Funding the DoE Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program

JOURNAL

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

Chemical Warfare: Part III

Nuclear Zero: World Peace or World Chaos?

Executing the DOD Executive Agent 

Role for Chemical and Biological 

Defense

Heisenberg In Action - A Year Plus in 

the Life of the Nuclear Disablement 

Teams

The Continuing Nuclear Military 

Revolution

Benefits of Nuclear Survivability

Protection Factors of 

Combat Systems

Issue 8 Winter/Spring 2012

Combating WMD

Fort Belvoir Nuclear Revisited in 2011

Biotoxins Used As Warfare Agents 

(Part I)
L Inside the Journal

COMBATING WMD SCIENCE and TECHNOLOGY

HISTORY

3 Biotoxins Used As Warfare Agents (Part I)

8 Chemical Warfare: Part III

27 Nuclear Zero: World Peace or World Chaos?

19 Fort Belvoir Nuclear Revisited in 2011

13 Executing the DOD Executive Agent Role for 

Chemical and Biological Defense

22 Heisenberg In Action - A Year Plus in the Life of 

the Nuclear Disablement Teams

44 Protection Factors of Combat Systems

38 The Continuing Nuclear Military Revolution

41 Benefits of Nuclear Survivability

35 Funding the DoE Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Program

 Mr. John S. Nordin

 Mr. Anthony M. Diglio

 COL Jeffrey H. Musk

Chaplain (COL) Scott Gardner

LTC Andreas Tschakert

 Ms. Julia LeDoux

 Mr. Phil Shubert

 Mr. Al Mauroni

LTC Bret Kinman

MAJ Matthew Armstrong

COL Joseph F. Marquart

Mr. Joseph Nellis

 MAJ Jason G. Anderson

 Mr. Nick A. Haugen

 LTC Gerad A.Vavrina
Disclaimer: Combating WMD Journal is published semi-annually by the United 

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Published by the 

United States Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency 

(USANCA)

Director

Mr. Peter Bechtel

Editor

Mr. Glen Scott

Editorial Board

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Design/Layout

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Combating WMD JU.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

OURNAL

Cover Photos: Courtesy of 20th Support 

Command (CBRNE) Public Affairs Office 

and dodlive.mil

1 From the Director 

Mr. Peter Bechtel

47 Combating WMD Resources
New Strategic Guidance and CBRN Capabilities 

for the Joint Force in the 21st Century

Mr. Peter Bechtel

Director

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

he new strategic guidance articulate priorities for a 21st century defense to sustain U.S. 

global leadership, “The Joint Force will 

be prepared to confront and defeat aggression anywhere in the world.” As we 

transition from today’s combat operations, the U.S. will engage on a broader 

range of challenges and opportunities. 

As an enduring task, a 21st century 

Joint Force must succeed against ubiquitous chemical, biological, radiological 

and nuclear (CBRN) threats that could 

be used as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) anywhere in the world.

The new strategic priorities for a 21st 

century defense require the Joint Force 

to succeed in ten primary missions that 

DoD senior leaders consider most important for protecting and advancing 

U.S. core national interests. You, as a 

Nuclear and Combating WMD (CWMD) 

professional, will quickly notice that 

several of these primary missions diT rectly impact the CBRN capabilities the 

Joint Force will need in the 21st century.

Adversaries will pursue asymmetric capabilities, including WMD, to complicate 

our operations and to counter our power 

projection capabilities. WMD proliferation 

will extend to non-state actors, as well. 

Given this anticipated environment, the 

Joint Force must be ready to operate in 

an extremely challenging environment. 

First, the Joint Force must deter and defeat aggression by any potential adversary, especially those armed with WMD. 

Second, it must project power despite anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) challenges, 

such as those from the asymmetric use of 

WMD. Third, the Joint Force must maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear 

deterrent for the U.S. and allies as long 

as nuclear weapons exist. As a nation 

with vital interests in multiple regions, our 

Joint Forces must deter and defeat opportunistic regional adversaries even when 

our forces are committed elsewhere.

Combating WMD is fundamentally 

linked to a primary mission at the heart 

of our profession: the Joint Force must 

counter WMD by preventing the proliferation and use of CBRN weapons 

against U.S. Forces and allies. The Joint 

Force conducts a wide range of activities to prevent the proliferation and use 

of CBRN weapons. These activities include planning and operations to locate, 

monitor, track, interdict and secure WMD 

and WMD-related components and the 

means and facilities to make them. 

They also include an active national 

non-proliferation effort to frustrate the 

ambitions of nations or non-state actors 

interested in developing WMD. In partnership with other elements of the U.S. 

Government, DoD will continue to invest 

in Joint Force’s capabilities to detect, 

protect against, and respond to WMD 

use, should preventive measures fail.

Finally, two more primary missions 

have direct CBRN implications that the 

Joint Force must be prepared to engage 

and succeed: defend the homeland and 

provide support to civil authorities, and 

provide a stabilizing presence abroad. 

The Joint Force must defend U.S. territory from direct attack from state and 

non-state actors, and provide support to 

civil authorities in the event that such defense fails. This is an enduring mission 

and we will address it in more details in 

future editions of the CWMD Journal. 

Likewise, the Joint Force must provide 

a stabilizing and sustainable presence 

abroad through deployments, bilateral/multilateral training exercises and 

building partner-capacity, especially for 

CWMD operations. The stabilizing presence provided by the Joint Force abroad 

is also an enduring mission with direct 

CBRN implications and closely related 

to the defense of the homeland and the 

maintenance of an effective deterrence. 

Each of these primary missions brings 

a series of CBRN challenges and the 

need for capabilities to counter them; 

we will briefly highlight some of the most 

critical challenges and needs from the 

Unified Land Operations perspective.

The first critical CBRN challenge for 

Unified Land Operations is the need for 

actionable WMD intelligence. WMD intelligence challenges imply a basic need for 

near or real time intelligence from tactical 

to strategic level (for hazard avoidance, 

risk mitigation and targeting). This in 

turn demands the fusion and networking 

of multiple disparate data sources (sensors, databases and intelligence) for near 

real time hazard modeling and prediction. 

Early warning on the deliberate use or 

natural emergence of dangerous patho-

“Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: 

Priorities for 21st Century Defense”

1 ISSUE 8 Combating WMD Journal
gens and other Biological Warfare Agents 

(BWAs) hinges upon the development of 

a global surveillance network that the 

U.S. can exploit. Enabling early warning, 

identification and continued situational 

awareness of existing or potential global 

threats is vital to protect the warfighter 

and for effective interagency response to 

prevent, protect and recover. Nevertheless, these efforts will fall short without a 

full Intelligence Community collaboration 

with labs and agencies to provide a complete common operational picture (COP).

Future WMD intelligence systems 

need to offer near real time, operational 

hazard prediction capabilities that include 

the fusion of indications and warnings, 

intelligence, environmental, operational, 

medical, and social media information. 

More specifically, these technologies 

must include networked COP employing a layered array of sensors, in conjunction with intelligence, surveillance 

and reconnaissance assets, to provide 

CBRN WMD intelligence updates in 

near real time. WMD intelligence technology must also enhance our ability to 

detect, collect, and analyze future warfare agents/radiological hazards in A2/

AD environments. Finally, these systems 

must be predictive of selected regions 

and diseases for advanced knowledge 

of future pathogenic theater conditions.

The second critical CBRN challenge 

for Unified Land Operations is the catastrophic potential of BWAs and the rapid pace of bio-technology that enables 

BWAs production and proliferation. Challenges include differentiating between 

natural, accidental or deliberate exposure and development of corresponding advanced prophylaxes and broadspectrum therapeutics against known 

and emerging threats. Additionally, the 

pressing needs for stand-off detection 

to reduce operational surprise, pathogen detection in water, personnel protection equipment (adaptable and scalable), personnel vaccination and vaccine 

stockpiling cannot be underestimated.

The BWAs challenge requires future 

technologies addressing real-time pathogen detection, forensics, and identification 

to alert commanders and assist medical 

personnel in assessing and responding to these threats. Portable detection 

equipment for austere environments, including airborne and water pathogens, 

and improved personnel protection 

equipment for passive defense must also 

rank high in technologies to develop. Finally, early detection and contamination 

avoidance are not sufficient to prevent 

exposure to BWAs, therefore it is essential to develop personnel, equipment 

and large weapon platform decontamination systems and associated joint standards that are feasible and sustainable 

anywhere the Joint Force must operate.

The third critical CBRN challenge for 

Unified Land Operations is the chemical warfare agents (CWAs) threat, specifically the Non-Traditional Agents 

(NTAs). NTAs challenges are many, 

but can be grouped in four basic categories: Detection and Identification (in 

all physical states); Protection (respiratory and ocular); Decontamination; 

and Therapeutics (antidote production 

and medical countermeasures). Future 

technologies to counter them include 

improved detectors, individual protective equipment, treatment protocols, and 

decontamination to enhance force protection. Given the intrinsic difficulties 

with detection of NTAs, it is important 

to develop “Smart” decontaminants that 

can be applied and removed by operators in the absence of autonomous, water-based decontamination operations.

The fourth critical CBRN challenge for 

Unified Land Operations is the threat of 

radiological hazards and nuclear weapons effects. Radiological and nuclear 

(RN) detection/identification is listed on 

the 2012 Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) Joint Priority List 

(JPL) given the need for breakthrough 

technologies in these areas remains 

critical to the Joint Force. In the most 

recent edition of the CWMD Journal, 

summer 2011, we discussed the need 

for Army’s doctrine and equipment to further develop to address radiological and 

nuclear challenges. In the article “Putting 

R and N Back in CBRN,” we described 

the challenges in this area and the positive steps that the Army has taken, but 

I also cautioned that “only through vigilance, renewed training on RN and an 

institutional adoption of prevention as a 

priority will the Army meets its responsibilities to the nation in combating nuclear and radiological weapons.” This 

assessment remains valid today from 

the overall U.S. Unified Land Operations operational perspective on CBRN.

Ground Forces face extraordinary 

CBRN challenges to succeed on the 

primary missions assigned to the Joint 

Force in the new DoD strategic guidance. The ability to effectively operate in 

a CBRN environment is necessary, since 

operations in a CBRN environment will 

no longer be possible; they will be probable. Providing the nuclear and CWMD 

expertise in support of the Joint Force to 

succeed in these missions is our professional duty and an essential element for 

a 21st century defense to sustain U.S. 

global leadership in a strategic environment where CBRN threats are ubiquitous. 

Future Unified Land Operations Planning Factors and Potential 

Impact of Associated CBRN Challenges

Planning factors

Ground forces should expect to operate in and provide effects within a CBRN

environment

CWMD missions are a part of and integrated into combined operations

CBRN capabilities will continue to be a part of future Unified Land Operations

structure

Potential CBRN Impacts

Smaller US footprint per country over a larger operational area (stretching

limited assets)

support timeline

Reduction or shifting of forward deployed US forces can increase response/

Potental competition for resources in support of civil authority

More austere environments (reduced access to water for decontamination

Potental contamination of water and/or food as weapon

Potental denial of access through contamination of Ports of Entry

Future - Unied Land Operations 

Combating WMD Journal ISSUE 8 2
Biotoxins Used As Warfare Agents (Part I)

John S. Nordin

AristaTek Inc

*This article is modified from another paper written by the same author for “The First Responder”, a newsletter of AristaTek, 

Inc., available at http://www.aristatek.com. 

hat Are Biotoxins?

A “biotoxin” is a poison produced by living organisms. 

The living organisms might be plants, 

animals, mollusks, fungi, microbes, or 

algae, for example. Over 400 biotoxins 

have been identified and many more exist 

in nature. The list includes ricin produced 

from the castor bean plant, snake venom, 

various toxins produced by bacteria, tetrodotoxin isolated from the livers of globe 

fish, aflatoxin produced by certain molds, 

cicutoxin from water hemlock, or histrionicotoxin from the skin of the poison arrow 

frog. The list is long. However the list 

is shortened to perhaps 15 or 20 biotoxins if we limit ourselves to those poisons 

which can be potentially used as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Only 

a few biotoxins produced in nature can 

be mass produced and dispersed in the 

form of an aerosol which can be inhaled 

or sprayed onto surfaces and absorbed 

through the skin. Poisoning of food and 

water supplies is possible, but the poison 

would have to be mass produced and 

added to the food source or water supply. 

Some biotoxins are destroyed by cooking or by normal water chlorination, but 

other biotoxins are not easily destroyed.

Sometimes the U.S. military and other 

agencies may publish lists under the 

broad classification of bioterrorist agents 

or biological warfare agents. The list may 

include listings such as smallpox, pneumonic plague, anthrax, ricin, saxitoxin, 

abrin, and botulinum toxin. We need to 

make a distinction between a biotoxin, 

a disease-causing agent (a pathogen), 

and the disease itself. A biotoxin enters 

the human body or is produced within the 

human body by disease-causing microorganisms and does not replicate itself. The 

disease-causing microorganism replicates 

itself. The condition of being “sick” as the 

result of the disease-causing agent is the 

disease. For example, the microorganism that is responsible for the disease 

botulism is caused by the bacterium 

Clostridium botulinum which can grow in 

food under anaerobic conditions, or in the 

intestinal tract, or in wounds. The bacterium produces a biotoxin called “botulinum 

toxin”. The disease botulism is caused by 

the biotoxin called “botulinum toxin” which 

is produced by Clostridium botulinum. 

We will limit our discussion to biotoxins. 

How Toxic Are Biotoxins?

Table 1, lists LD50 values for laboratory 

mice (unless otherwise specified) injected 

with or inhaling selected biotoxins. The 

LD50 value is the dose in units of micrograms per kilogram of body weight that 

results in approximately 50% kill of the 

test animal. Sometimes for inhalation 

the results are calculated as LCt50 in units 

of mg/min/m3 which are converted to LD50 

knowing the exposure time(s) and an estimated breathing rate of the test animals. 

The information was obtained from David 

R. Franz, 1997 (revised), “Defense Against 

Toxin Weapons”, U.S. Army Medical 

Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, 

Fort Detrick, MD. Additional values were 

obtained from the U.S. National Library 

of Medicine Hazardous Substances Data 

Bank (HSDB) which cites peer-reviewed 

toxicology data, and other sources.

Incapacitation as well as lethality must 

be considered. Some toxins such as 

the T-2 toxin cause illness at doses 

many times less than the concentration 

required to kill. 

w

Biotoxin

Botulinum toxin

Botulinum toxin

Shinga toxin

Maitoxin

Ciguatoxin

Batrachotoxin

Ricin

Ricin (1 micron)

Ricin

Tetrodoxin

Saxitoxin

Saxitoxin

Saxitoxin

Abrin

Abrin

Bacterium 

Bacterium 

Bacterium 

Rosary Pea plant

Rosary Pea plant

Marine 

dinoagellate

Fish marine 

dinoagellate

Arrow poison frog

Castor Bean 

(plant)

Castor Bean 

(plant)

Castor Bean 

(plant)

Puer sh

Marine 

dinoagellate

Marine 

dinoagellate

Marine 

dinoagellate

150000

150000

55000

65000

64000

64000

64000

65000

3400

1000

539

319

299

299

299

0.001 (by i.p.)

0.003 (by inhalation)

0.002 (by i.v.)

4.5 mg/min/ , LCt , 

rat, inhalation; LD 

3

50

50

50

about 0.7 μg/kg

0.01 (by i.v.)

0.13 (by i.v.)

0.40 (by i.p.)

2 (subcutaneous)

4 (by i.p.)

3 (by inhalation)

1000 to 20000 (by 

ingestion)

8 (by i.p or 

subcutaneous.)

10 (by i.p.)

263 (by ingestion)

0.9 (by inhalation)

1

2

1

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

12

13

Source Molecular LD , μg/kg, unless 

Weight otherwise specied

Reference

Table 1. Comparative Lethality of Selected Toxins in Laboratory Mice

3 ISSUE 8 Combating WMD Journal
diameter is produced, the aerosol is 

delivered uniformly over the area, and 

meteorological conditions are ideal. 

Some biotoxins result in incapacitating illnesses at levels much below the 

LD50 dose. An example is staphylococcal 

enterotoxin B which causes illness at very 

low dosages (vomiting and diarrhea). The 

LD50 by inhalation is 0.027 mg/kg (mouse). 

Staphylococcal enterotoxin B is a cytotoxin that causes the body to release large 

amounts of its own chemicals and fluids. 

Trichothecene mycotoxins in low dosages cause skin lesions and systemic 

illness without being inhaled and absorbed 

through the respiratory system. The most 

likely route of exposure is through the 

skin. A dose of one-billionth of a gram 

per square centimeter of skin is sufficient 

to cause irritation of the skin. A dose of 

one-millionth of a gram causes destruction of skin cells (necrosis). Microgram 

dosages can cause irreversible injury to 

the eye. The LD50 dose for one of the 

mycotoxins (T-2 Toxin) is 1210 μg/kg. 

An assassin could target an individual by injecting a biotoxin-contaminated pellet. An example is Bulgarian 

exile Georgi Markov who was apparently killed by a ricin-containing pellet (estimated 0.28 milligrams of ricin) 

injected in his thigh in London in 1978. 

What about Contamination of Food 

and Water Supplies?

Fortunately, there are a number of 

factors that work against massive contamination of public food and water 

supplies. Normal water chlorination will 

destroy bacterial toxins, for example, 5 

parts per million of chlorine for 30 minutes 

destroys botulinum toxin. Water chlorination at these concentrations is ineffective 

against ricin, saxitoxin, T-2 mycotoxin, 

or microcystin. Cooking food will also 

inactivate some biotoxins but not others. 

Cooking fish or mussels typically will not 

destroy the biotoxins associated with 

By comparison, the LD50 value (mice) 

for the chemical warfare agent Sarin is 

150 to 180 μg/kg (by injection), 1000 μg/

kg (dermal), or LCt50 of 540 mg/min/m3 

by inhalation (one-hour exposure) . For 

the chemical warfare agent VX, LD50 is 

22 μg/kg (subcutaneous injection). On 

a per unit weight basis, some biotoxins 

are more potent than any of the synthetic chemical warfare agents. 

How Do Biotoxins Act on the Human 

Body?

Toxins can be classified by the mechanism of toxicity. The two broad classifications are cytotoxins and neurotoxins. 

1. Cytotoxins cause cellular destruction 

2. Neurotoxins affect the central nervous 

system. Death is usually caused by 

paralysis of muscles of respiration. 

Neurotoxins may act as presynaptic or postsynaptic neurotoxins, or 

both. The mechanism of action may 

be an ion-channel binding toxin, the 

ion being sodium, potassium, or calcium, which blocks the ion channel by 

binding to or occluding the extracellular (cell membrane) pore opening 

of the channel. Alternatively, the 

neurotoxin may act as an ionophore, 

which facilitates the transport of ions 

across cell membranes, e.g., by 

combining with the ion or increasing 

the permeability of the membrane. 

The neurotoxin may bind externally 

to nerve terminals and intracellular 

blockage of acetylcholine secretion 

as in the case of botulinum toxin.

Ricin is an example of a cytotoxin. T-2 

Toxin is a cytotoxin which causes bleeding. Saxitoxin is a neurotoxin that acts as 

a selective sodium ion channel blocker and 

also inhibits the release of acetylcholine at 

nerve terminals. Tetrodotoxin is another 

example of a sodium ion-channel neurotoxin. Ciguatoxin (from fish contaminated 

with a dinoflagellate) is a sodium-ion binding toxin. Batrachotoxin affects the nervous 

system by causing depolarization of nerve 

and muscle fibers by increasing sodium 

ion permeability of the cell membrane.

How Might a Terrorist Deliver a 

Biotoxin?

The most likely method an aggressor 

might target military troops and civilian 

populations is as an aerosol, which allow 

the toxin to contact the inner surface of 

the lung. There are major technological 

problems that the aggressor must overcome. None of the biotoxins form gases 

or liquids that vaporize. All of them are 

solids (typically powders) which must 

be delivered as an aerosol usually by 

slurring in a liquid, e.g. a saline solution, 

perhaps with additives to prevent particles 

from clumping. To be most effective, the 

aerosol particle should be between 0.5 

and 5 microns in diameter to be captured 

by the lung surface. Particles larger than 

15 to about 20 microns fall harmlessly 

to the ground. Particles between 5 and 

15 microns may lodge in the nasal passages and trachea and therefore are 

not as effective as when lodged in the 

lungs. A substantial portion of particles 

less than 0.5 microns in diameter will be 

exhaled and not retained in the lungs. 

Consider ricin which has a LD50 aerosol 

toxicity of 3 μg/kg. Assuming the data 

obtained from mice also apply to man, a 

70 kg man receiving a 3(70)/1000 = 0.21 

milligram dose would have a 50% chance 

of surviving. The amount of ricin required 

to achieve this dose over a one kilometer 

square area is estimated to be about 80 

kilograms.1 This assumes that the ricin 

is emitted as a respirable aerosol near the 

ground. Even though ricin is very toxic, 

there are technological problems in covering a large surface area with the toxin. 

With botulinum toxin, less quantity is 

required. Botulinum has a LD50 of 0.003 

μg/kg. We are now talking of about 

80 grams of botulinum toxin to cover a 

one-square kilometer area.1 Again, this 

is assuming that the right-sized aerosol 

Combating WMD Journal ISSUE 8 4
these foods.2

 Coagulation/flocculation 

at a water treatment plant will remove 

the higher molecular weight compounds/

proteins but is ineffective against ricin, 

saxitoxin, or other lower molecular weight 

compounds. Carbon adsorption or 

reverse osmosis water treatment removes 

most biotoxins, even the lower molecular 

weight compounds. Ingestion of most 

biotoxins is less toxic than inhalation. 

Diagnosis

Responders and health care providers 

ask whether they may be able to tell the 

difference between a chemical warfare 

attack, a biotoxin attack, or a biological 

warfare attack using infectious agents. 

Radiation detection equipment is essential for detecting a dirty bomb attack. 

The onset of incapacitating symptoms 

in a chemical warfare attack is almost 

immediate (within minutes). The onset 

may be a little longer if the chemical 

agent is absorbed through the skin. 

Chemical nerve agent poisoning is a 

violent illness resulting in respiratory failure, airway constriction, and increased 

body secretions (saliva and airway 

secretions), pinpoint pupils, perhaps 

also convulsions and muscle spasms. 

Symptoms are almost always delayed in 

the case of a biotoxin attack or a biological warfare attack. There may be a delay 

of several days, even a week, from the 

time of exposure to an infectious agent to 

the time symptoms first occur. The delay 

could also be on the order of hours to two 

or three days in the case of a biotoxin 

attack depending upon the toxin and route 

of exposure. As expected, the delay is 

less if the toxin is inhaled. It is difficult, 

in general, to distinguish between a biotoxin and biological warfare agent attack. 

Diagnosis is based on specific symptoms 

and confirmation by laboratory tests. 

Each toxin must be considered individually. Some toxins incapacitate so quickly 

that there would be little time for therapy 

after an attack. Fortunately, the potent bacterial protein toxins (e.g. botulinum toxin) 

act slower, and therapy is usually successful if started within about 12 hours after 

exposure providing the toxin is identified. 

Identifying toxins or their metabolites in 

biological samples is very difficult because 

only a very small amount of toxin is required 

to cause illness. Therefore extremely sensitive assays are required. Furthermore, 

the biological samples must be collected 

soon after exposure or the molecules will 

be lost. The samples must be kept refrigerated until they can be analyzed as the 

toxin will be destroyed if stored at room 

temperature. Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays (ELISA) of nasal swabs 

(collected within 24 hours after exposure) 

are definitive diagnostic tests for inhalation 

of biotoxins. They are sensitive to about 

1 to 10 nanograms per millimeter and 

require about four hours to complete. The 

polymerase chain reaction technique provides a very sensitive means of detecting 

and identifying the genetic material of any 

living organism that might remain in the 

crude, impure toxin collected in the field. 

Protection

Biotoxins are solids, usually a powder, 

which when weaponized are dissolved 

or slurried in a liquid (usually a water or 

weak alcohol solution) and then an aerosol 

created. Details on how to weaponize 

biotoxins are not available in the open 

literature, but information on aerosol production for pesticide application and also 

tests on producing aerosols for inhalation LCt50 on test animals are published. 

Tight-fitting face masks can protect emergency response personnel. Eventually 

the aerosol will settle on the ground or 

on surfaces. Because toxins are not 

volatile, they should not pose a further 

threat (providing they are not ingested). 

An exception is the situation where the 

biotoxin also contains an infectious 

agent such as anthrax spores. Another 

exception is some mycotoxins (e.g. T-2) 

which are absorbed through the skin. 

If the toxin contaminates skin and 

clothing, ordinary soap and water 

should remove almost all of the toxin. 

Recognized Biotoxins Which Pose a 

Severe Public Safety Threat

Two of the natural biotoxins are classified 

as “Schedule 1 Chemical Warfare Agents” 

under the United Nations agreement on 

biological weapons, e.g. the Chemical 

Weapons Convention in 1993 and earlier 

agreements. These are saxitoxin and ricin.

On June 12, 2002, President George W. 

Bush signed into law the Public Health and 

Safety Act of 2002 (PL 107-188), which 

requires that the Department of Health 

and Human Services maintain a list of 

biological agents and toxins, which pose 

a severe treat to public safety. The list 

of biotoxins, as it appears in the August 

23, 2002 Federal Resister, (see also 42 

CFR Part 72, Appendix A) is as follows: 

• Abrin 

• Botulinum neurotoxins 

• Clostridium perfringens epsilon toxin 

• Conotoxins 

• Diacetoxyscirpenol 

• Ricin 

• Saxitoxin 

• Shiga toxin and Shiga-like toxins 

• Staphylococcal enterotoxins 

•Tetrodotoxin 

• T-2 toxin

We will look at each listed biotoxin in 

upcoming articles. Ricin is discussed here.

