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43–684 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–113]

READINESS AT RISK: THE DEPARTMENT

OF DEFENSE SECURITY CLEARANCE

PROCESS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HEARING HELD

FEBRUARY 13, 2008

(II)

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas, Chairman

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma

NANCY BOYDA, Kansas

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona

KATHY CASTOR, Florida

ELIJAH CUMMINGS, Maryland

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

TOM COLE, Oklahoma

ROB BISHOP, Utah

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington

DOUG LAMBORN, COLORADO

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia

(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2008

Page

HEARING:

Wednesday, February 13, 2008, Readiness at Risk: The Department of Defense Security Clearance Process ........................................................................ 1

APPENDIX:

Wednesday, February 13, 2008 .............................................................................. 19

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2008

READINESS AT RISK: THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SECURITY

CLEARANCE PROCESS

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Boyda, Hon. Nancy, a Representative from Kansas, Readiness Subcommittee . 1

Forbes, J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Ranking Member, Readiness Subcommittee ............................................................................................... 2

WITNESSES

Dillaman, Kathy L., Associate Director, Federal Investigative Services Division, Office of Personnel Management ............................................................... 6

Edwards, Jack E., Acting Director, Defense Capabilities and Management,

Government Accountability Office ...................................................................... 8

Romero, Ben G., Chairman of the Intelligence Committee of the Information

Technology Association of America, Lockheed Martin Corporation ................. 9

Torres, Gregory, Director of Security, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense

for Intelligence, Department of Defense ............................................................ 4

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Dillaman, Kathy L. ........................................................................................... 40

Edwards, Jack E. .............................................................................................. 45

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 26

Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P., a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Readiness Subcommittee ....................................................................................... 23

Romero, Ben G. ................................................................................................. 64

Torres, Gregory ................................................................................................. 29

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Report on Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable More Informed

Congressional Oversight submitted by Mr. Edwards ................................ 81

Security Clearance Survey 2008 by the Information Technology Association of America and National Defense Industrial Association .................. 122

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Mrs. Boyda ........................................................................................................ 145

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 142

Mr. Ortiz ........................................................................................................... 137

(1)

READINESS AT RISK: THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCESS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE,

Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 13, 2008.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. NANCY BOYDA, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM KANSAS, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in room

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Nancy Boyda presiding.

Mrs. BOYDA. The hearing will come to order.

Welcome to today’s Readiness Subcommittee hearing on security

clearances.

I want to thank our witnesses for taking the time to appear before us today, and we all look forward to your testimony.

The title for today’s hearing is ‘‘Readiness at Risk: The Department of Defense Security Clearance Process.’’ Those words simply

summarize why we are here today. It does not take a rocket scientist to know that every delay in properly processing clearances

can hurt our national security.

The problems in the Department of Defense (DOD) security

clearance process have been on our radar screen for years. And the

sudden stoppage of processing clearances for industry in 2006, certainly got our attention. That led to a reprogramming request for $90 million that Congress quickly approved. We approved another reprogramming last

summer to avert another crisis. And we have required the Secretary of Defense to submit a report with the President’s budget

submission on the status of the industry’s security clearances.

But these actions are only the tip of the iceberg. Currently, DOD

is responsible for about two million active personnel security clearances. Approximately 34 percent is held by industry personnel

working on DOD contracts.

In 2005, DOD transferred responsibility for conducting the initial

investigation to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). This

was intended to speed the process. DOD accounts for about 80 percent of the investigations now handled by OPM.

However, timeliness of the DOD clearance process continues to

be a significant issue. And that is why it landed on the Government Accountability Office (GAO) high risk list in 2005, and it remains there today.

We are very concerned with the budgetary implications of the

DOD’s apparent inability to measure the current backlog and accuVerDate 22-MAR-2001 09:54 Dec 08, 2008 Jkt 043684 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-113\044030.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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rately predict future requests. And we do not want any more surprise stoppages.

We do not believe DOD can simply rely on reprogramming requests to keep the program limping along year after year.

Why can’t DOD get it right when it comes to predicting its budget needs for processing clearances? What technology improvements

do we need? What are the costs? Is DOD budgeting for these costs

now?

If there are technology solutions, then let us not push those further down the road. We should not have to continue to plod along

with these outdated systems.

So, we are all interested in hearing more about what OPM is

doing to reduce delays. And I am very interested in the Tiger Team

that was set up to review and make recommendations for improving the process. Perhaps this will lead to a better system across the

board.

And just last week, the President signed a memo asking for a

plan to speed up the clearance process. He wants that plan by the

end of April. And I hope our DOD and OPM witnesses can tell us

more about what they are going to do to get that plan done. Continued delays increase risks to national security and add to the cost

of classified work for the government.

To me, this is unacceptable, so let us work together to find these

solutions.

Now, I would like to turn to my good friend from Virginia, Mr.

Forbes, the subcommittee Ranking Member, for any opening comments that he might like to make. Thank you very much.

STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE

FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Ms. Boyda. And let me just say, I appreciate you chairing this hearing, and I look forward to being a part

of it.

I am sorry the chairman could not be here today. I join you in

welcoming our distinguished group of witnesses. And I want to

thank you and Chairman Ortiz for holding a hearing on what I believe is a critical challenge to the readiness of our force.

The process of granting access to our Nation’s secrets through security clearances is not one that this committee and the Department of Defense take lightly. Even this week, we learned of allegations in Virginia and New Orleans, where individuals with access

to top secret information conspired to provide military secrets to

Chinese intelligence services.

We do not know the full impact of these failures, but it is clear

that these compromises may have seriously or gravely damaged the

national security of our country.

It is imperative that we have an effective screening process in

place to clear trustworthy individuals while weeding out those who

would not be safe custodians of our country’s secrets.

The process for determining security clearance eligibility should

not only be effective, but we must make it as efficient as possible.

Every day that a personnel billet that requires access to classified

3

information is filled by someone without a security clearance, our

readiness suffers.

According to the GAO, it took an average of 276 days to complete

end-to-end processing of a top secret clearance in 2007. That is a

full nine months this employee may not fully contribute on the job

site.

Our security clearance program must be focused, funded and responsive to the dynamics that shape the work force. The transfer

of personnel security investigations functions from the Defense Security Service (DSS) to the Office of Personnel Management seems

to have, at least in the onset, made things worse.

Added to the strain of an already enormous backlog of hundreds

of thousands of pending investigations, are several issues I will call

‘‘fact of life’’ challenges. These challenges include interagency coordination, incompatible Information Technology (IT) systems and

coping with the transfer of 1,600 staff members from DSS to OPM.

These are enormous hurdles for both agencies, and I know they are

actively working to deal with these things.

However, what we see today offers little improvement in the personnel security clearance process. While it appears that increased

staffing at OPM has reduced the backlog and improved clearance

processing time, more needs to be done to improve the efficiency

and effectiveness of the clearance program.

We also see that the Department is still struggling to determine

their baseline clearance work load and funding requirements. In recent years, this has resulted in insufficient funding for security

clearances and out-of-cycle reprogramming requests. Insufficient

funding causes breaks in security clearance processing. That is the

last thing we need when we are still dealing with the backlog of

requests.

I believe I can speak for my colleagues on this when I say that

we take the readiness needs of our military very seriously. The repeated challenges in the security clearance programs are ones that

threaten to undermine our capability to confront the security challenges we face today.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, and I am very interested in their views on how we right the process and eliminate

these clearance delays, so that we can get a fully qualified, trusted

work force fielded for our national defense.

Madam Chairman, thank you for the time, and I yield back the

balance of my time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 26.]

Mrs. BOYDA. Thank you, Mr. Forbes.

Today, we have a panel of distinguished witnesses, who will discuss the Department of Defense security clearance process.

Our witnesses today are Mr. Greg Torres, Director of Security for

DOD’s Office of Counterintelligence and Security.

Welcome.

Ms. Kathy Dillaman, Associate Director of the Field Investigative

Services Division of the Office of Personnel Management.

Welcome.

Mr. Jack Edwards, the Director of the Defense Capabilities and

Management Team for the GAO, General Accountability Office.

4

Welcome.

Mr. Ben Romero of Lockheed Martin Corporation, who is representing the Security Clearance Reform Coalition.

Without objection, all the written testimony will be included in

the record.

Mr. Torres, welcome, and please proceed with your opening remarks.

STATEMENT OF GREGORY TORRES, DIRECTOR OF SECURITY,

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. TORRES. Thank you.

Representative Boyda, Ranking Member Forbes and members of

the subcommittee, it is my pleasure to appear before you today to

discuss the DOD security clearance process and the progress we

are making toward the goals outlined in the Intelligence Reform

and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA).

As the director of security in the Office of the Under Secretary

of Defense for Intelligence within the Department of Defense, my

office is responsible for the development of personnel security policy and oversight of the personnel security program.

