United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

INSPECTORS 

GENERAL 

Actions Needed to 

Improve Audit 

Coverage of NASA 

December 2008 

 

GAO-09-88 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

December 2008

INSPECTORS GENERAL

Actions Needed to Improve Audit Coverage of NASA 

Highlights of GAO-09-88, a report to 

congressional requesters 

GAO was asked to review the 

National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA) Office of 

Inspector General (OIG) and 

provide information on (1) the

audit and investigative coverage of 

NASA; (2) the NASA OIG’s audit 

and investigative accomplishments; 

(3) the NASA OIG’s budget and

staffing levels, including staff 

attrition rates; and (4) the results of

external reviews of the NASA OIG. 

GAO obtained information from 

NASA OIG reports, interviews, and

documentation. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making two 

recommendations for the NASA IG 

to (1) revise strategic and annual

planning to include audits of

NASA’s program economy and

efficiency with potential monetary 

savings by working with an 

objective third party to obtain 

external review and consultation

during the planning process and 

(2) take actions to identify the 

causes of high staff turnover with 

the assistance of an objective 

expert. 

In addition, GAO is recommending 

that the Integrity Committee follow 

up on its investigative finding that

the NASA IG had an appearance of

a lack of independence.

In comments on a draft of the 

report, the Integrity Committee and 

the NASA IG disagreed with the 

recommendations. GAO believes 

the recommendations are valid and 

provides a detailed response to

these comments in the body of the 

report. 

The fundamental mission of the statutory federal IG offices, including the 

NASA OIG, includes identifying areas for improved economy, efficiency, and 

effectiveness through independent and objective oversight and preventing and 

detecting fraud, waste, and abuse. Of the 71 reports issued by the OIG’s Office 

of Audits in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, only 1 report had recommendations to 

address the economy and efficiency of NASA’s programs and operations with

measurable monetary accomplishments. 

Over the 5-year period of fiscal years 2003 through 2007, audit reports 

contributed to only 1 percent of the OIG’s total monetary accomplishments. 

The remaining 99 percent came from the OIG’s investigative cases. Of about 

$9 million in total reported monetary accomplishments from audits over the 5-

year period, almost $7 million was from one audit completed in fiscal year 

2007. When the monetary accomplishments of both audits and investigations 

in fiscal year 2007 are combined and compared to the OIG’s budget of $34 

million, the return for each budget dollar is $0.36. This calculation for all 30 

OIGs with IGs appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate 

averages $9.49, or 26 times that of the NASA OIG. 

The OIG’s relative lack of monetary accomplishments from audits is due, at 

least in part, to the OIG’s strategic and annual audit plans, which do not 

provide assurance that NASA’s economy and efficiency will be addressed or 

that measurable monetary accomplishments will be achieved. We believe that

during the planning process, the OIG should consult with an objective third 

party with experience in providing economy and efficiency audits with 

potential monetary savings. 

The OIG’s budgets and staffing kept pace or did slightly better than all of 

NASA for these same resources during fiscal years 2003 through 2007. When 

comparing the fiscal year 2007 budgets of all 30 IGs appointed by the 

President and confirmed by the Senate with their respective agencies’ 

budgets, the NASA OIG ranked 11th. Nevertheless, GAO noted that the OIG’s 

ability to retain experienced audit personnel was adversely affected by a staff 

attrition rate that has increased from 12 percent to almost 20 percent over

fiscal years 2003 through 2007. Due to the relatively high attrition rates, GAO 

believes that the OIG should use the assistance of an objective expert to 

identify the causes of staff turnover. 

The NASA OIG’s most recent peer reviews for both audits and investigations 

have resulted in unqualified opinions. A recent investigation by the Integrity 

Committee of the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency and the 

Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency reported that the NASA IG had 

an appearance of a lack of independence. The investigation was closed, but 

corrective actions did not address this finding and the Integrity Committee 

considers the issue unresolved. This issue has been raised by members of the 

Congress as a limitation in obtaining independent oversight of NASA. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-09-88. For 

more information, contact Jeanette Franzel at 

(202) 512-9471 or franzelj@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Scope and Methodology 2

Results in Brief 4 

Background 8

NASA OIG Provides Limited Monetary Accomplishments from 

Audits 11

NASA OIG’s Budgets and Staffing 18 

External Reviews of NASA OIG and the Integrity Committee’s 

Investigation 21

Conclusions 25

Recommendations for Executive Action 26 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 27 

Appendix I Monetary Accomplishments Reported in OIGs’ 

Semiannual Reports to the Congress for Fiscal 

Year 2007 33 

Appendix II Comparison of OIGs’ Budgetary Resources with Total 

Budgetary Resources of Their Agencies for Fiscal 

Year 2007 35 

Appendix III Comments from the Integrity Committee 37 

GAO Comment 39 

Appendix IV Comments from the Inspector General, National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration 40 

GAO Comments 69 

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 72 

 

Tables 

Table 1: NASA Mission Directorates and Their Primary Missions 8 

Table 2: NASA OIG Offices and Responsibilities 9 

Page i GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Table 3: NASA OIG Audit Coverage of High-Risk Areas and 

Management Challenges in Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007 13 

Table 4: NASA OIG’s Reported Monetary Accomplishments and 

Return per Budget Dollar for Fiscal Years 2003 through 

2007 15 

Table 5: NASA OIG and NASA Budgets and FTEs, Fiscal Years 2003 

through 2007 20 

Table 6: NASA OIG Attrition Rates for Fiscal Years 2003 through 

2007 21 

Figures 

Figure 1: NASA OIG Investigations Closed During Fiscal Years 2006

and 2007 14 

Figure 2: Distribution of NASA OIG Staff for Fiscal Year 2007 19 

Abbreviations 

CAIB Columbia Accident Investigation Board 

DCAA Defense Contract Audit Agency 

ECIE Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency 

FTE Full-time equivalent 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

IG Inspector General 

IG Act Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended 

JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

OIG Office of Inspector General 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

PCIE President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency 

SSRRC Senior Staff Referral Review Committee 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

December 18, 2008 

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Finance 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Bart Gordon 

Chairman 

Committee on Science and Technology 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Brad Miller 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight 

Committee on Science and Technology 

House of Representatives 

This report responds to your request that we review the operations and 

activities of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) 

Office of Inspector General (OIG). The NASA OIG was established by the 

Inspector General (IG) Act of 19781

 to provide independent audits and 

investigations of NASA’s programs and operations, promote economy and 

efficiency, detect and prevent fraud and abuse, and recommend actions 

for improvement. 

In the three decades since passage of the IG Act, the IGs have played an 

important role in enhancing government accountability and protecting the 

government from fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. In the current 

environment of an escalating federal budget deficit and increasingly 

limited resources, effective IG functions are needed to help transform 

what government does and how it does business and to hold it

accountable for achieving real, positive, and sustainable results. 

As discussed with your offices, we are providing information regarding 

(1) the NASA OIG’s audit and investigative coverage of NASA, including

oversight of high-risk areas and NASA’s management challenges; (2) the

 1

Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (Oct. 12, 1978) (codified, as amended, at 5 U.S.C. App.). 

Page 1 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
NASA OIG’s audit and investigative accomplishments; (3) the NASA OIG’s 

budget and staffing levels, including staff attrition rates; and (4) the results 

of external reviews of the NASA OIG, including peer reviews of its quality

assurance program and operations and an investigative report by the 

Integrity Committee of the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency 

(PCIE) and the Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency (ECIE).2

To review the OIG’s audit oversight coverage of NASA, we obtained the 71 

final reports from the Office of Audits as reported in the OIG’s semiannual 

reports to the Congress for fiscal years 2006 and 2007, which included 46 

audits with statements of compliance with Government Auditing 

Standards and 25 reports without reference to compliance with auditing 

standards. For purposes of our review, we considered only those reports 

that stated compliance with Government Auditing Standards as audit 

reports and refer to the reports without such statements as nonaudit 

reports.3

 We compared the contents of the 46 audit reports with the highrisk areas designated by us and with the management challenges identified 

by the NASA OIG to determine the audit coverage of these areas. We also 

analyzed the nature and scope of all 71 final reports and the resulting 

recommendations to determine the extent to which they addressed 

compliance with laws, regulations, and NASA policies and procedures; 

economy and efficiency; or the effectiveness of NASA’s programs and 

Scope and 

Methodology 

 2

PCIE is composed principally of the presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed IGs,

and ECIE is composed principally of IGs appointed by the heads of designated federal 

entities defined by the IG Act. Both were established by executive order to coordinate and 

enhance the work of the IGs and are chaired by the Deputy Director for Management,

Office of Management and Budget. In addition, Executive Order 12993, Administrative 

Allegations Against Inspectors General, provides an independent investigative mechanism 

to ensure that allegations against IGs and senior IG staff are expeditiously investigated and 

resolved. The executive order provides the authority for the Integrity Committee, as part of 

PCIE and ECIE, to address these allegations. The Integrity Committee is chaired by a 

designee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Other government members include the 

Special Counsel of the Office of Special Counsel, the Director of the Office of Government

Ethics, and at least three IGs selected from PCIE and ECIE. 

On October 14, 2008, Public Law 110-409, the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, was 

enacted. Among other provisions, it authorizes a new statutory Council of the Inspectors 

General on Integrity and Efficiency, which is to have its own Integrity Committee with 

powers similar to the PCIE and ECIE Integrity Committee, and disestablishes the PCIE and 

ECIE, effective on the earlier of the creation of the new Council, or 180 days after the

passage of the Act. 

3

GAO, Government Auditing Standards, July 2007 Revision, GAO-07-731G (Washington,

D.C.: July 2007). 

Page 2 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
operations. To review the investigative coverage, we used the

identification of closed cases reported by the OIG in semiannual reports 

for fiscal years 2006 and 2007. We also obtained the OIG’s strategic and 

annual audit plans covering the same 2-year period to determine if they 

contained goals and objectives to provide audit coverage of NASA’s 

program compliance with laws and regulations and program economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness. 

