district court gave “no indication 

that [it] considered the defendant’s nonfrivolous arguments 

prior to sentencing him” and stated only that it found Lynn’s 

sentence to be “fair and appropriate and consistent with the 

requirements of § 3553(a)” before imposing Lynn’s sentence) 

(internal ellipses and brackets omitted). 
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We also reject Bove’s argument that his 135–month

below-Guidelines range sentence was substantively unreasonable

and greater than necessary to achieve § 3553(a)’s purposes. 

After considering the district court’s thorough explanation for 

the chosen sentence and its explicit discussion of the § 3553(a) 

factors, and after considering the parties’ arguments, we find 

that Bove has failed to rebut the appellate presumption of 

reasonableness this court affords his below-Guidelines sentence. 

Susi, 674 F.3d at 289. Accordingly, we conclude that Bove’s 

sentence is not substantively unreasonable.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s 

judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED