1

Filed 9/17/20; Certified for Publication 10/14/20 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

MICHAEL DENNY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

JOHN ARNTZ, as Director, etc., et 

al.

Defendants and Respondents.

 A158029

 (City & County of San Francisco 

 Super. Ct. No. CGC-19-575070)

In November 2018, the voters in San Francisco passed Proposition A, 

the Embarcadero Seawall Earthquake Safety Bond, by 82.7 percent of the

popular vote. The following spring, plaintiff Michael Denny filed a lawsuit

against defendant John Arntz, the San Francisco Director of Elections, and 

defendant Dennis Herrera, the City Attorney, to set aside Proposition A. 

Denny alleged that, in various ways, the ballot materials were not fair and 

impartial, thus constituting grounds to contest the election outcome under

Elections Code section 16100.

1 Defendants demurred to the complaint, 

arguing that it failed to state a claim based on any of the permissible grounds 

for a postelection contest under section 16100. The trial court sustained 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Elections Code.
2

defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend and entered a judgment of 

dismissal. Denny appeals from the judgment. We shall affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We draw our statement of facts from the complaint and the documents 

that were judicially noticed by the trial court.2

A. Proposition A

At the November 6, 2018 election, the City and County of San 

Francisco (City) general election ballot3 contained Proposition A, which put to 

the voters whether the City should issue bonds to fund repairs and 

improvements to the Embarcadero Seawall. 

The official language for Proposition A that appeared on the ballot was 

as follows:

“SAN FRANCISCO SEAWALL EARTHQUAKE SAFETY BOND, 

2018: To protect the waterfront, [Bay Area Rapid Transit] and MUNI,

buildings, historic piers, and roads from earthquakes, flooding and 

rising seas, by: repairing the 100 year old Embarcadero Seawall; 

strengthening the Embarcadero; and fortifying transit infrastructure 

and utilities serving residents and businesses; shall the city issue 

$425,000,000 in bonds, with a duration up to 30 years from the time of 

issuance, an estimated tax rate of $0.013/$100 of assessed property 

2 In his appellate briefs, Denny requests that this court take judicial 

notice of sample ballots and local measure materials for various elections in 

California and other states. There is no indication that these materials were 

presented to the trial court, and appellate courts are not required to take 

judicial notice of documents in those circumstances. (McMahan v. City and 

County of San Francisco (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1368, 1373, fn. 2.) In any 

event, we do not find them relevant and the request is denied. 

3 A ballot contains, among other things, the “[t]itles and summaries of 

measures submitted to vote of the voters.” (§ 13103, subd. (c).)
3

value, and estimated annual revenues of up to $40,000,000, with citizen 

oversight and regular audits? The City’s current debt management 

policy is to keep the property tax rate from City general obligation 

bonds below the 2006 rate by issuing new bonds as older ones are 

retired and the tax base grows, though the overall property tax rate 

may vary based on other factors.” 

Consistent with the City’s Municipal Elections Code, a Voter 

Information Pamphlet, which included a digest of Proposition A, was 

prepared for the November 2018 election and distributed to every 

registered voter in the City. (S.F. Mun. Elec. Code, §§ 500, 502.) The 

digest of Proposition A was written by the City’s Ballot Simplification 

Committee (BSC)—a group responsible under the City’s Municipal 

Elections Code for digests of local ballot measures. (S.F. Mun. Elec. 

Code, §§ 500, subd. (c)(3), 515; 610, subd. (a)(1).) Generally, these

digests consist of four sections: (1) “The Way It Is Now”; (2) “The 

Proposal”; (3) “A ‘Yes’ Vote Means”; and (4) “A ‘No’ Vote Means.” (S.F. 

Mun. Elec. Code, § 515, subd. (a).) The digests must meet certain 

characteristics; for example, generally they do not exceed 300 words 

and they must be written for eighth-grade level readability. (S.F. Mun.

Elec. Code, § 515, subds. (b)-(c).) 

