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i 

53–397 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–91] 

THE U.S. SECURITY RELATIONSHIP 

WITH RUSSIA AND ITS IMPACT ON 

TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 30, 2009 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

MARK LEWIS, Professional Staff Member 

ROGER ZAKHEIM, Professional Staff Member 

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, July 30, 2009, The U.S. Security Relationship with Russia and 

Its Impact on Transatlantic Security ................................................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, July 30, 2009 .......................................................................................... 41 

THURSDAY, JULY 30, 2009 

THE U.S. SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA AND ITS IMPACT 

ON TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Ranking 

Member, Committee on Armed Services ............................................................ 2 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Gordon, Hon. Philip H., Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of European 

and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State .............................................. 9 

Vershbow, Hon. Alexander, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 

Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense ................................................... 4 

Winnefeld, Vice Adm. James A., Jr., USN, Director for Strategic Plans and 

Policy, Joint Chiefs of Staff ................................................................................. 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Gordon, Hon. Philip H. .................................................................................... 63 

Vershbow, Hon. Alexander .............................................................................. 45 

Winnefeld, Vice Adm. James A., Jr. ............................................................... 56 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 75 

(1) 

THE U.S. SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA AND 

ITS IMPACT ON TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC, Thursday, July 30, 2009. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in room 

HVC–210, Capitol Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the 

committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. This is the first hearing we are 

having in these temporary quarters. And when our quarters back 

in the Rayburn Building get completed, they are going to look very 

much like this. And I hope you enjoy the trappings that we have. 

We welcome you to this hearing on ‘‘The U.S. Security Relationship with Russia and Its Impact on Transatlantic Security.’’ 

Appearing before us today, the Honorable Alexander Vershbow, 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security, U.S. Department of Defense; our friend, Admiral James Winnefeld, United 

States Navy, Director of Strategic Plans and Policy of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff—good to see you again, sir; the Honorable Philip 

Gordon, Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Department of State. 

Even though we are learning the scope of today’s hearing on Russia to security issues, it still presents us with a range of topics as 

broad as that country is wide. Once the heart of a superpower, and 

today a power still to be reckoned with, Russia plays a major role 

in multiple, overlapping issues that have impact throughout the 

globe. 

Still, as big as it is, physically and metaphorically, it has been 

a while since Russia has dominated our thinking in regard to security issues. We have had an ongoing dialogue over matters of nonproliferation with them, of course. And I am pleased that President 

Obama has undertaken the ambitious effort to strengthen and expand our nonproliferation cooperation with Russia. It is clear that 

progress is already being made in that arena. 

In many matters, our two sets of national interests are intertwined. Both nations are concerned about extremist terrorism. 

Both nations are concerned about the proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction. Both nations are concerned about energy security. 
2 

There are many such areas that are ripe for our cooperation. The 

U.S.-Russia relationship remains important, and I am glad that 

President Obama has reinvigorated it. 

In the last few years, Iraq and Afghanistan have been center 

stage, and we have grown accustomed to thinking of our security 

challenge—as well as our North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) allies—through that lens. But we need to look no further 

than the Georgia crisis of last summer to remind us that Russia 

also represents a significant challenge in our security landscape. 

It is clear that Russia would like to define a sphere of influence 

in what it calls its ‘‘near abroad.’’ And it is equally clear that it has 

made some of our NATO allies and other European friends quite 

nervous. 

So, while NATO is performing an independent role in Afghanistan, we must not forget that it is first and foremost a regional security arrangement, and many of our allies count on it—and, therefore, us—as the guarantor of European stability. 

In regards to arms control and nuclear security, President 

Obama has established an ambitious agenda that he has described 

eloquently in his April speech in the Czech Republic. I am glad to 

see the Administration is working hard with its Russian counterparts to complete a modest follow-on to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) that expires in December. 

Even if a new treaty cannot be ratified by the December deadline, START should not be allowed to expire, because the data exchanges and other verification provisions in that treaty contribute 

significantly to strategic stability and is in our national interest. 

Yet these initiatives in other areas of mutual cooperation could 

be stunted by disagreements over issues such as non-strategic nuclear weapons, and especially missile defenses. The Administration’s ongoing review of missile defense requirements and how that 

fits in the larger framework of U.S. national security interests and 

striking that appropriate balance in U.S.-Russia and U.S.-NATO 

relations is a necessary though difficult task. 

And with luck, the Administration can find ways to work with 

Russia on some of these and more difficult topics. But in the end, 

the United States must balance its desire to reset the relationship 

with Russia with a clear calculation of our own national interests 

and the risks and threats that we and our allies do face. 

We must be careful to define these interests in the context of our 

overall national security strategy. At the end of today’s hearing, it 

will be clear that Russia remains a critical influence on that strategy. 

Now, let us turn to my friend, my colleague from California, the 

ranking member, Mr. McKeon. 

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank you for agreeing to hold a hearing on this subject 

regarding the relationship with Russia and its relation on impact— 

its impact on transatlantic security. 
3 

Your testimony this morning gives our members an opportunity 

to understand the Administration’s Russia reset policy and better 

appreciate the ongoing and evolving security challenges in Europe 

and Eurasia. 

This committee last met in March to discuss Russia and NATO 

when we received testimony from General John Craddock, who 

was, until recently, Commander of European Command and Supreme Allied Commander. His testimony was insightful and came 

with much appreciated candor. General Craddock said that, after 

the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 

there were no borders under threat of invasion in Europe and Eurasia. 

General Craddock continued, stating he thought that assumption 

has been proven false. General Craddock assessed that Russia’s intent may be to weaken European solidarity and systemically reduce 

U.S. influence. 

As a result, since the Georgia conflict in August of 2008, European Command (EUCOM) has called for a re-evaluation of the strategic environment, which includes EUCOM’s deliberative planning, 

a strategy for Russia and an evaluation of U.S. force presence in 

Europe. 

That was the view of our top military commander back in March. 

Since that time, the Administration’s Russia reset policy has taken 

shape. 

While I want to make clear that I support engagement with Russia, I am concerned that a grand bargain with Russia may risk the 

viability of the security architecture that has kept the European 

continent peaceful for nearly 60 years. Russian misdeeds and 

provocations in the recent past, as well as their planned European 

security treaty, suggest that the Kremlin seeks to weaken NATO, 

marginalize U.S. influence in Europe and gain a veto over European security affairs. 

This is why I support a NATO-first policy, which would make 

clear to our NATO allies that U.S. bilateral engagement with Russia will not foster collective insecurity among our allies. 

I commend the Chairman for including in the National Defense 

Authorization Act (NDAA) many of the provisions from the bipartisan NATO First bill sponsored by Mr. Turner and Mr. Marshall, 

which takes legislative steps to strengthen transatlantic security. 

These provisions, to name a few, cover the START Treaty, longrange missile defense in Europe, and U.S. force presence in Europe. 

Vice President Biden’s visit to Ukraine and Georgia last week 

was a step in the right direction. And his assessment that Russia 

used a pretext to invade Georgia demonstrated that the reset policy 

should not sugar-coat Russian behavior. Yet striking the balance of 

renewed engagement with Russia and supporting Central and 

Eastern European allies and partners is proving to be a challenge. 

In a July 15th open letter to President Obama, written by 22 

prominent Central and Eastern European figures, expressed deep 

concern among America’s Central and Eastern European allies over 

the implications of improved relations between Russia and the U.S. 

on their security and the transatlantic relationship. 

Following Vice President Biden’s visit, Russia’s envoy to NATO 

said that Russia considered the question of rearming Georgia more 
4 

serious than whether Georgia enters NATO. Secretary Clinton 

quickly affirmed that the Obama Administration considered Russia 

a great power, and remains committed to reset bilateral relations. 

It is precisely this balancing act that played out in the headlines 

this week that I would like our witnesses to discuss today. How do 

we ensure that our bilateral agreements with Russia do not compromise our commitment to transatlantic security? 

This leads me to a number of specific concerns. What kind of 

military-to-military relationship do we expect to have with Georgia 

and Ukraine? And will EUCOM continue its deliberative planning? 

With respect to European missile defense, I would like to understand how the reset policy has affected NATO’s support of European missile defense, in particular, the impact that it has had on 

Poland and the Czech Republic, as well as the Administration’s 

missile defense review. 

With respect to the START Treaty that many of us in the House 

have concerns about: how START may impact the nuclear triad, 

considering the announced reductions in strategic delivery vehicles 

to between 500 and 1,100; the Administration’s Nuclear Posture 

Review, which frames the military’s nuclear requirements; advanced conventional capabilities and space capabilities; enhancing 

the reliability, safety and security of our strategic nuclear forces 

and the needed modernization of our aging nuclear weapons complex; and finally, the large number of Russian tactical nuclear 

weapons deployed near Europe. 

In addition to hearing your views on these specific concerns, I am 

interested in the Administration’s views on the provisions in the 

House-passed NDAA that address these issues. 

Finally, I hope your testimony today will cover the recommendations of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of 

the United States. In particular, I am interested whether the Administration will adopt two of the commission’s unanimous findings 

and recommendations: number one, that the United States must 

retain nuclear weapons until such time as the international environment may permit their elimination globally; and two, the 

United States must also continue to concern itself with issues of 

deterrence, assurance and stability in the nuclear relationship with 

Russia. 

As you can see, there is a lot to cover today, and I look forward 

to your testimony and hope that the discussion we have today will 

give this Congress and the American people a better understanding 

of the U.S.-Russia security relationship. 

Thank you very much. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman from California. 

We will begin with Mr. Alexander Vershbow. 

The Honorable Vershbow, please. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ALEXANDER VERSHBOW, ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 

AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Secretary VERSHBOW. Thank you, Chairman Skelton, Ranking 

Member McKeon, and other members of the committee. 
5 

I very much welcome this opportunity to appear before you today 

to discuss the U.S. relationship with Russia and its implications for 

transatlantic and U.S. security. 

Russia has been a lifelong interest for me since I began studying 

the Russian language in high school in the 1960s. As a Foreign 

Service officer at what was then the Soviet desk in the 1980s, as 

U.S. ambassador to Russia from 2001 to 2005, and now as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, I have 

learned that getting U.S.-Russian relations right is one of our highest priorities and one of our biggest challenges. 

So, it is especially meaningful to report that recent developments 

in U.S.-Russian relations—and, most importantly, the Moscow 

summit that took place earlier this month—have created new opportunities for cooperation with Russia to enhance U.S. and European security. 

We are now trying to build on this positive momentum to collaborate with Moscow in areas where our national interests coincide 

such as nonproliferation, arms control and bringing security and 

stability to Afghanistan. 

Although we have pressed the reset button, this does not mean 

we will shy away from dealing with Russia on areas where we disagree such as Georgia or NATO enlargement. And we will in no 

way, reduce or compromise our commitment to the security of our 

NATO allies and also our allies in Asia and other parts of the 

world. 

The challenge is to find a way not only to work cooperatively 

with Russia in areas where our interests coincide but also to continue to engage in the other more contentious areas without artificial linkages. It is on this basis that we seek to establish a more 

solid basis for a sustained engagement with Russia. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a few comments on major 

areas of common interest where we did make some progress at the 

summit and where we believe Russia can work with us as a contributor to our mutual security. I will also touch on a couple of 

issues where we still have important differences. 

I have a longer statement that I would like to submit for the 

record. So I will keep my opening remarks brief. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

Secretary VERSHBOW. Thank you, sir. 

The summit in Moscow was far more productive than we had expected. The mood was positive and the discussions were highly substantive, opening the way to some concrete agreements and understandings on a range of subjects. 

Topping the list was Afghanistan, President Obama’s highest priority. The Russians I think recognize that they, too, have a stake 

in defeating the Taliban and establishing a stable, democratic Afghanistan. 

The most important deliverable was the signature of an agreement permitting the transit of troops and lethal material through 

Russian air space, up to 4,500 military flights and unlimited commercial flights each year which will diversify supply routes and significantly reduce transit times and fuel costs. We also are encouraged by Russian interest in expanding their involvement in other 

areas such as training the Afghan police. 
6 

Arms control was another area of progress. One of President 

Obama’s primary goals was to reach a framework agreement for a 

new START Follow-on Treaty and under the joint understanding 

signed in Moscow, strategic delivery vehicles will be reduced to a 

range of 500 to 1,100 and their associated warheads to between 

1,500 and 1,675. My colleagues, I think will say more about 

START. 

