United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

November 1996 FOOD SECURITY

Preparations for the

1996 World Food

Summit

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-97-44

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-275367 

November 7, 1996

The Honorable Nancy Landon Kassebaum

Chair

The Honorable Russell D. Feingold

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on African Affairs

Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

The Honorable Tony P. Hall

House of Representatives

This report responds to your request that we monitor and analyze U.S.

preparations for the World Food Summit to be held in Rome, Italy,

between November 13 and 17, 1996.

This report addresses the following: (1) the origin, purpose, and financing

of the summit; (2) the process used by member countries of the U.N. Food

and Agricultural Organization (FAO) to prepare and negotiate a policy

declaration and plan of action for approval by world leaders or their

representatives; (3) the U.S. approach to the summit; (4) key issues that

have arisen in the negotiations; and (5) the role and views of

nongovernmental organizations (NGO).

FAO was founded in October 1945 with a mandate to raise levels of

nutrition and standards of living, to improve agricultural productivity, and

to better the conditions of rural populations. FAO is the largest autonomous

agency within the United Nations. It has 174 member nations plus Puerto

Rico (associate member) and the European Community (member

organization) and more than 2,000 professional staff. FAO’s biennial budget

is set at $850 million, and FAO-assisted projects attract more than $2 billion

per year from donor agencies and governments for investment in

agricultural and rural development projects.

Background Food security is concerned with hunger and malnutrition. The U.S.

position paper prepared for the World Food Summit states that food

security exists when all people at all times have physical and economic

access to sufficient food to meet their dietary needs for a productive and

healthy life.

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Food security has several important dimensions: (1) availability—achieved

when sufficient supplies of food of appropriate quality are consistently

available to all individuals; (2) access—ensured when households and all

individuals in them have adequate resources to obtain appropriate foods

for a nutritious diet; and (3) utilization—refers to the proper biological use

of food through adequate diet, water, sanitation, and health care.

According to the U.S. position paper, world food security is important to

the United States for humanitarian, economic, and national security

reasons. The United States and other nations that signed the 1974 World

Food Conference Declaration agreed that all governments should accept

the goal of achieving world food security within 10 years. More than 

20 years later, the world still falls far short of this goal. Eighty-eight

countries are currently classified as low-income and food-deficit states.

According to FAO, close to 800 million people, or 20 percent of the

developing world’s population, are chronically undernourished. Most of

these people are in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. In addition,

millions of other people in more affluent societies do not have enough

food to meet their basic needs. And millions more experience prolonged

hunger during part of the year, or suffer birth defects, growth retardation,

mental deficiency, lethargy, blindness, or death because they do not have

the diversity of food necessary to meet their total needs. An estimated

200 million children under the age of 5 suffer protein or energy

deficiencies.

The world has made some important progress toward reducing food

insecurity. For example, according to FAO estimates, 35 percent of people

in developing countries were chronically malnourished in 1969-71, but

only 20 percent were by 1990-92. However, FAO has projected that, unless

the root causes underlying food insecurity are addressed by 2010,

700 million to 800 million persons worldwide will still be chronically

undernourished. In sub-Saharan Africa alone, FAO projects that the

chronically undernourished will increase from about 200 million to more

than 300 million people in the next 15 years. Most of the rest of the

chronically undernourished will be found in South Asia.

Poverty is a primary obstacle to food security. Worldwide, 1.3 billion

people, or nearly one-quarter of the world’s population, live on less than 

$1 a day. Their low income makes them especially vulnerable when prices

for basic commodities increase rapidly and sharply. Other important

factors affecting food security include weather, civil strife and war,

widespread unemployment or underemployment, inadequate returns to

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food producers, unsustainable use of natural resources, high-debt service,

overvalued exchange rates, and distorted international markets.

Future Outlook In 1996, world grain stocks reached a 20-year low and grain prices reached

an all-time high,1

 and world food aid has been in a sharp decline. Food

insecurity and food aid problems could increase significantly over the

short, medium, and long run. There are several reasons why this is so.

Although population growth rates have been declining , the world’s

population is expected to increase by 2.6 billion people by 2025. As a

result, even with modest income growth, world food supplies will have to

at least double by that year, according to the World Bank.2

 The Bank

concludes that due to land and water constraints, future increases in food

supplies must come primarily from increasing yields, rather than from area

expansion and more irrigation. This would require a doubling of current

yields over the next 30 years, which is uncertain.

An October 1995 U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Economic

Research Service (ERS) study3

 found that world food aid needs will nearly

double over the next decade simply to maintain current consumption

levels. This is true even if one makes reasonably optimistic assumptions

about recipient countries’ ability to produce their own food or to import

food commercially. Far higher food aid levels would be required if the

target was to meet minimum nutritional standards. The study concluded

that there is a looming mismatch between food aid resources and needs. If

global food aid budgets are maintained at 1995 levels, the gap between

needs and resources will grow rapidly. Factors limiting food aid

availabilities include changes in agricultural policies that will likely reduce

agricultural surpluses and reductions in aid budgets of donor countries.

According to the study, funding will be the major factor affecting food aid

shipments in the future. It noted that recent governmentwide budget

reductions in the United States and in some other countries have already

resulted in significant reductions in food aid donations. For example, food

aid shipments of grain by donors peaked at 15.2 million metric tons (mmt)

in 1992-93, declined to 12.6 mmt in 1993-94, and were estimated to have

declined to 8.4 mmt in 1994-95. U.S. shipments peaked at 8.5 mmt in

1

Grain prices have moderated in recent months. See also footnote 4.

2

Alex F. McCalla, Agriculture and Food Needs to 2025: Why We Should Be Concerned (Washington,

D.C.: The World Bank, Oct. 1994).

3

Food Aid Needs and Availabilities: Projections for 2005 (Washington, D.C.: USDA Economic Research

Service, Oct. 1995).

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-97-44 Food Security
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1992-93 and were estimated to drop to 4.2 mmt by 1994-95. These

reductions have already affected the food security of at least some

recipient countries.

According to many experts, other factors affecting the future of world

food security include the following:

• Many major agricultural producers, including the United States, Canada,

Australia, and the European Union, are implementing increasingly more

market-oriented agricultural policies, partly in response to the 1994

Uruguay Round trade agreement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and

Trade (GATT). More market-oriented policies are likely to result in a

reduction of agricultural surpluses and in less grain held in stocks,

particularly in government-held stocks. Lower average stocks, in turn, may

lead to more year-to-year volatility in grain markets.4

 Current U.S.

agricultural policy removes the link between income support payments

and farm prices. As a result, incentives for surplus agricultural production

are diminished. U.S. government-held stocks are likely to decline sharply.5

• Although signatories to the 1994 Uruguay Round trade agreement agreed

to establish mechanisms to ensure that implementation would not

adversely affect food aid commitments to meet the legitimate needs of

developing countries and stressed the need for sufficient food aid, the

signatories were not specific on how this is to be accomplished.

• To the extent that trade liberalization results in slightly higher grain prices

than without the agreement, food aid availabilities may be reduced

because a given budget will purchase less grain.

Results in Brief In 1994, the FAO Director General consulted with world leaders and others

about whether it would be useful to hold a global conference on world

food security issues, the first since 1974. According to U.S. officials,

initially there was considerable skepticism on the part of the United States

and a number of other countries. However, consensus eventually emerged

on the desirability of renewing the 1974 commitment to achieve world

food security for all and to agree upon effective policies and strategies for

4

In September 1996, USDA’s Economic Research Service concluded that relatively low stocks will

persist through at least 1997 despite projected increases in upcoming global harvests that will ease

immediate supply pressures. This will leave the world particularly vulnerable, it said, to major crop

shortfalls or demand shocks, and will very likely mean more price variability than in the past.

5

According to ERS, prospects for large-scale rebuilding of global grain stocks in the next few years are

slim, given budgetary constraints and recent exporting countries’ policies not to build stocks. Stock

decisions will be increasingly made by the private sector, ERS said, and private stock holding will

likely be substantially smaller than the large government stock levels of the 1980s.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-97-44 Food Security
B-275367 

dealing with the root causes of hunger and malnutrition in the 1990s and

beyond. The consensus also included understandings that the summit

would not establish new institutions for promoting food security or

pledges from donor countries for increased levels of assistance and that

the summit would be carefully planned to hold down costs.

The primary products of the summit are to be (1) a policy declaration

containing seven major commitments for advancing global food security,

approved by heads of state or their representatives and (2) a plan of action

setting forth objectives and actions needed to implement the policy

commitments. The FAO Secretariat prepared early drafts of the policy

statement and plan. However, FAO member countries found the drafts

unacceptable and took over the drafting process through the Committee

on World Food Security (CFS).6

 To facilitate reaching agreement, each

member country government was encouraged to prepare its own position

paper on food security issues. In addition, FAO regional conferences

addressed the subject. Intensive negotiations to reach agreement on a final

document were conducted between the end of July and the end of

October, primarily in CFS. The intention was to secure agreement before

the summit itself. During the summit, leaders would formally approve the

policy declaration and deliver speeches on the subject.

U.S. preparations for the summit have been led by a high-level interagency

working group consisting of 13 agencies and cochaired by USDA’s Under

Secretary for Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services, the Department of

State’s Under Secretary for Global Affairs, and the Administrator of the

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The interagency group

produced a U.S. government position paper on food security issues and

collaborated with Canadian officials in drafting a joint “North America”

position paper.

According to the United States, the primary responsibility for reducing

food insecurity rests with each country, and it is critical that all countries

adopt policies that promote self-reliance and facilitate food security at all

levels, including food availability, access, and utilization. Furthermore, the

6

The Committee on World Food Security is a Committee of the FAO’s Council. It (1) continuously

reviews the current and prospective demand, supply, and stock position for basic foodstuffs within the

context of world food security; (2) makes periodic evaluations of the adequacy of current and

prospective stock levels in aggregate, as well as in exporting and importing countries, to ensure a

regular flow of basic foodstuffs and food aid to domestic and world markets in times of short crops or

serious crop failures; (3) reviews steps taken by governments to implement an international

undertaking on world food security; and (4) recommends such short-term and long-term policy action

as may be necessary to remedy any difficulty forseen in ensuring adequate cereal supplies for

minimum world food security.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-97-44 Food Security
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most important prerequisite for improving food security within a country

is the development and implementation of an appropriate policy

framework. Other key U.S. views include the following:

• All countries should promote trade because self-sufficiency in food is not

sustainable in many countries.

• Governments should facilitate investments in infrastructure, invest in

basic health and sanitary services, and develop institutions that promote

sustainable development in a democratic and nondiscriminatory manner.

• Over reliance on resource transfers from developed to developing

countries is detrimental to self-reliance and food security.

• The most progress in food security is achieved by nations that have

pursued policy reform, macroeconomic stabilization, and structural

adjustments.

• The United States plans to concentrate its assistance on countries whose

national policies enhance food security.

According to U.S. officials, negotiations on a draft policy declaration and

plan of action got underway in January 1996. By late July-early August, the

discussions highlighted serious philosophical differences between

developed and developing countries regarding the overall approach to

food security and also among developed countries regarding trade and

other more specific issues. As a result, the negotiations became difficult

and protracted. From the perspective of U.S. goals for the summit, much

of the discussion was (1) focused on government intervention rather than

government facilitation; (2) protectionist rather than supportive of trade

liberalization; and (3) too centered on international resource transfers

rather than on national and private sector action to promote open

markets, better natural resource management, and population

stabilization.

A series of difficult and protracted bilateral and multilateral negotiations

were held in September and October. Member countries finally reached

agreement on text for a policy declaration and plan of action on

October 31. Some specific examples of key differences that arose during

the negotiations are as follows.