We identified monetary and other audit and investigative accomplishments 

reported by the NASA OIG in semiannual reports to the Congress for fiscal 

years 2003 through 2007 in order to observe any long-term trends. We 

limited our review of the NASA OIG’s accomplishments to the results of 

audits and investigations reported to the Congress for this period and did 

not audit or otherwise verify the dollar amounts of the monetary 

accomplishments or potential savings to the government reported by the 

NASA OIG. We also obtained the semiannual reports issued by all 30 IGs 

appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate to obtain the 

monetary accomplishments reported by those IGs during fiscal year 2007.

We obtained the total budgetary resources of each OIG for fiscal year 2007

from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and compared the 

reported monetary accomplishments with budgetary resources to obtain a 

return on investment for each IG office.4

We obtained the total budgetary resources at the NASA OIG and the 

agency for fiscal years 2003 through 2007 from OMB in order to observe 

any long-range budgetary trends. We obtained additional information on 

staffing levels, resource distribution, and attrition rates from the OIG to 

identify staffing trends over this period. The attrition rates for NASA 

overall were verified by NASA management officials. We compared the 

total budgetary resources for fiscal year 2007 of the 30 IGs appointed by 

the President and confirmed by the Senate with the total budgetary 

resources of their respective agencies for the same year. We calculated a

ratio for each OIG’s budget information as a percentage of its respective 

agency’s budget for comparative purposes. 

We obtained reports from the external reviews of the NASA OIG 

completed during fiscal years 2003 through 2007 to observe any long-term 

 4

Amounts presented as budgetary resources in this report for any given fiscal year may not

equal the amount made available as new appropriations for that year because the OMB

data include other available amounts. 

Page 3 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
trends in OIG quality for both audits and investigations. Specifically, we 

obtained the audit peer review report of audit quality dated January 8, 

2004, completed by the Department of Justice OIG, and the March 13,

2007, peer review report completed by the General Services 

Administration OIG. We also obtained the July 8, 2005, peer review report 

of the NASA OIG’s investigative quality completed by the Department of 

Transportation OIG. In addition, we obtained the report of investigation 

completed by the Integrity Committee of PCIE and ECIE, which addressed 

allegations of the NASA IG’s misconduct and appearance of a lack of 

independence. This investigative report was released in late March 2007 to 

the House Committee on Science and Technology, which has oversight 

responsibilities for scientific research and development at NASA and other 

nondefense agencies. We discussed the disposition of the investigation 

with the Integrity Committee. We met with the NASA IG and senior OIG 

staff at the beginning of our review regarding our scope and methodology. 

We conducted a series of interviews coordinated through the IG’s 

Executive Officer which included the Deputy Inspector General, the 

Counsel to the IG, the Assistant IG for Audits, the Assistant IG for 

Investigations, and the Assistant IG for Management and Planning. At the 

completion of our work we met with the NASA IG and senior OIG staff to 

discuss our report findings, conclusions, and recommendations. 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2007 through 

December 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

The fundamental mission of the statutory federal OIGs includes identifying 

areas for improved economy, efficiency, and effectiveness through 

independent and objective oversight; preventing and detecting fraud, 

waste, and abuse; and recommending corrective actions. Over fiscal years

2006 and 2007 the OIG completed 71 audits and other reports which 

included oversight of NASA’s high-risk areas and management challenges, 

and reported closing 153 investigations in response to allegations of fraud, 

waste, and abuse. However, only one audit report for the 2-year period 

included recommendations for improving NASA’s economy and efficiency 

with potential cost savings. 

Results in Brief 

Page 4 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
For fiscal years 2003 through 2007 the NASA OIG reported over 

$824 million in total monetary accomplishments from audits and 

investigations. The results of the OIG’s investigations accounted for over

$815 million or 99 percent of this amount while audits contributed about 

$9 million, or 1 percent. In addition, two OIG investigations were 

responsible for $726 million, or 88 percent of the investigative total, and

two audits were responsible for about $8.4 million, or about 94 percent of 

all audit monetary accomplishments reported during the 5-year period. 

Contributing to the lack of reported monetary accomplishments from 

audits for this period, the OIG reported no monetary accomplishments 

from its audit activity from April 1, 2004, through September 30, 2005. 

We believe that the lack of OIG recommendations regarding the economy 

and efficiency of NASA’s programs and activities has resulted in the 

relatively low amount of reported monetary accomplishments when 

compared to other OIGs during fiscal year 2007. By comparing the OIG’s 

budgetary resources of about $34 million for the same year with the 

combined monetary accomplishments for audits and investigations, there 

is a $0.36 return for each budget dollar. When this calculation is made for 

all 30 OIGs with IGs appointed by the President and confirmed by the 

Senate, the cumulative return for each budget dollar is approximately 

$9.49, or about 26 times that of the NASA OIG. Also, when compared to 

these other OIGs, the year that the NASA OIG had its largest reported 

monetary accomplishment from audits, it ranked 27 in return for each 

budget dollar out of the 28 OIG offices reporting monetary 

accomplishments for fiscal year 2007. 

These results can be attributed, at least in part, to strategic and annual 

audit plans that lack goals and objectives to provide assurance that the

economy and efficiency of NASA’s programs will be addressed. Instead, 

NASA OIG management officials often act as a clearinghouse for 

allegations received by the OIG and provide auditors with assignments to 

address limited scope procurement issues and areas that involve violations

of NASA regulations. This reactive approach to assigning audits can 

encroach on the ability of the OIG to assign staff needed for other audits to 

address the overall economy and efficiency of NASA’s programs and 

activities. We believe that the OIG can improve its audit plans by providing 

more specific attention to performance audits that address potential cost 

savings through recommendations that affect the economy and efficiency 

of NASA’s programs and operations and that the OIG should consult with 

an objective outside party with experience in this type of audit work when 

developing strategic and annual audit plans. 

Page 5 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
The lack of OIG audits focused on NASA’s economy and efficiency and the 

relative lack of reported monetary accomplishments from audits are not 

explained by a concurrent lack of budgetary resources. The NASA OIG’s 

total budgetary resources increased about 17 percent from $29 million to 

$34 million in constant dollars over fiscal years 2003 through 2007. The 

OIG’s full-time equivalents (FTE) over the same period increased from 191 

to 199 at year-end (a 4 percent increase). A comparison of the NASA OIG 

budget with the overall NASA budget indicates that the OIG budget has 

increased slightly more than the NASA budget. In addition, when this 

comparison is made for all 30 OIGs where the IGs are appointed by the 

President and confirmed by the Senate, the NASA OIG’s budget ranks 11th 

as a percentage of the agency’s budget. 

The NASA OIG’s staff attrition rate for fiscal year 2007 was almost 20 

percent, while the attrition rate for all other NASA offices was 5 percent. 

The loss of experienced staff in the Office of Audits is a result of 9 of the

10 highest-level audit managers’ leaving the OIG in the past 5-year period. 

These losses affect the ability of the OIG to maintain experienced audit 

personnel. 

Over the 5-year period of fiscal years 2003 through 2007 the NASA OIG had 

three routine external peer reviews to determine whether the OIG 

provides reasonable assurance of conforming to applicable professional 

standards and one nonroutine external review completed in fiscal year 

2007, conducted by the Integrity Committee of PCIE and ECIE. Two of the 

routine peer reviews concluded that the NASA OIG’s system of quality 

control for the audit function provided reasonable assurance of material 

compliance with professional auditing standards. The other routine peer 

review concluded that the OIG’s Office of Investigation’s system of 

internal safeguards and management procedures was in full compliance 

with the quality standards established by PCIE and ECIE and the Attorney 

General’s investigation guidelines. 

The nonroutine peer review was an investigation of allegations about the 

management practices of the NASA IG performed by the Department of 

Housing and Urban Development’s OIG under the direction of the Integrity 

Committee. The Integrity Committee concluded that the NASA IG had 

created an abusive work environment and that other actions created an 

appearance of a lack of independence. The Chair of both PCIE and ECIE 

referred the results of the investigation to the current NASA Administrator 

who provided a course of action to address the investigation’s 

conclusions. The Chair of PCIE and ECIE confirmed that the actions taken 

by the NASA Administrator constitute the final disposition of the 

Page 6 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
investigation, and the case was closed by the Integrity Committee. 

Nevertheless, the Integrity Committee considers the actions taken by the 

NASA Administrator to be insufficient and the matter of the NASA IG’s 

appearance of a lack of independence to be unresolved. 

We are making recommendations to the IG to help strengthen the 

oversight of NASA. Specifically, we recommend that the OIG’s strategic 

and annual audit plans address NASA’s economy and efficiency by 

working with an objective third party to obtain external review and 

consultation during the strategic and annual planning processes. In 

addition, we are recommending that the IG take actions to identify the 

causes of high staff turnover with the assistance of an objective expert. We

are also making a recommendation to the Integrity Committee to follow up 

on its investigative report and make any recommendations needed to fully 

resolve its finding regarding the IG’s appearance of a lack of 

independence. 

We obtained separate comments on a draft of this report from the Integrity 

Committee and the NASA IG. These comments are reprinted in their 

entirety in appendixes III and IV. Both the Integrity Committee and the 

NASA IG disagreed with our recommendations. The Integrity Committee 

stated that it did not have the power to compel any particular action 

regarding its investigative finding that the NASA IG lacked an appearance 

of independence and that we should make our recommendation to the 

Chair of PCIE and ECIE. However, our recommendation does not call for

the Integrity Committee to take the corrective action to resolve its 

investigative finding but rather to exercise its authority and make 

appropriate recommendations for the Chair of PCIE and ECIE to take 

corrective action. The NASA IG objected to our report’s scope, 

methodology, findings, conclusions, and recommendations but provided 

little additional information to show that NASA’s economy and efficiency 

had been addressed through OIG audit recommendations for potential 

cost savings, or that actions had been taken to fully resolve the Integrity 

Committee’s investigative finding that the NASA IG had an appearance of a 

lack of independence. We rebut disagreements and concerns raised by the 

Integrity Committee and the NASA IG in the Agency Comments and Our 

Evaluation section of this report. We also provide additional information 

in the GAO Comments section of this report. We reaffirm the need for the 

Integrity Committee and the NASA IG to take actions to address these 

findings. 

