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THE CHALLENGE OF PROTECTING MASS 

GATHERINGS IN A POST-9/11 WORLD 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 9, 2008 

Serial No. 110–124 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

AL GREEN, Texas 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

I. LANIER LAVANT, Staff Director 

ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 2 

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 4 

WITNESSES

PANEL I 

Colonel Robert B. Stephan, USAF (Ret.), Assistant Secretary, Infrastructure 

Protection, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of 

Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

Vice Admiral Roger T. Rufe, Jr., USCG (Ret.), Director, Office of Operations 

Coordination and Planning, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 13 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 15 

PANEL II 

Dr. Thomas H. Blackwell, MD, Medical Director, Center for Prehospital Medicine, Carolinas Medical Center, Charlotte, North Carolina: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 45 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 47 

Sergeant Scott McCartney, Program Manager/Exercise Planner, Large Stadium Initiative, Governor’s Office of Homeland Security, Sacramento, California, and Sergeant, Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 51 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 52 

Mr. Douglas Reynolds, Director of Security, Mall of America, Bloomington, 

Minnesota: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 58 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 61 

APPENDIX

Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Robert B. Stephan ........... 75 

Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Roger T. Rufe, Jr. ............ 80 

Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Thomas H. Blackwell ...... 81 

Questions From Hon. James R. Langevin for Thomas H. Blackwell .................. 83 

Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Scott McCartney .............. 84 

Questions From Hon. James R. Langevin for Scott McCartney .......................... 84 

Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Douglas Reynolds ............ 84 

Questions From Hon. James R. Langevin for Douglas Reynolds ........................ 86 

(1) 

THE CHALLENGE OF PROTECTING MASS 

GATHERINGS IN A POST-9/11 WORLD 

Wednesday, July 9, 2008 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in Room 311, 

Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson [Chairman of the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Thompson, Harman, Lowey, Jackson 

Lee, Christensen, Etheridge, Cuellar, Carney, Clarke, Green, 

Perlmutter, Pascrell, King, Shays, Lungren and Dent. 

Chairman THOMPSON. We are going to call the hearing to order. 

We will ask Mr. Shays to sit in for Ranking Member King who 

is—well, speak of the angel. He is here. 

The Committee on Homeland Security will come to order. The 

committee is meeting today to receive testimony on the challenge 

of protecting mass gatherings in a post-9/11 world. 

Good morning. I would like to thank our witnesses for appearing 

before us today. 

When Americans think of mass gathering events, the Super 

Bowl, the national conventions and the Pope’s recent visit come to 

mind. How the Department of Homeland Security manages and coordinates these high-profile national security events is certainly 

worthy of discussion, but that is a discussion for another day. 

Today, we will turn our attention to the challenges of securing 

mass gatherings that are not considered national special security 

events, that do not have the Federal Government coming in to run 

security and are held in communities that do not have huge 

amounts of resources for security. 

Think of State fairs, collegiate sporting events and even large 

shopping complexes during the holiday season. Mass gatherings, 

whether they have national security event rating or not, could be 

particularly tempting targets for Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations with the goal of killing or injuring the most people, destroying the most infrastructure and having the greatest impact 

possible with the least amount of effort. 

As you all know, I made it a priority to look at mass gatherings 

of all types. In fact, last year I directed committee staff to explore 

a variety of venues to see how mass gatherings are being handled. 

At these venues, committee staff observed members of the public 

and private sectors working to ensure the health, safety and security of all involved. They found that support personnel at these 
2 

venues are doing the best they can with what they have, especially 

when they do not have the benefit of substantial Federal support. 

This exploration culminated in a report that the majority staff of 

the committee released in May entitled, ‘‘Public Health, Safety and 

Security for Mass Gatherings.’’ The report concluded that while 

local and State official efforts are laudable, the Federal Government needs to partner with them in three particular areas: countering biological threats, collaborating and planning, and 

partnering across sectors. 

Among the report’s recommendations were that the Department 

of Homeland Security help these localities in hosting these mass 

gatherings now by strengthening public health and other critical 

infrastructures, establishing comprehensive biological surveillance 

systems and ensuring that intelligence about biological threats is 

made actionable for decisionmakers on the scene. 

It is remarkable how State and local and private sector partners 

have worked together to develop solutions on their own, given the 

absence of dedicated Federal resources. Fighting a common fight, 

they have established trusted relationships with other very different entities and that trust serves as the basis for sharing information and resources that would not otherwise occur. The Department of Homeland Security could stand to learn a lesson about information sharing here. 

The Department of Homeland Security should also take note that 

the districts that the Members of this committee represent are diverse. Some, like mine, are largely rural, while others, like the one 

represented by the gentlelady from New York, Ms. Clarke, are decidedly urban. However, when it comes to mass gatherings, we all 

share the same goal, ensuring that our communities are prepared 

for and can respond to the challenges of protecting mass gatherings. To that end, I look forward to this morning’s testimony. 

[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON

Good morning. I’d like to thank our witnesses for appearing before us today. 

When Americans think of ‘‘mass gatherings’’—events like the Super Bowl, the National Conventions, and the Pope’s recent visit come to mind. How the Department 

of Homeland Security manages and coordinates these high-profile National Security 

Events is certainly worthy of discussion but that is a discussion for another day. 

Today, we turn our attention to the challenges of securing mass gatherings that: are 

not considered ‘‘National Special Security Events’’; do not have the Federal Government coming in to run security; and are held in communities that do not have huge 

amounts of resources for security. 

Think of State Fairs, collegiate sporting events, and even large shopping complexes during the holiday season. 

Mass gatherings, whether they have National Security event rating or not, could 

be particularly tempting targets for Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations with 

the goals of: killing and injuring the most people; destroying the most infrastructure; and having the greatest impact possible with the least amount of effort. 

As you all know, I have made it a priority to look at mass gatherings of all types. 

In fact, last year, I directed committee staff to explore a variety of venues to see 

how mass gatherings are being handled. At these venues, committee staff observed 

members of the public and private sectors working to ensure the health, safety, and 

security of all involved. They found that support personnel at these venues are 

doing the best they can with what they have, especially when they do not have the 

benefit of substantial Federal support. This exploration culminated in a report that 

the majority staff of the committee released in May entitled ‘‘Public Health, Safety, 

and Security for Mass Gatherings.’’ The report concluded that while local and State 

officials’ efforts are laudable, the Federal Government needs to partner with them 
3 

in three particular areas: Countering biological threats; collaborative planning; and 

partnering across sectors. 

Among the report’s recommendations were that the Department of Homeland Security help the localities hosting these mass gatherings now by: Strengthening public health and other critical infrastructures; establishing comprehensive biological 

surveillance systems; and ensuring that intelligence about biological threats is made 

actionable for decisionmakers on the scene. It is remarkable how State, local, and 

private sector partners have worked together to develop solutions on their own, 

given the absence of dedicated Federal resources. Fighting a common fight, they 

have established trusted relationships with other very different entities and that 

trust serves as the basis for sharing information and resources that would not otherwise occur. 

The Department of Homeland Security could stand to learn a lesson about information sharing here. The Department of Homeland Security should also take note 

that the districts that the Members of this committee represent are diverse. Some 

(like mine) are largely rural while others (like the one represented by the 

Gentlelady from New York, Ms. Clarke) are decidedly urban. However, when it 

comes to mass gatherings, we all share the same goal: ensuring that our communities are prepared for—and can respond to—the challenges of protecting mass gatherings. To that end, I look forward to the testimony this morning. 

Chairman THOMPSON. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking 

Member of the full committee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. 

King, for an opening statement. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this 

hearing. 

Obviously, mass gatherings are a matter of great concern always 

but certainly since September 11; and I want to commend the Department for what it has done through the NIPP to try to address 

this, because this is primarily a local and State and private matter. 

But, on the other hand, it does need cooperation and assistance 

from the Department of Homeland Security; and I think that the 

NIPP goes a long way toward addressing that. But, again, this is 

a matter of great concern. 

I know certainly in New York we have had—for instance, in 

2004, we had the U.S. Tennis Open, we had the Republican National Convention, and we had the Yankees all playing in the same 

night. There is any number of events like that, such as New Year’s 

Eve, such as when the U.N. General Assembly is held. Often there 

is a Federal and local component. You may have the U.N. General 

Assembly and you have the Yankees or the Mets playing at the 

same time. 

So this is something, obviously, that is of great importance in a 

post-9/11 era. It, to me, shows the absolute necessity of having cooperation at all levels, with a significant input from the Federal 

Government, with the concept being that the locals know better 

than anyone. Certainly the Federal Government can provide whatever intelligence or perhaps coordination is needed, but it is primarily a local responsibility. 

Also the importance of layered defenses. Because there is no silver bullet that is going to provide the type of blanket coverage that 

we may like. For instance, a key component I know in New York 

has been the Securing the Cities program which has been pushed 

very much by the Department which basically is intended to protect the city from radioactive devices being brought in as a first 

line of defense. 

So, all in all, Mr. Chairman, I think this hearing is vital. It is 

important. This whole issue is important. 
4 

I think the Department has taken very significant first steps. I 

commend them for what they have done. Obviously, more needs to 

be done. More needs to be done at all levels, and we have to continue to work toward that. 

Mr. Chairman, no opening statement by me would be complete 

without my once again stating what I believe is an absolute necessity of us having an authorization bill this year and having hearings on it and going forward both for the purposes of the Department of Homeland Security, for the Committee on Homeland Security, and also so we can establish a benchmark that I think has to 

be set by this committee if we are going to be a successful committee. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Other Members of the committee are reminded that, under committee rules, opening statements may be 

submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Hon. Jackson Lee follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE

JULY 9, 2008 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for convening this important hearing 

that examines the challenge of protecting mass gatherings across the United States. 

Each year, millions of Americans attend sporting and theatrical events, visit resorts, 

and frequent shopping venues. In many ways, these places allow people to gather 

as they desire in order to participate in activities that bring them joy and entertainment. 

Unfortunately, these locations are also a potential target for terrorists. On several 

occasions, Al Qaeda’s leadership has asserted that causing economic damage to our 

country is among its chief objectives. In November 2004, for example, Osama bin 

Laden asserted that, ‘‘[w]e are continuing this policy in bleeding America to the 

point of bankruptcy.’’ When the economic consequences of an attack on a mass gathering event are combined with the spectacle that video coverage of it worldwide 

would cause, it is clear that we need to ensure that these events are secure and 

that effective response measures are in place. 

I am grateful, therefore, that Chairman Thompson has provided this necessary 

forum to speak on this vital issue and for us to discuss the best way forward to 

making sure that the American people can go about their way of life while knowing 

that their security is the top priority. 

As Chairwoman of the Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee, I am quite familiar with many of the issues that will be covered in today’s hearing. I believe that my subcommittee’s robust oversight over DHS’ infrastructure protection efforts has played a major role in helping to make the Department’s efforts more effective. 

The DHS effort to secure mass gathering events is coordinated by the Commercial 

Facilities Sector (‘‘CFS’’), one of among 18 critical infrastructure sectors in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (‘‘NIPP’’). Under this regime, the Department 

coordinates security efforts for assets and stakeholders within each of the 18 sectors, 

many in the private sector. Each sector has a ‘‘Sector Specific Agency’’ (‘‘SSA’’) that 

is responsible for leading the sector’s efforts in NIPP compliance and, therefore, 

must liaise with the private sector, State and local governments, and the relevant 

departments and agencies of the Federal Government. In the case of the CFS, the 

SSA is DHS. To be sure, this is a large task. Not only is DHS a new department 

with a well-documented track record of ineffective management, but the CFS, unlike 

most of the other 17 sectors, is not a traditionally regulated sector. In the case of 

the Energy Sector, for example, the SSA is the Department of Energy which has 

a long history of coordinating and regulating the sector’s various stakeholders. Although such coordination and regulation has not, hitherto, been based upon security, preexisting partnerships can be leveraged for security-related activities. 

Not only is DHS the SSA for the CFS, but it does not have a long history working 

and cooperating with the sector. Therefore, DHS must work harder. Accordingly, I 

know that my subcommittee will continue to provide DHS and the sector with the 

resources it needs to execute its vital mission. 
5 

I must state clearly, however, that I commend Assistant Secretary Robert B. 

Stephan’s leadership at DHS and the work he has done to develop the NIPP and 

to coordinate the relevant departments and agencies. I do believe his authority to 

coordinate NIPP-related functions must be legislatively strengthened to ensure better implementation of the NIPP—something that has been greatly lacking. 

With regard to the CFS specifically, Chairman Thompson and I have directed 

committee staff to assist us in examining the activities of this very important—and 

visible—sector. I applaud the organizational work that DHS has done to enable it 

to do more security-related work in the sector. By forming eight subsectors and convening regular meetings, Assistant Secretary Stephan has taken important steps to 

solidify a sector that was not preexisting prior to September 11, 2001. With that 

said, several steps are necessary to move from organizational progress to robust implementation of security and response-related measures and I have many concerns. 

First, my subcommittee held a hearing on March 12, addressing the security efforts currently underway in the United States in preparation for the Vancouver 

Olympics in 2010. During that hearing, several experts testified that Congress 

should consider creating a lead at DHS for non-National Special Security Events. 

Second, DHS needs to develop clear metrics for the implementation of security 

and response-related measures in the CFS as soon as possible. These metrics need 

to address exercises, resources allocation, and contingency planning efforts. I look 

forward to working with the Department to learn what it needs to make the metrics 

development process work as well as to help it acquire the necessary information 

from industry to feed those metrics. One response that I will not tolerate from the 

Department, however, is that the Paperwork Reduction Act prohibits the Department from acquiring information about security from the private sector. If the Department needs assistance to develop these surveys, then my subcommittee is eager 

and ready to assist. 

Third, I also encourage the Department to utilize the authorities that Congress 

has already allocated. For example, Assistant Secretary Stephan has effectively 

begun to use the convening power provided by the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC). I hope, however, that the CIPAC will seek to incorporate members that do not merely represent an association, but include individual 

asset owners and operators so that it is clear that these entities are acquiring the 

necessary knowledge to implement security and response-related procedures. 

Fourth, I hope that the Department leverages its voluntary private sector preparedness certification program that was a part of the ‘‘Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.’’ This program can be used to encourage 

companies to meet voluntary standards using a market-based approach. I look forward to hearing from Assistant Secretary Stephan about how this program has been 

introduced to the CFS. 

Fifth, I am very interested in the exercises taking place in the CFS and how postexercise reports are utilized: I would like a full description of these exercises, their 

participants, and their frequency. 

On all of these topics, I am eager to hear from the Department about the tools 

and resources it needs to effectively secure the CFS. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing today. I look 

forward to continuing to work aggressively on these issues. 

Chairman THOMPSON. I welcome our first panel of witnesses. 

Our first witness is well-known to the committee. Lieutenant 

Colonel Robert Stephan is Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure 

Protection at the Department of Homeland Security. He is responsible for the Department’s efforts to secure different aspects of the 

Nation’s infrastructure, including our commercial facilities where 

many mass gatherings occur and for which risk management assessment is a must. 

Our second witness is Vice Admiral Roger Rufe, Director of Operations Coordination and Planning at the Department of Homeland 

Security. His responsibilities include integrating component agency 

operations across the Department, coordinating with other Federal 

and non-Federal agencies and ensuring that the National Operations Center, which monitors many mass gatherings, functions efficiently and effectively. 
6 

We thank both witnesses for their service to the Nation and for 

being here today. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be inserted 

into the record. 

I now ask each witness to summarize his statement in 5 minutes, beginning with Assistant Secretary Stephan. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT B. STEPHAN, USAF (RET.), ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, NATIONAL 

PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT 

OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Colonel STEPHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

King and distinguished Members of the committee. I appreciate the 

opportunity to speak to you today and address DHS’s efforts to enhance the security of mass gathering venues. 

Places of mass gathering actually comprise a very diverse group 

of commercial facilities and assets, typically privately owned and 

operated, which may include sports venues, amusement parks, concert halls, retail malls, office buildings, residential apartment 

buildings, hotels or resorts, a very diverse landscape of things that 

we have to worry about as potential target sets. These facilities 

make up the Commercial Facilities Sector under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, or the NIPP, and generally follow a 

model of open access to enable operations and hence represent an 

inherent security challenge. 

Maintaining a balance between open access and security is a primary concern to both the Department and stakeholders at the 

State, local and private sector level within this sector. To address 

this complex dichotomy, DHS plays a key role in terms of information sharing, threat awareness, risk assessments, exercises and 

training, best practices, facilitating public-private sector interactions, sometimes at the local level, and incident management. 

These activities are frequently augmented by specific Federal support to select special events at commercial venues. 

It is necessary to frame the context of this discussion around a 

central point: Mass gatherings are overwhelmingly and predominantly owned and operated by the private sector. Hence, the Department must leverage partnerships and relationships with the 

sector as well as State and local government officials to achieve 

success. This engagement supports a balanced approach that fairly 

addresses public and private sector concerns and, more importantly, ensures that risks are appropriately and reasonably mitigated. 

Within this engagement, most security and emergency response 

planning across localized venues is principally the responsibility of 

the private sector and State and local officials at the venue level, 

with the role of the Federal Government to augment and facilitate 

this process in many significant ways as appropriate. 

To facilitate and catalyze strong interaction among various private sector, local and State authorities, the Department has developed a series of initiatives that involve face-to-face venue-level engagements. These interactions serve a variety of purposes. Our protective security advisors are in place in communities throughout 

the Nation to assist with local to protect local efforts to protect as-
7 

sets and provide a Federal resource to communities, businesses and 

State and local law enforcement and emergency managers. 

Over the life of the program, our folks in the field have provided 

support to over 400 mass gatherings and special events. We have 

also supported selective security assessments and planning, as examples, for the papal visit to Washington, DC, New York City, the 

Super Bowl and Rose Bowl earlier this year. 

DHS has also provided similar support to sporting organizations 

and events, including 30 outreach activities to NASCAR venues, 

supporting mass evacuation and emergency response planning, providing situational awareness, exercise planning, and observation 

and participation in various security summits. 

DHS also sponsors the buffer zone protection plan program grant 

initiative. As of May, 2008, we have reviewed 863 buffer zone plans 

for the commercial facilities sector, awarding grant funds to State 

and local jurisdictions exceeding $50 million. 

Sir, as an important and troubling side note, the House markup 

of the 2009 DHS budget includes effectively an elimination of this 

program. This is a very important error I think that needs to be 

corrected, because this is one of the most unique programs in our 

inventory that specifically drives me and my staff down to a local 

level of collaborative planning and focusing money on targeted capabilities, gaps within State and local law enforcement jurisdictions that surround these particular commercial venues. That 

money has effectively been zero-ized in our 2009 budget. We would 

like your support to correct that wrong as the bill moves through 

Congress. 

To augment our boots-on-the-ground efforts in coordination with 

our private sector partners we have created a suite of planning and 

informational resources that assist commercial facility owners and 

operators in enhancing their security posture. The various publications, vulnerability and risk assessment methodologies, reports 

that highlight common vulnerabilities within the commercial facility sectors, recommended approaches to reduce or manage risk and 

to effectively deal with various aspects of various threat vectors 

have all been provided in my written testimony. I will not elaborate 

on them there, other than to reemphasize the fact that we have 

done quite a bit of work across a wide range of activities, including 

information sharing exercises, vulnerability assessment, on-site collaborative security planning. The Department continues to move 

forward in this area. 

In terms of concluding my opening remarks, I would like to take 

a moment to thank the committee for bringing this very important 

topic to the floor of discussion. 

As many of you recall, 3 years ago the Department was severely 

chastised by our own Inspector General’s office and by the media 

for focusing on special events that happened to take place in local 

venues across the country. One that specifically comes to mind is 

the Mule Day Parade in Tennessee. We were specifically criticized 

for tracking and putting that event in our national asset database. 

That is unfortunate because, setting aside the importance of the 

mules temporarily, there are 150,000 to 200,000 people that gather 

in rural Tennessee one place, one time, 1 weekend every year. That 
8 

to me is 150,000 to 200,000 potential targets that involve the loss 

of human lives. 

So I am glad to see that this committee considers and acknowledges the importance of these particular mass gatherings. Because 

they make up the fabric of America, and we are here to secure that 

piece of America that often goes overlooked. 

Thank you, sir; and I look forward to your questions. 

[The statement of Colonel Stephan follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT B. STEPHAN

JULY 9, 2008 

Thank you, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and all of the distinguished Members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you 

about the Department of Homeland Security’s efforts to enhance the security of 

mass gathering venues. Today also serves as an opportunity to initiate a dialog to 

address the issues identified in the majority staff report, ‘‘Public Health, Safety and 

Security for Mass Gatherings.’’ 

‘‘Places of mass gathering’’ actually comprise a very diverse group of commercial 

assets and facilities, typically privately owned and operated, which may include 

sports venues, amusement parks, concert halls, retail malls, office buildings, residential apartment buildings, and hotels and resorts. These facilities, which make up 

the Commercial Facilities Sector under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan 

(NIPP) framework, may be generally characterized by one of four common traits: 

business activities, personal commercial transactions, recreational pastimes, and accommodations. The Commercial Facilities Sector’s requirement of open access, 

which is necessary to successfully conduct operations associated with these types of 

facilities, represents an inherent security challenge. 

Maintaining a balance between open access and security is a primary concern to 

both the Department and the stakeholders of the Commercial Facilities Sector. As 

is consistent throughout the private sector, business activities are driven by profitability. Owners and operators strive to ensure that patrons enjoy easy access to facilities; however, there is also an increasingly clear understanding within the sector 

that today’s risk environment dictates a degree of security not previously seen in 

this very visible sector. To address this complex dichotomy between business operations and effective security solutions, DHS plays a key role in terms of information 

sharing, threat awareness, risk assessment processes and tools, exercises and training, best practices, facilitating public/private sector interactions, and national incident management activities. These activities are augmented by specific Federal support to select special events at commercial venues. 

Reviewing the Department’s efforts in this Sector, I think it is necessary to frame 

the context of this discussion around a central point: Much like the bulk of the Nation’s CIKR, this sector is overwhelmingly and predominantly owned and operated 

by the private sector. Hence, the Department must leverage partnerships and relationships with the sector and State and local government entities to achieve success. 

This engagement supports a balanced approach that fairly addresses both public 

sector and private sector concerns and, more importantly, ensures that risks are appropriately and reasonably mitigated. 

The partnership framework for those relationships is laid out in the NIPP. As you 

know, the NIPP is an outcome of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 

(HSPD–7), which identified 17 Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource sectors and 

tasked the Department with developing a plan to enhance protection and security 

found in and around the Nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR). 

In addition, HSPD–7 designated the Department as the Sector Specific Agency 

(SSA) for a number of the 17 (now 18) CIKR sectors, including the Commercial Facilities Sector. Subsequently, DHS, in conjunction with 17 executive branch signatory departments and agencies, developed the NIPP, along with the associated Sector Specific Plans (SSP). DHS, as the SSA for the Commercial Facilities Sector, 

spearheaded the development of the Sector’s SSP, which was released in May of last 

year. 

The NIPP provides guidance on addressing both terrorist threats and all-hazard 

incidents using the Sector Partnership Model through which coordinated planning 

and program implementation may take place. The Commercial Facilities SSP, much 

like the other SSPs, molds the NIPP’s guidance to effectively address the diverse, 

complex, and unique environments and relationships found within the Sector. More-
9 

over, the Sector Coordinating Model serves as an avenue through which the sector 

can inform the Department of requirements for tools, information, and training. 

Reviewing the wide range of products and services that DHS has developed in collaboration with the Commercial Facilities Sector, I once again emphasize the importance of strong partnerships between and among DHS, the private sector, and State 

and local government officials. Ultimately, security and emergency response planning is the primary responsibility of the private sector and State and local officials 

at the venue level. The role of the Federal Government is to augment and facilitate 

this planning process as appropriate. Incident response typically highlights this division of roles; in the event of a terrorist attack or natural disaster, local law enforcement and emergency services providers will be the first on the scene, immediately coordinating and collaborating with the private sector. The more informed 

both parties are of facility and community capabilities and gaps, the better the planning process and overall joint response will be. 

VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS AND SITE SECURITY PLANNING

To facilitate strong interaction among DHS, the private sector, and local authorities, the Department has developed a series of programs and initiatives that involve 

face-to-face, venue-level engagements. The interactions serve a variety of purposes, 

including leveraging security specialist subject matter expertise to identify 

vulnerabilities and security gaps, recommending strategies to close security gaps, facilitating communications, initiating and maintaining relationships between the private sector and local authorities, and providing training and situational awareness. 

As you are no doubt aware, the Department’s infrastructure protection work is not 

performed only in Washington, DC; rather, it takes place across the country via the 

Protective Security Advisor (PSA) cadre. PSAs are in place in communities throughout the Nation to assist with local efforts to protect critical assets, providing a Federal resource to communities and businesses. During natural disasters and contingency events, PSAs work in State and local Emergency Operations Centers. PSAs 

also provide real-time information on facility significance and protective measures 

to facility owners and operators, as well as State and local representatives. 

Typically, PSAs are engaged to support the planning and execution of National 

Special Security Events (NSSEs), led by the U.S. Secret Service, as well as nonNSSEs, led by the Department’s Office of Operations Coordination and Planning 

under the direction of my colleague Vice Admiral Roger Rufe. These programs are 

designed to provide an objective framework through which Federal, State and local 

entities can identify special events occurring within their jurisdiction; request Federal support and training; and, after careful evaluation and assessment, receive 

Federal operational support as appropriate. I’ll defer to VADM Rufe for a more in 

depth discussion of the NSSE program, although I will briefly describe contributions 

from personnel within the Office of Infrastructure Protection. These personnel administer a variety of training courses for the relevant public and private sector personnel; conduct site assistance visits and buffer zone plans for the venue and adjacent infrastructure; provide situational awareness and intelligence briefings; and 

provide geospatial products of area CIKR. Over the life of the program, PSAs and 

other security specialists from my office have provided support to over 400 mass 

gathering and special events, and 156 Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) 

Levels 1, 2, and 3 Special Events. Most recently, we have supported security assessments and planning for the Papal Visit to Washington, DC, and New York City, 

Super Bowl XLII, and the Rose Bowl. 

As part of their steady-state activities, PSAs work with State and local law enforcement and the private sector in identifying critical infrastructure assets, identifying vulnerabilities, recommending and implementing protective actions/measures, 

and providing risk mitigation training designed to teach terrorism prevention, detection, and awareness to facility owners/operators and State and local law enforcement entities. 

DHS has provided similar support to sporting organizations and events, such as 

the National Football League, Major League Baseball, National Basketball Association, National Collegiate Athletic Association, as well as sporting and mass gathering venue managers associations in general. For example, specific to race events, 

PSAs work closely with NASCAR—having conducted over 30 outreach efforts to 

NASCAR venues, including mass evacuation and emergency response planning, providing situational awareness in the run up to and throughout events, exercise planning and observation, participating in NASCAR Security Summits, and conducting 

security surveys. 

In addition to the PSA program, the Buffer Zone Protection Program (BZPP) 

grant initiative, one of the Department’s most successful, long-running programs, is 
10 

administered by my office in conjunction with FEMA. This program is designed to 

provide local law enforcement and emergency responders and other public sector entities with the resources necessary to enhance security and responsiveness ‘‘outside 

the fence’’ at CIKR sites, including those in the Commercial Facilities Sector. Local 

entities are able to purchase equipment and training resources for the purpose of 

increasing preparedness, thereby complicating a terrorist’s plans to attack from the 

vicinity adjacent to CIKR sites, ultimately buying down risk on a local and regional 

level. As of May 2008, the amount of BZPP grant funds awarded to the commercial 

facilities sector has exceeded $50 million. 

The Site Assistance Visit (SAV) program is another long-running DHS program 

that has had a measurable impact on the Commercial Facilities Sector, particularly 

those sites that would be considered places of mass gathering. SAVs identify 

vulnerabilities, leading to a dialog between DHS and the facility owners/operators 

and local authorities concerning means of mitigating identified vulnerabilities. As 

of May 2008, there have been 246 SAVs performed at various commercial facilities 

across the Nation. We are also in the process of adding a cybersecurity analysis 

component to the SAV program, which will further enhance this program’s value to 

our private sector partners. 

PLANNING DOCUMENTS AND TOOLS FOR PRIVATE SECTOR USE

To augment our boots-on-the-ground efforts, in coordination with our private sector partners, DHS has created a suite of planning and informational resources that 

assist owners and operators of the Nation’s CIKR in enhancing security around 

their facilities. One of these products, the Protective Measures Guide for U.S. Sports 

League, released in January 2008, has been specifically designed for use by participating representatives of the Sports Leagues and Public Assembly Sector Coordinating Subcouncil (an organization formed under the NIPP framework). Private sector participants included Major League Baseball, Major League Soccer, NASCAR, 

the National Basketball Association, the National Football League, the National 

Hockey League, and the United States Tennis Association. The guide provides an 

overview of protective measures that can be implemented to assist sports teams and 

owners/operators of sporting event facilities in planning and managing security at 

their facilities. DHS plans to develop additional protective measures guides for the 

remaining six Commercial Facilities subsectors over the next 2 years, with guides 

for the Retail, Lodging, and Outdoor Events (Amusement Parks/Fairs) subsectors to 

be released in fiscal year 2009. 

The Department has also developed Common Vulnerability (CV), Potential Indicators of Threat (PI), and Protective Measures (PM) Reports based on data gathered 

from Site Assistance Visits and the Buffer Zone Protection Program, for use by local 

law enforcement and asset owners and operators to support their efforts in securing 

CIKR assets. The CV, PI, and PM reports have been updated and conveniently integrated into a single document for 17 facility types within the Commercial Facilities 

Sector. They have been distributed widely, including via the Commercial Facilities 

Sector Coordinating Council and its eight Subcouncils, in addition to the Homeland 

Security Information Network—Commercial Facilities Sector (HSIN–CFS) portal. 

FEMA has also created the Risk Management Series, designed specifically for 

commercial facilities, which includes a large suite of man-made disaster publications 

directed at strengthening the building inventory to reduce the potential impact from 

the forces that might be anticipated in a terrorist assault. The objective of the series 

is to reduce physical damage to structural and nonstructural components of buildings and related infrastructure, and to reduce resultant casualties from impact by 

conventional bombs, chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) agents; earthquakes; floods; and high winds. 

One publication in the FEMA Risk Management Series, Methodology for Preparing Threat Assessments for Commercial Buildings (FEMA 452), is designed to 

assist commercial facility owners/operators in assessing the vulnerabilities, threat, 

and risks associated with their facilities. FEMA 452 has been used to assess hundreds of buildings within the Commercial Facilities Sector. Currently, the number 

of people trained in FEMA has increased to 775; it is estimated that an additional 

15 training sessions will be offered by September 2009. 