• Right to Food and Other Human Rights. Most countries were prepared to

affirm that “every human being has the fundamental right to be free from

hunger and malnutrition,. . .” language from the 1966 International

Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, to which the United

States is not a party. The United States was reluctant to endorse a “right to

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-97-44 Food Security
B-275367 

food” because of concern within the Administration that the government

might be opening the door to a possible lawsuit by malnourished

individuals within the United States. In addition, the United States was not

willing to endorse a right to food without language also endorsing other

human rights. The final document affirms the right of everyone to be free

from hunger but calls for work to clarify the right and better define the

rights related to food and to propose ways to implement and realize these

rights. The document also concludes that promotion and protection of all

human rights and fundamental freedoms is essential.

• Definition of Food Security. Developing countries sought to define food

security narrowly in terms of hunger, malnutrition, and poverty versus a

broader definition, favored by the United States and others, that included

conflict avoidance and resolution, sustainable development,

environmental protection, good governance, population stabilization,

human rights, and open markets. Developing countries eventually agreed

to define the term more broadly.

• Environment. The United States was concerned that the draft document

did not pay sufficient attention to the importance of sustainable

development. A U.S. proposal to include the term “environmental” into a

list of policy frameworks—political, economic, and social—deemed

essential to food security was not well supported by other countries.

Developing countries were particularly concerned about their ability to

meet environmental commitments and thus the possibility that developed

countries could raise trade barriers to their food and agricultural exports.

The United States was able to find several other places in the document

where references to sustainable development and environmental issues

were accepted by all countries. For example, the final document notes that

environmental degradation contributes significantly to food insecurity and

states that increased food production should happen within the

framework of sustainable management of natural resources. At the same

time, the international community and member countries commit to make

every effort to ensure that environmental measures do not unfairly affect

market access for developing countries’ food and agricultural exports.

• Population Stabilization. The United States and many other countries

sought language committing countries to take population concerns into

account when developing economic and social development plans.

However, a very small but vocal group of developing countries insisted

that there be no reference to population in the final document. Some

countries were not willing to accept references to population planning or

reproductive health services on the ground that such language endorses

abortions. However, during the end of the October negotiating session,

these countries agreed to accept language on population and reproductive

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-97-44 Food Security
B-275367 

health with reference to the 1994 International Conference on Population

and Development.

• Pledges for New Assistance and Role of Private and Public Investment.

Notwithstanding the agreement that the summit would not be a pledging

conference, developing countries sought commitments from donor

countries to increase their levels of official development assistance and to

resolve the external debt problems of the developing nations. The

developing countries eventually agreed that specific commitments would

not be made.

• Target Dates for Reducing/Eliminating Food Insecurity. The developing

countries and others sought a commitment to reduce by one-half the

number of chronically malnourished people by 2010 and to eliminate food

insecurity within one generation. The United States and a number of other

countries felt these targets were not realistic. Agreement was eventually

reached on seeking to reduce the number of malnourished by one-half by

2015 and not cite any specific date for eliminating food insecurity.

• Trade Liberalization. The United States, Australia, Canada, and New

Zealand, with support from exporting Group of Developing Countries

(G-77), sought agreement on language calling for further agricultural trade

liberalization.7

 Latin American and Southwest Pacific countries pushed for

trade negotiations that would be based on the effective removal of

subsidies and barriers that distort trade. However, China, Japan, and

South Korea emphasized a need to protect domestic food production, and

many delegations said that domestic production must increase and

trade-restrictive measures were essential and valid to achieve this

purpose. The final document essentially drops references to further trade

liberalization beyond the Uruguay Round agreement and does not include

language justifying trade protection.

• Implementation of the Marrakesh Decision.8 The 1994 GATT trade

agreement included a written decision in which trade ministers agreed

that during implementation of the agricultural trade reform program,

appropriate mechanisms would be established to ensure that

implementation of the reforms does not adversely affect the availability of

food aid at a level that is sufficient to continue to provide assistance in

meeting the food needs of developing countries, especially least-developed

and net food-importing developing countries. Developing countries, with

considerable support from most other countries, favored including

7

G-77 countries are a group of developing countries that signed a joint statement in Geneva,

Switzerland, in 1964 articulating members’ collective interests in the areas of promoting economic

cooperation among developing countries and in negotiating economic matters with developing

countries. G-77 membership is now over 125 countries.

8

The understanding was made in Marrakesh, Morocco, and is commonly referred to as the Marrakesh

Decision.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-97-44 Food Security
B-275367 

language calling for early or full implementation of the agreement. The

United States emphasized that it was too early for the reforms to have

caused any measurable adverse effect and proposed language that the

agreement would be effectively applied. Eventually, the United States

agreed to full implementation within the World Trade Organization.

As with other recent international conferences, FAO sought wide

participation by interested NGOs in preparations for the summit. Among

other activities, NGOs were encouraged to work with their respective

governments in expressing their views on food security. NGOs held regional

forums to reach consensus on views that were provided to the FAO regional

conferences. In September 1996, NGOs from numerous countries held a

global consultation and reached consensus on a broad statement of key

views that was provided to CFS for use in its negotiations on the policy

statement and plan of action.

The NGO statement differed in a number of significant ways from the U.S.

government’s position on food security issues. For example, the statement

did not fully subscribe to reliance on free markets, supported by

self-sufficiency in food, and favored public regulation of food prices. In

addition, NGOs did not fully endorse the view that countries should

produce those things in which they have a comparative advantage and rely

on trade to obtain those goods for which they lack a comparative

advantage. According to the NGO statement, developing countries are often

forced to import food from overseas, so their food security is subject to

the vagaries of the international market. NGOs also concluded that

international trade liberalization is not the solution to the problem of food

security and in many cases undermines it.

U.S. NGOs were also active in preparations for the summit and interacted

with the U.S. government in a variety of ways. Most importantly, they

provided formal comments at two public forums held by the U.S.

government and the U.S. and Canadian governments, respectively. In

addition, a number of U.S. NGOs attended the global consultation, where

they generally endorsed the key points statement issued by the NGOs in

Rome. Some of the U.S. NGOs who participated actively in the preparations

for the summit told us that they were disappointed with the U.S.

government’s process for securing and responding to their views. In

general, they felt that the government waited too long before allowing

them to comment on the drafting of the U.S. position paper, did not treat

them as full partners in the process, and did not seriously consider many

of their views. U.S. officials expressed surprise when advised about these

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-97-44 Food Security
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comments. They felt that ample opportunity had been provided to NGOs to

participate in the process. Moreover, they said U.S. NGOs had generally

showed little interest until the approach of a U.S.-sponsored public forum

held in early June 1996.

Appendixes I through V provide additional information on these issues.

Agency Comments We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of

Agriculture, the Secretary of State, and the USAID Administrator, or their

designees. We obtained oral comments on November 1, 1996.

Representatives of these agencies generally agreed with the information

presented in this report but asked that we update our discussion of the

negotiations to reflect developments through October 31, 1966. We did so.

They provided their perspective on our discussion of the views of a

number of U.S. NGOs concerning U.S. preparations for the summit. Their

perspective is presented in this letter and and in appendix V. In addition,

they provided some technical comments, which we incorporated into the

report where appropriate.

Scope and

Methodology

Numerous federal agencies have been involved in the development of U.S.

objectives for the World Food Summit. We identified the role played by

each but concentrated especially on those agencies that are shown to have

been the leading players. These were USDA, the Department of State, and

USAID. We also attended several high-level interagency working group

meetings. We monitored the September and late October negotiating

sessions of CFS in Rome, Italy. We met with representatives of 17 U.S. NGOs

that were actively involved in preparations for the summit and obtained

their views.9

 We also attended two open forums that USDA, State, and USAID

held in June 1996, at which many NGOs commented on draft U.S. position

papers. In addition, we observed the NGO global consultation in Rome.

We obtained and analyzed relevant studies, reports, and other documents

from U.S. government agencies, as well as international organizations

(primarily FAO, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), and

the World Bank) and private entities. In addition, we obtained testimonial

9

They were the Adventist Development and Relief Agency, Associates of the National Agricultural

Library, Bread for the World Institute, CARE, Center of Concern, Coalition for Food Aid, Earthsave

International, Harrison Institute for Public Law, Humane Society of the United States, Institute for

Agriculture and Trade, Lutheran World Relief, Maryknoll Fathers and Brothers, National Farmers

Union, Save the Children, U.S. Network for Habitat II, World Food Day, and World Sustainable

Agriculture.

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evidence from relevant U.S. government officials; officials of several

foreign governments, FAO, the World Food Program, and World Bank

officials; and other experts.

To describe the recent status of world food security and U.S. food

assistance levels, we made use of data compiled by others, including U.S.

government agencies such as ERS and USAID, and international

organizations such as FAO and the World Bank. We did not make

independent projections of world agricultural production or food security.

Rather, we relied on a review and assessment of the results of studies

conducted by other experts, as well as testimonial evidence by experts

concerning such studies.

We conducted our review from May 1996 to November 1996 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to USDA’s Under Secretary for Farm

and Foreign Agricultural Services, the State Department’s Under Secretary

for Global Affairs, and the Administrator of USAID. We will also send copies

to appropriate congressional committees. Copies will be made available to

others upon request.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me

at (202) 512-4128. The major contributors to this report were 

Phillip J. Thomas, Gezahegne Bekele, and Wayne H. Ferris.

Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director

International Relations and Trade Issues

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-97-44 Food Security
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Origin, Purpose, and

Financing of the 1996

World Food Summit

14

Appendix II 

The Process of

Preparing a Policy

Statement and Plan of

Action for Approval

by World Leaders

17

Appendix III 

U.S. Approach to the

Summit

19

Involvement of NGOs 20

U.S. Position on Substantive Issues 20

Actions Advocated by the United States to Assist the Food

Insecure Countries

23

Appendix IV 

Key Issues That Have

Arisen During the

Negotiations

25

Broad Outline of an Overall Agreement 26

Significant Issues That Emerged During the Negotiations 27

Appendix V 

The Role of NGOs in

Preparations for the

World Food Summit

41

Involvement of U.S. NGOs in Preparations for the Summit 43

Key Positions Conveyed by NGOs to CFS in September 1996 47

NGOs’ Views That Differed Significantly From the U.S. Position

on Food Security

48

Other NGO Views 51

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-97-44 Food Security
Contents

Abbreviations

ACC Administrative Committee on Coordination

CFS Committee on World Food Security

ERS Economic Research Service

FAO Food and Agricultural Organization

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GNP Gross National Product

G-77 Group of Developing Countries

IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute

IWG Interagency Working Group

MMT million metric tons

NGO nongovernmental organizations

ODA Official Development Assistance

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OMB Office of Management and Budget

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture

USTR U.S. Trade Representative

WTO World Trade Organization

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-97-44 Food Security
Appendix I 

Origin, Purpose, and Financing of the 1996

World Food Summit

During 1994 the Director General of the U.N. Food and Agricultural

Organization (FAO) consulted a large number of heads of state and

government and delegations from all global regions represented at FAO

about whether it would be useful to hold a summit of world leaders to

address global food security issues, the first since 1974. The Director

General felt that the personal participation of heads of state and

government was needed to mobilize all the government departments

required to provide a comprehensive vision of the multiple dimensions of

the food issue. In addition, it was expected that the high visibility of a

summit would be more effective in raising awareness at the level of policyand decision-making in the public and private sectors, as well as among

the media and the public at large.

According to U.S. officials, initially there was considerable skepticism on

the part of the United States and a number of other countries. For one

thing, several summits on other issues had already been held or scheduled

in the 1990s,1

 and successful summits require considerable preparation

and involvement of high-level officials over a sustained period of time.