Page 7 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
NASA was established by the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 

to provide research into problems of flight within and outside Earth’s 

atmosphere and to ensure that the United States conducts activities in 

space devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind. On 

January 14, 2004, the President announced a new vision for space 

exploration endorsed by the Congress in the NASA Authorization Act of 

2005 5

 which includes a journey of exploring the solar system, returning 

astronauts to the moon in the next decade, and venturing to Mars and 

beyond. 

Background 

NASA comprises the Headquarters in Washington, D.C., nine field centers 

located throughout the country, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) 

operated for NASA by the California Institute of Technology.6

 The NASA 

centers and JPL conduct NASA’s programs in exploration, discovery, and

research and are led by four mission directorates at NASA Headquarters. 

(See table 1.) 

Table 1: NASA Mission Directorates and Their Primary Missions

NASA mission directorates

Aeronautics Research

Mission Directorate 

Exploration Systems Mission

Directorate Science Mission Directorate

Space Operations Mission

Directorate 

Conducts research to enable 

changes to the airspace 

system and the aircraft that fly 

within it while supporting 

NASA’s space exploration 

missions. 

Supports the development of 

human and robotic space 

exploration. 

Conducts the scientific 

exploration of the Earth, sun, 

and the rest of the solar 

system and the universe. 

Directs space flight operations, 

space launches, and space 

communications and manages 

operations of the International

Space Station.

Source: NASA. 

The NASA OIG was established by the IG Act to provide an independent

office within NASA to conduct and supervise audits and investigations; 

provide leadership and coordination and recommend policies to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness; and prevent and detect waste, 

fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. The IG Act provides protections to IGs’ 

organizational independence through key provisions that require specified 

IGs, including the NASA IG, to be appointed by the President with the 

 5

Pub. L. No. 109-155, 119 Stat. 2895 (Dec. 30, 2005). 

6

The NASA centers are Ames Research Center, Dryden Flight Research Center, Glenn 

Research Center, Goddard Space Flight Center, Johnson Space Center, Kennedy Space

Center, Langley Research Center, Marshall Space Flight Center, and Stennis Space Center. 

Page 8 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
advice and consent of the Senate. This appointment is required to be 

without regard to political affiliation and is to be based solely on an 

assessment of the candidate’s integrity and demonstrated ability. Such 

presidentially appointed IGs can only be removed from office by the 

President who must communicate the reasons for removal to both houses 

of the Congress. The current NASA IG was appointed by the President on 

April 16, 2002, after Senate confirmation. In addition to the IG, the Deputy 

IG, and the Executive Officer, the OIG is organized into four offices to 

provide oversight of NASA, as shown in table 2. 

Table 2: NASA OIG Offices and Responsibilities 

Offices Responsibilities

Office of Audits Responsible for financial and performance audits and other reviews to examine NASA 

activities, programs, operations, and organizations, and to focus on whether programs are 

organized, managed, and implemented economically, effectively, and efficiently; funds are 

expended in a manner consistent with laws, regulations, and policies; desired program results 

are achieved; and management controls are in place to prevent crimes, fraud, waste, abuse, 

and mismanagement. 

Office of Investigations Responsible for an investigations program to detect and deter crimes, fraud, waste, abuse, 

and mismanagement. This includes investigations of allegations of crime, cybercrime, fraud, 

abuse, or misconduct having an impact on NASA programs, operations, and resources. 

Office of Management and Planning Responsible for assembling the NASA OIG’s strategic plans; handling personnel matters, 

including recruiting and performance management; and preparing budget estimates and 

resource needs. 

Counsel to the Inspector General Prepares legal reviews of statutes and regulations that apply to the work of the OIG’s auditors 

and investigators, and addresses personnel matters and other legal matters affecting the

office. 

Source: NASA OIG. 

As a presidentially appointed IG, the NASA IG is a member of the PCIE, 

which together with the ECIE, operates a joint Integrity Committee that is

empowered to investigate allegations of wrongdoing against IGs and 

certain members of their staff. The Inspector General Reform At of 2008,

7

enacted on October 14, 2008, authorizes a new statutory Council of the 

Inspector General on Integrity and Efficiency which is to have its own 

Integrity Committee with powers similar to the PCIE and ECIE Integrity 

Committee and disestablishes the PCIE and ECIE effective on the earlier 

of the creation of the new Council, or 180 days after the passage of the 

Act. As of the date of this report the new Council has not yet been 

 7

Pub. L. No. 110-409, 122 Stat. 4302 (Oct. 14, 2008). 

Page 9 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
established, and the PCIE, ECIE, and their Integrity Committee continue

operation. 

Since 1990, we have periodically reported on government operations that 

we have designated as high risk because of their greater vulnerabilities to

fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement as well as challenges to 

economy, efficiency, or effectiveness.8

 In January 2007, we identified 27

high-risk areas across the federal government. These included high-risk 

areas applicable to NASA that had been reported in prior high-risk reports. 

We specifically identified NASA’s contract management as a high-risk area

because of weaknesses in NASA’s integrated financial management 

system. For example, we have reported that NASA’s contractor cost 

reporting process does not provide cost information that program 

managers and cost estimators need to develop credible estimates and 

compare budgeted and actual cost with the work performed. Also, NASA 

has lacked a modern financial management system to provide accurate

and reliable information on contract spending and placed little emphasis 

on product performance, cost controls, and program outcomes. On a 

governmentwide basis, we also identified protecting the federal 

government’s information systems and strategic human capital 

management across the executive branch as high-risk areas. 

Beginning in 1997, the IGs were asked by congressional leaders to identify 

the 10 most serious management problems in their respective agencies. 

The request began a yearly process that continues in response to 

requirements established in the Reports Consolidation Act of 2000.

9

 This 

act calls for executive agencies, including NASA, to report their IGs’ lists 

of significant management challenges in their annual performance and 

accountability reports to the President, OMB, and the Congress. In fiscal 

years 2006 and 2007, the NASA OIG identified management challenges that 

included areas also identified in our high-risk reports and in the additional 

areas of financial management, space operations and exploration, and 

safety and security. 

The OIG has identified NASA’s Integrated Enterprise Management 

Program as key to improving NASA’s ability to provide reliable 

information to management, support compliance with federal 

requirements, and strengthen the internal control program to address 

 8

GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.: January 2007). 

9

Pub. L. No. 106-531, 114 Stat. 2537 (Nov. 22, 2000). 

Page 10 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
continuing problems, such as NASA’s internal control weaknesses over 

property, plant, and equipment and materials. Regarding space operations 

and exploration, the OIG has identified the transition from the space 

shuttle to the next generation of space vehicles as a management 

challenge as NASA balances schedule and resource constraints while 

maintaining the capabilities required to fly the space shuttle and 

simultaneously developing the next generation of space vehicles. In the 

area of safety and security the OIG has identified NASA’s need to manage

risk, safety, and mission assurance controls to ensure reliable operations 

in the context of aggressive launch and mission schedules, funding 

limitations, and future uncertainties as management challenges. 

The IG Act requires independent IG offices to provide leadership on issues 

of economy and efficiency and to report on the effectiveness of programs, 

offices, and activities within their respective agencies. The NASA OIG’s 

Office of Audits provides financial and performance audits and other 

reviews to examine NASA’s operations.10 The NASA OIG has conducted 

audit activity in most high-risk areas identified by us and the management 

challenges identified by the OIG for fiscal years 2006 and 2007. In addition

to audits, the NASA OIG reported closing 153 investigative cases during 

fiscal years 2006 and 2007 in response to allegations of fraud, waste, and 

abuse. In providing audit coverage, the NASA OIG has generally not 

focused on audits with recommendations for improving the economy and 

efficiency of NASA’s programs and operations with potential monetary 

savings. For example, during fiscal years 2006 and 2007 the OIG had one 

audit with recommendations with potential monetary savings.

NASA OIG Provides 

Limited Monetary 

Accomplishments 

from Audits 

During the 5-year period of fiscal years 2003 through 2007, 99 percent of 

NASA OIG’s dollar accomplishments came from investigations with 88 

percent coming from two joint investigations with other OIGs. The 

remaining 1 percent of the monetary accomplishments reported by the

NASA OIG during this 5-year period was from audits. We believe that 

improvements to the OIG’s strategic and annual audit planning could help

 10A financial audit provides an independent assessment of and reasonable assurance about 

whether an entity’s reported financial condition, results, and use of resources are 

presented fairly in accordance with recognized criteria. A performance audit is an 

engagement that provides assurance or conclusions based on an evaluation of sufficient 

appropriate evidence against stated criteria, such as specific requirements, measures, or

defined business processes.

Page 11 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
to ensure that audits with an emphasis on NASA’s economy and efficiency 

through potential cost savings are included in its annual audit activities. 

Audit Coverage of High 

Risk Areas and 

Management Challenges 

Over fiscal years 2006 and 2007 the NASA OIG’s Office of Audits reported 

having completed 71 reports. Of these, the NASA OIG issued 13 audit 

reports in fiscal year 2006 and 20 audit reports in fiscal year 2007 on highrisk areas identified by us, and on NASA’s management challenges 

identified by the OIG. As shown in table 3, multiple NASA OIG audit 

reports were completed in most of the areas designated as high risk and as 

management challenges with the exception of asset management and 

human capital. Most of the OIG’s reports were in the areas of information 

technology security, contract management, and financial management. In 

contrast, the area of asset management had one report, and there were no

audits of human capital issues even though these areas are both among 

GAO high-risk areas and NASA’s management challenges. (The OIG is 

currently auditing an issue of asset management and has plans to address 

an issue of NASA’s human capital.) 

In addition, the NASA OIG’s audit reports also addressed areas not 

identified as high-risk areas or management challenges. These included 

quality control reviews of the audits of federal award recipients by 

nonfederal auditors to ensure that these audits are performed in 

compliance with government auditing standards.11 In addition, while the 

OIG’s audit policy is to complete audits using Government Auditing 

Standards and the IG Act requires that all NASA OIG audits be completed

using these standards, 25, or approximately 35 percent, of the OIG’s 71 

reports completed by the NASA OIG Office of Audits were completed 

without using these standards. Those reports included transmittal letters 

and information without a statement of compliance with auditing 

standards. Consequently, we did not consider these reports as part of the 

OIG’s audit coverage for high-risk areas and management challenges. 

 11Federal awarding agencies such as NASA have responsibilities under OMB Circular No. A133, Audits of States, Local Governments, and Non-profit Organizations, to conduct 

these quality control reviews. 

