1

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE
, :
:
v. : ID No. 1608024954

: LIAM SCHOFIELD
, :
: Defendant. :

SUBMITTED: October 25, 2023 DECIDED : November 3 , 2023

OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE

Abolore Jade Oshodi and Nichole Morton, Deputy Attorneys General , Office of the Attorney General, Wilmington, Delaware, Counsel to the State of Delaware

Ross Flockerzie and Nicole Schorah, Assistant Public Defenders , Office of Defense Services, Wilmington , Delaware, Counsel to Liam Schofield.

Jones, J.2

Liam Schofield (“Defendant”) has filed a pro

- se Motion to Vacate (the
“motion”) his Sentence.

Defendant, in his motion, does not indicate what Rule he is proceeding under

.
This Court will treat this re quest under Superior Court Criminal Rule, specifically
under Rule 61(i)(5) which provides relief where a new rule of constitutional law
applies which renders the conviction invalid.

FACTS
On August 31, 2016, officers from Operation Safe Streets were driving on 4 th

Street in Wilmington when they observed Defendant standing in the street near the
Delaware Technical Community College , grabbing at his waistband. The officers,
believing that Defendant was displaying the characteristics of an armed gunman,

turned their car around and continued to observe him

. They saw Defendant pressing
his right hand against his waistband and observed an object protruding from under
his shirt that appeared to be the butt of a handgun , as he approached Delaware

Tech nical Co mmunity College (“Del Tech”) . The officers approached Defendant,

asked to see his hands, and asked if he was armed ; D efendant admitted that he was
carrying a firearm but claimed that he had a permit to do so.

When the officers took Defendant into custod y, he was found to be in
possession of a loaded 9mm Glock handgun, a loaded magazine with 11 rounds of

ammunition , a police baton, a fixed knife, and a folding knife. Defendant maintained3

that he and his mother had a permit to carry the firearm but later admitted that he did
not have a permit and his mother purchased the gun for him

. The officers verified

Defendant did not have a permit, and that Defendant was a person prohibited from
carrying a firearm due to juvenile felony adjudications of : Terroristic Threatening
False Statement Caused to Evacuate a Building , and Non

- Compliance with

Conditions of Bond. 1

Defendant was indicted on seven felony offenses including : two counts of

Possession of a Firearm / Ammunition by a Person Adjudicated Delinquent ( 11 Del.

C. §1448 ) , three counts of Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon (11 Del. C. §1442 )
, Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Adjudicated Delinquent ( 11 Del. C.

§144 8 )
, and Possession of a Weapon in a Safe School Zone ( 11 Del. C. §1457 )

. On July 25, 2017, Defendant pled guilty to one count each of Carrying a
Concealed Deadly Weapon and Possession of a Weapon in a School Zone

. As part
of the plea, the State entered nolle prosequi on the remaining charges. The Superior

Court sen tenced Defendant to an aggregate sixteen

- year term of incarceration
suspended for one year of Level III probation.
Shortly after Defendant was released from Level V and placed on probation,
during a home visit by Probation & Parole, Defendant was found to be in possession

1 Defendant now disputes that he was a felon at the time of his 2016 arrest. Whether he was a felon at the time or not is irrelevant to the instant motion as he admits by virtue of his guilty plea that he possessed a weapon in a safe school zone.4

of a firearm and ammunition in violation of the terms of Defendant’s probation. On
September 1 3 , 2017, Defendant was arrested on the new weapons charges (Case ID
No. 1709009074) (“ t he Second Case ”).
On February 22, 2018, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief
, pro

se , regarding the original July 25, 2017
, sentence in this case

. Defendant requested
and was appointed Postconviction Counsel.
On June 19, 2018, Defendant pled guilty to Possession of Ammunition
by a Person Prohibited in connection with t he Second Case . At that time, Defendant
acknowledged that the conviction for t he Second Case would operate as a violation
of probation (“VOP”) as a matter of law for the Defendant’s probation on the
Original Weapons Charges.
On June 26, 2018, in connection with the plea agreement on the Second Case

and resolution of the VOP, Postconviction Counsel withdrew the pending motion
for postconviction relief to allow Defendant to focus on his mental health treatment
and prob ation.
Defendant was sentenced by Order dated July 31, 2018, effective September