Consequently, there was concern about whether governments would have

sufficient energy and time to prepare for another summit, as well as the

willingness to pay for the added expenses of both the preparations and a

summit itself. For another thing, there was concern that a summit might

simply become a vehicle whereby low-income, food-deficit countries

would seek additional pledges of assistance from developed countries and

not meaningfully address the root causes of food insecurity.

Eventually, the Director General found an emerging consensus on the

desirability of convening a World Food Summit. Its purpose would be to

renew the 1974 commitment to end hunger for all and to agree upon

effective policies and strategies for dealing with the root causes of hunger

and malnutrition in the 1990s and beyond. In October 1995, FAO members

gave their unanimous approval to the Director General’s proposal to

convene the summit. During the preceding months, growing support for

the summit had been confirmed by discussions at sessions of the FAO

Council and FAO regional conferences, as well as by resolutions and

recommendations adopted at numerous other intergovernmental

meetings.

1

Among others, they include the International Conference on Nutrition (1992), U.N. Convention on the

Law of the Sea (1992), Convention on Biological Diversity (1992), U.N. Conference on Environment

and Development (1992), World Conference on Human Rights (1993), International Conference on

Population and Development (1994), World Summit for Social Development (1995), Kyoto Declaration

and Plan of Action on the Sustainable Contribution of Fisheries to Food Security (1995), Fourth World

Conference on Women (1995), and the Leipzig Declaration on and the Global Plan of Action for the

Conservation and Sustainable Utilization for Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (1996).

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-97-44 Food Security
Appendix I 

Origin, Purpose, and Financing of the 1996

World Food Summit

FAO members agreed that the summit would not require monetary pledges

from developed to developing countries, nor would it create new financial

mechanisms, institutions, or bureaucracy. Each participating nation would

consider independently how and what it might want to contribute to the

implementation of the policies, strategies, and plan of action that would be

adopted by the summit. Members also agreed that the summit would be

carefully planned to keep costs to a minimum and at the same time ensure

sound preparation in terms of physical arrangements and logistics;

technical and policy documents; and consultation with governments,

nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and others. Some of the steps taken

to hold down costs include the following:

• Regularly scheduled sessions of FAO’s governing bodies, including

members’ regional conferences and the Committee on World Food

Security (CFS), were to be used to the maximum extent possible for

summit preparations.

• The summit would be held in FAO’s headquarters in Rome, using existing

conference facilities and services, to avoid costs to both FAO and member

nations resulting from holding such a meeting away from the

headquarters.

• The organizational work was entrusted to a small group of professionals

from various FAO departments, who will return to their normal work

following the end of the summit. Permanent representatives of

governments to FAO’s headquarters in Rome would fully participate in the

process.

• Maximum use was to be made of FAO’s own expertise to prepare a

comprehensive set of technical documents in advance of the summit, and

the cooperation of other organizations was sought in their preparation.

• The basic costs of holding the summit were to be financed by FAO’s regular

program. However, voluntary contributions in cash and in kind have been

sought to cover other costs, in particular, to encourage wide participation

from developing countries and NGOs.

• All participants are being encouraged to avoid holding receptions and

dinners during the summit and to donate any funds that would have been

used for hospitality to the financing of a special program for food

production in support of low-income, food-deficit countries.

In September 1996, the Secretary General for the World Food Summit told

us that about $2 million had been budgeted for the World Food Summit for

1996 to cover the costs of such things as pay for staff detailed from FAO to

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-97-44 Food Security
Appendix I 

Origin, Purpose, and Financing of the 1996

World Food Summit

work on the summit and extra meetings.2 She said the $2 million would not

cover all of the extra costs and that she did not yet know what the overall

additional cost would be. However, the Secretary General said that a

considerable amount of money had been saved by the use of the FAO’s

regular meetings and facilities to handle the summit.

2

The Secretary General said that the Inter-Sessional Working Group meetings and the September CFS

meeting were not considered regular meetings.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-97-44 Food Security
Appendix II 

The Process of Preparing a Policy Statement

and Plan of Action for Approval by World

Leaders

The summit is to be held in Rome during November 13-17, 1996. The

primary product of the summit is intended to be a policy declaration and

plan of action on universal food security, for implementation by all parties

concerned: governments, international institutions, and all sectors of civil

society. The policy statement, to be signed by heads of state or their

representatives, is to be a relatively brief, concise statement on the

problem confronting the world and broadly stated commitments for

addressing the situation. The plan of action is to be a longer document that

sets out objectives and actions considered necessary to fulfill the

commitments made in the policy declaration.

The process for preparing a policy statement and plan of action for

approval by world leaders has included several major elements:

• drafting of a policy statement and plan of action document, initially by the

Secretariat and subsequently by CFS or the Inter-Sessional Working Group;

• drafting by CFS members of individual countries papers to form the basis

for positions that each country’s government would advocate in

negotiations leading up to the summit;

• discussion of the subject at FAO regional conferences, with suggestions and

recommendations for the policy statement and plan of action forwarded to

CFS;

• discussion of the subject by various forums of NGOs, with suggestions and

recommendations for the policy statement and plan of action forwarded to

member countries, the FAO regional conferences, or CFS; and

• negotiations on drafts of a policy statement/plan of action by CFS and its

subordinate groups.

FAO Draft Policy

Declaration and Plan of

Action

In April 1995, well before the FAO’s approval of convening a summit, the

FAO Secretariat drafted what were referred to as possible elements of a

draft policy declaration and plan of action for world leaders to sign at a

summit. These elements were presented to and discussed by member

countries at FAO meetings. In December 1995, the Secretariat prepared a

draft policy statement/plan of action that sought to take account of the

members’ views. This draft was reviewed at a meeting of CFS from

January 29 through February 2, 1996. The U.S. view was that the draft was

generally acceptable in substance, but overly long and unfocused. Other

CFS members were also not satisfied with the document. Member countries

asked the Secretariat to prepare a revised draft document. CFS established

an Inter-Sessional Working Group to conduct its work until its next

scheduled meeting in September.

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Appendix II 

The Process of Preparing a Policy Statement

and Plan of Action for Approval by World

Leaders

The Secretariat’s revised draft was reviewed by the Inter-Sessional

Working Group in March 1996. The group was still not satisfied with the

document and decided to take over the drafting process. (Since then, the

Secretariat has acted as technical adviser and facilitator in the drafting

process.) A small committee that included the officers of the

Inter-Sessional Working Group, known as the Bureau, was charged with

preparing the next draft of a policy statement/plan of action.

In addition, FAO regional conferences, held between March and early July

(for the Near East, Africa, Europe, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America

and the Caribbean), also discussed the policies and priority actions needed

to ensure food security in the member countries of the respective regions.

To stimulate discussion on the issue, the Secretariat provided each

conference with a paper on the food security situation and issues in its

respective region. Each paper also included a proposed draft statement on

actions for addressing regional food security, along with the Secretariat’s

observation that the conference could recommend its transmission to CFS

as that region’s contribution to the World Food Summit plan of action. In

addition, the Secretariat provided the regional conferences with a copy of

its March draft policy statement and plan of action.

The regional conferences provided member state governments with

another vehicle for providing guidance to their Rome-based

representatives on what they would like to see in a policy statement and

plan of action.1

 It was hoped that the conferences would begin the process

of building consensus that would lead to the eventual approval of a draft

document by all CFS members.

Based on comments and amendments proposed by members of the

Inter-Sessional Working Group at its May and June meetings, as well as

consultations with Regional Chairs of CFS and individual members and

observers of the Inter-Sessional Working Group, in early July the Bureau

prepared a new draft policy statement and plan of action for discussion by

the Inter-Sessional Working Group from July 29 through August 2, 1996.

(See app. IV for a discussion of key issues that arose during negotiations

between late July and the end of October 1996.)

1

A few of the regional conferences took unusual steps. For example, CFS members at the European

conference refused to discuss the FAO Secretariat’s draft of possible European actions to be

recommended for the plan of action. The regional conference for Latin America and the Caribbean

also chose to ignore the Secretariat’s paper. Instead, it focused on a draft statement and plan of action

that had been prepared in Rome by the Latin American representatives to FAO. Attendees agreed to

adopt the Rome-produced document but to also include a nonconsensus appendix containing

delegations’ comments on the document.

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Appendix III 

U.S. Approach to the Summit

Key actions taken by the U.S. government in preparing for the summit

include establishing a high-level interagency working group to oversee and

guide the process, preparing a U.S. government position paper on the

World Food Summit, preparing jointly with Canada a North American

position paper on the summit, and inviting NGOs and the public more

generally to provide input to the process.

As early as April 1995, the U.S. government designated the U.S.

Department of Agriculture (USDA) as the lead agency for U.S. preparations

for the summit and established a “core group” comprising representatives

from USDA, the State Department, and the U.S. Agency for International

Development (USAID) to staff the issue. The U.S. National Secretary for the

summit was a USDA official from the Foreign Agriculture Service, and he

chaired the core group. According to U.S. officials, the group was not very

active between then and the early part of 1996 but did help prepare

positions on the FAO Secretariat’s draft and subsequent draft policy action

and plan of action.

In late March 1996, USDA’s Under Secretary for Farm and Foreign

Agricultural Services, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture,

took action to expand the interagency process. The goal was to fully

engage USDA and other agencies in addressing broad policy issues and

preparing for the summit, including developing a U.S. country paper,

providing regional coordination with Canada, securing input from the

public, and establishing policy guidance for U.S. negotiators. A high-level

Interagency Working Group (IWG) was established. Initially, it was

cochaired by the USDA Under Secretary and the State Department’s Under

Secretary for Global Affairs. Subsequently, USAID’s Administrator was

designated as third cochair. IWG includes broad representation. In addition

to the three cochair agencies, it has representatives from the Office of the

Vice President, the National Security Council, the National Economic

Council, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), the Office of

Management and Budget (OMB), the Department of the Treasury, the

Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, the Department of

Health and Human Services, the Office of Science and Technology Policy,

the Environmental Protection Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency,

and the National Intelligence Council. As of October 31, 1996, IWG had met

seven times.

At the same time, the interagency core group was expanded to include, on

an as-needed and as-desired basis, staff at the working level to do much of

the day-to-day work. The core group has met on a weekly basis and

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Appendix III 

U.S. Approach to the Summit

prepared the various drafts of the U.S. country paper, the U.S. draft input

into the North American paper, and positions for negotiations in CFS. Much

of the core group work has been staffed by USDA, the State Department,

and USAID. However, some other agencies have had considerable input on

certain specific issues. For example, USTR has played a key role with

regard to trade issues and the Department of Commerce with regard to

world fishery issues.

The core group prepared a draft paper for discussion at the first IWG

meeting on April 8, 1996. Based on comments received, the paper was

substantially revised and was considered the first draft of the U.S. country

position paper for the World Food Summit. The paper was discussed at the

second IWG meeting on April 30. Thereafter, the draft went through

additional revisions before being finalized in early July. The paper is

entitled “The U.S. Contribution to World Food Security.” During

approximately the same period of time, members of the core group, with

oversight by IWG, collaborated with Canadian officials in drafting a joint

paper titled “Food Security Situation and Issues: A North American

Perspective.”1

 Both papers formed the bases for positions that the United

States advocated in negotiations leading up to the summit.

Involvement of NGOs As discussed in a later section, U.S. NGOs with an interest in food security

provided comments to the U.S. government as it was developing the U.S.

position paper and the joint position paper with Canada. In addition, they

have participated in other activities designed to influence the content of

the policy declaration and plan of action.

U.S. Position on

Substantive Issues

The U.S. position paper, finalized in early July, and the U.S.-Canada North

American paper, finalized in early August, formed the basis for positions

that the United States has advocated in negotiations leading up to the

summit. These papers summarize the U.S. analysis of the principal causes

of food insecurity at the individual, household, local, national, and global

levels and identify major actions that the U.S. government believes are

needed to reduce food insecurity. The United States sought to persuade

CFS and its various working groups to draft and adopt a policy statement

and plan of action that is consistent with the U.S. overall assessment of the

problem and actions needed to reduce food insecurity.