Over the past year, under the leadership of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Department and its primary partner

for this process, the Office of Personnel Management, made significant progress.

First, I would note that within the Federal Government, DOD

comprises approximately 90 percent of the investigation requests

submitted to OPM for security clearances. On an annual basis,

DOD processes over 700,000 clearance eligibility actions at its adjudication facilities.

The process begins with a determination that an individual requires access to classified information for the performance of their

official duties. The individual completes a security questionnaire,

and submits it for investigation.

During the submission review process, we continue to expedite

interim clearances for our military, civilian and contractor work

force, enabling eligible personnel to begin working on classified programs quickly, with minimal risk to national security. The electronic submissions, a request for investigation for DOD military

and civilian personnel, are already at 82 percent, up from approximately 65 percent at this same time last year.

The planned modification to the Joint Personnel Adjudication

System (JPAS), which is the DOD system of record maintained by

the Defense Security Service, will add an electronic fingerprint submission capability for industry by June of this year—reducing the

time an electronic case is suspended at OPM, waiting for hard copy

fingerprints to be mailed and catch up to the electronic submission

of the investigative forms.

The completed investigation is then sent to one of DOD’s adjudication facilities to determine whether to grant, deny or revoke access to classified information.

DOD has also reduced the time to adjudicate 80 percent of the

completed investigations from an average of 53 days in the first

quarter of fiscal year 2007 to an average of 30 days in the first

5

quarter of fiscal year 2008. In December of 2007, DOD’s overall

end-to-end timeliness of the security clearance process was 80 percent and an average of 112 days.

DOD policy also requires the reciprocal acceptance of existing investigations and clearance determinations rendered by other executive branch agencies. The Department fully embraces OMB’s reciprocity policy.

In regard to the funding for industry personnel security investigations, DSS is now fully funded. This is due in part to the DSS’s

enhanced ability to predict requirements and tie them to the budget process.

Clearance transformation is one of the Secretary of Defense’s top

25 priorities for the Department. The Secretary’s call for improvement to the security clearance process is matched by the Director

of National Intelligence (DNI), who has placed security clearance

reform in his 100- and 500-day plans.

Together, these senior leaders established the Joint Security

Clearance Process Reform Team, charging this expert group to develop a transformed, modernized, fair and reciprocal security clearance process. The joint team conducts its activities with the oversight and concurrence of OMB.

The team recently assessed that the processes for determining

eligibility for access to classified information and suitability for

Federal employment rely on very similar background data. However, the processes for collecting and analyzing that data are not

sufficiently integrated.

Therefore, the overall scope of the reform effort expanded to encompass security clearances and Federal employment suitability, to

ensure the executive branch executes these authorities within a

framework that maximizes efficiencies and effectiveness.

The importance of this project was underscored on February 5,

2008, when the President issued a memorandum acknowledging

the work of this group, and directed that the heads of executive departments and agencies provide all information and assistance requested by the director of OMB in this important endeavor.

Every related component within the Department of Defense has

made improving this process a top priority. Of particular note, and

as part of the reform team demonstration projects, the Army is

validating the efficiencies to be gained by receiving completed investigations from OPM electronically, eliminating mail and handling time.

They are also scheduled to conduct a demonstration project using

automation to make adjudicative decisions on investigations that

have no significant or actionable derogatory information. If viable,

this process could demonstrate an automated decision for up to 30

percent of our investigations.

While we must clearly continue to improve our current clearance

process, unless there is a concerted effort to change what we do,

and not just how we do it, we will not have done our jobs. The

Joint Security Clearance Process Reform Team is that effort.

I am confident that sufficient executive commitment exists to ensure that security clearance reform will be achieved.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and testify

on the Department’s security clearance process and ongoing reVerDate 22-MAR-2001 09:54 Dec 08, 2008 Jkt 043684 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-113\044030.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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forms. We look forward to working with the committee on this very

important matter, as we continue to improve the security clearance

process.

This concludes my statement.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Torres can be found in the Appendix on page 29.]

Mrs. BOYDA. Thank you.

Ms. Dillaman.

STATEMENT OF KATHY L. DILLAMAN, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR,

FEDERAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES DIVISION, OFFICE OF

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Ms. DILLAMAN. Madam Chairperson, Ranking Member Forbes, it

is my pleasure to be here today to talk to you about OPM’s support

of the Department of Defense’s security clearance program and the

progress we have made in complying with the Intelligence Reform

Act of 2004.

As the agency responsible for 90 percent of the Federal Government’s background investigations, OPM continues to ensure that

the goals and expectations set by Congress and President Bush are

met.

And I am especially glad to be here today with an opportunity

to correct for the record two recent news articles that inaccurately

reflected where we are in terms of timeliness. Although retractions

were printed and apologies made, they are often overlooked.

On February 20, 2005, the Department of Defense’s personnel security investigations program and staff were successfully consolidated with OPM’s investigations program. As a result of this merger, OPM absorbed over 1,600 Defense Security Service employees,

145,000 investigations in process, and all ongoing background investigation work loads for DOD.

Overall, in 2007, OPM conducted almost two million background

investigations, half of which were for DOD, including 640,000 that

supported security clearance determinations for civilian, military

and contractor personnel.

Since this merger, we have been working closely with DOD in

four critical areas that must be managed effectively: work load projections, submission of requests for investigations, the investigations process and the adjudications process. Significant progress

made in these areas has improved the overall timeliness for making security clearance determinations, and we are continuing to

work together on any remaining issues that may hinder or delay

the process.

First, work load projections.

To staff the investigation and adjudication programs responsibly,

it is critical that agencies accurately project their investigation

needs. Work loads may vary significantly year-to-year, depending

on hiring patterns and contracting efforts. We have been working

closely with DOD to refine this process, and they have improved

the accuracy of their projections significantly.

Next, the submission for investigations.

OPM and DOD are now using online technology to speed the

time it takes to process the paperwork required to conduct an inVerDate 22-MAR-2001 09:54 Dec 08, 2008 Jkt 043684 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-113\044030.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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vestigation. OPM’s electronic questionnaires for investigations processing allows subjects to submit their background information electronically, improving both the timeliness and the quality of the information supplied.

During the first quarter of the fiscal year, DOD submitted 82

percent of all their security clearance investigations through eQIP,

reducing the processing time for submission from 30 to 14 days.

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act established a goal that 80 percent of the background investigations for

initial security clearances be completed within an average of 90

days or less by the end of 2006. OPM has met and exceeded that

goal.

In fact, of the 586,000 initial clearance investigations OPM received in 2007, 80 percent were processed in an average of 67 days.

That is 92 days for top secret and 63 days for secret and confidential level clearances.

Our success in meeting this goal is due to our increased staffing,

the work we have done with federal, state and local record providers, the standup of our international program and the automation

of many of our support functions within investigations. While

shortening the time it takes to complete investigations, we have

not compromised the quality of the investigations we do.

And finally, the adjudication phase.

We are also supporting agencies’ efforts to adjudicate completed

investigations timely. In 2007, we developed an electronic delivery

process that provides agencies with the option to receive their completed investigations in a combination data, text and imaged format—electronically, rather than by hard copy through the mail.

Last August, the Department of the Army began receiving their

completed investigations online, and to-date, over 113,000 completed investigations have been transmitted to them, making the

process between Army and OPM virtually paperless. We have also

linked with many agencies’ in-house records systems to our processing system, to update their adjudication actions electronically

into the clearance verification system.

OPM is continuing efforts to improve processing through greater

use of information technology. This year, eQIP—which is OPM’s

suite of automation tools that support the investigations and adjudications process—will allow for total end-to-end paperless processing for those agencies equipped to implement them.

As Greg mentioned, we are also partnering with the Office of the

Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the Department of

Defense for more significant reforms to the overall security clearance process. This reform effort is challenging traditional processing from application through adjudication.

The ultimate outcome of this effort will be a governmentwide system for determining security clearance eligibility that continues to

protect national security through more modern processes that are

secure, dependable, scalable and time and cost-efficient.

This concludes my remarks. I would be happy to answer any

questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dillaman can be found in the Appendix on page 40.]

Mrs. BOYDA. Thank you.

8

Mr. Edwards.

STATEMENT OF JACK E. EDWARDS, ACTING DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Mr. EDWARDS. Madam Chairwoman and Ranking Member

Forbes, thank you for this opportunity to be here today to talk

about the DOD personnel security clearance process.

We have documented that DOD and other agencies have taken

some positive steps forward to improve the clearance processes.

These steps include greater use of technology and increasing the

investigative work force.

While such steps are encouraging, DOD’s clearance program still

faces some of the same challenges that led us to put the program

on our high risk list in 2005. The most visible such challenge is

eliminating clearance delays and backlogs.

I will cover two other important issues. They are, one, improving

the projections of clearances needed; and also, demonstrating quality in all clearance processes. My full statement additionally discusses delays, funding and the need for a comprehensive plan to

address these challenges.