Ricin 

Ricin is a toxin extracted from the castor 

bean. The human fatal dose for ricin is 

about 1 to 20 mg/kg if ingested or about 70 

to 1400 mg for a 70 kg adult. A castor bean 

might pass through the gut unscratched if 

its surface is not broken (as in chewing), 

but eight chewed castor beans contain 

5 ISSUE 8 Combating WMD Journal
enough ricin to kill an adult and one 

chewed castor bean can kill a child3 and 

about 0.05 milligrams if injected.3 The 

lethal dose is much less in ricin is inhaled 

or injected (Table 1). Children are more 

sensitive than adults. Ricin acts by inhabitation of protein synthesis. Symptoms 

appear within a few hours after ingestion. The initial symptoms are abdominal 

pain, vomiting, and diarrhea (sometimes 

bloody). Within several days there is 

severe dehydration, urine decrease, and 

drop in blood pressure. If death has not 

occurred within five days, the victim usually recovers but suffers long-term organ 

damage. There is no specific antidote. 

The castor bean plant (Ricinus communis) originally is a native of tropical 

Africa. It is now grown worldwide, sometimes as an ornamental in gardens or as 

a houseplant, and also grows as a weed 

in tropical and semitropical areas. The 

growing of the plant is not illegal, but in 

the United States (see Title 18, United 

States Code, part 175) a person caught 

manufacturing or possessing ricin may 

be sentenced up to 10 years, or life for 

possession with intent to use as a weapon 

or to provide to a foreign government. 

Photographs and descriptions of the 

castor bean plant and its seed are readily available from the Internet making 

recognition easy. In tropical areas the 

plant can grow to almost tree-like size 

with up to 20-inch leaves. The leaves 

are usually eight-lobed as shown in 

the photograph with slightly serrated 

edges and prominent central veins.

Ornamental varieties grown in gardens 

may be purplish with narrower leaf lobes 

and smaller like the photo at the left. The 

flowers may be green or they may be pink 

or red as shown above (center). The soft 

flower capsules mature into soft spiked 

seed capsules each containing several 

mottled castor beans about 0.4 inch long. 

More than one million tons of castor 

beans are processed each year to make 

useful products such as castor oil. Besides 

its use as a laxative, castor oil when dehydrated is used extensively in paints and 

varnishes, and is said to have qualities 

superior to linseed oil. Its water resistant 

qualities make it ideal for coating fabrics 

and for protective coverings. Other use is in 

the production of sebacic acid, which is the 

basic ingredient in the production of nylon. 

Castor oil has an ability to cling to very 

hot moving parts making it an outstanding 

lubricant for high performance engines. 

Ricin does not partition into the castor oil 

product because the ricin is water-soluble. 

The ricin stays behind in the seed-pulp left 

over in oil extraction. The residual seed 

pulp (also called oil cake or pomace) may 

contain up to 5% ricin. The seed cake does 

make an excellent fertilizer. There are also 

numerous documented cases of ricin poisoning of horses or other livestock when 

they accidentally ate castor bean seeds 

or meal. Castor bean meal mixed in with 

bait is highly toxic to rodents and insects. 

Procedures for extraction of ricin from 

castor seeds or seed pulp are said to be 

available on the Internet, and this author 

has not attempted to research these 

procedures. The trick is to separate the 

ricin from the other complex proteins, 

which form part of the castor bean, and 

a simple extraction using water (or lye or 

acetone) plus filtration does not accomplish this. Consequently homegrown 

recipes are likely to produce a mixture 

of plant proteins, and the ricin produced 

might even be partly denatured (inactivated). Another toxin from castor beans 

called “Ricinus communis agglutinin” is a 

powerful hemagglutinin (clumps red blood 

cells) but does not penetrate the intestinal wall. U.S. Patent 3060165 (granted 

in 1962, withdrawn in 2004) may be the 

basis of some procedures. As mentioned 

before, manufacture of ricin is illegal. 

Mass spectrometry can be used 

as a method of forensic identificaImages of Castor Beans, Flowers, and Seeds

Source: University of Illinois Source: Cornell University

Source: NPR Website,

photo by Ketzel Levine

Source: Cornell

University

Source: Wikipedia as used 

in USA Today website

Combating WMD Journal ISSUE 8 6
tion of ricin including ricin in castor bean extracts. The procedure is 

described by Sten-Åke Fredriksson.4

Ricin is toxic by inhalation, injection, and 

ingestion. It is also absorbed by mucous 

membranes and the eyes. There is no 

known antidote. It is not readily absorbed 

through the skin. Symptoms of poisoning 

by ingestion may occur within a few hours, 

and include abdominal pain, vomiting, 

and sometimes bloody diarrhea (gastrointestinal hemorrhage). Within days, the 

victim experiences severe dehydration, 

decreased urination, and decreased blood 

pressure. Death occurs by shutdown of 

the circulatory system. Usually an otherwise healthy adult will recover if death has 

not occurred within five days, but could 

suffer organ damage. Based on table 1, 

the lethal dose for injection or inhalation is 

about 3 micrograms per kilogram of body 

weight assuming that mice data translates 

to humans. The lethal dose for ingestion is 

greater and depends on the body’s ability 

to absorb ricin through the intestinal tract.

There have been attempts to weaponize 

ricin by governments, but because the 

material is difficult to deploy as an aerosol 

and is easily deactivated, historically it 

has not been used as a mass casualty 

weapon. However, the potential for use 

as a mass casualty weapon is there. Al 

Qaeda has reportedly experimented with 

ricin. Historically, specific individuals 

have been targeted. There are also a 

few incidents where powdered ricin has 

been sent in first class letters in the United 

States, including one sent to U.S. Senate Majority Leader in November 2003. 

An overview on Ricin and its potential 

role in terrorism is presented in a Congressional Research Service Report to 

Congress presented in December 2010.5

Author Biographical

Dr. Nordin received his PhD degree in 

biochemical engineering from the University of Minnesota and has worked for 

several engineering firms and with the notfor-profit Western Research Institute on 

environmental and public safety problems. 

He is currently a co-owner of AristaTek Inc.

References for Table 1

1. Franz, D.R.cited above, and Gill, 

D.M.. Bacterial Toxins; a Table of Lethal 

Amounts. Microbilogical Reviews 46(1): 

86-94, (March 1982).

2. Physician Information Link, http://

www.aahealth.org/physicianslink/bioterrorism_botulism_overview.asp and 

Holzer, V.E., Botulism durch inhalation 

(German), Med Klin, 57: 1735-1738 

(1962).

3. U.S. National Library of Medicine 

Hazardous Substances Data Bank 

citing Griffiths, G.D. et al, Inhal Toxicol 

7(2): 269-298 (1995), exposure time not 

mentioned in HSDB

4. U.S. National Library of Medicine 

Hazardous Substances Data Bank citing 

Fodstad O. et al , Cancer 34(4): 418-425 

(1976). Another value LD50 (mouse, iv) 

is 20 μg/kg, from HSDB.

5. Franz, D.R.cited above and Yokoyama, A. et al; J. Biochemistry 104 (2); 

184-187 (1988).

6. Franz, D.R.cited above and Ishihara, 

Y., et al., Chemical Communications 46: 

2968-2970 (2010)

7. Franz, D.R.cited above and http://

www.batrachotoxin.com/

8. Fu T, et al. Int J. Immumopharmacol 

18(2): 686-692 (1966)

9. Griffiths et al. Hum. Exp. Toxicol, 

14(2): 155-164 (1995). Another estimate 

3 to 5 μg/kg by inhalation.

10. He, X. et al, Ricin Toxicokinetics and 

Its Sensitive Detection in Mouse Sera 

or Feces Using Immuno-PCR. PLoS 

ONE 5(9): e12858. doi:10.1371/journal.

pone.0012858. (2010). 

11. Franz, D.R and HSDB, cited above

12. HSDB, citing Lewis (ed),, Sax’s 

Dangerous Properties of Industrial 

Materials, 9th ed, Van Nostrand and 

Reinhold, New York, (1996)

13. Cresia, D.A., and M.L. Neally, 

“Acute Inhalation Toxicity of Saxitoxin 

to Mice.” Army Medical Research Inst. 

Of Infectious Diseases, Ft. Detrick, 

Md. Storming Media, report A365302. 

Aerosol of Saxitoxin in a saline solution. 

End Notes

1. Franz, David R., Defense Against 

Toxic Weapons. U.S. Army Medical 

Research and Material Command, 

(1997, revised), available at http://www.

usamriid.army.mil/education/defensetox/

toxdefbook.pdf. Original model from 

Calder, K.I., BWL Tech Study #3, 

Mathematical Models for Dosages 

and Causalty Coverage from a Single 

Point and Line Release of an Aerosol at 

Ground Level, DTIC# AD3 10-361, Dec. 

1957. The original model was based 

on a 100 square km area and assumed 

LD50 for ricin (inhalation) of 2.5 μg/

kg. which predicted 8000 kg ricin. For 

botulinum toxin, LD50 (inhalation) was 

0.0025 μg/kg, and about 8 kg botulinum 

toxin was predicted for a 100sqare 

kilogram area. 

2. FAO Corporate document respository, 

http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/y4743e/

y4743e0d.htm. Also Licciardello, J.J., et 

al, Applied Microbiology, 13(32: 249-256 

(1967) .

3. Wikipedia and Tebbett, I., O. Grundmann. Ricin on the Rise: Are we 

prepared?. Forensic Magazine. June 

2008, Available at http://www.forensicmag.com/print/208.

4. Sten-Åke Fredriksson et al, “Forensic 

Identification of Neat Ricin and of Ricin 

from Crude Castor Bean Extracts by 

Mass Spectrometry”, 2005, Anal. Chem. 

(An American Chemical Society publication), 77 (6), pp 1545-1555. 

5. Shea, D.A., and F. Gottron. Ricin: 

Technical Background and Potential 

Role in Terrorism. Congressional 

Research Service report for Congress, 

December 21, 2010.

7 ISSUE 8 Combating WMD Journal
Chemical Warfare: Part III

Mr. A. Mark Diglio

Chemical Engineer, U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

T his is the third article in a series 

detailing the history of chemical 

weapons that evolved into weapons of mass destruction and their role in 

our world today. Part I, CWMD Journal 

Issue 3, covers the development of chemical warfare (CW) from ancient times up to 

WW I. The article demonstrates how easily 

chemicals can be used in primitive inexpensive ways to create devastating impacts.

Part II, CWMD Journal Issue 4, covers 

CW during WW I. The use of chemicals 

in WW I ushered a new era known as the 

age of modern chemical warfare. As a 

result of the industrial revolution in the 

early 1900s, chemicals for killing were 

produced and disseminated on a massive and devastating scale. During WW 

I, post-war fatalities are estimated to be 

4 times those of post-war conventional 

fatalities. Although pulmonary poisoning 

from chemical weapons was common, 

death was often the result of influenza 

(for example, the influenza pandemic of 

1918), a major problem in WW I. Chemical toxicity as the result of inhalational or 

dermal exposure to agents often led to 

bacterial infection and death.1 From WW 

I, CW was understood to be a dastardly 

effective game changer – the weapon 

of mass destruction before the nuclear 

age following WW II. While for humanitarian reasons, the international community 

pushed to ban CW use, nothing stopped 

the research race to improve chemical 

protective and offensive capabilities.

Part III examines the role of CW during 

the interwar years – the years between WW 

I and WW II (1919 to 1939). During this 

period, the United States Chemical Corps 

transitioned into the Chemical Warfare 

Service (CWS). Throughout the 1920s, 

rumors and newspaper accounts told of 

international chemical use and attacks. 

CW technology advances and offensive 

use continued despite the Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning chemical weapons 

first use. In the 1930s the Italians and 

Japanese used CW (primarily mustard) 

to significant advantage. CW tactics are 

covered by illustration of mustard use in 

these two conflicts. Most significant was 

the German development of G-series 

nerve agents in the late 1930s drastically reducing quantity and time to kill. 

CW is not singly for killing, but for 

physiologically breaking the will of an 

adversary by denying food, water or 

terrain and inflicting painful to deadly 

consequence to those without protection. Understanding past warfare 

chemical employment tactics aids in 

our planning for defense against it in 

the future. In the wake of Osama bin 

Laden’s death, the instability of Middle 

Eastern countries possessing chemical 

weapons (i.e. – Libya and Syria), today’s 

ease of individuals to make or obtain 

deadly chemicals – the threat of CW 

use by a rogue state or non-state actor 

has never been greater.

The United States Chemical Warfare 

Service

When the United States sent the American Expeditionary Force to France in 

1917, the U.S. was largely unprepared 

for CW. The British and French militaries 

provided U.S. soldiers with protective gear 

and chemical munitions. Use of chemical 

weapons to break the deadlock of trench 

warfare led General Pershing to create 

a Gas Service. In September 1917, the 

U.S. Army formed the Gas Service with 

responsibility to train and equip our forces 

for protection and to use chemical offensive weapons (primarily British mortars 

and French 75mm artillery). On June 

28, 1918, the U.S. War Department created the U.S. Chemical Warfare Service 

(CWS) that was executed by the following 

U.S. Government Departments and Army 

Corps: the Bureau of Mines (research and 

development); the Ordnance Department 

(production of agents and filling chemical 

shells); the Medical Department (procurement and supply of gas masks); the Signal Corps (procurement of gas alarms), 

and; the Corps of Engineers (offensive training and employment of gas). 

Combating WMD Journal ISSUE 8 8
On July 1, 1918, MG William Sibert 

became the first director of the U.S. 

Army’s CWS. The CWS, originally organized by the Army as a temporary war 

measure, was part of the National Army 

only, not the Regular Army. Its temporary 

status was due to expire within 6 months 

after the end of WW I (later extended to 

June 30, 1920).2 However, if the CWS 

disbanded, the US Army would almost 

certainly forget the extensive experience of chemical offense, defense, and 

preparedness gained during the war.1

Two years later, July 1, 1920, Congress 

approved the CWS as a permanent part 

of the U.S. Army. Its mission included 

developing, procuring, and supplying all 

offensive and defensive chemical warfare 

material, together with similar functions in 

the fields of smoke and incendiary weapons. In addition, the CWS was responsible 

for training the Army in chemical warfare 

and use of special chemical troops. MG 

Amos Fries was the CWS chief from 1920 

to 1929. The 1920s were lean years for 

the CWS. It averaged 400 enlisted and 

less than 1,000 civilian employees. Initially limited to train only its own troops 

in all aspects of chemical warfare, the 

Judge Advocate General ruled in May 

1930 that both offensive and defensive 

training be allowed for all the Army.

During the interwar years, the CWS 

conducted research and development to 

ensure that the Army had credible chemical 

offensive capability as well as an effective 

defensive posture. The success of these 

programs helped prevent the use of chemical weapons in WW II.2

 However, it is 

speculated by others that early in the WW 

II, Germany could have used CW to great 

advantage; however, Hitler chose not to 

as his plan was to absorb fallen countries 

to peacefully join his cause. Later in the 

war, Germany lost air supremacy thereby 

becoming too weak to effectively deliver 

CW, even though their chemical weapons 

stockpile was vast. The United States had 

a no-first-use-policy regarding chemical 

warfare. The Allied countries practiced 

a similar policy. Chemical deaths and 

casualties from WW I served to remind 

both sides that CW use was a last resort.

The CWS expanded its battlefield 

capabilities with implementation of the 

4.2 inch chemical mortar and smoke 

generators, which delivered smoke and 

high explosive munitions in support of 

combat arms missions. The CWS also 

developed and deployed a family of 

flame and incendiary weapons systems.

In 1942 the CWS undertook the responsibility for managing developments in biological as well as chemical warfare. On 

August 2, 1946, Public Law 607 changed 

the name of the CWS to the “Chemical 

Corps.”3 The Chemical Corps continued its 

work on improving chemical and biological 

offensive and defensive capabilities. In 

1949 it was assigned the responsibilities of 

radiological warfare, giving the Chemical 

Corps the responsibility for Chemical, Biological and Radiological (CBR) warfare.2

Interwar Chemical Use

An international push to ban CW followed the conclusion of WW I. The 

Geneva Protocol of 1925 was essentially 

a “gentleman’s agreement” for no-firstuse, but even this was not adopted by 

the United States until March 26, 1975. 

The U.S. policy of continued CW preparation and retaliation in kind was viewed as 

the best deterrent. Hindsight has shown 

this strategy was effective for the U.S. in 

the 20th century. The Geneva Protocol, 

while well intended, did little to stop the 

advance of CW development, production and stockpiling. In fact, it was all 

too easy to claim wartime injustices for 

post-conflict use of chemical weapons. 

Despite global movements to stop CW, 

rumors and reports of chemical attacks 

plagued the world news throughout the 

1920s. During the Russian civil war and 

Allied intervention in the early 1920s, both 

sides possessed chemical weapons and 

reportedly used them on a limited basis. 

Isolated chemical attacks were also reported with accounts accusing the British, 

French and Spanish.4 Post WW I, many 

countries began to develop formal chemical warfare capabilities and some put their 

capabilities to the test in live operations. 

By the 1930s, many of the major powers had chemical programs and used 

or created stockpiles of chemical weapons. No international attempts to ban 

chemical warfare met any success in the 

1930s. Chemicals were secretly used for 

wars in the name of imperial expansion, 

most notably by Italy and Japan. Both 

Italy and Japan had formal CW development programs that led to their use 

of CW in the late 1930s. These cases 

show the insidious nature of chemical 

warfare is not just the lethal and latently 

debilitating or fatal casualties, but the 

very real psychological morale-breaking 

damage amongst the fighting troops. 

Italian-Ethiopian War (October 3, 1935 

to May 1936). This engagement was considered the first major use of CW following 

WW I. Italy’s dictator, Benito Mussolini 

launched an invasion of Ethiopia from its 

neighboring Italian controlled countries 

– Eritrea and Somaliland – that lasted 

7 months. Italy had military superiority. The question was not if Mussolini’s 

forces could secure victory, but when. The 

victory needed to come quickly before 

the world took notice and forced a preconclusive withdrawal. Mussolini used 

CW (predominantly mustard) to force an 

early conclusion. The conflict proved 

two things: 1) the ineffectiveness of the 

League of Nations (predecessor to the 

United Nations from WW II), and 2) the 

devastating effectiveness of chemical 

weapons against unprepared adversaries.5

Ethiopia

With air superiority, the Italians dropped 

mustard bombs and occasionally sprayed 

mustard from airplane tanks. They also 

disseminated mustard agent in powder 

form as a “dusty agent”, on the African des9 ISSUE 8 Combating WMD Journal
ert sands in order to burn the unprotected 

feet of the Ethiopians. There were rumors 

of phosgene and chloropicrin attacks, but 

these were never verified. The Italians 

later justified CW use as reprisal against 

illegal acts of war that the Ethiopians 

had tortured or killed their prisoners and 

wounded soldiers. The chemical weapons 

devastated the unprepared and unprotected Ethiopians, who had few anti-aircraft 

guns and no air force.6 Only decades 

later, in 1993, did Italy formally admit 

to using chemical weapons in the war. 

Described to the League of Nations by 

the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie’s:

“Special sprayers were installed on 

board aircraft so they could vaporize over 

vast areas of territory a fine, death-dealing 

rain. Groups of 9, 15, or 18 aircraft followed one another so that the fog issuing 

from them formed a continuous sheet. It 

was thus that, as from the end of January 

1936, soldiers, women, children, cattle, 

rivers, lakes, and pastures were drenched 

continually with this deadly rain. In order 

more surely to poison the waters and 

pastures, the Italian command made 

its aircraft pass over and over again. 

These fearful tactics succeeded. Men 

and animals succumbed. The deadly 

rain that fell from the aircraft made all 

those whom it touched fly shrieking with 

pain. All those who drank poisoned water 

or ate infected food also succumbed in 

dreadful suffering. In tens of thousands 

the victims of Italian mustard gas fell.” 7

The US Army closely followed the war 

with different assessments. From interviews with Italian soldiers and officers, 

one could be led to believe the use of 

chemical agents in the war was little more 

than an experiment, that mustard gas was 

not used extensively in the African campaign and its use had little if any effect 

on the outcome. The Italians claimed 

their machine guns and air force against 

the Ethiopians were the key elements. 

However, interviews with Ethiopians and 

analysis of effects gave an entirely different picture. Per US Army Captain Meade, 

“chemical weapons were a significant factor in winning the war. They destroyed 

the morale of the Ethiopian troops who 

had little or no protection. It broke any 

attempts at concentrating forces. Of all the 

weapons used, mustard gas was the most 

effective. It caused few immediate deaths, 

but temporarily incapacitated very large 

numbers and so frightened the rest that the 

Ethiopian resistance broke completely.”8

MG Fuller assessed that Italian use 

of mustard agent protected the flanks of 

columns by denying ridgelines and other 

key areas to the Ethiopians. In place of 

the laborious process of picketing the 

heights, the heights sprayed with mustard 

gas were rendered unoccupied by the 

enemy, save at the gravest risk. It was an 

exceedingly cunning use of this chemical.9

Japan-China War (1937). The next 

war that drew the interest of chemical 

warfare analysts began when the Japanese invaded China in 1937. Tensions 

between the large population of China 

and the more technologically advanced 

Japan existed for decades. In addition 

to their biological warfare program, the 

Japanese had an extensive chemical 

weapons program and produced agent 

and munitions in large numbers by the 

late 1930s. During the war with China, 

Japanese forces reportedly began using 

chemical shells, tear gas grenades, and 

lacrimatory candles, often mixed with 

Ethiopia

Courtesy of: World Atlas, http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/africa/et.htm

Combating WMD Journal ISSUE 8 10
smoke screens. By 1939 the Japanese 

had reportedly escalated to using mustard agent and lewisite. The weapons 

proved effective against the untrained and 

unequipped Chinese troops. The Chinese reported that their troops retreated 

whenever the Japanese used smoke, 

thinking it was a chemical attack.5,10,11

Chinese reports place the estimated 

number of chemical weapons used by 

Japan in this conflict around 2 million. 

About 670,000 abandoned Japanese 

chemical weapons are believed dumped 

or buried in the hilly plains of Jilin Province 

alone. Both Japan and China are working 

in cooperation to retrieve and environmentally dispose of these munitions.12

There are several lessons we can take 

away from the mid-1930’s Italian and Japanese employment of chemicals. The Italians tactic of using chemicals to deny their 

opponent terrain, food and water supplies 

still applies today. Also of note is how easy 

it was for Italians (as with the Germans in 

WW I) to find excuses to violate the firstuse ban on CW. When later challenged, 

the Italians claimed CW was a retaliatory 

measure for Ethiopian atrocities to Italian 

prisoners. The Japanese cunning mix of 

multiple agents with smoke thus faking 

the appearance of chemical attack is yet 

another tactic to be taken from this review.

Interwar Chemical Weapons Technology

At the close of the 1920s, the U.S. 

CWS categorized chemical warfare 

agents into three levels of importance.

• Mustard (H, HS for Hun-Stoffe 

where (S) for 35% solvent added 

to form crude mustard and HD signifying distilled or purified mustard)

• Methyl Difluorarsine (MD)

• Diphenylaminechlorarsine (DM)

• Chloroacetophenone (AN)

• Titanium Tetrachloride (FM)

• White Phosphorus (WP)

• Hexachlorethane (HC)

Less important were: 

• Phosgene (CG) 

• Lewisite (L) 

 Least important were:

• Choloropicrin (PS) 

• Chlorine (Cl).13

 The most important work on new chemicals was done secretly by Germany in the 

1930s (this information was not known 

by the allied powers until after WW II). 

Germany’s work on organophosphorus 

compounds, G-series chemical agents, 

brought about the first nerve agents, 

cholinesterase inhibitors. While initially 

discovered in 1854 synthesized by Wurtz 

and tested by Clermont in 185414, their 

use for chemical weapons was not realized until Germany’s efforts in the 1930s.

In the 1930s, Germany was in need of 

pesticides that could be made without the 

using petroleum, for oil was in very short 

supply. Dr. Gerhard Schrader was tasked 

by Dr. Bayer in 1934 to work on organic 

fluorides and other promising developments in organophosphates. In January 

1937, a drop of an organophosphatecyanide compound accidently fell upon a 

bench while Schrader was working. Soon, 

everyone in the room had constricted 

breathing and pin point pupils. After taking three weeks to recover, the research 

team understood that they had stumbled 

upon a highly toxic nerve agent with 

possible military applications. This was 

called “Tabun” (GA) originally code named 

“Taboon.” In 1938, using the same basic 

carbon-phosphate chiral center, but using 

fluorine instead of cyanide became known 

as “sarin.” Sarin (GB) was named after its 

inventors: Schrader, Ambrose, Rudiger, 

and Van der Linde.15 The G-series took 

CW to a new level of deadliness not again 

rivaled until the persistent V-series nerve 

agents were developed in the 1960’s.

Dissemination. WW I used cylinders and wind dispersal initially followed by chemical shells. The 1920s 

brought about chemical projectiles with 

central bursters. The 1930s, aircraft 

bombs and crude spray tanks as demonstrated by the Italians in Ethiopia.

Protection. For protection, significant 

improvements were made to gas masks 

after WW I in the early 1920s. Edgewood 

Arsenal, Maryland, made the first gas 

Courtesy of the US Military Academy, West Point History Department

11 ISSUE 8 Combating WMD Journal
masks that could filter smoke providing protection against arsenic-based compounds. 

Detection. Animals and noise makers were the practice in WW I. It was 

not until 1934 that the CWS was 

tasked with developing a field expedient detector. The fruits of that work 

were not realized until many years later. 

Closing Remarks

In review of chemical warfare in the 

1920s and 1930s, the most noteworthy 

item for chemical defense planning is 

the development of the G-series agents. 

The methods used by the Italians and 

Japanese in employing primarily mustard 

during the 1930s while not new, illustrate 

the possible application by hostile forces 

today. The key point of this discussion 

is how devastatingly effective CW use 

is against an unprotected population. In 

reality, the United States homeland is 

vulnerable to a CW attack at any level. 

This is because it is impractical to provide and maintain chemical protection and 

detection equipment for every person. 

However, the United States does the 

next best thing. There are intelligence 

efforts to identify and neutralize threats 

before they occur. Also, the Department of Homeland Security and DoD are 

prepared for rapid respond to domestic 

chemical incidents even though the public 

remains largely unaware and ill equipped.

The international memory of chemical atrocities from the WW I proved an 

adequate deterrent to both Axis and Allied 

employment of CW in WW II. However, 

this deterrent has little sway with terrorists. Furthermore, the international community continues to research to improve 

chemical offensive and defensive capabilities even today. Stay tuned to future 

issues of the Combating WMD Journal 

which will explore this topic further. 