Another major summit goal was to strengthen our cooperation 

with Russia on preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 

And in this regard, Presidents Obama and Medvedev had lengthy 

discussions on how to deal with the immediate challenges posed by 

Iran and North Korea. They spent a lot of time on Iran in particular. And they agreed as well to broaden our bilateral cooperation to increase security of nuclear materials and facilities worldwide. 

I think, taken together, the initiatives of the summit—on nuclear 

issues, the START follow-on and understandings on nuclear security—were an important step toward President Obama’s goal of a 

world without nuclear weapons, and will strengthen U.S. and Russian leadership as we prepare for next year’s review conference for 

the nonproliferation treaty. 

Now, on missile defense, although it remains a very contentious 

issue, we were able to reach agreement on a joint statement, which 

includes a joint ballistic missile threat assessment, that will be focused primarily on Iran and North Korea. We have had a U.S. 

team in Moscow this week to begin the process. We also pledged 

to redouble efforts to open the long-planned Joint Data Exchange 

Center in Moscow. 

We hope these modest steps will serve as the basis for more substantial cooperation, both bilaterally and in the NATO-Russia 

Framework, aimed at defending our nations against ballistic missile threats. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) is, as you know, conducting— 

is taking a comprehensive look at plans for European missile defense as part of the wider ballistic missile defense review. The outcome on European missile defense will be determined by the threat 

from Iran, by the technical feasibility of different missile defense 

options and the cost. This is not a bargaining chip in our dealings 

with Moscow on Iran, or START, or on any other issue. 

There are a lot of other subjects where I think we made some 

progress in resetting relations, including NATO-Russia cooperation, 

military-to-military contacts and European security architecture. 

My colleagues will say more about those. They are covered in my 

prepared statement. 

As I mentioned at the outset, there are some important issues 

where we continue to disagree, and where the U.S. is not going to 

compromise its principles. These include NATO’s open door policy, 

upholding the sovereignty of countries in the post-Soviet space, 

Russia’s suspension of its compliance with the Conventional Armed 

Forces in Europe Treaty, and its backsliding on democracy and 

human rights issues. 

As we move forward, we and the Russians will need to discuss 

these issues in an honest but respectful way, and keep them from 

damaging cooperation in other areas as much as possible. 
7 

I think that of all these areas, relations with Russia’s neighbors 

may be the most difficult to manage. As the President said in Moscow, the United States rejects anachronistic, 19th century notions 

of spheres of influence or spheres of privileged interest. 

That is why Vice President Biden, during his visits to Georgia 

and Ukraine last week, reaffirmed U.S. support for both countries’ 

sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. In our view, 

good U.S. relations with Russia and cooperation with Russia’s 

neighbors—including in the defense and security field—should not 

be seen as mutually exclusive. 

Russia, on the other hand, continues to take a zero-sum approach, so we are going to have to continue to address these differences in a bilateral dialogue, in discussions in the Organization 

for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on strengthening 

European security architecture. And we will, of course, continue to 

give highest priority to NATO, which is still the bedrock of transatlantic security. And as we begin to review NATO’s new strategic 

concept, ensuring that there is no doubt about the firmness of Article 5 will be one of our highest priorities. 

So, Mr. Chairman and members, the signals from Moscow since 

the summit have thus far been largely positive. We hope that with 

a more formal institutional framework for the relationship in the 

form of the bilateral presidential commission, we will be able to 

move toward a more stable and substantive partnership. 

I will just conclude by saying that, if we can maintain the momentum, historians may view the Moscow summit as a turning 

point in U.S.-Russia relations. But there is a lot of work to be done 

before we can say that. We are under no illusion that the reset will 

be easy. Nor do we believe that a strategic partnership will simply 

develop overnight, since our interests do not coincide in a lot of 

areas. 

But we do believe that improved relations between the U.S. and 

Russia, which had started on a downward trend long before the 

August 2008 events in Georgia, can help us meet many of the challenges that we face today. 

So, we are cautiously optimistic, as we diplomats say, that the 

agreements that arose from the summit will assist our efforts 

broadly, from reducing strategic weapons stockpiles to bringing 

peace to Afghanistan. 

So, thank you for the opportunity to share my thoughts today, 

and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Vershbow can be found in 

the Appendix on page 45.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

Admiral Winnefeld. 

STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN, DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY, JOINT CHIEFS 

OF STAFF 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Chairman Skelton, Mr. McKeon and members of the committee, it is good to be back. Thank you for inviting 

me to address the committee today. In support of my colleagues, I 

will focus my comments on the military aspects of our relationship 

with Russia. 
8 

It goes without saying that the nature of our relationship with 

Russia—on the military side and elsewhere—has changed dramatically over the course of the last year, with the invasion of Georgia 

clearly representing a setback. And at that point, as you are aware, 

we suspended all military-to-military activity with the Russians. 

And I would point out that that seminal event actually underscores the importance of having a strong military-to-military relationship with Russia, as with other nations in the world. Indeed, 

at several pivotal points during that particular conflict, the only 

constructive contact between our governments was the military-tomilitary channel. 

And when I accompanied Admiral Mullen to Helsinki in October 

of last year to meet with his General Staff counterpart, I observed 

firsthand how maintaining a strong military-to-military relationship can reduce tension and mitigate misunderstanding during a 

crisis. 

Moreover, it represented a small but important step in reinforcing our working relationship as a foundation for future 

progress. And we are making progress in resetting this vital relationship. 

We recognize that the path towards greater partnership and in 

cooperation will not always be smooth. However, by not allowing 

our relationship to fracture when our interests diverge, we will enable the benefits of cooperating where our strategic interests actually coincide. 

Positive relationships between our militaries are a foundation for 

good relationships between our governments and our countries. 

And we are working with the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 

General Staff to rebuild, and to try to improve, on the military-tomilitary programs we had before they were suspended. 

And, in fact, even since the beginning of this year, we have allowed the Harvard generals program to occur in February, after a 

difficult decision. We conducted two port visits to Vladivostok—one 

in June for Russia’s National Day, and one in July in support of 

our own Independence Day. 

We have seen limited but good cooperation on countering piracy 

off of Somalia, with limited Russian presence in that part of the 

world. And we reached, as you are well aware, an agreement on 

transit through Russia of non-lethal supplies bound for our troops 

in Afghanistan, even before the summit occurred. 

And as you are certainly aware, Admiral Mullen recently visited 

Moscow twice, once in late June for discussions with counterpart, 

Chief of the General Staff Makarov, and again in July in support 

of the presidential summit, where, in addition to various other 

agreements that were inked, they signed a new framework on military-to-military cooperation. 

This framework is our combined vision for changing the nature 

of our relationship, based on the principles of pragmatism, parity, 

reciprocity, balance and synchronization with NATO. It will set 

conditions that raise cooperation to a new level between our respective armed forces, although I would echo Ambassador Vershbow in 

saying that this will not happen overnight. 

Our interactions with Russian military officers will importantly 

improve their understanding of our society and lay the foundation 
9 

for future relationships such as that enjoyed by Admiral Mullen 

and General Makarov. 

These two men are also committed to leading the military-tomilitary working group of the Presidential Bilateral Commission to 

ensure that cooperative endeavors in the military realm remain on 

track and continue in the strategic direction that the President has 

mandated. 

We are currently in the midst of preparing a robust and meaningful proposal for how the military-to-military commission will 

function, how it will be constructed and what it will accomplish. 

Meanwhile, the 2009—and remember, we only have 6 months 

left—the work plan approved by Admiral Mullen and General 

Makarov encompasses nearly 20 meaningful and mutually beneficial exchanges and operational events. It is not as much as we 

would like for it to be in the future, but it is a good start for the 

remainder of this year. 

They include, among other interactions that I will be happy to 

list for you if you would like, joint staff talks which I will co-chair 

with my counterpart in Moscow, we hope in October. In addition, 

the U.S. European Command and the Russian Ministry of Defense 

are postured to create an even more ambitious work plan for the 

coming year. 

I would like to make an important caveat, though. Our improved 

military relations with Russia will not come at the expense of our 

already positive and cooperative military relations with our NATO 

partners and our other important partners. 

We do not believe it beneficial to engage in zero-sum gamesmanship in Eurasia or anywhere else, and we hope to convey that sentiment to our Russian colleagues to cooperative progress in areas 

of common strategic interest. We intend to continue our work with 

all parties to cultivate stability and enhance transparency throughout the region and indeed across the globe. 

In conclusion, we nearly always regret severing our military relationships with another country, as we did with Pakistan in the 

1980s. As such, we are getting back on a constructive footing with 

the Russian military without compromising our principles. 

As I rediscovered in January of last year while visiting the Baltic 

Fleet deputy commander aboard his flagship, Moskva, in Lisbon, 

relationships at the tactical level are almost always warm and productive. It is our mandate to ensure that the warmth and cooperation that we enjoy at the tactical level percolates up to the strategic 

level, and we have every intention of succeeding. 

Thank you again, sir, for the opportunity to be with the committee today. And I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Winnefeld can be found in 

the Appendix on page 56.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, thank you very much. 

Mr. Gordon. Secretary Gordon, please. 

STATEMENT OF HON. PHILIP H. GORDON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR THE BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN 

AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Secretary GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman 

McKeon and all the members of the committee. I would also like 
10 

to thank you for holding the hearing and giving us the opportunity 

to speak with you today about the Administration’s accomplishments at the Moscow summit and about our Russia policy more 

generally. 

I have also submitted my full testimony for the record, and here, 

if you will permit, would like to just make a few brief opening remarks. 

The CHAIRMAN. Any prepared remarks by the witnesses will be 

entered, without objection. 

Secretary GORDON. Thank you very much. 

My colleagues have already talked about a number of the military and security issues. So I would like to begin by putting the 

results of the summit in a somewhat wider context. 

The Obama Administration entered office seeking to put an end 

to a period of difficult and deteriorating relations with Russia. Last 

December, then-President-elect Obama talked about a reset in our 

relations with Russia. 

What he argued was that the United States and Russia have 

common interests in a number of areas. These include nuclear nonproliferation, Afghanistan, terrorism and many others. And he argued that it should be possible to cooperate practically in these 

areas, even as we disagreed on other issues. 

And I think it is fair to say that the results of the Moscow summit demonstrate that the President’s instincts on this were correct. 

Just six months since the President took office, and just three 

months since he and President Medvedev met in London and 

agreed to hold the summit in Moscow, the United States and Russia have gone far towards achieving a fresh start and reaching concrete accomplishments. 

At the summit, our leaders made progress in improving the tone 

of our relations and helping to build good will between our two 

countries. But perhaps even more importantly at the summit, we 

were able to translate this rhetoric about potential cooperation into 

concrete actions that are fundamental to the security and prosperity of both of our countries. 

This significant progress in our relations with Russia, let me 

stress, did not in any way come at the expense of our principles or 

our partnerships with good friends and allies. There are still many 

areas where the United States and Russia disagree. My colleagues 

have already mentioned Georgia and NATO enlargement among 

them. And we will continue to disagree about these and, no doubt, 

other issues. 

The President made this clear in Moscow. And he also did not 

shy away from raising—both privately and publicly—issues such as 

democracy, human rights and press freedoms. At the same time, in 

Moscow, we also demonstrated in real terms our shared desire to 

build a relationship based on common interests and mutual respect. 

As my colleagues have pointed out already, the United States 

and Russia took important steps to increase nuclear security and 

prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, beginning with the reduction of our own nuclear arsenals. The two Presidents signed a joint 

understanding for a follow-on agreement to START that commits 

both parties to a legally binding treaty that will reduce our nuclear 
11 

warheads and delivery systems by at least one-third over current 

treaty limitations. 

President Obama and his Russian counterparts spoke at great 

length on Iran. And the President underscored the importance we 

place on international efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. President Obama also emphasized the importance 

of Russia’s role in pressing Iran to comply with its nonproliferation 

obligations. 

In addition, the Presidents agreed to participate in a joint threat 

assessment of the ballistic missile challenges of the 21st century, 

including those posed by Iran and North Korea. An interagency 

team of experts is already heading out to Moscow this week to 

begin discussions of this joint threat assessment. 

In another related area, we made concrete commitments to deepen security cooperation, including by working together to defeat the 

violent extremists and to counter transnational threats, including 

those of piracy and narcotics trafficking. 