DOD has had a longstanding challenge in accurately projecting

the number of clearance investigation requests that it will make of

OPM, and before that, DSS. In 2004, we found some inaccuracies

there and recommended that DOD improve its projection. Two

years later, in 2006, OPM reported that DOD’s actual number of

clearance investigation requests was about 59 percent higher than

the number of projected needs that it was going to have.

In contrast, the governmentwide goal for agencies is to have

their projected and actual clearance investigation requests to be

about five percent from one another.

Recently, DOD have taken some steps to improve those projection procedures. These steps include: one, getting more industry facilities to provide information about the number of clearances they

estimate that they will need in the future; and two, looking at statistical enhancements to their procedures they use to calculate the

projections.

It is still too early right now to determine whether these steps

will be successful, and how successful. Improved projections are,

however, critical for the issue that you mentioned earlier about the

funding and making sure that we have a good measure of funding

into the future. And also, for work load and work force planning.

Let us move now to the second challenge that I talked about, and

that is, demonstrating quality.

We have cautioned that the government cannot afford to achieve

its goal of eliminating clearance delays by providing investigative

and adjudicative reports that are incomplete in certain key areas.

Concerns about quality can undermine the government’s efforts to

achieve reciprocity. And reciprocity is the process whereby one

agency will accept the clearance that another agency has issued.

The lack of full reciprocity is an outgrowth of agencies’ concerns

that other agencies may have granted a clearance based on an inadequate adjudication or investigation. If needless investigations or

adjudications are re-performed, that wastes government money.

9

Also, that uses some of the resources that we can use to try to get

the clearances done more quickly.

In the report that we are issuing today along with this testimony, we recommended that DOD develop quality measures and

report the statistics from those measures to Congress. We are

happy to say that DOD concurred with that recommendation and

will be issuing those metrics to the government and to Congress in

the near future.

In conclusion, we are encouraged by some of the DOD-specific

and governmentwide efforts that have been taken to improve the

clearance process. At the same time, the clearances that I have discussed, and the additional challenges cited in my full statement, indicate that much remains to be done. Therefore, we will continue

to monitor DOD’s program as part of our high risk series.

This concludes my remarks. I would be happy to answer any

questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Edwards can be found in the Appendix on page 45.]

Mrs. BOYDA. Thank you.

Mr. Romero.

STATEMENT OF BEN G. ROMERO, CHAIRMAN OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION

Mr. ROMERO. Good afternoon, Madam Chairwoman and Ranking

Member Forbes.

My name is Ben Romero, and I speak to you as the chairman of

the intelligence committee of the Information Technology Association of America, ITAA, and on behalf of the Security Clearance Reform Coalition.

I would like to thank you for the opportunity to discuss reform

of the clearance-granting process. In addition to these oral comments, I ask that the committee accept our attached written recommendations that expand upon many of the issues we in industry

feel are critical to addressing the persistent problem.

Industry has used a simple mantra to explain what we believe

will bring about transformation of the clearance-granting process:

one application, one investigation, one adjudication and one clearance.

We seek an Internet-based application that collects information

electronically and forms the basis for an end-to-end digital process

that creates a record that can be amended by investigators, adjudicators, security officers for the life of the clearance; an investigation that would be timely, uniform, thorough in its process and

product; an adjudication where an applicant is judged using updated, viable, post-Cold War criteria, and a clearance that is accepted across the Federal Government with minimal additional vetting.

In looking at the clearance-granting process and its effectiveness,

the committee should examine the reports of the industry-led working group of the National Industrial Security Program Policy Advisory Committee, or NISPPAC, which recently analyzed actual reVerDate 22-MAR-2001 09:54 Dec 08, 2008 Jkt 043684 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-113\044030.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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sults from clearances processed through DSS and the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office.

This task force found that on the average, secret clearances still

took more than 200 days. Top secret clearances took more than 300

days. This is in 2007.

This was an end-to-end analysis measuring from the time an applicant was given the form to complete—that is the SF–86—on the

electronic questionnaire for investigations processing Web site, to

the point where the adjudicators determined whether or not a

clearance was to be granted.

Even more alarming is the finding of the working group regarding investigations for top secret clearances, where the trend line

has grown for more than a year and currently tops out at 540 days.

Reinvestigations are the periodic review of the current clearance

holders, and those delays impact on their ability to continue supporting the national security programs.

I would like to commend the President for his February 5, 2008

memo that calls for the submission of a plan to transform the clearance-granting process. This memo memorializes the activity of the

joint task force coordinated by the Under Secretary of Defense for

Intelligence (USD(I)), OMB, ODNI and OPM. All of them are participating.

This task force has proceeded under the premise that we need to

bring about total transformation of the way we determine whether

or not someone is trustworthy enough to handle the Nation’s critical and crucial information. The effort would change what we ask,

the way we ask it, how we ask it and the way we grant and maintain clearances once granted.

This approach is different, because it does not seek to fix the

parts that are already broken in the system today, but instead creates a new, more efficient process going forward.

Industry has been apprised of the work of this group, and we

fully support the initiative. We are optimistic that the work of this

Tiger Team, and work—and wait to evaluate their report in April.

But further action is needed now.

The IRTPA was passed by Congress in 2004, and the delays in

the clearance-granting process has long been recognized, but we

are still calling for a plan. Further delays—be they bureaucratic,

legislative, budgetary—cannot be tolerated.

The nine associations of the Security Clearance Reform Coalition

again thank the committee for this opportunity to highlight our

perspectives in this deliberation, and we hope that 2008 will finally

be the year that we will see a solution implemented.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Romero can be found in the Appendix on page 64.]

Mrs. BOYDA. Thanks to all of our witnesses.

Mr. Forbes and I are kind of—since it is just the two of us, we

can go back and forth fairly informally.

There have been a couple of calls for reports here. The one that

the President has just done, I believe had an action plan of April

30th. In addition, the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act

(NDAA) also called for a report to be submitted with the budget.

So, can one of you give me an update on where that process is?

11

Mr. TORRES. Yes, ma’am. The NDAA report has been submitted.

The report that is due on the 30th is currently underway with the

reform team. And at this point, they expect that they will meet the

timeline set by the President for that particular report.

Mrs. BOYDA. Do you summarize what is in the report for the—

what was submitted with the budget resolution in terms of what—

is it just basically a summary of what you had just said, that some

progress has been made? Or where are we on addressing the entire

process?

Mr. TORRES. Yes, ma’am. I will tell you that the efforts of the reform team speak specifically to the conversation that just took

place here.

It is really geared toward a total transformation. It is not an effort to try to fix the pieces that are broken. It is an effort to try

to transform how we do business, not just what we do.

So, the report should include a plan that outlines where we think

we need to go. And it is also going to be based on an assessment

of some demonstration projects that are underway right now.

Mrs. BOYDA. Thank you.

Mr. Romero, have you seen that report that was submitted with

the budget? Have you had a chance to look at that one?

Mr. ROMERO. I have not, but some of the members of the coalition have had an opportunity to at least see glimpses of it.

And the one interesting part that we are looking forward to is

the replacement of JPAS with a complete new system.

Mrs. BOYDA. When is that expected to be done?

Mr. TORRES. The replacement of JPAS, we do not have a specific

date yet for that system. But that system is funded. The development of that system has been transferred from the Defense Security Service to the Business Transformation Agency, a part of DOD.

And most of that process and most of that development will be

based on the results of the report to the President, because that is

really what is designing our way forward in this particular effort.

Mrs. BOYDA. All right. Thank you very much. I will have some

additional.

Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Mr. Romero, when Congress passed the Intel Reform Act, we specifically addressed reciprocity of clearances, to address the longstanding problem.

Has the contractor community seen an improvement in the willingness of agencies to accept the clearances issued by other agencies? And what, if any, reciprocity related problems remain?

And just the third part of that, if there are problems, which

agencies seem to be least willing to accept clearances issued by

other agencies? And what reasons are given for that lack of reciprocity?

Mr. ROMERO. Sir, I can give you a personal example.

I hold an intelligence community green badge, which allows me

to visit the various intelligence offices of the members of the community. And I have had no problem going from one place to the

other. That is, in my estimation, remarkable, because up to six

months ago, I could not do that.

12

As far as one of the areas that continues in industry’s estimation

to be a problem is primarily with the Department of Homeland Security. They have too many different parts that do not even recognize their own reciprocity, much less reciprocity from those in industry that are coming in to work at the various parts.

Whether we hold Justice clearances or DOD clearances, they still

have to vet—yet again—that we are trustworthy enough to go work

their systems.

Mr. FORBES. GAO has indicated that there are costs associated

with delays in determining clearance eligibility. Can you provide us

with any concrete examples of the monetary and non-monetary

costs that contractors have incurred from the delays, so that we

can get an idea of how much effect the delays are having?