Author Biographical

Mr. A. Mark Diglio is a Sr. CWMD Defense 

Analyst with USANCA at Ft. Belvoir, VA 

since 2007. He has a B.S in Chemical 

Engineering from the Pennsylvania State 

University and a Masters in Business 

Administration from the Florida Institute 

of Technology. His career began in 1980 

in Edgewood, MD with 16 years as a 

Group Lead in NBC Protective Equipment 

Materiel Development, Initial Production 

and Fielding. From 1996 to 2007, he was 

a Associate Project Manager with the 

Chemical Materials Agency for demilitarization, stockpile elimination. His email 

address is: anthony.m.diglio.civ@mail.mil

Correction

Chemical Warfare: Part II had a table 

that listed the US use of 75 artillery shells 

of phosgene in Verdun, France on March 

1916. This was done by Germany. The 

US did not fight in Europe until 1917.

End Notes

1. Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare, Office of the Surgeon General, 

United States Army p. 42-43.

2. The U.S. Army Chemical Biological 

Radiological Nuclear School, Ft. Leonard Wood, MO via http://www.wood.

army.mil/cbrns/history.html

3. The Army Almanac. Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office; 1950:89.

4. Stockholm International Peace 

Research Institute; The Rise of CB 

Weapons. Vol 1, The Problem of Chemical Biological Warfare. New York, NY: 

Humanities Press 1971

5. Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare, Office of the Surgeon General, 

United States Army p. 44-46.

6. Thuillier HF. The Use of Mustard Gas

by the Italians in the Abyssinian War. 

Porton, United Kingdom. Memorandum 

CDR5/1793, April 25, 1941.

7. Time. Quoted in: Brett HH. Chemicals and aircraft. Chemical Warfare 

Bulletin. 1935; 22:151-152.

8. Clark DK. Effectiveness of Toxic 

Chemicals in the Italo-Ethiopian War. 

Bethesda, Maryland: Operations 

Research Office; 1959: page 20.

9. Chemicals in Ethiopia. Chemical 

Warfare Bulletin. 1936;22:page 143. 

10. Stockholm International Peace 

Research Institute (SIPRI). The rise of 

CB weapons. Vol 1. In: The Problem of 

Chemical and Biological Warfare. New 

York, NY: Humanities Press: 1971.

11. 5250th Technical Intelligence 

Company. The Use of Poison Gas by 

Imperial Japanese Army in China, 1937-

1945. Tokyo, Japan: 5250th Technical 

Intelligence Company; 1946.

12. China Through A Lens: WWII 

Japanese Chemical Weapons in China 

Explained: An Interview, China.org.

cn by Chen Chao and Daragh Moller, 

December 4, 2003.

13. Jeff K Smart, History of Chemical 

and Biological Warfare Fact Sheets. 

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: US 

Army Chemical and Biological Defense 

Command: 1996. Special Study 50.

14. Holmstedt B. Structure – activity 

relationships of the organophosphorus 

anticholinesterase agents. In: Koele Gb, 

ed. Cholinesterases and Anticholinesterase Agents. Berlin, Germany: Springer 

Verlag; 1963: 429.

15. Chemical and Biological Warfare, An 

Annotated Bibliography by Eric Croddy, 

The Scarecrow Press, Inc. Lanham, Md., 

& London, 1997: xv.

Combating WMD Journal ISSUE 8 12
showed little to no interest in the development of a DoD counterproliferation 

strategy in the late 1990s. Yet all four 

services, including the Army, resisted 

calls in 1999 to change the management 

structure, despite numerous criticisms and 

repeated failures to field new CB defense 

equipment on time and within budget.

The 9/11 attack was the catalyst to 

restructuring the DoD CBDP in 2002-2003, 

resulting in the creation of permanent, 

full-time offices within the DoD acquisition process. It also resulted in adding 

consequence management and installation protection as new responsibilities to 

the traditionally passive defense-focused 

program. The Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology 

(AT&L) approved an implementation plan 

that identified the Army as the material 

developer, test and evaluation executive, 

and program analysis and integration 

director of the DoD CBDP.3 Over the last 

ten years, we have seen new defense 

strategies for combating WMD and combating terrorism, significant changes in 

joint and multi-service doctrine, the development of a top-down and joint “capabilitybased” development process, and U.S. 

Strategic Command’s (USSTRATCOM) 

new role as the “synchronizer and integrator” of DoD combating WMD efforts. 

The stand-up of U.S. Northern Command 

(USNORTHCOM) initiated new discussions of homeland defense/civil support 

missions and capabilities, while U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 

addressed WMD terrorism concerns.

Despite these new DoD strategies, 

priorities, and direction, the DoD CBDP 

has remained focused on fielding the 

same passive defense equipment that 

it developed in the 1990s. The program 

Executing the DoD Executive Agent Role for Chemical and 

Biological Defense

n 1993, Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to designate the Army 

as an “executive agent ... to coordinate and integrate research, development, 

test, and evaluation [RDT&E], and acquisition, requirements of the military departments for chemical and biological warfare 

defense programs of the Department of 

Defense.”1 This direction originated in a 

section of Public Law 103-160 (National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

1994), now codified as 50 U.S. Code, section 1522. It is better known as the act that 

consolidated all DoD chemical and biological (CB) defense RDT&E funding (except 

DARPA) into six defense-wide program 

element funding lines, to be managed by 

a single office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). It also directed 

the Secretary of the Army to review all 

funding requirements developed by the 

Department of Defense’s (DoD) Chemical 

and Biological Defense Program (CBDP). 

The 1993 public law was not the first mention of this DoD Executive Agent role. In 

1976, DoD Directive 5160.5, “Responsibility for Research, Development, Test 

and Evaluation (RDT&E) on Chemical 

Weapons and Chemical and Biological Defense,” identified the Army as the 

DoD Executive Agent, with the Services 

responsible for requirements development 

and procurement of CB defense equipment. In 1985, this directive was updated 

to clarify this responsibility in terms of 

joint requirements, updated budget procedures, and the development of chemical warfare agents for military purposes. 

In executing the public law’s direction, 

the three Service acquisition executives 

signed a memorandum of agreement in 

1994 on how to implement the new joint 

program. Specific Army general officers 

were designated as chairs of a requirements committee and an acquisition 

committee, both populated by service 

action officers who had full-time jobs in 

other organizations. A larger oversight 

board, chaired by the Army Acquisition 

Executive and the Vice Chief of Staff of 

the Army and including flag officers from 

the other Services, presided over the 

annual development of the CBDP budget. 

Although the Army had most of the RDT&E 

infrastructure and majority of procurement requirements, a “one Service, one 

vote” rule effectively reduced the Army’s 

equity to being equal to the other three 

Services. In addition, the action officers 

divided responsibility for managing the CB 

defense acquisition projects among the 

four Services. The Army’s Executive Agent 

role was more facilitation than leadership.

By 2000, the need for a new management structure became painfully clear. 

Mid-level action officers were deciding 

the direction of the program, rather than 

the general officers who were appointed 

as principals on the committees. The 

program’s funding had roughly doubled 

in size since its inception to more than 

$700 million a year. The DoD CBDP was 

not responsible for the DoD Domestic 

Preparedness Program, which executed 

a 120-city “train the trainer” program for 

U.S. cities preparing to respond to CBRN 

terrorist incidents.2 It was not initially in 

charge of developing, certifying, and 

procuring equipment for the Weapons 

of Mass Destruction (WMD) Civil Support Teams. The Joint Program Office 

for Biological Defense ran its projects as 

an effort distinct from the Army Program 

Manager for NBC Defense. The Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) was 

established in 1998 as a combat support agency to address combating WMD 

issues. The DoD CB defense community 

I

Al Mauroni

13 ISSUE 8 Combating WMD Journal
traditionally favors building detectors and 

protective suits and masks over other CB 

defense capabilities, resulting in the addition of specialized, unique systems to the 

military force rather than integrating these 

capabilities into other major defense systems. The exceptions have been a small 

number of expensive, challenging initiatives that were directed by OSD and Congress (e.g., WMD Civil Support Teams, CB 

Installation Protection Program, Transformational Medical Technologies Initiative). 

The most recent OSD initiatives have 

been the “Medical Countermeasures Initiative” and global medical biosurveillance. 

Constant discussions about radiological 

and nuclear terrorism has called into 

question whether the DoD CBDP should 

address chemical, biological, radiological 

and nuclear (CBRN) defense capabilities 

that are not inherently passive defense 

in nature. Over the past ten years, the 

Army has not, however, led the DoD CBDP 

into these new combating WMD areas. 

The Challenges for a DoD Executive 

Agent

The DoD CBDP has not evolved along 

with the national security strategy and 

its direction over the past decade. Part 

of the problem has been the changing 

nature of the combating WMD culture. The 

National Strategy to Combat WMD uses 

a counterproliferation concept to address 

homeland security challenges, articulating 

the concern that terrorists might employ 

WMD developed by “rogue” nation-states 

against the United States.4 This was a 

dramatic change from pre-9/11 operational concepts and strategies addressing 

adversarial WMD programs and terrorism 

challenges. Since 2002, DoD has viewed 

counterproliferation, combating terrorism, 

and federal responses to industrial accidents and infectious disease in the context 

of WMD. As a result of this larger mission 

set, the Chemical Corps and Functional 

Area (FA) 52 (nuclear and counterproliferation) community have been shouldered aside for a new cast of post-9/11 

“WMD experts.” In response, the Army 

has chosen to repeat combating WMD 

narratives from higher strategic documents, rather than to critically examine 

the need for a new post-Cold War concept. 

When the 1993 public law was passed 

in Congress, there was no question as 

to what “CB defense” meant – it was the 

protection of military forces against CB 

warfare agents. The combating terrorism 

and the homeland security communities 

are using the term “CBRN defense” in 

discussions of policy, budget, and authorities, but U.S. Code still directs DoD to use 

the CBDP to procure all DoD CB defense 

needs.5 Because of the broadened mission, some have claimed that every 

piece of CBRN defense gear needs to be 

“dual-purpose” and applicable across the 

range of military operations. As a result, 

the desired equipment has become more 

expensive (due to the added requirements) and now requires more time to 

test and field. In addition, because the program’s budget has not appreciably risen 

to accommodate every CBRN defense 

requirement across the combating WMD, 

combating terrorism, and homeland security missions, this has resulted in less 

capability fielded to the force, not more. 

Many young Army officers on their first 

tour of duty inside the Pentagon are unprepared to deal with the DoD bureaucracy, 

being more familiar with field operations 

than staffing action packages. They often 

have difficulty understanding the implications of particular defense initiatives or 

how to engage the process in which CBRN 

defense issues are developed. They are 

outmaneuvered by those professionals who do understand the subtleties of 

defense policy and budgets and whose 

terms are longer than the two-three year 

tours of duty of a typical military officer. 

There are Chemical Corps and FA 52 officers at OSD Policy and AT&L, the Joint 

Staff, and offices within the DoD CBDP and 

Army staff, but they have not significantly 

impacted the direction of the program.

Currently, the DoD CBDP does not have 

a strategic plan, at least not in the terms 

of what the Government Accountability 

Office would call a strategic plan, one 

with measurable actions and discussion 

of available resources.6 The DoD Annual 

Report to Congress on CB Defense is 

not a strategic plan. Every year, the DOD 

CBDP stakeholders meet to develop a 

budget strategy. Every year, the same 

priorities and issues emerge for debate. 

And every year, the same projects (despite 

their respective success or failure over 

time) are funded at essentially the same 

levels.7 There is little to no formal review 

of the program’s progress and direction to address critical capability gaps. 

Despite the end of the Cold War, we 

remain mired in the general mindset of a 

passive defense construct that requires a 

large and technically-focused specialist 

force to execute the DoD’s CB defense 

requirements. The deliberate segregation of all combating WMD tasks in the 

Universal Joint Task List from the rest of 

the military tasks and capabilities, rather 

than integrating CB defense into current 

defense concepts and policy, has been 

a mistake. The “WMD/CBRN” definition 

now includes toxic industrial chemicals, 

natural disease outbreaks, and radiological hazards, and yet at the same 

time, no one considers the costs and 

benefits of trying to develop CB defense 

equipment to address these hazards in 

addition to military warfare agents. The 

tyranny of the scientific/technological 

elite drives the development of CBRN 

defense capabilities, concepts, and even 

policy, rather than any critical examination 

of operational capability needs against 

overall defense roles and missions.

There are few forums in which to discuss these important issues. The Chemical School sponsors multi-service CBRN 

defense training and doctrine development, but it largely stays at the tactical 

level of discussion and within the small 

community of CBRN technical experts. 

The Joint CBRN Defense Conference, 

Combating WMD Journal ISSUE 8 14
The definition of what a WMD is and 

what CBRN defense entails remains 

unclear, not only within DoD but across the 

interagency. Despite significant capability 

gaps within passive defense, the DoD 

CBDP is trying to address select capability 

gaps within antiterrorism, consequence 

management, WMD elimination and 

interdiction, medical biosurveillance, and 

medical countermeasures for infectious 

diseases other than validated biological 

warfare threats. Now when the DoD budget was flush, it was easy for the CBDP 

to research and develop equipment for 

purposes other than passive defense, but 

those days are long gone. The current 

budget will not allow for all critical CBRN 

defense requirements to be funded. If the 

Army does not clearly define what CBRN 

defense is and is not, and what the CBDP 

should and should not address, it will be 

defined by others. And the result will not be 

favorable for the Army or other Services. 

Establish an advocacy at senior levels 

within HQDA, OSD, USSTRATCOM, and 

Congress. Countering WMD threats 

is not a top priority for DoD, let alone 

the U.S. government, despite heavy 

rhetorical language to the contrary. Yes, 

the term “WMD” is mentioned in certain 

strategy documents. Yes, there are 

advocates for counter-WMD and CBRN 

defense issues within HQDA, OSD, and 

USSTRATCOM. Yes, there is a Joint 

Senior Leaders Course at Fort LeonardWood. These facts have not resulted 

in the successful resolution of counterWMD issues within the larger DoD/US 

Government. All too often when WMD 

is brought up, whether in a wargame or 

during a crisis, the topic is segregated 

from “normal” defense issues as a distinct strategic concern to be addressed 

by “someone else.” Without the support 

of Army leaders above the two-star level, 

it becomes very challenging to ensure 

that the desired outcome of any policy 

discussion will be reflective of Service 

concerns. At the same time, the Chemical Corps and FA52 community must 

formerly the Worldwide Chemical Conference, has not been the stage for academic 

or policy discussions for many years. The 

USSTRATCOM Global Synchronization 

Conference is an important forum, but it 

focuses more on regional plans, nonproliferation challenges, and consequence 

management than combating WMD 

policy and CBRN defense capabilities. 

As an example, after years of discussion, there still is no consensus on how 

to define foreign consequence management. The National Defense University 

has an annual combating WMD symposium that consistently has a number of 

impressive speakers. But the participants 

talk more about nuclear weapons and 

nonproliferation issues than counterproliferation or passive defense in particular.

Redefining the DoD Executive Agent Role

It remains unclear if the senior Army 

leadership (at the three-four star level and 

respective senior executive services) is 

convinced that it should proactively engage 

and lead the greater defense community 

on CBRN defense issues. If this were to 

take place, the Army leadership needs to 

understand what this engagement role 

would require. It has to be more than just 

fielding full-time specialist units and writing 

operational doctrine for the Army. This 

mission statement is offered as a starting 

point: The Army, as the DoD Executive 

Agent for CB Defense, coordinates and 

integrates the RDT&E and acquisition 

requirements of the military departments 

for CBRN defense capabilities within combating WMD, combating terrorism, and 

homeland security efforts. This includes:

 • Advocating military CBRN 

defense capabilities for all Services and combatant commands 

in line with national defense strategy and defense policy direction

• Leading the development of 

DoD CBRN defense issues based on 

analytically-derived facts and using 

rational cost/benefit projections of the 

consequences of action or inaction

• Supporting interagency and international discussions on DoD CBRN 

defense capabilities in support of military combat operations, as well as combating terrorism and homeland security

• Identifying critical DoD CBRN 

defense capability shortfalls, assessing 

the status of RDT&E projects, and leading the planning, programming, budgeting and executing of the DoD CBDP

• Supporting the operations 

and sustainment of critical Army 

CBRN defense RDT&E infrastructure with Army funds and personnel

• Developing professionals who 

understand the complexities of DoD 

CBRN defense and who are engaged 

with the broader defense community 

on critical DoD counter-WMD issues

Specific actions to execute this mission should include the following.

Update the DoD directive on management of the DOD CBDP. The original 

DoDD 5160.5 was signed in 1985 and 

addressed the development of chemical 

weapons in addition to CB defense.8

It should have been updated in 2000, 

but (as noted previously) the DoD CB 

defense community had no desire for 

change and OSD did not push the issue. 

The AT&L signed an implementation 

plan to restructure the DoD CBDP in 

2003, but it took until 2008 to update the 

DoDD with those roles and responsibilities (perhaps waiting for the completion 

of DoDD 2060.2, DoD Combating WMD 

Policy, signed in 2007).9 However, the 

current directive did not really change 

the way that DoD addressed RDT&E 

and acquisition of CB defense equipment. It does not reflect that the term 

“CBRN defense” has fundamentally 

changed, and yet the way DoD develops 

and acquires CBRN defense equipment 

has not changed.

15 ISSUE 8 Combating WMD Journal
understand the greater scope of defense 

priorities and concerns.

Working with the defense community 

within Washington DC is vital to developing a long-term constituency. This cannot 

be done from Fort Leonard-Wood or Offutt 

Air Force Base. OSD leaders will support 

the Army’s Executive Agent role only if they 

see some value-added in the discussion of 

counter-WMD issues in light of other, more 

urgent defense priorities of the day. There 

are many, many other defense issues and 

larger acquisition programs that command 

the attention of defense leaders. The DoD 

CBDP budget is less than one-half of one 

percent of the DoD budget, and as long 

as there is no immediate crisis involving WMD, there will be other meetings, 

other issues viewed as more deserving of 

time and funds.10 The Army must be able 

to articulate why OSD should address 

CBRN defense issues within the overall 

scope of contemporary defense policy. 

Within the Joint Staff, “combating WMD” 

responsibilities are split between four 

offices (J3, J4, J5, and J8). There are 

many priorities, few staff, and little time to 

adequately develop the issues. The combatant commands have many concerns, 

but CBRN defense is often not a priority 

(again, except in time of crisis). As a result 

of the staffing process, any Joint Staff 

action can result in a product developed 

by census, and thus may lack clarity and 

focus. If the Army does not have strong 

ties with these offices or is not engaged 

with the Joint Staff on the development 

of CBRN defense capabilities, it is losing ground. On rare occasions, the Joint 

Staff might work a WMD issue raised by 

a combatant command or an OSD office, 

but if that happens without Army participation, the outcome may not be favorable. 

Last, Congress is the Army’s friend. 

Every legislative representative wants to 

see the Army remain strong, but sometimes the Army has difficulty in effectively 

communicating its message. Of course, 

the Army cannot lobby Congress on 

specific defense issues that are to be 

legislated. That doesn’t mean that the 

Army cannot inform Congress about its 

CBRN defense capabilities and concerns 

through appropriate channels. Recently, 

in response to OSD direction to reduce 

the number and length of annual reports 

to Congress, the DoD Annual Report to 

Congress on CB Defense was changed 

from a colorful, informative discussion 

to a very short, black-and-white report 

that barely addressed the legal requirements of 50 USC 1522.11 This decision 

was a significant failure of strategic communications and needs to be rethought.

Redefine and strengthen the CBDP 

research and development program. The 

CBDP is executing the same R&D program 

that existed since the 1980s – “avoid, protect, and decon, in that order!” It continues 

to promote the stove-piped development 

of specialized CB defense gear that the 

warfighter often sees as unnecessary or 

burdensome during both conventional and 

irregular conflicts. To be successful, the 

DoD CBDP needs to integrate CB defense 

equipment into existing major defense 

acquisition programs rather than develop 

stand-alone equipment that might be integrated into other defense systems after 

the thought. A few years back, a project 

manager under Army PEO Soldier decided 

to abandon an integrated helmet-protective mask concept for its next generation 

land warrior program. There is little, if any, 

agreement on how to develop the next 

generation protective suit, other than it will 

be a separate suit, not integrated, into the 

future soldier system. There was no plan 

to integrate CBRN defense capabilities 

into the Future Combat System vehicles 

other than to plug in currently existing 

chemical and radiological detectors. 

The U.S. military has the most sophisticated reconnaissance, detection, and 

identification equipment in the world, 

and in an effort to achieve the Star Trek 

tricorder standard, continues to throw millions of dollars after immature technologies and unreachable requirements. It is 

unlikely that the DoD CBDP can develop 

any protective mask or suit with significantly improved capabilities over what 

has been fielded to date. But there is no 

attempt to integrate collective protection 

into fixed buildings, military vehicles, or 

military shelters. There is very little funding 

for a new decontaminant, which retards 

the ability to effectively decon military 

systems or to ensure fixed sites can 

recover from a CBRN attack. There is 

no attempt to address CBRN contamination survivability requirements for DoD 

major defense acquisition programs. 

As OSD redefines the term “WMD” to 

include natural infectious diseases, the 

ability to develop new CBRN defense 

capabilities for the military is diminished.12

Redefine and strengthen the CBDP 

acquisition program. Until there are 

adequate funds to execute a CBRN 

defense program that addresses all combating WMD, combating terrorism, and 

homeland security requirements, military 

forces will lack critical passive defense 

capabilities. Given funding realities and 

existing threats, the DoD CBDP needs 

to carefully procure the right equipment 

and capabilities for the force. One step 

would be to stop procuring consumable 

CB defense items such as protective suits 

and medical chemical countermeasures 

for the services. The counterargument has 

been the services won’t use operations 

and sustainment funds to buy consumable 

CB defense equipment, so the industrial 

base will suffer. This is a flawed argument. 

The Services have a Title 10 responsibility 

to sustain their operational capabilities in 

the field. If they shirk these responsibilities, they need to be held accountable.13

It is not the CBDP responsibility to buy 

all the CBRN defense equipment for all the 

Services’ requirements. This statement is 

hard for some to understand. Antiterrorism/

force protection is a Service and combatant 

command responsibility, and the Services 

should be free to procure CBRN defense 

equipment within the context of their antiterrorism priorities. Homeland security 

Combating WMD Journal ISSUE 8 16
Initiate an aggressive engagement strategy within the Army. There are only a few 

publications that promote CBRN defense 

discussions, notably the Army’s Chemical Review and the USANCA Combating 

WMD Journal. Recently, both magazines 

have gone to electronic formats, a step 

that was both long overdue and beneficial 

to increasing the discussion of WMD-related issues. Given the broad scope of topics 

and issues in the field, one might hope for 

quarterly distribution of both magazines, 

but there are known financial limitations. 

In addition, the Joint Program Executive 

Office for CB Defense has a quarterly 

journal and other information products that 

discuss its research, development, and 

acquisition efforts.15 These are good publications and need to be fully supported. 

However, there isn’t much evidence of 

the Army taking advantage of all of the 

evolving information technology efforts 

that have so significantly reduced communication barriers across the world. 

There are no electronic forum and few 

web sites that promote the discussion 

of WMD issues. One might point to various small discussion groups within select 

forums, and perhaps there are discussions within Army Knowledge Online, but 

these forums are limited and closed to the 

larger combating WMD community. We 

need to include industry and academia in 

the discussion to cross-fertilize the Army 

doctrine and concepts with new ideas. 

Not all good ideas originate within the 

military. If industry is there to get some 

valuable insights to developing new widgets, isn’t that still a good end result?

 The Chemical Corps Regimental Association (CCRA) needs to evolve from its 

current status of focusing on history and 

embrace modern business strategies that 

increase its visibility. The CCRA needs to 

leverage the active and retired Army community to advocate Chemical Corps challenges and needs with the public, with Congress, and with industry. The Association 

of the United States Army is a good model, 

and the CCRA needs to learn some best 

requires other government agencies to 

procure CBRN defense capabilities that 

can be sustained for responses to domestic incidents. The medical community has 

the responsibility to develop and procure 

capabilities for force health protection, to 

include protection against military warfare 

agents. While the medical response to 

CBRN weapons and industrial chemicals, 

natural diseases, and radiological accidents may be similar, that should not be 

an excuse to mandate that the CBDP fund 

the development of all material solutions 

to CBRN hazards. The DOD CBDP needs 

a true six-year strategic plan, with clear 

mission, vision, and goals and measurable 

actions, and someone who will hold feet 

to the fire to accomplish those actions. 

Redefine and strengthen the CBDP test 

and evaluation program. Although the four 

Services all have independent test and 

evaluation (T&E) agencies, there is only 

one Service that has the expertise and 

infrastructure to execute developmental 

and operational T&E of CBRN defense 

equipment. The CBDP coordinates the 

four Services’ T&E efforts under an Army 

office, but the cost of modernizing and 

sustaining that T&E capability is considerable. Prior to the 2003 reorganization, the 

Army was using its own funds to pay for its 

T&E facilities, and as a result, there were 

significant slips in program schedules and 

high customer costs to the program. As 

a result of the reorganization, the DoD 

CBDP moved hundreds of millions of dollars into the Army’s T&E infrastructure 

(notably, Dugway Proving Ground and 

Edgewood CB Center). However, sustaining and modernizing that capability 

continues to demand a high price, especially as the program attempts to address 

future threats and natural diseases.

Maintaining the funding for Army T&E 

facilities is an ongoing struggle during the 

annual budget builds. To some people, 

any CBDP money going to T&E is less 

money for research or fielding equipment. 

The Army as a whole (not just the Army 

T&E office) needs to justify what the DoD 

CBDP should fund, as opposed to what is 

funded by Army money. In addition, OSD 

decided to fund some Army laboratory 

modernization efforts that are related to 

CB defense research. This second effort 

is less well-justified, and should be terminated. The Army should demonstrate the 

cost/benefits of its T&E capabilities, while 

showing its willingness to use its own operating funds to ensure that basic laboratory 

capability at Edgewood, at Fort Detrick, 

and at Dugway continues in the future. 