As my colleagues have pointed out, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff Mullen and his Russian counterpart have agreed on a work 

plan of resuming military-to-military contacts that were cut off 

after the war in Georgia. 

I think another very tangible result of the summit was Russia’s 

agreement to allow the United States to transport military personnel and equipment across Russia in support of the NATO-led 

International Security and Assistance Force and our other coalition 

forces in Afghanistan. This agreement will add flexibility and further diversify our crucial supply routes, resulting in potential savings of up to $133 million in fuel, maintenance and transportation 

costs. 

The significance of this contribution to our efforts to bring peace 

and stability in Afghanistan—which is also of strategic benefit to 

Russia—should not be understated. It is indeed an excellent example of how the two countries can cooperate in pursuit of common 

interests without any quid pro quos. 

We also agreed to strengthen cooperation in nonstrategic areas, 

including public health, and by restoring the work of the Joint 

Commission on Prisoners of War and Missing in Action. 

Finally, President Obama and President Medvedev recognized 

the need for a more structured foundation for advancing cooperation in key areas across our respective interagencies. The Bilateral 

Presidential Commission, to be chaired by the two Presidents and 

coordinated by Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov, will 

provide a mechanism for sustaining and expanding on the progress 

achieved in Moscow while also providing a forum in which we can 

work together to effectively narrow our differences. 

Notwithstanding all these positive developments, I want to stress 

we have no illusions that our reset of relations will be easy, or that 

we will not have continuing differences with Russia. We are, however, confident that the United States and Russia can still work together where our interests coincide, while at the same time seeking 

to narrow those differences in a mutually respectful way. 

In this regard, the President was unequivocal in his message 

that the reset in our bilateral relationship will not come at the expense of our friends and our allies. More than in words but in ac-
12 

tions, we have demonstrated our commitment to the territorial integrity and independence of Russia’s neighbors, including Ukraine 

and Georgia. President Obama made very clear in Moscow that we 

will continue to support their sovereignty and their right to choose 

their own security alliances, a message that was reinforced last 

week by the Vice President in his trip to both of those countries. 

To conclude, Mr. Chairman, at the Moscow summit the United 

States and Russia took significant steps forward in translating the 

reset in our relations into concrete achievements that benefit both 

our nations and our global partners. Without abandoning our principles or our friends, we demonstrated that the United States and 

Russia can work effectively together on a broad range of issues 

where our interests coincide. 

Thank you again for giving us the opportunity to address these 

issues, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Gordon can be found in the 

Appendix on page 63.] 

The CHAIRMAN. I think, Secretary Gordon, my questions should 

be addressed to you. 

Can you give a quick summary of the relationship between Russia and Iran? And I have follow-up questions on them. 

Please? 

Secretary GORDON. I think, in terms of the way we look at the 

need for cooperation with Russia and Iran, there are some positive 

elements and some less positive elements. 

I believe that Russia shares our interest in preventing Iran from 

acquiring a nuclear weapon. And they have taken some constructive steps along with us to achieve that goal. They have agreed to 

several U.N. Security Council resolutions making it illegal for Iran 

to enrich uranium, and imposing sanctions on Iran for doing so. 

And they have joined us in the so-called P5-plus-1 or E3-plus-3 

process, which is our main diplomatic mechanism for showing Iran 

a path to cooperation with the international community, if it agrees 

to provide reassurance it is not producing nuclear weapons, but 

also making clear to Iran that there would be consequences if it 

fails to do so. And I believe that Russia has constructively worked 

with us within that context. 

At the same time, let me be honest. We do not see Iran exactly 

the same way. And as I noted, the President raised this very clearly with his counterparts—and they probably discussed this more 

than any other issue in Moscow—because we believe that Russia 

has an important role to play. If Iran fails to respond to the offer 

that is currently on the table, we believe that pressure needs to be 

enhanced on Iran, and that requires Russian cooperation. 

Russians have been less convinced than we are that such pressure will need to be applied. And therefore, we continue to work 

with the Russians and make it very clear to them that we hope and 

expect them to work with us on the way forward, if Iran fails to 

respond. 

The CHAIRMAN. That leads me to the question: Will Russia support us should events come to pass in the United Nations Security 

Council to have strong economic sanctions against Iran, if further 

evidence emerges that Iran is developing nuclear weapons? 

Secretary GORDON. Well, we will certainly seek such cooperation. 
13 

For a number of years, a number of countries including—— 

The CHAIRMAN. That is not answering my question. 

Secretary GORDON. Well, I will get to that. 

What I was going to say is, we have been working for a number 

of years—for a number of years, countries including Russia have 

been asking us to be prepared to engage with Iran and make sure 

that Iran has an alternative to pressure and sanctions, to make 

sure that Iran has an alternative path if they do cooperate with the 

international community. 

We have now done that. The President has made clear we are 

prepared to support a civil nuclear energy program for Iran. And 

we are prepared to talk directly with Iran. And we are prepared 

to support the other members of the Security Council in offering 

Iran such a path forward. 

That is on the table. And we have responded to the requests by 

our allies in Europe and in Russia to offer Iran that opportunity. 

And we have said, and the President has made clear, that if Iran 

does not respond soon—certainly by the end of the year—we will 

then come back to our partners on the Security Council and say we 

have offered that path, and now it is time to increase the pressure. 

So, there is only one way to find out. We will take it back to the 

Security Council and seek Russian cooperation. 

Can I guarantee that they will give a positive answer? No. But 

that is what we are working to achieve. 

The CHAIRMAN. What arms transfer and what nuclear cooperation has passed from Russia to Iran in recent months and years? 

Secretary GORDON. In terms of nuclear cooperation, Russia has 

for years provided assistance to Iran in finishing the construction 

of the Bushehr nuclear reactor, which is not necessarily a contribution to their nuclear weapons program. And so long as the fuel 

cycle is controlled by Russia, that can be contained without undue 

proliferation concerns. 

Beyond that, I do not think that Russia is in any way involved 

in contributing to nuclear cooperation in ways that would lead to 

Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon. 

The great concern in Iran, indeed, is its own autonomous capabilities. Our great concern in Iran is that it develops itself the technology to master the full fuel cycle, which would give it the opportunity to so-called break out of its nuclear nonproliferation obligations and produce its own nuclear weapons. 

So, it is not so much a matter of Russia’s cooperation with Iran 

in the nuclear area; it is Iran’s development of autonomous technology that would give it a fuel cycle and a breakout capacity. And 

that is what we are working with Russia and others to try to prevent. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. McKeon. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for your testimony and for your service. 

As I mentioned in my opening statement, in March General 

Craddock assessed that Russia’s intent may be to weaken European solidarity and systematically reduce the U.S. influence. 

I would like to ask each of you if you share General Craddock’s 

assessment. 
14 

And then, does the Administration have any concerns regarding 

President Medvedev’s proposed European security treaty? And does 

the Administration support EUCOM’s efforts to conduct deliberative planning? 

Secretary GORDON. I am happy to start. I am sure my colleagues 

will want to weigh in. 

The short answer to the first question is, yes, there have certainly been signs that Russia has an interest, or pursues an interest, in dividing the Western alliance. I think we always have to be 

careful in talking about Russia in deciding which Russians we are 

talking about. I think I would not want to issue such a blanket 

statement that all Russians pursue this. I think there are others 

who do not. 

But, yes, for sure there have been signs of Russian efforts to divide the West and to prevent what they would see as undue American influence and hegemony. I think that is accurate. 

On the President Medvedev idea of a European security treaty, 

we have said that we are always open to discussions of European 

security and happy to have a dialogue with Russia and our other 

partners about how it can be strengthened. 

But we have also said that we believe there are already some 

pretty sound European security organizations, including, first and 

foremost, NATO, also including the OSCE. And those are the channels in which this discussion should take place. 

The NATO-Russia Council is an opportunity for us to speak with 

the Russians about European security. And the OSCE is a chance 

for all 56 of its participating states to have exactly the sort of discussion that the Russians have proposed. So, we have insisted that 

that discussion take place at the OSCE, as it did at the recent ministerial. 

And frankly, there was not a lot of support for a Russian idea 

of some sort of new treaty, because, as I say, not only do we think 

we already have some pretty good institutions, we already have 

some pretty good principles for European security including a nonuse of force and respect for territorial integrity, and the principle 

that countries can join the alliances of their choosing. 

So, we are open to dialogue, we are happy to hear Russian ideas, 

and we are happy to talk to them. But we think it should remain 

in established channels based on the principles that we have already agreed on. 

Mr. MCKEON. And finally, do you support EUCOM’s efforts to 

conduct deliberative planning? 

Secretary GORDON. Yes, that is a very important manifestation 

of our commitment to NATO’s Article 5. I am sure my colleagues 

will want to elaborate on this. But the short answer is, ‘‘yes.’’ 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you. 

Secretary VERSHBOW. Mr. McKeon, I certainly share my colleague’s assessment that the Russians continue to practice the kind 

of policies that General Craddock described in terms of seeking to 

create divisions between the U.S. and its allies, and to create anxieties on the parts of our allies, particularly the new members of 

NATO in Central Europe, regarding their security. 

But I think the Russians at the same time are also realistic. And 

if we are doing our jobs in terms of ensuring that our security 
15 

guarantees through NATO remain effective, and that we make 

clear that key initiatives such as missile defense are not going to 

be bargaining chips, I think that we can manage this and steer the 

Russians towards a more cooperative agenda. It is not going to be 

an easy challenge, but that is certainly our goal. 

I cannot add much to Phil Gordon’s comments on the Medvedev 

proposals. I think that we certainly see room for improving some 

of the mechanism’s effectiveness in preventing conflicts. 

What happened a year ago in Georgia, clearly, is something that 

we do not want to see repeated. And to the extent that we can improve the effectiveness of mechanisms like the NATO-Russia Council, the OSCE, in diffusing these kinds of situations before they escalate, I think everybody’s security would be enhanced. 

But we do not think that we need to scrap the institutions we 

have. And I think the Russians, after initial signals that their 

agenda was to eliminate NATO or to downgrade NATO’s role, have 

taken a more realistic approach, and have said as much, including 

in the Moscow summit, when they insisted that they were not trying to abolish NATO. 

We do definitely believe that not only EUCOM but NATO as a 

whole should be doing the prudent planning for the defense of all 

of its members. And I think this is something that President 

Obama attaches great significance to, as does Secretary Gates. And 

it will be something that we will be pursuing as we engage with 

our allies in the formulation of NATO’s new strategic concept, 

which we are hoping to complete by the end of next year when 

NATO has another summit in Lisbon. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Sir, for the first two questions, I think my 

other colleagues are better positioned to answer those than I am. 

But I would tend to concur that the Russian behavior over the long 

term has been transactional, balance of power, and that they will 

take whatever they can get. 

I think the important thing is that, we have seen from our allies 

and our friends in Europe that they have exercised considerable resolve, and they understand the nature of a Russian proposal to do 

what they have suggested. And I think that Russia has recognized 

the resolve that these nations have shown. 

And, in fact, I think there was a recent comment from one of 

them—one of the Russians—that, ‘‘Well, we don’t really want to 

change the hardware; we just want to change the software,’’ you 

know, sort of backing down off of that proposal just a little bit. 

So, I think I am not concerned about the commitment of our 

friends in Europe to maintaining the health of the current mechanisms that are there, while they are interested in listening to what 

the Russians have to say, as they should. 

On the last point, it goes without saying that any discussion of 

actual military planning is a sensitive topic that I would be cautious in an open hearing in discussing. 

But I would also add that we tend to be very supportive of our 

combatant commanders when they come in and suggest that they 

need to do some planning, and that Admiral Stavridis has only 

been in the seat, as it were, for several weeks. And we know that 

he is building his thought process and his opinions on what he 
16 

would like to do there. And we will listen very closely when he 

comes in with a formal proposal, should he have one. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, we have a lot of members, so I will do these other 

questions later or in writing. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. McKeon. 

Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield to Mr. Loebsack. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Well, thank you, Mr. Taylor. I really appreciate 

the opportunity to speak to our witnesses. 

And thanks to all of you for your service. In particular, I guess 

I—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman suspend just for a moment? 

The clock showed two lights for a vote. That is a Senate vote and 

not a House vote. The House is not wired for this room evidently, 

so we can ignore that. 

Mr. Loebsack, you can proceed. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you. 

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Chairman, can we ignore the Senate as well? 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Suddenly, we are all members of the Senate. 