Mr. ROMERO. Sir, we are in the process of collecting data as we

speak to update our records on what the issue is. We did a data

call within the last two weeks. I would like to take that for the

record and get something back to you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 142.]

Mr. FORBES. That would be great if you could do that.

And Mr. Edwards, what steps need to be taken to remove security clearances from the GAO high risk list?

Mr. EDWARDS. GAO has a set procedure to go through and evaluate every different program or different area that is on the high

risk list. That is done every two years. We will be issuing a new

high risk list in January 2009.

At that time, we will go through and look at the status of the

problems that originally got the programs on the high risk list. We

will look at efforts that they have had to improve the process, look

at the plans that are in place for moving forward, and also look at

the high level involvement and other factors which can influence

whether we are going to see a continued improvement in those

areas.

Mr. FORBES. Good.

And Ms. Dillaman, it has been reported that OPM initiated a

pilot program with the Army to electronically transfer applications

for adjudications. What have been the results of this pilot program?

And are there plans to extend the program to other agencies?

Ms. DILLAMAN. Yes, sir. Yes, sir, it has been highly effective.

As I said in my testimony, well over 110,000 investigations have

been transmitted to the Army electronically—no paper, no mail.

And I believe the Army would attest to the fact that that is a successful initiative.

We have another ten agencies who are interested in signing on

this year. We are in the current process of adding Department of

Transportation and Transportation Security Administration (TSA).

Mr. FORBES. And just one more question before I yield back to

the chairman.

Mr. Torres, should the responsibility for handling all aspects of

processing security clearances for DOD employees and contractors

be returned to DOD? And why or why not?

Mr. TORRES. I do not think we are yet at a position where we

could answer that question. Whether that would be a better soluVerDate 22-MAR-2001 09:54 Dec 08, 2008 Jkt 043684 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-113\044030.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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tion or not, we do not have that data. The Department is currently

not pursuing that particular avenue or that approach.

But we suspect that, as a result of the reform team efforts, a unified, single process, way of doing business, will eventually have an

impact on the types and numbers of investigations or leads that we

submit to the Office of Personnel Management. But we do not have

a separate effort ongoing to make that decision.

Mr. FORBES. Madam Chairman, I yield back to you.

Mrs. BOYDA. Thank you.

I just would like to ask a few more questions to try to just understand a little bit more what is going on on the ground.

Right now, it sounds as if the goal is to have 80 percent of the

applications serviced or performed in 90 days. That is the current

goal.

Ms. DILLAMAN. Yes, ma’am.

Mrs. BOYDA. Okay.

Mr. Romero, is that a reasonable goal?

Mr. ROMERO. Yes, ma’am. I think it would be a reasonable goal.

But as looked at through the NISPPAC and some of the reviews

that they have done, it is going to be very, very hard to reach that

goal unless the system is reformed.

Mrs. BOYDA. We are meeting it now.

Ms. DILLAMAN. If I may, ma’am, yes, we are.

And I think one of the things that complicates the data is, not

only are we meeting that goal now for new applications that began

through the process starting in fiscal year 2006, but over the past

year we have effectively eliminated the entire backlog of initial

clearance investigations.

We put out about 150,000 more initial clearance investigations

than we received. Now, those had been in the process. They were

the backlog. And that contributed to the overall age of the clearances granted in 2007.

But clearly, if you started through the process on or after October 1, 2006, 80 percent of all initial clearance investigations are

being completed in an average of mid-60 days.

Mrs. BOYDA. Thank you.

Any comment on that?

Mr. Romero.

Mr. ROMERO. I will reserve comment.

Mrs. BOYDA. Mr. Edwards, do you——

Mr. EDWARDS. Yes. You know, one thing to consider there, the

interpretation on the Intel Reform Act, OPM and OMB are interpreting the law to deal strictly with the 90 days and 120 days total

to apply to just the initial investigations and adjudications.

However, we would see a higher level if we were also considering

the reinvestigations. And the decision has been made about putting

a higher priority on the initials, and we do not take exception with

that. We are just saying that there is a little bit more happening

there.

Mrs. BOYDA. Right. I would just—again, I am curious.

If 80 percent of them are being done in 90 days or less—and that

sounds like a good goal—what happens to the other 20 percent?

Are there any standards or goals with regard to that 20 percent?

14

Ms. DILLAMAN. Ma’am, while there are no standards established,

of course it is in everyone’s best interests to complete all investigations as quickly as possible.

I think there is a recognition, though, that there is a portion of

the population that, either due to the types of issues developed or

the complex nature of the background that we are conducting, they

were going to take longer. And I think the 80 percent goal was a

good place to start. This year, internally, we are upping that goal,

so that a bigger portion of the population will get done more quickly.

But I think, no matter what we do, there will still be a small segment that we will need to invest time and resources in to do it

right. And that has to be our first priority.

Mrs. BOYDA. Are the 20 percent more of the Top Secret and the

higher clearances, then?

Ms. DILLAMAN. Typically, because they are much more intensive

and in terms of the effort put in to doing the interviews.

Mrs. BOYDA. Mr. Edwards, if you were—is it appropriate to say

if you were a betting man?

Do you think this would be off the GAO high risk list in 2009,

and the manner with which we are proceeding?

Mr. EDWARDS. At this point, I am probably not a betting man,

one way or another. We would like to keep an open mind and to

consider what will happen in a future job that we have planned.

Ms. Garman has talked to us about some of the issues that this

committee in particular is interested in. And we are looking at how

can we best address those issues which would allow us to come to

an informed decision, probably in about December, about whether

it would stay on the high risk list or not.

Mrs. BOYDA. Do you expect a reprogramming request for this

year?

Mr. TORRES. No, ma’am. Defense Security Service is fully funded,

and the processes that they have designed and improved on to reject requirements has brought their accuracy up extremely well. So,

we expect no reprogramming requests.

Mrs. BOYDA. The reason I ask again is, you know, I think each

member present today—or not present today—certainly appreciates

the massive amount of work and the influx of—you know, not even

being able to predict for quite a little while what your work load

was going to be.

Certainly, we are all interested in making sure that we are ready

to do whatever it takes, either from a DOD personnel or from a defense contractor personnel. So, we are interested in knowing what

legislative—you know, we are here to help you, as well. What can

we do to make this better?

I understand you will be doing your report. It will be out by April

30th. And we are hoping that you make it very clear what we can

do to make sure that you have the resources that you need. We do

not want to put you in a position of not being able to get that done.

So, do you know of any other legislative fixes or resources that

you will need to move this forward?

Mr. TORRES. I am not currently aware of what legislative recommendations may come out of that particular reform effort, but

that particular requirement is in there, as well. So, if there are legVerDate 22-MAR-2001 09:54 Dec 08, 2008 Jkt 043684 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-113\044030.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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islative changes that need to be recommended, that will part of

that report.

Mrs. BOYDA. Mrs. Dillaman, as well, too. I mean, that is part of

the purpose of this hearing, is to make sure that we are all on the

same page, and we know where we are all heading, and we are all

heading for a system that is new and improved and works better,

and ends up with a more secure America.

Ms. DILLAMAN. Yes, ma’am. And I am highly optimistic.

Many of the things that are being looked at are even being incorporated in the ‘‘As-Is’’ today. And that will all make for positive improvement.

Mrs. BOYDA. Mr. Romero, what question have I not asked?

Mr. ROMERO. I think that we have been looking at the backlogs

and the problems. And we are continuing to fix a system that was

established during the Cold War.

What policies need to be addressed? What are we really looking

at and looking for? How much risk can we afford to take?

And the most important one is, if you look at Homeland Security

Presidential Directive (HSPD)–12 and the background investigations that are going to come in, what is the impact on those types

of background investigations going to have on the clearance-granting process as they start molding?

Mrs. BOYDA. Any comments?

Ms. DILLAMAN. Yes, ma’am. Last year, we experienced a bump

of about 200,000 investigations annually that we attribute to the

HSPD–12.

Now, those investigations do draw on the same investigative resources. They pull records from the same records systems at the

federal, state and local levels. And all of those records systems

have to increase their output capacity in order for us to complete

these investigations on time.

But by and large, the new investigations that are being introduced into this process are electronic. They are not the labor-intensive field investigations that support the Top Secret clearances.

And so, the impact on the investigative work force I do not believe

will be significant.

Mrs. BOYDA. Thank you.

Mr. Forbes, did you have others?

Mr. FORBES. Just a couple more, Madam Chairman, if I could.

Mr. Edwards, the chairman asked you if you were a betting man.

You indicated you were not a betting man, but we know that you

are forecasting and an analytical man.

And based on that forecasting capabilities and your analytical capabilities, do you believe that DOD, OMB and OPM made the necessary commitments to improve the security clearance process?

And what steps do you think need to be taken to ensure that ongoing initiatives continue?

Mr. EDWARDS. In the last few years, we have seen improvements.

We have seen more use of technology. We have seen an increase

in the adjudicative and investigative work force. But as I mentioned, we do see some challenges that are still out there.

