alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM CHAPMAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

SACRAMENTO COUNTY DISTRICT 

ATTORNEY’S OFFICE; ANN MARIE 

SCHUBERT, District Attorney, Sacramento 

County, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 19-16613 

D.C. No. 2:18-cv-02662-JAM-CKD 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 14, 2020**

Before: CANBY, FRIEDLAND, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges. 

California state prisoner William Chapman appeals pro se from the district 

court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that California 

Penal Code § 1405 violates his right to procedural due process. We have 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

FILED

JUL 20 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 19-16613 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to 

state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1118 

(9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Chapman’s action because Chapman 

failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Dist. Attorney’s 

Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 69 (2009) (a state’s procedures for post-conviction 

relief can violate procedural due process if they “offend[] some principle of justice 

so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 

fundamental, or transgress[] any recognized principle of fundamental fairness in 

operation” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Morrison v. Peterson, 

809 F.3d 1059, 1067-69 (9th Cir. 2015) (rejecting facial challenge to § 1405’s 

“reasonable probability” and “chain of custody” requirements); Hebbe v. Pliler, 

627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally 

construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim).

To the extent Chapman alleges errors by the state court during his criminal 

prosecution or during the adjudication of his post-conviction § 1405 motions, we 

do not consider those contentions because they are outside the scope of this appeal. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend 

because amendment would have been futile. See Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music 

Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008) (setting forth standard of review and 
3 19-16613 

explaining that futility is a basis for denying leave to amend). 

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on 

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Chapman’s motion for oral argument (Docket Entry No. 6) is denied.

AFFIRMED.
[LETTERHEAD KPMG LLP]




              CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

The Board of Directors
SFS Bancorp, Inc.:

We  consent  to  incorporation  by  reference  in  the  following   registration
statements of SFS Bancorp, Inc.:

               No. 333-05789 on Form S-8, and
               No. 333-05831 on Form S-8

of our report  dated  January 22,  1999,  relating to the  consolidated  balance
sheets of SFS Bancorp, Inc. and subsidiary as of December 31, 1998 and 1997, and
the related consolidated statements of income, changes in stockholders'  equity,
and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31,
1998, which report appears in the December 31, 1998 Annual Report on Form 10-KSB
of SFS Bancorp, Inc.


/s/KPMG LLP
----------- 
KPMG LLP

Albany, New York
March 26, 1999
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK>                         0000942378
<NAME>                        THCG, INC.
<MULTIPLIER>                  1
<CURRENCY>                    U.S. Dollars

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                    12-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                   JAN-1-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                     DEC-31-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                  1.00
<CASH>                                           1,592,000
<SECURITIES>                                     7,104,000
<RECEIVABLES>                                      352,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                             0
<INVENTORY>                                              0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                         0
<PP&E>                                             239,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                    (135,000)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  35,702,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                    0
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                           118,000
<OTHER-SE>                                      31,991,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    35,702,000
<SALES>                                          7,568,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 7,568,000
<CGS>                                                    0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                            0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 4,851,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                       0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,717,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,082,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,635,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                    (124,000)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,511,000
<EPS-BASIC>                                            .30
<EPS-DILUTED>                                          .30


</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
     DECEMBER 31, 1997 FORM 10-K AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE
     TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                    1,000

<S>                             <C>               <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS            12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               DEC-31-1997       DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                  JAN-01-1997       JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                    DEC-31-1997       DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                          5,188             5,770
<SECURITIES>                    0                 728
<RECEIVABLES>                   2,194             4,249
<ALLOWANCES>                    222               290
<INVENTORY>                     15                0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                8,660             11,625
<PP&E>                          5,605             4,256
<DEPRECIATION>                  3,775             2,475
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  29,401            24,468
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           5,300             3,320
<BONDS>                         0                 0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>           0                 0
<PREFERRED>                     0                 0
<COMMON>                        416               405
<OTHER-SE>                      22,688            19,977
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    29,401            24,468
<SALES>                         0                 0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                13,065            11,646
<CGS>                           0                 365
<TOTAL-COSTS>                   10,467            9,908
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                506               198
<LOSS-PROVISION>                0                 0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>              21                54
<INCOME-PRETAX>                 5,984             2,969
<INCOME-TAX>                    2,341             1,045
<INCOME-CONTINUING>             3,468             1,924
<DISCONTINUED>                  930               0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                 0                 0
<CHANGES>                       0                 0
<NET-INCOME>                    2,538             1,924
<EPS-PRIMARY>                   0.62              0.48
<EPS-DILUTED>                   0.59              0.46



</TABLE>
# February is Security Awareness Month: Here’s what you need to know concerning reporting suspicious activities 

/ Published Feb. 15, 2018
Richmond, Va., 
You have been parking your vehicle in the same parking lot and walking to your office for the past year. You know the quickest route; how many steps it will take and your environment. You know this path like the back of your hand. Therefore, it’s safe to assume you would also know if something or someone is out of the ordinary. 