The CHAIRMAN. Who said that? 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Larsen, we will take that under consideration. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. We might get bipartisan support for that proposal. 

If we could just spend a little time on Afghanistan, perhaps 

broaden it out to Pakistan as well, to the region. 

I think it was you, Mr. Gordon, who mentioned supply routes. 

Can you elaborate on that a little bit to begin with? 

Secretary GORDON. Sure. And as I noted, that was what I think 

is a very good example of the type of cooperation we can pursue 

in areas where we have common interests, even while we strongly 

disagree in other areas. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. First, can you tell us what those common interests are? How do our interests coincide in this? 

Secretary GORDON. I think both the United States and Russia 

have a very strong interest in a stable and peaceful Afghanistan. 

We have both, of course, fought wars and made sacrifices and lost 

lives and spent a lot of money in Afghanistan when it was unstable. 

And Russia, like the United States, has an interest in stemming 

Islamic extremism which, of course, emanated from Afghanistan 

and struck this country so tragically. 

So I do not think we have different interests in Afghanistan. 

Broadly at least, we both have interests in stabilizing that country. 

And that is precisely what we said to the Russians. ‘‘We may disagree in other areas, but we are working very hard with the rest 

of the international community to try to stabilize Afghanistan. You 

have an interest in that as well. It would help us if you allowed 

us to transit your country and diversify our supply routes.’’ 
17 

And the agreement that we reached allows the United States to 

undertake up to 4,500 flights, including military flights, across Afghanistan to get what we need to our troops there. And, as you 

know, that is such a difficult challenge, given Afghanistan’s location. 

And we were able to do that. The estimates are that doing so, 

depending on how many flights we end up flying, could save this 

country $133 million a year by having the shorter routes to fly. 

And that will directly and concretely benefit us. 

And as I said in my opening statement, there was not a quid pro 

quo. And that is just the sort of positive working together that we 

are seeking to achieve—not, they will allow us to fly across their 

territory, Afghanistan, if we do X or Y on Georgia or in NATO. No. 

We have a common interest and let us do it. 

So, it is a concrete agreement, and I think it directly benefits the 

United States. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. What about other countries in the region, Central 

Asian states, for example? What is Russia’s relationship with them 

and their allowing us over-flight rights as well? 

Secretary GORDON. There has been some sort of competition in 

terms of influence in those countries, at least through Russian 

eyes. They have been cautious about any American presence or involvement in what they see as their near abroad. And that has 

been a problem, because, again, we keep trying to stress that we 

should not see our relationship with Russia in zero-sum terms. 

Just to take a concrete example, if the United States is able to 

fly supply missions to Afghanistan from Kyrgyzstan, we would 

argue that Russia should have an interest in that. It helps our 

common goal of stabilizing Afghanistan. 

Russia has seen it somewhat differently, and is worried about 

any American presence in what they consider to be their backyard. 

But we are now to the point where the United States does have 

an agreement to use Kyrgyzstan territory to help supply in Afghanistan. We think that should not threaten Russia. And I think 

maybe the Russians have come around to that view. 

And that, again, is the example of the sort of thing we should 

be able to do without the other country seeing it in any way as a 

geopolitical threat. That is precisely the sort of thinking we are trying to get beyond, the notion that a gain for the United States is 

a setback for Russia, or vice versa. 

Being able to operate out of Kyrgyzstan is a gain for the United 

States. It should not be seen as a threat to Russia. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. And what about counterterrorism efforts, cooperation with respect to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Russian 

counterterrorism efforts and ours? 

Secretary GORDON. They are nowhere near playing the sort of 

role that we are and some of our NATO allies. But at the same 

time, they are not interfering in the role that we are trying to play. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Okay. 

Any others want to make any comments on that? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. I would simply add that we have a common 

interest with Russia in the drug piece coming out of Afghanistan. 

Both Iran, candidly, and Russia have tremendous markets for 

those drugs, and they flow freely across their borders. And it wor-
18 

ries Russia tremendously. And they would like—the cooperation 

there is good. 

Secretary VERSHBOW. I would just add, coming back to the supply routes issue, as you know, Congressman, there have been problems with some of the routes through Pakistan in recent months. 

So our goal has been to establish a network of multiple routes 

through Central Asia, through the Caucasus, through airfields in 

the Persian Gulf region, where we have close friends who provided 

us access, so that we are not dependent on any one route. 

So, the Russians have expressed understanding and said that 

transit is something that they can support. 

But as Mr. Gordon said, they are very touchy about the presence 

of U.S. forces on the territory of former Soviet republics. They keep 

saying that permanent bases are unacceptable, and we keep assuring them that we do not have any long-term designs to have permanent bases in the region. 

The Afghan campaign has gone on longer, perhaps, than we anticipated. But our aim is to support the war effort only as long as 

that is necessary. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thanks to all of you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

And thank you, Mr. Taylor. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here. 

Mr. Gordon, you indicated that you were excited to come and 

speak to us about some of the achievements that occurred in Moscow. And I am certain that you know that many have also some 

concerns about what is coming out of the discussions in Moscow, 

and I am looking forward to getting some of your additional 

thoughts. 

When we take a look at the Joint Understanding on a Strategic 

Arms Reduction Treaty that was signed, it included a provision 

that each nation would reduce their strategic delivery vehicles to 

a range of 500 to 1,100, from 1,600 in the 1991 START 1 Treaty, 

and the associated warheads to 1,500, to 1,675 from 1,700, to 2,220 

in the 2002 Moscow treaty. 

Obviously, the concern arises on what would be a drastic reduction in the level of delivery vehicles, if we were to go to a level of 

500. The bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic 

Posture of the United States, led by Drs. Perry and Schlesinger, believe that the triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems should be 

maintained, with our number somewhere around currently 1,200 of 

deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers. And reducing it to a level 

of 500 would certainly be a very drastic reduction. 

Secondly, the joint understanding also included a statement saying that a provision on the inter-relationship of strategic offensive 

and strategic defensive arms. Russian President Medvedev had 

suggested that progress on START could hinge on the U.S. giving 

up its European missile defense plans. It would appear that the 

Administration is considering such a concession by addressing defense arms in START. 
19 

And then thirdly, the issue of—according to March 2009 data 

from the National Nuclear Security Administration, Russia is estimated to possess 3,800 operational tactical nuclear weapons, while 

the U.S. possesses less than 500. The START joint understanding 

does not address Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons. 

So, the questions that follow arise out of the concerns of, you 

know, with such a drastic reduction that could be signaled in the 

joint understanding on delivery vehicles, what is the effect on our 

nuclear triad? And is that then at risk? 

And secondly, on the issue of our defensive arms, is the Administration including missile defense in the START negotiations? 

And then thirdly, since the joint understanding does not include 

Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons, does the Administration plan to 

address Russia’s overwhelming number of tactical nuclear weapons? 

Secretary GORDON. Thank you for raising all those important 

issues. Let me make a couple of comments, including, in particular, 

on the offense-defense and missile defense issue. And I hope my 

colleagues in the Pentagon will elaborate further on the warheads 

issues. 

Just broadly what I would say on the tactical nuclear weapons, 

no, the START follow-on agreement is the follow-on agreement to 

a treaty reducing offensive weapons. And that is what it is focused 

on, because we believe that both countries have an interest in reducing the numbers of their offensive nuclear weapons. So, it does 

not focus on tactical weapons. 

Again, I would say broadly, while deferring to my colleagues on 

some of the specifics of the triads or the numbers, but that the 

basic belief is that we can certainly maintain our deterrent adequately, even at the lower numbers in these ranges of 500 delivery 

vehicles and 1,500 warheads. 

On the issue of missile defense relationship to START, I want to 

be very clear. There is not a relationship between our thinking 

about missile defense in Europe and the START Treaty. There was 

not at the summit, and there will not be subsequently. 

On missile defense in Europe, the President has been quite clear 

all along that he believes there is a growing threat from ballistic 

missiles and nuclear weapons, particularly from Iran, and that if 

we can deploy missile defenses in Europe or elsewhere that will 

protect us and our allies from that threat, we should do so. 

When he came into office, he asked for a review of plans to do 

that, to make sure that we were going about it in the best way possible. And that review is currently under way. And what I want to 

stress is that that review is being driven by our perception of the 

threat, particularly from Iran, and by our assessment of the technology that would be used in achieving this goal. 

And the goal, again, is how do we best protect Americans and 

our European allies from the growing threat from ballistic missiles 

and nuclear weapons. It is not what do other countries think, including Russia, or what is the impact of this on START. 

And I also want to point out, because I think it is quite relevant, 

as you noted, sir, the Russians insisted all along that the price for 

these agreements in Moscow would be us abandoning the so-called 

‘‘third site’’ in Europe. And in particular, they did not want to have 
20 

even a statement about missile defense, unless we agreed beforehand to do that. 

We did not do so. We refused to do so. And it was not until the 

morning of the summit that they understood that we were serious 

about that, and went ahead with the joint statement on missile defense and the agreement to a joint threat assessment from Iran. 

And as I say, our people are already heading over there now, to try 

to share with them our analysis of the Iran situation and convince 

them of its seriousness. 

So, no, there is not a link between missile defense and START, 

or anything else. Missile defense decisions would be driven by what 

the threat is and how we think we can best protect Americans and 

Europeans. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Kissell. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just a few quick questions, Mr. Secretary and Mr. Vershbow. 

Who is in charge in Russia? And what is the relationship between the President and the Prime Minister? 

Secretary GORDON. If I could defer to our former ambassador to 

Moscow. I will make a comment, and then I am sure our former 

ambassador in Moscow will have a view. 

What I will not do is speculate on who is up and who is down. 

Russia has a president, President Medvedev. That is our President’s counterpart, and that is who he mainly met with at the summit. 

He spent more than four hours with President Medvedev and 

talked about the full range of issues. And he signed the agreements 

that he signed with President Medvedev. 

He also met with Prime Minister Putin, because Prime Minister 

Putin is the prime minister and a significant figure in Russia, and 

has significant influence. 

And we will not get engaged in really trying to figure out who 

does what. They have a constitution. They have a system. We deal 

with the President. We also acknowledge the importance of the 

Prime Minister. And we have reached agreements with Russia, and 

those are the ones that we intend to continue to pursue. 

Are there differences in emphasis? Yes, I think it is accurate to 

say that there are. Read their public statements, and I think you 

see some differences. 

But we can only deal with the government that is on the other 

side, and that is what we do. 

Secretary VERSHBOW. Well, Congressman, I cannot add much to 

that. It is clear that we are dealing with what the Russians themselves are calling a ‘‘tin democracy.’’ And I think President 

Medvedev has been a close ally of now-Prime Minister Putin for 

many years. And I think that they do represent a team. 

And as Mr. Gordon said, under the constitution, President 

Medvedev is the head of state and has overall responsibility for foreign policy. And therefore, he is President Obama’s principal counterpart. But President Putin clearly wields considerable influence 

in that system, as prime minister has responsibility for the economy. And so I think that, as Mr. Gordon said, we deal with the 

government structure as it is. 
21 

And I think that the conversations in Moscow that our President 

had with both of them suggested that there is not huge daylight 

between them. And I think that the progress that we made, we 

must assume reflects a consensus between the two leaders, even if, 

as Mr. Gordon said, they do have different accents in talking about 

certain issues, reflecting their different backgrounds. 

Mr. KISSELL. Why do you think you made more progress in the 

recent talks? Why do you think the Russians were more ready to 

concede, cooperate, whatever, than we had expected? 

Secretary GORDON. One can only speculate. We cannot know why 

Russians do what they do. It does seem, however, that the first six 

months of the Administration were a testing period. They wanted 

to see if maybe it was the case that we would be prepared to make 

all sorts of concessions in the name of a reset, in the name of a 

successful summit, in the name of getting over the deteriorating relations that I talked about. 

That would not be a surprising policy for Russia to pursue and 

test us, insist that we give up missile defense in order to reach 

agreements, insist that we make concessions on START, because 

we might want a successful summit. 

And I think, to be very frank, we showed them that that was not 

going to be the case. We were quite clear all along. We do want 

some agreements. We do want a better relationship. We do not 

think this is a zero-sum game in which we always have different 

interests. But we are not going to trade off important principles or 

allies in order to have a successful summit. 