The idea that we are going to reform the entire clearance process—that is a large undertaking. You know, I do not think any of

us can think about all of the things that are required with the risk

16

that is incurred whenever we grant somebody a Top Secret clearance.

So, at this point, trying to forecast into the future exactly when

this system might be able to come on line and what it would look

like, when I have not even gotten a briefing on this, because we

have not been involved in that particular area, I think would be

premature.

But we certainly are looking forward to seeing this system as it

is developed. And should you and other Members of Congress desire us to go in and look at that system, then we certainly are

available to do that.

Mr. FORBES. And Madam Chairman, just one more question.

Ms. Dillaman, I asked Mr. Romero about the reciprocity issue.

And we know that OMB has had a major role in trying to ensure

greater reciprocity of clearances. And just a series of little questions, if you could answer whichever one of them you could.

But who is currently keeping the database of the number of instances of non-reciprocity? And what agencies have the most cases

of non-reciprocity?

And in the last fiscal year, what was the number of waivers

granted to allow agencies to conduct new investigations or adjudications?

And then finally, why isn’t this type of information provided in

OMB’s annual report to Congress mandated by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act?

And I do not expect you to have all those at your fingertips

today. But if you cannot answer them today, could you just supply

those back to us in a written form, if that would be easier for you?

Whichever one would be best.

Ms. DILLAMAN. I would be happy to, but the application of reciprocity really is outside of OPM’s visibility. We conduct the investigations.

And I will tell you, though, that we have a stop system, that if

an agency attempts to request an investigation that is not needed,

because the investigative requirements have already been met, we

will not open a new investigation and do redundant, unnecessary.

And last year I believe there were about 25,000 investigation requests in total that we rejected, because the investigative requirements have already been met.

Under OMB’s guidance, I believe it was Bill Leonard and the

NISPPAC committee established a reporting system where contractors could report violations of the rules of reciprocity. But I do not

have access to that data, and I am not sure that there is any central data maintained.

Mr. FORBES. Well, if I could just leave it as an open question to

all four of our witnesses. Again, you can just reply in writing if you

want to.

But where is our data on looking at that? Or does it just not

exist at this particular point in time? And is it important for us to

have that kind of data?

Mr. Romero, I would think this would be an important thing for

your industry to know and to be able to look at. Is it all anecdotal

evidence, or do we have someplace that we can go to get some objectivity? Because the chairman and I have to work on just a few

17

facts—you know, at some point in time that we can get our hands

around to make sure this is working.

So, to the extent that any of the four of you have this or could

tell us who we need to go to, to get that information, that would

be helpful for us at some point in time.

Mr. ROMERO. I think what we will do is make sure that we add

that as one of the questions that we ask from our industry members, and see if we can collect that type of information to provide

back.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 142.]

Mr. FORBES. That would be useful.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Mrs. BOYDA. We are going to have votes here in a minute. I have

a couple more questions.

It is my understanding of the President’s budget that we saw a

decrease of about 34 percent into the Defense Information Systems

for Security, DISS.

Does that ring a bell?

Mr. TORRES. Yes, ma’am, it does.

We can get you some specific numbers on DISS. But DISS was

transferred to, as I mentioned before, the Business Transformation

Agency. There was money transferred. There is additional monies

that need to be transferred, as well. So, the actual numbers of

going up or going down are not easily defined right now.

We can get back to you and take that as a question for the

record——

Mrs. BOYDA. I would certainly appreciate this——

Mr. TORRES [continuing]. And provide that specific data to you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 145.]

Mrs. BOYDA [continuing]. Just to know where we are—what our

overall funding among the different agencies.

And again, when you say you do not anticipate a reprogramming

request, on what basis are you predicting that we will not need a

reprogramming request? Are you fairly certain about that?

Mr. TORRES. Yes, ma’am. We are quite certain of that. Defense

Security Services made numerous changes.

One of the critical changes, I think, is that they are now monitoring this on a weekly basis, so they know exactly how much is going

out, how much work is going out to the Office of Personnel Management. They can see the burn rates on a weekly basis.

And based on projections that are now more accurate, because

they have a new collection methodology, we feel very certain that

there will not be a request for reprogramming.

Mrs. BOYDA. Thank you very much.

Any additional questions?

Mr. FORBES. No. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for the hearing.

Mrs. BOYDA. All right. Thank you.

Thank you so much for your time today.

[Whereupon, at 2:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ

Mr. ORTIZ. In 2004, GAO recommended, and DOD concurred, that the Office of

the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence develop a comprehensive plan to address numerous challenges faced by the industry personnel security clearance program. Why hasn’t DOD issued such a plan in the four years since then?

Mr. TORRES. In response to the 2004 GAO report, Department of Defense (DOD)

has studied how to improve the security clearance process. One example of how the

Department is addressing the concerns outlined in the GAO report is the development of the DOD Security Clearance Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART),

which was submitted to the Office of Management and Budget on January 15, 2008.

The PART is a rating tool that continually assesses and reviews all factors that affect program performance including program purpose and design; performance

measurement, evaluations, and strategic planning; program management; and program results. In essence, it provides a long-range plan for security clearance program management and improvement. The PART will help DOD better assess and

manage the program using performance measures. These measures include the cost,

timeliness, and quality for the submission, investigation and adjudication phases of

the security clearance process. The Department expects to have baseline data on

these measures by end of this FY and use this data to set aggressive goals for performance improvement in the out years.

Mr. ORTIZ. The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2007 required that DOD provide Congress with annual reports on five aspects of industry personnel clearances. GAO’s evaluation of that report noted that the information on funding, timeliness, and quality was limited. What steps will DOD take to

address those shortcomings and help Congress in its oversight role?

Mr. TORRES. The GAO report asked the Department to provide information outside of the 2006 Congressional mandate. The Department agrees the additional information will aid Congress in its oversight role. DOD continues to develop the processes needed to address the shortcomings identified in the areas of funding, timeliness and quality:

• An extensive review within DOD by the Comptroller and Program Analysis

and Evaluation determined the funding for the Defense Security Service

(DSS) was not sufficient. A fix was implemented for the FY08 and FY09 funding lines, and the entire DSS program will be reevaluated for the FY10 Program Objective Memorandum (POM). Therefore, showing any numbers beyond FY09 in the 2008 report would not have reflected accurate information.

• The DSS Clearance Oversight Office reviews and evaluates end-to-end timeliness of industry personnel clearances, annually surveys cleared industry’s

clearance requirements, and tracks actual submissions against projections.

• DSS is working with DOD Personnel Security Research Center to develop a

quality metrics tool for the DOD Central Adjudication Facilities to identify

quality deficiencies. The DSS Clearance Liaison Office will track the quality

deficiencies and work with the community and Office of Personnel Management, as necessary, to identify and resolve systemic issues.

Our future annual reports will include this information as suggested. The additional information will be provided in the Department’s 2009 report since the GAO

recommendations were received after submission of the 2008 report.

Mr. ORTIZ. The backlog of overdue clearances has never been fully eliminated.

Since top secret clearances need to be renewed every five years, what types of analyses has DOD performed to see if there will be a large number of top secret clearances needing to be renewed in the next few years? Will the current system be able

to handle those requests?

Mr. TORRES. The Defense Security Service (DSS) is responsible for reviewing and

reporting the DOD projective investigative needs to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). We believe our security clearance system will handle the upcoming investigative requests. The Department is reducing its backlog of cases and is taking

steps towards meeting the OMB goal of keeping our backlog to an average of less

than 10% of its monthly submissions. Considering our steps towards reducing our

138

backlog and the work of the Joint Clearance Reform Team, we do not anticipate

periodic reinvestigate requirements to strain our adjudicative resources.

Mr. ORTIZ. The Intelligence Reform Act set a goal of 2009 for completing 90% of

all security clearances within 60 days. What progress have you made in meeting

that goal?

• What challenges do you face in meeting that goal—in terms of funding, staffing or electronic needs?

Ms. DILLAMAN. In the first quarter of fiscal year 2008, OPM conducted 80% of the

initial security clearance investigations in average of 67 days. In pursuit of the 2009

goal, for September 2008, we are holding ourselves accountable for providing 90%

of the initial investigations within an average of 65 days. We believe we have sufficient staff to complete the investigations, but our ability to close the cases within

the required timeframe will depend on timely responses from third party record providers, such as the FBI’s Record Management Division. For its September 2008 goal,

the FBI has been directed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to provide 90% of responses within an average of 30 days. It is critical the FBI make such

a dramatic improvement in processing times so we can meet our future goals. In

addition, we continue to work with other Federal, State, and local record providers

to improve the timeliness of their responses.