14, 2017, in connection with the Second Case and the VOP on the Original Weapons
Charges, to Level III Mental Health Court, GPS monitoring.
On September 10, 2018, Defendant renewed his motion for postconviction5

relief r equest ing that the Court rule on the original motion that had been withdrawn. 2
On January 03, 2019, Defendant’s motion for postconviction relief was
summarily dismissed by this Court on the merits

. 3

Defendant is currently serving a term of Level III probation stemming from

the sixth Violation of Probation in this case. 4

In his Motion , Defendant asserts that the United States Supreme Court ’s 2022

decision in N

ew York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen 5 renders

Delaware’s Criminal laws for Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapo n and Possession
of a Weapon in a School Zone illegal and uncons titutional, and that his guilty plea
to the charges should be vacated , accordingly

.
ARGUMENT
Prior to addressing the merits of a postconviction relief claim, the Court must
first apply the procedural bars governing the proper filing of a motion for

postc onviction relief set forth in Criminal Rule 61(i)

. 6
The only possible avenue that does not procedurally bar Defendant’s claims

2 See here in enclosed as State’s A

. 3 See herein enclosed as State’s B

. 4 Because Defendant is represented but filed the present Motion pro se , the State filed a Motion to Strike, on October 11, 2023, pursuant to De. R. Crim. P. Super. Ct. 47 ; the State’s Motion is pending with the Court. 5 New York State Rifle and Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen
, 142 U.S

. 2111 (2022)

. 6 Maxion v. State, 686 A. 2d 148, 150 (Del. 1996). All references to the rule are to the rule in place at time Defendant filed his motion for postconviction relief. See Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748, 757 n.24 (Del. 2016).6

is Rule 61(i)(5) which allows a claim that pleads with particularity a new rule of

constitutional law that is made retroactive to cases which renders the conviction

invalid. 7 Defendant relies upon the United States Supreme Court decision in New
York State Rifle & Pistol v. B ruen , 142 U.S. 2111 (2022) as establish ing a new
constitutional principle that makes his convic tion in valid. Bruen does not establish

a new Rule of Constitutional Law that invalidate Defendant’s conviction.

The Bruen decision addresses the constitutionality of a New York state law
that required law

- abiding citizens to demonstrate a “unique need for self

- defense” in
order to obtain an unrestricted gun permit. The Bruen Court found that requiring

law

- abiding citizens to make such a showing before i ssuing a carry permit infringed

on t heir Second Amendment right to bear arms , and that State regulations must

comport with a historical understanding of the Second Amendment. 8

The constitutionality of requiring a permit to carry publicly wa s not at issue

in Bruen . It wa s not raised by the movants nor addressed by the Supreme Court

. More importantly, the Supreme Court’s in

- depth analysis makes clear the legality of
certain requirements within gun permit applications makes it clear that state gun laws

are not invalid.

“[ t ] he Second Amendment right is not unlimited. It is not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose...the Court's opinion

7 S UPER

. C T

. C RIM

. R. , Rule 61(i)(5); Rule 61(d)(2)(ii). 8 Bruen 142 U.S. at 2126

- 2156

.7 should not be taken to cas t doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on t he commercial sale of arms.” District of Columbia v. Heller , 554 U.S. 570, 626

- 27 (2008)

.
In his M otion
, Defendant also misapprehends the Bruen decision to indicate :

1 . Delaware’s Possession of a Firearm in a School Zone law is illegal and

unconstitutional , and

2. because Defendant was on a sidewalk owned by the city of Wilmington
while he was illegally armed in a school zone, the Possession in a School Zone
prohibition does not apply to him, as sidewalks owned by the city are not sensitive
places

.

Bruen make s clear the opposite
, that Delaware’s Possession in a School

Zone l aw is constitutional as schools are “sensitive places” where arms carrying can
be prohibited, and “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such
as schools and government buildings” have a longstanding history that is consistent

with the Second Amendment. 9
As no new constitutional principle was announced in Bruen that was either

9 See Bruen, 142 U.S. at 2134 ; See also Bruen at 2162 ( K avannaugh concurring opinion ) “[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms

. ”8

applicable to him or his convictions, his motion to vacate must be D ENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/ s/ Francis J. Jon es, Jr. Francis J. Jones, Jr., Jones