Just for example, the issue of the U.N. follow-on mission in Georgia came up within two weeks of the summit. And I think some 

were wondering, if we were so keen on having a good relationship 

with Russia or a successful summit, that we would agree to whatever at the U.N. on Georgia in order to have a successful summit. 

But we did not, because we had red lines. We had certain principles that we were not going to walk away from where Georgia 

was concerned. 

We stuck to our guns, and the Russians ended up vetoing the 

U.N. follow-on mission in Georgia. And we were prepared to do 

that, because there are certain things we are just not willing to 

concede on. 

And I think that, to really answer your question, once they realized that was the case, then they went ahead and reached more 

agreements than, frankly, I at least would have predicted even a 

week before the summit. 

Mr. KISSELL. One real quick question as my time—has just gone. 

Yes, thank you. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Sorry. 

Mr. Coffman, please. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you so much for your service to our country. 

Can you give me an estimate of the current governance of Russia? It seems that either they have legitimate concerns in terms of 

their security, or it is a state which—a nation-state—which is devolving more into an autocracy, to where they are trying to estab-
22 

lish their legitimacy by focusing or, if not creating, threats, to establish legitimacy to the Russian people. 

But, I mean, their view of NATO, the expansion of NATO, their 

view of U.S. influence in satellite states that were former Soviet republics, as was mentioned earlier, missile defense, political and 

military interventions in Georgia and Ukraine—you know, are 

these based on legitimate historic fears of the Russian people? Or 

is this an autocratic government trying to flex its power and gain 

legitimacy that way? 

Secretary GORDON. Legitimate or not, I would certainly say these 

Russian fears exist and are unfounded. I believe it is accurate to 

say that Russia has historical concerns and insecurities that have 

led it to conclude that its most promising path for its own security 

is to dominate its neighbors. 

That is a historical Russian perception, and it continues to exist 

today to, what I would say, is an unfortunate degree, because I do 

not think it is accurate. 

I genuinely believe that Russia would have an interest in stable, 

prosperous democracies on its borders, even if they should be members of NATO, and that this perception that Russia has that somehow European security should be seen in zero-sum terms. And if 

its neighbors like Ukraine want to be friendly to the United States, 

or want to join the European Union or NATO, that is a threat to 

Russia. I believe that that is inaccurate. 

But really, to get at your question, the Russian view, at least for 

many Russians—again, I want to be careful about over-generalizing, because I think different Russians have different views. And 

hopefully, with time, the next generation will have a different view, 

and may come to the view that stable democracies in Russia’s 

neighbors is in Russia’s interest. 

But right now, yes. The predominant view in Russia is that they 

are better off dominating their neighbors, even if that means instability, than accepting the choices of those neighbors—unfortunately. 

Secretary VERSHBOW. If I could add, I agree with all of what my 

colleague said. 

I think you have both phenomena at work when you talk about 

what is driving Russia, what is the governance in Russia when it 

comes to their national security policy. And they clearly do have 

some legitimate security concerns which overlap with ours, whether it is violent extremism, which has affected them in Chechnya, 

and even in Moscow with terrorist bombings a few years ago. 

I think they do share an interest in controlling the proliferation 

of weapons of mass destruction, and working with us to try to 

thwart Iran’s nuclear ambitions. 

But it is when you get closer to their borders when the more negative impulses, I think, tend to dominate. And that is why those 

are going to be the toughest issues for us to manage as we go forward. 

But I think that, objectively speaking, as Mr. Gordon said, Russia is not threatened by NATO or by new countries, new democracies coming into NATO. The real security threats facing Russia 

are largely to their south. 
23 

And that is where I think we are going to try to expand our cooperation while continuing the dialogue, trying to convince them 

that NATO, whose mission now is largely to deal with distant security challenges like Afghanistan, bringing durable stability to the 

Balkans, is actually contributing to Russia’s security rather than 

posing a threat. But that is going to be a long debate. 

I think there is a tendency on the part of some Russian leaders 

to overdramatize external threats as a tool of maintaining political 

control and discipline at home. And the system is not one which 

has all the checks and balances and instruments of accountability 

that we would like. So, a kind of xenophobic mentality has entered 

into the Russian consciousness—not just on the part of the leaders, 

but on the part of the people. 

So, this is going to be a continuing problem for us going forward. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Washington, Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, I do not want you to feel left out, so I had a few things 

for you. 

Actually, in your testimony you discuss some of the U.S. naval 

activity in the Black Sea region and the unforeseen increase in 

military activity in the region having to do with our humanitarian 

visits to Georgia, as opposed to anything else. Also, you discuss 

Russian military exercises in the region. 

Just on the idea of exercises with this reset taking place, and 

some questions about whether—you know, we do not see things as 

a zero-sum game; perhaps the Russians do. 

What objectives or goals would we hope to seek through some of 

these military exercises with the Russians in that context of how 

we are perceiving each other? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. So, I believe you are asking about the military exercises with the Russians, not with Black Sea partners. 

Mr. LARSEN. That is correct, yes. Sorry. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. We believe that, whenever we are able to 

exercise with the Russians or another partner, that we gain common understanding, that we are able to better understand each 

other’s operating principles and techniques, tactics and procedures, 

so that when we do have a common objective—for example, in piracy off of Somalia—that we can work more effectively together. 

And we are seeing the drawbacks of not exercising with them, 

frankly, on the naval side as much as we would like to in those piracy operations off of Somalia. 

The Russians have had a near-continuous presence of a destroyer 

crew—you know, a small ship out there—along with their logistics 

support ships. We have had collegial and friendly interactions with 

them. They have appeared at the shared awareness and 

deconfliction events, and, in fact, are great supporters of those 

events. 

But we still find that we do not have the kinds of connectivity 

and signaling techniques, and the like, that we would like to enjoy 

with them in order to make that counter-piracy operation effective. 

One way of doing that is to exercise together. Another way of 

doing that is just to operate habitually together. 
24 

And before the Georgia crisis, we did have intermittent operations in Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean, which 

is a counterterrorist, counter-proliferation type of operation, in 

which a Russian ship would show up perhaps once a year, and we 

would enjoy some contact like that. And I think that sort of 

stretches across the board in land, air and sea domains in which 

it is healthy for us to exercise together. 

As I mentioned earlier, you have the opportunity to build personal relationships with individual Russian leaders, who may grow 

up someday to be important Russian leaders. And I think that is 

a very important interaction for us to have, because, as I mentioned, the sort of warm feelings and understanding you are able 

to achieve at that tactical exercise level are something we would 

like to percolate up into the higher levels where there tends to be 

a little bit more bureaucracy in scheduling meetings and that sort 

of thing than we would like to see from the Russia side. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. Will you speak a little bit, then, to the idea 

that the Russians and the Chinese also have done separate military exercises recently? 

And I know some of us have pressed the previous Administration, and I imagine we will press this Administration, and make a 

request that we be observers at those exercises as well. And, of 

course, we have been turned down, I think, in the past for that. 

Can you talk a little bit about the relationship between, say, 

Russian military exercises with other countries, and that we are 

not participating in that we would like to participate in? Can we 

use these relationships to press that case? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. I think that you make a good point. We are 

always seeking transparency in our relationship with whoever it 

is—Russia, China, and the like. And we have talked about inviting 

Chinese observers to certain exercises that we conduct. And we 

would love to be able to participate as observers in exercises that 

might be under the aegis of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, or other events that Russia does with other people—other nations that it considers its partners. 

Transparency is good. It builds confidence on both sides that you 

understand the purpose of the exercise and the actual tactics, techniques and procedures that were used in the exercise to make sure 

that nothing is amiss. And we invite them to observe our exercises 

all the time. And they do not always appear. But the invitation is 

out there. 

So I think the fundamental principle is that transparency is 

good. We seek more of it. And I think we are meeting them more 

than halfway, and in the hopes that they will understand that it 

is in their interest to do the same. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Shuster. 

Mr. SHUSTER. That was quick. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank all of you for being here today. And I apologize if you have 

had this question asked before. 
25 

I just was concerned about the Russians issuing a decree on opposing sanctions against manufacturers who sell arms to Georgia. 

I wondered if this will cause U.S. policy to change in supporting 

the Georgian military. 

Secretary VERSHBOW. I think this Russian announcement is unfortunate, but it will certainly not alter our policy. We think that 

Georgia, as a sovereign state, has not only a legitimate right to 

choose its security alliances, but also a legitimate right to have a 

military capacity to defend its own borders, and also to participate 

in multinational operations. 

So, we have developed a strategy of providing security assistance 

to Georgia, which will focus in the short term on helping raise the 

professional standards, helping them institute more high-quality 

defense personnel management systems, improving their training. 

But over time, we are prepared to consider the provision of defensive weapons to Georgia, as well. And we are also supporting 

their NATO aspirations and are helping them do the very arduous 

process of submitting their annual national program to NATO as 

they pursue their candidacy there. 

So, as I said, the Russian announcement is unfortunate, but it 

is not going to alter our policy. 

Mr. SHUSTER. That is good to hear. 

Also, is there any consideration—is the Administration considering to participate in the European Union monitoring mission that 

is going on in Georgia? 

Secretary GORDON. About that I would say that we think that is 

a critical mission. As you know, we lost the presence of the OSCE 

monitors in South Ossetia, because the Russians did not agree to 

a proposal that almost everyone else in the OSCE did. And we lost 

the U.N. presence in Abkhazia, because the Russians vetoed the 

follow-on agreement. 

And in the absence of those two missions, the European Union 

stepped up with more than 250 monitors. And we support that mission, because we think it is critically important that there be independent, objective monitors on the ground. 

The E.U. last week agreed to extend that mission for another 

year, and we are very pleased about that. No one has invited us 

to participate. We want to be supportive in whatever way we can. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Would that be something that we would consider, 

if somebody invited us to participate? 

Secretary GORDON. We will consider any way to strengthen efforts to make sure that there are appropriate, independent, international monitors on the ground in Georgia, yes. 

Mr. SHUSTER. And just in general, what is your assessment of 

the situation? I have spoken to some Georgians. They do not think 

it has gotten any better, and in some cases worse. Just your general observations on that situation in Georgia. 

Secretary GORDON. Well, the situation in Georgia is a troubling 

one. Russian forces remain in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 

Georgian territorial integrity and sovereignty is being violated. 

As the Vice President made clear in Georgia, we do not believe 

that there is a short-term or a military solution to this issue. But 

we will also not turn away from it. I think there, the Russians may 
26 

hope that, in the absence of the U.N. and OSCE missions we would 

just say, okay, you know, too bad. We will walk away. 

On the contrary, we have brought it up at every occasion, including the President in Moscow, including the ongoing Geneva talks, 

and including through the support of the E.U. monitoring mission. 

We do not consider the situation resolved. We think Russia should 

implement the cease-fire agreements of August and September 

2008, in support of Georgian territorial integrity. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Well, I am pleased to hear you say that. 

Ambassador, were you going to add to that? 

Secretary VERSHBOW. Nothing really much to add. 

We have not been asked yet, as far as the E.U. amendment is 

concerned. But I think we are considering the possibility, if we are 

asked. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Right. Well, I am pleased to hear that, because in 

dealing with the countries in that region, and the Ukraine, Azerbaijan, they are all very, very concerned about what America is 

going to do in regard to Georgia and Russia. And so, I think it is 

important that we stay strong with the Georgians. 

Secretary GORDON. If I might just permit myself to add in the 

context of staying strong with the Georgians, I have talked about 

how the President emphasized these important points, and the Vice 

President did when he was there last week. 

We have also, thanks to Congress’ support, completed the $1 billion assistance package to Georgia to help the country rebuild from 

the war. And that is already paying dividends in the Georgian 

economy and helping resettle refugees who were expelled. 

We have launched a commission following up on the U.S.-Georgia 

strategic cooperation arrangement from last year, which met recently in Washington. As I noted, the Vice President has recently 

been to Georgia. The Deputy Secretary and I have been there 

twice. 

We are actively demonstrating our support for Georgia, even 

while reminding the Georgians that they need to make more 

progress in their own democracy, and that they need to avoid any 

provocative actions. I think our relationship with Georgia is very 

strong. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Spratt, please. 

Mr. SPRATT. Thanks very much for your testimony. I have been 

in and out, and may have missed this question. It may have been 

asked before. 

Basically, what is the status of our deployment of missile defenses in the Czech Republic and in Poland? And is there any discussion, or was there any discussion with the Russians of alternative locations or alternative means of accomplishing the same objective, but with different locations? 