In terms of self-assessment tools available to the Commercial Facilities Sector, 

DHS is currently redeploying the Vulnerability Identification Self-Assessment Tool 

(ViSAT), to be designated the Risk—Self-Assessment Tool (R–SAT). R–SAT’s building block, ViSAT, is a Web-based self-assessment tool developed by DHS and provided free of charge to CIKR asset owners/operators. The goal of this program is 

to raise the level of security at CIKR facilities across the Nation and to assist in 

establishing a common baseline of security from which all assets in certain sectors 
11 

or subsectors can identify weaknesses and establish protection plans. Modules have 

currently been deployed for stadiums, arenas, convention centers, performing arts 

centers, and speedways. Approximately 1,000 commercial facilities have access to 

ViSAT, and DHS has provided a grant to the International Association of Assembly 

Managers, a co-chair of the Public Assembly Subcouncil, to promote and provide 

training for this tool. 

INFORMATION SHARING

The Department’s Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center 

(HITRAC) conducts all-source intelligence research and analysis to assess the potential threat to critical infrastructure and key resources across the Nation, as well as 

develop lessons learned products derived from attacks on commercial venues abroad. 

HITRAC’s goal is to provide owners and operators of CIKR with strategically relevant and actionable information on threats they face, primarily from terrorists. 

HITRAC conducts outreach to both private and public sector partners through classified and unclassified threat briefings to members of private sector coordinating 

councils; Government coordinating councils; State and local officials; and individual 

companies. In the last 10 months alone, DHS HITRAC has released more than 

seven products specific to places of mass gathering, including bulletins related to 

Super Bowl XLII, the recent Papal visit to Washington, DC, and New York City, 

and threats to popular sports and entertainment venues. 

Among other means, DHS disseminates these bulletins by the Homeland Security 

Information Network (HSIN), the Department’s primary platform used to facilitate 

the information-sharing necessary for coordination, planning, mitigation, and response by the Government and the private sector regarding threats to sectors identified by DHS. HSIN is an internet-based platform that enables secure, encrypted 

Sensitive But Unclassified/For Official Use Only (SBU/FOUO) level communications 

between DHS and vetted private sector members, both within the Commercial Facilities Sector and across other sectors identified by DHS. The Commercial Facilities 

Sector maintains an independent site on the HSIN portal, which was designed and 

implemented in collaboration with its Government Coordinating Council and Sector 

Coordinating Council, and presently has 131 registered GCC and SCC organizational users. 

The next generation of HSIN for the Commercial Facilities Sector, based on requirements developed by the sector itself, will include additional features enhancing 

the value and utility of the platform. Updates will include a virtual incident coordination center acting as a ‘‘one-stop-shop’’ for incident operations information sharing 

and improved Sector content management capabilities. 

TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES

We are also firm believers that in addition to providing on-site assessments, selfassessment tools, and disseminating threat and intelligence information, providing 

training to the private sector is a critical component of enhancing security capabilities. DHS engages the private sector through a number of different educational opportunities, including conferences and seminars, and takes advantage of association 

and trade conferences, working with our partners in the Commercial Facilities Sector. DHS has made presentations, facilitated table-top exercises, or exhibited educational materials at 12 major sporting events related seminars or conferences since 

2005. Audiences have included sport-specific conferences as well as facility manager 

conferences. 

The Private Sector Counterterrorism Awareness Course is designed to improve 

the knowledge of private sector security professionals by providing exposure to key 

elements of soft target awareness, surveillance detection, and improvised explosive 

device (IED) recognition. The workshop training materials enhance and reinforce 

participants’ knowledge, skills, and abilities related to preventing, protecting 

against, responding to, and recovering from terrorist threats and incidents. The 

workshop outlines specific counterterrorism awareness and prevention actions that 

reduce vulnerability and mitigate the risk of domestic terrorist attacks. DHS has 

provided this training to 336 Commercial Facilities Sector representatives. 

The Soft Target Awareness Course is available to property/facility managers, supervisors, first-line managers and their security and safety staff, and entry level employees. Participants receive an introduction to terrorism; learn to recognize and 

prevent terrorist activities (basic surveillance detection methods); learn the basics 

of prevention, response, and recovery; and then discuss with other attendees issues 

specific to their sector of business. DHS has provided this training to 1,935 Commercial Facilities Sector representatives. 
12 

The Surveillance Detection Course is intended for commercial infrastructure operators and security staff. This course is designed to provide attendees with a foundation for identifying locations conducive to observing facility operations and/or personnel, employing the fundamentals of surveillance detection, and observing and reporting suspicious individuals and activity around facilities. DHS has provided this 

training to 509 Commercial Facilities Sector representatives. 

The Protective Measures Course is the Department’s newest training available to 

Commercial Facilities Sector personnel in the public/private sector and is designed 

to provide students with the knowledge to identify vulnerabilities and select appropriate Protective Measures for their unique facility. The course focuses on providing 

information pertaining to common vulnerabilities, available Protective Measures, 

and strategies for selecting appropriate Protective Measures. 

DHS is also developing an Active Shooter Training Guide to enhance CIKR employee preparation for active shooter events. An active shooter event is generally defined as a situation where an armed person has used deadly force against other persons and continues to do so while having access to additional victims. The final 

product will be a desk reference guide addressing how employees, managers, training staff, and human resources staff, at their respective levels, can mitigate and appropriately react in the event of an active shooter. This material is slated to be distributed to the commercial facilities sector partners prior to the 2008/2009 holiday 

shopping season. 

The Bomb-Making Materials Awareness Program (BMAP) is designed to increase 

private sector and citizen awareness of activity associated with bomb making, including the manufacture of homemade explosives for use in the construction of 

IEDs. The program reaches out to businesses that manufacture and sell many of 

the materials that bomb makers will attempt to acquire, instructing retail employees not only which materials they need to be aware of but also how to better identify 

‘‘suspicious behavior.’’ The awareness tools, which include cards and posters, are industry-specific and can be kept at the point of sale for easy reference. DHS has provided this training to 28 Commercial Facilities Sector representatives. 

DHS also has developed a number of courses and training tracks for Commercial 

Facilities Sector association training venues, such as the International Association 

of Assembly Managers (IAAM) Academy for Venue Safety and Security (AVSS). This 

training includes security planning and life safety management for the public assembly venue industry. The core educational tracks are Risk Management, Emergency Planning, Security Operations, and Training. These tracks familiarize students with the many types of emergencies that can occur at public assembly facilities, and they offer techniques for planning, implementing, and ensuring the safety 

of patrons, staff, and facilities. Later this month, we will visit the Academy to discuss Evacuation Planning at Events/Venues of Mass Gathering. 

Going beyond private sector association activities, DHS is reaching out to academia for research and education focused on the Commercial Facilities Sector 

through the University of Southern Mississippi’s Center for Spectator Sports Security Management Advisory Board. The Center was established through a grant 

awarded by DHS. The Center is the first of its kind in the United States, building 

capabilities among those responsible for sports events and security management 

through research, education, and outreach efforts. Research conducted at the Center 

for SSSM has already paid off, identifying gaps in the education and training of current sport event management professionals. DHS works closely with the Center, 

participating with the Advisory Board in an information-sharing capacity. 

NASCAR MASS EVACUATION PLANNING GUIDE FOR MAJOR EVENTS

Last, as you know, earlier this year, DHS released the NASCAR Mass Evacuation 

Planning Guide for Major Events, which was developed through a DHS/NASCAR coordinated effort and provides guidance on utilizing a mass evacuation plan template 

for NASCAR-sanctioned facilities. The template was designed to assist NASCAR 

venues in developing site-specific evacuation procedures for responding to potential 

incidents in an all-hazards environment. The guide was rolled out to the sector in 

January 2008 at the annual NASCAR Security Summit. The development of this 

guide was an extensively collaborative effort. Meetings with NASCAR security officials between December 2006 and January 2008 hinged upon on-site visits to four 

NASCAR tracks—Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Talladega Superspeedway, Infineon 

Raceway, and the Milwaukee Mile. 

Our intent was to develop a flexible guide that each NASCAR venue type could 

utilize as a baseline for developing an individualized plan suited to the unique characteristics and jurisdictions that exist from track to track. This requires a collaborative planning process with the active participation of both private and public sec-
13 

tor stakeholders at the local level. This process also ensures that the plan is developed to the resources available to support plan implementation. 

Our long-term objective is to develop similar evacuation guides for other venues 

within the Sports Leagues Subsector and, eventually, for the entire Commercial Facilities Sector. A working group comprised of Federal agencies, stadium associations, 

universities, and private sector partners is currently making adaptations to the 

NASCAR guide for use at collegiate and professional sports stadiums. This guidance 

will be deliverable by January 1, 2009. 

PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY AND SECURITY FOR MASS GATHERINGS

Concluding my discussion of our progress and accomplishments in evacuation 

planning, I would like to take a moment to thank the committee for the commentary 

and constructive criticism provided within the report on Public Health, Safety and 

Security for Mass Gatherings. The report highlights the complexity of the Commercial Facilities Sector, and the Sports Leagues Subsector in particular, to wit: there 

are 42 NASCAR events annually, 32 NFL teams, 30 NBA teams, 30 MLB teams, 

30 NHL teams, 14 MLS teams, 116 Division 1 college football teams that compete 

weekly from late August through early January of each year, among a host of other 

sporting events that occur each and every week of the year at the professional, amateur, and recreational level. 

From State to State, jurisdictional boundaries vary, law enforcement and emergency services capabilities vary, legal authorities vary, and even the characteristics 

of the numerous sports venues themselves vary significantly. The one constant is 

that the individual facility owner or operator, and the corresponding State and local 

officials know the unique circumstances facing the specific asset, and are, therefore, 

best positioned to serve as primary lead in coordination of security and emergency 

response planning at the venue level. DHS’ role in Commercial Facility Sector 

events is to augment and facilitate planning and operational support where necessary and appropriate, with the specific facility developing the individual plan sideby-side with local and State authorities. As I previously outlined, DHS facilitates 

this coordination through a variety of engagements. These programs have been 

made readily available to the private sector and will be provided on a continual 

basis to ensure that DHS thoroughly engages with the multitude of facilities of this 

type throughout the Nation—also ensuring that the parties with the unique knowledge are enabled and contributing to the planning process. The feedback we have 

received from our partners has validated our efforts, and we will continue to solicit 

feedback on our activities and refocus where and as necessary. 

We are committed to continued engagement with the Commercial Facilities community not only by sharing our expertise, but also by enabling frank, two-way discussions focused on the overarching goals of enhancing their security efforts and 

protecting the general public. 

Thank you for your attention, and I would be happy to answer any questions you 

may have at this time. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. I am sure the people in Tennessee appreciate that shout-out for Mule Day. 

Vice Admiral Rufe for 5 minutes, please. 

STATEMENT OF ROGER T. RUFE, JR., USCG (RET.), DIRECTOR, 

OFFICE OF OPERATIONS COORDINATION AND PLANNING, 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Admiral RUFE. Good morning Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

King and Members of the committee. I am Roger Rufe, Director of 

the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning at the Department of Homeland Security. I am pleased to appear today alongside 

Assistant Secretary Stephan and the other distinguished witnesses. 

Thank you for inviting me to discuss how the Office of Operations 

Coordination and Planning conducts plannings for mass gatherings 

and other special events. 

It is important to recognize that, as Assistant Secretary Stephan 

just acknowledged, that the vast majority of planning that must be 

done for special events is the responsibility of State, local and tribal entities. As such, as it is in almost all cases, Federal support to 
14 

a special event or a mass gathering not on Federal property comes 

only after a request is received from the special event planners for 

support and is deemed to require Federal coordination. 

A special event is defined as a function that draws a large public 

crowd to the host city or venue. It may also be a significant political function or world event hosted on U.S. soil. It can be free or 

a ticketed event. It may be local or have regional importance. 

The Special Event Working Group, known as the SEWG, or 

SEWG, is a group of representatives of various Federal entities 

who are involved in planning and coordinating Federal activities 

for a special event. The SEWG facilitates a unified interagency 

planning and coordination effort for all special events. In addition, 

the SEWG identifies events that may require a coordinated Federal 

response and collectively coordinates Federal assets to bridge any 

capability gaps identified by State and local partners that have not 

already been addressed by exhausting local mutual assistance 

agreements. 

Within this process, the mission of OPS is to act on behalf of the 

Secretary to fulfill his Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 

responsibilities to integrate DHS and interagency planning and coordinate operations for designated special events. 

The membership of the SEWG consists of representatives designated by their respective Federal departments, agencies and components. Presently, there are upwards of 50 Federal entities with 

representatives assigned to the SEWG. I submitted a list of these 

member agencies along with my written statement today. 

DHS has developed a method for assigning a relative risk level 

to the multitude of special events Nation-wide brought to our attention by State, local and tribal entities. This is important as the 

Federal Government cannot support every special event occurring 

across the 56 States and territories of the United States. It is important to understand that entry of a request to be evaluated for 

a designated risk level is completely voluntary. Except in rare 

cases, DHS does not evaluate events for risk level unless the event 

is nominated by an appropriate State, local or tribal entity. 

The first step in this evaluation process is a Special Event Data 

Call. This automated system allows special event planners from 

across the country to enter information regarding upcoming events 

into a database. The most recent data call, which covers calendar 

year 2008, had over 4,000 events entered primarily by State and 

local planners. 

Once the data call is closed, the events are run through the risk 

methodology program, which analyzes response criteria captured 

by the questionnaire and then assesses stages of threat, consequences and vulnerabilities for each event. This results in a preliminary Special Event Assessment Rating, or SEAR, level for an 

event, categorized as SEAR levels 1 through 5. 

The preliminary ratings are passed to the SEWG co-chairs by 

OPS for further consideration. The SEWG co-chairs are made up 

of FEMA, OPS, our risk management folks at DHS, the FBI and 

the Secret Service. 

These co-chairs treat the preliminary SEAR rating output as a 

starting point to identify the final SEAR level. The co-chairs analyze the initial ranking to account for any special circumstances, 
15 

such as whether there has been a request for assistance from planners and whether a current threat has been identified for the 

event. 

The Federal Government coordination and non-SSE special 

events is concentrated on those events designated as SEAR Level 

1 or 2. These events are ones for which either direct or extensive 

Federal interagency security and incident management preparedness is required and some level of predeployment of Federal assets 

is required. For every SEAR Level 1 or 2 special event, a Federal 

coordinator is appointed by the Secretary to serve as the Secretary’s representative and has responsibility for coordinating Federal assets for an event. An Integrated Federal Support Plan is 

also developed. 

For these events, SEWG’s interagency threat committee also generates a Joint Special Event Threat Assessment. These assessments are crafted by interagency Intelligence Community professionals and are distributed to Federal partners as well as to State 

and local fusion centers in need of the information. The focus is 

upon intelligence, threat, risk information and identifies critical infrastructure and key resources in proximity to large events. 

Regardless of the SEAR level designation assigned, the Federal 

Government can remain involved with a special event. DHS will 

maintain awareness of all known special events through monitoring by a national operations center. In addition, State and local 

planners may request support for their events from the Federal 

Government and agencies located near the event. 

I am pleased to report to you today this progress that DHS has 

made with the interagency community and how we deal with these 

special event requirements each year. I would be happy to answer 

any of your questions. 

[The statement of Admiral Rufe follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROGER T. RUFE, JR. 

JULY 9, 2008 

Good morning, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King and Members of the 

committee. I am Roger Rufe, Director of the Office of Operations Coordination and 

Planning at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). I am pleased to appear 

today alongside Assistant Secretary Stephan and the other distinguished witnesses. 

Thank you for inviting me to discuss how the Office of Operations Coordination and 

Planning (OPS) conducts planning for Mass Gatherings and other Special Events. 

I welcome this opportunity to discuss the Special Events Working Group and how 

their planning effort facilitates the ability of the Secretary of DHS (Secretary) to 

execute his incident management responsibilities in accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive–5 (HSPD–5). 

The Secretary’s role in this arena is that of his overall responsibility for the execution of the key missions of DHS: preventing terrorist attacks; reducing the country’s 

vulnerability to terrorism; minimizing damage and assisting in recovery from terrorist attacks that do occur in the United States. It is important to recognize, 

though, that the vast majority of Special Events are the responsibility of State, local 

and tribal entities. As such, in almost all cases, Federal support to a Special Event 

or a Mass Gathering not on Federal property, comes only after a request is received 

from the Special Event planners for support and is deemed to require Federal coordination. 

SPECIAL EVENT WORKING GROUP (SEWG)

The Special Event Working Group (SEWG) is a group of representatives of various Federal entities who may be involved in planning for or coordinating Federal 

activities for a special event. To paraphrase, a special event is defined as a function 
16 

1 National Special Security Events are significant domestic or international events, occurrences, contests, activities, or meetings, which, by virtue of their profile or status, represent a 

significant target, and therefore warrant additional preparation, planning, and mitigation efforts. The designation process for NSSEs is established by NSPD–46/HSPD–15, Annex II and 

HSPD–7. 

that draws a large public crowd to the host city or venue in combination with political importance and local, regional or international significance. The SEWG was 

formed in April 2004, to validate a methodology for identifying and categorizing special events (other than those designated as National Special Security Events 

(NSSE)), and coordinating Federal support to those events.1

The mission and purpose of the SEWG is to support a unified interagency planning and coordination effort for Special Events and to ensure coordination of Federal support to the designated event. The SEWG identifies events that may require 

a coordinated Federal response and collectively coordinates Federal assets to bridge 

any capability gaps identified by State and local partners that have not already 

been addressed by exhausting local mutual assistance agreements. Within this process, the mission of OPS is to act on behalf of the Secretary and his HSPD–5 responsibilities to integrate DHS and interagency planning and coordinate operations for 

designated Special Events in order to prevent, protect, respond to and recover from 

terrorist threats/attacks. 

The SEWG consists of several elements: (1) The five Co-chairs of the SEWG who 

consist of senior or executive level (GS–15/SES) managers from OPS, the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI), the United States Secret Service (USSS) and DHS Office of Risk Management 

& Analysis (RMA); (2) the SEWG General Membership itself; and (3) the DHS programmatic, coordination and administrative staff dedicated to SEWG which is 

housed in OPS. 

The membership of the SEWG consists of representatives designated by their respective Federal Departments, Agencies and/or Components. These representatives 

are traditional Federal agencies with missions that are related to Special Events 

planning, coordination, and execution, and span the four pillars of the National Response Framework: Prevention, Protection, Response and Recovery. Presently, there 

are upwards of 50 Federal Departments/Agencies and their Components with representatives assigned to the SEWG (see the attached exhibit No. 1). 

PRIORITIZING SPECIAL EVENTS

DHS, including the Office of Risk Management and Analysis (RMA) and the Office 

of Intergovernmental Programs (IGP) has developed a method for assigning a relative risk level to the multitude of special events Nation-wide brought to our attention by State, local and tribal entities. This is important as the Federal Government 

cannot possibly support every ‘‘Special Event’’ occurring across the 56 States and 

territories of the United States. It is important to understand that a request to be 

evaluated for a designated risk level is completely voluntary. Except in exceedingly 

rare cases, DHS does not evaluate events for their appropriate risk level unless the 

event was nominated by an appropriate State, local, or tribal entity. On numerous 

occasions, DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis has reviewed and provided substantive input into a State and local produced threat assessments. 

The first step in this evaluation process is the Special Event Data Call. This automated system, allows Special Event planners from States, cities and localities to 

enter information regarding upcoming special events into a database. The most recent Data Call which covers Calendar Year 2008 had over 4,000 events entered primarily by State and/or local Planners. This list is the crucial starting point and is 

the only method that provides DHS and the SEWG with situational awareness. 

In order to ensure the Special Event Data Call properly conducts a preliminary 

assessment of events, the DHS SEWG has developed a questionnaire for individuals 

at the State and local level who are users of the system and entering their special 

event data. Once the data call is closed, the events are run through the risk methodology program,which analyzes response criteria captured by the questionnaire and 

assesses stages of threat, consequences and vulnerabilities for the event. This results in preliminary Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) level results, which 

are categorized as SEAR Levels 1–5. The preliminary ratings are passed to the 

SEWG co-chairs by OPS for further consideration. The SEWG, OPS, RMA, and IGP 

work with their respective subject matter experts to ensure the methodology fits the 

needs for the users at the Federal, State and local levels. 

The SEWG co-chairs treat the preliminary SEAR rating output as a starting point 

to identify the final SEAR level. The co-chairs analyze the initial ranking to account 
17 

for any special circumstances, such as whether there have been requests for assistance from planners and whether a current threat has been identified. 

SEAR LEVEL1&2 EVENTS

The Federal Government involvement in non-NSSE special events is concentrated 

on those events designated as SEAR Level 1 or 2. 

An event is considered to be a SEAR Level 1 when it is an event of significant 

national and/or international importance that may require extensive Federal interagency security and incident management preparedness. Pre-deployment of Federal 

assets as well as consultation, technical advice and support to specific functional 

areas in which the State and local agencies may lack expertise or key resources may 

also be warranted. In order to ensure unified Federal support to the local authorities and appropriate national situational awareness, a Federal Coordinator (FC) will 

be designated, and an Integrated Federal Support Plan (IFSP) will be developed. 

A SEAR Level 2 event is a significant event with national and/or international 

importance that may require direct national-level Federal support and situational 

awareness. The magnitude and significance of these events calls for close coordination between Federal, State, and local authorities and may warrant limited pre-deployment of USG assets as well as consultation, technical advice and support to specific functional areas in which the State and local agencies may lack expertise or 

key resources. In order to ensure unified Federal support to the local authorities 

and appropriate national situational awareness, a Federal Coordinator (FC) will be 

designated and an Integrated Federal Support Plan (IFSP) will be developed. 

On the other hand, SEAR Level 3, 4 and 5 events do not have a FC identified 

nor an IFSP generated, however, State and local officials may still solicit resources 

from Federal agencies at the agencies’ expense. 

Regardless of the SEAR Level designation assigned, the Federal Government can 

remain involved with the special event. DHS will maintain awareness of all special 

events through reporting produced by the National Operations Center (NOC). In addition, State and local planners may request support for their events from the Federal Departments and Agencies located near the event. 

I would like to note that the SEAR levels themselves are an excellent illustration 

of the cooperation and coordination accomplished in the SEWG. The SEAR level system is the evolution of various Special Event ratings previously used in the Federal 

Government. Until 2006, DHS used Special Event Homeland Security (SEHS) as the 

DHS standard. The Federal Bureau of Investigation used Special Event Rating 

Level (SERL) as their standard. Often levels were different from one organization 

to another. Through interagency cooperation fostered by the SEWG, it was agreed 

that the SERL/SEHS terminology would be eliminated, and the common term SEAR 

would be utilized by Federal planners for all rated events. For the first time, the 

interagency community had one term and one method to describe and categorize 

Special Events. 

A Federal Coordinator (FC) is assigned for every SEAR Level 1 or 2 special event. 

The FC is nominated by a SEWG member agency, approved and appointed by the 

Secretary, and has responsibility for coordinating Federal Assets for an approved 

SEAR Level 1 or 2 Event. He or she serves as the Secretary’s representative locally 

and is selected from the ranks of the trained Principal Federal Official cadre if 

available or another experienced senior or executive Federal manager. Whenever 

possible, the FC is selected from the local area of the event being supported. 

Responsibilities of the FC include: 

• Engaging Federal, State and local officials; consult State and local authorities 

on their event plans; 

• Coordinating the field information required for the completion of the Integrated 

Federal Support Plan; 

• Coordinating Integrated Federal Support Plan (IFSP) input from interagency 

HQS elements through OPS Special Events Staff; 

• Assessing, evaluating and de-conflicting requests for Federal assistance; 

• Coordinating requests for assistance and identified capability gaps with DHS, 

HQ and/or Field Elements and other Federal Departments/Agencies. 

For every SEAR Level 1 and 2 event, an IFSP is also prepared. The IFSP is a 

collaborative effort of the SEWG and is designed to: 

• Inform the Secretary and FC of all the Federal activities and support in preparation for and execution of a Special Event; 

• Facilitate the FC’s ability to initially participate within the Unified Coordination Group in case of an incident to support the Secretary’s incident management responsibilities; 

• Educate Federal interagency partners on Federal resource application. 
18 

Additionally, there are special threat products produced for each SEAR Level 1 

and 2 event. The SEWG has a robust interagency threat committee which works 

to generate Joint Special Event Threat Assessments (JSETA). These assessments 

are crafted by interagency intelligence community professionals who belong to the 

SEWG threat committee and are specific to Level 1 and Level 2 events. JSETA are 

distributed to the interagency community for situational awareness as well as to the 

State and local fusion centers in need of the information. They focus upon intelligence, threat and risk information, and identify critical infrastructure and key resources in proximity to large events. 

CONCLUSION

I am very pleased to report on the progress DHS and the interagency community 

has made in how we support Federal, State, and local events. The SEWG, in conjunction with the SEWG Threat/Risk Assessments, Methodology, Airspace Security 

committees, continue to work together to ensure that appropriate events are covered 

from a Federal perspective. The SEWG also ensures that there are no gaps in local 

plans and/or duplication of Federal efforts to support those plans. The SEWG does 

not interfere or limit any member agency’s ability to conduct its core mission, if appropriate, regardless of the SEAR level of the event. The success of DHS in supporting Special Event Planners is due to the cooperation and coordination found in 

the SEWG, with the ultimate goal of rendering appropriate Federal support for 

mass gatherings and Special Events. 

I hope that this testimony leaves you with an understanding for the efforts that 

DHS, OPS Coordination and Planning and the SEWG have made to improve planning and Special Event coordination. Thank you for the opportunity to report to the 

committee on our ongoing efforts. I request that you place this testimony and the 

list of SEWG member agencies in the permanent record and would be pleased to 

answer any questions at this time. 

EXHIBIT 1.—2008 SPECIAL EVENTS WORKING GROUP MEMBERSHIP

The interagency Special Event Work Group has members from the following organizations: 

• Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

• Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 

• Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

• Office of Grants and Training (G&T) 

• Office of National Capital Region Coordination (NCRC) 

• Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 

• Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

• United States Coast Guard (USCG) 

• United States Secret Service (USSS) 

• Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) 

• Office of Operations Coordination (OPS) 

• Incident Management Division (IMD) 

• National Operations Center (NOC) 

• National Preparedness and Programs Directorate (NPPD) 

• Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) 

• Office of Intergovernmental Programs (IGP) 

• Risk Management & Analysis (RMA) 

• Cyber Security & Communications (CSC) 

• Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) 

• Office of Private Sector Coordination 

• Office of Science and Technology (S&T) 

• Office of Health Affairs (OHA) 

• Office of General Counsel (OGC) 

• Office of Public Affairs (OPA) 

• Department of Justice (DOJ) 

• Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives (ATF) 

• Counterterrorism Division/DOJ HQS 

• Criminal Division/DOJ HQS 

• Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 

• Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) 

• U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) 

• Department of Agriculture (USDA) 

• Department of Commerce (DOC) 

• Department of Defense (DOD) 

• U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) 
19 

• Joint Task Force—Civil Support (JTF CS) 

• National Guard Bureau (NGB) 

• Joint Staff 

• NORAD 

• Office of Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense 

• National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) 

• Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) 

• Department of Energy (DOE) 

• Department of Health and Human Service (HHS) 

• Department of the Interior (DOI) 

• Department of State (DOS) 

• Department of Transportation (DOT) 

• Department of Treasury (TREAS) 

• Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 

• Homeland Security Council (HSC) 

• National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 

• National Security Agency (NSA) 

• Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 

• Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

I will start our questions for our first panel. 

Assistant Secretary Stephan, before I ask my first question, I 

want to just share with you my disappointment in the chemical security bill progress that we worked with your staff and this committee staff on for more than 9 months. At the beginning of that 

process, another committee had a hearing; and a day before the 

hearing, we received a letter saying you were against the bill. We 

had worked in good faith with you on that. 

I have since sent the Secretary a letter asking for a clarification 

on how we worked for 9 months on getting a chemical facility bill 

through this body. This committee passed it. When another committee takes it up, you are against it. 

So I just wanted to let you know that some of us are real concerned that if there was opposition to a bill, the way we work it 

out—and this committee does a good job at it—is we work it out 

before we go public. That was a real concern on my part, and I just 

wanted to make sure that you understood the disappointment we 

had. Because we spent time in my office and committee staff on 

trying to work the bill out. 

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, may I respond to your point? 

Chairman THOMPSON. Sure. 

Colonel STEPHAN. I just would like to remind you that we did, 

in fact, provide several objections to the bill during a previous testimony that I delivered personally to your committee Chairmanship 

and to several of the subcommittee meetings chaired by Chairwoman Jackson Lee. We have also worked with your staff to voice 

our objections over time as the bill seemed to get larger and larger 

and larger and more complex over time, and I believe we did a fairly good job at bringing you and your staff and Ms. Jackson Lee up 

to speed in terms of our specific objections. Not many of those objections, however, were noted in the final version of the bill. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Well, thank you. We are both on the 

record now. So we have a record. 

Admiral Rufe, one of the things we are told by State and locals 

is that, every time an event occurs, they have to make an application, whether it is an event that—let’s take the mule event. If it 

happens every year, there is some concern as to whether or not the 
20 

laborious process of repeating the submission of the data can somehow be streamlined. Have you all looked at that? 

Admiral RUFE. Yes, sir. We have a questionnaire that we have 

developed over time. In fact, we just met yesterday with a focus 

group to look at it again. We try to improve that over time to make 

sure it meets the needs of the State and local folks so that we are 

not asking for information that is not useful. 

I understand the concern that we would be asking for the same 

thing for a similar event each year. But, over time, the State and 

local capacity to be able to handle those events may change, may 

get better or may degrade. The event itself may grow or shrink. 

The participation could grow or shrink. Certainly the threat from 

year to year may change. So while an event may rate at one level 

one year, it may change the next year depending upon the response 

to the questionnaire by the State and locals who are submitting the 

information. 

Chairman THOMPSON. So is your testimony that you plan to at 

some point re-look at the information requested? 

Admiral RUFE. Yes, sir. Actually, we do that every year. The 

process starts right about now for next year, in fact. We hope to 

have it complete by December 1. 

The initial step in the process is to meet with representatives of 

about five to eight States who represent a focus group for us to look 

at what we did the previous year to make sure the questionnaire 

is meeting their needs as well as our needs and then changing it 

as we need to, and we will do that each year depending upon feedback that we get from our partners. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Colonel Stephan, you know, most of us 

live in communities where there are a number of gatherings of all 

sorts, from State fairs to what have you. They do make attractive 

targets. To what extent have you communicated with State and 

locals what you have to offer in support of their security concerns? 

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, I principally do that through my protective 

security advisors. I have 78 of them deployed now throughout the 

country, some in rural areas, some in major urban areas in the 

United States. We have a request for 10 additional positions in our 

2009 budget which I hope that you all support. 