Mr. ORTIZ. We are aware of the formation of an interagency security clearance

process reform team in June 2007. The teams’ memorandum of agreement indicates

that it seeks to develop, in phases, a reformed DOD and intelligence community security clearance process that allows the granting of high-assurance security clearances in the least time possible and at the lowest reasonable cost. The team’s terms

of reference indicate that the team plans to deliver ‘‘a transformed, modernized, fair,

and reciprocal security clearance process that is universally applicable’’ to DOD, the

intelligence community, and other US. government agencies.

• What support is your office providing to this ‘‘tiger team’’?

• Please describe what the government plans and give us an idea of when each

of the major steps is projected for completion.

• When will the system be operational, and what agency will be charged with

the responsibility for maintaining the system?

Ms. DILLAMAN. OPM is partnering with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Defense to reform the overall security clearance

process. In support of the group’s efforts, a number of OPM employees are working

directly with the ‘‘tiger team’’ to provide subject matter expertise in information

technology, policy, and case processing. Other OPM employees are supporting the

reform team’s efforts by conducting research, and identifying opportunities for

streamlining existing processes and procedures.

The initial set of recommendations will be submitted to President George W. Bush

no later than April 30, 2008. These recommendations will describe the government’s

plan for reforming the security process and will identify ongoing efforts and may

provide a timeframe for offering additional recommendations over the next several

months.

Mr. ORTIZ. What steps does OPM take to build quality into its clearance investigations?

• How are these processes different from those that resulted in the large number of incomplete investigative reports that GOA documented in its September 2006 report?

Ms. DILLAMAN. We recognized early in the transfer of DOD’s personnel security

investigation (PSI) function to OPM that the Defense Security Service (DSS) and

OPM did not have a consistent interpretation of the coverage requirements. We conducted training for the field agents and quality review staff to standardize the scope

and content of the investigations. The training has continued for new FISD field

agents and other investigative staff. (Please see response below concerning training

for contractor personnel.) In addition, we developed an investigator’s handbook in

partnership with DOD and the stakeholders that includes common baseline standards for conducting background investigations.

We also put an internal quality review process in place. In March 2006, we

formed the Quality Management Group that is responsible for handling the most

serious quality concerns. Recently, we expanded QMG to conduct random quality review of employees’ work. QMG was forming when the GAO conducted its audit and

we are confident GAO would see significant improvements in the quality of the

background investigations currently being produced.

Mr. ORTIZ. GAO has stated in multiple reports that the percentage of investigative reports returned for deficiencies is not—by itself—an adequate measure of qualVerDate 22-MAR-2001 09:54 Dec 08, 2008 Jkt 043684 PO 00000 Frm 00142 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\110-113\044030.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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ity. In its August 2007 Annual Report to Congress on Personnel Security Investigations for Industry and the National Industrial Security Program, DOD stated, ‘‘DSS,

OPM, and the DOD adjudicative community are gathering and analyzing quality

metrics to provide the national security community with a better product.’’ What additional quality measures have been developed, and what do they indicate?

Ms. DILLAMAN. In addition to recording and tracking the investigations returned

by adjudicating offices for corrective actions, there are a number of quality ‘‘indicators’’ that are tracked and recorded.

• OPM routinely conducts customer assessment surveys to obtain feedback from

agencies on the products and services we provide. Over 300 agency program

level or security offices responded to the November 2007 survey. Of these, 91

percent reported being satisfied with the content and quality of OPM’s background investigations and 95 percent were satisfied with the overall services

we provide.

• OPM’s Integrity Assurance program includes contacting personal and record

sources of information for quality feedback on our Federal and contractor field

agents. Overall, approximately 3% of all sources obtained by a field agent are

recontacted by a written inquiry soliciting performance feedback. Both positive and negative feedback are used for individual performance management.

Mr. ORTIZ. It is our understanding that the OPM PIPS system is an antiquated

data management system that is not interoperable with modern IT systems. What

steps is OPM taking to replace PIPS?

Ms. DILLAMAN. OPM has no plans to replace PIPS. The system is stable, reliable

and secure, providing efficiencies in processing a tremendous volume of information

within seconds. PIPS executes on an IBM z900 Enterprise Server under the control

of z/OS operating system. It is capable of processing 450 million instructions per second and averages 1.8 million transactions by 1,650 customers logged on daily. There

are over 10,000 authorized users, to include 1,200 customers and over 7,000 field

investigators. The system is integrated with the other applications that make up the

entire investigative application suite, called EPIC, and is accessible to agencies

through direct link or the Department of Defense’s Joint Personnel Adjudications

System (JPAS). The system is able to adjust to the changing needs of the investigative process and OPM has continually been modernizing PIPS and will continue on

this path to ensure the system is meeting the ever changing needs and demands

of the investigative community.

Mr. ORTIZ. In prior years, OPM’s contractors supplying investigative reports were

experiencing double-digit turnover of staff.

• What is the current level of turnover and what types of problems does this

present when trying to deliver timely, high-quality investigative reports?

Ms. DILLAMAN. The attrition rate for our contractors is between 15 to 20 percent.

While this does put a burden on the contract companies, they ensure the quality

of the investigative products they provide to OPM by managing robust training programs and relentless quality control.

Mr. ORTIZ. How does OPM monitor the initial and continuing training and knowledge of in-house and contractor investigative staff? For example, who approves the

training materials, methods, etc. used to promote high-quality performance of clearance-related staff? What training-related consistencies and inconsistencies have

been found for this quality control issue?

Ms. DILLAMAN. OPM’s Federal Investigative Services Division (FISD) takes an active role in ensuring the investigative staff is adequately trained. It is of the utmost

importance to ensure staff members understand current policies and procedures to

ensure a quality investigation. In January 2006, FISD established the Training and

Staff Development Group (TSDG). This training group is comprised of subject matter experts within the background investigation field. FISD management approves

the training programs TSDG develops. The TSDG primary goal is to develop and

execute the staged training program for the federal staff and audit the materials/

training provided to the contractors’ investigative staff.

The contractual agreements between OPM and the contractors outline the specific

competencies, skills, and policies that must be incorporated into their training program. As with most contracts in the Federal Government, it is the contractor’s responsibility to adequately train their staff. The following steps have been taken to

make certain the contract investigators are exposed and understand theses elements.

1. TSDG provided language to be inserted into the field contacts to standardize

the training provided to investigative staff.

2. TSDG provided the contractors with all materials used to train federal staff.

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1GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Faces Multiple Challenges in Its Efforts to Improve

Clearance Processes for Industry Personnel, GAO–08–470T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 2008). 2For example, GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed to Improve the Security Clearance Process, GAO–06–1070 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2006); DOD

Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long-standing Problems with DOD’s

Program, But Concerns Remain, GAO–06–233T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 9, 2005); and DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose National Security Risks, GAO/NSIAD–

00–12 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 1999). 3GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable More Informed

Congressional Oversight, GAO–08–350 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 2008). 4GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions and Answers for the Record Following the Second in a Series of Hearings on Fixing the Security Clearance Process, GAO–06–693R (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006).

3. TSDG reviews and approves all material utilized by the contractors’ training

programs prior to implementation.

4. TSDG provides oversight of the contractors’ training programs on a continual

basis to ensure they are accurately instructing on the appropriate policies and

procedures.

To ensure all training programs expose investigators to current policies/procedures and address areas of concern, the TSDG works closely with the FISD’s Operational Policy Group and Quality Assurance Group. Analysis of case deficiencies and

program challenges are conducted routinely and incorporated into the training programs.

Mr. ORTIZ. In the report that GAO 1 issued today to this committee and your testimony statement, you discussed a need for more emphasis on quality in clearance

products and processes. What have agencies been using as quality measures, and

are they sufficient?

Mr. EDWARDS. Through our reports and testimonies, we have emphasized a need

to build more quality and quality monitoring into the clearances process. As we

have reported, since 1999 government agencies have relied on a measure of quality—the percentage of investigative reports returned by requesting agencies to the

investigating agency because of incompleteness—and this measure is insufficient.

We find this measure to be problematic because the number of investigations returned for rework is not by itself a valid indicator of the quality of investigative

work. One reason for this is that according to adjudication officials, they were reluctant to return incomplete investigations in anticipation of further delays.2 Additionally, this metric pertains only to the investigation phase of the clearance process,

and there are no metrics for the other five phases of the investigative process (the

clearance process has six phases: the requirements setting, application-submission,

investigation, adjudication, appeal, and clearance updating).

Mr. ORTIZ. Do you believe that DOD, OMB, and OPM have made the necessary

commitment to improve the security clearance process? What steps need to be taken

to ensure that on-going initiatives continue past this Administration?

Mr. EDWARDS. As noted in our February 13, 2008 report,3 we are encouraged by

some department-specific and governmentwide efforts that have improved DOD’s

personnel security clearance program. Examples of improvements to the process include (1) DOD’s ability to electronically submit a clearance applicant’s form authorizing the release of medical information and (2) a governmentwide effort that has

resulted in the increased use of the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing.

