In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-16-00255-CR 

DEWAYNE DESHAE WILLIS, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

 

On Appeal from the 121st District Court 

Terry County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 6553, Honorable Kelly Moore, Presiding 

 

December 28, 2016 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ. 

Appellant, Dewayne Deshae Willis, through a single issue, appeals the 

revocation of his probation for Class A misdemeanor theft. We affirm.

Background

The State moved to revoke appellant’s probation on eleven grounds. When 

asked how he pled to the allegations, appellant answered true to ten of those eleven 

grounds, but not true to the allegation expressed in paragraph A. An evidentiary 

hearing ensued during which the State presented evidence of a criminal trespass 
2

committed by appellant. The latter objected because it was “not one of the allegations 

in this revocation.” Furthermore, “any testimony regarding any potential violation of a

previous criminal trespass order is a criminal violation for which I was not given notice.” 

In response, the trial court said:

Well, unless you want to bifurcate the hearing -- you know, if we bifurcate 

the hearing, then once I make determinations if there’s been a violation,

then I’m going to hear evidence of anything relevant on punishment. And 

so I guess what I’m going to do since you’ve entered a plea of true, I’m 

going to overrule the objection and allow the testimony, and I’ll consider it 

on my punishment.1

The motion to revoke was ultimately granted. The trial court found the allegations in the 

motion to be “true” “. . . based upon your plea and the evidence presented. . . .” So too 

did it revoke his probation and sentence him to 11 months in the county jail.

Extraneous offense

Through his sole issue, appellant asserts that the trial court denied him “due 

process.” That is, the State allegedly was obligated to notify him of its intent to use the 

evidence of criminal trespass as a ground for revoking probation. Assuming arguendo

that the “due process” complaint was preserved since the constitutional right was never

mentioned in the objection at trial, we nonetheless overrule the issue.

Revocation proceedings are unitary in nature. Parker v. State, No. 05-13-01535-

CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 13838, at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Dallas December 29, 2014, no 

pet.) (not designated for publication). In such proceedings “as in a punishment hearing,

the parties may offer any evidence the court deems relevant to sentencing, including 

unadjudicated extraneous offenses and previous bad acts attributable to the defendant.” 

Id. The trial court at bar knew that, as evinced by its explanation for overruling the 

 

1

Appellant did not request a bifurcated hearing.
3

objection. So too did it reveal that the evidence at issue would be considered for 

purposes of “punishment,” which it had the authority to do. And, appellant fails to argue 

that he was entitled to some prior notice of its use for that purpose as a condition to it 

being admitted. Nor did he cite us to anything of record illustrating that the State offered 

the evidence as an alternative basis upon which to revoke his probation; indeed, it was 

not needed given the plea of true to ten other allegations. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Brian Quinn

Chief Justice

Do not publish.