Those are my eyes and ears forward. They are my boots on the 

ground. They have developed, over the 3 years of the program’s life 

span to date, very extensive collaborative relationships with State 

homeland security advisors, local officials, municipal officials, 

emergency managers and, most importantly of all, private sector 

owners and operators, to include commercial venue owners and operators where lots of these mass gatherings take place. Principally 

through that forward arm, they facilitate a more detailed level 

planning for events that don’t necessarily pop up on Admiral Rufe’s 

radar screen through his process. 

I think top-down through that process as well as bottom-up 

through my protective security advisors, I think we are doing a 

fairly good job now of providing more blanket coverage situational 

awareness training exercise involvement doing site-specific vulnerability assessments and just helping out our State and local partners in many ways. 
21 

Chairman THOMPSON. I yield to the gentleman from New York 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Colonel, Admiral, I want to thank you for your testimony. 

Secretary Stephan, one of the things we have learned over the 

last several years—and Congressman Lungren made this clear during the whole port security debate about the importance of layers 

of defense and levels of cooperation in trying to stop the enemy 

from getting here. 

As you look back over the last several years with what you have 

tried to do with mass gatherings, what has struck you as being the 

most successful part of your program? As we look to a new administration, what do you feel has to be done over the next several 

years to strengthen our position? I am not asking you to give away 

any weaknesses. What particular areas would you recommend the 

next administration focus on when it comes to mass gatherings? 

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, some of the most important progress we 

have achieved again lies in the area of the massive boots-on-theground interaction we have now at these local venue levels. But I 

think we have also set up a framework with the leadership at the 

State and local level as well as within the private sector venue 

owner and operator community. 

We have provided them risk assessment and vulnerability assessment methodologies. We focus, based upon risk, on actually 

conducting physical and cyber on-site assessments of these different facilities. We have provided them massive amounts of training to both security guys at the venues themselves as well as within State and local law enforcement jurisdictions that have responsibility in some way, shape or form for securities venues. We have 

attempted to target grant money specifically to capabilities gaps 

that have been identified in collaborative security plans. 

So I think the planning framework, the training framework, the 

exercise framework is there. The challenge for the remainder of 

this administration and the next administration is to try to figure 

out how to stretch the dollars, the Federal grant dollars, and to 

support to the extent that you can so you can make sure that no 

important things fall through the cracks. 

As Admiral Rufe pointed out, it is impossible for us to be everywhere, nor is it really our responsibility as the Federal Government 

to be everywhere. But we do need to continue the pace of the interaction providing the framework, the tools, the methodologies, the 

planning templates for security and mass evacuation and so on and 

so forth that we have established. So we just need to push that 

kind of activity further, further, further down the bean trail and 

hopefully at some point in time the trainer concept will kick in; and 

for every dollar I spend, State and local officials and the private 

sector, most importantly, will be spending $10, $100 or $1,000 

based upon the models and templates we have provided them. 

Mr. KING. Do you find that local officials are cooperative? For instance, is there a difference between doing a New Year’s Eve event 

in Manhattan and doing a Mule Day event in Tennessee? Do you 

feel that your Department is able to cope with different part of the 

country and adapt to different situations? 
22 

Colonel STEPHAN. Certainly. One thing I have learned is every 

jurisdiction is different from every other jurisdiction across the 

country, and I think the places where we have probably the most 

challenge is where a certain number of scarce resources are distributed across different law enforcement and emergency management 

jurisdictions. Getting everybody to acknowledge that they need to 

be part of a collective plan instead of all individually trying to own 

a shiny new fire truck and a swat team capability and sexy night 

vision goggle equipment—not everybody needs all of that. We need 

to have a collaborative plan, multijurisdictional in nature for these 

specific areas we can carve out and define across the United States 

and have people support their part of the plan. We train, organize 

and equip to do that. I think that is one of the most significant 

challenges we face. 

Mr. KING. Thank you. 

Admiral Rufe, the DHS information network that you have that 

provides intelligence and information, how do you screen who is 

going to get that? What are the precautions that are taken? Who 

is going to receive that? At what level are they getting it? 

Admiral RUFE. Yes, sir. In fact, I was going to add to what you 

just asked Assistant Secretary Stephan. One of the improvements 

I think we have made in this area is in that information-sharing 

piece. For each one of these SEAR Level 1 and 2 events, we do a 

Joint Special Event Threat Assessment, which is done by the intelligence professionals in the interagency; and that is shared, obviously, with the people who need to have it at the local events for 

which the threat assessment is made. 

In addition to that, I think a great step forward has been our 

State and local fusion centers. Because any actionable intelligence 

that is going to affect the local community is pushed forward as 

soon as we have it to the State and local fusion centers to ensure 

it gets distributed adequately to anybody who needs to have access 

to it. 

Mr. KING. Thank you. Thank you for your testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

I yield 5 minutes to the gentlelady from the Virgin Islands, Mrs. 

Christensen. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you for 

holding this hearing. It is an important issue. Thank you for the 

report which really sets a good stage for us to begin to do some 

more work on this issue. 

Welcome to our two panelists. As a physician, I am going to ask 

you some health-related questions. 

First, I am extremely concerned about the ability of States, territories, tribes and localities to deal with mass casualties, which 

could certainly occur if a mass gathering were to be hit with a disaster or an act of terrorism. How has the infrastructure protection, 

Colonel Stephan, taken the requirements for med surge into account and especially given the inability of most hospitals to take 

on any more patients, given that they are stressed to the max as 

it is? Actually, both of you could answer. 
23 

Colonel STEPHAN. Yes, ma’am. I will do my best, although I will 

have to defer to a FEMA representative in our Office of Health Affairs as they kind of own this responsibility within the Department. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. That is going to get me to my next question. 

Colonel STEPHAN. For example, we have worked very specifically 

with the NASCAR community over the past 18 months to develop 

a mass evacuation guidelines template for them. We have worked 

with the NASCAR leadership, security and emergency preparedness folks, looking at three or four different size and complexities 

of various NASCAR venues around the country. We work with 

them hand-in-hand and with a represented sampling of local officials, emergency managers and health community experts to build 

a planning guide, which I have actually brought with me to leave 

with the committee if you are interested. 

This includes important medical and public health considerations, to include: What is the capacity? Have you thought about, 

if you don’t have the capacity locally, where are you going to take 

your patients in prioritized sequence? Those kind of questions are 

asked in the template. 

Now it is the responsibility for the NASCAR leadership to take 

this template to the two dozen or so major venues around the 

United States of America and push out this guidance and let’s 

work with them to help build those plans to the extent that we 

have the resources to do that. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. You made a comment about the need to provide the buffer funding. 

Colonel STEPHAN. Yes, ma’am. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Do you think that we need to pay at least the 

same amount of attention to building up the health and infrastructure in communities around our country so that they would be better prepared? 

Colonel STEPHAN. I think as a general answer I would say, yes, 

we have to focus on the resiliency and the capacity of the medical 

and public health care community, especially with respect to very 

specialized types of threat factors, such as burn victims and so on 

and so forth, given certain types of threat scenarios where we probably do not still have sufficient capacity across the country. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Admiral, did you want to answer the question? 

Admiral RUFE. The only thing I would add, ma’am, is that the 

national response framework which was recently published is the 

framework for our response to any event. Any event involving— 

whether it is a hurricane or a natural disaster or a terrorist attack, 

you always have to be concerned with the idea of a mass casualties. 

Within that national response framework there is a natural disaster medical system that HHS is primarily responsible for supporting. It does provide teams that can come into different areas 

to support the State and local folks and their needs for specialized 

training or for just augmented medical help. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Right. In the Virgin Islands we have taken 

advantage of some of the DEMAT and other teams. 

But to go back to Colonel Stephan, you mentioned the Office of 

Health Affairs; and I am always interested in how they are being 

utilized within the Department. So how have you worked with the 
24 

Office of Health Affairs to address the health concerns? Have their 

policy and programmatic input been incorporated into the product? 

Colonel STEPHAN. I think the principal distinction between Dr. 

Runge’s job and mine is he is responsible for coalescing or coordinating the medical and public health aspects of the Department’s 

approach to incident management to steady state policy development, and so on and so forth. 

Where we have an overlap is in the medical and public health 

sectors, as defined in HSPD–7 as well as the food and agricultural 

sectors as defined in HSPD–7. We have a cross-fertilization especially in the research and development and modelling and simulation and analysis world with not only Dr. Runge’s office but also 

Admiral Cohen’s office, the Science and Technology Directorate, 

where I serve as a source of requirements from the field from those 

three sectors: medical, public health, food and agriculture. 

We use an annual reporting process to determine what modeling 

simulation analysis, research and development and raw science requirements come up from the field. We risk them or we risk categorize them and push them both to Dr. Runge for his shop as well 

as to Admiral Rufe for final action to stay engaged in the process 

as we research and develop things. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. They do provide input into the planning and 

the process that you oversee in terms of identifying the needs and 

the vulnerabilities and implementing the actions and measures? 

They have provided input that is used? 

Colonel STEPHAN. Yes, ma’am. 

A specific example is we collaborated very closely with Dr. 

Runge’s shop to develop the Pandemic Influenza Guide across the 

critical infrastructure sectors to include commercial venues. That is 

a document that has been finalized, writ large across the sectors, 

and we are in the process of either distributing or finalizing documents that are sector-specific. I, again, have a copy of this guidance 

document for you. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Connecticut for 5 minutes, 

Mr. Shays. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you to our witnesses for being here. 

I would like to have you give me a sense of how you sort out 

what right the public has to know if their life is potentially in danger. We had this challenge before September 11. I chaired the National Security Subcommittee in 1998, and I focused on terrorism. 

That was the focus of our Committee on Government Reform. 

When I talked about a Department of Homeland Security, people 

said, what are we, Great Britain? It was just like foreign to them. 

But we all knew that the Twin Towers was a target. We all knew 

it. In 1999, 1998, 1997, it had been a target in 1993, and we knew 

it still was a target. They failed to get it the first time. It was still 

a target. 

When September 11 happened, I had constituents who said: How 

come you didn’t tell me? So I am going to quickly give you an example, a real-life example. 
25 

A number of years ago, we were given a very real briefing that 

there was a suspected—in December a suspected terrorist effort to 

hijack planes coming from Europe, Great Britain and Europe. We 

were told there were six cities that were potential targets for a 

dirty bomb. So I will just ask you rhetorically. Hearing that, would 

you have your daughter go to Europe, your son, daughter go to Europe during that time? No. Would you have them go to the celebration, the New Year’s celebration in New York? No. You are not go 

going to do that. You are going to tell your friends not to do it. 

That is exactly what I did. Then I said it publicly, and the shit— 

excuse me—things hit the fan. 

What I want to know is, where do you draw the line? If you know 

for a fact that five cities are a target and you believe a dirty bomb 

is what you are concerned about and you are using technology to 

determine if there is radioactive material, why doesn’t the public 

have a right to know if you sure would tell your own family? 

I want both of you to answer. 

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, I will take a shot first, if you don’t mind. 

I think that every one of these scenarios is actually an individual 

case study, although there are certain principles that I believe the 

Secretary, the Intelligence Community, and all the way up to the 

President kind of walk through in order to gauge the response or 

the final decision that is made. 

Some things would be: How specific, how credible, how imminent 

is the threat? How mature and how advanced is the plot? What is 

the opportunity to apprehend more of the network if, by waiting, 

you could do that? If you waited 1 hour or 2 days, could you bag 

more of the network or not? What is that all about? Will public release have a deterrent effect? That is, if the cat is out of the bag, 

are they now going to execute their plot or are they going to move 

it elsewhere? 

A final principle would be: Will public release, in fact, cause 

more mass panic and hence potentially self-generate casualties 

than the terrorist attack itself or self-generated consequences than 

the terrorist attack itself? 

I think the senior administration decisionmakers, to include our 

Secretary and the FBI Director and others up to the President, 

have to walk through very carefully a series of principled questions 

before they can get to your answer. 

Mr. SHAYS. Colonel, I think that was a very thoughtful answer. 

Thank you. 

Admiral. 

Admiral RUFE. Yes, sir. 

I don’t think I can improve very much on what the Assistant Secretary just said. I would only add that I am sure that the Secretary—if we had very actionable, specific intelligence that was targeted at a specific community, and going through the criteria that 

Bob has discussed here, the Secretary would certainly lean forward 

in terms of talking to the Governor, talking to the mayor, talking 

to the local folks who are, after all, responsible for their citizens’ 

safety to make sure that that was a decision that they did together, 

rather than in isolation. 

Mr. SHAYS. Now, in this case, they actually stopped 11 planes 

and they never flew from Europe. So we knew our intelligence was 
26 

pretty accurate. Eleven planes never flew from Great Britain because of suspected terrorists. 

So you have gone through that process with me. Give me an example of where the public would have a right to know. 

Admiral RUFE. I will just say that if we knew for sure that there 

was an attack that was imminent, that there was no opportunity 

to interrupt it or there was a high degree of uncertainty that we 

could interrupt it and that folks’ lives were in danger, I would say 

that would be a case where we would—I would expect—I can’t 

make that decision myself, but I would expect the Secretary and 

the President would be very forthcoming in terms of getting that 

information to the people who needed to have it. 

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, I would also add to that. The more specific 

the targeting information is—for example, if we could drill down to 

an individual facility—the easier the decision becomes. If it is a 

sector-wide threat or a widespread geographic area of the United 

States, the decision becomes more complex and complicated. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I think your answers were very thoughtful. Thank you. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN [presiding]. Thank you. 

The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Pascrell for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you. 

Secretary Stephan, I am concerned about a couple of things here, 

and that is—and thank you for both of your answers to the gentleman from Connecticut—the sharing of information when there 

are potential events. It would seem to me one of the biggest criticisms in the first 2 or 3 years that we kept on hearing all over the 

country was locals being the last resort for information. 

How do you put a list together? You have all of these events. You 

have an inventory of events out there; and, as you said, you can’t 

cover all of them. So you are really depending upon local responders and local enforcement folks to do what they usually do at these 

events. 

Since 9/11, there has not only been a high alert from the Federal 

Government but also by local enforcement. You want them to have 

the resources. You want them to have the training. The training 

would seem that is very—you know, we have a role. The Federal 

Government has a role in making sure—but what is your specific 

relationship with the local governments in putting the list together 

and then making sure that they are involved in prevention, detention, and response? 

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, I am going to answer your question, but 

I want to defer the part about how the list comes together to my 

colleague, Admiral Rufe. 

For known events on more of a major scale, specific threat assessments or risk profiles are put together by the Intel Community—that spans DHS, the FBI, the CIA and others—and we put 

together documents that are shipped out to the localities where the 

venue or the mass gathering is taking place. 

Mr. PASCRELL. But do you use local input in the first phase? 

That is my question. 

Colonel STEPHAN. To the extent that there have been incidents 

or suspicious activities reports over time that have been generated 

not related to the event or specific to the event—— 
27 

Mr. PASCRELL. Is the network set up to do that right now? 

Colonel STEPHAN. Yes, sir. I believe it is. 

Mr. PASCRELL. So, in other words, you are saying that local folks 

on the ground, particularly law enforcement in this case, have the 

wherewithal, have been taught the strategy and are trained to provide this information to you? Is what you are saying? 

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, I am saying, generally speaking, the answer to your question is yes. The fusion center, as Admiral Rufe 

pointed out—— 

Mr. PASCRELL. We will get to that in a sec. 

Colonel STEPHAN [continuing]. Are going to put an immeasurable 

capability enhancement in place once those things get fully set up. 

Importantly, prior to the events taking place in many cases as well 

as during the events themselves, I have my protective security advisors actually manning the fusion centers, the State emergency 

OPS centers, the local OPS centers, basically provide the incident 

command and control for the venue. Though the means of that person, I am extracting information from the national headquarters in 

the intel community and I am feeding locally produced information 

through that guy back up to my headquarters. 

Mr. PASCRELL. So you are getting information from—if I can use 

the term—‘‘below’’ as well? 

Colonel STEPHAN. Yes, sir. Through my deployed network of 

boots-on-the-ground. 

Mr. PASCRELL. That was not happening before 9/11? 

Colonel STEPHAN. I didn’t have this capability 3 years ago. 

Mr. PASCRELL. This was not happening. This is a very important 

ingredient to protecting people. 

Colonel STEPHAN. I agree. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Now let me ask you this question: What are you 

preparing in terms of this information to the transition team of the 

next administration? 

Colonel STEPHAN. In terms of—— 

Mr. PASCRELL. Well, what are you readying—what are you providing? GAO has done a report on what is being transferred, what 

is being prepared for whoever becomes the President of the United 

States. 

Colonel STEPHAN. Sure. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I can only assume—and I am not going to assume 

it—what are you preparing? What is your agency, which plays a 

very critical role in protecting America—— 

Colonel STEPHAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Are you preparing a transitional carry-off, handoff to the next administration? 

Colonel STEPHAN. Yes, sir, I am. Every single one of the divisions 

that works for me is either a GS–15 or a senior executive service 

member that is career in nature. They will be in place. They know 

their programs. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I am sorry. 

Colonel STEPHAN. They know their programs. They know their 

people. Transition briefings have been or are being assembled, upto-date, sector-by-sector checklists of what the status of the sector 

are, where we are going. In fact, Congress will receive a status of 
28 

the 18 critical infrastructure sectors series of reports the first week 

in November. 

Mr. PASCRELL. We have been asking about this to many of the 

agencies that have come before the committee or subcommittees 

about their obligation. By the way, it is a legal responsibility that 

we do this. I just want to know, is your agency up to snuff right 

now? 

Colonel STEPHAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PASCRELL. You are on time? You are on target? 

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, we are on time. We are on target. The only 

person that gets decapitated in this process is, unfortunately, me. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Why? 

Colonel STEPHAN. Everybody below me—because I am a political 

appointee, sir. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Some political appointees will be here next year, 

correct? 

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, some may; some may not. I don’t want to 

forecast the future. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I have seen some folks come before us that I 

would recommend. I don’t care what your political persuasion is. I 

could care less. You do your job in protecting our families and our 

neighborhoods. The rest is all baloney. 

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, that is a great approach. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Yeah. Well, that is me. I know I speak for myself. 

Let me ask this question—can I ask one more question, Madam 

Chair? 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. If it is very short, very brief. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I will try to be short. 

Admiral, the National Operation Center, a very key ingredient to 

what we are talking about today, you folks pay attention to mass 

gatherings. But what exactly do you do in the process? How do you 

do that? 

Admiral RUFE. Well the National Operation Center is the Secretary’s and is the Nation’s, actually, primary situational awareness and incident management node. It supports the Secretary during the steady state times every day, 24/7, 365 days of the year. 

They monitor—the watch monitors all manner of things going on 

during the course of the day, including the special events. So if the 

mule event that was described before, we are aware of that. We 

know the date is happening. We have contact information. Importantly, everybody who has a special event knows the National 

Operational Center is the way to contact the Federal Government 

should there be a need either just prior to the event or during the 

event for any kind of Federal support. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. I am going to have to—— 

Mr. PASCRELL. Just one follow-up. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. No, I can’t because I have too many other 

people. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I am not going to ask a question. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. You are already 2—almost 3 minutes over 

time, and we have a lot of other people to ask questions. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I want to go back to the point I made with what 

Mr. Stephan said before. 
29 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Maybe someone will yield you some time during their questions, but I have to give the other Members an opportunity to ask their questions. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Lungren for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much. 

As maybe the only Member here who has ridden a mule on Mule 

Day in Bishop, California, I hope you are aware of that Mule Day 

as you are of the one in Tennessee. 

I want to thank both of you gentlemen for your public service. 

I happen to think, both in the military service that you engaged 

but also now, you have made a real contribution to our country; 

and I appreciate the work product that you have put out and the 

status that we are at now versus where we were before the two of 

you took your positions. 

Second, you are talking about transition. We are going to bring 

new people in no matter who wins the next election, and I hope you 

will have some lexicon for them of the acronyms that you have. Because I counted 24 in your two testimonies: DHS, SSA, NIPP, 

HSPD, CIKR, SSP, PSA, NSSE, SEAR, BZPP, SAV, CV, PI, PM, 

HSIN–CFS, whatever that is. I suppose if you had human relations 

there, it would be his and hers. But I don’t know how to pronounce 

it. CBR, ViSAT, R–SAT, HITRAC, BMAP, SEWG, RMA, IGP, SBU/ 

FOUO. 

We sometimes talk about our kids texting, and we can’t understand what they are saying. I don’t think they have anything on 

you two. So I appreciate the work that you have done. 

Let me just ask you this. The Federal Government can’t do everything, can’t be everywhere, can’t be all things to all people; and 

I think we have to state that right up front. There seems to be a 

tendency in this town that nothing is important unless it is Federal. Whether it is the Supreme Court or whether it is the Congress or whether it is the President, if it is not the FBI investigating, it is not an important crime, which is just totally wrong 

since about 98 percent of all the violent crime is taken care of by 

local and State government. 

That being the case, it seems to me very important that we don’t 

make your structures so heavy on the top that we don’t have that 

conductivity that is necessary, the interoperability, the exchange of 

information on the ground floor where things really happen. 

The Chairman mentioned that we have a diversity of mass gatherings all the way from Mule Days to the Super Bowl and everything in between. So it seems to me it is important to set up the 

structures that you have talked about to make sure they are functioning. 

But, to me, the overriding factor where the Federal Government 

can contribute, where local and State cannot do, is in the area of 

intelligence. What I mean by that is, you can be the gatherers of 

information from the bottom up, but, obviously, the Federal Government, through DHS, has a capacity for intelligence gathering 

around the world on its own with our intelligence agencies and foreign intelligence organizations as well. That is why I hope the Senate is going to complete the work on FISA today so that we will 

have a capability of getting that information in very real ways. 
30 

My question to you, Secretary Stephan, is this. To what extent 

is the intelligence received and analyzed by our various elements 

of the Federal Government broken down and given out to the people on the ground, the boots on the ground, local and State governments in a comprehensive and understandable way so that they 

can make it work from an operational standpoint? 

To me, we can do all—everything else that you have talked 

about, but if we fail there we basically failed in the true Federal 

responsibility. How do you do that now? Where are there—if there 

are any holes in that, that you need to improve on, that we need 

to improve on? 

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, for my part of the information sharing 

puzzle, I try to focus on getting products together and disseminating them to the private sector; and then, through the operations 

center and other avenues within DHS, the State and local piece 

comes into play. I will defer that part to Admiral Rufe. 

But we focus on building the products collaboratively with the 

private sector. So we have gotten these folks—now almost between 

900 and 1,000 of them—security clearances so they can help in actual product development, be part of the process up front, help us 

craft a document that is not just written by just the intel folks. Because the intel folks again will have their own speak, and we need 

at the end of the day the products that are used in the field to be 

understood by the private sector folks. 

So we build in now some things up front, a very important part 

of the process where the private sector can come in through our 

sector coordinating council process and the cleared members. We 

have made tremendous progress with the FBI and Intelligence 

Community to declassify or downgrade from Secret and above to 

FOUO. 

We probably have still some work to do in terms of shortening 

that timeline so that we can get it more quickly in the hands of 

the private sector. But when I joined the Department in 2003, that 

was taking a week or more. Now it happens in the course of hours 

or a day or so, depending on what situation we are talking about. 

We have made tremendous progress there, but it needs to be a 

lot—just even a lot quicker than that. 

We also need to expand the platform through which information 

is exchanged with the private sector. We released a new contract 

or awarded a new contract with the HSIN network about 2 months 

ago, working collaboratively with Admiral Rufe and his staff. He 

has the lead for this project. 

The first priority of that advance-generation HSIN network is 

the private sector portals that are a piece of the overall puzzle. We 

are leading that first to get the information to the private sector 

at kind of the head of the line, if you will. So I think there will 

be tremendous strides made within the next 2 to 12 months. 

We are going to cover down on about nine items of general 

functionality across the 18 critical infrastructure sectors within the 

first 60 days of the program in its advanced phase. In the course 

of the next year, we will develop additional capabilities and 

functionalities sector by sector using their inputs. 

So we have got products that are built at the top. They are integrated by using overseas intelligence, domestically produced intel-
31 

ligence, sometimes from the State and local community, sometimes 

from private sector folks. We have got more of them cleared in now 

to help shape the products. 

We are pushing strategic and tactical level intel out to the field. 

We surge during special events to provide advanced capability. We 

are maturing and expanding the platform to get information out; 

and, ultimately, that is going to allow us to migrate a capability 

user potential from 7 to 10,000 to multiple tens of thousands, I believe, over the next year or so. So I think that is what this is all 

about. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you. 

Admiral RUFE. Well, the only thing I would add for the National 

Operations Center that Mr. Pascrell asked about a few minutes 

ago, within the National Operations Center is an intelligence watch 

and warning branch that is our connectivity on a 24-hour basis 

with the Intelligence Community, CIA and all the other members 

of the Intelligence Community that brings in actionable daily intelligence. Anything that is hot, we get immediately. We disseminate 

that through that watch and warning branch to the State and local 

fusion centers any information that is of relevance or importance 

to them. So I think that system is working better, working well. 

In addition to that, we have 10 different police departments that 

have put officers in the National Operations Center from around 

the country. So, for instance, Miami/Dade, Las Vegas Police Department, Chicago, Metropolitan Police Department all have officers in our operations center that see the same intelligence every 

day that I do. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you. 

Admiral RUFE. They don’t distinguish. They get the same access 

that I do. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. The Chairwoman recognizes Mr. Carney for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

This is for both of you. I represent an area that has kind of a 

unique event. I have the Little League World Series in my area. 

You know, in central Pennsylvania we don’t have a lot of the resources available, but yet the world comes to central Pennsylvania. 

It is not just Little League players from around the country; it is 

from around the world too. 

How much work do you do with organs of security of other countries, of the visiting countries, in preparation for something like 

this? 

Admiral RUFE. Well, certainly part of what we do when we give 

our data call out to the State and locals to find out what events 

we are looking at, we ask them what capacity that is being brought 

to bear that they can address as part of what is being prepared for 

this event. That enables us to determine how much additional capacity they need. 

In terms of what foreign support is given, I have to get back to 

you on that, because I don’t know that, for instance, for the Little 

League World Series, that the nations that send their teams over 

here provide any particular intelligence or security support to those 

teams, but I can answer that for the record if you would like. 
32 

Mr. CARNEY. Sure. Well, I would like to see that. For example, 

you know, we had a team from Saudi Arabia before, you know, 

Latin America, various Asian nations represented as well. You can 

imagine a showcase like the Little League World Series, with what 

it is, it is as American as it gets. That is Rockwell’s America right 

there. What a target. So, you know, working with other security organs of the visiting countries I think is something I would really 

like to see what you do. 

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, we have protective security advisors on the 

ground. What they will do is they will plug in, if the State Homeland Security office is working the overall security protocols, they 

will plug in to whatever structure the State sets up. If the State 

passes it down to a more local level of responsibility, my folks 

would plug in to that type of event at that level. 

We don’t do specific, direct outreach to foreign governments or 

foreign enterprises, but through the planning mechanisms and security collaborative framework that the State or the local guys set 

up to manage the venue. 

Mr. CARNEY. Well, let me ask this then: Is there a way for foreign governments to reach out to you and say, ‘‘This is what we are 

doing’’? Is there some sort of international outreach? 

Colonel STEPHAN. Again, I would—since that particular event 

would be hosted in the principle security and emergency preparedness planning responsibilities either reside at the State or local 

level. It would be to reinforce them as they do their—— 

Mr. CARNEY. Sure. I guess I didn’t phrase the question well then. 

From just the general DHS perspective, do we have the opportunity 

or is there a way for foreign governments to keep us apprised? 

Admiral RUFE. Sure. I mean, I don’t think there is any formal 

mechanism where we reach out to ask them. For instance, as Bob 

indicated, the event planners are the ones who are responsible to 

alert us to what are the particular peculiarities of the event and 

who is coming to support them, what the capacity is available locally and what the shortfalls are. That is usually the process in 

which we get that information. 

Certainly if someone wanted to reach out to us, they could. If we 

saw a need, we would probably do it ourselves. Although, in your 

particular case, I don’t know whether we have. 

Mr. CARNEY. Sure. 

Colonel STEPHAN. For the bigger events such as the national special security events that are really led by the Secret Service, those 

types of formal mechanisms do exist. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. Yeah, I mean, the Little League World Series 

certainly is not the Super Bowl or NASCAR, but it does get a lot 

of play, over a long period of time, frankly, and a lot of the games 

are televised. So it is one of the things we would need, I think, to 

pay close attention to. But I really want to understand how everybody works together, from our Nation to those of the visiting countries as well. 

Thank you, ma’am. No further questions. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Dent, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 
33 

To follow up on Congressman Carney’s question about these nonnational special security events—he mentioned central Pennsylvania, Little League World Series—a few miles from there is Penn 

State, 110,000 people, six or seven Saturdays every fall, similar situations in other States, for college football games. 

What can local municipalities and private organizations do better 

to utilize Homeland Security dollars to prepare for these types of 

non-national special security events? Anyone want to take a shot 

at that? 

Colonel STEPHAN. In my opinion, as I stated earlier, I think a 

better cross-jurisdictional collaboration in terms of pulling resources together. In some places that just naturally occurs, but a 

lot of it is personality-driven and operating-environment-driven, jurisdictional-authorities-driven. 

But I think one of the big things that I see across the country, 

many different States, many different local types of jurisdictions, 

the successful or the not-so-successful approach is based upon the 

relationships and the pre-event planning that takes place across jurisdictional boundaries to integrate a lot of different resources, authorities and capacities together to solve a common problem. 

Admiral RUFE. Grant funding doesn’t fall in my area of expertise, 

but I know within the Department they are always reviewing their 

grant guidance on the various Homeland Security grants that go to 

State and locals. If you have something specific you would like to 

suggest in terms of a change to grant guidance, I would be happy 

to bring that back. 

Mr. DENT. I guess my follow-up question would be, what kind of 

cooperation have you received from the NFL or Major League Baseball regarding the preparation for games that might not rise to a 

level of a national special security event? What kind of involvement 

does the Department have in planning for these types of events? 

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, our relationship with them is through our 

Commercial Facilities Sector Coordinating Council. We have a 

sports league sub-council; that includes hockey, baseball, tennis, 

soccer, football, baseball, basketball. We have worked with them to 

develop a protective measures guide that we have recently published, actually in January of this year. That gives a template for, 

based upon different threat scenarios, what are physical protection, 

cyber protection, insider-threat-type protection issues you should 

look at, and how the private-sector owners and operators need to 

be connected with State and local law enforcement emergency managers at the local, State and Federal level. That is put together 

jointly with the sports leagues and now distributed widely across 

all the cities where these venues are housed. So that is one example. 