In addition, as we have previously reported, we have been encouraged by the commitment that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and OPM have demonstrated in the development of a governmentwide plan to address clearance-related

problems.4 The OMB Deputy Director met with us to discuss OMB’s general strategy for addressing the problems that led to our high-risk designation for DOD’s

clearance program. Demonstrating strong management commitment and top leadership support to address a known risk is one of the requirements for us to remove

DOD’s clearance program from our high-risk list.

Nevertheless, as we noted in our February 13, 2008 statement, we have identified

a number of challenges in our past work that will require long-term commitment

from this and subsequent administrations to further improve the security clearance

process. Specifically, in our statement we emphasized the need for initiative in five

areas: (1) improvement in projecting future industry investigation needs, (2) eliminating delays in the clearance processes, (3) supplementing the limited information

on quality of clearance products and procedures, (4) increasing the amount of clearance-related funding information available to Congress to improve oversight, and (5)

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5GA0–08–470T.

6GAO, Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform Security Clearance

Processes, GAO–08–352T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 2008). 7GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation Found for Industry

Personnel, GAO–07–842T (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2007). 8GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed to Improve the Security Clearance Process, GAO–06–1070 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2006).

developing and implementing a department-specific plan to address clearance problems.5

In another recent testimony,6 we emphasized that current and future efforts to

reform personnel security clearance processes should consider, among other things,

the following four key factors: (1) determining whether clearances are required for

a specific position, (2) incorporating quality control steps throughout the clearance

processes, (3) establishing metrics for assessing all aspects of clearance processes,

and (4) providing Congress with the long-term funding requirements of security

clearance reform.

Mr. ORTIZ. The Intel Reform Act requires that timeliness statistics be reported to

Congress. Do the timeliness statistics provide a full picture of how quickly clearances are being issued? If there are additional statistics that would add to the

Congress’s oversight of clearance timeliness, what types of factors should be considered in identifying additional metrics?

Mr. EDWARDS. The timeliness statistics that OMB and OPM have provided to

Congress may not convey the full magnitude of the time required to complete clearance investigations and adjudications. In May 2007, we reported the following five

concerns with the transparency of the government’s timeliness statistics: (1) limited

information on reinvestigations for clearance updating, (2) not counting the total

number of days to finish the application-submission phase, (3) shifting some investigation-related days to the adjudication phase or not counting them, (4) not counting the total number of days to complete closed pending cases, and (5) not counting

the total number of days to complete investigations sent back for rework.7 Our preliminary observations of OMB’s February 2008 Report of the Security Clearance

Oversight Group and recent OPM congressional testimony indicate that there may

be continuing problems in these areas.

• Limited information on reinvestigations for clearance updating: In previous

OMB reports and OPM congressional testimony, the government provided

limited information on the time to complete reinvestigations. However, OMB

included in its 2008 Report of the Security Clearance Oversight Group information on the timeliness of reinvestigations.

• Not counting the total number of days to finish the application-submission

phase: Our preliminary observations of OMB’s February 2008 report raise

concerns that some activities occurring in the initial part of the applicationsubmission phase may not be included when counting the time to complete

the application-submission phase. For example, OMB’s February 2008 report

noted that investigation timeliness was ‘‘calculated from receipt of the full request for investigation;’’ however, some activities may be excluded in timeliness measurements depending on how OMB interprets the ‘‘full request for

investigation.’’

• Shifting some investigation-related days to the adjudication phase or not

counting them: In our September 2006 report, we raised concerns about how

the time to complete the adjudication phase was measured because OMB included mailing time in reporting the timeliness of the adjudication phase.8

This practice continues as noted in OMB’s February 2008 report to Congress:

timeliness statistics for adjudications ‘‘include . . . up to 15 days in mail and

handling between OPM and the adjudicating agency.’’ Including time to mail

and handle investigative reports from OPM to adjudicating agencies shifts a

portion of the time to complete the investigation to the adjudication phase.

• Not counting the total number of days to complete closed pending cases: OPM

may be combining two kinds of investigations, which may overstate the timeliness of completed investigations. In her February 13, 2008, congressional

testimony statement, the Associate Director in charge of OPM’s investigations

unit did not indicate whether the investigation timeliness statistics presented

in her statement included closed pending investigations in the calculation of

the average times to complete all investigations. Closed pending investigations are investigative reports sent to adjudication facilities without one or

more types of source data required by the federal investigative standards. In

our February 2004 report, we noted that closed pending cases should continue

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to be tracked separately in the investigations phase of the clearance process

because a closed pending investigation may be reopened when the missing

data are supplied. The time measurement of a closed pending case is suspended for an undetermined amount of time, which is not accounted for if the

pending cases are reopened later and included in the timeliness calculations

of fully completed investigations.

• Not counting the total number of days to complete investigations sent back for

rework: In 2006, we reported that in instances when investigative reports are

returned to OPM to address investigative insufficiencies, OPM’s procedure

has been to replace the investigative time recorded for providing the initial

report to the adjudication agency with the investigation time to rework the

report to address the insufficiencies. Reworking the investigative report could

take less time than the earlier effort to complete the initial investigative report. While reworking cases occurs approximately in 1 to 2 percent of investigative reports, replacing the initial investigative time with the time to complete the reworked investigations as the total number of days to complete investigations does not provide a full picture of how quickly clearances axe

being issued. OMB’s February 2008 report does not clarify its timeliness statistics to show how or if it is addressing this issue.

Mr. ORTIZ. OPM and DOD have reported decreases in the delays for providing

clearances. What, if any, measurable improvements for contractors have resulted

from these improvements in timeliness?

Mr. ROMERO. It is my pleasure to report to you, following a survey conducted of

the member companies of both ITAA and NDIA, that we believe there have been

some measurable improvements for contractors that have resulted from improvements in the timeliness for providing security clearances. Most notably, the majority

of member companies of both ITAA and NDIA agree that the E-Quip system that

has been put in place has generally expedited clearances in government agencies.

Most believe that allowing for internet application submittal not only speeds up the

clearance process, but that it also makes it easier to access the necessary forms.

However, the member companies have expressed certain concerns with this system

and tend to agree that the E-Quip system does have flaws. I have provided a list

of recommendations pertaining to E-Quip as well as the clearance process as a

whole; that document, as well as the results to the survey, is attached.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 122.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES

Mr. FORBES. Can you provide us with any concrete examples of the monetary and

non-monetary costs that contractors have incurred from the delays, so that we can

get an idea of how much effect the delays are having?

Mr. ROMERO. There was a study conducted some years ago that estimated the cost of the delays to process clearances was $192M. Details about the study are explained in the study titled ‘‘The Cost to Industry of Security Clearance Delays’’ and

is included below:

THE COST TO INDUSTRY OF SECURITY CLEARANCE DELAYS

Executive Summary: Continuing delays in issuing security clearances to defense

contractor employees are driving substantial ‘‘lost labor’’ costs for Industry. A recent

AIA study estimates $152M was lost at nine facilities examined in a small but representative sample. The study indicated timeliness of final clearance output for Industry is not yet improving despite concerted efforts by DOD since mid-1999. Extrapolation of sample data to all of defense industry would put the labor costs wasted, while employees await final clearance, into the billions of dollars annually. Senior corporate management should consider elevating concern to the incoming administration. Greater emphasis needs to be placed on: (1) more rapidly reducing DOD’s

administrative processing and field investigative time to an average of 90 days, and

(2) on expediting the processing of ‘‘issue cases’’ which require special adjudication.

Background: For well over two years the Department of Defense has struggled

with a huge backlog of background investigations (BIs) for initial security clearances

and for periodic clearance updates. DOD’s administrative process for managing BIs

is apparently broken and their repair effort has yet to take full effect as inordinate

delays in the timely completion of BIs continues. These delays drive a significant

cost impact for defense firms doing classified business with the U.S. Government.