Page 12 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Table 3: NASA OIG Audit Coverage of High-Risk Areas and Management Challenges in Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007 

NASA OIG reports

GAO high-risk areas for 2005a and 

2007b

Management challenges and issues 

identified by NASA OIG in 2006 and

2007c,d FY 2006 FY 2007 Total reports

Protecting the federal government’s 

information systems 

Information Technology & Security 5 3 8

NASA contract management issues 

caused by weaknesses in the integrated 

financial management system 

Contractor performance oversight, 

acquisition and contracting processes 

4 4 8

Managing federal real property Asset management 0 1 1

Strategic human capital management Human capital issues related to NASA’s 

transition to next generation of space 

vehicles 

0 0 0

Financial management, systems, 

analyses, and oversight 

1 9 10

Space Operations & Exploration 1 2 3

Safety and Security—space shuttle 

safety, operational and safety risks 

2 1 3

Total audits of high-risk areas and

management challenges

13 20 33

Quality control reviewse5 4 9

Other areas covered by audits 2 2 4

Audit products not using Government 

Auditing Standards

15 10 25

Total audit products 35 36 71

Sources: GAO’s 2007 and 2005 High-Risk Series and NASA OIG’s fiscal year 2006 and 2007 audit reports. 

a

GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, DC.: January 2005).

b

GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, DC.: January 2007).

c

NASA’s Performance and Accountability Report, fiscal years 2006 and 2007. 

d

NASA’s Most Serious Management and Performance Challenges, fiscal years 2006 and 2007. 

e

Reviews required by OMB Circular No. A-133, Audits of States, Local Governments, and Non-profit 

Organizations. 

Page 13 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
In addition to audits, the NASA OIG reported closing 153 investigative 

cases during fiscal years 2006 and 2007 in response to allegations of fraud, 

waste, and abuse. The OIG’s Office of Investigations investigates 

allegations of crime, cybercrime, fraud, waste, abuse, and misconduct that 

could affect NASA’s programs, projects, operations, and resources. The 

Office of Investigations refers its findings either to the Department of 

Justice for criminal prosecution and civil litigation or to NASA 

management for administrative action. In addition, the Office of 

Investigations identifies crime indicators and recommends measures for 

NASA management that are designed to reduce NASA’s vulnerability to 

criminal activity. 

Investigative Coverage 

from Closed Cases 

The OIG’s closed cases focused on NASA procurements or procurement 

activities and investigations of computer crimes. (See fig. 1.) In addition, 

there were investigations of conflicts of interest, large-scale thefts of 

government property, and false statements. Other investigations included 

safety, state and local crimes, travel card fraud, and drug abuse. 

Figure 1: NASA OIG Investigations Closed During Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007 

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

False statements

Other

Theft/conversion of

government property

Conflict of interest

Computer crime

Procurement/

procurement related

Number of cases

Fiscal year 2007

Fiscal year 2006

Source: GAO analysis of NASA OIG closed investigative file data.

12

5

21

8

8

8

0

11

11

27

13

29

Note: The types of investigations may include multiple categories. Also, other closed cases include 

investigations of safety, state and local crimes, travel card fraud, and drug investigations. 

Page 14 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Statutory OIGs subject to the IG Act, including the NASA OIG, are required

to report the monetary value of certain findings and recommendations in 

their semiannual reports provided by the OIGs through their agency heads

to the Congress. As required, the NASA OIG’s semiannual reports for fiscal 

years 2003 through 2007 included the number of audit reports issued and 

the questioned costs, unsupported costs, and funds to be put to better use 

identified by the OIG’s audits. As defined by the IG Act, questioned costs 

include either alleged violations of laws, regulations, contracts, grants, or 

agreements; costs not supported by adequate documentation; or the 

expenditure of funds for an intended purpose that was unnecessary or 

unreasonable. In addition, unsupported costs are defined as costs that do 

not have adequate documentation, and funds to be put to better use are 

inefficiencies identified by the OIG in the use of agency funds. These are 

often potential savings to the government. 

NASA OIG’s Monetary 

Accomplishments Are 

Largely from 

Investigations 

The monetary accomplishments of the NASA OIG’s Office of 

Investigations are largely from closed investigations that result in 

recoveries of federal dollars which include fines and court ordered 

restitutions regarding individuals and contractors who have defrauded the 

government. As shown in table 4, almost all of the NASA OIG’s monetary 

accomplishments have come from investigations during fiscal years 2003 

through 2007. 

Table 4: NASA OIG’s Reported Monetary Accomplishments and Return per Budget 

Dollar for Fiscal Years 2003 through 2007 

Fiscal 

year 

Monetary 

accomplishments

Dollar return on NASA’s OIG budget 

2007 $12,103,809 $0.36 (43 percent from investigations 

57 percent from one audit) 

2006 $657,116,285 $19.91 (Over 99 percent from investigations 

94 percent from one investigation) 

2005 $12,866,383 $0.39 (100 percent from investigations 

$0.00 audit accomplishments)

2004 $10,361,564 $0.35 (86 percent from investigations 

14 percent from one audit) 

2003 $131,985,231 $4.55 (Over 99 percent from investigations 

84 percent from one investigation) 

Source: NASA OIG. 

Page 15 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
In fiscal year 2006 the OIG reported the results of a joint investigation with 

the Department of Defense and Department of Justice OIGs that had total

recoveries of $615 million from a settlement with the Boeing Company 

regarding criminal and civil allegations. Also, in fiscal year 2003 the OIG 

reported another joint investigation with recoveries of about $111 million. 

The results of these two investigations alone account for 88 percent of the 

NASA OIG’s reported total monetary accomplishments of over 

$824 million from both audits and investigations over fiscal years 2003 

through 2007. The total monetary accomplishments from OIG 

investigations for this period were $815 million, or 99 percent of all 

reported OIG monetary accomplishments. In contrast, over the same 5-

year period the OIG’s potential audit savings contributed about $9 million

or about 1 percent of the OIG’s total reported 5-year monetary 

accomplishments, with one audit in fiscal year 2007 responsible for $7 

million of this amount and another audit in fiscal year 2004 responsible for 

about $1.5 million. Therefore, approximately 94 percent of all NASA OIG 

audit monetary accomplishments reported over the 5-year period came 

from the results of two audits. In addition, during the 1-1/2-year period 

from April 1, 2004, through September 30, 2005, the OIG reported no 

monetary accomplishments from its audit activity. 

A comparison of the OIG’s fiscal year 2007 total budgetary resources of 

$34 million to its reported combined monetary accomplishments for that 

year results in a return of $0.36 for each budget dollar. When this same 

calculation is made based on the monetary accomplishments reported by 

all 30 OIGs with IGs appointed by the President and confirmed by the 

Senate, the overall average return on their total budgetary resources in 

fiscal year 2007 was $9.49 for every dollar spent by the government for 

their offices, or almost 26 times that of the NASA OIG for fiscal year 2007.

In addition, when compared to these other OIGs, the year that the NASA 

OIG had its largest monetary accomplishment from audits it ranked 27 out 

of the 28 OIG offices reporting monetary accomplishments for fiscal year 

2007. (See app. I.) 

OIG Planning Lacks 

Economy and Efficiency 

Objectives 

Of the 71 reports completed by the NASA OIG’s Office of Audits over fiscal 

years 2006 and 2007, 70 did not include recommendations that address the 

economy and efficiency of NASA’s programs and operations with potential 

cost savings. The one exception to this was an OIG audit that addressed an

area of NASA’s economy and efficiency and resulted in about $7 million in

reported potential monetary savings. The remaining 70 reports included 

recommendations for improving compliance with laws, regulations, and 

NASA policies and procedures; internal controls; and addressed specific 

Page 16 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
areas of NASA’s operations. Nevertheless, these recommendations did not 

provide measurable improvements to the costs and resources used to 

achieve program results.

To illustrate, in fiscal year 2006 the NASA OIG audited the awards of 

subcontracts worth $4.6 billion for NASA’s space flight operations. The 

OIG found that the primary government contractor’s actions had complied 

with requirements for competition, quality assurance, and other 

procurement regulations, but also found examples of inadequate pricing 

determinations. The report recommended that the NASA contracting 

officer ensure compliance with contract agreements and procurement 

regulations but did not include recommendations to help ensure that this 

area will be effective or efficient in the future and did not identify any 

measurable cost savings to the government resulting from inadequate

pricing. In addition, over the 2-year period we reviewed there were no OIG 

audits with recommendations to increase the economy and efficiency of 

NASA’s space flight operations with identified cost savings even though 

the IG had identified this program as one of NASA’s management 

challenges. 

The OIG’s annual audit plan addresses NASA’s programs in high-risk areas 

and management challenges but does not have a strategy to deal with 

economy and efficiency associated with these NASA programs. The OIG’s 

strategic plan and annual audit plans do not identify goals and audit 

objectives related to evaluating NASA’s programs and operations through 

economy and efficiency audits. The OIG’s annual audit plans for fiscal 

years 2006 and 2007 provided details on the objectives of each individual

audit; however, similar to the results that we found for the OIG’s audits, 

the objectives of the audits in these plans were not directed at audits that 

might result in measurable cost savings. A subsequent revision of the fiscal 

year 2007 audit plan also had no specific objectives for addressing NASA’s 

economy and efficiency.

In addition, through limited scope audits of compliance as well as 

investigations, the OIG addresses allegations received. To illustrate, OIG 

auditors and investigators are often assigned reviews of allegations or 

other assignments received from the OIG’s Senior Staff Referral Review 

Committee (SSRRC). The SSRRC was established by the NASA IG in the 

fall of 2005 to act as a clearinghouse for allegations and to review all work 

planned for OIG staff. The SSRRC is composed of the Assistant IG for 

Investigations, the Deputy Assistant IG for Audits, the OIG Counsel, and 

the IG’s Executive Officer. The SSRRC meets once a week to coordinate 

audit and investigative assignments, review fraud hotline information, 

Page 17 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
review letters with allegations, and decide on where to assign the work. 

Generally, if the issues involve wrongdoing by NASA employees or 

contract fraud the OIG investigators will handle the cases. The OIG 

auditors are generally assigned limited scope procurement issues and 

issues that involve violations of NASA regulations. Issues involving 

standards of conduct or personnel matters will generally be referred to 

NASA management. 