The BSC holds meetings where the public can provide comments 

regarding the proposed digests. (S.F. Mun. Elec. Code, § 590; see also 

§ 9295 [providing a 10-day public examination period during which 

members of the public may review the voter information pamphlet 

before it is printed].) The BSC held public meetings on July 30 and

August 3, 2018, to discuss the digest language for Proposition A in 

advance of the November 6 election. 
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The Voter Information Pamphlet contained additional information 

about Proposition A: the City controller’s financial analysis, the City 

Attorney’s general statement about the measure, and arguments in favor and 

against the measure. (S.F. Mun. Elec. Code, §§ 510, subd. (a), 520, 540, 550, 

subd. (a).) There were also paid arguments in favor of the proposition; paid 

arguments in opposition are permitted, but none were submitted. (Id.,

§ 555.) The Voter Information Pamphlet also included the full text of 

Proposition A, which ran to some three single spaced pages. 

Proposition A passed in November 2018 with 82.7 percent of votes cast 

in favor. 

B. Denny Files Suit to Set Aside Proposition A

In April 2019, Denny, representing himself, filed a lawsuit to set aside 

Proposition A pursuant to section 16100, subdivision (c) based on five 

grounds: (1) the digest prepared by the BSC was not impartial; (2) the City 

should not have included paid ballot arguments in the Voter Information 

Pamphlet; (3) the ballot question for Proposition A violated the Elections 

Code because it did not include the phrase “shall the measure . . . be 

adopted”; (4) the ballot question was not impartial and the title should not 

have been printed in upper case letters; (5) the ballot question for Proposition 

A was too long. The complaint alleged that these purported deficiencies

constituted a failure to comply with section 13119 et seq., which sets forth the 

content requirements for ballots.

4

 Denny alleged that each deficiency 

4 Section 13119 provides, in relevant part, “[t]he ballots used when 

voting upon a measure . . . authorizing the issuance of bonds or the 

incurrence of debt, shall have printed on them the words ‘Shall the measure 

(stating the nature thereof) be adopted?’ To the right or below the statement 

of the measure to be voted on, the words ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ shall be printed on 

separate lines, with voting targets.” (§ 13119, subd. (a).) It also requires the 
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constituted an actionable “offense [by defendants] against the elective 

franchise” within the meaning of section 16100, subdivision (c), which 

authorizes election contests in certain circumstances. (§ 16100, subd. (c).) 

Defendants demurred to the complaint on multiple grounds, including

that Denny had failed to avail himself of preelection remedies for challenging 

the Voter Information Pamphlet and Ballot language, and that the complaint 

in any event could not state a claim as a postelection challenge under section 

16100. After a hearing, the trial court issued a detailed order sustaining the 

demurrer without leave to amend. The trial court determined that “none of 

the grounds giving rise to a post-election challenge under Elections Code

section 16100 applies.” The court explained that Denny’s reliance on section 

16100, subdivision (c) was misplaced because: (1) that section applies only to 

the conduct of candidates in an election; (2) failing to provide an impartial 

analysis is not an “offense against the elective franchise” within the meaning 

of section 16100, subdivision (c); and (3) Denny failed to show that any 

alleged violations of the law effected the outcome of the election, as required

by section 16100, subdivision (c). Denny timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

This dispute centers on whether Denny’s allegations—that Proposition 

A’s ballot materials were not impartial due to its alleged deficiencies—state a 

claim that defendants committed an offense against the election franchise 

under section 16100 subdivision (c). Denny contends his claims are

cognizable under the Elections Code, and the demurrer was procedurally 

improper. We address each contention in turn.

statement of the measure to be true, impartial, and should not be 

argumentative or “likely to create prejudice for or against the measure.”

(§ 13119, subd. (c).)
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A. Standard of Review

Our standard of review is well established. “When reviewing a 

judgment dismissing a complaint after the granting of a demurrer without 

leave to amend, courts must assume the truth of the complaint’s properly 

pleaded or implied factual allegations. [Citation.] Courts must also consider 

judicially noticed matters. [Citation.] In addition, we give the complaint a 

reasonable interpretation, and read it in context. [Citation.]” (Schifando v. 

City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081 (Schifando).) “We do not, 

however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact 

or law.” (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 

125.)