Educate the Army’s rank and file. The 

Air Force War College hosts the Air Force 

Counterproliferation Center, which runs 

elective WMD classes for Air Force students, hosts an annual conference on 

counterproliferation, and releases publications on relevant and current topics.14 

Where is the Army’s equivalent? Although 

there have been advances in joint professional military education, most students 

attending the Army War College and 

advanced schools at Fort Leavenworth 

probably do not learn about WMD issues 

and CBRN defense. Perusing the Army’s 

Strategic Studies Institute web site demonstrates two things – the high quality 

of academic papers being researched 

and published, and the absolute lack of 

any discussion on combating WMD. If 

combating WMD is one of the DOD’s top 

future priorities, where is the education 

and discussion going on within the Army? 

The Army may have a combating WMD 

concept, but outside of the CBRN defense 

community, discussion of WMD issues 

within the context of other Army doctrine 

and concepts isn’t happening. Developing 

a combating WMD elective at Carlisle and 

Leavenworth may require time and funds 

that the CBRN School (or DTRA) doesn’t 

have. This goes back to the advocacy 

issue – as the DoD Executive Agent for 

CB defense, the Army needs to be seen 

as the thought leaders for CBRN defense. 

That means investing in joint professional military education, both formally 

through the senior warfighting schools 

and through a broader publication basis.

17 ISSUE 8 Combating WMD Journal
practices from it. The Army could do worse 

than to move the Joint CBRN Defense 

Conference to Washington DC and to promote more diverse speakers other than 

the usual suspects from the DoD CBDP, 

bringing out the usual information briefs.

Conclusions

The DoD CBDP has fundamentally failed 

to evolve with the changes in national 

security over the past decade. A primary 

challenge is the lack of interest in CBRN 

defense issues above the two-star general 

officer level within Washington DC. The 

Army needs to demonstrate the acumen 

and leadership that propelled the Chemical Corps from near-extinction in 1973 to 

becoming a relevant combat support force 

in 1990. If the Army leads the way with its 

very talented community of CBRN defense 

and combating WMD experts, the other 

Services and the OSD offices will follow. It 

is because of the lapse of vision, the inability to articulate critical issues and advocate 

for new capabilities across all the services 

and defense agencies, that they have lost 

faith. It’s time for a new direction, one that 

recognizes the future national security 

trends and that integrates new concepts 

that are defendable and executable. 

In 2000, Stephen Scroggs penned a 

book titled “Army Relations with Congress: 

Thick Armor, Dull Sword, Slow Horse.”16 

He described Army leadership as deeply 

committed to national security and willing to do more with less, if the budget 

didn’t fund everything that they desired. 

However, there were characteristics that 

prevented the Army from being fully successful. These included insufficiently 

engaging its members on top priorities in 

advance of budget cycles; being reactive 

to critical national security issues instead 

of proactively planning for potential crises; treating OSD and Congressional 

interaction as a burden rather than an 

opportunity; and having the tendency to 

be inwardly focused and risk adverse.

The Army Chemical Corps and FA52 

community mirror these characteristics 

as well. This shouldn’t be a surprise; it’s 

natural for subordinate elements to mirror their leadership. However, these are 

detriments to executing the “DoD Executive Agent” role and joint engagement on 

combating WMD issues. The legislation 

that created the DoD CBDP and a DoD 

Executive Agent role can be changed 

to allow DTRA to lead or to devolve the 

program back to the four Services. Given 

the Army’s significant investment in this 

area, that path should be avoided, but 

that requires the Army’s combating WMD 

community to aggressively lead the DoD 

toward the development of new strategies, 

new operational concepts, and new capabilities that are sustainable and executable 

in the future joint operational environment.

Author Biographical

Al Mauroni is a senior policy analyst with 

more than 25 years in the area of DoD 

chemical-biological warfare and defense 

programs and policy. He is a former Army 

officer and 1985 graduate of CarnegieMellon University. He has published six 

books, the latest of which is “Where Are 

The WMDs?” by the Naval Institute Press, 

and has also published numerous journal 

articles on the topic. The views expressed 

in this article are my own, and do not 

necessarily represent the views of the 

Department of Defense or any other office.

End Notes

1. National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 1994, dated 18 Nov 93, 

50 USC 1522.

2. DoD Report to Congress, 

“Domestic Preparedness Program in 

the Defense Against Weapons of Mass 

Destruction, “ dated 1 May 97, http://

www.dod.mil/pubs/domestic/.

3. USD(AT&L) Memorandum, subject: 

“Implementation Plan for the Management of the Chemical Biological Defense 

Program,” dated 22 Apr 03.

4. The National Strategy to Combat 

Weapons of Mass Destruction (Dec 02) 

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16092.pdf. 

5. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/

text/50/1522).

6. “Weapons of Mass Destruction: 

DoD’s Actions to Combat Weapons 

Use Should Be More Integrated and 

Focused,” dated 26 May 00, http://www.

gao.gov/products/NSIAD-00-97.

7. http://www.acq.osd.mil/cp/pages/

CBD_Key_Docs_Reports.htm.

8. Al Mauroni, Where Are the WMDs? 

The Reality of Chem-Bio Threats on the 

Home Front and the Battlefield (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), p. 

28.

9. DoDD 2060.02 at http://www.dtic.

mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/206002p.

pdf.

10. Al Mauroni, Where Are the 

WMDs? The Reality of Chem-Bio 

Threats on the Home Front and the 

Battlefield (Annapolis, MD: Naval 

Institute Press, 2006).

11. 2011 DoD Annual Report to 

Congress on Chemical and Biological 

Warfare Defense http://www.acq.osd.mil/

cp/docs/2011_CBDP_ARC_V26_FINAL.

pdf) with any one of the reports done 

prior to 2011. 

12. 2011 DoD Annual Report to 

Congress (Ibid), p. 4, narrative on the 

Transformational Medical Technologies 

project. 

13. 32 US Code section 368.6, 

“Functions of the Military Departments,” 

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR2002-title32-vol2/xml/CFR-2002-title32-

vol2-sec368-6.xml.

14. U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation, http://cpc.au.af.mil/.

15. The JPEO’s quarterly journal 

http://www.jpeocbd.osd.mil/packs/Magazine.aspx.

16. Stephen Scroggs, Army Relations 

with Congress: Thick Armor, Dull Sword, 

Slow Horse (Westport, CT: Praeger 

Publishers, 2000, http://www.amazon.

com/Army-Relations-Congress-ThickArmor/dp/0275961761/. 

Combating WMD Journal ISSUE 8 18
Fort Belvoir Nuclear Revisited in April 2011 

Julia LeDoux

Special contributor to the Belvoir Eagle 

Mr. Phil Shubert,

Army Reactor Office, U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

ormer Army Reactor Program 

graduates Malcolm McLeod and 

Emery Chase recently revisited 

Fort Belvoir's long- deactivated nuclear 

power plant, which the U. S. Army 

Corps of Engineers is decommissioning.

In addition to planning and leading 

the decommissioning effort, the United 

States Army Corps of Engineers has 

been tasked with maintaining the 

plant, its security and safety and is 

actively engaged in maintaining both 

the facility and the health and safety 

of the public, since its deactivation,' 

said McLeod, who now works with 

the USACE and received his nuclear 

power plant operator training at Belvoir.

The 2- megawatt plant - designated 

as SM- 1 - went online in 1957 and was 

deactivated in 1977. When the plant 

was deactivated, both its fuel and control rods were removed, said McLeod, 

who added that any remaining radiation at the facility is essentially embedded, meaning the facility is not like an 

active nuclear plant and presents no 

hazards to the public's health and safety.

The plant provided the installation's electrical power and served 

as the training site for the Army 

Nuclear Power Program, which operated eight plants around the world.

“It’s a profession. The people that went 

into this who are in it today in the commercial world do a superb job,” said Chase, 

a former nuclear power plant operator for 

the Army who trained at Belvoir in 1969.

It was also the first nuclear power station to be connected to an 

electrical grid, said Phil Shubert, 

Army Reactor Program Manager.

“It was not a major source of power, 

because it was mainly supplying the 

Fort, but it did tie into the grid,” said Shubert, a licensed senior reactor operator 

who trained with the Tennessee Valley 

Authority. “The Fort Belvoir’s reactor’s 

main purpose was to train personnel 

in how to operate a plant, in addition 

to providing power for the base.” An 

agreement between the then Atomic 

Energy Commission and the Department of Defense led to the program’s 

creation and the plants’ construction. 

“They were looking at nuclear 

technology both for weapons 

and power,” explained Shubert.

There is no nuclear fuel at the plant, 

continued Shubert, who said the 

decommissioning process is arduous.

“You have to make sure there are no 

hazards present,” he explained. “You 

have to survey for a number of things. In 

the time frame it was built, there will be 

some issues, like asbestos.” The plant 

is at the southeast boundary of the post 

and overlooks Gunston Cove. Migrating 

F

Fort Belvoir Army Reactor

Fort Belvoir Army Reactor Plaque

19 ISSUE 8 Combating WMD Journal
ospreys love the area, Shubert said, and 

there is an osprey nest at the top of its 

stack. “It’s a beautiful spot,” he added.

Chase had a master’s degree and 

was a captain in the Army when 

he was accepted into the program, 

which included academic and the 

hands- on operation of the plant.

“I pulled shifts,” he said. “That was 

true of both officers and enlisted 

(personnel).” The Fort Belvoir plant 

operated 24/7 and had a staff of 55.

“It was never left by itself,” Chase 

said. “You did all your own maintenance.” Shubert said, the operators 

also had to maintain their qualifications and were nearly always training.

“We produced a cadre of operators 

and engineers that safely operated 

these plants for decades,” he added.

Chase was stationed in Panama after 

he graduated from the program. While 

there, he initially worked in a conventional power plant before becoming executive officer aboard the MH- 1 Sturgis, 

which pulled its first critical, a condition 

operators use to describe the status of 

the nuclear fission process, at Belvoir. 

The Sturgis was towed to Panama and 

moored at Lake Gatun, where it provided 10 megawatts of electrical power.

Shubert said the decommissioning of 

the SM- 1 could take some time, but, when 

the effort is completed, it should free up 

some additional space for the installation.

Additional information on the 

Army Nuclear Power Program

• SM-1: 2 MWe. Fort Belvoir, VA, 

Initial criticality April 8, 1957 and 

the first U.S. nuclear power plant 

to be connected to a commercial 

electrical grid. Used primarily for 

training and testing, rather than 

power generation for Ft. Belvoir. The 

plant was designed by the American Locomotive Company and was 

the first reactor developed under 

the Army Nuclear Power Program.

• SL-1: Boiling water reactor (BWR), 

300 kWe, National Reactor Testing 

Station, Idaho. Initial criticality August 

11, 1958. Site of the only fatal accident at a US nuclear power reactor, 

on January 3, 1961, which destroyed 

the reactor. The SL-1 was designed 

by the Argonne National Laboratory 

to gain experience in boiling water 

reactor operations, develop performance characteristics, train military 

crews, and test components. Combustion Engineering was awarded a 

contract by the AEC to operate the 

SL-1 and in turn employed the Army’s 

military operating crew to continue 

running the plant. This BWR was specifically designed to power Distance 

Early Warning (DEW) line stations. 

• PM-2A: 2 MWe, plus heating. Camp 

Century, Greenland. Initial criticality 

October 3, 1960. The first “portable” 

nuclear power reactor. Brought to 

Greenland in parts, assembled, operated, disassembled, shipped back to 

CONUS.[5] The PM-2A in Camp Century, Greenland, was designed by the 

American Locomotive Company to 

demonstrate the ability to assemble 

a nuclear power plant from prefabricated components in a remote, arctic 

location. The pressure vessel was 

subsequently used to investigate 

neutron embrittlement in carbon 

steel. This plant was shut down 

1963-1964. PM-2A operated at a uranium-235 enrichment of 93 percent. 

An interior shot of Fort Belvoir’s deactivated nuclear power plant.

Ospreys Nest on stack

Combating WMD Journal ISSUE 8 20
• ML-1: first closed cycle gas turbine. Initial criticality was on March 

30, 1961. Designed for 300 kWe, 

but only achieved 140 kWe. Operated for only a few hundred hours of 

testing. The ML-1 was designed by 

Aerojet General Corporation to test 

an integrated reactor package that 

was transportable by military semitrailers, railroad flatcars, and barges. 

This reactor was shut down in 1965.

• PM-1: 1.25 MWe, plus heating. Sundance, Wyoming. Owned 

by the Air Force, this pressurized 

water reactor was used to power a 

radar station. Initial criticality was on 

February 25, 1962. The PM-1 was 

designed by the Martin Company 

and provided electric power to the 

731st Radar Squadron of the North 

American Air Defense Command 

(NORAD). This plant was shut down 

in 1968. PM-1 operated at a uranium-235 enrichment of 93 percent. 

• PM-3A: 1.75 MWe, plus heating and desalinization. McMurdo 

Station, Antarctica.[8] Owned by 

the Navy. Initial criticality March 

3, 1962, decommissioned 1972. 

The PM-3A, located at McMurdo 

Sound, Antarctica, was designed 

by the Martin Company to provide 

electric power and steam heating 

to the Naval Air Facility at McMurdo 

Sound. PM-3A operated at an uranium-235 enrichment of 93 percent.

• SM-1A: 2 MWe, plus heating. Fort 

Greely, Alaska. Initial criticality March 

13, 1962. The SM-1A at Ft. Greely, 

Alaska, was designed by the American Locomotive Company and was 

the first field facility developed under 

the Army Nuclear Power Program. 

This site was selected to develop construction methods in a remote, arctic 

location. This plant was shut down 

in 1972. SM-1A operated at a uranium-235 enrichment of 93 percent.

• MH-1A: Power production10 MWe, 

Mounted on the Sturgis, a barge (no 

propulsion systems) converted from 

a Liberty ship, and moored in the 

Panama Canal Zone. Initial criticality 

at Ft. Belvoir, VA (in Gunston Cove, 

off the Potomac River), January 24, 

1967. It was the last of the eight plants 

to permanently cease operation. The 

MH-1A was designed by Martin Marietta Corporation. It remained moored 

at Gatun Lake in the Panama Canal 

from 1968 until 1977, when it was 

towed back to Ft. Belvoir for decommissioning. It was moved to the 

James River Reserve Fleet in 1978 

for an expected 50 years of safe storage. This reactor used low-enrichment uranium (LEU) in the range of 

4 to 7 percent. The MH-1A had an 

elaborate analog-computer-powered 

simulator installed at the Training Division, USAERG, Ft. Belvoir.

• Final Notes: The Army Reactor 

Office located at Fort Belvoir and 

residing in the US Army Nuclear 

and Combating Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Agency adminisMH-1A control room simulator

ters the program for permitting 

operation and decommissioning 

of the Army’s Nuclear reactors.

• The Corps of Engineers’ Radiation Safety Officer Maureen Zeiner 

was coordinator for the visit to 

SM-1. Thanks from the Army 

Reactor Office is extended to her.

Author Biographical

Julia LeDoux is military editor of the 

News & Messenger. She joined the 

newspaper in 2005 as a staff reporter 

for the Belvoir Eagle and was named 

military editor in 2007. Previously she 

worked at the Outer Banks Sentinel, 

Topsail Voice and WLAS-AM in North 

Carolina before moving to Virginia 

in 2005. A graduate of the University of North Carolina at Wilmington

Mr. Phil Shubert currently heads 

the Army’s Reactor Office. He is a 

Mechanical Engineering graduate 

from the University of Tennessee and 

served in the Navy as a Naval Flight 

Officer, with over 200 carrier landings 

on the USS Forrestal. He later served 

as a Senior Reactor Operator for the 

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), 

where he supervised the loading of 

the first fuel assembly at Watts Bar 

and was Unit Operating Supervisor 

for the initial critical for Watts Bar in 

1996. From 1997-2007 he served 

with the Joint Warfare Analysis Center 

(JWAC), a joint command located at 

Dahlgren Naval Base. From 2007- 

2011, he was a US manager for 

Alstom, which is a French multinational conglomerate. Phil returned 

to US government service in 2011 

as the Army Reactor Program manager under the US Army Nuclear and 

Combating WMD Agency (USANCA).

21 ISSUE 8 Combating WMD Journal
Heisenberg In Action--A year plus in the life of the Nuclear 

Disablement Teams

LTC Bret Kinman

Chief, Nuclear Disablement Team 2, 20th SUPCOM, APG, MD 

MAJ Matthew Armstrong

Deputy, Nuclear Disablement Team, 20th SUPCOM, APG, MD

he Nuclear Disablement Teams 

(NDT) of the 20th Support Command (SUPCOM) maintain a 

demanding training regimen in order to 

ensure mission readiness. The NDTs 

have a primary mission of assessing 

and disabling nuclear weapons production infrastructure, a strategic mission 

focused on actors and countries of proliferation concern. The teams have a 

secondary task of supporting the National Technical Nuclear Forensics (NTNF) 

Ground Sampling Mission (GSM) where 

an NDT, along with several enablers, 

operates as part of an FBI-led InterAgency Task Force to collect samples in 

a post nuclear detonation environment. 

Both mission areas require planning 

and training focus in order to be prepared on very short notice to execute.

 The 2010 Quadrennial Defense 

Review (QDR) called for an increase 

in Nuclear Disablement capability. 

Subsequently, the Army and the 20th 

SUPCOM have added a third NDT 

in FY11, with a fourth to be added in 

FY12. Because of the unique nature 

of the disablement mission, standard 

field type training at Army installations 

is not feasible. The NDTs require specialized support from Department of 

Energy (DOE) Laboratories, to include 

access to their infrastructure and 

facilities, subject matter expertise on 

nuclear fuel cycle as well as material 

production and handling. In addition, 

DOE provides radiation sources that 

can provide a realistic signal to the various detection equipment and software 

the NDTs use to conduct their mission. 

Throughout calendar year 2010 and 

into 2011, NDTs 1 & 2 were engaged 

in multiple training events and exercises, developing and honing skills for 

both the Disablement and NTNF mission sets. For the first part of the year, 

NDT 1 remained focused on supporting the disablement mission- the part 

of the team went to Korea to support 

Exercise Key Resolve. NDT 2 began 

the transition of the NTNF mission from 

DTRA’s Washington Technical Support 

Group (WTSG). In April, both teams 

then spent two and a half weeks at 

Idaho National Lab for the pilot Nuclear 

Infrastructure, Assessment and Disablement Course (NIAD). NIAD is an annual 

disablement training course designed 

to train NDT personnel as well as those 

involved in WMD Elimination intelligence 

analysis and operational planning. 

In May 2010, NDT 2 took the lead for 

Exercise Shining Tortoise, a full interagency (FBI & DoE) NTNF exercise at 

Nevada Test Site. The summer was 

spent in finalizing the transition of NTNF 

equipment from WTSG and planning 

for the 20th SUPCOM Exercise Liberty 

Focus at Ft. Hood, TX. In August, NDT2 

assumed the NTNF mission from WTSG 

and concurrently prepared for Exercise 

Liberty Focus. Liberty Focus is the 20th 

SUPCOM Annual WMD Elimination exercise, where the command exercises its 

Joint Task Force HQ capability. In a first 

for the command, the NDTs conducted 

tactical disablement training at Ft. Hood, 

and integrated exploitation information 

into the simulation part of the exercise. 

Finally, in November the NDT 1 conducted a validation exercise at Ft. Dix, 

NJ in order to refine skills to assume the 

NTNF mission from NDT 2. In all, a fast 

year for the Nuclear Disablement Teams 

of the 20th SUPCOM. The paragraphs 

below provide an overview of the NDT 

and outline the major training events 

the teams have been involved with.

Nuclear Disablement Team

The NDT is an 11 man team of technical experts, with a strategic mission 

to assess, exploit and disable nuclear 

weapons production infrastructure. In 

addition, the NDTs provide the core of 

the Army’s National Technical Nuclear 

Forensics (NTNF) Ground Sampling 

Mission capability. The team has a combination of Army equipment that provides 

the teams mobility, communications and 

protection; and commercial-off-the-shelf 

(COTS) equipment that provides the 

team the bulk of its radiation/nuclear 

detection and analysis equipment. In 

addition, the team uses both Army and 

COTS personal protective equipment to 

ensure team members can operate safely in unique hazardous environments. 

Ultimately, the strength of the team is 

in the knowledge and skill of the personnel- the various skill sets: FA 52s with a 

broad knowledge base in nuclear weapons design, nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear 

physics and nuclear plans and policy 

along with health physicists’ understanding of the physiological effects of radiation on humans; Explosive ordnance 

knowledge in identifying and mitigating 

other hazards to team operations; and 

finally the chemical specialists capability in initial entry operations and material sampling, packaging and transport. 

These talents combined together give 

the NDT a distinctive strategic capability for the Army that is unmatched.

The NDTs also possess a unique set 

of equipment known as STIRS (Smart 

Threads Integrated Radiological Sensors) which provides a networked 

set of radiation detection capabilities. 

STIRS detectors include ARDIMS (Aerial Radiation Detection and Mapping 

System), VMDS and VMDS-L (Vehicle 

Mounted Detection System and Vehicle 

T

Combating WMD Journal ISSUE 8 22
Mounted Detection System-Lite) and 

MPDS (Man Portable Detection System. 

The STIRS network uses a self-healing, 

mesh network of radios to transmit 

data from the various sensors to the 

NDT command post, where the data 

is collated, interpreted and analyzed 

with the help of MFK-R (Mobile Field 

Kit – Radiological) software and PeakEasy spectrum analysis software. The 

NDT utilizes sub-teams, outlined below, 

to execute its disablement missions:

• Initial Entry Team

The Initial Entry Team (IET) conducts 

site reconnaissance, identifies hazards, 

and gains access to the target. The 

team utilizes a number of tools including: radiation and chemical detectors, 

air monitors, and breech and access 

tools. The team consists of a Team 

Leader (FA 52), an Initial Entry NCO 

(MOS 74DL3 – CBRNE NCO) and 

when the NDT is augmented, Explosive 

Ordinance Disposal (EOD) personnel. 

• Contamination Control/Hotline Team

The hotline team monitors personnel 

and equipment and limits the spread of 

radiological material and other potential 

contamination. In addition to contamination control, the Hotline Team also 

advises on individual exposure guidance, tracks individual total accumulated dose, and physiologically monitors 

all team members. The team consists 

of a Health Physicist Officer (72A), 

and a Health Physicist NCO (68SN4). 

• Command Post

The command post monitors all operations in real time via FM, SATCOM, and 

a networked computer system using 

Mobile Field Kit-Radiation. The Command Post consolidates information, 

sketches, photographs and spectrum, 

from the objective for an onsite review 

and then forwards information to a designated headquarters or intelligence 

analysis center. The command post 

team consists of an Operations Officer 

FA 52, and 2-3 communications Soldiers 

MOS 25 B/U/S. In addition, the NDT 

Chief spends time in the CP assisting 

the Operations officer with communication to higher as well as reviewing collected data and information.

• Characterization and Disablement

The Characterization Team conducts 

the sensitive site exploitation of the target building; in reality this will involve all 

of the NDT members and in many cases 

other enablers such as intelligence analysts and engineers. Using detectors, 

STIRS, MFK-R, and other laboratory 

tools, the Characterization Team will 

assess the progress within the context 

of the nuclear fuel cycle process, and the 

extent of that progress. Upon completion of characterization the Disablement 

Phase is planned. In many cases Disablement may involve restricting access 

to a facility, preventing near-term repair, 

and rendering inoperable specific parts 

of the facility or related infrastructure. 

In addition, securing SNM and sensitive 

equipment and planning for retrograde 

of that material and equipment to a 

CONUS facility for in-depth analysis.

Nuclear Disablement team Training 

and Exercises

Exercise Nougat Poplar at Y-12 JAN 

2010- Exercise Nougat Poplar allowed 

NDT 2 to develop baseline assessment 

and disablement skills. This exercise 

was a Full Operational Capability (FOC) 

culminating event- ensuring the team was 

fully capable of executing disablement 

operations. This exercise also 

incorporated several communications 

assets from HHC, 20th SUPCOM 

augmenting the team command post.

The Nougat Poplar scenario involved 

a single target focused on uranium 

enrichment and material transport. 

The team had to use all of its detection 

equipment to find suspect target sites, 

gain access to facilities, identify masking 

material and strategic nuclear material, 

and determine the level of enrichment of 

the process. In addition, the team had to 

package and prepare containers to ship 

the material as well as meet the various 

procedural gates to transport SNM.

Nuclear Infrastructure and 

Disablement Course (NIAD) - In 

October 2008, the 20th Support 

Command called for the development of 

a Nuclear Facilities Disablement Course 

in order to assist in the exploitation 

and disablement mission. The intent 

VMDS

NDT Manning- 11

6 x FA 52 Officer

1x 89E EOD Officer

1x 72A Health Physics Officer

1x 68SN4 Health Physics NCO

2x 74D Chemical NCO

Key Points

 Self Mobile (21 seats)

 Self protect while moving

 Organic power supply

 Hazard Response & Emergency Training

 Secure internal Comms

 Secure “reachback” Comms

 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

 COTS, GOTS and Army Systems

Limitations

 Permissive environment (or security force)

 Team requires personnel augmentation for 24x7 Operations

 Need External Logistic support for food, water, fuel & maintenance

 No organic air assets (have the aerial detector)

 Support for COTS/GOTS

 Transport support to move samples and large amounts of material

 Disablement is a deliberate operation

Nuclear Disablement Teams

23 ISSUE 8 Combating WMD Journal
for the course was to capitalize on the 

knowledge base inherent to each of the 

DOE laboratories, specifically Idaho, 

Los Alamos, Sandia and Lawrence 

Livermore. The final version of the 

course, called the Nuclear Infrastructure, 

Assessment and Disablement (NIAD) 

course, was developed by Idaho 

National Laboratory and first run as a 

pilot in April-May, 2010. Based on the 

success of that pilot the course has now 

become an annual course taught at INL.

The course consists of a series 

of 21 modules including: tabletop 

exercises, field exercises and site 

and facility tours. The modules cover 

the nuclear fuel cycle, criticality, 

PeakEasy software calculations 

and spectra, fuel fabrication, reactor 

operations and plutonium production, 

reactor disablement and component 

recognition, reactor simulator take 

down exercise, weapons development 

and components, Counterproliferation 

Analysis and Planning System (CAPS) 

overview, fuel processing, and aqueous 

fuel processing tabletop exercise. In 

addition to this, INL has constructed a 

series of props that are use to create 

realistic, working target scenarios.