1

In conformity with FAO’s regional organization, the term “North America” refers to Canada and the

United States. Mexico is part of FAO’s regional group for Latin America and the Caribbean.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-97-44 Food Security
Appendix III 

U.S. Approach to the Summit

In the U.S. view, food insecurity is a complex problem with multiple

causes: natural disasters; war and civil strife; inappropriate national

policies; poverty; barriers to trade; environmental degradation; excessive

population growth; gender inequality; poor health; and inadequate

development, dissemination, adaptation, and adoption of agricultural and

other research and technology.

According to U.S. policy, the primary responsibility for reducing food

insecurity rests with each country, and it is critical that all countries adopt

policies that promote self-reliance and facilitate food security at all levels,

including food availability, access, and utilization. Furthermore, the most

important prerequisite for improving food security within a country is the

development and implementation of an appropriate policy framework. The

United States advocates the following national policies and actions to

improve food security:

• Governments should act as facilitators rather than intervenors. National

policies that facilitate the development of markets and expand the

individual’s freedom of action are the best guarantor of national food

security. Such policies require transparency and the opportunity for full

and meaningful participation in decision-making by all members of

society. Governments should create and sustain a stable economic

environment that is conducive to the full participation of the private sector

and foster political stability without resorting to repressive measures.

Governments should combat graft and corruption wherever it exists,

especially in the political and economic systems.

• All countries should work to promote liberalized trade to maximize the

potential for economic growth (within the context of sustainable

development) and to realize the benefits of comparative advantage.

Self-sufficiency in food production is not a viable or sustainable solution

for many countries. Governments should provide a macroeconomic and

trade environment with linkages to global markets so that long-term

changes are transmitted to the domestic economy, thus avoiding

macroeconomic imbalances that could induce destabilizing adjustments.

• Governments should invest in a public goods infrastructure that includes

transportation, communication, education, and social safety nets. And it

should provide basic health and sanitary services, maintain basic levels of

nutrition, and facilitate voluntary population stabilization.

• Governments should ensure a political system that does not discriminate

against women. All countries must recognize the essential role of women,

who work to produce more than half of the food in developing countries.

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Appendix III 

U.S. Approach to the Summit

Greater emphasis needs to be placed on child survival, family planning,

and other reproductive health information and services.

• Governments should establish a general development policy that (1) does

not discriminate against agricultural or fisheries sectors nor against rural

or coastal areas and (2) recognizes that poverty alleviation requires an

integrated approach to rural development.

• Governments should develop institutions and land tenure systems that

provide broad access to land services and incentives for users to protect

and invest in the long-term productivity of natural resources.

• All countries should promote the critical role of sustainable development

in the agriculture, forestry, and fisheries sectors, and these policies must

be environmentally sound. Governments should adopt policies that

provide an effective incentive structure for sustainable management of

natural resources, including soil, water, and genetic resource

management, and preservation of biological diversity. Food, agricultural,

and fishery policies should be consistent with the resource endowment of

the country and supportive of its natural comparative advantage.

• Greater emphasis needs to be placed on agricultural research and

extension services. Governments should emphasize investment in

agricultural research and technical education, international research

systems, and policies that facilitate the flow of knowledge and technology

among and within countries while protecting intellectual property rights

so necessary to provide incentives for private sector research.

In the U.S. view, countries that have demonstrated the most progress in

achieving food security are those that have seriously pursued policy

reform, macroeconomic stabilization, and structural adjustment, while

focusing government activities on public goods investment and the

provision of safety nets. The United States believes that such commitment

and assumption of responsibility at the national level create a climate

conducive to private and public external investment. Consequently, the

United States has said that it plans to concentrate its assistance efforts on

those countries that are willing to review and change their national

policies to improve their own food security. This approach is consistent

with USAID statements in recent years that it is concentrating its assistance

efforts on those countries that are partners in development and that can

achieve sustainable development results. According to USAID, sustainable

development cannot be achieved in countries that are not willing to

change their policies, do not allow their own citizens to participate

adequately in the development process, and have not invested their own

resources in sustainable development or have invested a disproportionate

amount in the military at the expense of development.

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Appendix III 

U.S. Approach to the Summit

Actions Advocated by

the United States to

Assist the Food

Insecure Countries

In September 1996, the United States advised other countries that in the

U.S. view, the international community can play a catalytic role in helping

food-insecure countries by providing development assistance and, where

necessary emergency food aid. However, the United States said that an

overreliance on resource transfers from the developed to the developing

countries will only decrease, rather than enhance, self-reliance and the

achievement of food security.

Consistent with the agreed-upon aims of the World Food Summit, during

negotiations on the policy declaration and plan of action, the United States

has opposed language that might be interpreted as requiring additional

resource pledges by the developed countries or the creation of new

financial mechanisms, institutions, or bureaucracies. This approach is also

consistent with U.S. budgetary constraints and congressionally mandated

reductions in foreign assistance expenditures. In addition, it should be

noted that the United States is in arrears on its dues owed to the United

Nations, and some of its specialized agencies, for example, FAO. According

to U.S. officials to whom we spoke, OMB advised IWG that the United States

was not in a position to make new resource commitments to food-insecure

countries during the World Food Summit. These officials also said that

many other developed countries also face a difficult budget environment

and are also unwilling to consider new pledges during the summit.

Although the United States is not prepared to pledge additional resources

at this time, the government has said that it intends to continue to play a

major role in promoting food security around the world. According to the

U.S. position paper, the United States plans to accomplish this objective

by

• enhancing U.S. government support for research and technology

development in agriculture and related sectors, both at home and abroad;

• employing an integrated approach to sustainable development, with a

strong emphasis on those countries that show a good-faith willingness to

adopt necessary policy reforms;

• continuing support for food security through the use of agriculture

programs, development assistance, and food aid;

• continuing support for international efforts to respond to and prevent

humanitarian crises that create a need for emergency food;

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Appendix III 

U.S. Approach to the Summit

• continuing efforts to encourage and facilitate implementation of food

security-related actions adopted at recent international conferences or

established in recently agreed-to conventions;2

• working within the multilateral system to enhance global approaches to

food security;

• working with all countries to achieve freer trade and to ensure that the

benefits are equitably realized and urging all countries to open their

markets in the interest of achieving greater stability and participation in

the world market; and

• continuing to work toward food security for all Americans.

2

During September 1996 negotiations on the policy declaration and plan of action, the United States

supported inclusion of references to conclusions reached and action plans adopted at a number of

recent international conferences and conventions. In the U.S. view, implementation of the goals of

these conferences and conventions can make a significant contribution to global food security. For

example, the 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, the 1992 International

Conference on Nutrition, the 1994 U.N. Conference on Population, and the 1995 Fourth World

Conference on Women emphasized sustainable national policies that would help promote global food

security. At the same time, U.S. negotiators opposed language that would represent a significant

retreat from the conclusions and goals of recent international forums.

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Appendix IV 

Key Issues That Have Arisen During the

Negotiations

The Inter-Sessional Working Group met from July 29 to August 2, 1996, to

address the Bureau’s revised policy statement and plan of action.

According to U.S. officials,

• the discussions and negotiations highlighted serious philosophical

differences between developed and developing countries regarding the

overall approach to food security and also among developed countries

regarding trade and other more specific issues;

• the session was largely an exercise in adding to the draft text and

proposing specific language changes (by the end of the meeting, the text

had increased to 40 pages and about 800 bracketed items (text on which

consensus was lacking)); and

• much of the discussion was (1) disconcertingly focused on government

intervention rather than on government facilitation; (2) protectionist

rather than supportive of trade liberalization; and (3) too centered on

international resource transfers rather than on national-level and

private-sector action—including promotion of open markets, better

natural resource management, and population stabilization—to encourage

self-reliance and household food security.

Nonetheless, U.S. officials concluded the meeting was relatively

productive, particularly because member country delegations came to the

meeting prepared not only to discuss but also to negotiate, to a limited

extent, the draft text. As a result, positions of the respective groups were

tabled, an important prerequisite for negotiation.

On September 21, CFS met to further negotiate the draft document that had

resulted from the late July-early August meeting.1

 The negotiations were

lengthy and cumbersome, partly because of (1) the large number of

bracketed text items that had to be addressed, (2) important substantive

differences of views, and (3) language translation problems.

Although several substantive issues remained unresolved at the end of the

round of negotiations on September 30, the U.S. view was that significant

progress had been made. At the start of the informal negotiations, on

September 20, CFS country delegations were working with a draft

document of approximately 40 pages and 800 brackets of text. When the

negotiations broke off, the draft documents had been reduced from

1

The September negotiations had originally been scheduled to last 5 days, with a goal of reaching full

consensus on both the policy statement and plan of action. However, the negotiations were extended

because of the large number of unresolved issues. Two days of informal negotiations were conducted

prior to the scheduled start on September 21, and negotiations continued for another 3 days beyond

the originally planned end date of September 27.

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Key Issues That Have Arisen During the

Negotiations

approximately 40 pages to 35 pages, and the roughly 800 bracketed items

had been reduced to about 220.

Following a personal appeal by the FAO Director General, the FAO Council

suspended part of its October session to permit a 2-day reconvening of CFS.

CFS met on October 8-9 to seek additional consensus on bracketed points.

The session was useful in removing some brackets and clarifying positions

on remaining difficult issues. However, there was no movement on major

issues.

On October 28-31, CFS met again with the avowed purpose of obtaining

consensus on all remaining issues. In fact, the committee reached

agreement on a consensus text to be submitted to heads of state or their

representatives at the summit. It is up to each member country’s

government to decide whether to enter reservations or interpretations

with regard to specific parts of the text. Governments have until

November 13 to advise if they have any reservations or interpretations

with regard to the text. A reservation means that a government does not

agree with the passage cited. In an interpretative statement, a government

explains its position with regard to the passage cited.

Broad Outline of an

Overall Agreement

The agreed-upon text includes seven broadly stated commitments.

One: We will ensure an enabling political, social, and economic

environment designed to create the best conditions for the eradication of

poverty and for durable peace, based on full and equal participation of

women and men, which is most conducive to achieving sustainable food

security for all.

Two: We will implement policies aimed at eradicating poverty and

inequality and improving physical and economic access by all, at all times,

to sufficient, nutritionally adequate, and safe food and its effective

utilization.

Three: We will pursue participatory and sustainable food, agriculture,

fisheries, forestry, and rural development policies and practices in highand low-potential areas, which are essential to maintaining adequate and

reliable food supplies at the household, national, regional and global

levels, and combat pests, drought, and desertification, considering the

multifunctional character of agriculture.

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Key Issues That Have Arisen During the

Negotiations

Four: We will strive to ensure that food, agricultural trade, and overall

trade policies are conducive to fostering food security for all through a fair

and market-oriented world trade system.

Five: We will endeavor to prevent and be prepared for natural disasters

and man-made emergencies and to meet transitory and emergency food

requirements in ways that encourage recovery, rehabilitation,

development, and a capacity to satisfy future needs.

Six: We will promote optimal allocation and use of public and private

investments to foster human resources, sustainable food, agriculture,

fisheries and forestry systems, and rural development, in high- and

low-potential areas.

Seven: We will implement, monitor, and follow-up this plan of action at all

levels in cooperation with the international community.

Significant Issues

That Emerged During

the Negotiations

Key issues that arose during the July through October negotiations include

the following.