The NASA OIG’s limited monetary accomplishments from its audit activity 

can be attributed to (1) the lack of emphasis in its annual audit plan on 

goals and objectives for areas to improve economy and efficiency of 

NASA’s programs and operations and (2) the OIG’s focus on reviews of 

allegations and limited scope issues in a reactive approach to audit 

planning through assignments from the SSRRC, which can encroach on 

the ability to assign staff needed for other performance audits that can 

address potential dollar savings. We believe that the OIG can improve its 

audit plans by providing more specific attention to performance audits 

that address the economy and efficiency of NASA’s programs and 

operations, and that the OIG should consult with an objective, 

knowledgeable outside party with experience in these types of audits 

when completing these plans. 

From fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2007, the NASA OIG’s total 

budgetary resources increased by approximately 17 percent, from 

approximately $29 million to $34 million in constant dollars, while the 

FTEs increased 4 percent, from 191 to 199. Of the 199 FTEs at the end of

fiscal year 2007, 47 percent were in the Office of Audits, 37 percent in the

Office of Investigations, 10 percent in the Office of Management and 

Planning, and 4 percent and 2 percent, respectively, for the Counsel to the 

IG and the IG’s immediate office. (See fig. 2.) 

NASA OIG’s Budgets 

and Staffing 

Page 18 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Figure 2: Distribution of NASA OIG Staff for Fiscal Year 2007 

2%

IG, Deputy IG, Executive Officer

4%

Counsel to the IG

37%

10%

47%

Source: NASA OIG.

Office of Management and Planning

Office of Investigations

Office of Audits

A comparison of NASA OIG’s total budgetary resources with NASA’s total 

budgetary resources shows that the OIG’s budget as a percentage of 

NASA’s budget has increased. In addition, NASA OIG’s staffing levels have 

increased while NASA’s staffing level has decreased. During fiscal years 

2003 through 2007, NASA’s overall total budgetary resources increased by

about 4 percent, compared with the OIG’s budgetary resources, which 

increased by about 17 percent. Therefore, the NASA OIG’s total budgetary 

resources as a percentage of NASA’s total budgetary resources increased 

from 0.15 percent to 0.17 percent. (See table 5.) During that same period, 

NASA’s FTEs decreased by approximately 2.7 percent, compared with the 

OIG’s FTE increase of about 4 percent. 

Page 19 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Table 5: NASA OIG and NASA Budgets and FTEs, Fiscal Years 2003 through 2007 

Fiscal 

year 

NASA’s total 

budgetary 

resources (dollars 

in millions) 

NASA OIG’s total 

budgetary 

resources (dollars 

in millions)

NASA OIG’s total 

budgetary resources 

as a percentage of

NASA’s total 

budgetary resources

NASA’s 

FTEs

 (on board

staff) 

NASA OIG’s 

FTEs (on

board staff)

NASA OIG’s 

authorized FTEs

2007 $20,011 $34 0.17 18,212 199 213

2006 20,315 33 0.16 18,280 199 213

2005 20,121 33 0.16 18,807 183 213

2004 20,743 30 0.15 18,821 189 213

2003 19,254 29 0.15 18,709 191 213

Source: GAO analysis of OMB and NASA OIG data. 

Note: Budgetary resources are in constant 2007 dollars. 

When NASA OIG’s budget-to-agency-budget ratio is compared to this same 

ratio for other OIGs in which the IG is appointed by the President with 

Senate confirmation, the percentages vary depending on the size of the 

federal agencies, their missions, and the oversight issues emphasized by 

each OIG. Such a comparison for fiscal year 2007 budgets indicates that 

the ratio of the NASA OIG’s total budgetary resources to the total 

budgetary resources for NASA was within the range of these percentages 

for other OIGs and their agencies. Specifically, the comparison of these 

other OIGs’ budgets with those of their agencies ranged from 0.005 percent 

to 1.10 percent, and the NASA OIG’s percentage of NASA resources was at 

0.17 percent, which ranks 11th of these 30 agencies. (See app. II.) 

Regarding staffing levels, we obtained the attrition rates for the NASA OIG 

for fiscal years 2003 through 2007. Attrition is the percentage of personnel 

losses for all reasons during the fiscal year, and is measured by comparing

personnel losses during the year to the total personnel strength on board 

at the beginning of the year. The staff attrition rate for NASA OIG has 

increased over the 5-year period from 12.4 percent in 2003 to 19.9 percent 

in 2007. Specifically, the NASA OIG had losses of 24 personnel in fiscal 

year 2003 compared to a loss of 40 personnel in fiscal year 2007, an

increase of approximately 67 percent. (See table 6.) As a comparison, the 

overall attrition rate for NASA was about 5 percent in both fiscal years 

2006 and 2007. 

From fiscal years 2003 through 2007, the NASA OIG lost 157 staff. These 

losses affect the ability of the OIG to maintain experienced audit 

personnel. To illustrate this effect on the Office of Audits, we compared 

Page 20 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
the audit staff on board in January 2003, shortly after the current IG took 

office, to the audit staff on board in March 2008. Of the 78 auditors on 

board in January 2003, 42 auditors have left the OIG audit directorate, 

including 9 of the 10 management-level auditors. Those leaving included 

all but one of the audit directors, the Assistant IG for Audits, and 2 deputy 

assistant IGs for audits. We did not review the reasons for the OIG’s 

employee turnover but believe that the OIG would benefit from a review 

by an objective third-party expert to address the reasons for the relatively

high attrition rate as compared to the overall rate for NASA. 

Table 6: NASA OIG Attrition Rates for Fiscal Years 2003 through 2007 

Fiscal 

year 

Beginning of year

personnel strengtha Gains Losses 

End of year 

personnel strengtha

Attrition 

rate

2003 194 21 24 191 12.4

2004 191 21 26 186 13.6

2005 186 37 35 188 18.8

2006 188 45 32 201 17.0

2007 201 40 40 201 19.9

Sources: NASA OIG. 

a

Actual personnel on board. 

Over the 5-year period of fiscal years 2003 through 2007, NASA OIG had 

three routine external peer reviews—two reviews of its auditing practice 

and one review of its investigative practice. The NASA OIG also had a 

nonroutine external review performed by the Integrity Committee of PCIE 

and ECIE completed in fiscal year 2007 as a result of concerns about the 

management practices and conduct of NASA’s IG. 

Government Auditing Standards requires audit organizations that 

perform audits in accordance with the standards to have external peer 

reviews on a routine basis, at least once every 3 years. Those reviews are 

to be performed by reviewers independent of the audit organization. In the 

federal IG community, other federal IGs perform these peer reviews. The 

purpose of the peer review is to conclude whether the audit organization

has a system of quality control that is suitably designed and implemented 

in order to provide reasonable assurance of conforming to applicable 

External Reviews of 

NASA OIG and the 

Integrity Committee’s

Investigation 

Routine Peer Reviews 

Page 21 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
professional standards. In addition, for investigations, the Homeland 

Security Act of 200212 amended the IG Act to require that each OIG with 

investigative or law enforcement authority under the act have its 

investigative function reviewed periodically by another IG office. 

For peer reviews of the audit practices,

13 the external reviewers concluded

that NASA OIG’s system of quality control for the audit function provided 

reasonable assurance of material compliance with professional auditing

standards. The peer review of the NASA OIG’s investigative function14

concluded that the system of internal safeguards and management 

procedures for the Office of Investigations was in full compliance with the 

quality standards established by PCIE and ECIE and the Attorney 

General’s investigation guidelines. 

Integrity Committee’s 

Investigation 

The NASA OIG also had a nonroutine external review completed in fiscal 

year 2007 as a result of serious concerns that had been raised about the 

management practices and conduct of the IG. At the request of the 

Integrity Committee of PCIE and ECIE, the Department of Housing and 

Urban Development’s (HUD) OIG conducted an investigation into the 

allegations of possible misconduct by the NASA IG. The Integrity 

Committee initiated the investigation through a request letter to the HUD 

OIG dated January 6, 2006, and forwarded 18 complaints with 79 separate

allegations regarding actions of the NASA IG to the HUD OIG 

investigators. 

The HUD OIG submitted the results of its investigation for the Integrity 

Committee’s consideration on August 30, 2006. In a January 22, 2007, letter 

to the OMB Deputy Director for Management who serves as the Chair of 

both PCIE and ECIE, the Integrity Committee concluded that (1) the 

NASA IG had engaged in abuse of authority by creating an abusive work 

environment and (2) the NASA IG’s actions in two instances created an 

appearance of a lack of independence. In addition, the Integrity 

Committee stated that the IG had sought to develop and maintain a close 

 12Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 812, 116 Stat. 2135, 2223 (Nov. 25, 2002). 

13The Department of Justice OIG issued its peer review report of the NASA OIG on 

January 8, 2004, and the General Services Administration OIG completed the subsequent

peer review and reported on March 13, 2007. 

14Department of Transportation OIG conducted the peer review of NASA OIG’s 

investigative practice and issued its report on July 8, 2005. 

Page 22 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
relationship with the former NASA Administrator and that this effort 

contributed to an appearance that his independence was being 

compromised. However, the Integrity Committee offered no 

recommendations for corrective actions in their letter. 

Executive Order 12993 entitled Administrative Allegations Against 

Inspectors General provides guidance to address investigations of alleged

IG wrongdoing. Under this guidance the Integrity Committee is 

responsible for deciding whether the investigative report prepared at its 

request establishes any administrative misconduct within its oversight 

jurisdiction. If in the Integrity Committee’s opinion the report establishes 

such issues or otherwise requires action, the report is referred to the Chair

of PCIE and ECIE with recommendations for appropriate action. The 

Integrity Committee advised us that they had not believed it necessary to 

include specific recommendations in this case due to the extent of the 

findings and the presumption that the Chair of PCIE and ECIE would take 

disciplinary action commensurate with these findings. 