Exercise Shining Tortoise- This was 

a full-scale National Technical Nuclear 

Forensics Ground Sample Mission 

(NTNF GSM) Exercise, and included 

robust participation from the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation and Department 

of Energy. The Exercise was held at the 

Nevada Test Site 19 - 24 May 2010 and 

sample collections were conducted in 

and around the Johnny Boy shot crater. 

NDT 2 and DTRA WTSG had done an 

extensive NTNF training work-up to learn 

all about NTNF and the skills needed to 

execute successfully. Even so, NDT 2 

worked closely with DTRA WTSG in 

a “left-seat, right-seat ride” method to 

ensure success during a major exercise. 

In the event, Shining Tortoise provided 

NDT 2 a unique insight in to what an 

interagency task force looks like on 

the ground and more importantly, 

how it operates. The NDT and DTRA 

WTSG personnel worked closely 

with the DOE technical team and FBI 

Hazardous Material Operations Unit 

specialists on sample collection mission 

planning, mission command, control and 

communications and contamination 

control measures. One of several 

challenges during the exercise was 

having the collection teams operate 

over extended distances from the 

NTNF Task Force Forward Operating 

base, in some cases over 20 miles 

away. This distance challenges mission 

planners to ensure communication 

planning support operations as 

well as developing executable 

contamination control procedures.

Even with the challenges of the various 

inter-agency partners coming together 

for the first time, the exercise was a 

great success. The relationships built 

during the exercise and the knowledge 

gained by deconflicitng each agencies’ 

procedures and process, has ensured 

the entire NTNF GSM Task Force is able 

to execute the mission today. Clearly, 

NTNF is a new mission area for the 

Tasks: Tasks:

•Intel preparation of Op Env

•Area survey (Air & Ground)

•Prioritize facilities

•Establish C2

•Site Setup

•Gain access

•Prioritize targets/buildings

•ID key systems and materials

•Sample collection

•Document facility and equipment on site

•Determine purpose of site

•Provide “Silver standard” analysis of material

•Develop disablement plan •Package of Stage Material

•Conduct near term disablement of facility

•Develop hand-off plan

•Final Site survey

•Execute Turn Over

NDT CONOPS is flexible and can be altered

based on mission requirements, time and other operational considerations

Tasks: Tasks:

Aerial Systems

Ground Systems

BACKPACK

 HANDHELD

Phase I:

Reconnaissance

Phase IV:

Disable site

Phase II:

Initial Entry &

Assessment

Phase III:

Characterization

& Exploitation

Phase V:

Follow-On

NDT member in Level A suits assess a hot cell during a NIAD exercise.1

NDT CONOPS

Combating WMD Journal ISSUE 8 24
Army, and not all the requirements and 

intangibles are fully identified. The 

NDTs rotate on to this mission in 4-6 

months cycles, along with continual 

interaction with the FBI and DOE 

partners to ensure TTP/SOP as well 

as alert procedures are updated and 

refined based on operational experience.

Liberty Focus- Nuclear Disablement 

Teams operations require high level 

proficiency on several nuclear and 

chemical processes involved in the 

production of fissile material and 

weapons related components. Exercise 

Liberty Focus 11 (LF-11), held at Ft, 

Hood TX 17-21 OCT 2010 enabled the 

NDTs to test proficiency in all phases 

of NDT operations and allowed a focus 

on nuclear engineering, radiochemistry, 

material sampling and shipping 

procedures. The NDTs utilized the Ft. 

Hood Underground Training Facility, 

a former nuclear weapons storage 

complex near Ft. Hood’s Robert Gray 

Army Airfield. Developing a rigorous 

exercise construct that supported both 

the NDT tactical field training as well as 

supported the integration of the NDTs 

into the command post simulation part 

of the exercise was also a challenge. 

In addition, developing suitable targets 

that could be constructed in the tunnel 

complex at Ft. Hood tested the skills 

of DOE experts from Idaho National 

Lab, Oak Ridge National Lab and 

Y-12 National Security Complex. 

In conjunction with NDT leadership, 

the DOE lab team reviewed the 

training concept and assured the 

physics and chemistry aspects of the 

training followed proper radiochemistry 

reprocessing process logic. In other 

words, the DOE team wanted to ensure 

that what they set up in the tunnels was 

accurate both in terms of “look and 

feel” and also scientifically accurate as 

to how a process was laid out. This 

included making sure the chemistry 

equations found on white boards and 

in other media were what could be 

expected from a pilot program of a 

proliferant country. DOE also deployed 

several chemistry challenges that 

stressed each teams’ sampling and ID 

capabilities. We benefitted from their 

professional assistance at every stage 

of the planning and execution phases. 

 

Supporting LF-11 also presented 

challenges never before experienced 

by the NDTs. For the first time NDTs 

operated as part of a task force which 

required intense coordination for 

logistics and personnel support. NDTs 

integrated during the early stages of the 

exercise with 23d Chemical Battalion 

and jointly exploited multiple targets. 

We coordinated for all classes of supply 

through our higher headquarters; 

this validated the NDTs support 

concept. Furthermore, movement 

and maneuver had to be closely 

de-conflicted to avoid training area 

constraints. The exercise lessons learn 

will guide future operations and allow 

the NDTs to further refine our TTPs. 

In the event, the NDTs faced two target 

tunnels. One tunnel housed a uranium 

enrichment process and the other 

housed a separation and reprocessing 

facility. There was also bulk chemical 

storage, and receiving/shipping room 

involved in the scenario. In each target 

tunnel, the DoE team had constructed 

realistic lab and pilot scale process to 

include operating mixer-settlers, glove 

boxes and hot cells. Of course, DOE also 

provided a variety of radioactive sources 

to ensure that detection equipment 

would alarm or detect appropriately. In 

all Liberty Focus held a number of firsts 

for the NDTs to include: first tactical 

exercise as part of Liberty Focus, 

first non-simulation task organization 

as part of another unit, and first time 

NDTs have had to work the various 

aspects of sustainment and support. 

TEEX Collapse Rescue OperationsIn early January 2011, NDT 2 & 3 

travelled to College Station, Texas to 

train at the Texas Engineering Extension 

or TEEX. TEEX provides world-class 

training for fire fighters and other 

first responders. The facility has an 

area called Disaster City, which has a 

multi-story building, partly collapsed 

parking garage and large rubble pile. 

In addition, there are other expected 

urban structures and buildings in various 

states of damage to assist in training.

The NDTs conducted a course 

called Collapse Rescue Operations 

or CRO. The CRO course trained the 

team on methods and procedures to 

shore buildings or walls, move large 

objects with limited tools and no crane 

or other type support, and the use 

of breeching and disablement tools 

such as hammer drills, chop saws, 

welding torches and similar equipment.

This training is essential as the 

NDTs may have to operate in an area 

or on a facility that has been bombed 

or otherwise has structural damage 

from military action. The CRO class 

provides team members skills and 

hands-on application experience on how 

to ensure the NDTs are able to access 

NDT members prepare a disablement plan as part of Exercise Liberty Focus. a facility and operate there safely.

25 ISSUE 8 Combating WMD Journal
Exercise Storax-Poplar - NDT 2 

and CBRNE Response Team (CRT) 

3A of the 22d Chemical Battalion 

conducted Exercise Storax-Poplar 

from 24 -29 January 31, 2011 to test 

joint NDT and CRT operations and 

improve tactical skills for exploiting a 

nuclear or radiological target set. This 

exercise was the first full scope field 

training event involving both an NDT 

and a CRT and by design the exercise 

scenario tested both teams capabilities 

and ability to work together and 

separately in shared operational space.

The addition of a CRT added a new 

level of complexity. This exercise 

utilized three targets for assessment 

and exploitation. In addition Y-12 

provided a day of instruction and 

hands-on training with the disablement 

tools, providing metal for torch training 

and concrete for cutting and breaking.

Smoking Armadillo- This was a semi-full 

scale NTNF GSM Validation Exercise, 

and included robust participation from 

the DOE, with a smaller footprint 

from the FBI. The Exercise was held 

at TEEX, at College Station, Texas, 

and was a re-validation of NDT 2 to 

assume the NTNF mission in April 2011. 

This exercise had an increased level 

of Incident Command System (ICS) 

involvement in the scenario which 

added to realism. In addition the NTNF 

Task Force set up an actual FOB at the 

TEEX Riverside campus, and performed 

collections in “Disaster City”. NDT 2 line 

hauled all of their equipment to Houston, 

TX and then conducted a 100+ mile 

convoy operation to College Station. 

During this validation iteration the 

NTNF-GSM rehearsed a new team 

lineup that now includes four 74D 

sample collectors from CRT 3A, 22nd 

Chemical Battalion (TE). In addition 

to increased ICS interaction, this 

exercise had the first use of DOE 

produced “replicant” post-detonation 

material, giving the collection teams a 

more realistic sample media to collect 

than has previously been possible. 

An added aspect of the exercise 

introduced “survivors” in the collection 

area as well as media interaction.

Conclusion

The Nuclear Disablement Teams of 

the 20th Support Command continue to 

prepare for new missions and maintain 

readiness to execute their current 

set of both Disablement and Nuclear 

Forensics. In both mission areas, the 

NDTs continue to improve the scope 

and quality of training and exercises.

Photos 1,2 Courtesy: 20th Support 

Command (CBRNE) Public Affairs 

Office

Author Biographical

LTC Bret Kinman is a Defense Policy 

Advisor on Nuclear and Combating 

WMD Matters at the US Mission to NATO 

in Brussels, Belgium. He has a B.A. in 

Political Science from North Georgia 

College and an M.A. in Defense Decision 

Making and Planning from the Naval 

Postgraduate School. He was previously assigned as Chief, Nuclear Disablement Team 2 at the 20th SUPCOM, 

APG, MD and the Chief of the Warfare 

Support Division at the EUCOM Joint 

Analysis Center, RAF Molesworth, UK. 

His email address is kinmanb@state.gov

MAJ Matthew Armstrong works in the 

G37 Nuclear Training and Exercises

section of 20th SUPCOM, APG., MD. 

He has a B.S. and M.S in Chemical

Engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in Troy, NY. He was

previously assigned as a Nuclear Disablement Team Deputy, and Nuclear

Disablement Characterization Team 

Leader and the Nuclear Disablement Team a Combat Advisor/

Mentor in Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan and an 

Assistant Professor in the Department 

of Chemistry and Life Science at

the United States Military Academy.

H i s e m a i l a d d r e s s i s 

matthew.j.armstrong2.mil@mail.mil

NDT member uses a notebook computer to sketch information on nucelar infrastrucutre during Exercise Liberty Focus at Ft. Hood, TX2

NDT2 Vehicles leave Ellington Field 

TX for College Station TX as part of 

Exercise Smokin’ Armadillo

NDT 2 and DOE team members 

conduct mission planning

Combating WMD Journal ISSUE 8 26
NUCLEAR ZERO: WORLD PEACE OR WORLD CHAOS?

COL Jeffrey H. Musk, Ph.D.

Chaplain (Col) Scott Gardner

LTC Andreas Tschakert

Joint Forces Staff College

Joint and Combined Warfighting School

magine a world without nuclear 

weapons - a world free of the 

specter of nuclear annihilation, 

free from nuclear terrorism, a world 

where all nations and all people live 

in peace and security. This is the 

world envisioned by President Barack 

Obama and articulated in a speech 

delivered on April 5, 2009 in Prague 

with the words “I state clearly and with 

conviction America's commitment to 

seek the peace and security of a world 

without nuclear weapons.”1 So, with 

a few simple words, President Obama 

effectively made “nuclear zero”2 a goal 

of U.S. defense and foreign policy.

At first, the goal of nuclear zero seems 

both admirable and desirable. After 

all, who could argue that a world with 

nuclear weapons is preferable to one 

without? It is only upon further analysis 

that one begins to question the wisdom, 

practicality, and the basic premises and 

assumptions that govern the nuclear 

zero movement. By systematically 

and logically considering the technical 

challenges, economics, security 

implications, and social-political realities 

that will inevitably be encountered on 

the “road to nuclear zero”, one quickly, 

and paradoxically, finds that a world 

with nuclear weapons may well be 

preferable to one without. That instead 

of making the world safer, the road to 

nuclear zero will actually lead to a world 

that is more dangerous and less secure.

Nuclear Weapons and National 

Security: A Brief History

In pursuit of nuclear zero, the U.S. “will 

reduce the role of nuclear weapons in 

our national security strategy, and urge 

others to do the same.”3 Substantively 

diminishing the role of nuclear weapons 

will mark a tectonic shift in the national 

security strategy of the U.S., one in 

which nuclear weapons have been 

the geopolitical lynchpin since the 

closing days of the Second World War. 

Initially developed under the 

“Manhattan Project” (1942-1945) to 

counter a suspected German nuclear 

weapons4 program, the first U.S. 

nuclear device5 was successfully tested 

at Alamogordo, New Mexico, on July 

16, 1945.6 Shortly thereafter, with the 

goal of avoiding a costly amphibious 

invasion of Japan, the U.S. dropped 

nuclear weapons on the Japanese 

cities of Hiroshima (August 6) and 

Nagasaki (August 9). The weapons had 

the desired effect, with the Japanese 

Emperor announcing his nation’s 

unconditional surrender on August 15.7 

The U.S. nuclear monopoly was shortlived as the Soviet Union, using a design 

gained through espionage, detonated 

its first nuclear device on August 29, 

1949 in Kazakhstan.8 The Soviet 

nuclear test came years in advance of 

when the U.S. believed it would likely 

occur. This strategic surprise both 

heightened the Cold War and initiated 

the nuclear arms race – an arms race 

which would dominate U.S. and Soviet 

defense strategies for the next forty plus 

years. During the nuclear arms race, 

the Soviet nuclear arsenal eventually 

grew to an estimated 40,723 nuclear 

weapons by 1986, while the U.S 

arsenal peaked at 32,193 in 1966.9 

Yet despite the tensions of the Cold 

War, associated proxy wars in Korea, 

Vietnam, and Afghanistan, the large 

nuclear arsenals possessed by both 

sides, and a couple of close calls (most 

notably the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis10 

and the 1983 NATO exercise ABLE 

ARCHER11 ), no nuclear weapons have 

been used in anger since World War II.

The fact that neither a nuclear 

exchange between the U.S. and 

the Soviet Union, nor a large-scale 

conventional war in Europe between 

NATO and the Warsaw Pact occurred 

during the Cold War, can largely be 

credited to the inherent deterrent effect 

of the nuclear weapons possessed 

by both sides. With the awesome, 

unprecedented destructive power12 

of even the first, most basic nuclear 

weapons, it quickly became evident 

to both the U.S. and the Soviet Union 

that these were not “normal” military 

weapons, but were instead weapons 

whose true value lies not with their 

destructive power, but in the political 

power and prestige (“superpower” 

status) they bestowed and the deterrent 

value they granted. This realization 

did not come immediately, however. 

Military and civilian planners in 

both the U.S. and the Soviet Union 

contemplated a number of nuclear 

warfare strategies such as countervalue, 

counterforce, devastating first strike, 

and decapitation13 before concluding 

that any nuclear exchange would result 

in unacceptable friendly casualties 

and run the risk of initiating a full-scale 

nuclear war. With the development of 

thermonuclear weapons14, “mutually 

assured destruction” became the 

inevitable result of any full-scale or nearfull-scale nuclear exchange forcing both 

sides to conclude that the primary value 

(if not sole value) of their nuclear arsenals 

I

27 ISSUE 8 Combating WMD Journal
was in their deterrent value. As long as 

both sides possessed credible nuclear 

capabilities, no military advantage 

would be gained by using nuclear 

weapons, and direct conventional 

conflict between the superpowers would 

be too risky due to the real possibility 

of escalation to a nuclear exchange.

The end of the Cold War and improved 

U.S. relations with Russia greatly 

reduced both the numbers of deployed 

nuclear weapons and the risk of global 

thermonuclear war, but did not bring 

about the end of nuclear weapons 

nor end their role as an important 

element of U.S. (and Russian) national 

security. The current role of nuclear 

weapons in U.S. national security is 

laid out in the 2010 Nuclear Posture 

Review (NPR)15 which “outlines the 

Administration’s approach to promoting 

the President’s agenda for reducing 

nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal 

of a world without nuclear weapons, 

while simultaneously advancing broader 

U.S. security interests.”16 The NPR 

describes the five key objectives of U.S. 

nuclear weapons policies and posture:17 

1) P r e v e n t i n g n u c l e a r 

proliferation and nuclear terrorism;

2) Reducing the role of U.S. 

nuclear weapons in U.S. national 

security strategy;

3) M a i n t a i n i n g s t r a t e g i c 

deterrence and stability at lower 

nuclear force levels;

4) Strengthening regional 

deterrence and reassuring U.S. 

allies and partners; and

5) Sustaining a safe, secure, 

and effective nuclear arsenal.

These objectives are also reflected in 

the 2010 National Security Strategy 18 

(NSS). Along with reiterating the goal 

of nuclear zero, the NSS describes 

the need to prevent violent extremist 

organizations (VEOs) from acquiring 

nuclear weapons, preventing the spread 

of nuclear weapons, securing vulnerable 

nuclear materials, strengthening the 

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, seeking 

a treaty to end the production of fissile 

materials for nuclear weapons, and 

reducing the numbers and role of nuclear 

weapons. As with the NPR, however, 

the NSS acknowledges the continuing 

deterrent role of nuclear weapons19 and, 

as long as nuclear weapons exist, the 

need to maintain “a safe, secure and 

effective nuclear arsenal”.20 These 

basic objectives are also reflected in the 

Quadrennial Defense Review Report,21 

the National Military Strategy,22 and the 

National Defense Strategy.23 (Note: 

The current National Defense Strategy 

document published in 2008 pre-dates 

the current Administration and does 

not reflect the goal of nuclear zero.)

From Arms Control to “Ban the 

Bomb” to Nuclear Zero

The goal of nuclear zero is not new. 

Even before the bombings of Hiroshima 

and Nagasaki, Leó Szilárd, the scientist 

who first envisioned the nuclear 

chain reaction process (and hence 

the possibility of nuclear energy and 

nuclear weapons) and who had worked 

on the Manhattan Project, circulated a 

petition among scientists working on 

the bombs urging the U.S. Government 

not to use the bombs on Japan.24 

Shortly after the war, two diametrically 

opposed ideas surfaced on how the 

world should deal with this new type of 

weapon. The Acheson-Lilienthal Report 

advocated making nuclear technology 

and knowledge of how to make nuclear 

weapons available to all (basically 

an “Anti-Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Treaty”). The theory was that this 

would remove “the element of rivalry 

between nations”25 and, presumably, 

reduce the likelihood of nuclear conflict 

and conflict in general. At the other 

extreme was the Baruch Plan which 

suggested that the U.S. give up its 

nuclear arsenal, as long as others did 

the same.26 Both plans ultimately failed 

to be accepted as distrust of the Soviets 

was already growing within the U.S. and 

in Europe. Interestingly (and somewhat 

predictably), the Soviet response 

to the Baruch Plan was to propose 

“immediate and universal nuclear 

disarmament without inspection.27”

Today, the primary diplomatic tool used 

to try to prevent the spread of nuclear 

weapons among nations is the legally 

binding Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 

(NPT) which entered into force on March 

5, 1970. The objectives of the NPT are 

to: “stop the spread of nuclear weapons; 

provide a sound basis for international 

cooperation on the peaceful uses of 

nuclear energy; and commit all Parties 

to undertake negotiations in good faith 

on disarmament”.28 The NPT currently 

boasts 189 signatories, making it one of 

the most universally agreed to treaties 

in existence. Of note, however, are the 

three countries who have not signed 

the NPT – India and Pakistan who have 

both openly tested nuclear weapons, 

and Israel who is strongly suspected 

of possessing a nuclear arsenal.29

Historically, the declared nuclear 

weapons states (i.e., U.S., Russia, 

China, United Kingdom, and France) 

have been criticized by many of the nonnuclear weapons states for not making 

a serious attempt at disarmament as 

prescribed by the NPT. The adoption 

of nuclear zero as official U.S. policy is 

the most recent and the most ambitious 

attempt to address this criticism, but is not 

the first. The first tangible steps towards 

the goal of nuclear disarmament and 

for diffusing the nuclear tensions of the 

Cold War were the series of arms control 

agreements signed between the U.S. 

and the Soviet Union (now Russia). The 

first of these agreements, the Strategic 

Arms Limitation Talks agreement (SALT 

I) was signed in 1972. This was followed 

by the 1979 SALT II agreement (which 

never entered into force), the 1991 

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START 

I), START II (which also never entered 

into force) in 1993, the 2002 Strategic 

Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), 

and most recently the 2010 New START 

agreement which reduces the number 

of deployed strategic warheads on both 

sides to 1,550.30 These strategic arms 

agreements were complemented by 

the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear 

Forces (INF) Treaty which verifiably 

eliminated “all ground-launched 

ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges 

between 500 and 5,500 kilometers”31

and the 1991 Presidential Nuclear 

Initiative by which the U.S. unilaterally 

removed all tactical nuclear weapons 

(i.e., artillery shells, short-range missile 

warheads, etc.) from deployment.32 

Meanwhile, both in the U.S. and in 

Europe the fear of a possible nuclear 

war and dissatisfaction over rising 

Combating WMD Journal ISSUE 8 28
defense budgets fueled a growing 

anti-nuclear movement - a movement 

that had originated in the 1950’s amid 

growing public concerns over the 

environmental and health effects of 

above-ground nuclear testing.33 These 

concerns, combined with growing 

uneasiness over the accelerating 

nuclear arms race, soon bred the 

“Ban the Bomb” movement in the U.S. 

and Europe, and spawned such antinuclear groups as Federation of Atomic 

Scientists, the National Committee for 

a Sane Nuclear Policy, the Campaign 

for Nuclear Disarmament, International 

Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear 

War, Greenpeace, and others.34 Having 

been unsuccessful in bringing about 

nuclear disarmament, the anti-nuclear 

movement largely changed its message 

from “ban the bomb” to “nuclear freeze” 

by the time the 1970’s drew to a close. 

In addition to being driven by the same 

general concerns as the “Ban the Bomb” 

movement (mainly the nuclear arms 

race and growing defense budgets), 

the Nuclear Freeze movement drew 

extra strength and public support from 

both the failure of the U.S. to ratify the 

SALT II treaty35 and the impending 

deployment of Pershing II intermediaterange nuclear missiles to Europe by the 

U.S.. The Nuclear Freeze movement 

“called on the U.S. and Soviet Union to 

adopt a mutual freeze on the testing, 

production, and deployment of nuclear 

weapons and of missiles, and new 

aircraft designed primarily to deliver 

nuclear weapons."36 Though the freeze 

movement resulted in a number of large 

demonstrations in the U.S. and across 

Europe in the early 1980’s, it did not 

succeed in actually getting either the 

U.S. or the Soviet Union to implement a 

nuclear freeze policy. (The Soviet Union 

did agree to support a freeze proposal at 

the United Nations in 1982, however.)37

The end of the Cold War and 

significant cuts in the nuclear arsenals of 

both sides temporarily quieted the antinuclear movement. As fears of nuclear 

proliferation and nuclear terrorism began 

to grow in the late 1990’s and early 

2000’s, a new nuclear disarmament 

movement began to take hold – “Global 

Zero”. Officially launched in 2008, the 

Global Zero movement advocates the 

belief “that the only way to eliminate the 

nuclear threat — including proliferation 

and nuclear terrorism — is to stop the 

spread of nuclear weapons, secure 

all nuclear materials and eliminate all 

nuclear weapons.”38 Unlike the antinuclear and disarmament movements 

of the past, the Global Zero movement 

has the open support of a growing 

number of high-profile current and 

former politicians including former 

Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger 

and George Schultz, and former U.K. 

Prime Minister Gordon Brown, among 

others. More significantly, however, the 

Global Zero movement has the public 

support of not only a growing number 

of non-nuclear weapons states, but 

also of both President Medvedev of 

Russia and President Obama, who 

has made the goal of nuclear zero 

official U.S. policy. In February, 2010, 

the Global Zero movement published 

its plan of how it believes nuclear zero 

can be achieved by the year 2030. 

Global Zero: The Plan, the Issues, 

the Consequences 

The “Global Zero Action Plan” (which, 

significantly, has not been officially 

agreed to by any nation) lays out the 

steps the organizers of the Global Zero 

movement believe are needed to achieve 

a world free of nuclear weapons.39 The 

plan describes a four-phase approach 

to achieve the goal of nuclear zero by 

the year 2030. In Phase 1 (2010-2013), 

the U.S. and Russia are to negotiate a 

follow-on treaty to New START reducing 

the number of warheads to 1,000 per 

side by 2018. Meanwhile, all other 

nuclear weapons states would agree to 

freeze their arsenals at current levels 

and prepare for multi-lateral talks. 

During Phase 2 (2014-2018), the U.S. 

and Russia are to further reduce their 

arsenals to 500 warheads each by 

2021. This will be done in a multi-lateral 

framework in which the other nuclear 

weapon states are assumed to maintain 

the freeze until 2018 when they too will 

begin proportionate reductions to the 

year 2021. These reductions will be 

accompanied by a strengthening of 

the safeguards on the civilian nuclear 

fuel cycle to prevent the diversion 

of weapons-grade and weaponsusable material for nuclear weapons 

and a comprehensive verification and 

enforcement system, the hallmark 

of which will be no-notice, on-site, 

inspections. In Phase 3 (2019-2023), 

an international, legally binding “Nuclear 

Zero Accord” will be signed by all nuclear 

capable40 nations “for the phased, 

verified, proportionate reduction of all 

nuclear arsenals to zero total warheads 

by 2030.”41 Finally, in Phase 4 (2024-

2030), in a phased, proportionate, 

and verifiable manner, all nuclear 

weapons would be eliminated, and 

production of new weapons prohibited. 

The verification and enforcement 

system would continue indefinitely.

Though not going into specifics, the 

Global Zero Action Plan acknowledges 

that “nations will confront profound and 

complex political and security issues”42 

on the road to nuclear zero, and that 

the process for getting there will be 

“long and difficult.” Naturally, the plan’s 

supporters believe that all these issues 

can be overcome and that the desired 

end state – a world free of nuclear 

weapons – is both achievable and 

desirable. In reality, however, believing 

and hoping for something to be true does 

not make it so, no matter how admirable, 

pure, and good that something may 

be. Before embracing this plan and 

the goal of nuclear zero, the U.S must 

seriously question the assumptions 

upon which this plan rests and address 

the whole range of issues that must 

be overcome to make a world without 

nuclear weapons more than a dream.