Secretary GORDON. We did comment on this briefly earlier. And 

what was said was that we are reviewing our approach to missile 

defense in Europe. 

The President believes that we should do what is necessary to 

protect ourselves and our European allies from a growing threat of 

nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. He has ordered a review of 
27 

plans to deploy an X-band radar in the Czech Republic and interceptors in Poland. 

And that review is being driven by our perception of the threat 

from Iran and the technology. And we hope that that review will 

be done by the end of the year, so that we can move forward in 

the way that best would defend us and our allies. 

In terms of the Russians, what their discussion of it—what there 

has been discussion with Russia of—is ways in which Russia and 

the United States could cooperate on the issue of missile defense. 

Because as we have made quite clear, any missile defenses we deploy in Europe will not be directed at Russia. They are designed 

to deal with a different threat. And the size of deployments considered could not in any way threaten the Russian arsenal anyway. 

So, we have been open with the Russians, as the previous Administration was, in terms of exploring the possibility of cooperation that could help protect both of our countries. We have sent a 

delegation to Moscow several times. 

It is true the Russians continue to say that they do not want to 

talk about cooperation unless and until we give up or change our 

current plans. And we continue to make clear that that criterion 

is not acceptable to us. 

But we do think that we have a common interest in protecting 

ourselves from missile defenses. And if the Russians want to work 

with us on that, then we would be open to that. 

Secretary VERSHBOW. If I could just emphasize, we are looking 

at the question of European missile defense as part of the broader 

missile defense review. And the site in Poland and the radar in 

Czech Republic are among the options that are being considered, 

together with other options that might be able to perform the mission, as well. 

Mr. SPRATT. Does your review include alternative locations and 

alternative defenses? 

Secretary VERSHBOW. We are looking at a range of options. It is 

really not appropriate to get into what those options are, but we 

are reviewing these internally. We are not engaged in any discussion with the Russians about alternative options at this point, until 

the review is completed. 

And as we have stressed, our conclusions will be based exclusively on the threat from Iran, the effectiveness of the systems and 

the cost. We want to see what is the best way to meet the real and 

growing threat from Iran to ourselves and to our allies. 

But we do, as Mr. Gordon said, believe that this is something 

that the Russians should see a common interest in. They, too, could 

be threatened by long-range ballistic missiles from Iran, and that 

there may be ways to connect with the Russians, once we have 

made our own conclusions, in terms of cooperation, whether it is 

shared early warning or joint testing initiatives, which have been 

pursued in the NATO-Russia framework in the past. 

Mr. SPRATT. With respect to strategic arms limitation talks, 

would defensive systems be part of that? 

And, in addition, what are our objectives going into these talks? 

What are the broad objectives that we are seeking in terms of warhead levels and the mix of our weapons within our nuclear arsenal? 
28 

Secretary VERSHBOW. As we stressed, defensive systems are not 

covered by—are not going to be covered by—the START follow-on 

agreement. It will deal strictly with limitations on strategic offensive arms, strategic nuclear arms. 

We and previous Administrations have recognized that there is 

a conceptual relationship between offense and defense, and there 

may be some reaffirmation of that principle. But that does not 

translate into any limitations on our ballistic missile defense systems. 

To the extent that the Russians are prepared to engage in possible cooperation on missile defense, I think we would pursue that 

in a separate forum which has yet to be established. 

But there is no linkage between limits on offensive systems and 

limits on defensive systems. But the limits that you have seen in 

the joint understanding for the START follow-on agreement reflect 

a range of possibilities. The specific levels still have to be negotiated. 

But before we made any proposals in this negotiation, we analyzed our strategic force requirements as part of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which is still ongoing. As one of the initial 

thrusts of the NPR, we look for a strategic approach that could ensure stability at lower numbers, so that we could proceed with the 

START follow-on negotiations, given that the existing START Treaty expires in December. 

But the proposals that we put on the table were based on the 

NPR analysis. It was not the other way around. And the proposals 

maintain our policy and strategy objectives in terms of assuring 

our allies, dissuading competitors, deterring potential adversaries, 

and defeating adversaries if deterrence fails. 

So, the final result will have to be consistent with those principles as well. We are not necessarily willing to accept any number 

within the ranges that are in the joint understanding. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Akin. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to our witnesses and your bearing with us on the 

questions. 

I have got a couple of quick ones, yes or nos, and then I have 

a couple of longer ones. And, of course, we are all on the clock, so 

if you can help me with fairly short answers, I would appreciate 

it. 

First, are we going to continue to train and equip the Georgian 

military? 

Secretary VERSHBOW. Yes, we are. And in the short term, the 

Georgians have made an offer to send a battalion to Afghanistan 

starting next spring. And so, later this year, we will be engaged in 

helping to train that unit for—— 

Mr. AKIN. In that context, then. Okay. Thank you. 

And then, will the U.S. support NATO membership for Ukraine 

and Georgia? 

Secretary GORDON. We continue to support their NATO aspirations, and are working with them on becoming stronger candidates. 

As you know, last year NATO agreed to have commissions with 

both countries. And in the context of those commissions, we are 
29 

working with them to strengthen their candidacies for NATO membership. 

But of course, they will only join NATO when there is a consensus in NATO that they will join. 

Mr. AKIN. Got that. Good. Thank you. 

These are a little bit longer questions. 

You made a comment in terms of missile defense, that it is going 

to be based on the threat of Iran or North Korea? In that regard, 

are we limiting missile defense, that it is only going to be relative 

to two nations? Because I think my sense is that missile defense 

is good any time somebody lobs an ICBM at us. 

So, are we, in a way, trading off some of our missile defense 

when you say that it is specifically connected to North Korea and 

Iran? 

Secretary VERSHBOW. Well, I think the focus, in terms of what 

are the most immediate threats we see looming, are the missile 

programs of North Korea and Iran. And certainly, the focus in 

terms of European missile defense is Iran, which has tested a 

2,000-kilometer, medium-range ballistic—— 

Mr. AKIN. We all understand that. My question is, though, we 

build missile defense—at least in my opinion, I vote to fund it. And 

I do that, because not only North Korea and Iran, but somebody 

else that makes some over-sized skyrocket with a nuclear weapon 

on it, we like to shoot it down from that country, too. 

Secretary VERSHBOW. I think we are obviously trying to be prepared for any threat, anticipated or not. And of course, an accidental launch via a single missile from a country that is not a 

rogue state is something that we should be prepared for, as well. 

Mr. AKIN. So, we are not in any way negotiating away our use 

of missile defense for any kind of missile that is shot at us then? 

Secretary VERSHBOW. No. There is no negotiation going on that 

would give away our missile defense option. 

Mr. AKIN. Okay. The second thing is on the limits on nuclear 

warheads. Almost every treaty that I know of that we ever got with 

the Russians, they always cheated on all of them. Do we have 

verification that that is not going to happen here? 

Secretary VERSHBOW. That is going to be one of the many challenges in completing this treaty, and we have a very short time period to do so. 

But we are going to probably use many of the verification provisions from the soon-to-be-expired START Treaty. But we may need 

to be more ambitious under this agreement, particularly given, you 

know, the margin of tolerance may be lower as you go to lower levels under these kinds of agreements. 

Mr. AKIN. Because it does seem like it is a pretty hard thing to 

verify, whether they have got some arsenal of them now, and we 

do not know how many they had before, so then it makes it hard. 

I guess the last thing—I have only got about a minute-and-ahalf, and I was trying to be a good steward of time. 

If you could, one thing that you did not include in your testimonies that is of interest, and it would probably be of interest to 

other members of the committee. And that would be, if you could 

just describe sort of in broad brush, what is the nature of the way 
30 

Putin and Russia has—you know, was 8 years ago with us—that 

relation degenerated to some degree. 

With a new President, hopefully, we are getting kind of back on 

a talking—I am a big fan of the inter-military kind of things. 

Could you just give us a broad brush as to where you think we 

are in relation with them? And that is the last of my questions. 

Thank you. 

Secretary GORDON. Thank you. 

I think I said in my opening comments that we saw the relationship that we inherited as one that was deteriorating, which, frankly, is accurate. And when the Cold War ended and the first few 

years after that, I think we had hopes that by now the relationship 

with Russia would be much different from what it is. We had hopes 

that by now, NATO might have—sorry, Russia—might have gotten 

over its aversion to NATO enlargement and been more willing to 

work with the West. 

I think one thing that has happened, to be very brief about it—— 

Mr. AKIN. Was that their biggest—NATO enlargement—was that 

the biggest thing that rubbed them the wrong way? 

Secretary GORDON. I think it stands in for a greater point, which 

is simply America’s role in the world. 

I think when the Cold War ended, the Russians believed and 

hoped that both sides would stand down, and we would be no 

greater a power than they were, and our equality would be maintained. But that, of course, was not realistic, and the United States 

played an important role in the world. And it frankly became the 

sole superpower, rather than having two superpowers. 

And it has been very difficult for Russia to get used to that 

world. And again, I think for many Russians, it is something that 

they have resented. And therefore, in particular in the past few 

years, as high oil prices have fueled a resurgent, or had fueled a 

resurgence of the Russian economy, some Russians wanted to take 

advantage of that and do more to try to stand up to the United 

States. 

I would add, unfortunately, the period when Russians perceived 

Russia to be down coincided with the period when Russian democracy was being established. And the period in which many Russians perceived Russia to be rising coincided with, in some ways, 

a backing off of democracy. And that, unfortunately, has led a number of Russians to equate the two, which we do not think is the 

case. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Arkansas, Dr. Snyder. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you all for being here. 

Secretary Gordon, I would just add one comment. I think, during 

the period in which Russia was down in the early days of the postCold War period, I think it is fair to say that, retrospectively, the 

United States clearly could have done more to help what many people perceived to be as a floundering Russian economy. 

I mean, having personally been there, and I saw people out and 

standing on the side of the road, middle-aged women with brand 

new green hose. That was their pay from the factory. If they could 

sell it on the road, that was their payment. I mean there were real-
31 

ly some things that we could have stepped forward on to assist 

them, and did not. 

I wanted to ask one missile defense question. 

Maybe I will direct this to you, Mr. Vershbow. 

I was talking with one of my Russian friends recently, who made 

the point that I think most people agree with. It is that Russia has 

nothing to fear from any missile defense system we put in, and 

they know it. They know that they have nuclear missiles in places 

that we do not know where they are at, and that this kind of a system really is not aimed at Russia. And they know that, if we ever 

thought it was, it just would not be the facts of the situation. 

But this man made the point, he said, ‘‘What makes us apprehensive is that there will be people in your power structure that 

will believe it can do more than it is capable of doing.’’ 

And we have had—you know, from their perspective, they have 

not agreed with all of the foreign policy decisions made in the last 

decade-and-a-half, and would hate to see some of these foreign policy decisions of the future based on some misbelief that some of 

this limited system could somehow allow for some American action 

that we might not take otherwise, if—anyway, I probably made the 

point. 

How do you respond to that kind of—that perspective? 

Secretary VERSHBOW. That is a very good question, Congressman. 

And I think you are correct that, objectively speaking, most Russians—particularly their experts who really know the capabilities 

of our system—recognize that it is not a threat to the Russian strategic deterrent, as they claim. In fact, it is not solely because they 

have mobile systems and submarine launched systems that could 

be survivable. 

But actually, if you look at the geography of our systems, if we 

go forward with the site in Poland, are not physically capable of 

intercepting the vast majority of Russian strategic missiles heading 

toward the United States, because those go over the North Pole. 

And our missiles would be a day late and a dollar short. 

So, they are, clearly, optimized to deal with threats such as those 

from Iran, from the south. And hopefully, through this joint threat 

assessment, we can begin to chip away at some of the Russian 

misperceptions. 

But sometimes we hear that, well, there are only 10 missiles 

today, but tomorrow we could wake and there will be 1,000. But 

still, there are defensive systems in a position that, even if there 

were more than 10—— 

Dr. SNYDER. Well, I am running out of time, and I have a second 

question. 

But I mean, they do not believe that, no matter how many missiles we put in that area, that it would be a threat to their ability 

to overwhelm us. But it still deals with the issue, their apprehension, that there may be people that replace Admiral Winnefeld, 

that will actually think it can do more than it is capable of. 