You, as an employee of Defense Supply Center Richmond, Virginia, are considered the first line of defense to a safe and secure work place. You have the responsibility to report suspicious activity or items to your supervisor or to a security official. 

What is suspicious activity? According to the Department of Homeland Security website, suspicious activity is defined as any observed behavior that could indicate terrorism or terrorism-related crime. This includes, but is not limited to:
      -  unusual items or situations: a vehicle parked in an odd location; unattended packages/luggage; a window/door is open that is usually closed; or other out-of-the-ordinary situations. 
      -  eliciting information: A person questions individuals at a level beyond curiosity about a building’s purpose, operations, security procedures and/or personnel, shift changes, etc. 
      -  observation/surveillance: Someone pays unusual attention to facilities or buildings beyond a casual or professional interest. This includes extended loitering without explanation (particularly in concealed locations); unusual, repeated, and/or prolonged observation of a building (e.g., with binoculars or video camera); taking notes or measurements; counting paces; sketching floor plans, etc. 

Some of these activities could be innocent. It's up to law enforcement to determine whether the behavior warrants investigation. The above activities are not all-inclusive, but have been compiled based on studies of pre-operational aspects of both successful and thwarted terrorist events over several years.

**How to Report Suspicious Activity**

DLA has established several communication avenues to receive your information: 
      -  DLA iWatch – DLAAVNiWatch@dla.mil, 
      -  911 (on base phone only) or 804-279-4888 (all phones), and 
      -  your supervisor. 

Describe specifically what you observed, including:
      -  who or what you saw;  
      -  when you saw it; 
      -  where it occurred; and 
      -  why it's suspicious.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-6591

KELVIN JAY X MORRIS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

HENRY C. MURDEN, Circuit Court Clerk; PAMELA

H. ASKEW, Court Reporter, individually and in

their official capacities,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Henry C. Morgan, Jr., District

Judge. (CA-95-419-2)

Submitted: September 20, 1996 Decided: October 1, 1996

Before NIEMEYER, HAMILTON, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Kelvin Jay X Morris, Appellant Pro Se. Abram W. VanderMeer, Jr.,

CLARK & STANT, P.C., Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying

relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint. We have reviewed

the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district

court. Morris v. Murden, No. CA-95-419-2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 22, 1996).

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court

and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### FLORIDA NORTH SIDE BANK OF JACKSONVILLE v. LOWNI CORP.

No. 37951.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Jan. 1969.

Rehearing Denied March 7, 1969.

Certiorari denied without opinion. 213 So.2d 729.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR 
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                         4,065
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  25,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               29,065
<PP&E>                                         0
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 29,065
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          196,137
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       3,441,308
<OTHER-SE>                                     (3,608,380)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   29,065
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               0
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               71,700
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             9,200
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (80,900)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (80,900)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 26,860
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (107,760)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (.004)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (.004)
        


</TABLE>
#### CONSOLIDATED CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, Appellant, v. Miriam M. DUSENBERRY, Appellee.

No. JJ-28.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Aug. 30, 1978.

Dawson A. McQuaig, Gen. Counsel, William Lee Allen and Eve D. Peck, Asst. Counsel, Jacksonville, for appellant.

John J. Sulik and David M. Wiesenfeld of Dawson, Galant, Maddox, Sulik & Nichols, Jacksonville, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

At issue here is the validity of Section 804.311 of the Jacksonville City Ordinance Code requiring a $1,000.00 occupational license fee for fortune tellers, clairvoyants, astrologists, etc. The trial court found that the ordinance, asserted by the city to be solely a revenue raising device, was *133. . unreasonable and thus illegal and void . . We agree that the ordinance is not valid as a revenue raising device and affirm the trial court’s judgment. We do not in this opinion consider the power of the city to control this type of activity through regulatory ordinances.

AFFIRMED.

SMITH, Acting C. J., and MELVIN and BOOTH, JJ., concur.
# Women-Owned Small Business (WOSB)

/ Published March 6, 2024

                Access Women-Owned Small Business Brochure by clicking image                            Access Women-Owned Small Business Brochure by clicking image                            Women-Owned Small Business            SHARE IMAGE:Download ImageImage DetailsPhoto By: A3L- Terrance RussellVIRIN: 220713-D-D0441-8017

## What is the Women-Owned Small Business Program?

The **WOSB Program**was created to help level the playing field for women small business owners. Under the program, DLA and other federal agencies reserve certain contracts exclusively for competition among woman-owned small businesses or economically disadvantaged women-owned small businesses (EDWOSB).

Unique to the WOSB Program, only certain contracts are eligible. The Small Business Administration (SBA) designates industries where woman-owned small businesses are underrepresented and eligibility for the program is determined by the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code assigned to the contract. The SBA maintains a list of eligible industries and the corresponding NAICS codes at **www.sba.gov/WOSB**.

## What are the Program Requirements?

To be eligible for the **WOSB** Federal Contract program, you must be:
      - A small business according to  SBA size standards ; and
      - Be at least 51 percent owned and controlled by women who are U.S. citizens; and
      - Have women manage day-to-day business operations and make long-term decisions.