The first, and perhaps foremost, set 

of challenges confronting nuclear zero 

are technical ones. These challenges 

are rooted in both the nature of science 

and discovery and in the feasibility of 

a verification and accountability regime 

that must be absolutely perfect for 

nuclear zero to work. Nuclear weapons 

and the knowledge on how to make 

them exists, that is a fact. Though it 

may be physically possible to eliminate 

all nuclear weapons, it is impossible 

to completely purge the world of the 

knowledge of how to construct them. 

Once something is invented, it can’t be 

“un-invented”. The basic knowledge 

of how to construct a simple nuclear 

weapon exists, and will continue 

to exist, in the historical record, in 

documents, in books, in computer files, 

29 ISSUE 8 Combating WMD Journal
on the internet, and most importantly 

in the minds of the world’s nuclear 

engineers and physicists. Documents 

and computer files can be eliminated, an 

idea cannot. If nuclear zero is nominally 

achieved, nuclear weapons are no 

longer being produced or designed, and 

a concerted effort is made to destroy 

all existing nuclear weapons design 

information (a step not in the Global 

Zero Action Plan), then eventually the 

knowledge of sophisticated nuclear 

weapons designs may fade from the 

collective consciousness – but the 

concept of nuclear weapons and the 

knowledge of their basic design will not.

The knowledge of nuclear weapons 

and how to make them will continue 

to exist because nuclear engineers 

and physicists will continue to be 

needed to design, develop, and run 

the world’s growing nuclear power 

infrastructure (Fukushima Daiichi 

disaster and Germany’s recent decision 

to forgo nuclear power notwithstanding). 

Acknowledgment that nuclear power is 

essential for combating climate change 

and replacing dwindling supplies of 

fossil fuels is growing, even among 

many who previously opposed nuclear 

power.43 Though the nuclear engineers 

needed for the growing nuclear 

power industry will be educated and 

trained to design nuclear reactors, 

not nuclear weapons, the fact is that 

if one can design a reactor, one can 

also design a basic nuclear weapon.

Knowledge alone is not enough 

to build a nuclear weapon; one also 

needs a minimum amount of appropriate 

fissile material (usually Uranium-235 

or Plutonium-239). According to the 

International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA), a “significant quantity” is 8 kg of 

Plutonium-239, 25 kg of highly-enriched 

(>90%) Uranium-235, or 75 kg of lowenriched or natural uranium.44 Here, 

a significant quantity is defined by the 

IAEA as “the approximate quantity of 

nuclear material in respect of which, 

taking into account any conversion 

process involved, the possibility of 

manufacturing a nuclear explosive 

device cannot be excluded.”45 So, for 

a verification regime to be completely 

effective, it would have to account for 

all existing supplies of these materials 

down to this level of accuracy within each 

nuclear-capable state (and everywhere 

else) to ensure that no single actor 

was able to obtain these quantities of 

material outside the verification regime. 

This would be particularly challenging 

since there is estimated to be over 

2,000 tons of weapons-grade fissile 

material in existence today worldwide,46

with more than 1,000 tons of highlyenriched uranium (HEU) and 150 tons 

of weapons-grade plutonium residing 

in Russia’s remaining nuclear complex 

(enough to build approximately 60,000 

nuclear weapons).47 

Compounding the verification problem 

is that uranium would continue to be 

mined, processed, and enriched for 

the nuclear power industry, even after 

nuclear zero took effect. The Global Zero 

Action Plan specifically tries to address 

this concern in Phase 2, in which “the 

entire fuel cycle of all countries” would 

be put under international safeguards, 

a possible international fuel bank would 

be established, and where the fuel cycle 

management for uranium enrichment 

and plutonium reprocessing would be 

placed under international control.48 The 

international safeguards, management, 

control, and fuel bank aspects of this 

plan raise difficult sovereignty issues, 

especially for nations who heavily 

depend on nuclear power. Under such 

a system, a nation could conceivably 

be denied nuclear fuel if it ran afoul 

of international opinion. It is hard 

to imagine an independent-minded 

nation like France that depends so 

heavily on nuclear power49 effectively 

giving up that level of control and 

authority to the international community.

More seriously, the Global Zero Action 

Plan does not adequately address 

the problem it really wants to solve 

- preventing the use, by anyone, of a 

nuclear weapon. Today, the biggest 

security concern from nuclear weapons 

is the possible detonation of a nuclearyield producing improvised nuclear 

device (IND)50 in an urban area by a 

violent extremist organization (VEO). To 

carry out such an attack, a VEO would 

need to either steal or illicitly obtain 

a state-produced nuclear weapon or 

obtain a sufficient amount of either HEU 

or weapons-grade plutonium to fabricate 

a simple gun-type or implosion-type 

nuclear device. The probability of a VEO 

stealing a complete functioning nuclear 

weapon from a state actor, transporting it 

to the target undetected, overcoming all 

its use-control features, and detonating 

it is so low that it is not generally 

considered to be a credible threat. The 

more likely scenario is a VEO obtaining 

enough nuclear material, from a stolen 

weapon or another source, to build a 

crude yield-producing IND. As such, the 

best way to prevent such an event is 

to improve the security and use-control 

features of nuclear weapons worldwide, secure all HEU and weaponsgrade plutonium from theft or diversion, 

and deny VEOs access to nuclear 

expertise. A large number of effective 

efforts are already underway outside the 

auspices of Global Zero to do just that. 

These include the Proliferation Security 

Initiative (PSI)51, the Cooperative 

Threat Reduction (CTR)52 Program 

and the associated Global Nuclear 

Lockdown Initiative53, the Nuclear Cities 

Initiative54, the International Nuclear 

Materials and Protection Cooperation 

Program (INMPC)55, the Global Threat 

Reduction Initiative (GTRI)56, and the 

Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty57 among 

others. Except for its Phase 2 efforts 

to better safeguard the civilian nuclear 

fuel cycle, the Global Zero Action Plan 

does little to substantively reduce the 

threat of a VEO detonating an IND. 

Instead of focusing on the VEO/IND 

threat, Global Zero’s main emphasis is 

on having state actors eliminate their 

nuclear arsenals in order to, in theory, 

preclude the possibility of a state-to-state 

nuclear exchange. Certainly if all state 

actors did indeed reduce their arsenals 

to zero, and did not attempt to cheat the 

system (more on this later), the threat of 

a state-to-state nuclear exchange would 

be removed (as would the already low 

probability event of a VEO stealing or 

otherwise obtaining a state-produced 

nuclear weapon). Even without nuclear 

zero, however, the likelihood of a stateto-state nuclear exchange is very low 

due to both the deterrent effect of 

nuclear weapons and the devastating 

consequences such a nuclear exchange 

would bring to both sides. Although 

traditional nuclear deterrence is 

unlikely to be effective against VEOs 

Combating WMD Journal ISSUE 8 30
themselves, it is still effective with 

regard to state-to-state interactions 

and against any state with thoughts of 

providing a nuclear weapon to a VEO. 

Supporters of Global Zero often state 

either that “whatever stabilizing impact 

nuclear weapons had during the Cold 

War, any residual benefits of these 

arsenals are now overshadowed by 

the growing risk of proliferation and the 

related risk of nuclear terrorism”58 or that 

state-to-state deterrence using nuclear 

weapons is “becoming increasingly 

hazardous and decreasingly effective.”59

Is this really the case? History tells 

us that in the sixty plus years since 

nuclear weapons were invented there 

has never been a state to state-nuclearexchange. Of course that does not 

mean that one is not possible, but it 

does indicate that states have not taken 

the use of nuclear weapons lightly and, 

to date, have been loathe to break the 

“nuclear taboo”. One can also argue 

convincingly from the historical record 

that the possession of nuclear weapons 

has been instrumental in preventing a 

number of direct large-scale stateto-state conventional conflicts from 

occurring - Warsaw Pact versus NATO, 

India versus Pakistan, and a coordinated 

attack against Israel by its neighbors. 

Given their proven deterrent effect in 

preventing both nuclear and conventional 

conflict, it is very difficult to make the 

case that simply eliminating nuclear 

weapons will make the world safer. It is 

doubtful that Israel, Pakistan, and India 

will feel “safer” without their nuclear 

arsenals. Removing Israel’s ability to 

hold its enemies at existential risk will 

just invite attack. Removing the ability 

of Pakistan and India to hold each other 

at existential risk makes the likelihood 

of a large-scale conventional conflict 

that much greater. Even for the U.S. 

and Russia, the road to zero would be 

a perilous one, for as arsenals approach 

zero, the security consequences of 

cheating would multiply as would 

the risk from other nations suddenly 

emboldened by the absence of the threat 

of nuclear retaliation. Taking away a 

nation’s ability to hold another nation at 

existential risk does not make that nation 

more secure, it does just the opposite.

Although not explicitly stated as a 

goal of nuclear zero, it is also widely 

assumed that significant economic 

savings would be realized if the world’s 

nuclear arsenals were reduced to zero. 

If nuclear weapons were no longer a 

part of the U.S. defense infrastructure, 

what would they be replaced with? The 

idealist might say that they need not 

be replaced with anything due to the 

increased “safety” inherent in a world free 

of nuclear weapons. The geopolitical 

realities of a world of diverse nations 

competing for finite resources and of 

clashing ideologies will certainly dictate 

otherwise. At a minimum, the elimination 

of nuclear weapons will require largersized conventional forces of increased 

capabilities and modernized weapons 

systems – expensive propositions 

all. Even more expensive, however, 

would be a potential new arms race to 

develop a new type of weapon of mass 

destruction, outside current arms control 

regimes, to replace the capability lost 

through nuclear zero. From an economic 

perspective, the security provided by 

the current levels nuclear weapons 

may ultimately be deemed a “bargain” 

compared to the nuclear zero alternative. 

Even if new expenditures on 

conventional forces or new weapon 

systems were minimized or avoided, 

the overall savings realized from the 

elimination of nuclear weapons may 

still not be as great as hoped by policy 

makers and Global Zero advocates. 

Even if nuclear zero was nominally 

achieved, the U.S. could not assume 

that the probability of a nuclear strike 

on the U.S. homeland or against 

deployed U.S. forces would be zero. 

No verification and monitoring system 

can be assumed to be perfect, and 

the possibility of VEO use, cheating, 

or of a now former weapons state 

clandestinely reconstituting a nuclear 

weapons program cannot be assumed 

away. As such, weapons systems and 

other critical assets and infrastructure 

would still need to be survivable 

against electromagnetic pulse (EMP) 

and other nuclear weapons effects. To 

do otherwise would encourage such 

an attack. Similarly, research and 

development in the areas of nuclear 

survivability, nuclear detection, nuclear 

weapons effects, nuclear forensics, 

missile defense, and consequence 

management would continue, 

though likely at some reduced level.

As pointed out earlier, a world free 

of nuclear weapons does not equate 

to a world without nuclear technology. 

In addition to the increased role of 

nuclear power in meeting the world’s 

energy demands, nuclear technology 

will continue to be used in a wide and 

increasing range of medical and industrial 

applications. As such, the risk of a 

VEO employing a radiological dispersal 

device (RDD) or a radiological exposure 

device will remain, thereby necessitating 

that our radiation portal monitoring 

systems at ports, border crossings, 

and other key locations continue in 

operation and continue to be improved. 

Similarly, research and development in 

the area of radiation detection in general 

would continue in order to improve 

routine monitoring and targeted search 

operations and, presumably, to support 

the nuclear zero verification regime.

With the continued existence of nuclear 

technology, particularly for uranium 

enrichment and fuel reprocessing, 

comes the possibility of the diversion of 

nuclear material and cheating. Though 

a stringent verification regime is part 

of Global Zero, no verification regime 

can be guaranteed to be perfect. Even 

in today’s non-proliferation verification 

and monitoring environment, cheating 

is almost certainly occurring in Iran and 

North Korea, posing serious security 

concerns to the world community. In 

a nuclear-zero world, where the U.S. 

and all others have eliminated all their 

nuclear weapons, the consequences 

of a nation cheating and producing a 

crude nuclear weapon are far more 

severe. In such a world, a nation with 

even one nuclear weapon holds the 

power to threaten any other nation 

without the fear of retaliation in kind.

Global Zero’s verification regime, if 

implemented as written, will certainly 

make it difficult for cheating to occur, 

particularly for nations who did not 

previously possess their own nuclear 

weapons program. For nations that 

did previously have such a program, 

cheating would be significantly easier 

to accomplish, in spite of the verification 

regime. Such a nation could secretly 

store the technology needed to quickly re31 ISSUE 8 Combating WMD Journal
constitute a nuclear weapons program; 

produce nuclear materials needed for a 

weapon at a secret facility constructed 

prior to Global Zero; or possibly even 

hide a small number of nuclear weapons 

in order to reveal them when needed. 

It is safe to assume that nations that 

live up to all their treaty obligations 

today would also do so as signatories 

to Global Zero. It is equally reasonable 

to believe that nations that have had 

a history of not living up to their treaty 

obligations and who have operated in 

a culture of secrecy and obfuscation 

will continue to do so, even if they sign 

onto Global Zero. For the U.S. to give 

up its nuclear deterrent in such an 

uncertain environment is naïve at best. 

If the U.S. does give up its nuclear 

deterrent and the assurance it provides 

to its allies, less scrupulous nations will 

cheat within the Global Zero regime 

to take advantage of the situation to 

threaten the security of the U.S. and 

its allies. To believe that just because 

the nations of the world have agreed 

to Global Zero they will all suddenly 

become good world citizens, even when 

they were not before, is dangerously 

unrealistic and runs contrary to basic 

human nature and common sense.

Cheating will occur in a Global Zero 

world, just as it does today (Iran and 

North Korea with respect to the NPT, 

for example). No verification regime 

can absolutely prevent it. Though the 

analogies are far from perfect, the U.S. 

can simply look to how effective its “ban” 

on alcohol was during the Prohibition 

Era, or how effective gun control has 

been in cities that have tried it, or to 

the overwhelming failure of the “War 

on Drugs” to convince itself that when 

something is banned, people will find a 

way to cheat regardless of the efforts to 

prevent it. From a human perspective, 

it is not the nuclear weapons themselves 

that lead to violence; it is the nature of 

people. That is an issue debated by 

the philosophers and theologians over 

the centuries. A nuclear-free world, 

like world peace, is a wonderful dream 

and we can hope for those who believe 

and pray that it will become a reality. 

However, as long as there are those 

who seek to gain and wield power for the 

purpose of controlling others and forcing 

an ideology or perspective on others, 

we will need to maintain our expertise 

in the weapons and science of the day.

Envisioning a World without 

Nuclear Weapons

Assuming that all the technical, 

security, economic, geopolitical, and 

social barriers were overcome, what 

would a world without nuclear weapons 

look like? How would the U.S. National 

Security Strategy change? Would 

there be more peace or less? Would 

we be more secure or less? Though 

the future is unknown, it is possible 

to speculate what that future may 

look like based on current trends, 

history, and basic human nature.

As previously discussed, the role 

of nuclear weapons in U.S. security 

strategy is primarily laid out in the 

NPR and reiterated in the NSS. In 

the absence of nuclear weapons, 

presumably there would no longer be 

any need for a NPR, but its objective 

of “preventing nuclear proliferation and 

nuclear terrorism” (echoed in the NSS) 

would remain relevant. Clearly, the 

key to nuclear zero’s success will be a 

strong, enforceable verification regime to 

prevent cheating and hence proliferation 

and nuclear terrorism. If recent history 

is any indication, the U.S. will likely find 

itself as the “world’s primary enforcer” 

of this verification regime, requiring 

conventional and specialized forces 

trained and equipped for the task. 

This will be a difficult mission requiring 

forces equipped with latest in radiation 

detection technology informed by a 

comprehensive system of intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance 

– none of which will come cheaply.

More profound, however, will be the 

removal of nuclear deterrence from 

U.S. national security and the security 

of the other known and suspected 

nuclear weapons states. Historically, 

nuclear deterrence has provided great 

motivation for nuclear-armed nations 

to avoid direct conflict and has allowed 

them to “hedge” on the size of their 

conventional forces. This will no longer 

be the case once nuclear zero takes 

effect. With the restraint imposed 

by nuclear weapons removed, direct 

conventional conflict will become more 

likely and more destructive. Eliminating 

nuclear weapons will not bring about 

world peace and the end of conflict; it 

will likely have just the opposite effect.

With all the difficult and complex 

issues to be overcome, it seems 

highly unlikely that nuclear zero can 

be achieved solely though political 

means. For some nations (Israel, for 

example) the security provided by 

nuclear weapons is too important to 

their national survival to just give away. 

To work, nuclear zero requires universal 

acceptance and compliance - without it 

the entire framework collapses. Human 

nature and history tell us that cheating 

will occur; to believe otherwise is folly. 

The stakes are too high for cheating not 

to occur. For in a world nominally free of 

nuclear weapons, a nation that breaks its 

nuclear-zero commitment and suddenly 

emerges with just a few nuclear weapons 

will be in a position of great power. The 

idea that nations, particularly nations 

that currently have nuclear weapons, 

will leave themselves vulnerable to such 

strategic surprise and peril by going to 

nuclear zero seems highly improbable.

Nuclear zero may indeed be achieved 

someday, but it will not be through 

purely negotiated or political means as 

outlined in the Global Zero Action Plan. 

Like weapons systems of the past, 

nuclear weapons too may someday 

become obsolete. Not because they 

have been negotiated away, however, 

but because they have been replaced 

by something else - something more 

effective, equivalently destructive, with 

fewer residual effects, and easier to 

produce. Ironically, nuclear zero may 

hasten the development of such followon systems. Another path to nuclear 

zero would be for the world to develop 

the genuine collective political will to 

renounce nuclear weapons and actively 

and aggressively enforce a ban, not just 

attempt to verify it. This likely would only 

happen, however, in the aftermath of 

either a state-to-state nuclear exchange 

or the use of a nuclear weapon by a VEO. 

Unfortunately, this scenario may play 

out sooner, rather than later. The 2008 

report by the bipartisan Commission 

on the Prevention of Weapons of 

Mass Destruction predicts that a WMD 

attack (more likely biological than 

nuclear) will occur by the end of 2013.60 

Combating WMD Journal ISSUE 8 32
Though noble in its intentions, the 

utopian goal of nuclear zero is simply 

not realistic at this time. The barriers to 

its implementation are simply too high 

and too profound to be overcome solely 

through political means. Paradoxically, 

instead of bringing peace, removing the 

restraint imposed by nuclear weapons will 

more likely result in more conventional 

conflict and the development of even 

more destructive weapons. Weakening 

the nuclear deterrent will not make the 

U.S. or the world more secure, it will 

only invite aggression. Even more 

dangerously, nuclear zero does little to 

directly address the most probable threat 

from nuclear weapons today – use by a 

VEO. Instead of a quixotic pursuit of a 

mythical world of nuclear zero, the U.S. 

should redouble its ongoing efforts to 

secure all nuclear materials worldwide 

to prevent possible VEO use – real and 

tangible efforts that actually will make 

the world safer now and in the future. 

Author Biographies

Colonel Jeffrey H. Musk, Ph.D., USA. 

Colonel Musk currently serves as the 

Deputy Director, Nuclear Technologies 

Directorate, Research and Development 

Enterprise, Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. He was 

commissioned through AROTC after 

earning a B.S. in Engineering Physics 

from the University of Maine. In 

addition, COL Musk has earned a M.S. 

in Nuclear Engineering from M.I.T. and 

a Ph.D. in Nuclear Science (Plasma 

Physics) from Cornell University. COL 

Musk has served in a variety of Nuclear 

and Counterproliferation career field 

positions including as a Nuclear Physicist 

at the Armed Forces Radiobiology 

Research Institute, Defense Nuclear 

Agency, as an Assistant Professor of 

Physics and Nuclear Engineering at 

the United States Military Academy, 

as a Staff Officer in the Office of 

Defense Programs, National Nuclear 

Security Administration, Department 

of Energy, and as the Director, Nuclear 

Science and Engineering Research 

Center, Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency. COL Musk participated in 

the “Hunters Trophy” underground 

nuclear test – the second to last such 

test conducted by the United States.

Chaplain, Colonel Scott R. Gardner, USAF. Chaplain Gardner currently serves 

as the Command Chaplain United States Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, 

Nebraska. After completing a B.A. in Journalism from the University of Arkansas, 

he went on to earn a Master of Divinity degree from Southwestern Baptist 

Theological Seminary in Fort Worth, TX. After serving as a civilian pastor for 

three years he received a direct commission in the USAF as a chaplain. He 

later earned a Doctor in Ministry degree from Reformed Theological Seminary 

in Jackson, MS. Ch Gardner has served as a command chaplain twice, in the 

USAF Chief of Chaplain’s office and in a variety of staff and wing level positions.

Lieutenant Colonel Andreas Tschakert, German Army. Lieutenant Colonel Tschakert 

is member of the German Armed Forces and currently serves in the Division of Army 

Armament in the Army Office, Cologne, Germany. He was trained as Air Defense Officer 

by trade and served in several Air Defense career field positions. He was assigned 

Battery Commander of a SHORAD Battery and Commander of a Staff and Supply 

Battery of the Air Defense Training Battalion, before working as S3 of an Air Defense 

Battalion in the past. He will serve in his current position after his return to Germany.

End Notes

1. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-BarackObama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/

 2. The term “nuclear zero” is also sometimes referred to as “global nuclear zero” or 

simply “global zero” by its proponents. All three terms will be used interchangeably 

throughout this paper.

3. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-BarackObama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/

4. In the terminology of the times, what we now refer to as nuclear weapons 

were then called “atomic bombs”. For consistency, the term nuclear weapon will 

be used throughout this paper. For an account of the German nuclear weapons 

program during the World War II era, see Heisenberg’s War: The Secret History 

of the German Bomb by Thomas Powers.

5. The term “device” is more properly used here as the system tested was not in 

a weapon-deliverable configuration. The “Trinity” device tested at Alamogordo, 

New Mexico, was a plutonium implosion device and was the design basis for the 

“Fat Man” bomb later dropped on Nagasaki, Japan. There was such a high degree 

of confidence in the uranium gun-type design, later used in the “Little Boy” bomb 

dropped on Hiroshima, that no advance test was deemed necessary.

6. Rhodes, Richard, Making of the Atomic Bomb, Simon and Schuster, New York, 

1986, p. 670.

7. In the years since World War II, much has been written questioning the necessity 

of using nuclear weapons on Japan (The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb by 

Gar Alperovitz, Hiroshima by Ronald Takaki, and Hiroshima in America by Robert 

Jay Lifton and Gregg Mitchell are a few examples). Second guessing aside, it is 

clear from the historical record and the operational environment of the time that 

the nuclear bombings of Japan saved thousands of American lives and likely many 

thousands more Japanese lives if the fanatical Japanese defenses of Iwo Jima 

and Okinawa were any indication.

8. Rhodes, Richard, Dark Sun, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1995, p. 365. The 

first Soviet nuclear device tested was copy of the U.S. plutonium implosion “Fat 

Man” bomb. The design for the bomb was delivered to Soviet operatives by Klaus 

Fuchs, a German émigré physicist who was part of the British contingent at Los 

Alamos during the Manhattan Project.

9. Soviet Stockpile Number: http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab19.asp

U.S. Stockpile Number: http://www.brookings.edu/projects/archive/nucweapons/50.

aspx. Note: these totals include both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.

10. Rhodes, Richard, Dark Sun, pp. 570-576.

11. Rhodes, Richard, Arsenals of Folly, Alfred A. Knopp, New York, 2007, pp. 

163-167.

12. The yield of the Trinity device was 18.6 kT (Rhodes, Making of the Atomic 

Bomb, p. 677), the yield of Little Boy was 12.5 kT (Rhodes, Making of the Atomic 

Bomb, p. 711), the yield of Fat Man was 22 kT (Rhodes, Making of the Atomic Bomb, 

33 ISSUE 8 Combating WMD Journal
p. 740) , and the yield of the first Soviet Device, Joe 1, was ~20 kT(Rhodes, Dark Sun, p. 368). One kT is the equivalent 

explosive force of 1,000 tons of TNT or 4.183 x 1012 Joules.

13. Rhodes, Arsenals of Folly and Kaplan, Fred, The Wizards of Armageddon, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California.

14. Thermonuclear weapons were initially referred to as “hydrogen bombs”. The U.S. detonated the first thermonuclear 

device at Eniwetok atoll on November 1, 1952. This device had a yield of 10.4 MT, or ~1000 times greater than the bomb 

dropped on Hiroshima (Rhodes, Dark Sun, p. 510). On October 30, 1961 the Soviet Union tested a nuclear device with a 

yield of 50 MT (http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Russia/Sovatmtest.html).

15. http://www.defense.gov/npr/.

16. NPR, p. iii.

17. NPR, p. 2.

18. www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss.../national_security_strategy.pdf

19. NSS, p. 14.

20. NSS, p. 23.

21. www.defense.gov/qdr/

22. www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=62736

23. www.defense.gov/news/2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.pdf

24. Rhodes, Making of the Atomic Bomb, p. 697 and http://www.atomicarchive.com/Bios/Szilard.shtml

25. Rhodes, Dark Sun, p. 231.

26. Rhodes, Dark Sun, p. 240.

27. Rhodes, Dark Sun, p. 240.

28. United States Information Pertaining to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2010) located at: http://

www.state.gov/t/isn/npt/index.htm.

29. http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nptfact

30. http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USRussiaNuclearAgreementsMarch2010

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid. Note, the Russians made a similar pledge to withdraw its tactical nuclear weapons from deployment, but to date they 

appear not to have done so. For an excellent summary of the tactical nuclear weapons issue, see the Congressional Research 

Service (CRS) Report: Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons, by Amy F. Woolf, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/137264.

pdf

33. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-nuclear_movement

34. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-nuclear_movement_in_the_United_States; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-nuclear_

movement

35. http://www.culture-of-peace.info/apm/chapter6-15.html

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. http://www.globalzero.org/en/about-campaign

39. http://www.globalzero.org/en/about-campaign

40. “Nuclear capable states”, as defined in the Global Zero Action Plan are “countries with nuclear weapons, weapons-grade 

fissile materials, uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities, or nuclear power or research reactors.”