In accordance with the Executive Order, the Chair of PCIE and ECIE 

advised the NASA Administrator to determine the appropriate actions to 

address the investigation’s conclusions. The NASA Administrator 

proposed to the Chair that the NASA IG attend the Federal Executive 

Institute to develop a leadership and management training plan, attend at

least one management/leadership program annually, obtain the services of

an executive coach, and meet with the Deputy NASA Administrator on a 

bimonthly basis to discuss implementation of the leadership and 

management plan as well as the NASA IG’s professional growth. The NASA 

Administrator also stated that the proposed actions would resolve any 

concerns he had after reviewing the Integrity Committee’s report of 

investigation. 

Reacting to the NASA Administrator’s response, the Integrity Committee 

expressed its view in a March 20, 2007 letter to the Chair of PCIE and 

ECIE that the proposed actions were inadequate to address the 

investigation’s conclusions. Specifically, the Integrity Committee stated 

that “[a]ll members of the committee believed the proposed course of 

action recommended by the Administrator of NASA was inadequate to 

address the conduct of [the IG]. All members of the committee further 

believed that disciplinary action up to and including removal could be 

appropriate.”

In a follow-up letter dated March 29, 2007, the NASA Administrator 

reaffirmed his belief that his proposed actions were adequate. With 

Page 23 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
respect to the appearance of a lack of impartiality he stated that he and the 

IG had a professional arms-length relationship and that he did not believe 

that additional corrective measures were necessary. In a letter also dated 

March 29, 2007, the Chair of PCIE and ECIE asked the Integrity Committee 

for confirmation on several matters including that its members (1) had not 

concluded that the IG had broken any laws or acted illegally; (2) had no 

uniform view on what actions would be appropriate to address its 

concerns regarding the IG; (3) that it was not now recommending removal 

of the IG as a disciplinary action; and (4) that the January 22, 2007, letter 

to the PCIE and ECIE Chair had not contained recommendations on this 

matter. That same day, the Chair of the Integrity Committee confirmed 

that the PCIE and ECIE Chair’s understanding accurately reflected the 

intent of the Integrity Committee. In accordance with the discretion 

afforded in the Executive Order and the related implementing guidance, 

on April 18, 2007, the Chair of PCIE and ECIE advised the Chair of the 

Integrity Committee to consider the actions in the NASA Administrator’s 

March 29, 2007, letter as constituting the final disposition of the 

investigation. In line with the Executive Order, the Integrity Committee 

informed the NASA IG that their review was complete and that the case is 

considered closed. 

Notwithstanding the formal process outlined by the Executive Order, the 

Integrity Committee confirmed in a written response to our questions, its 

continued concern that the actions taken regarding the appearance of a

lack of independence were insufficient. In the same response, the Integrity 

Committee stated that the views expressed in its March 20, 2007, letter 

remain unchanged and that the NASA IG’s lack of an appearance of 

independence was not resolved by the actions proposed by the NASA 

Administrator. 

In late March 2007, both the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Space, 

Aeronautics, and Related Matters, Senate Committee on Commerce, 

Science and Transportation, and the Chairman of the Subcommittee on 

Investigations and Oversight, House Committee on Science and 

Technology, received a copy of the Integrity Committee’s report of 

investigation. In their letter of April 2, 2007, to the President of the United

States, the Chairmen requested that the President remove the NASA IG 

from office based on the results of the investigation. The letter states that 

the committees and the public are not receiving useful assistance from the 

NASA IG, one of their primary tools for oversight, and that the NASA IG 

can no longer be effective in his office and should be replaced

immediately. 

Page 24 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
In prepared testimony on June 7, 2007, before a joint hearing between the 

Subcommittee on Space, Aeronautics, and Related Sciences, Senate 

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, and the 

Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, House Committee on 

Science and Technology, the NASA IG disputed the findings of the 

Integrity Committee investigation by calling the allegations unjustified and 

the investigation flawed. The IG pointed out his views regarding possible 

mistakes by the investigators, and provided arguments to explain his 

actions regarding many of the allegations investigated. In this joint hearing 

members of both the House and the Senate called for the IG to resign. 

Independence is the cornerstone of professional auditing. The IG Act 

requires that IGs comply with Government Auditing Standards, which 

specifies that auditors and audit organizations be free from personal, 

external, and organizational impairments and avoid the appearance of 

such impairments to independence. Auditors and audit organizations must 

maintain independence so that their opinions, findings, conclusions, 

judgments, and recommendations will be impartial and, just as important, 

viewed as impartial by objective third parties with knowledge of the 

relevant information. 

Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General issued by 

PCIE and ECIE include requirements for IGs to be objective with an 

obligation to be impartial, intellectually honest, and free of conflicts of 

interest. Independence is considered by these standards to be a critical

element of objectivity, and without independence both in fact and in 

appearance, objectivity is impaired. 

As noted above, the absence of actions to address the perceived lack of 

independence can perpetuate concerns regarding the IG’s objectivity in 

dealing with IG responsibilities related to audits and investigations. Given 

the importance of IG independence both in fact and appearance and the 

lack of any corrective actions to fully resolve this matter, we believe that 

additional follow up and recommendations by the Integrity Committee are 

warranted related to its investigative finding dealing with the NASA IG’s 

appearance of a lack of independence. 

The fundamental mission of the NASA OIG includes providing 

independent and objective oversight of NASA to identify areas for 

improved economy, efficiency, and effectiveness, and to detect and 

prevent fraud, waste, and abuse. While the OIG has conducted audits in 

areas of high risk and management challenges and provided the results of 

investigations, the OIG’s monetary accomplishments from its audit 

Conclusions 

Page 25 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
activities have been limited by a lack of audits to evaluate the economy 

and efficiency of NASA’s programs and operations that result in 

recommendations for measurable cost savings. 

The NASA OIG’s monetary accomplishments and recommendations in the

areas of economy and efficiency significantly lag behind the 

accomplishments and return on investment of the federal OIG community 

as a whole. A reevaluation of audit planning and methods within NASA’s 

OIG is needed to include audits that hold NASA accountable for its 

stewardship of public funds through independent audits and investigations

that include recommendations for economy and efficiency. Due to the 

importance of this issue, we believe that a reexamination of the audit 

strategy and planning approach within the OIG can best be accomplished 

with the assistance of an objective outside party with experience in these 

types of audits. 

The OIG’s budgets and staffing levels have not been adversely affected

when compared to both the NASA budgets and staffing and to the budgets 

of other OIGs. However, the effectiveness of the OIG can be negatively 

affected by an environment of high staff turnover, which has especially

affected audit management staff. The reasons for the relatively high rate 

and recent increases in employee turnover should be examined by an 

objective expert so that any underlying issues can be addressed and the 

NASA OIG can effectively meet its mission of providing objective and 

reliable information. 

The independence of the IG is central to the effectiveness of the IG’s 

office. The Integrity Committee, which has the authority to make 

recommendations regarding the outcomes of its investigations, considers 

the actions taken by the NASA Administrator to be insufficient, that the 

NASA IG’s lack of an appearance of independence is not resolved, and that 

the views expressed in its letter of March 20, 2007, are unchanged. 

Because independence is fundamental to effective oversight and 

professional auditing, we believe that additional follow up actions are 

warranted related to the Integrity Committee’s findings dealing with the 

appearance of a lack of independence on the part of NASA’s IG. 

In order to strengthen audit oversight and management of the NASA OIG, 

we recommend that the NASA IG 

• include in strategic and annual planning, performance audits that 

address NASA’s economy and efficiency with potential monetary 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Page 26 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
savings and that the OIG work closely with an objective outside party 

to obtain external review and consultation in the strategic and annual 

planning processes, and 

• identify the causes of high employee turnover with the assistance of an 

objective expert, and determine actions needed as appropriate. 

In order to resolve the matter regarding the appearance of independence 

of the NASA IG, we recommend that the Integrity Committee 

• follow up regarding its investigative finding regarding the NASA IG’s 

appearance of a lack of independence and make any recommendations 

needed. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

In written comments on a draft of our report, the NASA IG expressed 

widespread disagreement with our conclusions and recommendations and 

questioned the depth and scope of our evaluation. We disagree with the IG

and in the following paragraphs reaffirm our conclusions and 

recommendations. We augmented our discussions of the scope and 

methodology of our work and expanded the evidentiary matter in the body 

of this report for issues related to the Integrity Committee’s investigation 

and the monetary accomplishments reported by the NASA OIG over fiscal

years 2003 through 2007. We rebut what we consider the most important 

aspects of his disagreement in this section of the report. In addition, please 

refer to the appendix section of this report following our reprint of the IG’s 

comments (see app. IV) in which we rebut or clarify other less material 

matters. 

The Integrity Committee limited its comments to matters in our draft 

report concerning the committee’s investigation of allegations against the 

NASA IG. The Integrity Committee restates its determination that actions

taken by NASA regarding the appearance of a lack of independence 

findings were insufficient, states that the Integrity Committee has no 

power to compel any particular action, and suggests that we should 

present our recommendation to the Chair of PCIE and ECIE. However, we 

see nothing in the guidance in Executive Order 12993 to prohibit the 

Integrity Committee from making recommendations to the Chair of PCIE 

and ECIE regarding its investigative finding which has not been fully 

resolved. Therefore, we reaffirm our recommendation to the Integrity 

Committee. (See app. III.) 

In the written comments, the NASA IG stated that the Integrity Committee 

investigation of allegations against him was a closed matter. He 

Integrity Committee 

Investigation 

Page 27 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
emphasized that the Integrity Committee’s views regarding the 

independence matter were from a historical perspective and that there 

was nothing to suggest that the appearance of a lack of independence was 

an ongoing issue. Further, he stated that the Integrity Committee had not 

included any recommendations in its report and that therefore, nothing is 

unresolved.

The IG commented that we had ignored the documented final disposition 

of this matter in the PCIE and ECIE Chair’s April 18, 2007 letter, and that 

we had selectively included or excluded information to suggest that a 

closed matter is still open. We fully understand that the formal 

investigation has run its course, and we have added discussion to the body 

of the report to reflect the documented interactions among the Chairman 

of PCIE and ECIE, the Integrity Committee, the NASA Administrator, and 

the NASA IG. Our report acknowledges that the Integrity Committee did 

not make any specific recommendations to address either the investigative

findings of an abusive work environment or the perception of a lack of 

independence. However, despite the PCIE and ECIE Chair’s acceptance of 

the actions proposed by the NASA Administrator and closure of the case, 

the Integrity Committee stated in response to our questions, that the 

actions were not adequate to resolve the investigative conclusion that the

IG lacked an appearance of independence. 