“[W]e determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to state a 

cause of action.” (Schifando, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) “If the complaint 

states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which 

the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good 

against a demurrer.” (Quelimane Company v. Stewart Title Guaranty 

Company (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.) Issues of statutory construction are 

questions of law subject to independent review. (MacIsaac v. Waste 

Management Collection & Recycling, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1082.)

Our review is de novo, but appellant bears the burden of demonstrating 

error. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) We treat a party 

who represents himself on appeal as we would any other party or attorney. 

(Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247.)

B. Denny Cannot Proceed With A Post-Election Contest

It is “ ‘ “the duty of the court to validate the election if possible,” ’ ” 

meaning the election “ ‘ “must be held valid unless plainly illegal.” ’ ” 

(Friends of Sierra Madre v. City of Sierra Madre (2001) 25 Cal.4th 165, 192
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(Friends of Sierra Madre).) Thus, a “court’s authority to invalidate an 

election is limited to the bases for contest specified in Elections Code section 

16100.” (Ibid.) Those bases include misconduct of a precinct board member, 

the elected person being ineligible for office at the time of election, bribery or 

offense against the elective franchise, the casting of illegal votes, denial of 

eligible voters’ right to vote, precinct board errors in canvassing or conducting 

the election returns, and an error in vote counting programs or summation. 

(§ 16100, subds. (a)-(g).) 

Denny’s complaint is based on section 16100, subdivision (c), which

authorizes an election contest on the ground that “[t]he defendant has given 

to any elector or member of a precinct board any bribe or reward, or has 

offered any bribe or reward for the purpose of procuring his election, or has 

committed any other offense against the elective franchise.” (Italics added.)

The trial court concluded that although Denny labeled his claim 

statutory misconduct by defendants under section 16100, subdivision (c), his 

complaint is actually a challenge to the sufficiency and impartiality of 

Proposition A’s digest and ballot materials, and that is a claim that can only 

be raised preelection. (Friends of Sierra Madre, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 192-

194.) As we explain below, we agree with the trial court that Denny failed to 

state a claim under section 16100.

The first issue with Denny’s complaint is the definition of “defendant” 

under section 16100, subdivision (c). The Elections Code defines “defendant” 

as, essentially, a candidate in the election. (§ 16002 [defining “defendant” as 

“that person whose election or nomination is contested or those persons 

receiving an equal and highest number of votes, other than the contestant, 

where, in other than primary elections, the body canvassing the returns 

declares that no one person has received the highest number of votes for the 
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contested office”].) By its terms, section 16100 subdivision (c) applies where a

defendant (i.e., candidate) has offered a bribe or otherwise “has committed 

any other offense against the elective franchise defined in Division 18

(commencing with Section 18000).” (§ 16100, subd. (c).) Neither of the 

defendants here were candidates in the November 2018 election. 

Although Denny relies on Canales v. City of Alviso (1970) 3 Cal.3d 118, 

to support his argument that section 16100, subdivision (c) allows election 

contests to ballot measures as well as candidate conduct, that reliance is 

misplaced. In Canales, our Supreme Court construed a prior version of 

section 16100, subdivision (c) to allow an election contest where proponents of 

a ballot measure offered bribes to secure the passage of a measure, and the 

challenger sought a recount. (Id. at pp. 129-130.) The court noted the bribes 

“should not void an election unless it is shown that the result would have 

been different without their influence”—that it affected the outcome of the 

election. (Id. at p. 130.) Here, Denny does not seek a recount of the ballots. 

Nor, as we will discuss, does he satisfy the requirement of alleging facts that 

any improper conduct affected the outcome of the election. (See ibid.; see also 

Horwath v. City of East Palo Alto (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 766, 774 [“When a 

contestant seeking to overturn a ballot measure election, as opposed to a 

candidate election, relies on subdivision (c), he or she must demonstrate that 

the forbidden act affected the outcome”].) 

Second, section 16100, subdivision (c) does not provide a statutory basis 

“to attack the outcome of an election based on deficiencies in the impartial 

analysis” of a ballot measure after the election, such as the attack Denny 

wages on Proposition A here. (People ex rel. Kerr v. County of Orange (2003) 

106 Cal.App.4th 914, 932 (Kerr).) Enforcing the requirements for an 

impartial analysis of a ballot is a preelection activity. (Friends of Sierra 
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Madre, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 178-179, 193 [postelection challenge to a local 

ordinance based on city improperly changing the ordinance’s language on 

scope and intent not permitted by section 16100].) 