41. Global Zero Action Plan, p. 3. http://www.globalzero.org/en/about-campaign

42. Ibid, p. 4

43. For example, Patrick Moore, one of the founders of Greenpeace, now is a proponent of nuclear energy. http://www.

washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/14/AR2006041401209.html

44. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/Safeguards/pia3810.html

45. Ibid.

46. http://www.nuclearterror.org/faq.html#faq_9

47. http://www.nti.org/j_features/j4_threats.html

48. Global Zero Action Plan, p. 7. http://www.globalzero.org/en/about-campaign

49. Currently, France generates over 75% of its electricity with nuclear power. http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf40.html

50. An Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) is defined as: “A device incorporating radioactive materials designed to result in the 

dispersal of radioactive material or the formation of a nuclear-yield reaction. Such devices may be fabricated in a completely 

improvised manner or may be an improvised modification to a U.S. or foreign nuclear weapon.” Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Terms Handbook, DSWA-AR-40H, 1998.

51. http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm

52. http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/nunn_lug/overview.htm

53. http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/fissile-materials-working-group/deconstructing-us-funding-nuclearmaterial-se

54. http://www.y12.doe.gov/missions/nonproliferation/inp/gipp/nuclearcities.php

55. http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/fissile-materials-working-group/deconstructing-us-funding-nuclearmaterial-se

56. Ibid.

57. http://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearterrorism/articles/071509_factsheet_fmct/

58. Global Zero Action Plan, p. 2. http://www.globalzero.org/en/about-campaign

59. http://fcnl.org/issues/nuclear/world_free_of_nuclear_weapons/

60. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/03/terrorism-nuclear-biological-obama-white-house

Combating WMD Journal ISSUE 8 34
Funding the DoE Stockpile Stewardship and Management 

Program

LTC Gerard A. Vavrina

Industrial College of the Armed Forces

he United States nuclear weapon 

stockpile is aging. The last new 

nuclear weapon built in 1990. 1 The 

FY12 Department of Energy (DoE) Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program (SSMP) would implement a comprehensive twenty-five year plan2

 to ensure 

the viability of all nuclear weapons in the 

stockpile without underground testing.3

This program would maintain confidence 

that these weapons would perform as 

designed through non-nuclear component 

testing, computer modeling, and laboratory 

testing. The program would also extend a 

weapon’s operational lifetime (Life Extension Program (LEP)) using refurbishment, 

reuse, or replacement of components.4

The SSMP should be fully funded, 

because it provides the best program to 

maintain an effective deterrent while allowing further reductions in nuclear weapons, 

thus supporting both the President's goals.

What are they?

(1) Long Term-Global Nuclear 

Weapons Elemination.

(2) Near Term - Credibile Nuclear 

Deterant.

And President Obama’s explained his 

position on the U.S. nuclear weapon 

program in his remarks April 2009 in 

Hradcany Square, Czech Republic.

“So today, I state clearly and 

with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and 

security of a world without nuclear 

weapons. I'm not naive. This goal 

will not be reached quickly – perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take 

patience and persistence... As 

long as these weapons exist, the 

United States will maintain a safe, 

secure and effective arsenal to 

deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies...”5

President Obama expressed the U.S. 

commitment to work toward the ultimate 

goal of a world without nuclear weapons. 

This commitment is best exemplified by 

the Administration signing the New START 

(Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) on April 

8, 2010, and their successful efforts to gain 

Senate ratification, with the treaty entering 

into force on February 5, 2011. 6 President 

Obama also understands the critical role 

the U.S. nuclear deterrent plays in our 

national security. A credible deterrence 

to our adversaries and assurance to our 

Allies is created by the capability of the 

Department of Defense (DoD) to conduct 

attacks with nuclear weapons delivered 

via missile, submarine, or aircraft. This 

capability, and by extension, our deterrence and national security, is then 

directly supported by the DoE’s SSMP. 

The Obama Administration reaffirmed 

its commitment to ensuring an effective 

stockpile with the FY2013 $7.6B SSMP 

funding request 7. However, in September 

2011, the Senate Appropriations Energy 

and Water subcommittee recommended 

$400M8 in cuts to the Administration’s 

$7.6B FY12 SSMP funding request. With 

current concerns about the large Federal 

budget deficit, this recommendation could 

be repeated in response to the FY2013 

budget request and threaten implementation of the Administration’s promised $85B 

investment in the SSMP over the next 

ten years.9 The 2012 and 2013 budget 

requests were meant to correct chronic 

SSMP funding deficiencies, assessed 

in 2006 as “already resulting in triage 

among demands to sustain a healthy 

nuclear enterprise. Current capacities 

are forcing choices between essential 

areas of work”.10 Any further funding cuts 

could force cutting of selective programs 

and thus jeopardize the U.S. stockpile 

safety, security, and/or effectiveness. 

The SSMP funds would allow replacement and modernization of aging DoE 

laboratories and facilities that Vice President Biden stated was “underfunded and 

undervalued” for many years.11 They 

would also support construction of a new 

uranium research facility in Tennessee 

and a chemistry and metallurgy research 

building in Los Alamos. These facilities 

would facilitate a better understanding 

of the effects of aging processes on 

warhead reliability, especially important 

since the U.S. stopped testing nuclear 

weapons over twenty years ago. The 

budget also funds completion of the life 

extension study of an aircraft-delivered 

nuclear bomb, continuation of the LEP 

for the Minuteman ICBM warhead, and 

refurbishment of sufficient quantities of 

submarine-based warheads.12 Cuts to 

the budget request would degrade all 

portions of the SSMP or else severely 

degrade and perhaps eliminate certain 

programs, necessitating more expensive 

fixes later and creating greater risks associated with maintaining an aging stockpile. 

Opponents of President Obama’s 

request argue that SSMP funding should 

be cut because a nuclear stockpile of the 

T

35 ISSUE 8 Combating WMD Journal
current size is not required to deter threats 

to the United States and its Allies. They 

question whether the United States should 

maintain and enhance an expensive 

nuclear force, arguing the immense superiority of U.S. conventional forces provides 

sufficient deterrence. Actually, maintaining 

nuclear deterrence is even more critical to 

offset the potential decrease in conventional deterrence that may result from a 

perception that planned conventional force 

reductions would decrease U.S. conventional capabilities. As for protection of U.S. 

Allies, these critics also argue “no one 

can imagine that the United States would 

ever use a nuclear weapon on a European 

battlefield.”13 Following this reasoning, 

some advocate cuts of up to $26B from 

the SSMP over 10 years, to include the 

$251 million LEP for the B61 bomb, versions of which are deployed in Europe. 14

Significant SSMP cuts would diminish confidence in the effectiveness of 

the U.S. stockpile, which in turn could 

severely degrade America’s nuclear deterrent. This degradation would occur in 

an environment where Russia and China 

are enhancing their nuclear capabilities 

through modernization efforts. Without 

a strong SSMP to help maintain our own 

nuclear forces, America’s allies could 

come to doubt President Obama’s assurance in Prague that “they can count on 

America’s security commitments.”15 More 

importantly, if U.S. allies lost confidence 

in the U.S. nuclear deterrent, they might 

embark on their own nuclear weapon 

programs, as France did in the 1950s. 

France maintains its own nuclear stockpile even now because it does not want 

to rely on U.S. extended deterrence and 

believes a major threat to Europe could 

occur in the next fifteen to twenty years.16

Other opponents question why the United States is increasing expensive stockpile stewardship initiatives if the Administration is truly committed to near-term 

reductions in weapons stockpiles and to 

long-term elimination of all nuclear weapons. They argue that a fully funded SSMP 

undermines U.S. credibility in its efforts 

to stem further proliferation, because it 

would appear to endorse the long-term 

usefulness of nuclear weapons. Actually, 

a strong SSMP would allow further U.S. 

reductions in nuclear weapons. Out of 

5113 warheads in the stockpile, a couple 

thousand warheads are kept in the “inactive” stockpile as potential replacements to 

hedge against problems with warheads in 

the “active” stockpile.17 A strong SSMP 

would increase confidence in the reliability 

of warheads in the active stockpile and 

reduce the need for an oversized inactive 

stockpile, allowing significant reductions. 

Even George Schultz, former U.S. Secretary of State, and a leading advocate 

for the elimination of nuclear weapons,18

argued that “investments are urgently 

needed” to help the nuclear weapons 

laboratories “attract, develop, and retain 

the outstanding scientists, engineers, 

designers, and technicians we will need to 

maintain our nuclear arsenal.”19 The U.S. 

investment in the SSMP would help bolster 

not just the nuclear weapons laboratories, 

but also the human capital at dozens of 

supporting laboratories and university 

programs. These science, technology, 

and engineering investments are balanced 

and integrated to the maximum extent 

possible among multiple DoE programs, to 

include non-proliferation programs. Thus, 

SSMP funding enhancements would have 

far reaching impacts on future U.S. scientists intelectual capital developments 

and engineers and the technology base 

they help to support. Investment in SSMP 

is an investment in the United States’ 

future scientific and technological edge. 

Fully funding the U.S. SSMP will help 

ensure a safe, secure, and effective 

nuclear weapon stockpile. Funding will 

bring a nuclear weapon complex up to a 

level where tradeoffs and offsets are not 

required within critical programs. Funding 

is also critical to deterring threats to the 

United States and its Allies. Further, its 

deterrence effect could offset possible 

loss of deterrence from planned conventional force reductions. A strong SSMP 

would allow further stockpile reductions 

without degrading operational effectiveness by reducing the number of warheads 

required as a hedge against possible 

failures. Contrary to critics’ views and 

conventional wisdom, the SSMP budget 

request certainly aligns well with President Obama’s non-proliferations goals 

enroute to a world without nuclear weapons. Vice President Biden highlighted the 

crux of this budget issue during remarks 

in February 2010 at National Defense 

University, “guaranteeing our stockpile, 

coupled with broader research and development efforts, allows us to pursue deep 

nuclear reductions without compromising 

our security.” 20 Congress understands 

the connection between a strong SSMP 

and our nation’s security, and should fully 

fund the FY2013 SSMP budget request.

Author Biographical

LTC Gerard Vavrina is a student at the 

Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 

in Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. He 

has a B.S. in Physics from Loyola 

University (MD), a M.S. in Physics, and 

a Ph.D. in Nuclear Physics from North 

Carolina State University. He was previously assigned as a Combating WMD 

Branch Chief at the Army G-35 Staff. 

His email address is Gerard.vavrina@

us.army.mil

End Notes

1. “U.S. Nuclear Stockpile,” Office of 

the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of 

Defense for Nuclear Matters, www.acq.

osd.mil.

2. “FY 2012 Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Program Report to Congress”, April 15, 2011, 14, http://www.fas.

org/blog/ssp/.

Combating WMD Journal ISSUE 8 36
3. ”Department of Energy FY 2012 Congressional Budget Request, National Nuclear Security Administration”, DOE/CF-0057 

Volume 1, February 2011, 49, www.cfo.doe.gov. 

4. ”Department of Energy FY 2012 Congressional Budget Request”, 59. 

5. Barack Obama, remarks (Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/

the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/.

6. Amy F. Woolf, “The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions”, Congressional Research Service Report to 

Congress, 7-5700, April 21, 2011.

7. “FY 2013 Budget Request Seeks $11.5 Billion to Achieve President Obama’s Nuclear Security Objectives, Shape Future of 

Nuclear Security”, February 13, 2012, http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/fy13budget21312.

8. Kelsey Davenport, “Support for Nuclear Weapons Funding Dips”, Arms Control Today, October 2011, http://www.armscontrol.

org/act/2011_10/Support_for_Nuclear_Weapons_Funding_Dips.

9. “FY2012 Budget Request Includes Critical Investment in Nuclear Security Enterprise”, February 4, 2011, http://www.nnsa.

energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/fy12budget21411.

10. “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force”, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics, December 2006.

11. Biden, Joe, “The President’s Nuclear Vision,” Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2010.

12. “FY 2013 Budget Request Seeks $11.5 Billion to Achieve President Obama’s Nuclear Security Objectives, Shape Future of 

Nuclear Security”, February 13, 2012, http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/fy13budget21312.

13. “The Bloated Nuclear Weapons Budget”, The NY Times, October 29, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/opinion/

sunday/the-bloated-nuclear-weapons-budget.html.

14. Sustainable Defense Task Force, Debt, Deficits, & Defense: A Way Forward, June 11, 2010, http://www.comw.org/pda/

fulltext/1006SDTFreport.pdf.

15. Obama, Barack. “The National Security Strategy.” The White House, May 2010, 23.

16. Bruno Tertrais, “France,” in Unblocking the Road to Zero: Perspectives on Advanced Nuclear Nations, Barry Blechman, ed., 

(Washington: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2009), 3. 

17. “Fact Sheet, Increasing Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile”, U.S. Department of State, May 3, 2010, 

www.defense.gov/news/d20100503stockpile.pdf.

18. Schultz, George P., Perry, William J., Kissinger, Henry A., and Nunn, Sam, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons”, The Wall 

Street Journal, January 4, 2007. 

19. Schultz, George P., Perry, William J., Kissinger, Henry A., and Nunn, Sam, ”How to Protect our Nuclear Deterrent”, The Wall 

Street Journal, January 20, 2010.

20. Biden, Joe “The Path to Nuclear Security: Implementing the President’s Prague Agenda” (remarks, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., February 18, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-vice-presidentbiden-national-defense-university.

37 ISSUE 8 Combating WMD Journal
The Continuing Nuclear Military Revolution

Major Jason G. Anderson

The way to win an atomic war is to make certain it never starts. Omar N. Bradley

lbert Einstein once said, “I do not 

believe that civilization will be 

wiped out in a war fought with 

the atomic bomb. Perhaps two-thirds of 

the people of the earth will be killed.” 1

This quote from one of the key inventors 

of the atomic bomb has set the stage 

for the last 65 years of warfare. The 

atomic bomb was not only a revolutionary new weapon, but one that defined 

both a military revolution (MR) and a 

revolution in military affairs (RMA).2,3 To 

understand this complex interaction on 

how one weapon did both, there must 

be an understanding of both terms and 

the perpetuation, even today, of the 

strategic value of being able to wipe 

out a civilization in a single maneuver.

There is some controversy as to 

whether the terms MR and RMA were 

developed by either the United States 

or the former Soviet Union (Russia).4

The historian Williamson Murray first 

proposed prior to writing his book, The 

Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-

2050, “Military revolutions recast the 

nature of society and the state as well 

as of military organizations.” whereas 

RMA’s, “involve putting together the 

complex pieces of tactical, societal, 

political, organizational, or even technological changes in new conceptual 

approaches to war.” 6 The dropping 

of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima 

and Nagasaki at the end of World War 

II, a technological RMA, spawned 

the future global MR. The American 

people had no idea that by ending one 

war they would immortalize warfare 

even during times of relative peace. 

 The COLD WAR

During the Cold War, a period marked 

by the end of World War II to the fall of 

the Berlin Wall, the threat of nuclear war 

shaped American society even though 

no nuclear bombs or missiles were ever 

used in anger. During this time, the 

United States was involved in two major 

conflicts, Korea and Vietnam, and multiple covert actions. Sun-Tzu said, “The 

army values being victorious; it does 

not value prolonged warfare.”7 If this 

is the case, then why weren’t nuclear 

devices used in either of the two major 

conflicts? Books have been written 

about this subject, but in essence its 

psychological fear, as the Cold War continued, the ways and means of delivery 

and effect of nuclear weapons increased 

so dramatically, that one bomb being 

employed no longer equaled victory, but 

mutually assured destruction (MAD). 

Unbeknownst to most citizens today, the 

US is still in this predicament.8 MAD 

is, “An evolutionary defense strategy 

based on the concept that neither the 

United States nor its enemies will ever 

start a nuclear war because the other 

side will retaliate massively and unacceptably.”9

 This led the U.S. to develop 

a policy of limited warfare and containing the threat of nuclear war through 

economic and diplomatic means. 

“The most important consequence 

of the war was the vast increase in the 

U.S. defense budget.”10 Figure 1, from 

Carl Conetta, co-director of the Project 

on Defense Alternatives, shows from 

the Korean War to 2019 an increase 

in defense spending. Embedded in 

those spending plans was the development of the nuclear arsenal.11 On 

December 1, 1950, “Executive Order 

10186 created Federal Civil Defense 

Administration (FCDA) within Office for 

Emergency Management, Executive 

Office of the President.”12 This enabled 

the people of the United States to be 

prepared for a nuclear war by purchasing fall-out shelters, stock piling food, 

and participating in emergency drills. 

With the majority of Americans behind 

the Defense Department’s strategic 

“first strike”13 deterrence policy, the 

societal MR was institutionalized and 

the nuclear arms race was perpetuated 

throughout the rest of the Cold War. 

On one occasion, during the height of 

the Cold War, the world stood by locked in 

fear. The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 

1962, was a turning point for diplomatic 

relations between the US and USSR.14

Both countries agreed to pull out the 

nuclear missiles in Cuba and Turkey 

(the USSR publicly and the US privately) 

and a direct communication telephone 

and telefax were established between 

the US and USSR less than six months 

later.15 This ensured that the leaders of 

the two countries with the most nuclear 

weapons could quikly address issues 

diplomaticly rather than initiating WWIII.

The LAST 20 YEARS

Since the end of the Cold War, the 

threat of terrorism and rogue nation 

states has driven US Defense policy. 

With the thought of one of these groups 

acquiring or using a nuclear weapon 

always at the forefront of that policy. 

The Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS), which was created in response 

to and after the terrorist attacks on 

A

Combating WMD Journal ISSUE 8 38
September 11, 2001 also maintains the 

same policy. According to Fred Ikle, 

the former Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy, “Democracy cannot survive 

in a highly uncertain world in which 

a smuggled nuclear bomb might be 

detonated in Paris or Manhattan.”16

Thus, preventing nuclear proliferation 

and nuclear terrorism has risen to the 

current administration’s number one 

priority.17 This has been following 

intermitted with the deterrence policy 

as demonstrated over the last 20 years. 

This expansion of the nuclear RMA to 

include terrorist use of nuclear weapons 

pushed the evolution of technologies 

for detection, identification, and information about all the current and possible future nuclear powered nations.

Dr. Andy Butfoy, an international security specialist from London, notes, that 

the nuclear RMA “encompassed the 

exploitation of many overlapping and 

mutually reinforcing factors – satellite 

technology, a communications revolution, breakthroughs in data processing, 

improved surveillance and target identification, stealth technology, increase 

weapons accuracy and range, and 

the magnified ability to rapidly focus 

firepower on selected targets.”18 By 

demonstrating the United States has 

the ability to project itself anywhere in 

the world in the first part of the twentyfirst century in order to contain state 

actors; it maintains the status quo of 

the non-use of nuclear weapons. 

The Future

The future holds unknown threats, 

and according to the Nuclear Posture 

Review report, (“By working to reduce 

the salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs and moving step-by-step 

toward eliminating them, we can reverse 

the growing expectation that we are destined to live in a world with more nucleararmed states, and decrease incentives 

for additional countries to hedge against 

an uncertain future by pursuing nuclear 

options of their own,” p.vi.)19 John 

Caves, a distinguished fellow at the 

National Defense University’s Center for 

the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, observes, “Despite its call for the 

abolition of nuclear weapons, China is 

the only recognized nuclear weapons 

state that is both modernizing and 

expanding its nuclear forces.”20 This 

may bring the US back into another Cold 

War with a different country while still 

continuing limited warfare in other parts 

of the world. Even as the drawdown in 

Afghanistan occurs, the Defense budget 

outlook shown in Figure 1 still shows 

expenditures in excess of $600 billion 

through 2017. According to Caves, “The 

reality is that geopolitical developments 

actually could increase rather than 

decrease US dependence on nuclear 

weapons to deter and contain challenges from nuclear-armed great powers.”21

Conclusion

The continuation of deterrence only 

works if all nuclear parties (Russia, 

China, U.S., France, U.K., Pakistan, 

India, North Korea and possibly Israel)22 

accept that any one country in possession of an arsenal is willing to use it. 

According to Knox and Murray the issue 

with MRs and RMAs is sometimes the 

organizations that create them don’t 

know they are doing so until a new one 

replaces them.23 As the Cold War, the 

Global War on Terrorism, and the future 

threat have shown the world, nuclear 

weapons have shaped society and 

the State as well as how we organized 

and conduct 21st Century Warfare.

DOD Budget Authority Average DOD Budget 1954-2001

Chart 2. DOD Budget Authority 1948-2019

(Billions of 2010 USD)

Figure 1

39 ISSUE 8 Combating WMD Journal
Author Biographical

MAJ Jason G. Anderson is CBRN Officer 

assigned to the US Army Student Detachment. He has a BA in Sociology and is 

a recipient of the Department of Defense Information Assurance Scholarship 

(DoDISAP). He is completing his Master’s 

Degree in Information Management at 

Syracuse University. He was previously 

assigned as the Chief WMD Assessments 

for Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability 

Assessment (JSIVA) Team 2 at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. His email 

address is jason.anderson3@us.army.mil

Bibliography

Adamsky, Dima. “Through the Looking Glass: the Soviet Military-Technical 

Revolution and the American Revolution 

in Military Affairs.” The Journal of Strategic 

Studies, April 2008: Vol. 31, No. 2, 257-294.

BBC News. Cold War hotline recalled. 

June 7, 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/

europe/2971558.stm (accessed May 5, 2011).

Bradely, Omar. Briany Quote.com. n.d. http://

www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/o/omarnbrad108428.html (accessed January 22, 2011).

Butfoy, Andrew. “The Rise and Fall of Missile Diplomacy? President Clinton and 

the “Revolution in Military Affairs” in Retrospect.” Australian Journal of Politics 

and History, 2006: Vol. 52, No. 1, 98-114.

Caves, John P. Jr. “Avoiding a Crisis of 

Confidence in the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent.” 

Strategic Forum, January 2010: No. 252, 1-6.

Conetta, Carl. “DoD Budget Authority 1948-

2019 from “An Undisciplined Defense”.” 

Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing 

Report 20. January 18, 2010. http://www.

comw.org/pda/fulltext/1001PDABR20.

pdf (accessed May 3, 2011).

Editor. The World’s Nuclear-Armed 

States. October 9, 2006. http://www.

defencetalk.com/the-worlds-nuclear-armedstates-7938/ (accessed May 5, 2011).

Einstein, Albert. Briany Quote.com. n.d. 

http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/keywords/

atomic.html (accessed January 22, 2011).

Gates, Robert. Nuclear Posture Review 

Report. Congressional Mandate, Washington 

DC: US Government Printing Office, 2010.

Green, Eric. Civildefensemuseum. n.d. 

http://www.civildefensemuseum.com/

index.html (accessed May 3, 2011).

Ikle, Fred Charles. “The Second Coming of the Nuclear Age.” Foreign Affairs, 

January/feburary 1996: 119-128.

Jervis, Robert. “The Impact of the Korean War 

on the Cold War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 

December 1980: Vol. 24 No. 4, 563 – 592.

JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY 

AND MUSEUM. Cuban Missile Crisis. n.d. http://

www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/CubanMissile-Crisis.aspx (accessed May 4, 2011).

Knox, MacGregor, and Williamson Murray. The 

Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050. 

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Murray, Williamson. “Thinking About 

Revolutions in Military Affairs.” Joint 

Forces Quarterly, Summer 1997: 69-76.

PARRINGTON, ALAN J. Col, USAF. 

“Mutually Assured Destruction Revisited.” Airpower Journal, Winter 1997: 4-19.

Purcell, John. the Best-Kept Secret, 

The Story of the Atomic Bomb . New 

York: The Vanguard Press, Inc., 1963.

Stone, John. “Politics, Technology and 

the Revolution in Military Affairs.” the 

Journal of Strategic Studies, September 2004: Vol. 27, No. 3, 408-427.

Tzu, Sun. “The Art of War.” By Ralph 

Sawyer. New York: Basic Books, 1994.

Woolf, Amy. U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes 

in Policy and Force Structure. CRS Report 

for Congress, Washington DC: Congressional 

Research Service: The Library of Congress, 2006.

Figure 1 Source: Conetta, Carl. “DoD Budget 

Authority 1948-2019 from “An Undisciplined 

Defense”.” Project on Defense Alternatives 

Briefing Report 20. January 18, 2010. http://

www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/1001PDABR20.

pdf (accessed May 3, 2011).

End Notes

1. Albert Einstein. Briany Quote.com. n.d. 

http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/keywords/

atomic.html (accessed January 22, 2011).

2. Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox. 

The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-

2050. Cambridge: Cambridge University 

Press, 2001: 5-14

3. Dima Adamsky. “Through the Looking 

Glass: the Soviet Military-Technical Revolution and the American Revolution in Military 

Affairs.” The Journal of Strategic Studies, 

April 2008: Vol. 31, No. 2, 257-294.

4. Ibid, 258.

5. Williamson Murray. “Thinking About 

Revolutions in Military Affairs.” Joint Forces 

Quarterly, Summer 1997:71.

6. Ibid, 73.

7. Sun Tzu. “The Art of War.” By Ralph 

Sawyer. New York: Basic Books, 1994: 174.

8. Fred Charles Ikle. “The Second Coming 

of the Nuclear Age.” Foreign Affairs, January/

Feburary 1996: 119-122.

9. Col Alan J. Parrington, USAF. “Mutually 

Assured Destruction Revisited.” Airpower 

Journal, Winter 1997: 4-19.

10. Robert Jervis. “The Impact of the Korean 

War on the Cold War.” Journal of Conflict 

Resolution, December 1980: Vol. 24 No. 4: 

574.

11. Ibid, 577.

12. Eric Green. Civildefensemuseum. n.d. 

http://www.civildefensemuseum.com/index.

html (accessed May 3, 2011).

13. John Stone. “Politics, Technology and 

the Revolution in Military Affairs.” The Journal 

of Strategic Studies, September 2004: Vol. 

27, No. 3, 413-414.

14. JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL 

LIBRARY AND MUSEUM. Cuban Missile 

Crisis. n.d. http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/

JFK-in-History/Cuban-Missile-Crisis.aspx 

(accessed May 4, 2011).