The DOD BI agency, Defense Security Service (DSS), signed up to a get-well

schedule with the Defense Management Council last year. That schedule now apVerDate 22-MAR-2001 09:54 Dec 08, 2008 Jkt 043684 PO 00000 Frm 00146 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\110-113\044030.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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1The six industrial security organizations are: Aerospace Industrial Association’s Industrial

Security Committee, the American Society for Industrial Security’s Government Security Committee, the Contractor SAP Security Working Group, the Industrial Security Working Group,

the National Classification Management Society and the National Defense Industrial Association’s Industrial Security Committee. 2The pricing model used to develop the cost figures cited in this paper applies a typical burdened salary for an aerospace professional employee. It assumes that a large percentage of the

uncleared employee’s time, after having waited an initial 90 days for a clearance, is ‘‘wasted

labor’’ because the employee’s services are being denied to the classified program to which he

is assigned. That waste can be attributed to the delay in clearance completion. Details of the

pricing model as applied to survey project data can be supplied on request. 3The adverse impact of delay in receiving a Final Secret clearance is mitigated to some extent

by DOD’s timely issuance of ‘‘Interim Secret’’ clearances to qualified applicants. For that reason

the Final Secret pending backlog is not included in the cost impact-pricing model used in this

paper. DSS’ concerted effort to improve and maintain their timely performance in this regard

is deserving of praise. However, certain restrictions on Interim Secret clearances limit their

value in many industrial job situations. Specifically, they cannot be used for access to classified

NATO or COMSEC information, and they do not provide a basis for access to Special Compartmented Information (SCI) or Special Access (SAP) programs. 4Monthly averages for Final Secret LOC issuance were 243, 293, 267, and 249 days over the

course of the study. Monthly averages for Final Top Secret LOC issuance were 381, 342, 348

and 343 days. 5 An ‘‘issue case’’ is one where the BI has revealed some piece of potentially adverse information about the subject. That triggers a formal review of the investigation report against presidential-approved adjudicative guidelines. If the government adjudicator then decides the derogatory information is significant enough to require denial of an initial clearance, or revocation of

an existing clearance, it moves into a ‘‘due process’’ phase. In this phase the subject is offered

an opportunity to appeal the denial or revocation at an administrative hearing prior to a final

decision. Such cases have been known to drag on for years.

pears to industrial observers not to be aggressive enough, and a recent study raises

the question of whether DSS’ progress is still tracking to plan.

Since August 2000 a group of Industrial Security organizations1 has tracked

DOD’s BI backlog reduction and production timeliness at nine representative industrial facilities. Based on data from this sample it’s estimated that DOD’s failure to

complete timely clearances on just the 2271 sampled Top Secret BIs has cost Industry in excess of $152M in lost or wasted labor at these nine facilities alone. If the

sample is extrapolated to the more than 10,000 cleared industrial facilities in the

U.S., the total annual cost to Industry reaches the billions of dollars.2

The nine-facility study revealed that it currently takes 249 days on average (over

eight months) for a contractor employee to receive a ‘‘Final Secret’’ clearance. That

span is measured from the time the employee’s clearance request is transmitted by

the contractor’s Security Office to DOD until a ‘‘Letter of Consent’’ is received back

from DOD authorizing the employee’s access to classified information.3

For a Final Top Secret clearance, the current average wait is 343 days, or almost

eleven and a half months from submittal of the request to DOD.

The four-month survey also raised some trend questions:

♦ CASE COMPLETION TIMELINESS did not move toward any significant improvement over the four months examined.4

♦ PENDING CASE BACKLOG showed signs of aging even further.

 The percentage of Secret clearance cases in pending status for OVER ONE

YEAR increased steadily over the survey period, from 8.6% of the total pending backlog in August to 13.0% in November.

 Secret clearance cases over one year will likely increase, since the percentage

of pending Secret cases in the Nine-to-Twelve Month age category also increased steadily, and more than doubled over the four months surveyed, from

11.6% to 22.9% of the total backlog. This may indicate a continuing DOD

process problem with the older cases.

 The percentage of Top Secret eases pending for OVER ONE YEAR went from

26.1% of the total pending backlog in August to 31.5% in November. Thus,

in just four months, the number of Top Secret pending cases over one year

old went from about one-quarter to nearly one-third of the entire backlog.

Most of DOD’s recent remedial efforts have focused on fixing the BI process problems at DSS where the great majority of cases are bogged down. That is proper.

However, an added delay invariably occurs as a result of ‘‘issue cases’’ 5 stacking up

on adjudicators’ desks. DSS’ job is finished once it writes the BI report. However,

there is virtually no visibility to Industry when an issue case on one of our employees moves to the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) for issue adjudication. Yet our employee in this situation, seeking an initial clearance, remains unable

to perform work on classified programs while ‘‘due process’’ plays itself slowly out.

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6The 23% would include most of the 13% of all currently pending Secret cases over one year

old, and most of the 10% of all pending Top Secret cases over 18 months old. However, due to

Industry’s lack of visibility on matters pending with DOHA, the exact backlog there can only

be estimated. We only know that a case remains pending within the government.

About 23% of Industry’s current pending case backlog is old enough in the system

to indicate most of those matters are probably pending issue adjudication at

DOHA.6 That is a significant enough figure to indicate that DOD needs also to focus

greater attention on the resources needed for more timely adjudicative output by

DOHA.

Mr. FORBES. Who is currently keeping the database of the number of instances

of non-reciprocity? And what agencies have the most cases of non-reciprocity?

And in the last fiscal year, what was the number of waivers granted to allow

agencies to conduct new investigations or adjudications?

And then finally, why isn’t this type of information provided in OMB’s annual report to Congress mandated by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention

Act?

Mr. TORRES. The Department of Defense (DOD) does not keep a database on instances of non-reciprocity. However, the Department is committed to the reciprocal

recognition of investigations or adjudications for security clearances conducted by

other U.S. Government Agencies, as outlined in Title III or Public Law 108–458

(The Intelligence and Reform Terrorist Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004) and Executive Order 13381, Strengthening Processes Relating to Determining Eligibility for

Access to Classified National Security Information.

DOD implementation of Office of Management & Budget (OMB) guidance on reciprocal recognition of existing security clearances specifically stipulates that any

DOD component that determines it necessary to impose additional investigative or

adjudicative requirements must notify the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of

Defense for Counterintelligence and Security; this office has received no such notifications.

Additionally, DOD is a participating member of the National Reciprocity Working

Group which ensures reciprocal recognition of existing security clearances across the

Federal government.

Mr. FORBES. Who is currently keeping the database of the number of instances

of non-reciprocity? What agencies have the most cases? In the last fiscal year, what

was the number of waivers granted to allow agencies to conduct new investigations

and adjudications? Why isn’t this type of information provided in OMB’s annual report to Congress mandated by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention

Act?

Ms. DILLAMAN. The application of reciprocity is often outside of OPM’s visibility.

OPM’s role is to conduct the investigations, and we have a process in place that

stops an investigation from being initiated when the same or a higher level investigation is currently pending or recently completed. Our automated system will not

open a new investigation when the investigative requirements have already been

met. We are also expanding our record system to capture additional adjudicative information that will provide better transparency into a subject’s suitability and/or security determination. This will assist agencies in achieving full reciprocity.

Mr. FORBES. Who is currently keeping the database of the number of instances

of non-reciprocity? And what agencies have the most cases of non-reciprocity?

And in the last fiscal year, what was the number of waivers granted to allow

agencies to conduct new investigations or adjudications?

And then finally, why isn’t this type of information provided in OMB’s annual report to Congress mandated by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention

Act?

Mr. EDWARDS. We are not aware of a database maintained by any government

agency that records information on reciprocity.

Mr. FORBES. Where is our data on looking at that? Or does it just not exist at

this particular point in time? And is is important for us to have that kind of data?

Mr. ROMERO. As noted by Ms. Dillaman, issues related to reciprocity were managed by Mr. Bill Leonard and the ISOO office at the National Archives. Mr. Leonard

convened several government/industry sessions where specific instances and experiences related to reciprocity were discussed and new standards were developed as a

result of those discussions.

Unfortunately, reciprocity is still determined by security officers that can be several layers removed from the agency security officers and variances in application

of reciprocity still occur. Mr. Leonard and ISOO created a voluntary reporting mechanism where industry could report instances of non-reciprocity. Unfortunately, in

practice, contractor personnel were extremely reluctant to report non-reciprocity by

145

their government customers for fear of retaliation during the period of contract performance. Some in industry, however, have taken advantage of the reporting mechanism, so there should at least be anecdotal evidence available.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. BOYDA

Mrs. BOYDA. It is my understanding of the President’s budget that we saw a decrease of about 34 percent into the Defense Information Systems for Security, DISS.

Does that ring a bell?

Mr. TORRES. Program management and development responsibility for the Defense Information System for Security (DISS) moved from the Defense Security

Service (DSS) to the Business Transformation Agency (BTA) in November 2007 at

the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Upon achieving full operational

capability, the system will transition to DSS for sustainment. DSS and BTA are

working to ensure a smooth transition from the existing Information Technology

(IT) systems to the next generation system.

The Operations & Maintenance (O&M) program has not decreased but instead

has experienced a 68% increase between FY07–FY08. This increase was related to

DISS legacy system sustainment in FY08. The O&M portion of DISS represents the

cost of sustaining the existing systems such as the Joint Personnel Adjudication

System (JPAS).

Between FY08 and FY09 there was a decrease of 66% versus 34% ($34.2M—

$11.5M) in Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) funding. The decrease is because the ‘‘old’’ DISS should have been developed and operational by

FY09. Once a program is developed it drops out of RDT&E funding and goes into

sustainment/maintenance O&M funding. This would explain the drop in RDT&E

funding between FY08 and FY09.

The remaining RDT&E funds, other than those needed to maintain the existing

systems, will be transferred to BTA for DISS development. That transfer is expected

in FY08.

Æ