Both the California Elections Code and the City’s Municipal Elections 

Code authorize preelection challenges to alleged flaws in the Voter 

Information Pamphlet or ballot and set out the procedure for doing so. 

During the 10-day public examination period when the public may review the 

Voter Information Pamphlet prior to printing, “any voter of the jurisdiction in 

which the election is being held, or the elections official, himself or herself, 

may seek a writ of mandate or an injunction requiring any or all of the 

materials to be amended or deleted.” (§ 9295, subd. (b)(1); see also S.F. Mun. 

Elec. Code, § 590.) The writ of mandate or injunction must be filed “no later 

than the end of the 10-calendar-day public examination period.” (§ 9295, 

subd. (b)(1).) 

Section 13314 similarly permits a voter to seek a preelection writ of 

mandate “alleging that an error or omission has occurred, or is about to 

occur, in the placing of a name on, or in the printing of, a ballot, county voter 

information guide, state voter information guide, or other official matter, or 

that any neglect of duty has occurred, or is about to occur.” (§ 13314, subd. 

(a)(1).) In Kerr, for example, a group of citizens made a postelection challenge 

to the passage of a local measure adopting a county charter by claiming, 

among other things, the measure was misleadingly described in the ballot 

materials, which also omitted a fiscal impact statement. (Kerr, supra, 106 

Cal.App.4th at p. 918.) The court noted that “anyone who thought that the 

impartial analysis provided with the ballot materials was somehow deficient 

might have made a preelection effort to cure any deficiency and thereby 
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prevent any alleged misleading of the voters before it happened.” (Id. at pp. 

931-932.)

Nothing in Denny’s complaint or the proceedings in the trial court 

reflect that he availed himself of preelection procedures for challenging the 

Proposition A ballot materials or digest. The BSC held public meetings on 

July 30 and August 3, 2018, at which members of the public had the 

opportunity to comment on the digest of Proposition A. (See § 9295, subd. (a)-

(b).) If Denny believed the impartial analysis or other ballot materials or 

digest were deficient, he could have made a preelection effort to cure them at

public meetings or by a writ of mandate. (See § 13314, subd. (a)(1).) Denny 

does not dispute that a preelection writ of mandate was an available remedy

and that he did not use it. His postelection challenges to the ballot and 

information pamphlet after Proposition A has already passed cannot 

proceed.

5

Denny nonetheless argues that the failure of a local ballot measure to 

strictly comply with Elections Code requirements for language and form gives 

rise to a proper postelection challenge. But the two cases he relies on do not 

support his point; both cases address challenges to ballot materials and voter 

guides that were made before the election, not after. (See Huntington Beach 

City Council v. Superior Court (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1417, 1426 [preelection 

petitions for writs of mandate to address false or misleading statements]; 

5 We note that courts have recognized “the ‘possibility’ that an 

impartial analysis of a county measure or other ballot materials can be so 

misleading and inaccurate ‘that constitutional due process requires 

invalidation of the election,’ ” but Denny does not raise any such claim here.

(Owens v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 107, 123.)
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McDonough v. Superior Court (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1173 [preelection 

writ of mandate challenging ballot title and question].) 

Finally, even if Denny could rely on section 16100, subdivision (c) as a 

basis to challenge the ballot measure, Denny does not allege the defendants’

actions affected the election results for Proposition A as required for ballot 

measure election contests under section 16100, subdivision (c). (Horwath v. 