And maybe I will just leave it as a point to be made. It is a more 

difficult kind of reassurance to give. 
32 

Secretary VERSHBOW. I would certainly agree with you that those 

kinds of views exist within the Russian elite. There is a tremendous amount of paranoia and worst-case assessments. 

And so, we have to continue to chip away at this through our dialogue, and by trying to bring the Russians into the architecture to 

some degree and make this a cooperative venture. 

Dr. SNYDER. It may be helpful for people like you to remind all 

of us that, in fact, that system does not have the ability to do to 

anything to Russian systems. 

My final question—I am running out of time, Professor 

Vershbow, so I will direct it to you—where do you think we are 

right now with regard to our Russian language speaking skills 

within the Foreign Service? 

And Secretary Gordon, if you have any thoughts, too, as far as 

Foreign Service officers with Russian language skills. What is our 

current need, gap, and where we are with getting the number of 

Foreign Service officers with Russian language skills? 

Secretary VERSHBOW. Well, my impression is that we are doing 

pretty well. And the State Department has a very good Russian 

language program, which, through an intensive course of 10 

months, does prepare people to operate professionally in Russian— 

in Moscow and in some other posts in the former Soviet Union 

where Russian is still used. 

But we are seeing fewer and fewer people coming out of the universities having studied Russian. It is not as popular as it used to 

be. 

But in terms of the overall deficits in language skills, I think we 

are still more worried about Chinese and Arabic speakers, Farsi 

speakers, than we are about Russian speakers. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Admiral Winnefeld, I want to thank you for your service, 

supporting our ground troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

I also want to point out, as we are discussing Russia, that 20 

years ago this summer, no one projected that in about three 

months that the Berlin Wall would collapse. There were no projections, truly, of the extraordinary and wonderful reunification of 

Germany. The projections of Ronald Reagan, that the Soviet Union 

would end up in the ash heap of history, did come to fruition. 

I am an optimist. And I am really hopeful and I believe, that 

through mutual contacts, freedom, democracy, free markets will 

prevail. And I have visited Russia a number of times. Each time 

I am impressed by the friendship that the Russian people have for 

the American people. 

And I have worked very closely promoting the new Rotary Clubs 

across the country giving opportunity for Russians to interact with 

people around the world, chambers of commerce. And then I am 

particularly interested in military-to-military contacts, so that 

there are not misunderstandings. This is mutually beneficial to 

Russia, to America. 

And so, Admiral, you have mentioned this. Could you go a little 

bit further on specific contacts that we have? 
33 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Sir, I would be happy to. 

One of the key points that you raise is the importance of people 

meeting people. And that is why earlier this year, when the tensions really had not subsided as much as they have to the point 

they are today, we made the difficult decision to allow the Russians 

to come over and participate in what we call the Harvard generals 

program, where a number of them come over and are able to visit 

the United States. 

They attend Harvard for a couple of weeks, and it is really just 

an exchange. And in fact, it is really just Russian generals going 

to Harvard for two weeks, giving them a great opportunity to see 

America, what we are like and to perhaps put some of their predispositions behind them. 

And we carry that through in our military-to-military relationship any way that we can. And I can list some of these events for 

you. 

Obviously, the joint staff talks that I mentioned in my opening 

statement will occur this October, we are hopeful. And that would 

lay the groundwork for a lot of the planning that we would do to 

really get the detail into the relationship that we are talking about. 

We are hopeful that their chief of defense or some representative 

will show up at the Pacific Commanders Conference that he is 

holding for all Asian area chiefs of defense, and that would be a 

great thing for them to be a part of. They participate in the share 

awareness and understanding and deconfliction piracy pieces. 

So, they are out there operating with us, and they see U.S. officers working with other countries’ officers in a very cooperative, 

collegial way. And they want to be a part of that. They want to act 

like that when they see it. 

We will have a counter-hijacking exercise with them, Navy staff 

talks. The International Sea Power Symposium up in Newport, 

they will attend. And Naval War College and Russian Naval Academy exchanges, where for a couple of weeks they will have young 

people coming over. 

And these people are going to grow up to be leaders someday, 

particularly if they have the credibility that comes with perhaps 

having visited the United States for a while. 

Our port visits are very important to us. We have had two to 

Vladivostok in just the last couple of months. The Russian Military 

Academy is going to have an exchange with Fort Leavenworth. The 

air staff talks are going to occur. 

We are going to try to set up a number of conferences at the 

Marshall Center in Europe. West Point and Russian Ground Forces 

Academy cadet exchange, which is not a full-year program. Again, 

it is one of these 2-week things. 

The Strategic Command Deterrence Symposium, so they can get 

a sense for how we view deterrence, and perhaps the missile defense may be not part of that as much as they may think. And then 

the EUCOM Colonels Working Group, where they roll up their 

sleeves and get down to what the program would be for next year. 

And we are hopeful that all of this will happen in this calendar 

year. So, that is a pretty ambitious program. And we are hoping 

to expand that cooperation into the next year. 
34 

And our challenge is always with the Russian military in doing 

these sorts of things, they have, believe it or not, a more cumbersome bureaucracy than we do. Just to get decisions made on 

who can show up for a conference is a challenge. 

And that is why I speak of percolating this trust up through 

their ranks, so that it is a little easier for them to make these 

kinds of decisions, a little more natural, a little less suspicion and 

distrust, so we can expand this kind of cooperative activity. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, I really appreciate it. You have taken virtually all of my time, but that is good, because this is good, peopleto-people contact. 

And I just want to commend Secretary Vershbow for your service 

as ambassador to Moscow. You know the beautiful culture and how 

we should be working together. We have a great shared culture. 

But thank you, and I appreciate the opportunity to be with you 

today. Thank you for your service. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Shea-Porter, please. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you. 

Mr. Gordon, you said that the U.S. and Russia affirmed their 

commitment to increase assistance provided to the government of 

Afghanistan developing the capabilities of the Afghan National 

Army and police. 

Now, I was there in May, and I know that Afghanistan has a lot 

of problems—corruption, lack of trained personnel, et cetera. 

But what do you perceive the role of Russia to be there? To do 

exactly what? 

Secretary GORDON. We would be happy for Russian assistance in 

developing the sort of stable Afghanistan that we are trying to 

seek. 

The statement that you are alluding to there was actually a Russian initiative. They came to us and said, ‘‘We have a common interest in Afghanistan. We would like to help your efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. And we would like to show that we have this 

common interest.’’ 

So, they proposed a joint statement on Afghanistan along the 

lines that you cited from. And we were more than happy to agree 

with that, because Russia—as I believe one of my colleagues alluded to earlier—has the same interests that we do in stopping extremism and drug-running out of Afghanistan. And if they can help 

us deal with that, sharing intelligence and dealing with those responsible, then we welcome it. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Well, they had many years there, as you 

know. And I am not sure that the Afghans would welcome this. 

Are you talking about a physical presence there? Or are you just 

talking about providing monetary help, personnel? Could you tell 

me what you see their role as? 

Secretary GORDON. Well, we will have to look at what role could 

be constructive. A physical presence is probably unlikely for the 

reasons that you say. 

But there are all sorts of porous and dangerous borders, and people coming back and forth. And the Russians do have some intelligence on Islamic extremists who go back and forth to Afghanistan. So, that is the type of help that I am referring to. 
35 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Do you see them as training the Afghan police 

or the Afghan military? 

Secretary VERSHBOW. Congresswoman, I think you are right that 

a military presence by the Russians is probably not something that 

the majority of the people in Afghanistan would be welcoming. 

But they have participated in some counternarcotics programs, 

including setting up an office of their federal narcotics service in 

Moscow to help coordinate assistance. And they are doing some 

training of Afghan police at a center in Moscow, at Domodedovo, 

which has been going on in the NATO-Russia framework. 

So, their contributions may be small and narrowly focused, but 

they are meaningful, and we think more should be encouraged. But 

I think they have done some infrastructure projects, as well, and 

repairing some Soviet era bridges and tunnels that are improving 

access for commercial goods in and out of Afghanistan. 

So, again, military presence is not something we are talking 

about, but more on the civilian side. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Now, as they train the Afghan National Army 

and police, we have different philosophies very often. 

So, what kind of control would we have? How would we know for 

sure that what the Afghan military was learning was something 

that we thought was appropriate in terms of, say, democracy or the 

way that you treat the civilians, et cetera? 

I just want to know what our thinking is on that and how handson they will actually be. 

Secretary VERSHBOW. I do not know enough about the details of 

these programs. We will have to get back to you on that. 

But I know that the terms of reference were drawn up pretty 

carefully by NATO and Russia within the NATO-Russia Council. 

So, I think we have—I am sure we have—a good idea of exactly 

how the Russian trainers are operating and what kind of skills 

they are focusing on. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I would appreciate it. 

Secretary VERSHBOW. In fact, during the summit, some of our 

delegation had a chance to visit this training center. So, there is 

good transparency. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. And I would appreciate it, if there is further 

information, that you could share it with me. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

The gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

For Mr. Gordon, I understand the department’s Nuclear Posture 

Review is not expected to be complete until the end of the year. According to an online DOD terms of reference factsheet dated June 

2nd of this year, the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review, quote, will establish U.S. nuclear deterrence policy, strategy and force posture 

for the next 5 to 10 years, and will provide a basis for the negotiation of a follow-on agreement to the Strategic Arms Reduction 

Treaty. 

Now, with that in mind, how can the Administration or the department commit to specific nuclear force reductions prior to the 

conclusion of the NPR? Isn’t that putting the cart before the horse? 
36 

Secretary VERSHBOW. Congressman, as the Pentagon representative, let me respond. 

We are certainly putting the NPR first, and the START negotiations second. And within the NPR, we are looking at a whole range 

of alternative strategic approaches. 

But in view of the fact that the existing START Treaty expires 

in December, we made it an initial priority within the NPR coming 

up with a strategic approach that could ensure stability at somewhat lower numbers, so that we could engage in the START followon negotiations and try to complete it by December. 

But the alternative approach, which is the basis for the proposals 

that we have put on the table, has been judged within the NPR to 

maintain our policy and strategy objectives of assuring our allies, 

dissuading all competitors, deterring potential adversaries, and defeating those adversaries if deterrence fails. 

So the NPR goes on, and its conclusions will be released later in 

the year. And continuing analysis is going on in terms of longer 

term scenarios, in which we might, in a follow-on to the follow-on 

treaty, consider even deeper cuts. 

But we did not put the cart before the horse. We have done the 

analysis within the NPR process before putting any proposals regarding the warheads levels or the delivery vehicles—— 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. If I hear you correctly, you have said that 

you have agreed to lower numbers. You used that term, lower numbers. And yet, the NPR is not done yet. 

Secretary VERSHBOW. Again, lower numbers than in the START 

or the Moscow treaty, but numbers which we believe can fulfill our 

deterrence objectives during the term that this new treaty will be 

in effect, a 10-year period. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, I guess I see a contradiction there. But let 

me ask a follow-on question. 

I am deeply concerned that in considering deep reductions—possibly deep reductions—in our strategic delivery vehicles from 1,200 

down to a level as low as 500. And my concern is because the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the 

United States, led by Drs. Perry and Schlesinger, believe that, 

quote, the triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems should be 

maintained. And my concern is that levels as low as 500 could 

threaten the triad. 

Isn’t there a contradiction between maintaining our nuclear triad 

and reducing delivery systems to the 500 level? 

For anyone of you. 

Admiral WINNEFELD. I would tell you that the NPR is considering all of that in great rigor and detail, and that, as Secretary 

Vershbow mentioned, we advanced the analysis on that to inform 

the START negotiation process. And it would be, of course, inappropriate to get into the details of the START negotiation process or 

the details of the NPR at that point. But I can assure you, the 

analysis is rigorous. 

And I would also suggest that, whenever you see a band presented in a document, it is generally because one side is sort of on 

one end of that band, and the other side is on the other end. 

So, we are really looking at this responsibly. We are looking very 

closely. The triad has been a strength of our nuclear deterrent for 
37 

many, many years, and it would be unlikely that we would consider, you know, threatening the fundamental nature of what our 

triad is and how it is a force deterrence. 

But again, all this and the analysis has advanced. It is rigorous. 

I would tell you the NPR is the most advanced of all the studies 

we are doing right now, because we knew we needed to get it done. 

And there was already a lot of pre-existing analytical detail that 

we leveraged, that has been done over the years and very recently. 