Right to Food, Code of

Conduct, and Respect for

Human Rights

The draft policy statement contained bracketed text affirming that “every

human being has the fundamental right to be free from hunger and

malnutrition.” The phrase “right to be free from hunger” is from the 1966

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, to which

the United States is not a party. The language was originally introduced

into the draft policy statement and plan of action at the request of FAO. At

the request of the United States, this language remained bracketed at the

end of the September negotiations. The United States preferred language

from the U.N. Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which states that

“every human being has the right to a standard of living adequate for the

health and well-being of himself (herself) and family, including food.”

However, it deserves noting that in 1974 the United States endorsed the

World Food Conference’s Declaration, which proclaimed that “every man,

woman, and child has the inalienable right to be free from hunger and

malnutrition.”

U.S. officials told us that when it comes to endorsing human rights, the

United States prefers to focus on political rights, such as free speech and

religion, rather than on things over which governments have less control,

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Key Issues That Have Arisen During the

Negotiations

such as food, housing, water, and so forth. For example, one official said,

the U.S. government has for decades subscribed to the “aspirational goal”

of everyone’s right to be free from hunger but does not “guarantee” such a

right to every citizen. According to another U.S. official, the United States

vests rights to pursue objectives (such as to develop to one’s full potential)

rather than rights to objects (such as food and housing). Governments

alone are not the only actors who provide things to people. Most people in

society secure food either by growing it themselves or purchasing it in the

marketplace. Policies are needed that allow people to pursue their basic

needs. In the United States you cannot simply say that people have a right

to housing or food, the official said. Rather, people have a right to

protection that enables them to pursue their basic needs.

The United States has also been reluctant to endorse a “right to food”

because of concern within the Administration that the government might

be opening the door to a possible lawsuit by undernourished individuals

within the United States.

The September negotiations scarcely discussed the right-to-food issue

because the proposed language appeared in the policy declaration, and the

declaration was only negotiated briefly at the end of the CFS session. Most

of the negotiations concerned language in the plan of action. The

September draft plan of action also proposed that FAO and the U.N. High

Commissioner for Human Rights should better define or clarify what a

“right to food” means and propose ways to implement the right. One

bracketed suggestion would require that FAO and the Commissioner

consider the appropriateness of formulating an international code of

conduct for implementing the right to food.

In the U.S. view, any consideration of endorsing a right to food and a code

of conduct needed to occur within the context of references to other

human rights. During the September negotiations, some countries opposed

including language affirming “respect for human rights.” A State

Department official told us that if other countries were not willing to

endorse other important human rights, it would not make sense for the

United States to agree to endorse a right to food. The official indicated that

the United States would be prepared to see the summit not go forward if

agreement could not be reached on this point.

The completed text agreed to by CFS at the end of October reaffirms the

right of everyone to have access to safe and nutritious food, consistent

with the right to adequate food and the fundamental right of everyone to

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Key Issues That Have Arisen During the

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be free from hunger. The document also states that promotion and

protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the

right to development and the progressive realization of the right to

adequate food for all, is indispensable to the goal of achieving sustainable

food security for all. The final document drops specific reference to a code

of conduct. However, members stated their objective to clarify the content

of the right to adequate food and the fundamental right of everyone to be

free from hunger, as stated in the International Covenant on Economic,

Social, and Cultural Rights. More specifically, they invited the U.N. High

Commissioner for Human Rights, in consultation and collaboration with

others, to better define the rights related to food and to propose ways to

implement and realize these rights as a means of achieving the

commitments and objectives of the World Food Summit. In addition, the

document specifically noted that some countries are not parties to the

International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.

According to the U.S. Permanent Representative to FAO in Rome, the

United States is pleased that the final document recognizes the importance

of all human rights and recognizes the need to further clarify what is

meant by rights related to food as stated in the covenant. In his view, since

the United States is not a party to the covenant, the United States is likely

to file an interpretive statement indicating that the document’s objectives

and actions relating to the covenant do not apply to the United States.

On a related issue, the final text affirms that food should not be used as an

instrument for economic and political pressure. It specifically underscores

the importance of international cooperation in refraining from unilateral

measures consistent with the international law and the Charter of the

United Nations. This language was the result of a compromise essentially

between Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and Libya on the one hand and the United States

on the other hand.

Conflict Avoidance and

Conflict Resolution;

Democracy and Good

Governance; and Open

Markets

During the July negotiations, many developed countries proposed that

open markets and representative democracy were the best foundations for

sustainable food security, but many developing countries responded that

poverty and underdevelopment were problems that required eradication

before the developing world focused on institution-building. Concepts of

democracy, conflict avoidance and resolution, peace, and responsibility of

governments were quickly bracketed, and G-77 group repeatedly accused

the industrialized countries of the Northern Hemisphere of trying to

impose their ideas on the less developed countries of the Southern

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Key Issues That Have Arisen During the

Negotiations

Hemisphere. Further, G-77 sought to delete the term “political” from the

commitment, calling on governments to ensure “an enabling political,

social and economic environment, designed to achieve the best conditions

for the reduction of poverty and durable peace.”

In September 1996, the United States and many other countries supported

language for the plan of action whereby countries would commit to

ensuring a “democratic” political environment and “good governance.”

However, they were opposed by countries from G-77 and China. As a result,

the draft policy statement contained bracketed text affirming support for

democracy and good governance. The United States considered this a

major unresolved issue.

The completed text agreed to by CFS at the end of October includes the

following objective: To prevent and resolve conflicts peacefully and create

a stable political environment, through respect for all human rights and

fundamental freedoms, democracy, a transparent and effective legal

framework, transparent and accountable governance and administration

in all public and private national and international institutions, and

effective and equal participation of all people, at all levels, in decisions and

actions that affect their food security.

Environment Another major issue from the perspective of the United States had to do

with sustainable development and environmental concerns. The United

States was concerned that the July 1996 draft document did not pay

sufficient attention to the importance of sustainable development. Initially,

developing countries were reluctant to include proposed additions to the

text on this matter. In addition, when the U.S. delegation sought to insert

the term “environmental” into a list of policy frameworks—political,

economic, and social—deemed essential to food security, most other

countries were not supportive. However, the United States was able to

find places in the document where references to sustainable development

and environmental issues were accepted by all countries. For example, the

final document notes that environmental degradation contributes

significantly to food insecurity and states that increased food production,

which must be undertaken, should happen within the framework of

sustainable management of natural resources.

G-77 countries were particularly concerned about the possible use of

environmental measures as trade barriers to their food and agricultural

exports. In the final document, the international community, in

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cooperation with governments and civil society,2 pledge, as appropriate, to

make every effort to ensure that environmental measures do not unfairly

affect market access for developing countries’ food and agricultural

exports.

Population Stabilization The United States and many other countries sought language committing

countries to take population concerns into account when developing

economic and social development plans. However, a very small but vocal

group of developing countries, taking a very narrowly focused view of

what is involved to achieve food security, insisted that there was no

relationship between food security and population stabilization and,

therefore, no reference to population should be in the document. Some of

the same countries were also not willing to accept references to

reproductive health on the grounds, as they define it, such language could

involve abortions.

The U.S. delegation and others argued that the ability to reconcile food

needs with the constraints imposed on food production by natural

resource endowments and environmental degradation argues strongly for

continuing the recent slowing of population growth with the goal of

eventually stabililizing population. The United States also argued that

integrating population and reproductive health strategies is key to

addressing the cycle of frequent pregnancies and increasing child care

demands that diminish a woman’s capacity to provide a nutritional diet for

her family or take advantage of new technologies or market opportunities

to improve food security. According to a U.S. official, the U.S. approach

was consistent with language agreed to in previous international

conferences that recognized that population programs and reproductive

health care are an integral part of social, economic, and cultural

development, which focuses on meeting the needs of individual men and

women and improving the quality of life of all people.

At the end of the October 1996 negotiating session, the small group of

opponents agreed to endorse language on population and reproductive

health with reference to the 1994 International Conference on Population

and Development. That conference included the reservations of some

governments on reproductive health language. Thus, the final document

includes references to population policies, family planning, and

reproductive health.

2

Civil society is a term that includes individuals, corporations, and NGOs.

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Resource Commitments In July, 1966, G-77 interventions focused on declining official development

assistance (ODA) grants and loans as the reason for continuing food

insecurity. The United States initially found it difficult to refocus the

discussion on what it felt were the more important roles of policy and

private foreign and domestic investments. In September, G-77 countries

supported language that directed specific attention to falling levels of ODA

in recent years and that would commit developed countries to fully

complying with an ODA target of 0.7 percent of the gross national product

(GNP) that was adopted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD) in the 1970s without U.S. participation. G-77 supported

language whereby governments would commit, in cooperation with

international and private financing institutions, to reverse a falling trend in

international funding commitments to agricultural development and to

reach and maintain an investment flow of $15 billion annually by 2010. In

addition, G-77 supported language that would have committed member

countries to resolving the external debt problems of the developing

countries.

The United States was opposed to the ODA language on the grounds that

ODA is only one, and not the major, source of funding for food security and

that the World Food Summit is not a pledging conference. A compromise

on ODA was agreed to whereby governments would commit to strengthen

efforts toward fulfilling the ODA target. The United States gave notice that

it would not oppose inclusion of this agreement in the document but that

the United States would file an interpretive statement concerning it. CFS

members agreed to drop text calling for attaining a specific level of

investment in agricultural development.

Still bracketed at the end of September was text whereby governments

would commit to “mobilize adequate” resources to support national efforts

for the earliest possible achievement of sustainable world food security.

This text, or similar language, was dropped from the completed text

agreed to at the end of October.

With regard to debt relief, the United States opposed language to convert

the least-developed countries’ external debt to implement summit

commitments. In September, compromise language was agreed to

whereby member countries will endeavor to mobilize and optimize the use

of technical resources from all sources, including debt relief, in order to

raise investment to the levels needed to contribute to food security.

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Target Dates for Achieving

Food Security

The draft text for the September negotiations included bracketed text

proposing that countries commit to reduce by 2010 the number of

undernourished people in the world to half their present level and to

eradicate hunger in countries, within one generation. G-77 urged adoption

of all targets, while most OECD countries expressed skepticism. The United

States was opposed on the grounds that the targets were not realistic.

During the September negotiations, members agreed to compromise

language for the plan of action whereby members envisaged reducing the

number of undernourished people to half their present level no later than

2015 and a midterm review to ascertain whether it is possible to achieve

this target by 2010. U.S. officials believe that achieving the 2015 target is

possible but would be difficult. The compromise language did not include

any target date for complete elimination of hunger.

Trade Liberalization As previously discussed, the United States favors a document that

commits member states to pursue further trade liberalization to maximize

the potential for economic growth and to realize the benefits of

comparative advantage. However, in July 1996, China, Japan, and South

Korea emphasized a need to protect domestic production. Further, many

delegations said that domestic production must increase and that

trade-restrictive measures were essential and valid to achieve this

purpose. Japan, South Korea, Switzerland, and the European Union

proposed including various types of language that would allow countries

to make use of trade protectionist measures. In the U.S. view, doing so

would represent a step backwards from what was achieved in the Uruguay

Round trade agreement. During July, the United States, Australia, Canada,

and New Zealand, with support from exporting G-77 countries, introduced

language on trade liberalization and the benefits to food security of an

open trading system. Latin American group members pushed for trade

negotiations that would be based on the effective removal of subsidies and

barriers that distort trade. North American members—the United States

and Canada—proposed strengthening language on export subsidy

restrictions, and the European Union proposed deleting such language.

The European Union members indicated some concern that trade

liberalization references would define the basis for future World Trade

Organization (WTO) agriculture negotiations, and Japan indicated it was

against supporting further trade negotiations.

During July, Switzerland proposed, with considerable support from others,

language to ensure the compatibility of food and agricultural trade policies

with the sustainable management of natural resources. However, the

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United States, Canada, and South-West Pacific countries noted that trade

and environment discussions were underway in the WTO and OECD and their

outcome should not be prejudged in the summit.