Another example is providing them at Government expense, actually, standardized vulnerability assessment methodologies that 

are Web-based, user-friendly tools where the facility can do a selfassessment. We provide IED-specific training to security cadres, 

both on the law enforcement side as well as the private-sector 

venue owner and operator side, prior to the events, where we get 

with the Homeland Security advisors to understand the schedule. 

We push focus training to those particular jurisdictions based upon 

an annual event schedule. 
34 

Mr. DENT. Thank you. 

At this time, I would be happy to yield the balance of my time 

to my friend, Mr. Pascrell from New Jersey, if he would like it. 

Mr. PASCRELL. How much time is left? 

Mr. DENT. One minute, 48. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I wasn’t kidding before when I said the American 

people deserve to have a solid transition during the time of transferring of powers regardless of if it is a Democratic or Republican 

President. American people need to not have extended anxiety 

over, are we are going to the next chapter? There should be one 

chapter here. We should be all on the same page when it comes to 

defending the Nation. That was my point, and I meant what I said. 

I think we should, Mr. Chairman, go on record, I think we should 

go on record some time in stating this as a principle, that we believe there should be a continuity. If it need be, to have some people, even in political appointments—I have met some great political 

appointments from the Bush administration. I didn’t find too many 

redeeming qualities in any other area, but in Homeland Security 

I thought there were some great folks that really loved this country 

and are seeing beyond the politics. We should insist upon that, that 

that is very important in securing the homeland. 

That is my point. Thank you. 

Admiral RUFE. I will just respond to that by saying that the Secretary has made it very, very clear to all of us that that is one of 

his main priorities, to make sure that he turns over a Department 

that is fully functional, operational and is in great shape for the 

next administration, no matter who it is. 

He has taken steps, I think, in terms of putting, as Bob said, 

people in place at the non-political level, at senior levels in non-political positions, to make sure that we have in place—if the new administration decides to take all the politicals out, to make sure 

there are career civil servants in place at senior levels to make 

sure there is continuity across the Department. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you. 

Chairman THOMPSON [presiding]. Thank you. 

I think Mr. Pascrell is correct. As you know, we have had a hearing and some follow-up already on transition. So, this is a priority, 

as is the entire transition to the next administration, for the Department. 

We now yield 5 minutes to the gentlelady from New York, Mrs. 

Lowey. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this important hearing. 

Mr. Secretary, Admiral, in April, Pope Benedict visited the 

United States, including stops in New York City and Yonkers. This 

was a wonderful opportunity for my community, but it came at 

great expense to the city of Yonkers. It paid over $400,000 for security. Unfortunately, no Federal funds helped cover the cost, and 

Yonkers was told it could reallocate previous DHS grants in the absence of new money. 

Now, this is a recurring issue in New York—Washington, DC, I 

would say, as well—as the New York Police Department provides 

security for non-head-of-state diplomats attending United Nations 

meetings. To date, the New York Police Department is owed $40 
35 

million for security expenses. I am not sure of the amount of 

money, Ms. Norton isn’t here, but I believe Washington, DC, faces 

similar expenses with Presidential inaugurations. 

I would like to ask you whether the Federal Government should 

help offset the cost to local governments for the most high-profile 

national special security events. 

Colonel STEPHAN. I believe that there are sources of funding 

available in terms of some existing Homeland Security grant programs that can be leveraged to provide enhanced security for exactly these types of special events, specifically the UASI program 

and the State Homeland Security Grant Program. Again, these 

moneys can be leveraged to support surge requirements. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, I would be happy to follow up with that, because Yonkers is out $400,000, and it is not a local football game. 

Having the Pope come is a national event. I was told that it could 

reallocate previous DHS grants. 

What I was also told is, the way those grants are set up, that 

money is already obligated. So what I would like to do, and I would 

be happy to follow up with you, is to see whether there is any way 

they could apply directly. Because Yonkers was not given a positive 

response. 

Colonel STEPHAN. We can reach out to your staff through our legislative affairs folks and get them in contact with the FEMA grant 

shop that really has responsibility for the grant guidance and the 

rules of the road, in terms of what can and can’t be used. 

Mrs. LOWEY. So you are saying there may be a possibility, although we were told there wasn’t, and I thank you. 

Colonel STEPHAN. No, I think what I am saying is your information is accurate, that previously allocated grant moneys, moneys 

that the States were pushed in either 2008, 2007 or earlier, I believe can be used in some way, shape or form to cover down on 

some of these expenses, depending on what they might be. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, I would like to follow up, because the issue 

is, if they are already obligated, we are looking for moneys for an 

event that are clearly national events. So we will follow up with 

you. 

When calculating the fiscal year 2008 Homeland Security Grant 

Program’s awards, FEMA uses threat vulnerability and consequence criteria to calculate the relative risk of a terrorist attack 

on an urban area. While FEMA has not publicly released all variables that comprise the risk score, it does not appear as though 

mass gatherings are included. 

Now, another question that I would like to follow up on: Is there 

any coordination between your offices and the FEMA grants directorate in determining how mass gatherings should impact grant allocations? If not, should mass gatherings be included in grant determinations? 

Because it is not a surprise that New York and Washington, DC, 

for example, have these mass events. These are very, very difficult 

for a community to deal with and to absorb. 

Colonel STEPHAN. Ma’am, in terms of the overall risk calculator 

of the Department, I own the input that feeds the FEMA folks the 

infrastructure component across all the risk engines of the Depart-
36 

ment. That is based upon a tabulation of a Tier 1 and Tier 2 set 

of established criteria, sector by sector. 

Inside the Commercial Facilities Sector, we have various categories of commercial venues that would be the sites where mass 

gatherings would generally take place. They could be colosseums, 

arenas, stadiums, amphitheaters, performing art centers, so on and 

so forth. Based upon criteria specific to each category of commercial 

facility, we do a risk ranking based on, principally from my shop, 

potential consequences and vulnerabilities. I feed that part of the 

algorithm that FEMA controls with respect to the infrastructure 

target set. There is very close collaboration between my staff and 

the FEMA staff that owns that overall algorithm. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, thank you very much. 

I see my time is up, so I will save the other question on interoperability, because I am always interested in knowing who is talking to who and whether their equipment is interoperable. But I will 

save that, Mr. Chairman. 

We will follow up with you. I thank you very much for your response. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. I am sure that the 

city of Yonkers appreciates your persistence. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, I am sure they do. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman THOMPSON. We now recognize the gentleman from Colorado, who I am sure has an interest in mass gatherings going forward, Mr. Perlmutter, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, I do; we have 

the two conventions coming up. 

The first question I have is, listening to you two today and just 

reading some of the materials, that there is a real focus on law enforcement, at least in the materials. How do you think the coordination has gone at either convention or generally with firefighters 

and paramedics and hospitals who might have to also respond to 

a mass casualty kind of a situation? 

Admiral RUFE. Well, as you know, both conventions are NSSEs, 

national special security events. So that is under the guidance of 

the Secret Service, and they have that down very well, in my opinion. You would have to really speak to them directly to get their 

sense as to what the interaction is. But they have a principal Federal official designated from the Secret Service in each one of those 

places to be their guy. That person is, I am sure, working very 

closely not just with law enforcement, with the State and local responders from the fire and medical community as well. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. I think they are. We have been working on the 

thing for about a year now, so I feel like there has been decent coordination. 

Let’s move to the next level. Let’s say it is either one of these 

conventions or it is some other big gathering, and it isn’t a situation where there is intent to do harm but there is an intent to disrupt and just bring it to a halt, whatever the situation is. How do 

the Federal officials, how does the Federal coordination play a role 

in that? 

So, I mean, let’s just say there is lots of vandalism, rioting, whatever it might be. Is there a Federal role? Do you just say, ‘‘Police, 

that is your problem. We are not getting involved.’’? 
37 

Admiral RUFE. It is pretty much a State and local problem. But, 

obviously, if they are overwhelmed—and, in fact, this has happened 

before in a natural disaster. Katrina is a good example of that, 

where the local law enforcement was not able to keep up with that 

level of unrest, and we had to bring in Federal support to do that. 

So I think when they do their planning for these big events like 

the conventions, obviously there have been disruptions at conventions in the past, a long time ago, most recently it is a long time 

ago, and that is part of the planning. Principally it is the responsibility of the State and the locals to handle that sort of criminal or 

disruptive activity. But the Secret Service certainly plays a role in 

that and would bring in extra Federal support, if needed. 

Colonel STEPHAN. The key to making that successful is the joint 

operation centers that have law enforcement and emergency manager people from across jurisdictions of government and across disciplines are all sitting together in an incident command post, and 

everybody would know or have the same situational awareness, 

know what was happening, know what capabilities were being exhausted and where additional authorities, resources and capacities 

need to be brought into the fight. You do that through the nodes 

that are then connected up to the regional and the national level, 

such as the NOC. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. I am sorry Sheriff Reichert isn’t here now, but 

the WTO up in Seattle, I assume that would be an NSSE, that 

would be a special event. 

Admiral RUFE. No, I don’t think it has been. I am not sure where 

that came at this year. It is not at NSSE. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Okay. 

Admiral RUFE. It would be categorized as one of the SEAR-level 

events. I am not sure where that would fall. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. But there was one where people were there to 

make trouble. So, in that instance, there would still be an incident 

command post and everybody trying to work in a coordinated fashion. I mean, was there Federal involvement in that? 

Admiral RUFE. An example of that is World Bank-IMF meetings 

here in the District of Columbia, which are sometimes the subject 

of considerable protest, and the chance for disruption is there. 

That, this year, is a Level 3 event. So that does not qualify at the 

higher level for Federal support. 

But, certainly, if there is additional Federal support needed for 

any of these lower-level events, it is provided on a case-by-case 

basis. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Admiral, maybe you can help clear us up. If you take the highest 

level where Secret Service is in charge—is there a formula for Federal participation at that level? Or how is that derived? 

Admiral RUFE. There is not, no, sir, Mr. Chairman. There is not 

a strict formula. There are some guidelines, however. For NSSEs, 

that is within the purview of the Secret Service, as we said. They 

look at each event individually and decide what level of support is 

needed. 

You may have noticed that, just recently, that the Democratic 

Presidential candidate is going to do his acceptance speech now at 
38 

the Mile High Stadium, which is going to change, obviously, the requirements for protection for that event. So the Secret Service 

looks at those things as they move along and makes adjustments, 

as necessary, for those events. 

On the SEAR 1, SEAR 2 and SEAR 3 events, there are some 

general guidelines. For example, for a SEAR 1 event, the FAA always puts in a temporary flight restriction in the area. That does 

not necessarily hold true for a SEAR 2 event. They might put in 

a TFR, but they might not. So it varies depending upon the type 

of event you have. In some cases, you will have a waterfront activity where the Coast Guard would play a pretty big role. In another 

case, it might be pretty far inland; there wouldn’t be a Coast Guard 

role. 

So there is no real set formula for the amount of Federal assets 

that are used. It is based on what capacity is available locally and 

with mutual aid agreements and then what the holes and the gaps 

are that need to be filled by the Federal Government. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Well, I guess the point I am trying to figure out is, how do we derive what is a State or local financial burden versus the Federal burden? Is that some formula that is 

worked out in advance? Or how is this done? 

Admiral RUFE. No, sir, there is no formula for that. The formula 

is that when each one of these events, these 4,000 events is entered 

into the data call each year, the State and local officials who are 

putting the information in respond to the questionnaire, and 

among the questions that they have to answer is, ‘‘Is the State and 

local capacity sufficient to cover the requirement?’’ Oftentimes they 

answer yes. In that case, there really isn’t a need for Federal assistance. 

Now, whether the State and local capacity that is utilized is 

available for reimbursement from the Federal Government is another question. That is where the grants from DHS would play a 

role. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

I now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Since we are on that topic, let me stay with it for a moment. Because there a lot of large mass gatherings that really, sort of, fall 

under the radar screen and don’t get national notice. I can think 

of one in North Carolina where we will have the State fair and we 

will have 850,000 people in the course of a week, and on most any 

day there will be about 150,000 people moving through it. 

I didn’t realize how many Mule Days they have, since North 

Carolina has one in Benson. It is a large event. Roughly 60,000 

people will show up for that event. Just for a parade, they are 

going to have somewhere in the neighborhood of 20,000 people. 

I share those numbers for a reason: Because you don’t hear about 

it here in Washington. It is the local folks who do all the planning, 

all the training, ensure that it is safe, it is enjoyable for the people 

who come and attend. 

With that said, I think the Federal Government does help and 

does spend a lot of time in preparing for emergencies, developing 

best practices for securing large events and protecting the public 
39 

from terrorism. But it isn’t clear that the guidance is being applied 

at the local level. 

Let me tell you why I ask this question. Committee staff has 

heard that the Federal, State, territorial, tribes, local and privatesector personnel that plan events are often separated from other 

activities, such as training, standard-setting, and the identification 

and communications of the lessons learned. 

Both of you are retired officers, and you know from your experience in the armed and uniformed services that it is critical to bring 

planning together with those activities. So my question is, what is 

being done and what can be done that we aren’t doing to better integrate these efforts? 

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, I think to the extent that the special 

events are identified through either Admiral Rufe’s process or from 

my protective security advisors that are my eyes and ears forward, 

my boots-on-the-ground forward, that when we have time and we 

know that something is coming, it is deliberately planned—— 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. How much time do you need? 

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, it depends on the size and scope of the 

event, the complexity of the event. But for something that recurs 

on an annual basis, like a State fair, I will have my protective security advisor working with the State homeland security advisor to 

figure out a plan that does involve actually building the security 

plan, figuring out what Federal requirements might be needed, 

helping facilitate cross-jurisdictional collaboration and coordination, 

trying to tie a grant-funded State and local exercise program to the 

event. 

For the Vice Presidential and Presidential debates coming up, we 

are doing this very thing to bring bombing prevention, IED prevention and awareness training, soft target awareness training to 

those communities specifically, and to make sure that all of these 

folks are connected to the national information-sharing network all 

around the various venues. 

So I think we are making progress, again, principally because 

now I have a cadre of people deployed across the country that have 

been taken up under the wings of the State and local officials that 

they support every day. 

Admiral RUFE. The only thing I would add would be, sir, that for 

the SEAR 1 and SEAR 2 events, we appoint a Federal coordinator 

that is the Secretary’s representative for the event. Generally, it is 

somebody from the local area. We try to get somebody who has 

some local knowledge from one of the Federal agencies that is in 

the area. They are tasked with putting together, with our support, 

an integrated Federal support plan. As its name indicates, it is a 

support plan to support the State and locals. It is supposed to be 

integrated completely with the planning that is being done at the 

State and local level. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. The best practices? 

Admiral RUFE. Absolutely. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Assistant Secretary Stephan, let me follow that 

up, because I understand that the Department has been working 

with State and local governments and with the private sector to develop the planning guidance. 
40 

I guess my question, how would you assess the Department’s efficiency in providing material that these non-Federal actors can actually use in the field? 

I guess the second part would be, what are you doing to improve 

that effort? Because I think that is a critical piece, because there 

is more out there in the private sector, really, than in the public 

sector. 

Colonel STEPHAN. Absolutely, sir. In this particular sector, commercial facilities, there is just such a wide diversity in the number 

of actors involved, it is a difficult problem set. 

But we try to conquer that challenge two ways. One is to enroll 

and engage the stakeholders in the development of the guidelines 

documents, so that they are understood and translatable down to 

the local level. So the people that are going to have to use them 

are actually involved part and parcel in terms of the process that 

guides their development. 

The second part that we really need to work on is to get more 

guidance and guidelines pushed out the door to the various sub elements of this sector. We have hit the sports leagues. We are working on stadiums and arenas. We have a shopping mall, giant retail 

piece about to go out this fall, early next year. 

I just need more time. In fact, I am not going to have more time. 

The next administration will have to pick up this ball, understand 

where we have been able to reach out and touch folks, and continue to push the products and the guidelines out, hopefully using 

the template of bringing in the stakeholders from the very beginning of the process. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Very quickly, scale of 1 to 10, 10 being the best, 

what would you rate? 

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, I hate those kind of questions. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. I knew you would. 

Colonel STEPHAN. You know, it is a 10 in terms of the places 

where we had the guidance out right now, 9 or 10. In places where 

we don’t have the guidance, it is at the 1 or a 2 level. I mean, it 

is different depending on which piece of this sector you are talking 

about. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Colonel, can you provide the committee with a listing of where 

you had the guidance out versus where you don’t have the guidance 

out? 

Colonel STEPHAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to do 

that. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. I think that will help us. 

We will now yield to the gentlelady from New York for 5 minutes, Ms. Clarke. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. This has been a very informative and interesting hearing, especially coming from a place like New York 

City, where it seems, every time I leave my house, I am involved 

in a mass gathering. 

There are a number of facilities and environments across the 

United States that routinely handle mass gatherings that I believe 

would likely be classified as SEAR 1 or 2. For example, in New 
41 

York we have Madison Square Garden, which is an extremely popular venue for high-profile events that is right in the heart of the 

city. Certainly, being in the heart of the city, it is also in the middle of a commercial hub. So you have not only the people who gather in the venue, but you have, I would estimate, maybe hundreds 

of thousands of people that are just moving about either in the subway system, Amtrak is right there, and you have this massive 

shopping area. So potentially hundreds of thousands of people are 

there. 

With these types of environments, how do you offer support and 

resources? Is it only in the direct run-up to a specific event? Or do 

you work with them on a continuing basis if there are facilities 

that commonly hold mass gatherings, such as stadiums and similar 

venues? 

Colonel STEPHAN. Ma’am, I think we actually approach it from 

both angles. We do lots of what I refer to as steady-state activities, 

collaborative planning, trying to target the various grant programs 

to fix gaps that have been identified through collaborative security 

planning efforts, so on and so forth. 

Then during particular special events, depending, again, on the 

risk factor, surge, additional Federal support as required. For example, in New York City, the U.S. Coast Guard is very active in 

working as a team with local law enforcement officials, in terms of 

the waterways around Manhattan island; the TSA folks, in terms 

of no-fly zones during certain periods to cover certain special 

events; TSA, also, in terms of helping beef up with additional bomb 

dogs and things like that, in terms of the subway system up there. 

So I think the answer to your question is actually both approaches, trying to work them together. 

Ms. CLARKE. Is that a consistent, in your estimation, a consistent 

operation? 

In other words, New York is always going to be dynamic like 

that. One of the issues that I think the citizenry of the city has is 

the fact that we get comfortable, because this is the way we live. 

We want to be comfortable in the fact that the individuals who are 

entrusted with our safety are not as relaxed about the environment 

we reside in but are always in a state of readiness. 

For instance, what is the protocol in place for these types of environments that creates and maintains the state of readiness for the 

deployment of emergency response? Is that something that your offices would monitor, or is it something that has to be requested 

from the ground up? 

Colonel STEPHAN. Ma’am, I think we have consistency in terms 

of the guidance and protective guidelines, vulnerability assessment 

methodologies, training, exercise programs, across my mission 

area, from city to city or from rural area to rural area. The guidelines are there, but they are flexible enough to allow themselves to 

be tailored to the specific operational risk environments where they 

have to be applied. 

I think where you are going to find a variance, however, is there 

is a tremendous difference in resources city by city across America. 

A New York City and a Wichita, those are apples and oranges. 

New York City is on a heightened alert posture almost every day 

of the year, whereas other communities around the United States 
42 

of course do not feel, necessarily, that sense of urgency with respect 

to the homeland security mission set. 

So you will find different levels of focus, different levels of resources being applied. But in the plans that we push out and the 

guidance documents we push out, we try to maintain consistency, 

yet approach that allows flexible tailoring of things to the local 

landscapes. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you very much, gentlemen. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

We now recognize the gentlelady from Texas for 5 minutes, Ms. 

Jackson Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me 

thank you very much for what I think is a very important hearing 

that allows us to discuss the best way to go forward in ensuring 

the safety of the American people. 

Secretary Stephan, let me thank you also for your concerted leadership. Of course, as we have been quite tough in our questioning 

on a number of occasions, we do appreciate the fact that both you 

and the Admiral are consistent in your commitment and dedication, and I truly appreciate it. 

As you well know, I chair the Subcommittee on Transportation 

Security and Infrastructure Protection, so I am quite familiar with 

the many issues we have been discussing today. 

We recently had a hearing, and I wanted to ensure that a number of the issues of that hearing could be framed in the hearing 

today. I think that it is clearly important for a country that loves 

to come together at big events, that we focus our attention on how 

we can be more effective. The hearing I speak of was held on 

March 12. So I am going to ask a series of questions back to back, 

and then I will yield to you, Mr. Secretary, if I can. 

During our hearing, several experts testified that Congress 

should consider creating a lead at the Department of Homeland Security for non-national special security events. I would like to get 

an assessment of the progress being made there. 

In addition, I think it is important that DHS develops clear 

metrics for the implementation of security and response-related 

measures in the CFS, the Commercial Facilities Sector. I would 

like to get your assessment of how far along the Department is. 

The metrics need to address exercises, resource allocation and contingency planning efforts. 

Additionally, I think that it is important that the CIPAC will 

seek to incorporate members that do not merely represent an association. This, of course, is encouraging the Department to utilize 

the authority that Congress has already allocated, such as the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council. But I would like 

to see how you incorporate individual asset owners. So go outside 

of the boundaries of Government and see whether or not they can 

participate as well and give us extra insight. 

I also hope that the Department leverages its Voluntary PrivateSector Preparedness Certification Program. This program can be 

used to encourage companies to meet voluntary standards. I would 

like to hear from you how that program is proceeding and how this 

program has been introduced to the Critical Facilities Sector. 
43 

Then I am interested in something that I have discussed with 

you for a period of time, and that is exercises. I think we have had 

some long-standing discussions on exercises. I have listened to the 

Congresswoman from New York, Mrs. Lowey, about the unexpected 

visit—or, let’s say, the visit by the Pope. I just think that these exercises are important, and I am interested in a full description of 

these exercises. Probably some of that may be in writing, but, anyhow, if you could give just a quick assessment, their participants 

and their frequency. 

Again, let me make my request of utilizing the area in the Southwest region, in this instance a city like Houston, for an opportunity, but I believe we should spread those opportunities and have 

some method of doing so. 

I think there are about 5 points there, and I know that—if you 

give a snippet on each, you will be able to write some of the answers presented in writing. 

Colonel STEPHAN. Yes, ma’am, you are going to have my staff 

busy for quite a while over the next couple of weeks, but we are 

going to get back to you to answer all these questions very fully. 

In terms of exercises, we have integrated really more than an observer capacity for the first time. All of the elements of the critical 

infrastructure sectors that wanted to be engaged, starting back in 

TOPOFF 4, full players, full members of the exercise design control 

simulation cell, as well as players during the exercise event itself. 

We carried that forward a couple of months ago, in May, when we 

had another national-level exercise. For the first time, I opened up 

our National Infrastructure Coordinating Center to seat members 

of the private sector in the hub of the nerve center of my operation. 

I think you will receive a favorable report, if you query the folks 

that were involved, that they now have a special exercise working 

group of the private-sector coordinating councils across the board. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. If I could just get you to answer the point 

about ensuring that we have a person, a lead at DHS for non-national special security events. 

Colonel STEPHAN. I am proud to announce that that individual 

is seated to my left. Admiral Rufe is the lead. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Excellent. I only have a short time, if you 

want to finish your last sentence. 

Colonel STEPHAN. The individual asset owners and operators, 

ma’am, their equities, their interests and concerns are incorporated 

really by my deployed cadre of 78 protected security advisors that 

have solid and growing, ever-maturing, professional relationships 

with the owners and operators in their geographic areas of responsibility. 

The private-sector voluntary standards program, in accordance 

with the statutory requirements, has been briefed to the sector coordinating council membership writ large. FEMA has the lead for 

that program within DHS. The status we are at now is mining 

what constitutes preparedness standards, figuring out what kind of 

standards are out there, defining what the accrediting body will be, 

and pushing out a contract to bring those folks in. 

We are going to roll in through the sector coordinating council 

structure, under the national infrastructure protection plan, the 

private sector input across the 18 sectors into that process. That 
44 

will move out over the course of the next year. I will have the 

FEMA folks put together a more comprehensive status briefing. 

The metrics piece, specifically for this sector but all the sectors 

really, will come to you in the sector annual reports. I just received 

each of those on July 1. I am aggregating them into a nationallevel cross-sector risk report that will be coming to the Congress 

of the United States the first week in November per statute. That 

contains a detailed metrics piece sector by sector for you. 

I believe I have covered five of five. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I think you have, but we will pursue it further 

in further discussions. 

Colonel STEPHAN. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I yield back. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

In the event, Ms. Jackson Lee, there is something that you asked 

or wanted to ask and we did not, we will gladly provide our witnesses with anything you provide us in terms of questions for their 

response. 

We want to thank our first panel of witnesses. You have been 

very thorough in your answers, and we appreciate, again, your 

service to this country. Thank you very much. 

We will now call our second panel of witnesses. 

We would like to welcome our second panel of witnesses. I appreciate your patience and, obviously, your service to the country. 

Our first witness, Dr. Thomas Blackwell, is a medical director for 

the Center for Prehospital Medicine at the Carolinas Medical Center in Charlotte, North Carolina. He is also the medical director for 

MEDIC, the Mecklenburg EMS agency, Lowe’s Motor Speedway, 

and the Bank of America Stadium, all in Charlotte, North Carolina. 

Dr. Blackwell, we want to thank you, especially for making the 

time to testify today. We know that you have deployed your mobile 

hospital to the State of Indiana to provide support as part of the 

response to the recent floods there. We appreciate your dedication 

to providing emergency medical care throughout the Nation. 

Our second witness is Sergeant Scott McCartney. Sergeant 

McCartney is the program manager and lead exercise planner for 

the Large Stadium Initiative for the State of California. He is also 

a member of the Critical Incident Negotiation Team for the Sacramento County sheriff’s office. 

Welcome. 

Our third witness, Mr. Doug Reynolds, is the director of security 

for the Mall of America in Bloomington, Minnesota. We commend 

his service in this capacity, as well as his previous 21 years of service as a member of Army National Guard. Speaking of the Mall of 

America, my wife appreciates the security. 

We thank our witnesses for their service to the States and to the 

Nation and for being here today. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be inserted 

into the record. 

I now ask each witness to summarize his statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Dr. Blackwell. 
45 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS H. BLACKWELL, MD, MEDICAL DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR PREHOSPITAL MEDICINE, CAROLINAS MEDICAL CENTER, CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA 

Dr. BLACKWELL. Chairman Thompson, distinguished Members of 

the Committee on Homeland Security, good morning. Thank you 

for inviting me to testify this morning. 

My name is Dr. Tom Blackwell. I am an emergency physician at 

Carolinas Medical Center’s Level 1 trauma center in Charlotte, 

North Carolina. I also serve as a clinical associate professor of 

emergency medicine at the University of North Carolina-Chapel 

Hill. 

My other positions do include the medical director for the Mecklenburg Emergency Medical Services Agency, the 911 medical provider for Charlotte, and the medical director for Lowe’s Motor 

Speedway, the Wachovia Championship PGA, and Bank of America 

Stadium, home to the Carolina Panthers. 

I have had the opportunity to read the committee’s report on 

public health, safety and security for mass gatherings, and applaud 

the efforts at better understanding the issues we face with preparedness and with response. It was a pleasure to spend time with 

Dr. Asha George, Scott Springer, and other staff members during 

their several visits to Charlotte. 

Before I begin, I would like to iterate that planning and preparedness for any mass gathering event goes hand-in-hand with 

any mass casualty planning resulting from a disaster. Thus, my 

comments this morning will apply to both of these situations. 

As you think about mass gathering medical support, there are 

four primary criteria that I believe must be acknowledged and addressed: No. 1, the coordination between State and local authority, 

including the Federal and tribal governments when those are applicable; No. 2, the participation of all law enforcement, fire services, 

EMS, public health and hospitals and emergency management 

agencies; No. 3, the comprehensive preparedness, planning and 

training; and No. 4, the procurement or availability of assets or resources required to save lives, ease suffering and successfully mitigate the medical consequences. 

In Charlotte, we have addressed many of the issues in the report 

and have created solutions that will preserve human life and infrastructure, all of which have direct implications for mass gathering 

events and disaster management. First is the development of the 

Advanced Local Emergency Response Team, or ALERT, which is a 

multi-agency team of law enforcement, fire and medical staff 

trained to respond to a weapon of mass destruction. No. 2 is the 

design, development and implementation of the state-of-art mobile 

hospital. 

Our ALERT multidisciplinary program has been training and 

preparing since 1998, way before the events of 9/11. It also includes 

a medical online surveillance tool that was integrated into a Statewide detection system. This system is able to track disease or potential disease spread and provides epidemiologic feedback to the 

region or the area affected. 

Now, while this is an important public health component, the 

real issue facing communities in mass gathering venues today is 

the acquisition of appropriate resources required to manage patient 
46 

care, especially given to current state of health care delivery in the 

United States. 

The 2006 Institute of Medicine report entitled ‘‘The Future of 

Emergency Care in the United States Health System’’ outlined the 

degree of emergency department overcrowding and hospital closings. Since many hospitals across this Nation operate at surge capacity on a daily basis, it is extremely difficult to successfully handle any incident that results in mass casualties. 

So to support the ALERT initiative and the overcrowded state of 

our health care system we developed and constructed a mobile hospital that was different in design from the traditional tent systems 

that have been used in the past. This unit is designed to quickly 

move to the site of a disaster, can be deployed in under 20 minutes, 

and supports the provision of comprehensive medical and surgical 

care for traumatic injuries, infectious disease, and general emergency and ambulatory care. 

It incorporates a two-bed operating room, four-bed intensive care 

unit, and an eight-bed emergency department in an expandable 53- 

foot tractor trailer. When more beds are needed, a shelter system 

can be deployed from the trailer that can support an additional 250 

beds. 

In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, MED–1 was 

dispatched to Waveland and Bay St. Louis, Mississippi. Within an 

hour after set-up, we began seeing patients. Within 24 hours, we 

had conducted our first surgical procedure, transferred our first 

pregnancy who was soon to deliver in Gulf Port, and saw our first 

traumatic injury. 

This case involved a 12-year-old boy who was riding an all-terrain vehicle when he was struck by a car. Due to the head injury, 

the child had stopped breathing on their arrival at our facility. We 

resuscitated and stabilized the child and quickly transferred him 

by Coast Guard helicopter to the trauma center in Jackson. It is 

my pleasure, Mr. Chair, to report to you that this child eventually 

survived, walking out of the trauma center in Jackson with no permanent nor long-term disability. 

During the 7-week deployment, we saw more than 7,500 patients, sometimes going up to 350 a day. Six months later, MED– 

1 was called to assist in the excessive surge capacity conditions in 

New Orleans, during the first Mardi Gras celebration following the 

hurricanes. During the 2 weeks of deployment, 575 patients were 

treated. 