City of East Palo Alto, supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at p. 774 [“When a contestant 

seeking to overturn a ballot measure election, as opposed to a candidate 

election, relies on subdivision (c), he or she must demonstrate that the 

forbidden act affected the outcome”].) In Horwath, plaintiffs alleged that the 

city attorney failed to provide complete and impartial analysis of a ballot 

measure, rendering the election process as “hopelessly riddled with the 

effects of misleading official ballot materials.” (Id. at pp. 771-772.) By failing 

to demonstrate how these deficiencies affected the ability of the voters to 

make an informed choice, the court determined the plaintiffs were not 

entitled to relief because they could not “maintain a statutory election 

contest.” (Id. at pp. 774-775; see also Nguyen v. Nguyen (2008) 158 

Cal.App.4th 1636, 1662-1663 [noting “[w]here technical deviations from 

Elections Code provisions have not posed the possibility of an actual change 

of result, the courts have uniformly upheld the results of the election as 

against any challenges based on those technical deviations”].)

Here, rather than alleging that deficient language and analysis in the 

ballot materials affected the outcome of Proposition A, Denny admits in his 

complaint, “[n]o one can say with any certainty what the will of the voters 

would have been if they had been . . . presented with a ballot stating the chief 

purpose of the measure free from language that is untrue, misleading, partial 

and likely to create prejudice in favor of the measure.” But where “voters are 
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provided the whole text of a proposed law or ordinance, we ordinarily assume 

the voters voted intelligently on the matter.” (Owens v. County of Los 

Angeles, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 126.) Here, as we have described, the 

voters were provided with the full text of Proposition A, and we assume that 

any alleged discrepancies in the ballot materials did not affect the voters’

ability to vote intelligently.

Arguing that he is not required to make this showing, Denny relies 

entirely on Bradley v. Perrodin (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1153, a case annulling 

the election of a candidate who fraudulently registered voters, despite the 

lack of evidence that the misconduct affected the election outcome. Bradley is 

inapposite. It expressly distinguished invalidating the election results for a 

candidate (as compared to a ballot measure) in the absence of any evidence 

that unlawful behavior changed the outcome of the election. (Id. at p. 1168.) 

Indeed, the court reiterated that a ballot measure election “should not be 

annulled for the misdeeds of the measure’s proponents, ‘unless the misdeeds 

affected the outcome.’ ” (Ibid.) 

“[M]ost of the time [a court’s] analysis ends with determination of 

whether plaintiff is attacking election on one of the grounds specified in 

section 16100.” (McKinney v. Superior Court (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 951,

955, 958 [holding that a postelection challenge brought on the theory that a 

write-in candidate who lost in an election was ineligible for office and it 

affected the outcome of the election should have been brought before the 

election].) Because Denny has not stated any grounds for relief under section 

16100 for a postelection contest, our analysis ends here, and we do not assess 

the particulars of his claim that the Proposition A ballot materials were 
13

technically deficient under section 13119. (See id. at p. 958.) Nor do we

address defendants’ remaining arguments in support of the demurrer.

6

Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court properly sustained 

the demurrer.

C. The Demurrer Was Procedurally Proper

Denny argues defendants were not authorized to file a demurrer 

because his claim is governed by the election contest procedures set forth in 

Division 16, Chapter 5, Article 3 of the Elections Code (§ 16440 et seq.), not 

the Code of Civil Procedure. He contends that defendants were required 

under section 16400, subdivision (c) to file an affidavit to respond to his

complaint. 

Denny’s argument is premised on his assumption that his complaint 

states a claim under section 16100 subdivision (c), which, as we have

addressed above, is incorrect. Because Denny does not properly allege a 

section 16100 subdivision (c) claim, limiting the trial court’s procedures to 

those in Article 3 and precluding a demurrer is unwarranted here.7

6 Defendants argue Denny’s claims were untimely within the limits set

under section 16401, requiring election contests based on grounds aside from 

section 16100, subdivision (c) to be brought within 30 days after the Director 

of Elections has declared the results of the election; and Government Code 

section 53511 for actions to determine the validity of bonds. Nor do we 

address defendants’ argument that Denny’s claims fail under the Third 

Validating Act of 2018. (Sen. Bill No. 1499 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) §§ 1, 6.)