The September negotiations on the trade commitment were very

contentious. The United States sought to get all of the protectionist-type

language dropped from the text. In addition, the United States and others

argued that the trade text focused too much on agriculture and that

countries should look at overall trading opportunities and the trading

system more broadly. However, the protectionist countries did not yield

on most of their proposed text. As a result, the section on trade remained

heavily bracketed.

The final text agreed to at the end of October essentially dropped all

references to an agreement to promote further trade liberalization. A

statement that trade generates economic efficiencies from comparative

advantages was revised to eliminate direct reference to comparative

advantage. However, the document discusses the positive role of trade in

contributing to food security and states it is essential that all members of

WTO respect and fulfill the totality of undertakings of the Uruguay Round.

Governments also commit to supporting the continuation of the reform

process underway as a result of the Uruguay Round. According to U.S.

officials, the document dropped or adequately revised all of the language

that might have been used to justify trade protectionist measures.

The completed document dropped language urging all countries to refrain

from using export restrictions that limit the access of trading partners to

agricultural products but includes language stating that food-exporting

countries should act as reliable sources of supplies to their trading

partners and give due consideration to the food security of importing

countries, especially the low-income, food-deficit countries. The document

urges WTO members to refrain from using export restrictions in accordance

with the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. The document also dropped

language whereby countries would commit to eventually eliminating

subsidies on food exports to developing countries that undermine

production in those countries. It kept language reaffirming that countries

would reduce subsidies on food exports in conformity with the Uruguay

Round agreement.

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Implementing the

Marrakesh Decision and

Taking Other Measures to

Address the Negative

Impacts of Price Instability

The 1994 Uruguay Round trade agreement included a written

understanding reached by trade ministers in Marrakesh, Morocco, on

April 15, 1994. Commonly referred to as the “Marrakesh Decision,” the

understanding recognized that during implementation of the Uruguay

Round agricultural trade reform program, least-developed and net

food-importing countries might experience negative effects in terms of the

availability of adequate supplies of basic foodstuffs from external sources

on reasonable terms and conditions, including short-term difficulties in

financing of normal levels of commercial imports. As a result, the

ministers agreed to establish appropriate mechanisms to ensure that

implementation of the reforms does not adversely affect the availability of

food aid at a level that is sufficient to continue to provide assistance in

meeting the food needs of developing countries, especially least-developed

and net food-importing developing countries. To this end, the ministers

agreed to do the following:

• to review the level of food aid established periodically by Committee on

Food under the Food Aid Convention of 1986 and to initiate negotiations

in the appropriate forum to establish a level of food aid commitments

sufficient to meet the legitimate needs of developing countries during the

reform program;

• to adopt guidelines to ensure that an increasing proportion of basic

foodstuffs is provided to least-developed and net food-importing countries

in fully grant form and/or on appropriate concessional terms in line with

article IV of the Food Aid Convention of 1986; and

• to give full consideration in the context of their aid programs to requests

for the provision of technical and financial assistance to least-developed

and net food-importing developing countries to improve their agricultural

productivity and infrastructure.

The ministers also recognized that as a result of the Uruguay Round,

certain developing countries might experience short-term difficulties in

financing normal levels of commercial imports and that in order to address

such financing difficulties, these countries might be eligible to draw on the

resources of international financial institutions under existing facilities, or

such facilities as might be established.

The agreement further specified that the provisions of the decision would

be subject to regular review by the WTO Ministerial Conference and that

follow-up to the decision would be monitored by the WTO’s Committee on

Agriculture.

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During the July negotiations, it was argued that countries that must import

should receive protection from “price vulnerability,” and debate was

intense over the Marrakesh commitment to aid net food importers who

might be hurt by price increases related to the General Agreement on

Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Most groups wanted to make every effort to

implement the decision, while the United States and Canada suggested

that WTO members take appropriate steps to follow up on the decision.

North American members also opposed language on safeguards for

unstable world prices, instead proposing WTO-compatible language on the

ability of importing countries to purchase adequate supplies of basic

foodstuffs from external sources on reasonable terms and conditions.

During the September negotiations on the World Food Summit documents,

the G-77 countries sought approval of language committing countries either

to implementation or early implementation of the Marrakesh Decision and

of language that would ensure that international financial institutions

would help the least-developed and net food-importing developing

countries meet their short-term difficulties in financing essential food

imports. The G-77 attributed recently high world grain prices to Uruguay

Round agricultural reforms. The United States recognized that recent

market prices for grains had adversely affected the least-developed and

net food-importing countries but opposed the proposed language on the

ground that the Uruguay Round reforms were just beginning to be

implemented and thus it was too early for the reforms to have had any

measurable adverse effects.

The United States was concerned that language calling for implementation

of the agreement suggested that adverse impacts had already occurred and

that corrective action was needed. As a result, the United States supported

alternative language that the Marrakesh Decision should be “effectively

applied.” No agreement was reached on this issue. With regard to the

action of international financial institutions, CFS members agreed to

replace the term “ensure” with “encourage.” In the end-of-October

negotiations, the United States agreed to accept language that the decision

be fully implemented within WTO.

The European Union, Japan, and the G-77 also supported other language

whereby governments would commit to take necessary steps to minimize

the possible negative effects of price instability on food-importing

countries, including basic foodstuffs. The United States did not endorse

the proposed language, since it might raise expectations for creating

international reserves, international commodity agreements, increased

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food aid, or other assistance. This language remained bracketed at the end

of September. The agreed-upon text at the end of October dropped

references to governments and the international community taking

necessary steps to mitigate possible negative effects of world price

instability on food imports. But the agreement states that governments and

the international community, recognizing the effects of world price

fluctuations, will examine WTO-compatible options and take any

appropriate steps to safeguard the ability of importing countries,

especially low-income, food-deficit countries, to purchase adequate

supplies of basic foodstuffs from external sources on reasonable terms

and conditions.

Hunger Maps The draft plan of action included a proposal, supported by Japan, the G-77,

and FAO, that governments, in cooperation with civil societies and

international organizations, prepare as quickly as possible and update

thereafter “hunger maps” for each low-income, food-deficit country and

for other countries and regions vulnerable to food emergencies. The

concept of a hunger map was introduced at a January 1996 meeting of CFS

as a means to better assess and monitor the food security situation in

various parts of the world, as well as to raise awareness of the problem.

According to an FAO Secretariat study, current information available to FAO

would allow hunger mapping only at the national level and would not

allow for identification of (1) dispersion and identification of hungry

people within a country, (2) energy deficiencies of a transitional or

seasonal nature, or (3) trends linked to changes in the pattern of food

distribution. The United States and a number of other developed countries

were concerned that CFS might approve a new data system that was not

fully thought out and that would duplicate existing information developed

by other programs, such as those in the World Food Program and the

World Health Organization, as well as FAO. And they wanted to ensure that

all relevant institutions would be involved.

During the September negotiations, it was agreed to use the term “food

insecurity and vulnerability information and mapping system” in place of

“hunger maps.” It was further agreed that emphasis would be placed on

analysis and effective coordination among international and national

agencies, including making maximum use of existing data and information

systems. It was also agreed that subsequent technical consultation

meetings would deal with the full definition of various types of hunger

maps.

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Summit Follow-Up and

Coordination Within the

U.N. Agencies

Governments agreed that they will (1) develop national action plans for

implementing the summit plan of action, including establishing or

improving national mechanisms to set priorities; (2) develop, implement,

and monitor the components of action within designated time frames,

based both on national and local needs; and (3) provide the necessary

resources for their functioning. The final text also states that within the

global framework, governments should cooperate actively with one

another and with U.N. organizations, financial institutions,

intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, and public and

private sectors on programs directed toward the achievement of food

security for all.

An important issue arose regarding the mandate to be given to FAO and

coordination within the U.N. system for international-level monitoring and

follow-up after the summit. One set of proposals favored by FAO and the

G-77 countries would have given FAO lead responsibility in cooperation with

other U.N. bodies but would not have required involvement of the U.N.

Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC). ACC is the U.N.

committee tasked with coordination and integrated follow-up to

U.N.-sponsored conferences in the U.N. system. An alternative set of

proposals would have ensured FAO leadership of follow-up within the U.N.

agencies, but also would have required that the ACC coordinate follow-up

within the U.N. system consistent with its role in other recent international

conferences. The United States and many other countries felt that ACC

must be involved to secure the necessary level of cooperation required

from other U.N. bodies. Text on this issue remained bracketed at the end

of September, but U.S. officials thought that substantial progress had been

made in clarifying the issue and that the latter approach would eventually

be approved.

The text agreed to at the end of October notes that the international

community and the U.N. system, including FAO, as well as other agencies

and bodies according to their mandate, contributed greatly to the

implementation of the World Food Summit plan of action. The text states

that the member governments through CFS will be responsibile for

monitoring the implementation of the plan of action. The ACC is invited to

ensure appropriate interagency coordination and, when considering the

Chair of any ACC mechanisms for interagency follow-up to the World Food

Summit, to recognize the major role of FAO in the field of food security,

within its mandate. The text dropped language stating that any ad hoc ACC

mechanism considered to promote interagency follow-up on food security

must be led by FAO.

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In terms of follow-up, the completed text calls upon governments to

establish or improve national mechanisms to set priorities; develop,

implement, and monitor the components of action for food security within

designated time frames, based on national and local needs; and provide

the necessary resources for their functioning. Governments, in

cooperation among themselves and with international institutions, will

start in 1997 to review the adequacy and effectiveness of the allocation and

use of financial and human resources for action required to ensure food

for all as a follow-up to the World Food Summit and will reallocate

available resources accordingly, with special reference to the needs of

countries facing deteriorating food security, nutrition, health, and

resource.

At the end of October, CFS members agreed on a number of specific

actions to be taken to increase the likelihood that the plan of action will

lead to useful and measurable results. Accordingly, the text states that in

partnership with all actors of civil society and in coordination with

relevant international institutions, governments will take the following

actions:

• Establish, through the CFS, a timetable; procedures; and standardized

reporting formats, which do not duplicate similar reports to the U.N., FAO

and other agencies, on the national, subregional, and regional

implementation of the World Food Summit plan of action.

• Set out in CFS a process for developing targets and verifiable indicators of

national and global food security where they do not exist.

• Report to CFS on national, subregional, and regional implementation of the

World Food Summit plan of action, drawing on a food insecurity and

vulnerability information and mapping system, once established, as an

analytical aid.

• Monitor, through the CFS, the national, subregional and regional

implementation of the World Food Summit plan of action, using reports

from national governments, reports on U.N. agency follow-up and

inter-agency coordination, and information from other relevant

international institutions.

• Encourage the effective participation of relevant actors of civil society in

the CFS monitoring process, recognizing their critical role in enhancing

food security.

• By 2006, undertake in CFS and within available resources a major

broad-based progress assessment of the implementation of the World

Food Summit plan of action and a mid-term review of achieving the target

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of reducing the number of undernourished people to half their present

level no later than 2015.

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Appendix V 

The Role of NGOs in Preparations for the

World Food Summit

This appendix discusses how NGOs1 were invited to participate in

preparations for the World Food Summit. It presents views that were

adopted by a large group of NGOs from around the world that participated

in a global consultation and relates these views to the U.S. position for the

summit. We do not comment on the merits of the views expressed. In

addition, this appendix discusses views some U.S. NGOs shared with us

concerning how the U.S. government involved them in the process.