At this very moment, Carolina’s MED–1 is on its third deployment in Columbus, Indiana, providing emergency department services in the wake of the severe flooding that destroyed Columbus 

Regional Hospital on June 6. 

We are confident that the MED–1 asset, due to these deployments and our lessons learned, would be a useful resource for any 

mass gathering event and for tornados, earthquake and floods that 

have plagued our country. The time is now, Mr. Chair, to seek 

unique solutions that support a combination of health care needs 

and mass gathering special events. 

Finally, I would like to comment on two additional important 

issues that we have concerns, and that is sustainment and mutual 

aid. 
47 

It is important to realize that while many of our assets and programs are grant-funded, sustainment dollars are equally significant 

to keep those initiatives operational and functional. 

Last, I would encourage Congress to entertain methods to expedite the process for requesting and authorizing mutual aid, using 

the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, or EMAC. When 

devastated communities and populations need emergency care, deployment strategy should be as streamlined as possible so as to facilitate that response. 

I thank you again, Mr. Chair and committee Members, for your 

time. I am pleased to answer questions that you may have. 

[The statement of Dr. Blackwell follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS H. BLACKWELL

JULY 9, 2008 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, distinguished Members of the committee and guests, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. My 

name is Dr. Tom Blackwell and I am an emergency physician at Carolinas Medical 

Center, a designated Level 1 trauma center in Charlotte, North Carolina. I also 

serve as Medical Director for the Mecklenburg Emergency Medical Services Agency, 

which is the 9–1–1 EMS provider for the city of Charlotte and Mecklenburg County. 

Additionally, I am a Clinical Associate Professor of Emergency Medicine at the University of North Carolina—Chapel Hill School of Medicine and the University of 

North Carolina—Charlotte. 

Carolinas Medical Center, is the flagship hospital of Carolinas HealthCare System 

and is a State-designated Academic Medical Center Teaching Hospital. Carolinas 

HealthCare System is the largest healthcare system in the Carolinas and the thirdlargest public healthcare system nationally. 

I have dedicated the last 10 years of my career to improving our community’s and 

this Nation’s ability to address surge capacity medical needs and to respond to incidents resulting from natural and man-made disasters. Today, I would like to share 

with you my experience in developing our local capacity to respond to a mass casualty event in our region. I would like to emphasize that when you prepare for mass 

casualty incidents at mass gatherings, the same preparation applies with mass casualties resulting from a natural disaster; thus my comments this morning will apply 

to both situations. 

In our region, we have addressed many of the issues in the committee’s Report 

Public Health, Safety and Security for Mass Gatherings and have created solutions 

that will preserve human life and infrastructure. Since 1998, I have been integrally 

involved in two comprehensive medical management initiatives in Charlotte, both 

of which have direct implications for mass gathering events and disaster management. 

1. The development of the Advanced Local Emergency Response Team, or 

ALERT which is a multi-agency team of law enforcement, fire, and medical staff 

trained to respond to a weapon of mass destruction. 

2. The design, development, and implementation of a state-of-the-art mobile 

hospital. 

Put simply, I am the doctor in the field at ground zero who will be there when 

any incident unfolds. As such, I believe that I am able to provide to you a unique 

perspective from the ground up as to how we address patient care issues. 

DEVELOPMENT OF ALERT

Charlotte is the second-largest banking center in the country and is the only city 

in the world that has two nuclear power plants within 25 miles from the center of 

our uptown district. It hosts the NFL Carolina Panthers and the NBA Charlotte 

Bobcats. The Lowe’s Motor Speedway, home to several prominent NASCAR events, 

sits just outside of Charlotte in Cabarrus County, North Carolina. In addition, Charlotte hosts a number of other annual mass gathering events such as the Central 

Intercollegiate Athletic Association (CIAA) Basketball Tournament and the 

Wachovia Championship Golf Tournament. The Charlotte-Douglas International 

Airport is the tenth largest airport and the largest hub for USAirways. Charlotte 
48 

has the sixth-most Fortune 500 companies and is home to many international businesses. 

Our wake-up call came in February 1998, when a man entered the Mecklenburg 

County Court House in uptown Charlotte carrying a bomb. The Court House is a 

mass gathering at 9 and 2 every day when district court convenes. This man told 

deputies that he had a second device that could be remotely detonated in the trunk 

of his car several blocks away. A rapid search of his home revealed ingredients for 

constructing a bomb, in addition to potential chemicals and biological agents on-site. 

While the incident was successfully resolved, the emergency response revealed several issues that we, as a community, needed to address. Collaborative agreements 

were fostered between emergency management, law enforcement agencies, the fire 

department, EMS, public health, and hospitals. The result of our labor was the formation of the Advanced Local Emergency Response Team (ALERT) to ensure preparedness for urban terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, as well as natural 

disasters (such as hurricanes and floods). The team makeup is comprised of local 

law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical staff, and incorporates resources to 

effectively and efficiently respond to any terrorist incident or natural disaster. 

ALERT has been training for terrorism and mass casualty responses including 

tactical operations involving bombs, biological, and chemical agents detection/disposal, decontamination, triage and scene treatment, hospital response, and incident 

command. ALERT exemplifies the kind of ‘‘culture of collaboration’’ among various 

private and public entities that the committee’s Report Public Health, Safety and 

Security for Mass Gatherings so appropriately recognized is essential to protecting 

our citizens and preserving the community’s infrastructure. 

Two areas that are most critical in medical response and readiness are real-time 

detection and surge capacity. Real-time detection is a prerequisite to containing disease outbreak, particularly in a mass gathering environment. Our ALERT program 

includes a medical on-line surveillance tool that was integrated into a State-wide 

detection system. This system is able to track disease or potential disease spread, 

and provides epidemiologic feedback to the region or area affected. Another critical 

issue facing communities and mass gathering venues today is surge capacity—ensuring the availability of appropriate and adequate resources required to manage 

an enormous influx of ill or injured patients. In the 2006 Institute of Medicine Report entitled ‘‘The Future of Emergency Care in United States Health System,’’ one 

of the three reports ‘‘Hospital-Based Emergency Care: At the Breaking Point’’ focused on surge capacity. The report outlined the degree of emergency department 

overcrowding and hospital closings. This, along with the fact that many hospitals 

across this Nation operate at surge capacity on a daily basis, makes it extremely 

difficult to successfully handle any incident that results in mass casualties, particularly from mass gatherings where tens of thousands of people could be affected. 

DEVELOPMENT OF MOBILE HOSPITAL

Learning from the anthrax attacks, our deliberations surrounding the ALERT initiative, and the overcrowded state of our hospitals, we set out to design and construct a mobile hospital that was different in design from the traditional tent systems that have been used in the past. Initiated in 2002, we wanted to build a medical facility that could quickly move to the site of a disaster, be rapidly deployed 

on arrival, and be able to provide comprehensive medical and surgical care so as 

preserve hospital resources for the most critical patients. Amid the growing concern 

of biological threats, including infectious disease outbreaks which raises the issues 

of isolation, containment, and quarantine, it was essential that the mobile hospital 

serve patients that could not and should not be transferred to local hospitals. Transferring patients who may have an infectious disease could contaminate and jeopardize the integrity of a hospital’s infrastructure for indefinite periods of time. Our 

design incorporated a 2-bed operating room, 4-bed intensive care unit, and an 8-bed 

emergency department in an expandable 53-ft. trailer. While 14-beds are helpful, a 

mass casualty incident or pandemic outbreak could result in hundreds or even thousands of patients. Thus, to plan and accommodate the expected large number of patients, we developed a shelter system that could be deployed from the trailer that 

can support an additional 250 beds. 

The Department of Homeland Security was incredibly supportive of our approach 

and plan. We applied for a grant and received funding from the Department to build 

the prototype hospital. In April 2004, we unveiled the Carolinas MED–1 mobile 

emergency department. The MED–1 unit is owned and operated by Carolinas Medical Center, and includes emergency physicians, trauma and orthopaedic surgeons, 

anesthesiologists, nurses, and paramedics as the healthcare team. Additional sup-
49 

port personnel includes drivers, clinical engineers, and security staff provided by the 

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department. 

After much training, planning, and operational exercises, the MED–1’s first deployment came in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. MED–1’s emergency response unit and team was dispatched to Mississippi to provide care to the 

survivors of the hurricane under an Emergency Management Assistance Compact 

between the States of Mississippi and North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, it was our 

great fortune to serve the communities of Waveland and Bay St. Louis, and to support Hancock Medical Center which was incapacitated by the storm. 

Carolinas MED–1 set-up in a K-Mart shopping center parking lot, located approximately 1 mile from Hancock Medical Center. Approximately 150 refugee families 

were living in make-shift structures on hot asphalt, all without any significant medical care. Within an hour of our arrival, we began seeing patients. On day 2, we 

conducted our first surgical operation, transferred our first pregnancy who was soon 

to deliver, and saw our first traumatic injury. The trauma involved a 12-year-old 

boy who was riding an all terrain vehicle when he was struck by a car. The local 

EMS provider noted that the child had stopped breathing as they arrived at MED– 

1. Our team was able to resuscitate and stabilize the child, provide head injury 

therapeutics, and complete a full diagnostic evaluation including labs and X-rays. 

He was transferred by Coast Guard helicopter to the Level 1 trauma center in Jackson, Mississippi. It is my great pleasure, Mr. Chairman to let you know that this 

boy eventually walked out of the hospital intact and with no permanent nor longterm problems. Epidemiologists would comment on the cost-benefit ratio of a MED– 

1 unit. In my opinion, that 12-year-old’s life was worth the cost of 1,000 MED–1s. 

During the 7 weeks of deployment in Mississippi, we saw more then 7,500 patients. The MED–1 staff along with the hundreds of physicians, nurses, EMTs and 

paramedics, and other allied health personnel from across North Carolina will forever have a bond with the people of Waveland and Bay St. Louis. Our prototype, 

again funded and supported by the Department of Homeland Security, was a true 

success story from the devastation invoked by Hurricane Katrina. 

Six months later, Carolinas MED–1 was called back into service to serve as a 

stand-alone emergency department to assist in the excessive surge capacity conditions present in New Orleans during the first Mardi Gras celebration following the 

Hurricane Katrina and Rita. The unit quickly became the primary receiving facility 

for the city of New Orleans EMS and other services in the surrounding parishes. 

During the 2 weeks of deployment, 575 patients were treated. Dr. Jullette Saussy, 

the Director of Emergency Medical Services for New Orleans has been working for 

the last 2 years to obtain funding for a full-time MED–1 for her city. 

Presently, Carolinas MED–1 is deployed to Columbus, Indiana to provide emergency department services in the wake of the severe flooding that destroyed Columbus Regional Hospital. Our first patient to arrive was in respiratory failure. A 

breathing tube was required and inserted, he was placed on a ventilator, antibiotics 

were immediately administered, and he was transferred by helicopter to Methodist 

Hospital in Indianapolis. Today, MED–1 and the Columbus Regional Hospital staff 

is seeing approximately 60–70 patients a day. 

Overall, each of our deployments has been a tremendous success. We developed 

MED–1 to meet a critical need in Charlotte and elsewhere, and developed a company to produce more MED–1’s to meet local preparedness needs in other parts of 

the country. Los Angeles County procured its second MED–1 and is in the process 

of building a program similar to the one in North Carolina. Several County Supervisors have expressed a great desire to deploy the unit to mass gatherings within 

the County such as the Tournament of Roses Parade, Rose Bowl, and the Los Angeles Marathon. Plans are also being developed to use MED–1 to provide routine outpatient medical care to the people of Los Angeles County. Frequent use will translate to quality training for the medical staff, thus ensuring proficiency when a true 

disaster occurs. 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on my experience with ALERT and MED–1, as you think about mass gathering medical support, I have several specific recommendations for your consideration. 

Recommendation No. 1: Coordination between Federal, State, and local authorities 

is essential both before and after a terrorist attack or natural disaster. 

Mass casualty incidents don’t recognize county or State lines, and our responses 

shouldn’t either. We designed MED–1 to be set up in just 20 minutes. After Hurricane Katrina, MED–1 began providing patient care services shortly after arrival at 

the K-Mart parking lot. However, it took 4 days from the time Hurricane Katrina 
50 

hit for MED–1 to actually be deployed. At the time, extensive conversations were 

conducted between the Federal Government, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Carolinas Medical Center. Each time we deploy, there is a great deal of paperwork and 

contracting that has to occur between the public and private entities before we are 

able to move MED–1 toward the patients that need the care. We must consider 

ways to simplify the process by which MED–1 and other critical assets get deployed 

to minimize time delays. That means ensuring coordination between the various entities ahead of time to the greatest extent possible. 

More specifically, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, (EMAC) is a 

congressionally ratified organization that provides form and structure to interstate 

mutual aid thus allowing a disaster-impacted State to request and receive assistance from other member States quickly and efficiently. Based on my experience deploying MED–1 several times out of State, we need for all States to amend their 

EMAC legislation so that the same immunity that applies to State employees will 

also apply to all employees that work with the responding State to provide the help 

that is needed. MED–1 and the employees who agree to be part of an emergency 

response often deploy with or as a part of a State’s emergency response assets. An 

amendment to the EMAC model State laws that are enacted in each State would 

save valuable time that is now being spent on drafting and executing contracts between the hospitals and the responding State so that the hospital employees will 

be covered by the immunity given to the State. 

Recommendation No. 2: All law enforcement, fire services, emergency medical services, public health and hospitals, and local emergency management agencies 

must participate in disaster planning and response. 

ALERT’s success is due in large part to the participation of all relevant private 

and government entities. This participation is reflected in four key elements: 

ALERT’s operational guidelines are established collaboratively; ALERT members 

plan, prepare, and respond as one unit; ALERT’s equipment is standardized and has 

been approved by all member agencies; and ALERT personnel wear a standardized 

team uniform with nametags for personal recognition and familiarization, thus fostering cohesion and nourishing ALERT’s team concept. The relationships fostered 

through our joint preparedness activities ensures our cohesive and comprehensive 

response to any incident. 

Recommendation No. 3: Developing comprehensive all-hazards preparedness plans 

and consistent training on those plans. 

Medical preparedness planning includes an understanding of who is going to do 

what and how regarding evacuation, containment, medical care, triage, transport, 

and recovery. To ensure that preparedness plans are complete and to identify and 

fill gaps in the plans, it is critical to test and evaluate the plans through ongoing 

and sustained training and adjust where necessary. It is a never-ending, fluid process and we are always learning from our training and experiences with both ALERT 

and MED–1. 

Recommendation No. 4: Procurement or availability of assets and resources required 

to save lives, ease suffering, and successfully mitigate the medical consequences 

of a terrorist attack or natural disaster. 

Local medical needs include ongoing financial support for equipment, personnel, 

and training. Just maintaining MED–1 on an annual basis and having it ready to 

go costs over $800,000. Ensuring adequate response and recovery in the event of a 

mass casualty incident at a mass gathering costs money. Critical assets like realtime detection of a biological release should be made available at all mass gathering 

venues. It is not plausible to think that any public hospital or local government 

agency will have the resources on hand to provide the funds necessary for full preparedness. While many of the assets and programs we do have are grant funded, 

sustainment dollars are equally significant to keep these initiatives operational and 

functional. 

Last, I would like to emphasize that the time is now to seek solutions that support healthcare needs at special events and mass gatherings. As a Nation, our preparedness for terrorist attacks also serves to ensure our preparedness for the more 

common occurrence of various types of natural disasters which are plaguing the 

United States more and more each year. 

I thank you again, Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee for your time, 

and I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 
51 

We now will hear testimony from Sergeant McCartney. If you 

would, summarize your statement in 5 minutes, please. 

STATEMENT OF SCOTT MCCARTNEY, PROGRAM MANAGER/EXERCISE PLANNER, LARGE STADIUM INITIATIVE, GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY, SACRAMENTO, 

CALIFORNIA, AND SERGEANT, SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT 

Sergeant MCCARTNEY. Chairman Thompson and Members of the 

committee, on behalf of Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and Director Matthew Bettenhausen of the California Office of Homeland 

Security, I would like to thank you for opportunity to appear before 

you this morning regarding California’s Large Stadium Initiative 

and the challenges protecting mass gatherings in a post-9/11 world. 

My name is Sergeant Scott McCartney, and I work for the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department. I am assigned there to the 

Governor’s Office of Homeland Security as the program manager of 

the Large Stadium Initiative. 

I would like to take just a moment to acknowledge Chairman 

Thompson, his staff and the Members of the committee for recognizing the importance to preparing States’ stadiums and venues to 

be more aware of homeland security challenges. 

In 2004, California recognized the need to develop a comprehensive approach to the safety and protection of the people and economy relating to mass gatherings of California and began the California Office of Homeland Security Large Stadium Initiative. 

Originally, the Large Stadium Initiative was focused on specific 

stadium priorities and specific events that rose to high-profile status. The program has since evolved into a multi-event, multi-venue 

program utilizing an all-hazards approach to public safety. 

LSI assists mass gatherings with strategies for enhancing prevention, response and recovery capabilities; establishing a high 

level of security practices in stadiums, regardless of the building’s 

size or type; integrating private partners into NIMS, an ICS structure, in understanding local, State and Federal systems; and provides customized training in venue roles and responsibilities, lessons learned, mass care in sheltering, and crisis communication. 

LSI provides stakeholders in California a stair-step approach to 

enhancing homeland security preparedness using best practices, infrastructure security plans through automatic critical asset management systems, shared discoveries, and discussion-based exercises such as seminars, workshops and tabletops. 

LSI was the focus of California’s Golden Guardian 2007 full-scale 

exercise, and events were held in all three regions of California. 

The venues and public safety agencies that participate in the LSI 

program are integrated into the State-wide exercise planning cycles 

to allow them to fully assess their strengths and identify any areas 

of improvement during annual Golden Guardian exercise. 

LSI partnered with other professional and collegiate venues 

around the State, as well. The Large Stadium Initiative program 

highlights target capabilities in the area of prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. LSI works with venues and first responders to raise awareness regarding criminal and terrorist activities, against spectators or venues during mass gatherings. 
52 

LSI has partnered with OHS Special Projects Division and the 

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office to develop a comprehensive preventative strategy for building a surge capacity to detect and interdict radiological and nuclear threats at mass gatherings in California. LSI prepares venues and stadiums for critical infrastructure 

protection, which enables them to identify, assess, prioritize and 

design protective measures to increase the security and safety of 

venues. 

The LSI program also collaborates and coordinates with emergency public safety and security responders, venue operators and 

security partners and to reduce the impact of natural, manmade 

and any other all-hazard incidents by discussing and exercising 

their safety and security plans from mass care in evacuations. 

The LSI program is designed to assist mass gathering venues 

with information on structural damage assessments, restoration of 

lifelines, and continuity of business and economic recovery. 

To return a mass gathering facility to a full operation, which is 

vital to the economic sustainment and growth of the community, 

LSI is evolving to meet the needs of mass gathering venues of nonnational significance. Future program goals of the program: major 

sports television networks, chaplain and community services, major 

award ceremonies and convention gatherings. 

I would like to highlight how LSI assists colleges and universities in creating the implementing policies and procedures for 

their stadiums. These venues augment security with student services and still require assistance from first responders. Funding can 

be an issue regarding training and equipment needs for these 

venues. 

As a result of the program, we see relationships develop between 

universities and first responders and the increase in strategic planning, crisis communication and memorandums of understanding. 

The areas of improvement noted during the LSI university series 

include communication process, development of evacuation plans 

for different buildings, safety and security equipment resources for 

normal operations, including consistent training and exercising, 

identification of mass casualty incidents, incident command and 

unified command training, recovery and remediation. 

California and the Large Stadium Initiative is committed to 

keeping all mass gatherings, both national and non-national significance, protected by partnering with local, State and Federal entities in a post-9/11 world. LSI is developing new, state-of-the-art 

ideas to design strategies to better prepare all stakeholders and 

spectators in venue safety and security during mass gathering 

venues for natural and man-made disasters and all other hazards 

incidents. 

Again, thank you for this opportunity today, and I would be 

happy to answer any questions. 

[The statement of Sergeant McCartney follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SCOTT MCCARTNEY

JULY 9, 2008 

Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and Members of the committee, on 

behalf of Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Director Matt Bettenhausen and the 

California Office of Homeland Security, I would like to thank you and the committee 
53 

on Homeland Security for the opportunity to appear before you this morning regarding the California Large Stadium Initiative and the ‘‘Challenges of Protecting Mass 

Gatherings in a Post 9/11 World’’. 

My name is Scott McCartney and I am a Sergeant with the Sacramento County 

Sheriff’s Department, California. I am assigned as a Law Enforcement Subject Matter Expert to the Office of Homeland Security as the Program Manager of the California Large Stadium Initiative—LSI. It is an honor for me to share with the committee the many accomplishments and strides California is making on the Large 

Stadium Initiative and mass gathering venues for the State of California and the 

Nation. 

I would like to take just a moment to acknowledge Chairman Thompson, his staff 

and the Members of the committee on Homeland Security for recognizing the importance of large-scale mass gatherings and the commitment to better preparing States, 

stadiums and venues to be more aware of Homeland Security challenges and to increase their capabilities for the prevention, preparation, response and recovery to 

mass gatherings that encompass the true American sprit of freedom. 

LARGE STADIUM INITIATIVE

The tragic events of September 11, 2001 demonstrated the need to develop programs to deal with terrorism prevention, response and recovery at mass gathering 

venues. Large public venues, such as sports stadiums, present unique security and 

disaster response challenges. Through the Large Stadium Initiative, California is 

able to work with our public and private partners to tailor exercises to their specific 

needs to ensure the greatest possible protection for the public at these venues. 

California recognized the need to develop a comprehensive approach to the safety 

and protection of the people and economy relating to mass gatherings of California; 

and in 2004, the California Office of Homeland Security began the Large Stadium 

Initiative (LSI). Originally, the LSI program was focused on specific stadium properties and specific events that rose to a high profile status. The program has since 

evolved into a multi-event, multi-venue program utilizing an all hazards approach 

to public safety. 

The LSI program explores commonalities of large stadium/venue Homeland Security preparedness issues and assists in developing strategies for enhancing prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities as set forth by Presidential 

Directive No. 8. 

The Large Stadium Initiative is based on the premise that a majority of stadiums 

are not owned by municipal or State governments, and therefore security varies 

from facility to facility. Managers rely on a combination of private security companies, local police/sheriff, State, Federal partners and their own employees to protect 

their facilities. 

At a single facility, security strengths and weaknesses, the quality of supervisory 

personnel and operational practices can vary from event to event. Consequently, instituting a high level of security practices in stadiums across the Nation regardless 

of the stadium size or event type is a critical step in establishing a solid infrastructure protection standard for the stadium or mass gathering industry. 

With this in mind, the Large Stadium Initiative partners are provided with customized training and exercises which focus on venue roles and responsibilities, lessons learned and mass-care and shelter issues from previous disasters and crisis 

communication during incidents of both national and non-national significances. 

California is committed to keeping all large-scale mass gatherings protected in a 

post-9/11 world through the Large Stadium Initiative. 

In working with the owners and operators of facilities in California and other 

States, OHS–LSI has developed plans, policies and procedures that follow the DHS/ 

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) guidelines for Prevention, Protection, Response and Recovery to assist local, State and Federal partners who help secure these large-scale mass gathering venues. At each venue, we 

assess with preventative measures used not only for criminal acts of terrorism, but 

hazard prevention based on the facility, disaster preparation and prevention of 

criminal activities not associated with terrorism. We look at the physical plant of 

the facilities and make recommendations on protective measures that can be employed to deter criminal acts or provide for the greater safety of the spectators. 

LSI in conjunction with our Critical Infrastructure Protection Program (CIPP) and 

Automated Critical Asset Management System (ACAMS) assesses response plans 

within each facility and make sure those plans work together with the response 

plans for the public agencies that will respond to an event within the facility. I facilitate meetings between venue operators and public safety personnel to build relationships and resolve discrepancies in the plans. 
54 

California provides training in the form of Seminars and Workshops following the 

(HSEEP) guidelines to assess policies and procedures, and identify strengths and 

areas for improvement. Table top exercises are developed for these facilities and 

venues and their first response partners, in order to assess their capabilities. The 

exercises are designed to highlight first responders, private security and venue facilities on their preparedness, response, recovery and recovery procedures for mitigating and managing a terrorist attack or disaster or other incident, which may 

occur at their venue during events. 

I also work with venue operators to develop comprehensive recovery plans so they 

can move toward the return of their facility to normal operations as soon as possible. These recovery plans not only deal with the physical plant (structure, stadium 

or venue), but with a marketing plan to inform and reassure the public regarding 

the safety and availability of the facility for use. This is an important step in the 

economic recovery of the affected area or region. 

LSI ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The goal of the State of California Office of Homeland Security Exercise Division 

is to conduct a series of exercises for Large Stadium and Mass Gathering sites, 

which includes a seminar, workshop and table top exercises during a calendar year 

in support of the Large Stadium Initiative (CA–LSI). 

CA–LSI assists large-scale mass gathering stadiums/venues and sites with: 

• Developing strategies for enhancing prevention, response and recovery capabilities; 

• Establishing a high level of security practices in stadiums across the country 

regardless of the building size or event type; 

• Integrating private partners into SEMS/NIMS/ICS structure and understanding 

local, State and Federal systems. 

CA–LSI partnered with large-scale and mass gathering venues and provided customized training: 

• Venue roles and responsibilities; 

• Lessons Learned; 

• Mass Care and Shelter issues from previous disasters; 

• Crisis Communication during incidents of national or non-national significance. 

CA–LSI provides stakeholders in California a stair-stepped approach to enhancing 

Homeland Security preparedness using: 

• Best Practices; 

• Exemplars; 

• Infrastructure Security Plans; 

• Shared Discoveries; 

• Exercises. 

CA–LSI was the focus of California’s Golden Guardian 2007 Full-Scale Exercise 

with events in the Southern, Inland and Costal Regions of California, specifically 

the Honda Center and Angel’s Stadium in Anaheim, University of the Pacific (UOP) 

Spanos Center in Stockton and the H.P. Pavilion in San Jose. 

Past CA–LSI accomplishments have been with: 

• Arco Arena in Sacramento involving Professional Basketball; 

• Staples Center in LA involving Professional Basketball; 

• Monster Park in San Francisco involving Professional Football; 

• PacBell Park in San Francisco involving Professional Baseball; 

• Dodger Stadium in LA involving Professional Baseball; 

• AAA Club Speedway in Fontana and Infineon Raceway in Sonoma involving 

Professional Motor Sports; 

• University of California at Davis involving Collegiate Athletics. 

The California Large Stadium Initiative has worked since 2004 to assist these 

partners and venues with the latest and most progressive practices and technologies 

of Homeland Security. Our goal is to better prepare them to respond and recover 

from terrorist attack, natural disaster and all other hazards or incidents while spectators are visiting facilities to view sports or other large-scale events. The LSI program works with the venues to match their approach to their specific or desired 

focus of their event with first responders. 

LSI SEMINARS

LSI Seminars are designed for specific audiences at local, State and privately 

owned mass gathering venues. The seminar focuses on shared, new and innovative 

equipment, local, State and Federal resources. The seminars are informal discussions, designed to orient participants to authorities, strategies, new or updated 

plans, policies, procedures, protocols, resources, concepts, and/or ideas (e.g., a sem-
55 

inar to review a new Evacuation Standard Operating Procedure). Seminars provide 

a good starting point for jurisdictions that are developing or making major changes 

to their plans and procedures. 

LSI WORKSHOPS

The LSI workshop is designed to build specific products, such as a draft plan or 

policy (e.g., a Mass Evacuation Plan Workshop is used to develop a Multi-year 

Training and Exercise Plan). The workshop, a type of discussion-based exercise and 

represents the second tier of exercises in the building-block approach. Although 

similar to seminars, workshops differ in two important aspects: increased participant interaction, and a focus on achieving or building a product (e.g., plans, policies). A workshop is typically used to: test new ideas, processes, or procedures; train 

groups in coordinated activities; and obtain consensus. 

LSI TABLE TOP EXERCISES

A table top exercise (TTX) involves key personnel discussing simulated scenarios 

in an informal setting. TTXs can be used to assess plans, policies, and procedures 

or to assess types of systems needed to guide the prevention of, response to, or recovery from a defined incident. TTXs are intended to stimulate discussion of various 

issues regarding a hypothetical situation. During a TTX, senior staff, elected or appointed officials, or other key personnel meet in an informal setting to discuss simulated situations. TTXs are typically aimed at facilitating understanding of concepts, 

identifying strengths and shortfalls, and/or achieving a change in attitude. Participants are encouraged to discuss issues in depth and develop decisions through slowpaced problem-solving rather than the rapid, spontaneous decisionmaking that occurs under actual or simulated emergency conditions. TTXs can be breakout (i.e., 

groups split into functional areas) or plenary (i.e., one large group). 

OHS APPROACH FOR LSI

Prevention 

LSI is working with the venues and local first responders on information gathering and recognition indicators and warnings for the ability to see gathered data, 

potential trends, indications, and/or warning of criminal and/or terrorist activities 

(including planning and surveillance) against U.S. citizens and critical infrastructure of the stadium or venues during large-scale mass gatherings. 

LSI, in partnership with members of the Special Projects Division of The California Office of Homeland Security, is currently working with all directorates inside 

of OHS to partner or leverage opportunities on a State-wide collaborative effort to 

develop a comprehensive, preventive strategy to detect and interdict radiological 

and nuclear threats within California’s borders. The purpose is to give State and 

local response entities, the tools and resources necessary to interdict and resolve radiological and nuclear terrorist threats. California has convened a group of key 

State, Federal and local stakeholders to develop this program which is being developed in close partnership with the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). In 

addition to everyday monitoring and detection efforts on our land and waterways, 

one capability CA is looking to develop is a surge capacity for radiological nuclear 

detection resources that could be deployed throughout the State as needed for largescale events and mass gatherings. 

Protection 

Under this priority, LSI works with venues and stadiums on critical infrastructure protection which enables public and private entities to identify, assess, 

prioritize, and design protective measures to increase the security and safety of the 

venues. Some of the protective measures could involve hardening of the facilities, 

adjusting schedules, installing enhanced fire protection or security systems and the 

training of the facility staff in security and hazard mitigation. 

Response 

The LSI program collaborates with emergency public safety and security responders, venue operations and security partners to reduce the impact and consequences 

of an incident either terrorist, natural or an all-hazards-type event by discussing 

and exercising their safety and security plans for mass care and evacuations. The 

process works to build continuity among venues and first responders to assist in 

providing security support to other response operations and properties and sustaining operations from response to recovery. This inclusive program requires the 

coordination among officials from law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical 

services (EMS). 
56 

Recovery 

This part of the LSI program is designed to assist large-scale mass gathering 

venues with information on structural damage assessments, restoration of lifelines 

and continuity of business and economic and community recovery to return the 

large-scale mass gathering facilities to full operation. It is important to note here 

the significance both to the venue recovery and employee’s recovery after an incident. The return of patrons to these venues is vital to the economic sustainment 

and growth of the community and Nation. By discussing plans and procedures both 

as a private partner and local community, we show the importance of establishing 

the recovery process for venues and patrons to return to the venue with minimal 

delay or concern. 