15. BBC News. Cold War hotline recalled. 

June 7, 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/

europe/2971558.stm (accessed May 5, 2011).

16. Ikle, 127.

17. Robert Gates. Nuclear Posture Review 

Report. Congressional Mandate, Washington 

DC: US Government Printing Office, 2010: iii.

18. Andrew Butfoy. “the Rise and Fall of 

Missile Diplomacy? President Clinton and the 

“Revolution in Military Affairs” in Retrospect.” 

Australian Journal of Politics and History, 

2006: Vol. 52, No. 1:99-100.

19. Stone, 409.

20. John P. Caves Jr. “Avoiding a Crisis of 

Confidence in the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent.” 

Strategic Forum, January 2010: No. 252: 4.

21. Ibid, 4.

22. Editor. The World’s Nuclear-Armed 

States. October 9, 2006. http://www.

defencetalk.com/the-worlds-nuclear-armedstates-7938/ (accessed May 5, 2011).

23. MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray. 

The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-

2050. Cambridge: Cambridge University 

Press, 2001: 12-14.

Combating WMD Journal ISSUE 8 40
Benefits of Nuclear Survivability

Mr. Nick Haugen

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

he Army has prepared itself to 

face nuclear threats since it built 

and used the world’s first nuclear 

weapon in combat. Today, the Army 

requires that all mission critical systems 

with electronics be hardened against the 

nuclear weapon effect of High Altitude 

Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP).1 The 

HEMP survivability requirement is generally not challenged by Combat and 

Material Developers. From a threat 

standpoint, HEMP can be created by a 

state with relatively undeveloped nuclear 

and missile technology. A single nuclear 

weapon detonated at high altitude can 

generate a HEMP over a wide area.2 In 

terms of hardening, dealing with HEMP 

is not unlike dealing with other electromagnetic environmental effects (E3), like 

lightning, directed energy weapons, and 

interference from friendly communications 

emitters and radars. If one is dealing with 

a set of E3, adding HEMP to the set is 

not costly or technologically challenging.

The Army also requires that mission 

critical weapons systems be hardened 

against a broader set of nuclear weapons effects.3 This requirement is more 

frequently resisted by developers. It is a 

less obvious threat and is more difficult to 

harden against. The threat is less obvious 

because few states have tactical nuclear 

weapons. Since the collapse of the Soviet 

Union, there are no clear cut scenarios 

involving the use of nuclear weapons 

against deployed formations. When one 

does imagine a nuclear weapon being 

used against our forces, it is easier to 

imagine a response involving the United 

States responding in kind than continuing 

the conventional fight on the battlefield. 

Besides the threat being less obvious, 

hardening against it is difficult. One must 

deal with thermal radiation, nuclear blast, 

and initial nuclear radiation (INR). The INR 

environment is composed of neutrons and 

gamma rays, considering both dose rate 

and total dose, which affect electronics in 

different ways. Added to these challenges 

is the increasing pressure to save money 

in the face of significant budget cuts. 

This article seeks to make clear the 

benefits of the Army’s requirement to 

harden mission critical systems against 

thermal radiation, nuclear blast, and INR.

Strategic Benefits

The benefits to the Army’s nuclear 

hardness program extend beyond the 

survivability of individual systems. By 

sustaining the Army’s nuclear survivability 

program, we dissuade adversary proliferation and sustain the technical knowledge 

associated with nuclear hardening. These 

are strategic benefits that exist regardless of whether any individual system is 

hardened. The key is maintaining the 

nuclear hardening requirements of enough 

systems through the lifecycle maintenance 

process to realize these strategic benefits.

To dissuade adversary proliferation, 

we must influence a potential nuclear 

weapon state’s decision on whether or not 

to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear 

weapons.4 There are significant costs 

associated with violating promises not to 

proliferate, such as international sanctions. As important as imposing costs is 

denying benefits. If a proliferating state 

is a potential adversary of the United 

States—a likely case—then it will see less 

benefit to possessing nuclear weapons if it 

knows that the U.S. Army is fully prepared 

to deal with nuclear weapons. If we field 

forces that are hardened to the effects of 

nuclear weapons, there is one less benefit 

to an adversary obtaining them. On the 

other hand, if we abandon our hardening 

program, we present the potential enemy 

with a softer target. This will be one more 

weight on the scale in his calculation of 

whether or not to obtain nuclear weapons.

One could plausibly argue that the 

hardness of U.S. Army combat systems 

T

The nation’s hedge against long-term uncertainty. Bradley Fighting Vehicles 

unloading in Pusan, Korea. These vehicles are currently being hardened to 

survive the effects of nuclear weapons at modest cost to the Army.5

41 ISSUE 8 Combating WMD Journal
is not likely to be a significant driver in 

this decision. If one considers Iraq’s 

on-and-off weapons program prior to 

2003, it is difficult to imagine Saddam 

sitting in one of his palaces thinking, “I 

was going to develop nuclear weapons, 

but I heard that the Abrams is hardened 

so I won’t.” However, suppose that the 

U.S. Army had abandoned its policy of 

hardening its systems against nuclear 

weapons. Instead of thinking of the specific hardness level of a specific weapon, 

Saddam might have thought, “The U.S. 

Army thinks that nuclear weapons are 

too scary or difficult to deal with.” This 

would have been a rational conclusion 

on his part and plausibly could have 

been a significant factor in his decision 

regarding nuclear weapons development. 

The second strategic benefit is sustaining the technical knowledge base. The 

Army has been able to attract talented 

engineers and scientists to commit to a 

career based on knowledge of nuclear 

weapons effects. This technical knowledge base can be compared to a human 

body. It is mature and healthy. Its health 

can be sustained through modest effort 

and expense. If we allow it to die, it would 

be very difficult indeed to replace it with 

an infant. Worse, we cannot know when 

or for what purpose we will need this 

knowledge base. The Army would face 

a situation similar to that faced by the Air 

Force and Navy, which have not sustained 

the expertise necessary to maintain their 

strategic ballistic missiles to the point that, 

according to the Defense Science Board, 

“Current skills may not be able to cope 

with unanticipated failures requiring analysis, testing, and redesign.”6

 By maintaining the nuclear hardness requirement and 

consistently applying it, we create a need 

for Material Developers who understand 

the impact of nuclear weapons effects on 

systems and the technical approaches 

for addressing those impacts. We create a need for Combat Developers to 

understand how nuclear weapons impact 

the forces they are developing. We create the need for parts suppliers to build 

radiation tolerant parts. Finally, we sustain our test facilities and their personnel.

As with dissuading adversary proliferation, rational arguments exist against maintaining the technical knowledge base. One 

could read through the list of people above 

who need to maintain nuclear knowledge 

and think that it could hardly be worth the 

cost. Conventional thought might suggest 

that cutting this initiative is a chance to 

accept a bit of risk and spend taxpayers’ 

money on something more pressing. This 

might be true were it not for the modest 

cost of the Army’s hardening program. 

Historically, meeting and sustaining a 

system’s nuclear hardness requirements 

amounts to approximately 1% of total 

program costs. When one considers that 

there are only about fifty systems with 

a full nuclear survivability requirement, 

this is cheap. Consider how much the 

Army spends on big ticket programs that 

are cancelled prior to production. How 

much do they contribute to our long term 

security? If chopping out this modest 

spending is an opportunity to capture 

some short term savings, then sustaining 

it is a cheap way to mitigate long-term risk.

Individual Program Benefits

As noble a goal as achieving these strategic benefits might be, the Army spends 

money program by program and it is the 

individual Program Manager (PM) who 

must justify his costs. He might not be 

able to say, “I’m taking one for the team 

with my nuclear survivability program. 

Check out these strategic benefits in the 

Combating WMD Journal to which I’m 

contributing.” He will need something 

relevant to his individual system to justify 

the costs involved. Fortunately, there are 

concrete benefits to an individual program 

and the soldiers who use the system. 

The most important of these benefits is 

the preparedness against future threats. 

In their recent study of ground vehicle 

modernization in the U.S. Army and Marine 

Corps, Andrew Krepinevich and Eric Lindsey of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments identify the proliferation 

of nuclear weapons as one of seven 

trends impacting the future land warfare 

environment. They find that “[t]he ongoing proliferation of nuclear weapons and 

changing attitudes about their use will substantially increase the likelihood that U.S. 

military forces will confront an adversary 

that is willing and able to employ nuclear 

weapons.”7 Besides noting the increasing 

likelihood of a nuclear battlefield in the 

developing world, Krepinevich and Lindsey cite a published Central Intelligence 

Agency memorandum and Congressional 

testimony which point to Russian development of small yield nuclear weapons 

and more flexible employment doctrine.8

One might challenge the relevance 

of this assessment when discussing 

the Abrams and Bradley, since these 

are cases of matching legacy systems 

against hypothetical future threats. However, the Abrams and Bradley vehicles 

will be in service twenty-five years from 

now. Consider that twenty-five years ago 

Russia was a threat in its incarnation as 

the Soviet Union. If our relationship with 

Russia can change so dramatically in one 

twenty-five year period, can it not change 

again in the next twenty-five years? Who 

guarantees that Russia will be friendly? 

Alternatively, who guarantees that it will 

be orderly and its 12,000 nuclear warheads will be secure and accounted for?9

Another benefit to an individual program 

is that sustaining a system’s nuclear hardness is much less expensive than trying to 

recreate it. Just as the technical knowledge 

of the Army as a whole is inexpensively 

maintained and cannot easily or quickly be 

recreated, so it is with the hardness of an 

individual vehicle. Currently, the essential 

parts of a hardened vehicle are tested on a 

supplier by supplier basis, the results captured in a database, fixes for faulty parts 

implemented, faulty parts tracked through 

the fleet of fielded systems, et cetera. In 

the case of the Abrams and Bradley, this 

management system has been developed 

Combating WMD Journal ISSUE 8 42
and improved over thirty years. If it is 

abandoned, knowledge of what parts from 

what suppliers are inherently hard goes 

away. Knowledge of how to fix faulty parts 

atrophies and then goes away. Knowledge of what parts are in what vehicles 

goes away. Knowledge of how to manage 

the databases that track this information 

atrophies and then goes away. Knowledge of how to test parts for radiation 

tolerance atrophies and then goes away. 

Surely the cost of recreating this system 

is an order of magnitude higher than sustaining it. If today’s user doesn’t want 

nuclear hardened vehicles, what about 

the user ten or fifteen years from now? If 

one justifies a modest savings using the 

requirements of today’s user, one is setting 

up the future PM to spend a fortune meeting the possible needs of tomorrow’s user.

A third system level benefit is that 

hardened systems deter enemy nuclear 

weapon use. Just as a hardening program 

throughout the Army impacts an adversary’s decision on whether to develop 

nuclear weapons, a survivable formation 

impacts his decision to use them. In this 

case, the benefit is much more concrete. 

The impact of nuclear weapons on battlefield formations can be modeled with confidence. Currently, the Army hardens its 

systems to the level at which humans will 

survive on the battlefield. If we stop hardening our systems, the radius at which our 

formations are likely to be impacted by a 

nuclear weapon extends from the radius 

at which humans in vehicles are inherently 

vulnerable to the level at which electronics 

are disrupted. In very rough terms, this 

leads to a quadrupling of the area impacted. If an enemy can quadruple the area 

over which his nuclear weapon is effective, he is that much more likely to use it. 

The final system level benefit of sustaining a full nuclear hardening program deals 

with soldier morale. Currently, combat 

vehicles are designed and built so that if 

the crew lives, their vehicle works. This 

is a consistent message that can be 

communicated to operators. Currently, 

soldiers can be told, “After the event, keep 

fighting,” and “If you live, you still have a 

mission.”11 Lowering the level at which 

we harden vehicles complicates and sours 

this message. If some or all functions 

are left unhardened, the message to soldiers would need to be something along 

the lines of, “After the event, get your 

vehicle as close to the rally point as possible before you collapse so that we can 

repair it and give it to another crew,” or “If 

the automotive system works but the fire 

control system doesn’t, that means you 

are not going to be with us much longer.”

Conclusion

The Army is facing tough decisions in 

the near future on how to accomplish its 

mission with a smaller budget. Naturally, 

all of our spending needs to be examined 

to ensure that we are not wasting increasingly scarce resources. But allow leaders 

make these decisions with eyes wide 

open. Any decision today to cut the Army’s 

nuclear hardening program will present a 

large problem for future decision makers 

in the likely event that nuclear weapons 

become a steadily more serious threat. 

Author Biographical

Nick Haugen is the CBRN Survivability 

Manager at USANCA. Prior to joinging 

USANCA, he worked for DTRA, SAIC 

Inc., and the Pacific Northwest National 

Laboratory. He served in the U.S. Army 

from 1997 - 2003 as a combat engineer 

stationed at Giessen, Germany and Fort 

Hood, Texas. Mr. Haugen is a graduate of the U.S. Military Acedemy (B.S. 

civil engineering major), Georgetown 

University (M.A. in Security Studies), 

and the Naval War College (M.A. in 

National Security and Strategic Studies).

End Notes

1. Army Regulation 70-75, Survivability of 

Army Personnel and Materiel, May 2005, p. 2.

2. Report of the Commission to Assess 

the Threat of the United States from

EMP Attack, 2004, Vol.1, pp. 4-6.

3. AR 70-75, p. 2.

4. This understanding of dissuasion, 

distinct from deterrence, as influencing 

how an adversary competes, is from M. 

Elaine Bunn, “Can Deterrence be Tailored?,” Strategic Forum #225 (January 

2007), Institute for National Strategic 

Studies, National Defense University, p. 2.

 5. Source: dodlive.mil, accessed 17 

February 2012.

6. Report of the Defense Science 

Board Task Force on Future Strategic Strike Skills, March 2006, p. 58.

7. Andrew F. Krepinevich and Eric 

Lindsey, The Road Ahead: Future 

Challenges and Their Implications for 

Ground Combat Vehicle Modernization 

(Washington: Center for Strategic and 

Budgetary Assessments, 2012), p. 24.

8. Ibid., p. 23.

9. Quantity of Russian weapons from 

Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, 

“Nuclear Pursuits, 2012,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 68(1) (January 2012), p. 96.

10. Source: ready.gov, accessed 23 

February 2012.

11. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010. 

Not the end of the world. Nuclear 

weapons are big bombs. Failing to 

harden our systems makes adversary 

nuclear weapons more effective than 

they otherwise would be.10

43 ISSUE 8 Combating WMD Journal
Protection Factors of Combat Systems

COL Joseph F. Marquart

Mr. Joseph C. Nellis, Chemical Engineer

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

onsider this plausible 

scenario:

Unit Cmdr: “DragonToc, this is 

Recon6, be advised that the new vehicles 

and shelters just off-loaded from the bird 

(break). Troops are positioned and ready 

for movement in 15 mics. Over.”

CP: “This is Dragon Toc, copy that , 

Recon6 (break). We prepared quadrant 

maps showing routes and locations for 

your mission...(break) ...Transmitting them 

over right now...(break) Three circles on 

map refer to distances 5, 10, and 15 clicks 

from the center of radiation source. Over.”

Unit Cmdr: “This is Recon6, maps 

showing up on our screen now... (break). 

Good job, men...(break) Now transmit PF values for our systems. Over.”

CP: “This is DragonToc, be advised 

that for 2 days we tried to get PF values...(break)... PFs don’t seem to 

exist for new systems (break). Found 

only a few for 2005 and older. Over.”

Unit Cmdr: “This is Recon6, the plan 

included PF values for our vehicles. 

(break)... Be advised that without PFs 

we cannot move forward (break) (break). 

(Long pause).

Unit Cmdr: “This is Recon6, (break) 

all units stand down and abort mission...(break). I say again, abort mission 

(break) and return to assembly area.”

Background and Problem Definition

Protection Factor (PF) is a quantitative value of the vehicle’s or the shelter’s 

ability to shield occupants from penetrating nuclear radiation. The measurement 

of a particular shield to protect against 

incident radiation depends on its thickness, material composition, and the 

type and energy of incident radiation(s). 

The measure of radiation shielding is a ratio called the PF, defined as

The “free-field” radiation dose is the dose 

of radiation with no shield present. The protection factors are commonly expressed 

as ratios of dose rates instead of doses.

Currently, there is no DoD regulation 

requiring the Army to obtain radiation PF 

for combat vehicles and shelters. Previously, the PFs were measured only for a 

few selected vehicles and combat systems. 

Today’s combat environment has changed 

to the point that accumulating PF data to fill 

this gap is prudent. To plan and execute 

missions in radiologically (R) contaminated 

environments, Commanders must know 

the PFs of their vehicles and shelters.

Based on recent lessons learned from 

Operation Tomodachi (Japan), where 

PFs were required to support operational 

decisions, the Army must address gaps 

to implement a requirement to measure 

PFs in systems which may operate in 

R-contaminated environments. Radiation exposure is a serious hazard to 

soldiers. Currently, ground component 

Commanders are hindered in making exposure decisions without established PF information on their systems. 

Without PFs for combat vehicles and 

shelters, Commanders cannot determine 

the appropriate length of operational 

exposure in which their forces could 

safely operate in R-contaminated environments. The above scenario amplifies the importance of PF information.

How to Solve this Gap

USANCA is initiating a process for 

the Army to begin measuring PF on 

combat vehicles and shelters, particularly for mission critical systems. If 

a system is required to operate and 

protect the crew in an R-contaminated 

environment, knowing the PF is an extension of this operational requirement.

Proposed Way Forward

To put into motion the data collection effort, the Army will adopt the PF 

requirement. The means of gathering the valuable data is outlined below:

 A near-term solution is to incorporate 

the requirement to collect PF data in the 

capability development documents (CDD) 

for combat systems. Initially, the Combat 

Developer (CBTDEV) would address PF 

in their requirements section of all CDDs 

for manned combat vehicles and shelters. 

During document staffing, USANCA verifies the PF statements for completeness, 

or suggests modifications to accommodate 

the system. (See a sample of PF statement 

in Table 1). The PF paragraph is tracked 

as a test requirement from the CDD to the 

Test Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) and 

Detailed Test Plan. Consideration had 

been given to introduce this requirement 

with the system CBRN survivability criteria, but it is not practical since PF values 

are not criteria and will vary by system.

 The long-term solution is the requirement for CBTDEVs to include a PF statement in all appropriate CDDs. The most 

appropriate guidance document is AR 71-9, 

Warfighting Capabilities Determination. 

Additionally, the PF testing requirement 

can be incorporated in the next revision 

of AR 73-1, Test and Evaluation Policy.

C

Free-field radiation dose

Dose of radiation penetrating the shield PF =

Combating WMD Journal ISSUE 8 44
Courses of Action for Obtaining PF Data

There are several ways to obtain 

the actual PF values on systems: (a) 

Direct measurement; (b) measurement 

of composite materials used in construction to estimate PF of systems; 

and (c) modeling. These approaches 

are outlined and analyzed below.

Direct Measurement. In this approach, 

the system is sent to the test site and the 

PF is directly measured using a radioactive 

source. An advantage to this approach 

is that it can be done concurrently with 

other test activity, and the cost is generally 

low. The tester is responsible to conduct 

a system level test and provide the data 

in a standardized format to the PM and 

USANCA. The PF value is addressed by 

the program manager (PM) in the Technical 

Manual for the system. The tester and PM 

are also responsible for transferring PF data 

into the Army’s Testing Database System.

During T&E phase, the cost for direct 

measurement of PF will be addressed in 

the overall test program for the system, by 

the PM. Cost depends on complexity of the 

combat system. This is a relatively uncomplicated test based on Allied Engineering 

Publication-14 employing calibrated radiac 

meters and a radiation source such as 

cobalt. The PF data are collected and 

recorded with other test data. There is no 

need to develop a new scientific process to 

measure PF on a system level because it is 

already addressed in Test Operations Plan 

(TOP) 01-2-625. Additionally, with systems 

under development, the PF will be established at the end of the testing period in the 

acquisition life-cycle. Ultimately, PF values 

will be provided in the System Evaluation 

Test Report by Army Evaluation Command.

The direct measure for obtaining PF 

data is preferable because it is least costly 

and it is prompt. The PF values would 

then be readily available to Commanders, units, the community utilizing the test 

database, and USANCA. USANCA would 

be the repository of PF data for operational 

users and potential modeling scenarios.

Measurement of Composite Materials used in construction to estimate PF 

of systems. With this approach, the PFs 

of materials are measured and collected 

before assembly of military vehicles and 

shelters. PF data for composite materials can be collected and stored for later 

use estimating the PF of a new system. 

The advantage of this approach is that 

the PF values will be available for modeling or manipulation, and can be applied 

conceptually to any system in the future.

The disadvantage of this measurement is it requires significant upfront 

funding before the PFs of conceptual 

systems can be estimated. This approach 

does not include geometrical effects 

or any second order neutron effects.

Modeling. Currently, only old codes are 

available for modeling PF data. These 

codes are based on obsolete equipment 

and do not meet AEP-14 requirements. In 

order to make modeling a viable option, 

new PF data are required to update the 

codes. After PF data are collected from 

direct measurement on actual systems 

or from composite materials, computer 

modeling could be introduced. The model 

provides radiation dose data affecting 

personnel inside the system. One of the 

benefits of coupling computer models to 

the data is that it allows averaging PF for 

all system orientations, since the direct 

measurements are only made at a few 

vehicle/shelter positions. Without such 

integration of computer models and experimental data, the applicability of resulting 

protection factors would be very limited.

While modeling would enhance PF 

measurements, it requires allocation of 

resources to improve existing models 

and the development of new codes to 

meet AEP-14 requirements. In addition 

to the expense of generating and validating new codes, further resources are 

required at regular intervals for ensuring maintenance of the special codes

Conclusions

It is important to record PF values for manned 

combat systems such as armored vehicles 

and shelters. A Commander needs this 

information for determining mission duration and calculating risk when operating 

in a radiation-contaminated environment. 

 Army stakeholders such as White 

Sands Missile Range, the Army Nuclear 

and Chemical Survivability Secretariat, and 

DTRA concluded that the most effective 

and affordable approach for implementing 

the PF requirement for new systems is 

instructing CBTDEVs to insert language into 

Sample PF Statement for Use in 

Capability Documents

During test and evaluation (T&E) 

of the system, the radiation protection factor (PF) will be measured 

and recorded. The system provides 

its occupants with shielding from 

penetrating radiation hazards. Commanders at all levels require the PF 

information to plan for, control, and 

manage the occupants risk during 

operations in radiologically-contaminated environments. For this reason, 

it is paramount that the radiation PF 

is measured and collected, especially 

for all armored vehicles. To operate 

in this type of contaminated environment, Commanders and users must 

know the PF to determine mission 

duration and make risk calculations.

Table 1. Sample PF Statement

M1114 Up-Armored HMMWV 

(photo by U.S. Army)

45 ISSUE 8 Combating WMD Journal
CDDs. The new PF requirement is tracked 

in the TEMP and Detailed Test Plan. Eventually, the requirement must be addressed 

in regulations (AR 71-9 and AR 73-1).

 The best approach for obtaining PFs for 

legacy systems is direct measurement while 

undergoing product improvement or retrofit. 

The cost for measuring PF directly 

on systems depends on the complexity of the system. Cost for PF measurement would be borne by the PM as an 

integral part of the nuclear test program

The benefit in implementing the proposed 

PF measurements will address troop protection at relatively low cost. PF information will mitigate some costs of long-term 

effects associated with medical treatment 

of soldiers exposed to nuclear radiation.

Further Reading

1. QSTAG 754 (AEP-14), Guidelines 

for the Armored Fighting Vehicle Designer 

to Improve Nuclear Radiation Protection (U), 17 Jun 1992. (classified report).

2. JP 3-12, Doctrine for Joint 

Nuclear Operations, Dec 1995.

3. FM 3-11.6, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear Aspects of Command 

and Control, MCRP 3-37.B, NTTP 

3-11.34, AFTTP (I) 3-20.70, Sept 2007.

4. TOP 01-2-625 (AEP-14), Outlines the 

procedures to measure radiation protection factors, U.S. Army White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) email, 14 Mar 2011.

Author Biographical

COL Joseph F. Marquart is the Chief 

of the Capabilities Division at USANCA, 

HQDA G-3/5/7 (Field Operating Agency). 

He earned his Bachelor of Science in Business Management from Gannon University, 

Master of Science in Business Administration from Central Michigan University and 

Commission in the U.S. Army Chemical 

Corps. His assignments include duties as 

a Nuclear Weapons Liaison Officer, Commander of 503rd Chemical Detachment, 

Commander of NATO Multifunctional Logistics Support Company and Commander 

Newport Chemical Depot. Preceding his 

assignment at USANCA, he was the Director for Chemical Demilitarization Programs 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics. His 

email is: joseph.f.marquart.mil@mail.mil

Mr. Joseph Nellis currently works as 

a Chemical Engineer/Staff Officer at 

USANCA. His 27 years of work in CBRN 

survivability for the Department of the Army 

include duties as Test Officer and Test 

Director at U.S. Army Dugway Proving 

Ground, and as CBRN analyst at ARL/

SLAD, Aberdeen Proving Ground. He 

earned his Master of Science degree in 

Geochemistry of Uranium/Radioactive 

Materials from the University of Utah and 

M.B.A. degree in Management Science 

from the University of California, Riverside. 

His email is: joseph.c.nellis.civ@mail.mil

STRYKER (Photo by Fotodynamics)

Shelter, Tactical, Expandable, Two 

side (Photo by U.S. Army) 

Mobile Tactical Shelter S-280C/G 

designed for housing communications and electronics equipment 

(Photo by U.S. Army)

Combating WMD Journal ISSUE 8 46
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Distribution

To be added to the electronic distrubution list please 

contact Executive Secretary Ms.Cassonya Gates at Email: 

cassonya.l.gates.civ@mail.mil. 

The latest electronic issue of Journal is available on 

USANCA’s AKO Portal and CBRNIAC Key Documents 

page:https://www.cbrniac.apgea.army.mil/Products/Links/

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USANCA is partnered with Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear Defense Information Analysis Center (CBRNIAC) to bring you the latest CWMD Journal in electronic 

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Combating WMD Resource Page

47 ISSUE 8 Combating WMD Journal
U.S. Army Nuclear and Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Agency

(USANCA)

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