To qualify as an **EDWOSB**, you must meet all the requirements above for WOSBs and be owned and controlled by one or more women each with:
      - A personal net worth less than $850,000.
      - $400,000 or less in adjusted gross income averaged over the previous three years; and
      - $6.5 million or less in personal assets.

It is important to understand that EDWOSBs are a subset of WOSBs and all EDWOSBs are also WOSBs. This means that EDWOSBs are eligible to compete for contracts reserved for either EDWOSBs or WOSBs.

## Getting Certified as a WOSB

Becoming certified for the WOSB Program means your business is eligible to compete for contracts that are set-aside for WOSBs and EDWOSBs, as well as sole source awards under the program (for more, refer to **Subpart 19.15** in the Federal Acquisition Regulation).

Before firms can compete for WOSB/EDWOSB set-aside contracts, they must apply for certification using SBA’s free online certification process at **https://wosb.certify.sba.gov/** or go through an approved third-party certifier, which may charge a fee for their services.

## Where to Find Additional Information and Resources

Read more on SBA’s website -- www.sba.gov/federal-contracting/contracting-assistance-programs

You may also obtain free assistance from your local APEX Accelerators which can help you understand the rules and opportunities for the WOSB Program -- www.apexaccelerators.us/#
# Jones takes the helm at DLA Distribution

/ Published June 14, 2018
NEW CUMBERLAND, Pa., 
Navy Rear Adm. Kevin Jones formally took over as DLA Distribution commanding officer during a June 12 Change of Command ceremony, when he accepted the organization’s colors from DLA director Army Lt. Gen. Darrell K. Williams.

Relinquishing command was Army Brig. Gen. John S. Laskodi, who has served as DLA Distribution commanding general since June 2016.

Following the traditional passing of the colors, marking the transition of leadership, Williams spoke of Laskodi’s numerous accomplishments over the last 24 months, including the DLA Distribution Expeditionary team’s humanitarian efforts in the wake of Hurricanes Harvey and Irma, the standup of three overseas distribution centers, and the organization’s superior performance metrics.

Laskodi responded to the comments saying “...those were not my accomplishments, but rather, the work of this incredible workforce.  As both a 35-year customer and as your leader for the last two years, I am incredibly thankful.”

Introducing the workforce to Jones, Williams announced that DLA Distribution was in good hands, describing Jones as a “focused leader” and a “Warfighter’s logistician” who will get the job done.

Jones, who joined DLA Distribution following his last assignment as commander of the Office of Special Projects, announcing that he was “very proud” to be taking over as commander.

“We are a command on the leading edge of change.  I believe our future is a good one and I look forward to realizing it with you. Now let’s get back to work and see if we can make life a little better for our friends and a lot more difficult for our enemies.”

DLA Distribution offers best value supply chain solutions through a broad range of services including storage, distribution, customized kits and specialized packaging as well as transportation support and technology development.  Customers include the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force and other agencies.  Headquartered in New Cumberland, Pa., DLA Distribution operates a global network of more than 50 sites employing over 10,000 people worldwide.  DLA Distribution is a major subordinate command of the Defense Logistics Agency.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GARY ECCHER,

 Petitioner - Appellant,

 v.

KATHY MENDOZA-POWERS,

 Respondent - Appellee.

No. 07-55437

D.C. No. CV-06-00842-RSWL

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Ronald S.W. Lew, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 24, 2011** 

Before: PREGERSON, THOMAS, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Gary Eccher appeals pro se from the district court’s

judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We dismiss.

Eccher contends that the Board’s 2003 decision to deny him parole was not

supported by “some evidence” and therefore violated his due process rights. After

FILED

JUN 6 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 07-55437

briefing was completed in this case, this court held that a certificate of

appealability (“COA”) is required to challenge the denial of parole. See Hayward

v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546, 554-55 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Now the Supreme

Court has held that the only federal right at issue in the parole context is

procedural, and the only proper inquiry is what process the inmate received, not

whether the state court decided the case correctly. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S.

Ct. 859, 863 (2011) (per curiam). A COA cannot issue on Eccher’s contention that

the Board’s decision was not supported by “some evidence,” and we dismiss the

appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 

Further, because Eccher has not has made a substantial showing of the denial

of a constitutional right, we decline to certify his remaining claims. Id.

Appellee’s motion to dismiss the case is denied as moot.

DISMISSED.
254 La. 12

#### Lezime J. TRAHAN v. CENTRAL MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 49788.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 9, 1969.

In re: Central Mutual Insurance Company applying for certiorari, or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Acadia. 219 So.2d 187.

The application is denied. There appears no error of law in the judgment complained of.

SANDERS, J., is of the opinion a writ should be granted.
Exhibit 32.1

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF
                         THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of International Surfacing, Inc. ("ISI")
on Form 10-QSB for the three months ending March 31, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "REPORT"), I, Samuel
Serritella, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, respectfully certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

The Report fully complies with the requirements of the section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

/s/ Samuel Serritella
------------------------
Samuel Serritella
Chief Executive Officer