Similar to other recent international conferences and summits of world

leaders, and consistent with the summit’s objective of producing a policy

declaration and plan of action for implementation by all concerned parties,

FAO sought wide participation by interested NGOs in preparations for the

summit. NGOs, along with governments and other civil society actors, were

seen as having a very important role to play in analyzing problems of food

insecurity and proposing remedial action at various levels. These levels

ranged from international and national policy-making to planning,

implementing, and monitoring activities related to food security at the

local level.

In January 1996, FAO invited NGOs to participate in the summit preparatory

process by (1) providing comments on the technical papers prepared for

the summit, (2) exchanging information and promoting dialogue on food

security issues, and (3) providing feedback on the plan of action and

identifying areas of concern for follow-up action by NGOs at the national

and international level. NGOs were especially asked to share their

experience with food security problems and programs based on their

development work, particularly at the grassroots level and with poor

communities. In inviting NGOs to participate, FAO said that given the wide

diversity of NGOs and their many interests, all NGOs would not be expected

to agree on a common position. However, they were encouraged to at least

group themselves into “caucuses.”

At the national level, NGOs were invited to work with the national

secretariat or committee established by the government in each country to

coordinate summit preparations. They were also encouraged to promote

seminars, workshops, and symposiums or roundtables on the summit’s

main issues. At the regional level, NGOs were invited to provide input to the

FAO regional conferences. Before each regional conference, a 2-day NGO

meeting was held. NGOs agreed on concerted positions, recommendations,

and declarations that were presented to the conferences. NGOs attended

1

Some NGOs are international, meaning that they operate in two or more countries and have an

international organization.

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World Food Summit

the conferences either as members of their respective national delegations2

 or as observers. Reports on the results of the regional NGO meetings were

prepared by the Secretariat and distributed to interested parties. NGOs

were also invited to participate in the Inter-Sessional Working Group

meetings as observers.

At the global level, NGOs were invited to attend a 3-day consultation,

September 19-21, just before the CFS scheduled September 23-27 meeting.

The main objective was to enable participants to discuss the draft policy

statement and plan of action and to produce concrete proposals

concerning them for CFS. FAO anticipated that the CFS session would be the

last negotiating forum for the draft and thus the final opportunity to

provide input to the document before its submission to heads of state and

government for approval at the summit. The NGOs’ September forum and

key views that they expressed to CFS at that time are separately discussed

in a later section of this report.

With regard to the summit itself, NGOs were invited to participate if

selected to serve on their respective national delegations. In addition, FAO

invited a group of relevant and competent NGOs to participate as observers.

FAO said it would not be able to accredit all NGOs that might like to attend

due to space constraints. National NGOs were encouraged to seek

representation through their international federations or networks.

Preference is being given to those NGOs that have previously worked with

FAO and those that participated in the preparatory work.

The costs of holding the NGO forums and September consultation were

financed by voluntary contributions from governments and private sector

organizations that were paid into a special trust fund set up by FAO.

According to the Secretary-General of the World Food Summit, FAO’s

budget has not been used to finance these costs.

NGOs are holding a special forum, beginning 2 days before the start of the

summit and continuing throughout the period of the summit. The forum is

being hosted by Italian NGOs and paid for by voluntary contributions from

the Italian government and others. During the first 2 days the NGOs will

review the completed policy declaration and plan of action and seek to

reach consensus on a statement that they will present to the summit itself.

During the summit, NGOs plan to hold workshops and discussions on

various aspects of food security, to network with one another and country

delegations, and to attend summit sessions.

2

Each country’s government decided whether to include NGOs on its delegation.

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Involvement of U.S.

NGOs in Preparations

for the Summit

The U.S. government assigned one official as a liaison to U.S. NGOs to

encourage and help facilitate their participation in the process leading up

to the summit. The principal vehicle used to secure NGO views on food

security issues was two public forums, where NGOs were invited to

comment on drafts of the U.S. government position paper and the

U.S.-Canada North American position paper.

On June 3, 1996, an open forum was held at USDA headquarters in

Washington, D.C., to receive comments on a May 17 draft of the U.S.

government’s position paper. Forty-seven U.S. NGOs provided formal

comments on the paper. The forum was led by officials from USDA, the

State Department, and USAID. Successive panels of NGO representatives

(typically four to five in a panel) were held, with representatives orally

summarizing their organizations’ comments and views. (Most NGOs also

presented written statements for the record.) A limited amount of time

was allowed for discussion between the U.S. officials and the panels.

On June 24 and 25, an open U.S.-Canadian forum was held in East Lansing,

Michigan, to receive comments from NGOs and the public on a draft of the

North American paper. More than 20 NGOs and interested persons provided

formal comments on the paper. In addition, during the 2 days before the

forum, some 35 U.S. and Canadian NGOs met to discuss the draft and

prepare a statement of key points. Their statement was presented to the

forum.

Both forums presented a variety of critical comments and concerns

regarding the draft papers. Among some of the critical comments made at

the June 3 forum were the following:

• The paper focuses too much on government policy and actions and not

enough on the individual and local community.

• The paper is too complacent about the treatment of U.S. domestic food

security.

• The United States is not sufficiently proactive in considering alternative

food reserve schemes at the international and national levels.

• The paper stresses agriculture, but U.S. foreign assistance allocations do

not reflect the same emphasis.

• The paper does not adequately address the importance of soil and water

management.

• Countries that have trade policies that discriminate between domestic and

export demand are causing food insecurity in importing countries.

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U.S. officials recorded the views of NGOs at the public forums. Following

the meetings, the core group summarized the comments, assessed their

content, and reported the results to IWG. The core group recommended

that some changes be made to the U.S. position paper, and U.S. officials

told us that some of the recommended changes were implemented. The

core group concluded that some of the NGO comments were too specific to

be included in the paper and that others were not appropriate.

U.S. NGOs had a number of other opportunities to express their views. For

example, some NGOs were invited to attend small meetings with U.S.

officials where discussions were held on at least some aspects of food

security. Some of these meetings took place before the public forums. In

addition, the core group held periodic briefings for NGOs and the public

more generally on the progress of preparations for the summit. NGOs were

able to raise questions at the briefings. Also, as was the case with other

NGOs, U.S. NGOs could attend meetings of FAO’s Inter-Sessional Working

Group and of CFS.

Twenty-three U.S. NGOs attended the September 19-21 global NGO

consultation on the draft policy statement and plan of action, immediately

prior to the negotiation session on the draft plan of action and policy

statement by CFS. A number of these NGOs stayed on to observe and to try

to influence the outcome of the negotiations.

During the week of negotiations, the U.S. delegation held a daily briefing

for the U.S. NGOs to advise them of the status of the talks and to listen to

their concerns and views. U.S. NGOs were unhappy that none of them were

on the U.S. delegation, as was the case with some of the other country

delegations (e.g., Canada had included three of its NGOs). Part-way though

the week, the U.S. delegation invited the U.S. NGOs to nominate two of the

U.S. NGO representatives to attend morning U.S. strategy sessions. The U.S.

NGOs did so. In addition, the U.S. delegation agreed to consider suggestions

from the various U.S. NGOs on proposed language changes with respect to

text in the plan of action. On a number of occasions, U.S. officials told

NGOs that their suggestions had been helpful and used by the United States

in the negotiations.

On October 25, 1996, USDA announced that 10 individuals from the private

sector had been selected to accompany the U.S. delegation to the summit.

They will advise the delegation, participate in negotiations of World Food

Summit documents, and attend the NGO forum and related activities.

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The Role of NGOs in Preparations for the

World Food Summit

According to USDA, the three cochairs of the IWG made the selections, and

the selection process was designed to ensure representation of various

groups that have a stake in world food security issues. The organizations

represented include AFRICARE; Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public

Affairs; Land-O-Lakes, Inc.; McNamara Farms; National Farmers Union;

the National Food Processors Association; Pioneer Hi-Bred International

Inc.; Save the Children; Tuskegee University; and Zero Population Growth.

U.S. NGOs’ Views on the

U.S. Effort to Involve

Them in Preparations for

the Summit

We had individual or group discussions with U.S. representatives of 17

NGOs that participated in preparations for the World Food Summit. Of the

17 organizations, 10 sent representatives to the global consultation of NGOs

in September 1996 and 7 made presentations at the public forums.

Representatives of many of these NGOs had a number of critical comments

about how the U.S. government involved NGOs in the preparations. Their

biggest complaints were that the U.S. government waited too long before

affording them an opportunity to comment in a serious manner on the

development of the U.S. government’s position papers, did not treat them

as full “partners” in the process, and frequently did not seriously consider

NGO views when offered.

Many of the U.S. NGOs who were critical of the process told us that they

had wanted an opportunity to sit at the table and work side by side with

U.S. officials at the start of the process of developing a U.S. position paper

for the summit. However, they said, they were never invited to do so. They

acknowledged that some NGOs were invited to attend small meetings,

including with some high-level officials, before the paper was begun or

well developed but said some of the discussions seemed to be more of a

monologue than a dialogue and some food security issues could not be

discussed. By the time the public forums were held, these NGOs said, the

U.S. position was so far along it was not possible for their views to be

adequately discussed and considered. They acknowledged that some

changes were made to the U.S. paper following the forums but said the

changes did not go far enough.

In addition, these NGOs said that they were concerned that their views had

been solicited more for pro forma reasons and less for serious substantive

consideration. They also suggested that the U.S. officials who organized

the process during spring 1996 lacked experience with previous

international conferences where, they claimed, U.S. NGOs had been

involved in a much more substantive way and with positive results. They

also suggested that previous conferences had led U.S. officials to be leary

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The Role of NGOs in Preparations for the

World Food Summit

of working more closely with NGOs in the future because it is troublesome

to U.S. officials when disagreements occur.

As discussed on page 47, many of the key points expressed by NGOs (not

just U.S. NGOs) at the September 19-21 consultative session differed

significantly from the substantive positions adopted by the U.S.

government. U.S. NGOs that participated in the consultation generally

agreed with the key points adopted by the NGO forum.3

 Therefore, the

dissatisfaction of those NGOs who were critical of the U.S. process may be

partly a result of the significant difference in views. For example, if U.S.

NGOs had been invited to sit at the table with the U.S. core team at the start

of the development of the U.S. position paper, NGOs might have come away

from the process nearly as dissatisfied—assuming the U.S. government did

not significantly change its views during the process.

U.S. Government Views on

the Involvement of NGOs

U.S. officials expressed surprise when advised that a number of the NGOs

were critical of how the U.S. government had involved NGOs in

preparations for the summit, including the preparation of the U.S. position

paper. The officials told us that they themselves had been disappointed by

the level of participation by U.S. NGOs in preparations for the summit.

For example, U.S. officials said that in general U.S. NGOs showed little

interest in the summit until about the time the government started

preparing for the June 3 forum. The U.S. National Secretary said that his

recollection was that only one NGO showed up for a briefing held in early

1996, even though the event had been published in the Federal Register

and faxes had been sent to many known NGOs. In addition, he said, during

the first 5 months of 1996, he averaged only a few telephone calls a month

from NGOs and these calls did not express any real concern about the

process for securing NGOs’ views. The official appointed to liase with U.S.

NGOs observed that although more than 300 NGOs are accredited to USAID

alone, less than 25 U.S. NGOs attended the September global consultation.

In addition, he said, some key umbrella-like organizations that interact

with many NGOs had shown little interest in the summit. U.S. officials also

expressed disappointment with a relative lack of interest on the part of

farm and commodity groups, major environmental and population

organizations, trade groups, and big business.

3

One U.S. NGO disagreed with the vote on the overall document. At least one other U.S. NGO was not

present for the vote. As discussed later, the document noted that not every participant necessarily

endorsed every point as formulated. Representatives of several U.S. NGOs told us that while they

agreed with the general substance of the key points statement, the tone of the document was stronger

than they would have preferred.