So, as worm’s eye view of the apple here, I am very confident 

that it is a healthy process. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. I appreciate those answers. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I want to thank you for your testimony here today, 

and thank you for your service to our country. 

I was in an Intelligence Committee meeting at the start of this, 

so I apologize if my question has already been addressed. 

But for Secretary Vershbow, the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration and DOD’s Cooperative 

Threat Reduction Program have generally enjoyed cooperation, access and cost-sharing issues with regard to nonproliferation efforts 

in Russia. 

Could you elaborate on the successes and the challenges of these 

cooperative efforts, and kind of give us an update on where we are 

and, say, what is still left undone? 

Secretary VERSHBOW. Okay. Well, I will give you the general answer, Congressman. 

I am not in the office that is responsible for those programs, but 

I think we have made enormous progress since those programs 

were initiated in the immediate years following the end of the Cold 

War. And I visited many of the sites when I was ambassador, in 

terms of creating better security at the Russian nuclear facilities, 

helping now begin the destruction of the Russian chemical weapon 

stocks at the Shchuchye facility, which I think began operating this 

year. 

We have basically completed most of the major infrastructure 

projects in terms of storage security upgrades that were envisaged 

by the program. And we are now beginning to broaden the focus 

of the CTR program to address problems in some other countries. 

And in this regard, the Russians are now becoming a partner and 

contributing even some of their own resources to these programs. 

So, that is, I think, the best I can give you today, Congressman. 

I do not have all the chapter and verse on the state of play on some 

of these programs. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

For Secretary Gordon and Admiral Winnefeld, with Iran’s recent 

satellite launch and ongoing development of its nuclear program, 

the threat to regional stability obviously continues to grow. This 

threat obviously affects not only the Middle East, but Europe and 

Asia, as well. Russian arms transfers and nuclear cooperation with 

Iran are also considered destabilizing by many countries in the 

Middle East and elsewhere in the international community. 
38 

How does Russia’s relationship with Iran affect its ties with such 

regional powers as Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iraq? And are there 

more areas for cooperation with the Russians that we have not yet 

explored? 

Secretary GORDON. First I would simply say we share your concern about the potential proliferation threat from Iran. And as I 

noted earlier, there was probably no subject that President Obama 

raised and discussed more intensively in Moscow than this one. 

You ask how it affects, if I understood correctly, Russia’s relations with other powers in the region. And I think it is accurate 

to say that we are not the only country in the world concerned 

about Russian cooperation with Iran, whether it be arms sales or 

nuclear cooperation. 

The countries you mentioned, all of those—Iraq, Saudi Arabia 

and Israel, and others in the Gulf and elsewhere—are very concerned about a potential Iranian nuclear weapon and concerned 

about any country, including Russia, helping them. So, I do think 

that Russians know and should know that there are consequences 

to any relationship with Iran that it might have. 

As I said earlier, I think we have seen signs of cooperation with 

Russia on this issue, and then other areas where they have been 

less helpful. And we are obviously doing all we can to move them 

back towards the former category. 

I am sorry. There was a last element of your question that I—— 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Well, can you elaborate on the first part, though? 

I want to know, have we seen any tangible fallout from Russia’s 

continued cooperation with Iran with respect to how they interact 

with other nations in the Middle East? 

Secretary GORDON. Well, not dramatically, because other nations, 

like we, are watching very carefully what Russia does. And no 

doubt, certain Russian actions would provoke a real problem in 

their relationship with those countries or with us. 

But I think Russia has refrained from moving forward with what 

would be really considered more destabilizing arms transfers to 

Iran, or steps in the nuclear area that would be provocative to us 

and others. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Before my time runs out, the second half of my 

question. Are there areas of cooperation with the Russians that 

have not been explored? 

Secretary GORDON. We are constantly asking ourselves how to 

best work with the Russians. 

Are there any that have not been explored? Not that we are 

aware of. But obviously, we have not had total success on this 

issue, so we need to keep doing whatever we can to try to get the 

Russians where we are. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. McKeon and, I believe, Mr. Shuster have additional questions. 

Mr. McKeon, the floor is yours. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mine is just a short follow-up. 

If the Administration does not intend to—and this came up in 

earlier questions—to link missile defense with START, then why 
39 

include a provision in the joint understanding to address, and I 

quote, the interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms? 

Secretary GORDON. The President addressed this issue quite 

clearly in Moscow. 

The provision, the reference that you allude to, is actually a 

standard reference in previous arms control agreements as well. It 

is in the START agreement. It is in the Strategic Arms Limitation 

Treaty (SALT) agreement. 

And it acknowledges, as Assistant Secretary Vershbow suggested 

earlier, that we do accept that there is some theoretical, conceptual 

relationship at some level between offensive weapons and defensive 

weapons. 

What the President made quite clear in Moscow, however, is 

that, A, the START follow-on agreement is only about offensive 

weapons; and, B, the type of defenses we are talking about in Europe are just not relevant to the types of numbers we are looking 

at in an arms control agreement with Russia. 

We are talking in terms of European missile defense about sites, 

as discussed earlier, that could deal with a handful of missiles coming from a country like Iran. That in no way threatens the numbers that, even at the lower end of the spectrum, that we are talking about from Russia. 

So, again, the President was quite clear with the Russians on 

this, that even if this follow-on agreement should include a provision talking about this potential conceptual relationship, as previous strategic arms limitations agreements have done, it is not relevant to our discussion about European missile defense. And we 

are quite clear about that. And it will not change between now and 

when the treaty is negotiated. 

Mr. MCKEON. And you are confident that, even though we put 

it in there, we understand that it is not going to be part of it, that 

the Russians have the same understanding? 

Secretary GORDON. I can only speak for our side, and can reassert that the President made that quite clear. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Shuster, wrap it up. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just back to Georgia for one final question to the admiral. 

I wondered if you might talk a little bit about the training and 

equipping of the Georgian forces. Many are concerned that we are 

not doing enough, and that they believe that Russia is not done in 

Georgia, and they are going to wait for another opportunity. 

So, can we do more to train and equip them to deter the Russians from making another incursion deeper into Georgia? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. I would like to give you a summary of what 

we are doing. 

We have recently concluded a couple of exercises with them. One 

is—and you may well be aware of these, but I will mention them 

anyway—Cooperative Longbow and Cooperative Lancer. And Cooperative Longbow was an exercise—multinational brigade land staff, 

sort of a staff ex, if you will, a command post exercise. And it also 
40 

involved air integration training with the Georgians, which is 

something that they definitely needed. 

A lot of participants—NATO countries and several other partner 

countries, including Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the former 

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—and I won’t list them all. But it 

was a good, successful exercise. 

And then, that was followed by Cooperative Lancer, which was 

a live-fire exercise with many of the same players to promote interoperability with Partnership for Peace countries, and the like. 

And it goes without saying that whenever we do an exercise like 

this—and this was sort of a crisis response exercise—that it is 

going to improve the Georgian military. And our principal focus 

right now is on organization and training of that military. EUCOM 

has done an assessment, has looked at where their shortfalls are 

in that area, and we are trying to address them. 

At the same time, as Ambassador Vershbow mentioned, I believe, 

they are going to deploy a battalion to Afghanistan. And we are 

going to help them train for that deployment. 

Now, this is a counterinsurgency operation. But again, it goes 

without saying, that any exposure they have to our tactics, techniques and procedures, writ large, is going to help their military 

become more proficient. And this is probably a two-year deployment that they are going to take in six-month chunks, so that a 

lot of Georgians will be exposed to how we operate on the ground. 

So, I think, in general, they are getting a lot of exposure to us, 

and it is going to raise them up as that progresses. 

Mr. SHUSTER. What about the equipment? Is there anything we 

can—— 

Admiral WINNEFELD. The equipment—I do not believe that we 

are—we did return their equipment from Iraq, as they requested. 

And I believe we are still exploring what the nature of our equipment support to the Georgians would be. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. If there are no further questions, let me thank 

you gentlemen for this very excellent hearing. It has been very enlightening, and we appreciate it. We look forward to seeing you 

again. 

The meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:11 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

JULY 30, 2009 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JULY 30, 2009 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. SHUSTER. Speaking at the Ukraine House exposition center on July 22, 2009, 

VP Biden countered Russian claims made following their War with Georgia by stating, ‘‘We recognize no sphere of influence, or no ability of any other nation to veto 

the choices an independent nation makes as to with whom and under what conditions they will associate.’’ Does this statement apply to all Former Soviet States and 

Russia’s neighbors and what actions is the Obama Administration willing to take 

to uphold this position? 

Secretary GORDON. Both the President and Vice-President have made clear that 

the United States rejects any notion of a country having a ‘‘sphere of influence’’ or 

declaring they have ‘‘privileged relations’’ with other nations. We continue to support the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Russia’s neighbors, as 

well as their sovereign right to make their own choices about their defense and alliance relationships. The President has addressed this issue very directly and clearly 

in his discussion with his Russian counterpart, and noted that we will not paper 

over our differences on these issues even as we seek to cooperate in areas where 

it is in both countries’ interests. The United States continues to support NATO enlargement and the aspirant countries working to meet NATO’s performance-based 

standards for membership. We reject zero-sum thinking regarding Russia and its 

neighbors, and believe that our good relations with Russia and with its neighboring 

countries are not mutually exclusive. 

Mr. SHUSTER. How does the Obama Administration plan to encourage Russia to 

comply with its obligations under the Six Point Peace Plan with Georgia and prevent loose interpretations of the agreement that violate the intent of the agreement? 

Secretary GORDON. The United States calls on all states to uphold their commitments under numerous UN Security Council resolutions to support Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. We continue to press the Russian Government to 

fulfill its August 12 Ceasefire Commitments to allow humanitarian access to 

Abkhazia and South Ossetia, to pull back their troops to positions held prior to the 

outbreak of hostilities, and to continue its engagement in the ongoing Geneva talks. 

The United States is actively working with the UN, OSCE and EU to restore an 

adequate monitoring presence in the conflict zones and maximize the participation 

of the international community in promoting human rights and the unhindered provision of humanitarian aid in all of Georgia. We are also working to convince the 

Russians to revisit their decision to block the UN Observer Mission in Georgia and 

the OSCE Conflict Prevention Center. We support the efforts of the EU Monitoring 

Mission, welcome the Incident Response Prevention Mechanism talks which have 

aided in lowering tensions in the region, and encourage Russia to weigh on South 

Ossetian and Abkhaz authorities to cooperate fully in those talks. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Since Russian military doctrine identifies NATO’s eastward enlargement as a threat to its National Security because Former Soviet States have 

joined or are seeking NATO membership, how will this affect Russian/NATO relations? 

Secretary GORDON. The United States and our NATO Allies are committed to upholding Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, which states that ‘‘The Parties may, 

by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further 

the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic 

area to accede to this Treaty.’’ As the President has made clear, we also stand by 

the principle that all states have a right to choose their own Alliances, and no country should have a ‘‘sphere of privileged interests.’’ At the same time, we seek areas 

for practical cooperation with Russia in the NATO–Russia Council on such issues 

as counter-narcotics, counterterrorism, and Afghanistan, to name only a few. It also 

means engaging with Russia in a broader security dialogue in which we seek to reject zero-sum thinking about security in Europe and Eurasia. We believe NATO Allies and Russia both have an interest in cooperation, and we will continue to pursue 

practical cooperation and engage with Russia in a broader dialogue about European 

security while maintaining NATO’s principle of an open door. 

Mr. SHUSTER. The transit agreement made with Russia on July 6th allows the 

U.S. to move troops and critical equipment to resupply international forces in Af-
76 

ghanistan and to bring needed supplies to the government and people of Afghanistan, potentially saving $133 million annually, but at what cost is this agreement 

made to the strategic flexibility of United States response to any Russian actions 

or aggression during a crisis without having ‘‘troops or critical equipment or supplies’’ delayed, halted, or detained in transit to Afghanistan? 

Secretary GORDON. The transit agreement provides the United States with an additional avenue in the Northern Distribution Network for the supply of the international mission in Afghanistan. If we were to lose access to this avenue, we would 

continue to utilize the non-Russian routes we have heretofore been using to move 

supplies to Afghanistan. Beyond the material benefit to our resupply efforts, this 

agreement also serves as an example of the potential for cooperation with Russia 

and underscores the strategic importance of success in Afghanistan to both our 

countries. We look forward to working with Russia bilaterally and in multilateral 

fora towards a stable, prosperous Afghanistan. 

Æ