FUTURE GOALS OF LSI

California LSI is working with the following organizations, stadiums and mass 

gathering venues to introduce them to the LSI program and series to them in the 

hopes of developing a standardization of preparedness, response and recovery to 

large-scale mass gathering sites in California and the Nation. 

• College and University Stadiums 

• Major Awards Ceremonies and Conventions Gatherings (The Oscars, The Tonis) 

• Major Sports Television Networks 

• Chaplin and Community Services 

COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY STADIUMS

I see many ways to expand into the collegiate level mass gatherings. Most college 

or university venues are private or publicly owned and operated, which can pose 

problems with funding and training of venue security. Many of these venues require 

the assistance of local law enforcement, fire and emergency management services, 

which can place a strain on the finances and staffing of the locals. Frequently, the 

collegiate venues use student services to augment security and to help with the 

basic needs of the venue. This is a good way to involve students and staff, but with 

that type of service, training becomes one of the biggest concerns. 

Training and equipment for these venues can strain the resources of the colleges 

and universities that operate them. While training can be provided by local agencies, funding is often a problem. Many of the universities have working police officers, which is beneficial in the development of plans and procedures; however, those 

universities who do not employ their own law enforcement professionals must create 

plans and procedures without first responder expertise. 

The LSI program works with these colleges and universities to help them through 

the plan development process and networking with locals to help solves problems 

or close issues while planning for events on their campuses. One of the major 

strengths I see from working with these universities is the relationships they developed with their local first responders. They also work on strategic planning and crisis communication plans with local first responders and have memorandums of understanding (MOU) for response and assistance at the venue regarding incidents. 

I have also seen some areas for improvement during my visits to campuses. The 

development of evacuation plans and training of those plans needs to occur more 

often. Facility staff and management need to ensure information sharing between 

departments on campus; and messaging internally in facilities with staff, families 

and students for family reunification is very important. 

In working with some of the colleges and universities in California, I have been 

given many examples of what they need to overcome some of the areas discussed 

above. Here are some of the concerns and questions facing college campuses with 

large-scale mass gatherings: 

• Communication process—lines of responsibility during an incident; 

• Development of evacuation plans for different buildings; 

• Consistent training and exercising should be a priority; 

• Safety and security equipment resources for normal operations; 

• Communication between various campus groups during events or about events; 

• Identification of mass casualty incidents during an event; 

• Incident Command and Unified Command training; 

• Recovery and remediation needed to restore patrons’ faith. 

MAJOR SPORT TELEVISION NETWORKS

Create a seminar or workshop, as a part of the LSI program, for the major sport 

networks to raise situational awareness of safety and security issues at venues 

among media personnel. This exercise series would provide reporters an opportunity 
57 

to learn about crisis communication and how their roles could change once an incident occurs. The seminar’s intent is to raise awareness within the sports-casting 

community about how to react to a catastrophic incident, how to transition from a 

sportscaster role into more of a newscaster role or even function as a Public Information Officer (PIO) or Joint Information Officer (JIC) within the Incident Command Structure (ICS) structure during and incident. Perhaps teach the staff of the 

networks how to integrate with the venue security and operational staff to increase 

the overall understanding of incident response and crisis communication. 

CHAPLIN AND COMMUNITY SERVICES

The LSI program would assist mass gathering venues and community first responders to create a network or system of chaplains or community volunteers for 

each venue, whether it is a professional sport stadium, public gathering venue or 

collegiate facility to respond to the emotional and reunification needs of the people, 

both spectators and first responders, involved in an incident. Within this network 

a phone list (call down system) would be developed to go into effect in the event 

of an incident. One person would initiate the phone tree to bring in local law and 

fire chaplains to assist with recovery, reunification and other volunteer functions as 

needed. A number would be provided to the venue Incident Commander to activate 

this network of agency and community chaplains. Eventually there would be a Nation-wide database of chaplains who could be brought into a facility in a time of 

need. These chaplains could be recruited through local first responder agencies as 

well as through local, State and national volunteer organizations. 

MAJOR AWARDS CEREMONIES AND CONVENTION GATHERINGS

The LSI program would utilize the same exercise series: seminar, workshop and 

table top exercise with these mass gathering sites to increase awareness among the 

venue security and first responder communities regarding major awards and convention gatherings. The exercise process would develop strategies and procedures to 

meet protection, response and recovery goals during these events. It would also 

work with event staff to better understand the need for evacuation and sheltering 

plans and protocols during the planning process. With the cooperation of site security and local first responders, the venues would be better prepared for a terrorist 

attack or an all hazard and/or natural incident. 

BEYOND THE LSI PROGRAM IN CALIFORNIA

The LSI Program is one of many pieces of California’s effort to protect its citizens 

from hazards and improve our ability to respond to and recover from them. Each 

year, California hosts a series of Functional and Full Scale Exercises that are designed to assess the ability of California to respond to and recover from any incident. The venues and public safety agencies that participate in the LSI program are 

integrated into the State-wide exercise planning cycles to allow them to fully assess 

their strengths and identify areas for improvement during the annual Golden 

Guardian Exercise. 

In closing, California and the Large Stadium Initiative is committed to keeping 

all large-scale mass gatherings both of national significance and non-national significance protected by collaborating with local, State and Federal partners in a post9/11 world. The CA–LSI program is working with and developing new state-of-theart ideas to design strategies, following DHS/OHS and HSEEP guidelines for safety 

and security at mass gathering sites, to better prepare all the stakeholders in spectator and venues safety and security during mass gathering large-scale venues, natural disasters, and all hazard incidents. 

Again, thank you for this opportunity to be here today. I will be happy to take 

your questions. 

OHSTED: OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY TRAINING AND EXERCISE DIVISION

LARGE STADIUM INITIATIVE

The State of California Office of Homeland Security Exercise Branch (OHSEB) 

conducts a series of exercises for Large Stadiums and Mass Gathering sites, which 

includes—a seminar, workshop, and tabletop exercises (TTXs)—during a calendar 

year in support of the California Large Stadium Initiative (CA–LSI). 
58 

OBJECTIVES

The CA–LSI program explores commonalities of large stadium/venue Homeland 

Security preparedness issues and assists in developing strategies for enhancing prevention, response, and recovery capabilities in an open, stress-free environment. 

The Large Stadium Initiative is based on the premise a majority of stadiums are 

owned by municipal or State governments, and therefore security varies from facility to facility. Managers rely on a combination of private security companies, local 

police, and their own employees to protect their facilities. Even at a single facility, 

security weaknesses, strengths, the quality of supervisory personnel and operational 

practices can vary from event to event. Consequently, a critical step in establishing 

a solid infrastructure protection standard for the stadium industry is to establish 

a high level of security practices in stadiums across the country regardless of the 

size of building or the type of event. 

With this in mind, the Large Stadium Initiative partners are provided with customized training which focuses on venue roles and responsibilities, lessons learned 

and mass-care and shelter issues from previous disasters and crisis communication 

during incidents of national significance. 

MISSION STATEMENT

Provide to large stadium owners and stakeholders in California a stair-stepped 

approach to enhancing Homeland Security preparedness by using Best Practices, 

Exemplars, the Infrastructure Security Plans, Shared Discoveries, and Exercises. 

GOAL

The State of California Office of Homeland Security Exercise Branch conducts a 

series of exercises for Large Stadiums and Mass Gathering sites, which includes: a 

seminar, workshop and table top exercises during a calendar year in support of the 

California Large Stadium Initiative (CA–LSI). 

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

CA–LSI assists large stadiums/venues: 

• Developing strategies for enhancing prevention, response and recovery capabilities; • Establishing a high level of security practices in stadiums across the country 

regardless of building size or event type. 

CA–LSI partners are provided with customized training: 

• Venue roles and responsibilities; 

• Lessons Learned; 

• Mass Care and Shelter issues from previous disasters; 

• Crisis Communication during incidents of national significance. 

CA–LSI provides stakeholders in California a stair-stepped approach to enhancing 

Homeland Security preparedness using: 

• Best Practices; 

• Exemplars; 

• Infrastructure Security Plans; 

• Shared Discoveries; 

• Exercises. 

CA–LSI is a focus of California’s Golden Guardian 2007 Full-Scale Exercise with 

events in the Southern, Inland and Coastal Regions. 

FUTURE PLANS

• Racetracks and Speedways. 

• Professional Outdoor Sporting Venues. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you, Sergeant. 

We will now hear from Mr. Reynolds for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS REYNOLDS, DIRECTOR OF 

SECURITY, MALL OF AMERICA, BLOOMINGTON, MINNESOTA 

Mr. REYNOLDS. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Members of the 

committee. My name is Doug Reynolds. I am the director of security for Mall of America, located in Bloomington, Minnesota. It is 
59 

an honor to be here today to acquaint you with the security program of Mall of America and to share our challenges for the future. 

For those of you who have never visited Mall of America, it is 

important to understand this is much more than another shopping 

center in fly-over country. In fact, Mall of America is the Nation’s 

largest retail and entertainment complex. It is two to three times 

as large as the typical, super-regional shopping malls found on either coast. Our building is 4.2 million square feet, large enough to 

fit seven Yankee stadiums. It includes a 7-acre indoor amusement 

park. It is home to more than 520 stores and 50 restaurants. It is 

open to the public. 

Mall of America is one of the top tourist destinations in the 

United States. In fact, we have more than 42 million visits every 

year, which is more than the combined populations of North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, Montana, Wyoming and all of Canada. 

On any given day, there are well over 100,000 people—— 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. REYNOLDS. Yeah, pretty big. 

On any given day, there are well over 100,000 people in Mall of 

America, making it the third-largest city in the State of Minnesota. 

Those numbers increase dramatically during holiday and summer 

seasons. Mall of America employs more than 13,000 people and has 

an annual economic impact of nearly $2 billion for the State of 

Minnesota. 

Mall of America hosts more than 350 events every year. Each 

event is free and open to the public, which can pose some unique 

security challenges. These events may attract from a few dozen to 

more than 50,000 participants. Given the sheer number of visitors 

to the Mall of America and our status as a symbol of consumerism 

and capitalism, security remains a top priority for us. 

Unlike a typical shopping mall, our security department has approximately 100 people, and we run our operation 24 hours a day, 

every day of the year. We work closely with the local police department, as well as other local, State and Federal authorities, for the 

protection of our regular visitors, celebrities and VIPs. 

We have been able to institute many programs, procedures and 

policies that help ensure the safety of our guests, employees and 

facilities. Some of the programs that are unique to the Mall of 

America include extensive ongoing training. Our security officers go 

through 240 hours of initial training and 50 hours of recertification 

training every year, including such things as effective communication, first aid, defensive tactics, verbal judo, crisis intervention, terrorism awareness, and rapid response. 

That is more training than many municipal police departments 

require. 

We also have two highly trained canine explosion detection units 

that patrol public and non-public areas of the Mall. In addition to 

that, we cross-train with canine units from the adjacent 11 counties to maintain our proficiency. 

We have recently implemented two separate ion detection systems that can be used to detect explosive residue as well as chemical agents. The stationery unit is used to check all delivery vehicles that enter our secure loading docks, and the portable unit can 

be used throughout the Mall. 
60 

Most importantly, we have created our own counterterrorism 

unit. We call it the risk assessment and mitigation unit. It specializes in behavior profiling. Our RAM unit, or Risk Assessment and 

Mitigation unit, is based on a technique that has been perfected 

over the years in Israel. In fact, leaders of our unit received training in Israel at our expense to help us develop a special program. 

These officers look for intent, rather than means. The objective 

is to focus on suspicious indicators in three categories: people, vehicles and unattended items like backpacks, shopping bags, suitcases. Our unit has eight full-time equivalent positions and is 

staffed every day of the year. 

External connections have also helped us strengthen our security 

program due to strong support from other agencies. We have been 

able to establish a strong working relationship with our local contact with the Department of Homeland Security, Glenn Sanders. 

He has been helpful with sharing relevant information, providing 

access to needed resources and just as a voice of reason or a sounding board to make sure our decisions are on track with the big picture. 

In 2007, I was granted a seat on the Joint Terrorism Task Force 

Executive Board through the FBI. This was made possible when 

they activated my security clearance. This has proven to be an invaluable asset to Mall of America and our security program. However, I would like to note that it took more than 7 years for us to 

forge these relationships and to gain this limited access. We had 

to be persistent, diligent, methodical in order to gain access; and 

this really is just the beginning. 

As a testament to our effectiveness, we are frequently asked to 

share our expertise and knowledge with other large venues and 

groups across the globe. Whenever time and resources permit, we 

are more than happy to share with others. 

For example, we have worked with the Canary Wharf financial 

and retail complex in London, the world-famous Mayo Clinic and 

a Canadian retail development company, helping each structure a 

strong security program. 

With growing concerns over biological, chemical, explosive and 

firearm threats, we are taking steps to remain effective leaders in 

the private industry. However, in order to continue to succeed, we 

need timely, relevant information from proper agencies, insight 

into new trends or issues and additional. Access to training opportunities for our officers is critical to the continued success of our 

programs. 

Although we are a private entity, we are also a national icon. If 

a major terrorist incident were to occur at Mall of America, the 

ramifications to the retail industry and other malls throughout the 

country would be devastating. Our goal is to prevent that from ever 

happening. 

Mr. Chairman, Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify and for your continued leadership on the issue 

of security in public venues. 

Chairman THOMPSON. I thank all our witnesses on this panel for 

their excellent testimony and your excellent testimony. I will leave 

it at that. 

[The statement of Mr. Reynolds follows:] 
61 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS REYNOLDS

Honorable Chair and Members of the committee, this testimony is submitted on 

behalf of Mall of America, the Nation’s largest retail and entertainment complex located in Bloomington, Minn. It is an honor to be asked to acquaint this committee 

with the security program in place at Mall of America; and to share our challenges 

for the future. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT

As a major tourist attraction—and a national symbol of consumerism and capitalism—Mall of America (MOA) faces security challenges and opportunities that are 

unique within the industry. Mall of America remains committed to working closely 

with local, State and Federal agencies to ensure the safety and security of our 

guests, employees and facilities. We are also committed to sharing our expertise 

with other entities, and continued growth and vigilance of our security program. 

TESTIMONY FOR NON-NATIONAL SPECIAL SECURITY EVENTS HEARING

For those Members of the committee who have never visited Mall of America, it 

is important to understand that MOA is much more than another shopping center 

in fly-over country located somewhere in the Midwest. In fact, Mall of America is 

the Nation’s largest retail and entertainment complex. 

MOA is two to three times as large as the typical super-regional shopping malls 

found on either coast. Our building is 4.5 million square feet, which is large enough 

to fit seven Yankee Stadiums, 32 Boeing 747’s or 258 Statues of Liberty. MOA also 

includes a 7-acre indoor amusement park; a 1.2-million-gallon aquarium; is home 

to more than 520 stores and 50 restaurants; and is open to and easily accessed by 

the public. 

Mall of America is one of the top tourist destinations in the United States. We 

have more than 42 million visits every year—which is more than the combined populations of North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, Montana, Wyoming and all of Canada. In fact, on any given day there are well over 100,000 people in Mall of America, 

making it the third-largest city in the State of Minnesota. Those numbers increase 

dramatically during holiday and summer seasons. 

Mall of America employs more than 13,000 people and has an annual economic 

impact of nearly $2 billion on the State of Minnesota. We host more than 350 events 

every year. Each event is free and open to the public which can pose unique security 

challenges. These events may attract from a few dozen to more than 50,000 participants. 

Given the sheer number of visitors to Mall of America—and our status as a symbol of consumerism and capitalism—security remains a top priority for us. 

Unlike a typical shopping mall, our security department has approximately 100 

officers, and we run our operation 24 hours a day, every day of the year. We work 

closely with the Bloomington Police Department as well as other local, county, State 

and Federal authorities for the protection of our regular visitors, celebrities and 

VIP’s. 

We have been able to institute many security programs, procedures and policies 

over the years that help ensure the safety of our guests, employees and facilities. 

Some of the programs that are unique to MOA include: 

• Parental Escort Policy. We have been a leader in the Nation by instituting a 

policy that helps redirect responsibility for kids back onto parents. This policy 

has been a model throughout the Nation and requires children under the age 

of 16 be accompanied by parents or adults age 21 or older on Friday and Saturday evenings. In fact, we receive calls from other malls, businesses and reporters almost every week to learn about our program. 

• Extensive on-going training. Our security officers go through 240 hours of initial training and 50 hours of recertification training every year (including effective communications, first aid, verbal judo, crisis intervention, terrorism awareness and rapid response). That is more training than some municipal police departments require. 

• We have two highly trained canine explosive protection units that patrol public 

and non-public areas of the mall. We also cross-train with canine units from the 

11-county metro area. 

• We have recently implemented two separate Ion Detection Systems (one stationary and one portable) that can be used to detect for explosive residue as 

well as chemical agents. The stationary unit is used to check all delivery vehicles that enter our secured loading docks, and the portable unit can be used 

throughout the mall. 
62 

• Most importantly, we have created our own counter-terrorism unit—our RAM 

Unit—that specializes in behavior profiling. Our RAM Unit is based on a technique that has been perfected over the years in Israel. In fact, leaders of our 

unit received training in Israel—at our expense—to help us develop this special 

program. These officers look for intent rather than means. The objective is to 

focus on suspicious indicators in three categories: people, vehicles and unattended items like backpacks or shopping bags. Our unit has 8 Full Time Equivalent positions and is staffed every day of the year. 

External connections have also helped us strengthen our security program due to 

strong support from other agencies. • We have been able to establish a strong working relationship with our local contact with the Department of Homeland Security, Glen Sanders. He has been 

helpful with sharing relevant information, providing access to needed resources 

and just as a voice of reason or sounding board to make sure our decisions are 

on track with the big picture. • In 2007 I was granted a seat on the Joint Terrorism Task Force Executive 

Board through the FBI. This was made possible when they activated my security clearance. This has proven to be an invaluable asset to Mall of America and 

our security program. 

However, I would like to note that it took more than 7 years for us to forge these 

strategic partnerships with the Joint Terrorism Task Force and the Department of 

Homeland Security, and to gain this limited access. Over the years we had to be 

persistent, diligent and methodical in order to gain access. And this really is just 

the beginning. 

A good example of some of the challenges we face is that of the MJAC. Mall of 

America was the No. 1 source of actionable intelligence in the State of Minnesota 

to the Minnesota Joint Analysis Center, supplying more intelligence than any other 

single entity. Unfortunately, we were pulled off of this system of information sharing. It is actions such as this that make our job of securing a top national tourist 

destination much more difficult and challenging. 

As a testament to our effectiveness, we are frequently asked to share our expertise and knowledge with other large venues and groups across the globe. Whenever 

time and resources permit, we are more than happy to share with others. For example, we have worked with the Canary Wharf financial and retail complex in London, 

the world-famous Mayo Clinic and a Canadian retail development company; helping 

each structure a strong security program. 

The success of Mall of America’s security program has been the subject of many 

news stories and reports including in The New York Times, Boston Globe, Inside 

Edition, Nightline, The Today Show, Good Morning America, The Travel Channel, 

Fox National News, CNN, Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post. With growing concerns over biological, chemical, explosive and shooting threats 

we are taking steps to remain effective leaders in the private industry. However, 

in order to continue to succeed, we need timely, relevant information from proper 

agencies, insight into new trends or issues. Additional access to training opportunities for our officers would be quite helpful. 

In short, here’s what we need to remain successful: 

• Access to real time, relevant information; 

• Additional training opportunities; 

• Resources to strengthen our security program. 

Although we are a private entity—we are also a national icon. If a major terrorist 

incident were to occur at Mall of America, the ramifications to the retail industry 

and other malls throughout the country would be quite severe. Our goal is to work 

hard to prevent that from ever happening. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to 

testify and for your continued leadership on the issue of security in public venues. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Dr. Blackwell, first of all, let me thank 

you for the help you have given in the past in addressing natural 

disasters not just in the State of North Carolina but my home 

State of Mississippi as well, as well as Indiana. 

But I am interested in your notion of sustainability for your own 

local unit and how you see the Federal Government helping with 

that. Also the notion of mutual aid you talked about and how we 

can somehow put that in some structure that people can just plug 

into, rather than people coming together just because they have 

good will. 
63 

Dr. BLACKWELL. First, Mr. Chair, let me say that I can think of 

no better place to initiate our project than Waveland and Bay St. 

Louis. The people there were grateful, they were a pleasure to help, 

and it was a great experience that will long live with all of us for 

the rest of our lives. 

As far as sustainment goes, these programs are expensive. When 

a MED–1 unit is sitting on the ground not deploying, there is a 

cost for that. When MED–1 goes out to a venue to provide mass 

gathering support, to provide medical care in any mass gathering 

venue or strategic event, there is a cost for that. For those two 

costs, our hospital is absorbing those costs right now. 

Carolinas Medical Center is a Level 1 trauma center, sees the 

need for that, supports the initiative but is providing the funds for 

the sustainment dollars. When there is a deployment, obviously, 

the Federal Government steps in, be it HHS or FEMA or whatever. 

With our three deployments, we have been under a Federal contract. So the Federal Government does step up. But to get that unit 

prepared and ready to go and on the ready, there is a cost for that 

readiness; and no one is picking up the tab for that. So 

sustainment dollars, again, are equally important through the Department of Homeland Security to support these initiatives to keep 

them functional and operational. 

Regarding getting out the door, it was a real chore for us. It took 

4 days before we could deploy before moving to the Gulf Coast. We 

were ready to deploy. Our units were packed. We were staged. We 

had units from physicians, nurses and allied health personnel, 22 

vehicles, 100 staff ready to deploy to the Gulf Coast; and it took 

4 days before the agreements could be mustered to get us out the 

door. 

Attorneys from both sides were settling contracts. They were disputing contracts, and we were ready to go see patients. They needed help in the Gulf Coast. We wanted to go. We were ready to go. 

But we had to wait until those contracts were signed. 

There is a process in place called the Emergency Management 

Assistance Compact, the EMAC agreement. All 50 States are part 

of that today. But to get a streamlined approach to this, I would 

encourage Congress to really take a critical look at that EMAC 

agreement and see if there are ways—when people need help, they 

need help. Attorneys don’t need to be arguing over contracts for 

that. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Well, and as you know we held some oversight hearings on some of those issues. We have heard stories of 

the Royal Canadian Mounted Police offering help; and, after about 

4 days, they just called Continental Airlines from Canada, flew to 

Houston, rented vehicles, and drove into Louisiana. There were a 

number of stories. 

I think it is incumbent on all of us to fix the mutual aid situation 

so it is seamless. Now we put some language in the reorganization 

of FEMA to cut down on a lot of red tape in times of natural disasters. Our national response plan basically provided for a seamless 

approach to that process. But we do have to fix it, and your comments won’t fall on deaf ears because we know what you are trying 

to do. 
64 

Mr. Reynolds, you talked about a 7-year effort to get into the 

JTTF program. With 100,000 people on any given day in operation, 

that is, in my mind, a significant venue of a gathering. What was 

their reluctance to include the Mall of America into this Joint Terrorism Task Force? 

Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Thompson, I am not 100 percent certain of 

where that reluctance came from. I do know that when a new 

ASAC arrived for the area, we gave him a tour of our facility, and 

he understood what we were doing, saw it as cutting edge and said, 

I will get you access to the JTTF Executive Board. I had replied, 

with all due respect, I have heard that before, and it hasn’t happened. However, he was true to his word, and he did speed the 

process up and get it through. 

I know in the past when we had inquired about access—and I 

had an active Top Secret SCI clearance from the military they said, 

yes, I understand that is a military clearance. It is not any good 

to, you know, the JTTF board. I found it frustrating, especially 

when it was the same paperwork I filled out to get the access that 

he ended up giving me, eventually. 

Chairman THOMPSON. So, since your inclusion, you feel that you 

are a full partner in the effort? 

Mr. REYNOLDS. Absolutely. We had talked about—we have people 

out there looking for what we call suspicious indicators. We need 

real-time intelligence to tell our people what it is, what the trends 

are, what the bad things are they should be looking for. I do feel 

we are a great contributor. In 2007, we were the No. 1 source of 

actionable intelligence for the Minnesota Joint Analysis Center; 

and that is a private entity. 

Chairman THOMPSON. I guess one of the other questions is, Admiral Rufe talked about having to submit paperwork annually for 

every event. Now, as a private entity, are you required to submit 

any paperwork showing how many people come into the Mall every 

day? Or are you exempt from that? 

Mr. REYNOLDS. That is one of the benefits of sitting on the JTTF 

board. We share that information with others, what events we have 

coming up, that type of thing. We have had assessments done by 

many different agencies that come in and look at our facility. Are 

we required to submit that paperwork? No. 

Chairman THOMPSON. But they are aware of what is going on? 

Mr. REYNOLDS. Correct. That is one of the great things, again, 

about being on that board, is just being able to exchange information openly with people, build those contacts. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Okay. Yield to the gentleman from California for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to echo your words of compliment to the three that 

are testifying here. I would hope that more members of the public 

would have a chance to be exposed to this kind of testimony to realize how much work has gone into protecting our Nation on this 

level since 9/11; and I think we are far better prepared than we 

were before 9/11, although we still have much to do. 

Mr. Reynolds I want to congratulate you. Without feigning an accent, you managed to sound like a Texan in the beginning of your 

testimony. Everything is the biggest and the best and the largest. 
65 

I haven’t heard that since I sat down with my colleagues from 

Texas. 

Mr. REYNOLDS. Thanks y’all. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I appreciate that. 

Dr. Blackwell, one of the concerns I have is, in terms of responding to a particular incident, the surge that we need to do that, 

there has always been the question of adequate medical personnel, 

and particularly nurses. I just know in my State we have a lot of 

nurses well-trained who are retired now—and I am not talking 

about 80, 90 years of age. I am talking about retired, raising families, doing other things. But certainly still sharp, still capable. Is 

there any kind of program you have in your State or can you visualize a program in which we could create a reserve of nurses as 

something like a military reserve so that, when we did need that, 

that they would have adequate training to sort of keep their skills 

high in order to be able to assist when the surge is necessary? 

Dr. BLACKWELL. Yes, sir. There is a program that exists today. 

It is the Medical Reserve Corps. It is active in all 50 States that 

I know of. It is very active in North Carolina. We have a central 

repository of data where any healthcare provider—I agree with 

you. Nurses—I have run two plane crash disasters in Charlotte; 

and I can tell you, the nurses are the ones who made it happen. 

They are the ones that really get the emergency department operational and get patients cared for. The physicians do their work, 

but the nurses orchestrate it. 

It is the same on our MED–1 unit. We are always looking for 

nursing staff. Seventy percent of our staff are nurses on our MED– 

1 hospital. 

But there is a medical reserve component that private citizens 

can sign up for, and it is a repository for their credentials to ensure 

that they have active license with the State Board of Nursing or 

the State Medical Boards, whatever, depending on who is signing 

up. We do have that physician—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. Is there a specific program which allows them to 

have training dedicated to the Medical Reserve Corps to bring 

them up? Or is it a repository of information which tries to coordinate, as opposed to a specific program that we need to focus on 

these folks who aren’t going to be working during the year but 

need to bring their credentials and their training up to snuff? 

Dr. BLACKWELL. There is not a centralized training that I am 

aware of. That is up to each individual State to put that in place. 

Our State office of EMS does for our State, and we do have those 

programs in place. But that is State-dependent. I don’t believe that 

there are Federal programs out there. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you. 

Sergeant, again thank you for the work that you are doing and 

how much you have advanced this effort in our home State of California. 

Let me ask you particularly about the college setting. A lot of college campuses, if they have their own facility, they rely on volunteers or they rely oftentimes on a core of retired folks who are ushers. I mean, my alma mater, Notre Dame, they have got some great 

ushers, but they were there when I was in college. They do a great 

job in terms of getting people to their seats—— 
66 

Football, we play a little bit there. We are going to even play 

more this year. In fact, we have got some nice trips to Mississippi. 

But, anyway—— 

They do a very, very good job of creating an environment of welcome and showing people to their seats. But, in many cases, they 

would not be the most physically fit individuals to assist in a disaster where you may need some additional hands. How do you deal 

with that in terms of working with the colleges and universities? 

Sergeant MCCARTNEY. Congressman, I appreciate the question. 

The important thing to remember, too, with colleges and universities that I enjoy or that the Office of Homeland Security enjoys 

in the LSI program is we go in and work with first responders, the 

venues, the school, the administrators, the staff and try to help 

them better understand programs or games or facilities, basketball, 

baseball, football, graduation. Six thousand people show up to a 

graduation at a facility in UOP, as you know, in Stockton, and with 

that many people they don’t have—you know, there is an evacuation plan that has to go into effect. 

So the training of staff, the training of students is a huge component of that because they use students to augment security at 

these venues. 

Mr. LUNGREN. That is a question that I would run into. You have 

a large number of students usually at these venues—— 

Sergeant MCCARTNEY. Right. 

Mr. LUNGREN [presiding]. Many of them sober—and capable of 

working out. I am just not aware of a program which tries to enlist 

the student body at large, not to be ushers, not to be official volunteers but to be able to respond if there were an emergency so that 

they would know their particular assembly points in the stadium 

to assist. Is that kind of thinking going on? Are you doing that sort 

of thing? 

Sergeant MCCARTNEY. Yes. Through the Large Stadium Initiative, what we do when we go to those schools is we talk about that 

exactly. During their evacuation plans, one of the things is they 

can set up an evacuation plan on paper. But if they don’t train to 

that and if they don’t exercise to that, then it does nobody any 

good. 

One of the other things we noticed is that what if all the lights 

go out in the basketball arena? It is pitch black. You can’t see anything. So flashlights was a big proponent, because they didn’t have 

flashlights. 

So through the LSI program, through the first responders and 

the local operational areas in California and the different regions 

throughout California, we are able to help with some funds through 

grants or other funds through the after-action reporting and the 

improvement planning to get them to those things, flashlights, 

basic necessity. 

But, again, if this building right now was to—lights to go out, 

minus the light from outside, it would be very dark in here; and 

flashlights for those that are doing security and those trying to 

evacuate people is very important. So we rely on the schools and 

the first responders really to help in the training; and through the 

facilitation of the program, we kind of develop policies, procedures 

and new evacuation plans to assist these universities. 
67 

Mr. LUNGREN. May I ask one more? 