7 The procedures in Division 16, Chapter 5, Article 3 govern election 

contests based on limited, specific grounds, including section 16100, 

subdivision (c), offenses against an elective franchise (§ 16440 [identifying the 

election contest grounds to which Article 3 applies].) They require a 

contestant to file an affidavit alleging the contest grounds with the clerk of 

the superior court, which must then be served on the defendant—which, as 

noted above, is a candidate. (§ 16442; see also § 16002.) The statute further 

provides that “[n]o special appearance, demurrer or objection may be taken 
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Nor do we credit Denny’s additional claim that the Code of Civil 

Procedure is generally inapplicable to election contests. The Elections Code 

expressly incorporates the Code of Civil Procedure into procedures for 

election contests as long as they are compatible. Section 16602, which sets 

forth the procedures for election contests, states that trial courts shall “be 

governed by the rules of law and evidence governing the determination of 

questions of law and fact, so far as the same may be applicable.” (§ 16602; cf. 

Anderson v. County of Santa Barbara (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 780, 786-788 

[finding Code of Civil Procedure section 437c timelines for filing a summary 

judgment motion 60 days after a general appearance in court incompatible 

with election contest requirements to commence a trial within 45 days of 

filing the contest].) 

There is no such incompatibility between a demurrer and Denny’s 

election contest. Section 16602 authorizes a trial court to “dismiss the 

proceedings if the statement of the cause of the contest is insufficient,” which 

is no different from the standards in a demurrer under the Code of Civil

Procedure. (§ 16602; Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (e) [authorizing a 

demurrer if the “pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause 

of action”].) Indeed, other courts have resolved election contests through 

demurrers. (See, e.g., Salazar v. City of Montebello (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 

953, 955 [affirming trial court order sustaining a demurrer in an election 

contest]; Hale v. Farrell (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 164, 168 [affirming trial court 

order sustaining election contest on one cause of action].) 

other than by the affidavits which shall be considered a general appearance 

in the contest.” (§ 16444.) 
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This case is no different. Defendants’ demurrer was properly before the 

trial court.

D. Leave to Amend Is Not Warranted

The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. In his 

brief on appeal, Denny has not argued that he could cure any defects in the 

causes of action in the complaint, but he states without more that he seeks 

leave to amend his complaint to add a new ground for relief “based on the 

restriction in Proposition 46 that the measure purports to impose ad valorem

taxes for bonded indebtedness for purposes other than ‘the acquisition or 

improvement of real property.’ ” This is the sum total of the argument. 

Although an amendment to a complaint may be requested for the first 

time on appeal, we reject this request because Denny has not demonstrated

to us how this amendment would allow him to state a cause of action. 

(Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 

1371, 1386) [leave to amend may be made for the first time in the reviewing 

court, but requires demonstrating a reasonable possibility an amendment 

will cure the complaint’s defects]; Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service

(2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43 [requiring party to “clearly and specifically set 

forth the ‘applicable substantive law’ and the legal basis for amendment, i.e., 

the elements of the cause of action and authority for it,” and all specific 

factual allegations for the claim].) Denny’s complaint was properly dismissed 

without leave to amend.8

8 We do not address Denny’s additional claims, asking us to rewrite the 

Elections Code timing requirements for filing election contests, and to 

invalidate the City’s Municipal Code sections 515 and 600, governing the 

BSC and the procedures and requirements for preparing ballot materials for 

voter pamphlets. Those claims were not raised in his complaint. (Jones v. 

Kvistad (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 836, 842 [“Ordinarily a party is prohibited from 
16

DISPOSITION

The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. 

asserting on appeal claims to relief not asserted or requested in the court 

below”].)
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_________________________

Miller, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Kline, P.J.

_________________________

Richman, J.

A158029, Denny v. Arntz
Filed 10/14/20

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

MICHAEL DENNY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

JOHN ARNTZ, as Director, etc., et 

al.

Defendants and Respondents.

 A158029

 (City & County of San Francisco 

 Super. Ct. No. CGC-19-575070)

BY THE COURT:

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on September 17, 2020, 

was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause and 

pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105, it now appears that the 

opinion should be published in the Official Reports, and it is so ordered.

Dated: ________________________ ________________________________

Kline, P.J.
Court: San Francisco County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Ethan P. Schulman

Michael Denny, in pro per, for Plaintiff and Appellant 

Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney, Wayne Snodgrass, Tara M. Steeley, Deputy 

City Attorneys, for Defendants and Respondents

A158029, Denny v. Arntz