As discussed in our report, the Integrity Committee told us that it did not 

include recommendations for corrective actions in its January 22, 2007, 

letter to the Chair of PCIE and ECIE regarding the results of its 

investigation because of the extent of the findings and a presumption that 

the Chair of PCIE and ECIE would take disciplinary action commensurate 

with these findings. These concerns are captured in the Integrity 

Committee’s March 20, 2007, letter to the Chair of PCIE and ECIE, which 

stated that “[a]ll members of the committee further believed that 

disciplinary action up to and including removal, could be appropriate.” 

Given the Integrity Committee’s documented dissatisfaction with the 

corrective actions and that no actions we are aware of address the 

independence issue, we disagree that this matter has been fully resolved. 

Objective third parties with knowledge of the relevant information 

including that of the Integrity Committee’s investigation; the lack of 

actions to attempt to change perceptions; and the Integrity Committee’s 

continuing concern, expressed in a written response to our questions, that 

the actions taken were inadequate; could conclude that the appearance of

independence issues have not been resolved. As a result, the decisions and 

actions of the IG may not be fully accepted as a basis for policy or other 

Page 28 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
changes. This perspective is illustrated by the stances taken by the 

leadership of NASA’s oversight committees. As noted in the body of the 

report, in their joint letter dated April 2, 2007, the Chairman of the 

Subcommittee on Space, Aeronautics, and Related Matters, Senate 

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, and the Chairman 

of the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, House Committee 

on Science and Technology, requested that the President of the United 

States remove the NASA IG from office based on the results of the 

Integrity Committee’s investigation. The letter states that the oversight 

committees and the public are not receiving useful information from the 

NASA IG, one of their primary tools for oversight, and that the IG can no 

longer be effective in his office and should be replaced. 

The Integrity Committee commented that it could not concur with our 

recommendation because it lacked the authority to compel any particular

corrective action. However, our recommendation to the Integrity 

Committee does not call for it to compel the corrective action, but rather

to exercise its authority as allowed in Executive Order 12993 and 

acknowledge the concerns of its own members and make appropriate 

recommendations to the Chair of PCIE and ECIE for corrective action 

regarding its unresolved investigative finding that the NASA IG lacked an 

appearance of independence. The Integrity Committee confirmed its 

opinion that the actions taken were not sufficient and restated its opinion 

in the March 20, 2007 letter to the Chair of PCIE and ECIE that it 

supported a range of actions to be considered, up to and including removal 

of the NASA IG from office. Because the Integrity Committee has the 

authority to make recommendations within the guidance of the Executive

Order, we reaffirm our report recommendation. 

Interviews with OIG 

Management 

Contrary to the NASA IG’s statement that we failed to consult with NASA 

OIG’s senior leadership on the important issues in this report, we met with 

the NASA IG and the senior OIG staff at the beginning of our review 

regarding our scope and methodology. We also coordinated a series of 

interviews through the IG’s Executive Officer with the OIG senior 

management officials responsible for all areas addressed in our report. In 

all instances, we identified the purpose of our planned contacts, and the 

IG’s Executive Officer scheduled meetings with those NASA OIG 

management staff who were best suited to address each matter. These 

included the Deputy Inspector General, the Counsel to the IG, the 

Assistant IG for Audits, the Assistant IG for Investigations, and the 

Assistant IG for Management and Planning. At the completion of our work 

Page 29 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
we met with the NASA IG and the senior OIG staff to discuss our report 

findings, conclusions, and recommendations. All meetings were 

coordinated through the IG’s office, and we were available for any input 

the IG may have wished to provide. 

Audit Coverage The NASA IG disagreed with our recommendation to revise approaches 

taken in audits to include in strategic and annual planning, performance 

audits that address NASA’s program results, effectiveness, and outcomes 

as well as audits of economy and efficiency by working closely with an 

objective outside party. Specifically, the NASA IG did not agree with our 

conclusion that the OIG’s effectiveness has been hindered by reliance on

audits that do not include evaluating NASA’s program economy, efficiency,

and effectiveness, and result in limited monetary accomplishments. The IG 

Act requires that IGs address issues of economy and efficiency and 

provide independent audits and investigations. We have removed our 

concern regarding effectiveness because of the subjective nature of 

evaluating the OIG’s efforts in this regard. However, as stated in our 

report, the NASA OIG had reported only one audit with recommendations 

for economy and efficiency and potential cost savings to the agency over 

fiscal years 2006 and 2007. Therefore, we have narrowed the focus of our 

report and our recommendation in order to address our major concern 

that the OIG has an insufficient number of economy and efficiency audits 

that result in reported monetary savings. 

In addition, the IG does not believe that our conclusions regarding audit 

coverage are sufficiently balanced to recognize audits that are focused on

areas other than economy and efficiency. Contrary to this statement, our 

report provides information stating that the OIG’s audits have addressed 

areas designated as high-risk and management challenges. We also state 

that while the OIG’s audits do not adequately address the economy and 

efficiency of NASA’s programs and operations, they do include 

recommendations for improving compliance with laws, regulations, and 

NASA policies and procedures; internal controls; and other specific areas 

of NASA’s operations. 

 

The IG provided a listing of issued audit products that he said have 

addressed economy, efficiency, and effectiveness issues and specifically 

highlighted nine examples. While the report recommendations may affect 

the economy and efficiency of NASA’s operations, none of these reports 

highlighted by the IG have specific recommendations to improve NASA’s 

economy and efficiency with potential cost savings. In addition, the 

reports’ recommendations address compliance with laws, regulations, 

Page 30 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
policies and procedures, internal controls, and other areas. In addition, 

two of the highlighted reports were not audits and made no reference to 

professional auditing standards. To illustrate our concerns regarding the 

lack of OIG audit reports with recommendations for improving NASA’s 

economy and efficiency, our report provides an example of an OIG audit 

regarding a NASA contractor’s inadequate pricing determinations. The 

audit recommends that the contracting officer ensure compliance with 

contract agreements. However, even though the OIG had the opportunity,

the report did not identify any measurable cost saving to the government 

resulting from the inadequate pricing and made no recommendations to 

help ensure that pricing determinations will be accurate in the future. 

The NASA IG states the difference between actual monetary recoveries 

from investigations and potential monetary accomplishments from audits. 

The IG comments that the results of audits are more speculative and must 

rely on the implementation of management to be realized. This statement 

acknowledges the different purposes of audits and investigations: audits 

can recommend improvements to future operations, and investigations 

tend to focus on the identification of fraudulent and illegal activities that

have occurred. 

Our review found that the OIG’s strategic and annual audit plans did not 

have goals and objectives that specifically address the economy and 

efficiency of NASA’s programs and operations. We had recommended that

the NASA IG include in strategic and annual planning, performance audits

that address NASA’s economy and efficiency with potential monetary 

savings and that the OIG work closely with an objective outside party, 

such as the PCIE, to obtain external review and consultation in the 

strategic and annual planning processes. The NASA IG stated his intent to

benchmark with the PCIE community to provide assurance that audits 

address these areas. While this is a positive statement we continue to 

make our recommendation that the IG work closely with an objective 

outside party during the strategic and annual planning processes. However 

we no longer specify that the IG work with the PCIE Audit Committee on 

this issue. 

The NASA IG also disagrees with our recommendation to identify the 

causes of high employee turnover with the assistance of an objective

expert and determine actions needed as appropriate. The IG states that we 

did not discuss employee turnover with OIG leadership. To the contrary, 

Monetary 

Accomplishments 

Audit Planning 

Staff Attrition 

Page 31 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
our discussions with OIG management, both past and present, provided 

the information on turnover in our report and alerted us to the problem of 

the OIG’s relatively high staff attrition rate. The IG also provides attrition 

rates of other agency OIGs that are all lower than that of the NASA OIG 

and supports our conclusion that the NASA OIG has a comparably high 

staff attrition rate even when compared to other OIGs. The IG also states 

that a number of steps have been taken to address the continuing 

significant turnover rates. We are encouraged that the IG is already taking

steps in this area, however, because of the OIG’s relatively high rate of 

staff attrition we are recommending that the NASA IG use the assistance 

of an objective expert to identify the causes of employee turnover. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of

this report earlier, we will not distribute it until 30 days from its date. At 

that time we will send copies of the report to the NASA Administrator; the 

NASA IG; the Chairman of the Integrity Committee; the OMB Deputy 

Director for Management; the Chairman and Ranking Member of the 

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation; interested

congressional committees; and other parties. This report will also be 

available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you have any questions or would like to discuss this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-9471 or franzelj@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix V.

Jeanette M. Franzel 

Director 

Financial Management and Assurance 

Page 32 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix I: Monetary Accomplishments 

Reported in OIGs’ Semiannual Reports to the Appendix I: Monetary Accomplishments Congress for Fiscal Year 2007 

Reported in OIGs’ Semiannual Reports to the 

Congress for Fiscal Year 2007 

Federal agency

IG total budgetary 

resources

Monetary 

accomplishments 

 Dollar return on 

IG’s budget

a

1 Social Security Administration $92,000,000 $4,802,207,264 $52.20

2 General Services Administration 58,000,000 1,121,385,515 19.33

3 Department of Transportation 71,000,000 1,086,688,396 15.31

4 Department of Education 50,000,000 639,389,462 12.79 

5 Department of Health and Human Services 285,000,000b3,537,923,000 12.41

6 Department of Housing and Urban Development 121,000,000 1,347,799,879 11.14 

7 Office of Personnel Management 19,000,000 188,856,301 9.94 

8 Department of Defense 221,000,000 2,083,836,000 9.43

9 Department of Veterans Affairs 74,000,000 670,200,000 9.06

10 Department of Justice 89,000,000 754,357,601 8.48

11 Department of Labor 73,000,000 561,849,158 7.70 

12 Small Business Administration 21,000,000 130,177,723 6.20

13 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 26,000,000 116,280,993 4.47 

14 Agency for International Development 51,000,000 193,342,475 3.79

15 Department of the Interior 43,000,000 142,527,564 3.31

16 Department of Energy 42,000,000 99,409,187 2.37 

17 Department of Commerce 23,000,000 51,736,992 2.25

18 Department of the Treasury 19,000,000 40,257,085 2.12

19 Environmental Protection Agency 54,000,000 92,792,457 1.72

20 Corporation for National and Community Service 7,000,000 11,974,636 1.71 

21 Department of State 34,000,000 52,500,036 1.54

22 Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 16,000,000c15,854,105 0.99 

23 Department of Agriculture 91,000,000 81,412,378 0.89

24 Department of Homeland Security 128,000,000 100,916,585 0.79 

25 Railroad Retirement Board 7,000,000 5,179,515 0.74

26 Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration 135,000,000 54,902,108 0.41 

27 National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration

34,000,000 12,103,809 0.36

28 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10,000,000 495,065 0.05 

29 Export-Import Bank of the United States 2,000,000 nadnad

30 Central Intelligence Agency nad

nad nad

Total $1,896,000,000 $17,996,355,289 $9.49

Source: GAO analysis of OMB and IG semiannual reports to the Congress for fiscal year 2007. 

