COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Elder and Overton 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

STEVEN LAWRENCE SYKES 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0012-97-2 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 MARCH 31, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBEMARLE COUNTY 

Paul M. Peatross, Jr., Judge 

 (Willis J. Spaulding, on brief), for 

appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. 

 Thomas D. Bagwell, Senior Assistant Attorney 

General (Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Steven Lawrence Sykes (appellant) was convicted in a bench 

trial of credit card theft in violation of Code § 18.2-192. On 

appeal, he contends the trial court erred in finding that the gas 

card he used was a credit card within the meaning of Code 

§ 18.2-192 and that his conduct violated the statute. For the 

following reasons, we reverse and remand. 

 I. 

 The facts are not in dispute. While appellant was a student 

at the University of Virginia, he worked for pay and as a 

volunteer for the University escort service. As a part of his 

employment, he had permission to use a University "gas card" to 

obtain gas for the University escort van. Appellant admitted to 

using the gas card to obtain gas for his own vehicle on seven 

occasions. 
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 The gas card had a magnetic strip on it which, when inserted 

into a University motor pool gas pump, allowed a person to 

dispense gas and created a record of the amount extracted. The 

card enabled the University to audit the internal distribution of 

gasoline among its employees, allocate funds among its 

departments, and detect misuse of gasoline. 

 At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's case in the trial 

court, appellant moved to strike on the grounds that the facts 

demonstrated petit larceny rather than credit card theft and that 

the gas card was not a credit card as defined in Code 

§ 18.2-191.1

 After extensive argument on whether the gas card 

was a credit card for the purposes of the statute, the trial 

court convicted appellant of credit card theft and sentenced him 

to two years in prison suspended on condition of good behavior 

for five years. 

 II. 

 Appellant was convicted under Code § 18.2-192, which 

provides: 

 A person is guilty of credit card or credit 

card number theft when: 

 (a) He takes, obtains or withholds a credit 

card or credit card number from the person, 

possession, custody or control of another 

without the cardholder's consent or who, with 

knowledge that it has been so taken, obtained 

or withheld, receives the credit card or 

credit card number with intent to use it or 

sell it, or to transfer it to a person other 

 1"'Credit card' means any instrument . . . issued . . . for 

the use of the cardholder in obtaining . . . goods . . . ." Code 

§ 18.2-191. 
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than the issuer or the cardholder; or 

 (b) He receives a credit card or credit card 

number that he knows to have been lost, 

mislaid, or delivered under a mistake as to 

the identity or address of the cardholder, 

and who retains possession with intent to 

use, to sell or to transfer the credit card 

or credit card number to a person other than 

the issuer or the cardholder; or 

 (c) He, not being the issuer, sells a credit 

card or credit card number or buys a credit 

card or credit card number from a person 

other than the issuer; or 

 (d) He, not being the issuer, during any 

twelve-month period, receives credit cards or 

credit card numbers issued in the names of 

two or more persons which he has reason to 

know were taken or retained under 

circumstances which constitute a violation of 

§ 18.2-194 and subdivision (1)(c) of this 

section. 

Appellant argues that his unauthorized use of the gas card does 

not constitute credit card theft for the purposes of this 

statute. We agree. 

 "The main purpose of statutory construction is to determine 

the intention of the legislature 'which, absent constitutional 

infirmity, must always prevail.'" Last v. Virginia State Bd. of 

Med., 14 Va. App. 906, 910, 421 S.E.2d 201, 205 (1992) (quoting 

Board of Supervisors v. King Land Corp., 238 Va. 97, 103, 380 

S.E.2d 895, 897 (1989)). "Where a statute is unambiguous, the 

plain meaning is to be accepted without resort to the rules of 

statutory interpretation." Last, 14 Va. App. at 910, 412 S.E.2d 

at 205. "'Courts are not permitted to rewrite statutes. This is 

a legislative function. The manifest intention of the 

legislature, clearly disclosed by its language, must be 
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applied.'" Barr v. Town & Country Properties, Inc., 240 Va. 292, 

295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990) (quoting Anderson v. 

Commonwealth, 182 Va. 560, 566, 29 S.E.2d 838, 841 (1944)). 

 The legislature clearly intended to prohibit the theft of 

credit cards when it enacted Code § 18.2-192. However, the 

section deals only with improper acquisition, possession, and 

distribution of credit cards; it does not cover subsequent 

misuse. Therefore, even if the evidence established that the gas 

card was a credit card as defined in Code § 18.2-191,2

 the 

statute prohibiting theft of credit cards does not apply to the 

instant facts. Appellant had possession of the gas card with the 

permission of the University. He did not steal it. The above 

facts, if proven, show that he stole gasoline. As appellant 

acknowledges, theft of gasoline valued under $100 is petit 

larceny, not credit card theft. For the foregoing reasons, we 

reverse and remand for the Commonwealth to take whatever action 

it deems appropriate. 

 Reversed and remanded.

 

 2Additionally, appellant argued that the gas card was not a 

credit card as defined in Code § 18.2-191. Resolution of this 

question is not necessary to our decision.