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The Role of NGOs in Preparations for the

World Food Summit

U.S. officials acknowledged that NGOs had not been invited to sit at the

table with the government in the actual drafting of the paper. However, the

officials said that they had worked hard to advise interested NGOs of the

types of views that were being considered by government drafters for

inclusion in the position paper and to secure the reaction of the NGOs.

According to the officials, a number of meetings were held with interested

NGOs for this purpose.

U.S. officials speculated on a number of possible reasons as to why NGO

participation was not stronger but could not offer a definitive conclusion

on this matter.

U.S. officials said NGOs’ interest in the summit had increased somewhat

following the September NGO global consultation. For example, they said, a

wider variety of NGOs showed up for an October 17 briefing on the summit.

In addition, in late October, the Secretary of Agriculture received three

letters, each representing a considerable number and variety of

organizations, providing views on the U.S. position for the summit. Among

other things, these letters reflected concern with the positions against

trade expressed by NGOs at the global consultation (see discussion in the

next section). All of the letters offered support for existing trade

agreements, and two of the letters supported the U.S. government’s

position favoring further trade liberalization. Two of the letters also urged

U.S. support for a variety of other policies and programs to promote food

security in developing countries.

Key Positions

Conveyed by NGOs to

CFS in September

1996

During September 19-21, 1996, more than 200 NGOs or civil society

organizations from more than 83 countries and all regions of the world

met in Rome at the invitation of FAO for a consultation on the World Food

Summit. The purpose was to provide views to CFS’ draft policy declaration

and plan of action.

According to FAO, the organizations represented a wide variety of groups.4

According to our analysis of a provisional list of the participants, however,

4

The variety of groups included farmers, peasants, farmworkers, fisherfolk, indigenous communities,

herders, consumers, urban poor people, children’s rights activists, urban communities, industrialists,

emergency aid workers, legal workers, AIDS solidarity advocates, commerce, food workers, scouts,

gender equality advocates, urban workers, family advocates, human rights advocates, antihunger

advocates, university professors, researchers, social workers, breastfeeding advocates, organic and

conventional agriculture advocates, agroecological and sustainable agriculture advocates, the

international press, service clubs, peace advocates, education workers, cooperatives, academics,

voluntary workers, nongovernmental organization networks, mothers, the private enterprise sector,

foodgrain banks, health workers, religious groups, fair trade advocates, environmentalists, nutrition

workers, and women, children and youth organizations of civil society.

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The Role of NGOs in Preparations for the

World Food Summit

most countries were represented by only one or two NGOs. However, Italy

was represented by 63 NGOs (perhaps because Italy was the host country

for the forum), the United States by 23, the United Kingdom by 15, France

by 10, Belgium and the Netherlands by 8, Canada by 7, and Germany and

Switzerland by 6. In addition, Brazil, Japan, Mexico, and the Philippines

were represented by five NGOs; India, Spain, and Venezuela by four; and

Bangladesh, Egypt, Kenya, Malaysia, Senegal, Sudan, and Turkey by three.

During the consultation, participants formed working groups to review

different parts of the draft policy declaration and plan of action. Each

group prepared recommended changes to the text of the document for

which it was responsible. In addition, NGOs decided to issue an overall

statement of their own in response to the positions expressed in the draft

CFS documents. Each working group prepared a set of key points for its

part of the document. On the final night of the session, all of the

participants met to discuss and debate the various sets of key points.

Changes were agreed upon, and an overwhelming majority of the NGOs

voted to approve 29 key substantive points.5

 The document was formally

conveyed to CFS when it met in plenary session on September 23.

Specific proposals of the working groups for amending the text of the

draft policy statement and plan of action were consolidated in English

only. There was not sufficient time for FAO to have these proposals

translated into several languages for discussion and approval by NGOs in

plenary session. As a result, these proposals were informally made

available to CFS as additional input to the negotiating process.

A number of NGOs’ key points appear to be consistent with U.S. views on

food security and with views CFS provisionally approved on September 30.

However, a considerable number of the NGOs’ key points disagree in part

or in whole with key U.S. views on food security.

NGOs’ Views That

Differed Significantly

From the U.S.

Position on Food

Security

NGOs’ at the September 1996 global consultation presented significantly

different views from the United States on the operation of economic

markets, comparative advantage, self-sufficiency, trade liberalization,

public and private investment (including the level of ODA), international

food reserves, and the Marrekesh Decision. Other issues on which NGOs

expressed at least partially different views include structural adjustment

programs and debt forgiveness and food reserves.

5

The document noted that “as is usual when large assemblies adopt substantive statements, not every

participant can necessarily endorse every point as formulated.”

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The Role of NGOs in Preparations for the

World Food Summit

Reliance on Markets,

Comparative Advantage,

and Self-Sufficiency

NGOs did not fully subscribe to reliance on free markets. On the one hand,

they said governments should support small-scale producers and farms

that are economically sound. On the other hand, they said that food

security is a human right that must take precedence over the dictates of

the marketplace. In addition, they favored public regulation of food prices

in urban areas and establishment of a decentralized system of local,

national, and regional food reserves for staple crops that would be used to

stabilize prices of staple foods.

NGOs also did not fully endorse the view that countries should produce

those things in which they have a comparative advantage and rely on trade

to obtain those goods for which they lack a comparative advantage.

According to the NGO statement, developing countries are often forced to

import food from overseas, so their food security is subject to the vagaries

of the international market. Developing countries should strive to achieve

self-sufficiency in basic food staples, NGOs said. In addition, the NGO

statement said that when the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture

expires in 2000, it must be renegotiated to ensure the exemption of all

staple food crops from trade liberalization commitments, in support of the

sovereign right of countries to protect their national food self-sufficiency.

To help promote self-sufficiency, NGOs urged governments to “directly

support” small farmers and fisherfolk, promoting their productivity, since

they are responsible for most food staple production. The NGO statement

did not define what is covered by the term “directly support.” However, a

representative of one NGO said that he understood the point to mean that

governments should target their agricultural support policies toward small

farmers. For example, he said, agricultural extension agents in developing

countries often concentrate on larger producers. The term does not

necessarily mean that governments should subsidize small producers, he

said, although it could include subsidies. Regarding the latter, he noted

that governments in major agricultural producing and exporting countries

have subsidized their producers.

Trade Liberalization According to NGOs, “international trade liberalization is not the solution to

the problem of food security and, in many cases, undermines it.” In many

countries, the NGOs said, trade agreements have driven farmers and

farmworkers, especially women, off the land, creating national and

regional dependency on food imports for future generations. According to

NGOs, international agricultural trade is dominated by a small number of

transnational companies, and their market power enables them to

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The Role of NGOs in Preparations for the

World Food Summit

compete unfairly with local food producers in developing countries. For

example, according to NGOs,

“four food companies control the vast majority of the global grain trade..... Similarly, a

small number of companies control virtually every agricultural commodity—a trend which

will worsen as global agribusiness substitutes developing country commodity exports with

biotechnologically engineered products. The monopolistic position of these companies

impedes the development of local food markets and in fact is rapidly displacing them in

many regions of the world as trade liberalization proceeds. Therefore, we urge

governments to establish regulations in a code of conduct restricting such practices by

transnational corporations.”

In addition, NGOs indicated that the transnational corporations are

benefiting from reliance on “unsustainable practices.” These practices

were not explicitly defined. However, elsewhere in their key points, NGOs

said that they favored “socially and ecologically fair trade.” A

representative of one NGO told us that the latter means, for example, that

companies should not employ child labor in producing their goods or

unsafe environmental practices. Companies that do so, the representative

said, have reduced costs and thus can compete unfairly with companies

that observe good social and ecological practices.

Consistent with their view that trade liberalization is harming food

security, NGOs called upon governments to put a freeze on the

implementation of further agricultural liberalization until after a thorough

study of the impacts of the Uruguay Round and other trade agreements is

undertaken. Furthermore, as the Uruguay Round Agreement on

Agriculture expires in the year 2000, they said, it must be renegotiated with

a comprehensive food security clause ensuring the exemption of all staple

food crops from trade liberalization commitments.

Investment and Resource

Commitments

NGOs expressed the view that all donor nations should immediately comply

with the OECD target of committing 0.7 percent of GNP to ODA and should

restore the share of ODA allocated to food security objectives. According to

NGOs, ODA has to be separated from private international investment

because the goals of each are different, and even in areas where private

international investment is necessary, the investment has to be strongly

regulated.

As previously discussed, the United States has never subscribed to the

OECD target of 0.7 percent of GNP. The United States believes that ODA is

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The Role of NGOs in Preparations for the

World Food Summit

important but also believes that only the international private sector is

capable of generating most of the developing countries’ needs for

investment from external sources.

Implementation of the

Marrakesh Decision

NGOs called for implementation of the Marrakesh Decision without

commenting specifically on whether they thought the Uruguay Round had

already adversely affected the least developed and net food-importing

countries. As discussed earlier, the United States had opposed language

for the plan calling for implementation, or early implementation of the

decision, while supporting language that the decision be “effectively

applied.” However, the United States eventually agreed to language for full

implementation.

Other NGO Views

Structural Adjustment

Programs and Debt

Forgiveness

According to NGOs, poverty in the developing countries results from,

among other causes, structural adjustment programs and external debt.

Structural adjustment programs and external debt of the developing

countries are seriously limiting the achievement of food security, they

said, and thus need to be reconsidered. NGOs said that in some cases

structural adjustment programs promoted by international financial

institutions endanger access to land, water, sanitation, food, and nutrition

and should be renegotiated to ensure consistency with the right to safe

food for all. Regarding debt, NGOs said, cancellations should be

implemented, especially for the least-developed countries. Otherwise,

NGOs said, governments of the countries will have to continue converting

agriculture from domestic food production to cash crops for export to

generate foreign exchange, directly aggravating food shortages and import

dependence while increasing environmental degradation.

As discussed earlier, the U.S. view is that countries that have

demonstrated the most progress in achieving food security are those that

have seriously pursued policy reform, macroeconomic stabilization, and

structural adjustment. At the same time, the United States has joined other

CFS members in endorsing language whereby countries and international

financial institutions will cooperate among themselves to make every

effort to ensure that food security and poverty eradication goals and

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The Role of NGOs in Preparations for the

World Food Summit

programs are safeguarded in difficult times of economic transition, budget

austerity, and structural adjustment.

Regarding debt relief, the United States and other members have agreed

on language to intensify the search for practical and effective solutions to

debt problems of developing countries. They also support the recent

initiatives of international financial institutions to reduce the total external

debt burden of heavily indebted poor countries.

Food Reserves As mentioned earlier, NGOs said they favor the establishment of a

decentralized system of local, national, and regional food reserves for

staple crops that would be used to stabilize prices of staple foods. In

addition, NGOs said that national and international food reserves that are

freely accessible are essential for states and communities to exercise food

sovereignty. NGOs did not specify who should pay for the establishment of

such reserves or how such reserves would be controlled to ensure that

adequate supplies would be produced to meet regular demand. However,

they did say that priority should be given to mobilizing and using local

resources in creating food reserves (as well as emergency food aid) and

that international organizations should ensure that small farmers’

organizations can compete on an equal footing with local commercial

interests when purchasing such reserves or food aid.

The United States has supported language for the plan of action whereby

governments commit to pursuing at local and national levels, as

appropriate, adequate, cost-effective strategic food reserve policies and

programs. However, the United States is opposed to the establishment of

an international emergency food reserve. In addition, it opposed proposed

language for the plan of action that would have supported international

organizations, particularly FAO, examining possible international action to

ensure an adequate level of global food security reserves. Such language

has been dropped from the draft text. According to a U.S. official involved

in the negotiations, the United States opposes international food reserves

because of the difficulties that would arise in deciding how to finance,

hold, and trigger the use of such reserves.

(711196) Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-97-44 Food Security
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