Chairman THOMPSON. Sure. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Reynolds, I am going to be attending a convention up in your neck of the woods later this summer. I expect 

that my wife and I and others may visit your mall. I presume you 

are making special efforts for that while you are up there. What 

kind of pressure does that put on the mall when you are going to 

have a national convention in the area where you probably would 

expect more than the 100,000 a day? 

Mr. REYNOLDS. Certainly we will adjust our staffing levels. We 

are already training up for that. The RNC crew has put me on the 

Crisis Management subcommittee, which helps, again, develop 

what the big picture is, gets us involved in that, who we can report 

to if we see different incidents, what we should be watching for, 

that type of thing. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Have you noticed a ramp-up in terms of the participation you get from DHS and the Federal establishment with 

respect to that versus your everyday large operation and relationship to the Federal Government? 

Mr. REYNOLDS. Two weeks ago, I was invited to or just completed 

some training with the FBI directly relevant to the RNC coming 

up. Prior to that—there is a lot with the local law enforcement. The 

Capitol Police have been out to visit us. I had a chance to visit with 

them yesterday as well. 

Yes, there are a lot of entities that are regularly calling and stop 

out for tours, visits, want to know what our plan is, anticipate their 

people will be coming out to our area and want to know what kind 

of facilities we have and what kind of security arrangements we 

have. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Well, I look forward to seeing you there. 

Mr. REYNOLDS. We look forward to seeing your billfold, sir. 

Chairman THOMPSON. We are sure you will invest in the economy. 

We will now recognize the gentlelady from the Virgin Islands for 

5 minutes, Mrs. Christensen. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a few 

questions. 

Dr. Blackwell, on MED–1, you have deployed it at several places. 

I have operated under the tents, the ones that you blow up after 

Hurricane Hugo. We were able to do surgery, deliveries and do regular medical emergencies there. So one question would be, how is 

MED–1 better than the tents? A couple of ways that you could tell 

us that they are better. Do you feel that MED–1 units should be 

used either in whole or in part at mass gatherings? Do you think 

they have a role there? Also, I don’t know how many there are. Is 

yours the only one in the country? 

Dr. BLACKWELL. No, ma’am. Los Angeles County just bought the 

first one after ours. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. How many do you think we should have? 

What would be—the last question on that would be, what would be 

the optimum number that we should have to be able to have 

enough to be deployed? 

Dr. BLACKWELL. Yes, ma’am. I have got a bit of an interest in 

MED–1 just because our charge—we received grant funding from 
68 

the Department of Homeland Security to build this as a prototype. 

Our charge was to build something different than a tent, and that 

is something that was aesthetically pleasing. You as a physician 

know that a tent looks like a tent, smells like a tent and leaks like 

a tent. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. It was not aesthetically pleasing. We did 

what we had to do. 

Dr. BLACKWELL. Yes, ma’am. It was probably very functional at 

the time. What we did is create an environment that would be 

pleasing to patients, No. 1, that anybody that has just suffered a 

disaster—— 

When we rolled into Mississippi, there were 150 refugee families 

living on hot asphalt 7 days after the storm with no health care; 

and so many of these had chronic conditions, as you can imagine. 

When we rolled in and set up, they were in an emergency department. It looked like a hospital. It was clean like a hospital, and it 

wasn’t a tent. 

No. 1 for the patients, No. 2 for the healthcare providers, physicians, nurses, allied help that don’t work in those austere environments. We want them to feel comfortable, that they are not worried 

about leakage coming down. But, literally, after 30 seconds after 

you are in this, we think that you forget that you are in a tractor 

trailer. It looks like a hospital. 

So we think we have accomplished our mission on what Homeland Security asked us to do and that was create something different and prototype it and see if it is something that can be used. 

Which brings us to the next, should it be used in a mass gathering venue? I think absolutely. It will raise the level of care. 

Most mass—not most but many mass gathering venues, depending on the level of care they are providing, might just be Band-Aid 

stations or first aid—Boy Scout first-aid-type procedures. What we 

do at Lowe’s Motor Speedway and Bank of America, we try very 

hard to keep people on-site. We don’t want to separate them from 

their family or friends because that is a repatriation issue. So we 

provide a higher level of care. 

But using a MED–1 does several things. It raises the level of 

care for patrons that are visiting those. It prepares you for a mass 

gathering event, should a terrorist incident actually occur; and it 

provides training for your staff that when the river does rise or 

when the terrorist incident does occur, your staff is ramped up and 

trained on that unit. 

Do I think they need to be across the United States? Yes, ma’am. 

We have proven it. We think it is what is needed today. I would 

say start in every FEMA region across the United States and expand it from there. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. That is what I was thinking, to the regions. 

Sergeant McCartney, could you speak to the impact of handling 

numerous events that are happening at one time across the State 

or a big city? Earlier—I think you were here—the New York folks 

particularly talked about having a number of things happening on 

any given one day in New York City. Can you speak to that at all? 

Sergeant MCCARTNEY. Yes, ma’am. One of the things that California does and through the Large Stadium Initiative—and I have 

to say, the first responders in all the communities in California and 
69 

I am sure across the United States are the real doers of all these 

mass gathering events. What they do especially is they work together in a unified and ICS structure. That is how they manage 

those big mass gathering events or multiple events within a community. 

One of the ways we recognize that and one of the ways we help 

with that in the Office of Homeland Security is the fact that we do 

a State-wide exercise where we bring all three regions together at 

the same time in different parts of the State and say, this just occurred. They, through mutual aid, through operational areas, work 

through up to the State and to the Federal, depending on the 

needs, to manage that type of event. 

Last year, in 2007, we did use a large stadium mass gathering 

event which happened in the coastal region on the Bay Area, San 

Jose. It happened in the inland region in the Stockton—middle of 

the country—middle of the State, I should say, and then in the 

southern region down in the Anaheim area where all three areas 

were impacted by mass gathering events during a day. Each local 

first responder had to come in using unified command ICS structure and how they work through a problem, along with emergency 

medical systems, fire, private partners and dealt with the catastrophic events. So, through the training and exercising, it really 

works that way. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. May I ask just a real quick question, Mr. 

Chairman? 

To Mr. Reynolds, in the training that you listed—this is just a 

real brief question—you listed ‘‘verbal judo’’. What is that? 

Mr. REYNOLDS. Yes, ma’am. It is sometimes known as tactical 

communication, also. A gentleman named Dr. George Thompson 

wrote a textbook on it. It is used a lot within law enforcement. You 

are probably familiar with it. 

Sergeant MCCARTNEY. Very familiar with it. 

Mr. REYNOLDS. There is a version for teachers, also. It is a way 

of talking to people and de-escalating situations. There was a time 

in our past when we thought that the way to handle things was 

to increase numbers and, you know, force on force and that type 

of thing. That wasn’t the solution. The solution was to de-escalate 

it and to prevent it from getting worse. Given the option of talking 

to somebody into leaving and going hands-on with them, I would 

rather use my brain every time. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

I have a couple other questions that I would like to throw out. 

Mr. Reynolds, one of the challenges in any kind of potential situation is the ability for people to communicate with each other. 

Since you are in a private setting, are you allowed to have the ability to communicate with local law enforcement on their radio frequencies? 

Mr. REYNOLDS. That is an excellent question. 

There are a couple different ways to look at that. We do have one 

of the police base radios and one of their handheld radios within 

our dispatch center. Yes, we are. We have direct ring-down lines 

to the local police department that, we pick it up, it goes straight 
70 

to their dispatch. We have unlisted phone numbers to their dispatch area. We have a great communication center with the local 

police department. 

Chairman THOMPSON. So with real-time communication though, 

it is like a relay system or something like that? 

Mr. REYNOLDS. Absolutely. We pick it up. Their dispatch knows 

it is us on the other end. We know it is them. It is a direct call 

line to them. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Was that difficult to work out, to get the 

ability to have a radio? 

Mr. REYNOLDS. No. I started working for Mall of America in 

1996, and we have had it ever since I started, before I started. We 

have continued to make improvements on that along the way. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Sergeant McCartney, while you are working with the LSI initiative, have you seen that interoperability 

challenge? 

Sergeant MCCARTNEY. It is certain challenges in certain areas, 

depending on interoperability in the local area. But for the most 

part in California that has been the huge component of getting ourselves better prepared. Law enforcement, fire, EMS, private partners, especially private partners in college stadiums which have 

mostly law enforcement first responder assistance during those 

venues. 

Some colleges in California have police departments that are actually the police for that university. Some other colleges don’t. So 

in some of the stadiums in some of the other areas they used first 

responders to assist in that. In either/or, with first responders 

being there or the private police or the police department from the 

university, they can work together. Quite frankly, they are retired 

from the police department in the city is usually how they build the 

police department in the university. So they do work together to 

make sure that if there is a problem anywhere on one of those sites 

that local first responders can talk to each other and talk to them 

to get the best resources in to take care of the problem. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Mr. Lungren. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Following up on that, Mr. Chairman. We haven’t 

solved the interoperability problem Nation-wide. We haven’t solved 

it here with the Capitol Police, as a matter of fact. We are working 

on that in another committee. But as I understand it looking at the 

technology, we don’t have automatically compatible systems. There 

are patches. 

Sergeant MCCARTNEY. Correct. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I have seen the vehicles that can come in. As long 

as you have someone who really knows what they are doing, they 

can patch one through to the other and it almost is instantaneous. 

Sergeant MCCARTNEY. Right. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I presume that is part of the efforts that you have 

ongoing? 

Sergeant MCCARTNEY. Yes, Congressman. What we do in the 

Sacramento area—I can speak to that in California as much as Los 

Angeles area in the southern region and the Bay Area. There are 

multiple communication vans or vehicles that are out traveling 

through local areas in California. Through those vehicles, just like 
71 

the Congressman stated, a gentleman or woman who is very knowledgeable in that activity can go in there and I can bring—the three 

of us could have three different radios from three different places, 

walk into this facility, hand them our radios. They get them back 

and the three of us are now best friends because we can all talk. 

I am sure in the Carolinas and I am sure in Minnesota it is the 

same as far as that type of response when it comes to those type 

of vehicles and the knowledge those people have. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I just want to make sure that as we are moving 

forward to the interoperability solution, which we are not at, even 

this many years after 9/11, we don’t forget what I call the interim 

fix, which I call these mobile patch units. I just want to make sure 

that if something comes up in the mean time where we decide that 

there is an interoperability problem immediately that we make 

sure that those kinds of fixes can be made and funds can be directed to that. I was just asking those of you as experts whether 

that makes sense. I mean, is that technology out there? Are you 

using it now? Should we make sure that that is available as we 

look to the ultimate solution, the better solution where I think we 

are going to get but it is going to be a number of years? 

Sergeant MCCARTNEY. I think it is very important very quickly 

to go off of what was talked about in the first panel, mutual aid. 

It is very important to have that connectability with those other 

departments. Because during mutual aid, as we all know, we are 

bringing in resources from faraway places to assist us. Fires in 

California have been astronomical, and we require help from other 

States. So it is nice when we can bring those people over and we 

have that opportunity to communicate so we can handle those catastrophic events in California at least. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I was just thinking, Mr. Chairman, you mentioned 

the Canadian Mounted Police coming down and assisting. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Right. 

Mr. LUNGREN. We wouldn’t necessarily have them on the same 

frequency as some of the others. But I know if we have one of those 

vehicles, I know it is a possibility. It is kind of the flexibility and 

agility that we need to build into the system, as opposed to rigidity. 

Chairman THOMPSON. If the gentleman would yield. One of the 

problems with that is how do we plan for the agility? Because everybody wants their own piece of equipment. If we have to buy mobile command centers for everybody who has a unit to deploy, then 

we won’t have many other resources to push toward the problem. 

One of the other problems associated with this, too, is our vendors have been very strategic in going out and convincing some less 

sophisticated departments that all they need to do is buy a new 

system. Well, that new system is fine for that unit. If it is a police 

system but they can’t communicate with the fire, you all have 

stovepiped that communication. 

So you are absolutely correct. The temporary piece is how can we 

patch everyone in with these units. Ultimately, from a technology 

standpoint we just have to be able to move it even further. But 

that has been one of our real, real problems. 

I yield back. 

Mr. LUNGREN. The other thing is, I have been reading Dwight 

Eisenhower’s memoirs from World War II called Crusade in Eu-
72 

rope; and it is amazing as you pick up insights into leadership and 

so forth. 

One of the things that he points out, and Stephen Ambrose writing about World War II did, the success of the American Armed 

Forces was attributable to many things but one of them was the 

creativity of the average GI, the sergeant. They give example after 

example where they did things that weren’t planned, but they responded. 

I guess if I could just ask one question, my last question would 

be this: How do we ensure that in all the planning that you do that 

we still allow for that creativity, that we still allow for someone to 

figure out the answer to a question that you didn’t really fully map 

out beforehand? In other words, are we assured that within these 

plans—all the planning and cooperation that we have, that there 

is enough left there that someone with a spark of creativity can respond to a situation as opposed to—well, you know, I got the Director from DHS which came out to the Office of Homeland Security 

down to us, and we figured out this thing at the Mall of America, 

and that is the way we are going to do it. Is there a way to ensure 

that that maintains itself, that possibility of creative response to an 

unanticipated problem? 

Dr. BLACKWELL. Congressman, on the medical side of things, you 

raise a great issue. Where would we be if we didn’t have that? I 

would simply say, every deployment that we go on, we learn something else. The key to our success is after-action planning. We debrief on the mission. We spend a lot of time around the table and 

say, what did we do right? What did we do wrong? How can we 

make it better? 

We learned lots of lessons after Katrina, we learned a lot of lessons after Mardi Gras, and we utilized those lessons in improving 

our system. The radio communication you just mentioned, we realized we were dealing with multiple ambulance services coming in, 

bringing us patients and we had no way to communicate with 

them. Now we have UHF, VHF, 800 megahertz radios, and a ham 

radio and a communications officer that travels with us and that 

mixing box that makes all that happen. 

We have learned those lessons, and we have gotten creative 

every time we deploy. That is what is so vital in all this, and that 

is why I think using our asset for mass gathering venues—every 

time you deploy that, you are going to learn something else and 

make your program better. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you. 

Sergeant MCCARTNEY. I think also, in law enforcement, it is very 

much the same way as it is in medical and fire as far as creativity. 

The first-line folks, the folks that are doing the job every day have 

valuable information when it comes to how to solve problems and 

do certain things. Leadership, yes, definitely is a process of that. 

But I think it is the leaders—and I can speak for the Sacramento 

County Sheriff’s Department in the sense that we allow those people to make those creative decisions. We test those things. We exercise; and again we also, through after-action reporting and learning, we learn new things. When we learn new things, we develop 

new programs, policies, procedures. 
73 

As you know, we have the air show that comes to Sacramento. 

I am the traffic commander for that entire event. 

Mr. LUNGREN. You have improved. 

Sergeant MCCARTNEY. We have improved over the last 2 years. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I appreciate that. It is not too far from where I 

live. The lines are shorter. 

Sergeant MCCARTNEY. We do a lot of creative thinking, planning 

and using our first-line responders to help us make those decisions 

and work with us to find better ways to fix whatever the problem 

may be. 

Mr. REYNOLDS. Whether you are doing a real scenario or a real 

situation or a training exercise, again, one of the keys is to quickly 

have after-action reports after it. So often when people are done 

with these, they see the situation as being done and they want to 

leave. You have to gather them quickly, put pride aside, and if you 

had some shortfalls, you have got to point those out and, again, put 

pride aside at all levels, like you were discussing. It can’t just be 

the command level. It has got to be the person on the ground, getting the boots muddy, who has got to be able to give you input and 

what they saw going right and what they saw going wrong or else 

you are not going to make a difference, you are not going to improve. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you, gentlemen, very much for your 

excellent presentations to the committee and again for the service 

all of you do for our country. We appreciate it. 

I think I speak for the entire committee. Our commitment is to 

do all we can to make sure that the planning, the equipment, and 

the resources at the Federal level get pushed down in concert with 

working with State and locals and the private sector to see that 

mass gatherings are as safe as any other venue in this country. 

Thank you again. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:41 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(75) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON OF MISSISSIPPI FOR COLONEL

ROBERT B. STEPHAN, USAF (RET.), ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INFRASTRUCTURE PRO- TECTION, NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY

Question 1. What are the challenges unique to those mass gathering events that 

are not considered National Special Security Events (non-NSSEs)? 

Answer. Similar to challenges for an NSSE, specific challenges for non-NSSEs 

vary from one event to another. There is no direct Federal funding mechanism for 

non-NSSE mass gathering events. When local event sponsors/planners do not have 

the necessary resources to overcome specialized equipment and manpower (security 

and emergency response) challenges, they must first exhaust the mutual assistance 

agreements they share with their neighboring localities. If these agreements are implemented and the event planners still face the challenge of additional resource 

shortfalls, they may choose to request Federal support as needed to fill a particular 

gap they have identified, such as adequate maritime security or airspace security 

coverage. Other examples could be a need for specialized radiological detection 

equipment or bio sensors beyond their local and neighboring resources and capabilities. In such cases, many individual Federal agencies and departments that comprise the SEWG may be able to supplement local gaps and shortfalls if it is in keeping with their core mission areas and responsibilities. Direct requests from the localities is one way to determine the level of Federal assistance that may be required; 

the application of SEAR levels to all special events is another (automated) way to 

determine the likely level of Federal assistance that may be required. 

Question 2. What additional resources do you think are necessary to help secure 

the venues that host mass gatherings that are not considered National Special Security Events (non-NSSEs), from whom, and why? What additional contributions are 

you/Infrastructure Protection prepared to make to improve security at these venues? 

Answer. While the responsibility for securing non-NSSE events resides primarily 

with the local authorities, local planners can request Federal support from the Federal agencies in their area, regardless of the SEAR level of the event. These authorities are responsible for developing their own Special Event Plans. 

The coordination conducted on behalf of the SEWG does not provide for Federal 

operational oversight of member organizations, nor does the Federal Coordinator 

have operational oversight of Federal organizations during an event. As your question implies, the Office of Infrastructure Protection (OIP), other DHS Components 

and SEWG member agencies are in a position to support local planners, if their core 

mission calls for such support. 

Question 3. How can the Department of Homeland Security, State, territorial, 

tribal, and local governments, and the private sector work together better to ensure 

public health, safety, and security for mass gatherings that are not considered National Special Security Events (non-NSSEs)? 

Answer. The continued participation and engagement of each State Homeland Security Advisor and their S/L/T/T planners in the annual DHS special event data call 

is of vital importance to strengthening the Federal-State working relationship that 

can solve resource and capability gaps and therefore better ensure the public health, 

safety, and security for mass gatherings of all levels. 

The information from this annual special event data call allows the Department 

to ensure that all of the entered events are accurately assessed, rated and communicated to the Federal community for overall situational awareness and, when warranted, signal the need for direct Federal support to occur. The State Homeland Security Advisors, OPS and the SEWG are open to suggestions and feedback from our 

partner data call users to ensure a consistent, reliable and trouble free entry of 

events experience by all of the data call system users. In addition to the data call 

itself, OPS works closely with the DHS Office of Intergovernmental Programs to 
76 

craft special event program messages to the Homeland Security Advisors during the 

year and to communicate whenever necessary via written correspondence and by 

hosting joint tele-conference calls with the States. 

Question 4. How do the Operations Coordination Division, Office of Infrastructure 

Protection, Office of Risk Management Analysis, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 

and the Grants Program Directorate (now sitting in FEMA) interact? Short of Secretary Chertoff, who is responsible for coordinating the activities of these various 

entities that all have something to do with mass gatherings? 

Answer. The Federal Government coordination mechanism for non-NSSE Special 

Events is the Special Event Working Group. While concentrating on SEAR level 1– 

2 events, the SEWG, which consists of over 50 Federal Departments, Agencies and 

DHS components, is also a mechanism for coordinating and interaction on all nonNSSE Special Events. The agencies noted above are all members of the SEWG. 

Question 5. We have observed and heard from Federal, State, territorial, tribal, 

local, and private sector personnel that planning efforts are often disconnected from 

other activities (such as training, exercises, standard setting, and the identification 

and communication of lessons learned), even within the Department of Homeland 

Security. What is being done, will be done, and/or can be done to better integrate 

these efforts? 

Answer. Following Hurricane Katrina, the President and Congress directed DHS 

to conduct a Nation-wide plan review. The results of that review, which were provided to Congress, included a series of recommendations to address how planning 

should be more closely synchronized with other elements of the preparedness cycle 

(e.g. training, equipping, evaluating, assessing, and corrective actions). Since then, 

Federal, State, tribal and local governments have made significant progress in modernizing emergency planning and ensuring it serves as the foundation for preparedness activities. The National Response Framework clearly identifies the value of 

planning in Chapter IV. The President issued Annex I (National Planning) HSPD– 

8 in December 2007. 

The Integrated Planning System (IPS) will formally establish a standard and comprehensive approach to national planning that will facilitate the integration of planning efforts across multiple levels of government and link planning to other preparedness activities. Efforts directed by IPS will provide planning guidance to Federal departments and agencies at the national and regional level and examine possible approaches for a long-term evolution to a national planning system. IPS will 

also translate policies, strategies, and planning guidance into a family of strategic, 

operational, and tactical plans, fostering integration and synchronization with State, 

local, and tribal officials, to include linkages with Comprehensive Preparedness 

Guide efforts. 

The newly updated FEMA Comprehensive Preparedness Guide, CPG 101 (A guide 

for all-hazard emergency operations planning for State, territorial, tribal and local 

governments), provide guidance about emergency operations planning to State, local, 

territorial, and tribal governments. The Guide provides emergency managers and 

other emergency services personnel with recommendations on how to address the 

entire planning process, from forming a planning team, through writing and maintaining the plan, to executing the plan. It also encourages emergency managers to 

follow a process that addresses all of the hazards that threaten their jurisdiction 

through a suite of plans connected to a single, integrated emergency operations plan 

(EOP). Additionally, CPG 101 incorporates concepts that come from disaster research and day-to-day experience. The Guide is part of a larger series of emergency 

planning related CPGs published by FEMA. Follow-on guides will provide detailed 

information about planning considerations for different response functions and hazards. 

The 2006 Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) mandated 

the transfer of certain DHS preparedness functions to FEMA. As part of this transition FEMA created the National Preparedness Directorate (NPD) with a mission of 

unifying DHS’ preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery missions. Since 

2007, NPD has overseen the coordination and development of the capabilities and 

tools necessary to prepare for terrorist incidents and natural disasters. NPD is 

working closely with the disaster operations directorate on implementation of the 

IPS and planning integration and synchronization with State, territorial, local and 

tribal governments. 

The IPS and CPG documents are driving the development of planning curricula 

at the Emergency Management Institute (EMI), as well as planning instruction for 

Federal planners. EMI operates within the National Integration Center (NIC), 

which develops, manages, and coordinates all homeland security training, external 

education, exercise, and lessons learned programs. 
77 

* See Exhibit 1, Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral Roger T. Rufe, Jr., page 18. 

The FEMA National Exercise Division (NED) supports an all-hazard, capabilitiesbased approach to exercises. Exercises are designed and facilitated to address identified needs and underdeveloped capabilities at the Federal, State, local, and tribal 

level of government. Each exercise is targeted to a jurisdictions needs or to exercise 

previously untested/under-tested capabilities, including those capabilities that address hazards specific to a mass gathering event. 

Through the Regional Exercise Support Program (RESP), the NED has delivered 

or scheduled 72 exercises for State and local communities in fiscal year 2008. Of 

those exercises, the following exercises represent a sample of exercises with scenarios related to supporting planning relative to a mass gathering event: • Loudoun Speedway (NASCAR).—Facilitated in Loudoun, New Hampshire, this 

Table Top Exercise (TTX) occurred in March 2008. The exercise validated command and control plans for a small town (a population less than 5,000) that has 

a NASCAR track, which can become overwhelmed on NASCAR weekends. The 

town depends heavily on State/mutual aid and, because New Hampshire is a 

strong commonwealth, the State cannot become involved in an emergency event 

unless requested by local officials. • Martinsville Speedway (NASCAR).—Facilitated in Martinsville, Virginia, this 

TTX occurred in May 2008 and was the third in a series of building block exercises supported by NED. This exercise is a good example of how to use the 

building block approach, through workshops and seminars, to develop plans and 

then validated plans in the TTX. The State and local officials have indicated 

that they will request a full-scale exercise through RESP in fiscal year 2009. • Olympic Trials Preparation.—Facilitated in Portland, Oregon, this Functional 

Exercise was held in June 2008 to validate plans and procedures related to the 

pending Olympic Trials in Oregon. • Baltimore Ravens Stadium (M&T Bank Stadium).—This Full Scale Exercise 

will be facilitated in Baltimore, Maryland, on August, 2008. The exercise will 

test evacuation, security, and decontamination plans and procedures. The exercise will utilize approximately 1,000 volunteers for a scenario involving a ‘‘dirty 

bomb’’ inside the stadium. • Presidential Candidate Debate at Hofstra University.—This exercise, scheduled 

for September, 2008 in New York, will support the local emergency preparedness community with their preparations for the actual debate, scheduled for October 2008. 

Question 6. Committee staff members have visited a number of venues that feature mass gatherings that are not declared National Special Security Events (nonNSSEs), and have witnessed the presence of FEMA, ICE, and other organizations 

from the Department of Homeland Security. Please provide a list of all organizations from the Department of Homeland Security that provide support at mass gatherings that are not National Special Security Events (non-NSSEs). What is the Department of Homeland Security doing to institutionalize such support at these types 

of gatherings? 

Answer. Some DHS organizations that have participated in past SEAR Level 1 

& 2 special events include the Immigration Customs Enforcement Agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Office of Health Affairs, the United States 

Coast Guard, The United States Secret Service and the Transportation and Security 

Administration among others. Local planners are always able to solicit Federal support from the local Federal agencies represented in their area, if the local planners 

feel such support is needed, regardless of the SEAR level of the event. 

DHS OPS continues to support special events and mass gatherings through interagency coordination efforts. Formalized procedures for the Special Events Working 

Group are in development. The formal procedures, when completed, will develop 

processes for SEAR Level 1 & 2 special event support to include air space security 

procedures, joint threat assessments, joint risk assessments, Federal Coordinator 

designations, Integrated Federal Support Plans and other inherently Federal roles 

that cover the spectrum of prevention, protection, response and recovery activities. 

A copy of a list of all members of the SEWG is attached for your information.* 

Question 7. How have you involved high-level decisionmakers at the Federal, 

State, territorial, tribal, and local levels personally in planning efforts? What are 

you doing to improve the processes by which this should occur? 

Answer. From a Federal perspective, the SEWG (for non-NSSE events) is the established planning process. All high level decisionmakers in the Federal organizations represented on the SEWG endorse these planning efforts. 

DHS OPS and the SEWG have made considerable efforts to identify special events 

through the annual special event data call and through continued outreach to the 
78 

Homeland Security Advisors of each State. During the annual mass teleconference 

between DHS OPS and the State Homeland Security Advisors there is an open 

forum to discuss any feedback to improve the data call program. Outside of this call, 

the HSAs remain in regular contact with the DHS Office of Intergovernmental Programs, a key working partner and member of the SEWG. 

The data call process enables any event considered important enough to Federal, 

State, territorial, tribal, and local planners to be easily entered electronically for ultimate evaluation by the SEWG co-chairs and member organizations. Electronic 

submission and tabulation eliminates the introduction of favoritism based upon any 

pre-existing relationships between local high level decisionmakers and DHS program administrators. 

On-going relationships at the local level between local event planners and local 

Federal field offices enable specific requests for assistance to be made to specific 

Federal organizations at any time in keeping with core mission responsibilities in 

the communities they serve. 

Question 8. Mr. Thompson has said that the Department of Homeland Security 

must provide additional guidance to the public and private sector about what to do 

when the National Threat Level changes. What are you doing to get guidance out 

about what mass gathering venues should do when the National Threat Level 

changes—especially at mass gatherings that are not National Special Security 

Events (non-NSSEs)? 

Answer. DHS, in conjunction with the FBI and other affected Federal agencies, 

uses a coordinated notification process when the national threat level changes. This 

process involves notification to appropriate Federal, State, territorial, tribal, and 

local officials, and if appropriate, the American public. The guidance is often in the 

form of a national advisory or sector-specific area, so it may not be specific or applicable to all individual special event venues in every locality Nation-wide. 

The listing of current and upcoming special events is monitored by the National 

Operations Center (NOC) at DHS. Should a change to the National Threat Level 

occur and specifically and disproportionally affect a particular State or city, the 

NOC may contact the State’s Homeland Security Advisor regarding the event and 

provide? establish mutual? [sic] situational awareness. In addition to the Homeland 

Security Advisor of the affected State/s or areas, other agencies, such as the FBI, 

may engage and collaborate further with local high level decisionmakers. Any ultimate determinations about whether an event should be canceled or not is made at 

the local level in tandem with event organizers. Local/city managers would engage 

pre-determined local communication mechanisms to announce any changes to the 

local public and/or event attendees. 

Question 9. We applaud the Department’s willingness to work with the non-Federal Government and private sector to develop planning guidance. However, we 

question the efficiency of the Department’s processes to do so. For example, evacuation planning guidance has been returned by the private sector to the Department 

six times. What can be done to make these processes more efficient? 

Answer. To say that the document was returned to the Department six times is 

misleading and does not properly illustrate the level of Federal and private-sector 

collaboration that was involved in the development of the product. The document 

was developed over a 1-year period between the 2007 and 2008 National Association 

for Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR) Security Summits. 

From the outset of the project, the release date for the final document was set 

for the January 2008 NASCAR Security Summit. The development process included 

an initial scoping meeting with the NASCAR Security Director. Two additional teleconferences were held to finalize an initial draft. NASCAR had the opportunity to 

review this draft document before and after the inaugural ‘‘dry run’’ visit to Lowes 

Motor Speedway in Concord, NC, during the Coca Cola 600. The initial draft was 

intended to be a foundation document of common evacuation practices. 

After the Coca Cola 600, DHS, NASCAR track officials, and local first responders 

attended a validation meeting to ensure that the document correctly captured the 

NASCAR racing environment and recommended realistic processes for evacuating a 

NASCAR facility. It was also suggested during this session that DHS refine the initial draft to reflect lessons learned and prepare for the three unique track type visits. DHS provided drafts before and after each visit to the unique track types of 

Talladega, AL (large track), Infineon, CA (road course), and Milwaukee Mile, WI 

(small track). The draft document was shared before each visit to ensure that all 

attendees (i.e., DHS personnel, NASCAR track personnel, State and local first responders, and other Federal partners) had a similar foundation for the 2-day sessions at each track. These sessions were carefully planned to ensure that the document captured the uniqueness of each track type. The document was reviewed after 

the visits to the three unique track types to ensure that it reflected the wide span 
79 

of NASCAR facility types and was ready to be presented at the January 2008 

NASCAR Security Summit. 

We will continue to engage with the sectors and stakeholders to identify ways to 

improve the process. 

Question 10. How has Infrastructure Protection worked with the Office of Health 

Affairs to address the health concerns that could arise from mass gatherings? 

How—if at all—has policy and programmatic input from the Office of Health Affairs 

been incorporated into your products—including guidance to commercial facilities 

and other venues where mass gatherings occur? 

Answer. The Office of Infrastructure Protection is the Commercial Facilities (CF) 

Sector-Specific Agency. We have worked with the Office of Health Affairs, and 

through that Office, with the Department of HHS, which has the lead for health 

care and public health under HSPD–7 and the National Infrastructure Protection 

Plan, to address health concerns that could arise from mass gatherings—most notably in its work in accordance with the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza: 

Implementation Plan. This important work has been accomplished through a series 

of briefings, workshops, and conferences with the CF stakeholders representing each 

of its eight sub-sectors. Information provided through these venues is representative 

of intradepartmental and interagency coordination and collaboration to support CF 

Continuity of Operations and Continuity of Business planning. Examples include 

identification of essential functions and personnel, targeted layered containment 

strategies, supply chain management issues, infection control information, etc. 

Question 11. We are extremely concerned about the ability of our States, territories, tribes, and localities to respond to mass casualties—which could certainly 

occur if a mass gathering were to be hit with a disaster or an act of terrorism. How 

has Infrastructure Protection taken the requirements for medical surge into account—especially considering the inability of most hospitals to take on many more 

patients, as they are at top capacity on a daily basis right now? 

Answer. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is committed to ensuring that 

the Federal response, whether it is a medical, environmental, or law enforcement 

response, is well-coordinated with State and local officials to ensure a seamless and 

integrated response. The role of the Federal Government is to supplement the State 

and local efforts, and to provide assistance when it is needed. 

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has the primary responsibility for building and enhancing medical surge capacity. DHS Office of Health Affairs (OHA) works closely with HHS, which in turn works with State and local jurisdictions to assist in developing inter-State and multi-State agreements to provide 

supplies, hospital beds, medical professionals during a catastrophic event. Also, 

HHS has response assets such as the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) 

which partners with the Department of Defense and the Department of Veteran’s 

Affairs for the care and transport of disaster patients. DHS constitutes the fourth 

partner in the NDMS consortium. These partnerships are important to ensure medical surge capacity. 

The Office of Infrastructure Protection works with the OHA through active participation on the Government Coordinating Councils (GCC) for the Health and Public Health and Emergency Services Sectors, organized under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) framework. Both offices work with private sector 

representatives through those sectors’ Sector Coordinating Councils (SCC). This 

partnership framework supports coordination and collaboration with the HHS Office 

of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) and the Centers 

for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to address the issues that affect our Nation’s ability to effectively prepare for and respond to a mass casualty event. 

Question 12. During the hearing, Mr. Etheridge asked Assistant Secretary 

Stephan about how the Department of Homeland Security has been working with 

State and local governments and with the private sector to develop planning guidance for mass gathering events. The Assistant Secretary responded that some guidance and guidelines had been developed and ‘‘pushed out the door.’’ Chairman 

Thompson subsequently asked Assistant Secretary Stephan if he could provide the 

committee with lists of where the guidance has gone out versus where the guidance 

is not yet out. Please provide those lists here, along with any necessary qualifying 

information. 

Answer. Guidance documents currently provided to the Commercial Facilities (CF) 

Sector are shared with our various critical infrastructure partners at the Sector Coordinating Council (SCC) level. Some guidance is shared with the entire SCC (e.g., 

the Pandemic Preparedness Guidance), which then shares it with members of its 

sub-sectors, be it one or more associations or a single group of security chiefs with 

assets at one or more locations. Guidance developed in close collaboration with private-sector partners (e.g., the Protective Measures Guide for U.S. Sports Leagues) 
80 

is shared only with the participating sub-sector’s chairperson, who then distributes 

the document to the sub-sector’s membership. Some guidance (e.g., the Infrastructure Protection Report Series Papers) is shared with all Critical Infrastructure and 

Key Resources stakeholders at the Federal, State, local, territorial, tribal, and private-sector levels during the execution of Infrastructure Protection outreach initiatives, private sector security training and awareness programs, and vulnerability assessments. Last, guidance developed for a specific organization (e.g., the NASCAR 

Mass Evacuation Planning Guide) is shared with the specific organization, which, 

in turn, shares the guidance within its membership. Current guidance documents 

provided to the CF Sector that pertains to events of mass gathering are: • NASCAR Mass Evacuation Planning Guide; 

• Protective Measures Guide (Sports Leagues Sub-Sector); 

• Bomb-Making Material Awareness Program; 

• Commercial Facilities Pandemic Preparedness Guideline; 

• Infrastructure Protection Report Series Papers for: 

• Racetracks (Horse and Dog); 

• Stadiums and Arenas; 

• Large Public Outdoor Gatherings (i.e., parades, fairs, festivals, rallies, flea 

markets, demonstrations, concerts, and celebrations); 

• Convention Centers; 

• Motor Race Tracks; 

• Performance Venues (i.e., theaters, movie theaters, concert halls, auditoriums, 

amphitheaters, and community playhouses); 

• Hotels; 

• Casinos; 

• Office Buildings; 

• Shopping Malls; 

• Apartments. 

Future guidance developed for the CF Sector will be shared as described above. 

Guidance documents in development that pertain to events of mass gathering are 

Mass Evacuation Planning Guide for Stadiums, and Protective Measures Guide (Retail, Outdoor Events, and Lodging Sub-Sectors). 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON OF MISSISSIPPI FOR VICE ADMIRAL ROGER T. RUFE, JR., USCG (RET.), DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF OPERATIONS COORDINATION AND PLANNING, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Question 1. Does the Operations Coordination Division of the Department of 

Homeland Security provide the same level of monitoring for all events receiving a 

Special Events Assessment Rating? Please explain. 

Answer. The Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) is broken up into 5 levels. 

These levels are a starting point for further coordination and monitoring by the 

DHS and the Special Event Working Group (SEWG) member agencies. All events, 

level 1–5, are monitored by the DHS National Operations Center (NOC) for Situational Awareness. 

DHS OPS and the SEWG further coordinate the Federal support and monitoring 

of events that are identified as SEAR Level 1–2. Special events designated SEAR 

Level 1–2 signify events which involve close monitoring by the National Operations 

Center due to their scale, complexity and the large degree of Federal resources, support and manpower allocated, including the appointment a Federal Coordinator by 

the DHS Secretary and the issuance of an Integrated Federal Support Plan document. SEAR Level 3–5 special events are monitored by the NOC as well for situational awareness purposes, but due to their minimal or non-usage of Federal resources, they fall below the threshold of the appointment of a Federal Coordinator 

and they do not require an Integrated Federal Support Plan. 

Question 2. In your opinion, why do States not apply for Special Event Assessment Ratings for many of the mass gathering events that occur throughout the 

year? Is the application process prohibitive? 

Answer. ‘‘Applying for a SEAR rating’’ mischaracterizes the process for obtaining 

a SEAR rating. The only way a special event is given a SEAR rating is through participation in the DHS coordinated Special Event Working Group (SEWG) data call, 

which is conducted each year in the fall. 

Prior to the opening of the yearly special event data call a mass State Homeland 

Security Advisors (HSA) tele-conference is convened with assistance and coordination provided by the DHS Office of Intergovernmental Programs. The purpose of the 

mass HSA tele-conference is to notice the upcoming DHS special event data call for 

the new year, welcome and encourage participation of every State in the process, 

engage active discussion as to any difficulties that are occurring, provision of on the 
81 

spot technical support to system questions and last to open a yearly forum for any 

suggested improvements for system users. The special event data call that quickly 

follows is open to all State/local/territorial/tribal (S/L/T/T) Planners. Further participation within the State is coordinated directly through the State Homeland Security 

Advisors that participated on the teleconference kick-off call. Each HSA can encourage participation locally but there is no penalty for non-participation. Reasons for 

non-participation may include no forthcoming Federal funds to assist local special 

event planners and no anticipated need for Federal resource allocation to the special 

events in question. 

The DHS/SEWG purpose for the data call is two-fold. First, the list compiled from 

the data call enables DHS and the Inter-Agency SEWG members to monitor activities and events around the Nation for situational awareness. Second, the iconic nature of SEAR Level 1–2 local events often requires considerable Federal support and 

coordination. All Federal support for these Level 1 & 2 events generally comes from 

the SEWG members’ operating budgets, and not State and local budgets. DHS and 

the SEWG have no leverage to compel S/L/T/T Planners to participate in the data 

call, yet many S/L/T/T participate and users entered approximately 4,000 events for 

2008. 

The data call itself is not a prohibitive process. A focus group of past S/L/T/T 

users is convened by DHS prior to the mass Homeland Security Advisors teleconference and the special events data call to discuss changes and their suggestions and 

comments. The Homeland Security Advisors are briefed in detail before the data call 

and asked to identify S/L/T/T personnel responsible for entering the events into the 

system. The entry of data itself is quite easy, using a web-based secure application, 

which includes helpful drop-down guidance boxes for individual assistance with 

many of the questions and also provides some examples of entries for new uses. This 

year, users who enter events in the data call will see the entire list of special events, 

as an added user benefit and situational awareness. If an event reaches the criteria 

warranting a Federal Coordinator or an Integrated Federal Support Plan (SEAR 

Level 1–2), the local elected official is notified by the Secretary. 

Question 3. Do you believe that each mass gathering venue or event should have 

an emergency action plan? Do you believe that an emergency action plan should be 

required of each mass gathering venue or event that applies for a Special Event Assessment Rating? Why or why not? 

Answer. Yes, the benefit of an emergency action plan to a special event planner 

is immeasurable. However, the lack of a plan or an insufficient plan may be an indication that a special event, usually an S/L/T/T event by definition, may require some 

type of Federal assistance or guidance. Accurate event data are crucial to the DHS 

data call process and enables the SEWG and DHS to identify and/or fill any gaps, 

if appropriate. 

Many localities are achieving a common national standard by adopting the Incident Command System as part of their training and procedures on their own schedule. It is not the intent of the SEWG to dissuade event planners from access to the 

system based on whether or not they have achieved emergency action plans for all 

of their mass gatherings. The data call system does question each locality as to 

whether their event security and resources are met by their local existing capabilities. The capabilities question is one of many that help to determine an events 

SEAR Level; however, the SEWG, a Federal interagency mechanism, does not have 

the authority to actually mandate submission of emergency action plans or require 

them for events occurring in a local domain. 

Question 4. Who is the individual responsible at the Department of Homeland Security for events designated as Non-National Security Special Events? 

Answer. The Secretary of DHS has delegated programmatic, administrative and 

operational coordination of Special Events to Roger T. Rufe, Jr., Director of Operations Coordination and Planning (OPS). The interagency Special Event Working 

Group (SEWG) is the coordination body for non-NSSEs, and the OPS Future Plans/ 

Special Events Branch coordinates this entity. 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON OF MISSISSIPPI FOR DR. THOMAS

H. BLACKWELL, MD, MEDICAL DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR PREHOSPITAL MEDICINE, 

CAROLINAS MEDICAL CENTER, CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA

Question 1. How do you (as head of emergency medical services, as Director for 

Medical Services at Lowe’s Motor Speedway in North Carolina, and Director for 

Medical Services for the Carolina Panthers games) gather and analyze health data 

for unusual trends at mass gatherings? If you do not do so, are you aware of anyone 

who does? How would you recommend this be done or done better? 
82 

Answer. A patient care report is generated for every patient encountered at each 

mass gathering venue covered. The reports are similar regardless of the type of 

mass gathering event. Reports are analyzed and specific data is entered into a secure database to track the number of patients encountered, types of injuries or illnesses, medical supplies used, and number of patients transported for further care. 

While this is a retrospective review of the activity and as such would not provide 

real-time information during an incident, our mass gathering venues are such that 

direct interoperable communications is maintained. Physicians and nurses staffing 

the Emergency Care Centers on-site would immediately be apprised of multiple patient encounters where similar signs or symptoms presented during a finite period 

of time. 

I am unaware of how other stadiums, arenas, or race tracks conduct their medical 

or public health activities. 

To improve our system, an electronic patient care reporting system that supports 

real-time downloading of patient information could expedite a system of epidemiologic surveillance. Perhaps the best scenario would be to activate Fusion Centers 

that include pubic health, hospitals, and emergency medical service staff so that intelligence-sharing of potential threats is enhanced. If a biological or chemical incident did indeed occur, this advanced knowledge would lessen the time for definitive 

diagnoses and treatment algorithms. 

Question 2. What types of mobile hospitals do you think would be of most use at 

disasters involving large numbers of people—whether they occur at mass gatherings, or otherwise? What are your recommendations in this regard? 

Answer. When Carolinas Medical Center received the Homeland Security Grant 

to design, construct, and deploy a mobile hospital, we set out to create a facility that 

is different from previous structures, specifically tents, which are often used as medical shelters at mass gathering events. Patients and healthcare workers alike should 

not have to endure the nuances of tents that leak, mildew, smell, and have size restrictions. The MED–1 design incorporates an esthetically-pleasing therapeutic environment such that one forgets that the infrastructure is a trailer shortly after entering. Just as important, the set-up time from site arrival until commencing patient 

care is approximately 20 minutes. Patients inflicted by a disaster should not have 

to wait hours or days for a medical shelter or structure to be erected. 

Using MED–1 mobile hospitals at mass gathering events would accomplish several objectives. 

1. The equipment would be used on a regular basis keeping it operational and 

functional (important for medical devices). 

2. Staff would be afforded the training opportunity to refresh their knowledge 

and skills on the set-up, equipment, patient care, and movement processes associated with a mobile facility. Thus, retention and recall, along with core competencies are maximized when a disaster does occur. 

3. The mobile hospital would continue to store current medical supplies and 

pharmaceuticals so that when an unexpected incident occurs, the unit is always 

in a state of readiness to respond. 

Question 3. You have deployed the MED–1 mobile hospital three times following 

natural disasters. Do you feel that the MED–1 unit could be used for mass gathering events and if so, should more of these units be available for use or deployment 

across the country? 

Answer. Absolutely. A MED–1 unit could be deployed to any mass gathering 

venue to provide routine medical care before, during, and after the event. Should 

a disaster occur, the asset is deployed and staffed, ready to begin triage and treatment of patients, and would serve to immediately augment the local healthcare delivery system to prevent excessive hospital surge and to preserve resources for more 

critical patients. 

Question 4. We understand that MED–1 has been deployed in support of Hurricane Katrina to the State of Mississippi, and that the hospital is currently deployed 

to Indiana to help provide emergency medical services after the floods. How have 

your experiences responding to disasters with this mobile hospital helped you provide support at mass gatherings, and vice versa? 

Answer. The three MED–1 deployments have provided valuable feedback and information to improve our system of response and care delivery. Following each deployment, After-Action Reports and debriefing sessions serve to identify gaps in our 

system and targeted areas for improvement. The third design version of the MED– 

1 unit is currently under construction and incorporates each of the identified improvements in infrastructure that were noted from these deployments. All design 

modifications serve to address patients in any mass casualty incident regardless of 

a mass gathering or natural disaster. 
83 

Question 5. What sorts of detectors for weapons of mass destruction and agents 

of terrorism do you believe are necessary to be used at mass gatherings for which 

the U.S. Secret Service, the FBI, and/or other Federal agencies do not bring in their 

own detectors? 

Answer. 

Chemical 

Current and periodic training for staff in recognizing clinical signs and symptoms 

of chemical nerve agents, vesicants, pulmonary agents, blood agents, and riot-control 

agents would be the best preparation for recognizing a chemical agent release. 

Biological 

The Biowatch air samplers would likely assist in determining what particular 

agent was released if multiple patients presented simultaneously. Again, the key for 

any biological event will be the syndromic surveillance and advanced intelligence activities. The SMART Tickets (Litmus paper) for biological detection have high false 

positive rates and would not be useful unless they show a negative reaction. 

Radiological 

While the thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) film badge and dosimeters records 

the quantity of radiation to which one is exposed, a Geiger-Muller tubes would be 

useful for surveying a scene to determine if it is safe to enter. 

Question 6. What issues do you have with hand-held detectors for weapons of 

mass destruction and agents of terrorism—especially those being used by emergency 

medical services and other first responders in the mass gathering context? 

Answer. As outlined above, the actual detectors that are available today are not 

particularly practical for first responder use, if biological detectors are setup in advance of an event and can provide direct, real-time information at the time of an 

agent release, this assists in planning for those mass casualties that would likely 

present days to weeks later. Public information would be important under such a 

scenario. Chemical agent detectors are very time-consuming to use and do not measure all of the specific chemicals that could be used. The radiological detectors are 

easy to use and easily deployable. 

Question 7. What challenges have you faced in deploying your mobile hospital? 

Answer. The main challenges we have faced are two-fold: (1) Sustainment funding 

to ensure readiness and (2) rapid deployment when the need arises. 

Sustainment 

Simply having a MED–1 mobile hospital does not translate to a unit being capable of responding. Supplies, pharmaceuticals, clinical engineering and preventative 

maintenance, generator maintenance, tractor and trailer maintenance, etc. are all 

required to keep the resource active. Maintenance staff, administrative oversight, 

and training are all cost-generating areas. 

Deployment 

When disasters strike and patients are suffering, all means and processes for 

medical assets to respond must be simplified and streamlined. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) agreement is in place to afford such processes; however, inordinate time periods plague this system. The three deployments 

have all been associated with contract negotiations between States, resulting in prolonged delays in our response. 

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE JAMES R. LANGEVIN OF RHODE ISLAND FOR DR. THOMAS H. BLACKWELL, MD, MEDICAL DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR PREHOSPITAL MEDICINE, 

CAROLINAS MEDICAL CENTER, CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA

Question. Your job is to provide prehospital medicine, and it is clear that you are 

expert at doing so in a variety of environments. As the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, I am 

particularly interested in emerging biological threats. Can you talk about how you 

would treat patients that have been attacked with a biological agent, such as 

weaponized anthrax, at a mass gathering occurring at either of the stadiums for 

which you serve as medical director? Do you feel that you have the right assets at 

your disposal to be able to adequately treat numerous patients—especially if you 

were told that there would be no evacuation, and that people would have to shelter 

in place? What would you need to deliver the adequate prehospital care in this context? 

Answer. A specific pharmaceutical cache is required to provide the antibiotics or 

other countermeasures indicated for the specific biologic attack. Most large cities en-
84 

gaged in Federal preparedness programs have prepackaged pharmaceuticals in strategic locations. These can be mobilized quickly and efficiently if the training component has been satisfied. If anthrax were disseminated, stockpiles of antibiotics 

(doxycycline or ciprofloxicin) would be required for initial treatment of exposed patients. If chemical nerve agents were released, the nerve agent antidotes (atropine 

and 2-pralidoxime chloride) would be required. Each of the pharmaceutical resources are stockpiled at our hospital facility. 

The stockpiles of these agents are not sufficient to treat a population that would 

be present at our larger mass gathering events, e.g. Lowes Motor Speedway or Bank 

of America Stadium. A mechanism of triage would be required to identify those individuals who have the highest likelihood of survival and to provide comfort care to 

those noted to be moribund. To achieve the numbers of pharmaceuticals required, 

the Strategic National Stockpile of pharmaceuticals would need to be requested. The 

issue now becomes one of time. The request procedures, approval processes, mobilization, transportation, delivery, inventory, and distribution all are time-prohibitive 

to be completely effective unless the stockpile were within a few hours of the event. 

In such instances where prolonged times were inherent, there would need to be a 

facility for the sheltering in place that supports emergency medical care. The MED– 

1 mobile hospital provides such a platform. In the basic form, there are 14 beds capable of providing acute care. Expanding the awning system that extends from 

MED–1 unit to a full-scale general medical-surgical hospital will support up to 250 

beds. Having this capability prevents surge capacity and keeps isolated/quarantine 

patients off-site while providing the acute and ambulatory and surgical care required during such conditions. 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON OF MISSISSIPPI FOR SERGEANT

SCOTT MCCARTNEY, PROGRAM MANAGER/EXERCISE PLANNER, LARGE STADIUM INI- TIATIVE, GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY, SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA, AND SERGEANT, SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT

Question 1. What lessons have you learned as part of your work with large stadiums in California that could be applied to securing mass gatherings nationally? 

Answer. Response was not provided at the time of publication. 

Question 2. How are you utilizing information from the State Fusion Center to 

support your activities with the Large Stadium Initiative in California? 

Answer. Response was not provided at the time of publication. 

Question 3. What partnerships have you seen (via the Large Stadium Initiative 

and other activities) that you think should be utilized at all venues? 

Answer. Response was not provided at the time of publication. 

Question 4. How have you seen information shared with trusted non-Federal and 

even non-governmental (private sector)? 

Answer. Response was not provided at the time of publication. 

Question 5. How have you seen State assets stretched to support mass gatherings? 

If so, how? 

Answer. Response was not provided at the time of publication. 

Question 6. Would you speak to the impact of handling numerous events—including mass gatherings—in a State simultaneously? 

Answer. Response was not provided at the time of publication. 

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE JAMES R. LANGEVIN OF RHODE ISLAND FOR SERGEANT

SCOTT MCCARTNEY, PROGRAM MANAGER/EXERCISE PLANNER, LARGE STADIUM INITIATIVE, GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY, SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA, 

AND SERGEANT, SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT

Question. You’ve done a great deal of work with large stadiums in California. To 

what extent have you addressed the biological threat to such venues? Have you exercised any biological scenarios? If you have not addressed this threat, can you talk 

about how you would? 

Answer. Response was not provided at the time of publication. 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON OF MISSISSIPPI FOR DOUGLAS

REYNOLDS, DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, MALL OF AMERICA, BLOOMINGTON, MINNESOTA

Question 1. How are you utilizing information from the State Fusion Center to 

support your activities at the Mall of America in Minnesota? 

Answer. Unfortunately there is no State Fusion Center in Minnesota. If the action 

directly pertains to Mall of America (such as a mall shooting) then the Minnesota 

Joint Analysis Center (MN JAC) contacts me directly. If the information is not determined to impact me directly then it is filtered through the Bloomington Police 
85 

Department. The filtered information may be trends in terrorism that the sender 

does not see as being relevant to MOA. However, we use these trends to develop 

a list of possible methodologies and create associated suspicious indicators. It is difficult to generate suspicious indicators for our Risk Assessment and Mitigation 

(RAM) Team without adequate intelligence. Our RAM Team, which utilizes behavior 

profiling and other techniques to detect potential terrorist incidents, was the number one source of actionable intelligence in Minnesota for 2007. Due to changes in 

the past year, we can no longer submit information directly to the MN JAC. All of 

our reports now go through local law enforcement which delays or stops the report 

from reaching the necessary recipients. A cleaner line of communication (directly to 

the Minnesota JAC) would help Mall of America and the United States greatly. 

Question 2. What partnerships have you seen (via the activities you participate 

in) that you think should be utilized at all venues? 

Answer. We have many strong partnerships, most of which could be utilized by 

other mass gathering venues. These partnerships include local/Bloomington Police, 

Federal Air Marshalls, Airport Police, various Metro Area Police Departments, local 

County Sheriff (mostly for intelligence), 55th Civil Support Team, numerous K–9 

units (Federal Protective Service, A.T.F., and the FBI (for peroxides to train our inhouse K–9 teams), Minnesota ARNG (Military Intelligence, Joint Operations Center, 

etc.), Metropolitan Emergency Manager’s Association, Bloomington Fire Department, HSAS, Imulik Juchtam with International Consultants on Targeted Security 

(ICTS) for behavior profile training, and the International Association of Bomb 

Technician’s and Investigators. 

Question 3. How have you seen information shared with trusted non-Federal and 

even non-governmental (private sector)? 

Answer. We are an active member of the Joint Terrorism Task Force (I am on 

the Executive Board), Tripwire (HSAS), the Security Management Daily publication 

(ASIS), ICEFISHX (MN JAC) which shares Law Enforcement Sensitive Information 

through local law enforcement. Information from private-to-private entity is created 

by developing strong relationships before the incident occurs. In emergency management it is well known that a crisis is no time to exchange business cards. Develop 

the contacts before the need whenever possible. There is a tool that is used by the 

Federal Air Marshall’s called the Tactical Information Sharing System (TISS). This 

allows for a searchable platform to determine if others in your area/industry are seeing the same trends as you are. It is used to validate, or mitigate concerns and show 

patterns. It can provide invaluable intelligence for both the end users and those 

echelons above that are developing national or global trends. Those that enter and 

retrieve data would be credentialed into the program. The private sector could benefit from a process similar to TISS and the cost would be minimal. 

Question 4. Do you think that Federal, State, territorial, tribal, and local governmental support to private sector entities that host mass gatherings can be improved? If so, how? 

Answer. Yes. It took Mall of America Security 7 years (2008) to gain access to 

classified information. Prior to that we had to hope for someone to forward information to us, but that was sporadic and spotty. For example, MN JAC would share 

information with Bloomington PD who in turn might share it with Mall of America. 

The private sector needs direct access to searchable intelligence. AII money should 

be controlled by the private sector that it is designed to protect instead of at the 

determination of law enforcement, for example: 

• Money for the private sector could help cover over time and temporary security 

positions needed during heightened alert levels. Currently the money is given 

to law enforcement and they determine when they need to provide overtime coverage. The person in charge of the venue should be making that determination. 

• Federal intelligence programs should have open seats for the private sector to 

be represented. 

• Federal training should be open to credentialed critical private sector groups. 

The private sector can pay for their own lodging and travel expenses. This 

would be utilizing seats that often go unfilled at government conducted training. This provides common language, an understanding of acceptable standards, 

and forms critical relationships prior to an incident. 

• Federal grants could be used for equipment such as CBRN (monitoring & response), rescue equipment, K–9’s, CCTV and digital recording. These are all assets that protect the public and may aid in the recovery of evidence or the prosecution of those with harmful intentions. 

Question 5. What could the Department of Homeland Security do better to help 

secure the public from terrorist attacks in facilities such as yours? 

Answer. Information sharing is the key to our success. 
86 

• We would like access to verify ID’s (for nationals and non-nationals) and to 

verify that license plates are associated with the correct vehicle and not stolen. • Access to a TISS-type system for same or similar incidents; a searchable database of suspicious or terrorist activity. • Access to International Alien Query (IAQ) information. IAQ is currently available to law enforcement only. The IAQ is used to check an international traveler’s status in the United States and determine if they are properly registered 

to be in the United States. • Ability to share ideas that are effective such as our RAM program. MOA has 

created several programs that we are quite proud of. I would like to share these 

programs with others in the industry and walk them through the hurdles we 

had to overcome. 

• Assign Reconnaissance & Surveillance (R&S) Teams (aka: Intelligence and Information Teams) during major events to assist with identifying suspects; and 

be alert for pre-event; surveillance and rehearsal. 

• Training and intelligence sharing. 

• Mall of America will train other private entities or groups to be familiar with 

our RAM program. The training would be free or minimal—I would simply ask 

for them to pay for their travel, lodging, and meals. 

Question 6. Minneapolis/St. Paul is hosting the Republican National Convention 

this September, with a mass influx of people coming into the Twin Cities for over 

a week. How is the Mall of America preparing from a security standpoint, and how 

can the Federal Government be of assistance? 

Answer. I know this event has already occurred. I apologize again for my late response and will send the answer I had written prior to the RNC. 

There are a number of areas that the Federal Government could be of assistance 

including: 

• CCTV—Mall of America has a very developed camera system. We could use additional people to assist with monitoring these cameras during peak RNC times. 

Although we will always have at least two people assigned, it is difficult to actively monitor hundreds of cameras with a small group of people. If more people 

are assigned to our CCTV area it can turn from mostly reactive to a more 

proactive approach. 

• Access to police operation’s and communication centers for real time information 

and answers about our assets. This will allow a better understanding of how 

we can assist law enforcement. We have our own K–9 department, limited 

chemical monitoring unit, and more. These assets may not be properly utilized 

if the responding officers don’t know they exist. This is more likely as law enforcement officers from throughout Minnesota are drawn together. 

• Detection (radiological) equipment provided by the Department of Energy. This 

was provided the day before the RNC and provided another tool to use should 

a threat arise. 

• Access to Federal training programs. 

• Assigning R&S personnel to Mall of America—we would supply an office and 

communication center they could use as their base of operations. 

• K-9 teams—we could use an additional four teams on site. 

• Funding for MOA Security staff overtime. 

• MOA owned chemical agent detector. 

• Training with FBI, Bloomington Police Department and the ATF. We conducted 

many training exercises that ranged from reactions to protestors to WMD incidents. We were treated as equals by those we trained with and the level of respect appreciated. 

Ways that we prepared for the Republican National Convention included: 

• Restricted time-off for security staff. 

• Purchased chemical detection equipment and trained staff for proper use. 

• Conducted regular protest awareness briefs. 

• Held regular protest intelligence meetings. 

• Conducted in-house training to deal with the most likely scenarios that might 

occur during the RNC. 

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE JAMES R. LANGEVIN OF RHODE ISLAND FOR DOUGLAS

REYNOLDS, DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, MALL OF AMERICA, BLOOMINGTON, MINNESOTA

Question. As as director of security at the Mall of America, you must be aware 

that there are numerous planning scenarios in which a biological agent such as 

Yersinia pestis—plague, is released at a popular mall. Please describe the steps you 

have taken to protect the Mall of America from biological threats such as this one? 

Answer. There are a number of actions we have taken: 
87 

• There is restricted access to our ventilation systems including required security 

escorts to those areas that house our primary ventilation systems. 

• We have a strong partnership with the 55th CST and done have done many 

studies and much training with them as well as the local fire and law enforcement agencies for WMD incidents. 

• Our RAM offers routinely train on rehearsal, surveillance, and execution techniques associated with this threat. 

• CCTV and door alarms are monitored 24/7—including primary ventilation access areas. 

• We rely on intelligence and information-sharing—biological threats are generally slow to develop and recognize. 

• In rapid incidents (i.e. Anthrax) we rely on recognizing an incident, isolating 

the area, and alerting the Bloomington Police Department as well as the State 

Duty Officer. 

• We have stopped chasing the means, and look at intent instead—this is a specialty area of our RAM officers. Too often the U.S. counter-measures focus solely 

on the means (look for the weapon). The weapon can change and be almost anything; I hope that lesson was learned on 09/11/01 by most Americans. Although 

the means may change, it is hard to conceal intent. That is why we focus on 

intent. This is not to say we ignore means, it is just not viewed as the sole indicator. 

• We utilize intelligence to track trends and techniques. 

• For biological threats we rely heavily on other circles or aspects of a broader 

security plan to not let the suspect get this far. 

Again, I thank you for this great honor and to be associated with your efforts to 

enhance the security of this great Nation. 

Æ