Note: The agencies presented are those with presidentially appointed IGs confirmed by the Senate. 

Page 33 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix I: Monetary Accomplishments 

Reported in OIGs’ Semiannual Reports to the 

Congress for Fiscal Year 2007 

a

Dollar return on each IG’s budget is calculated by dividing the total monetary accomplishments by

the IG’s total budgetary resources. 

b

Includes budget authority to combat Medicare and Medicaid fraud. 

c

Amounts for TVA’s OIG are from PCIE’s fiscal year 2007 profile data. 

d

Information not available. 

Page 34 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix II: Comparison of OIGs’ Budgetary 

Resources with Total Budgetary Resources of Appendix II: Comparison of OIGs’ Budgetary Their Agencies for Fiscal Year 2007 

Resources with Total Budgetary Resources of 

Their Agencies for Fiscal Year 2007 

Dollars in millions 

Federal agency

IG total budgetary 

resources

Agency total 

budgetary resources 

IG budget resources as a 

percentage of agency 

budgetary resources

1 Nuclear Regulatory Commission $10 $910 1.10

2 Small Business Administration 21 2,869 0.73

3 Corporation for National and Community Service 7 1,154 0.62

4 Environmental Protection Agency 54 12,795 0.42

5 Agency for International Development 51 15,156a0.34

6 Export-Import Bank of the United States 2 730 0.27

7 Department of Justice 89 35,661 0.25

8 General Services Administration 58 24,756 0.23

9 Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration 135 69,016 0.20

10 Department of Commerce 23 11,926 0.19

11 National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration

34 20,011 0.17

12 Department of Homeland Security 128 75,903 0.17

13 Tennessee Valley Authority 16b9,666 0.17

14 Department of the Interior 43 26,681 0.16

15 Department of Housing and Urban Development 121 86,641 0.14

16 Department of Energy 42 34,647 0.12

17 Department of State 34 30,954c0.11

18 Department of Labor 73 76,789 0.10

19 Department of Veterans Affairs 74 96,168 0.08

20 Department of Agriculture 91 131,486 0.07

21 Department of Transportation 71 121,093 0.06

22 Railroad Retirement Board 7 12,131 0.06

23 Department of Education 50 88,037 0.06

24 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 26 53,083 0.05

25 Department of Health and Human Services 285d976,749 0.03

26 Department of Defense 221 843,179 0.03

27 Social Security Administration 92 664,305 0.014

28 Office of Personnel Management 19 201,742 0.009

29 Department of the Treasury 19 413,634e0.005

30 Central Intelligence Agency nafnafnaf

Source: GAO analysis of OMB data. 

Page 35 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix II: Comparison of OIGs’ Budgetary 

Resources with Total Budgetary Resources of

Their Agencies for Fiscal Year 2007 

Note: The agencies presented are those with IGs appointed by the President with Senate 

confirmation. 

a

Total budgetary resources are from the Agency for International Development’s fiscal year 2007

financial report. 

b

Amounts for TVA’s IG are from PCIE’s fiscal year 2007 profile data.

c

Total budgetary resources are from the State Department’s fiscal year 2007 financial report. 

d

Includes budget authority to combat Medicare and Medicaid fraud. 

e

The Department of the Treasury’s total budgetary resources excludes the Internal Revenue Service.

f

Information not available. 

Page 36 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix III: Comments from the Integrity

Appendix III: Comments from the Integrity Committee 

Committee 

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear at 

the end of this appendix. 

See comment 1. 

Page 37 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix III: Comments from the Integrity

Committee 

Page 38 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix III: Comments from the Integrity

Committee 

The following is GAO’s comment on the Integrity Committee’s letter dated October 

10, 2008. 

As the Integrity Committee stated, the information related to its activities in this 

report was obtained in connection with our separate ongoing audit of the activities 

and operations of the Integrity Committee. 

GAO Comment 

Comment 1. 

Page 39 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: C

Genera

Adm

omments from the Inspector 

l, National Aeronautics and Space 

inistration 

Page 40 GAO-09-88 

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear at 

the end of this appendix. 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

See comment 1. 

Page 41 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

Page 42 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

Page 43 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

Page 44 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

Page 45 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

See comment 2. 

See comment 3. 

Page 46 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

See comment 2. 

Page 47 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

See comment 4. 

Page 48 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

Page 49 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

See comment 5. 

Page 50 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

Page 51 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

See comment 5. 

See comment 6. 

Page 52 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

See comment 7. 

Page 53 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

Page 54 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

See comment 8. 

Page 55 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

Page 56 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

Page 57 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

See comment 9. 

Page 58 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

Page 59 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

Page 60 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

Page 61 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

Page 62 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

Page 63 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

Page 64 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

Page 65 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

Page 66 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

Page 67 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from the Inspector 

General, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

Page 68 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from

the Inspector General, National

Aeronautics and Space

Administration 

The following are GAO’s comments on the NASA Inspector General’s letter

dated October 14, 2008. 

The meetings referred to by the IG do not result in an endorsement of the 

OIG’s work plans but rather are discussions between the NASA OIG and 

GAO for purposes of coordination and cooperation. Our review of the 

NASA OIG’s strategic and annual plans on this audit was in response to 

our findings regarding the need for additional oversight of NASA’s 

economy and efficiency and measurable potential cost savings from OIG 

audits. We are encouraged by the NASA IG’s intent to benchmark with the 

PCIE community to provide assurance that audits addressing program 

effectiveness, economy, and efficiency fulfill the OIG mission. Therefore, 

we have modified our report recommendation to have the OIG work 

closely with an objective outside party to include audits of NASA’s 

economy and efficiency with potential monetary savings in strategic and 

annual plans. 

The IG’s comments do not cite any specific recommendations that are 

targeted toward economy and efficiency with potential cost savings. In 

addition, we reviewed all the recommendations in the OIG’s audit 

products issued during fiscal years 2006 and 2007 and found only one 

report with these types of recommendations. By providing the titles of OIG 

reports, the IG provides little if any additional information on whether 

economy and efficiency issues were addressed by the outcomes of the 

reports. Therefore, our report continues to focus on the OIG’s lack of 

economy and efficiency audit results with measurable cost savings as well 

as the lack of a strategy for dealing with these types of objectives in the 

annual and strategic audit plans. 

The OIG’s audit of NASA’s plan for Space Shuttle transition concluded that 

NASA’s transition plan did not comprehensively address all elements 

critical for a successful transition and recommended that the planning be

enhanced and that the transition be recognized as an agency management 

challenge. Neither this report nor any other OIG report issued during fiscal 

years 2006 and 2007 had any specific recommendations to improve NASA’s 

economy and efficiency with measurable cost savings related to this 

important and costly transition program. 

GAO Comments 

Comment 1. 

Comment 2. 

Comment 3. 

Page 69 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from

the Inspector General, National

Aeronautics and Space

Administration 

We did not include the percent of OIG recommendations implemented as 

part of our review. We evaluated the substance of the recommendations to 

determine whether they identified opportunities for improvements to 

NASA’s economy and efficiency with measurable potential cost savings. 

Comment 4. 

This investigation was a coordinated effort by several offices including 

those from NASA, components of the Department of Defense, and 

academia, but was not performed by the NASA OIG. Our scope was to 

review the results of audits and investigations by the OIG and thus,we did 

not include it in our review. 

Comment 5. 

The IG also provided the title of an investigative report regarding 

allegations that NASA had suppressed climate change information as an 

example of an accomplishment. This information does not deal with the 

economy and efficiency of NASA’s programs and operations and monetary 

accomplishments which is a focus of our findings and recommendations. 

We did not consider DCAA audits to be related to the NASA OIG’s 

accomplishments since they are routinely provided as a service to NASA’s 

contracting officers. The NASA IG points out that in our comparison of 

monetary accomplishments and the return on investment by 30 IG offices 

where the IGs are appointed by the President and confirmed by the 

Senate, our presentation of monetary accomplishments for the 

Department of Agriculture OIG and the Department of Homeland Security 

OIG includes the accomplishments of DCAA. Accordingly, we have 

removed the DCAA amounts from the accomplishments reported for these 

OIGs and adjusted the total monetary accomplishments for all 30 OIGs for 

fiscal year 2007 from a $9.52 dollar return on all their budgets to a $9.49 

return. This did not affect the status of the NASA OIG’s monetary 

accomplishments, which continues to be a $0.36 dollar return on the OIG’s 

budgetary resources and continues to rank 27th out of 28 OIGs reporting 

such accomplishments for fiscal year 2007. 

Comment 6. 

We selected fiscal year 2007 for comparison because at the time of our 

review it was the most recent full year with comparative data among the

OIGs, and it was the year with the largest reported dollar savings resulting 

from NASA OIG’s audits. However, in response to the NASA IG’s 

suggestion that we provide data on accomplishments over a 5-year period,

we added table 4 to our report. It shows the NASA OIG’s monetary 

accomplishments from fiscal years 2003 through 2007 and further supports 

Comment 7. 

Page 70 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix IV: Comments from

the Inspector General, National

Aeronautics and Space

Administration 

our conclusion that the OIG provides limited monetary accomplishments 

from audits. 

We agree that the NASA IG should be committed to the full range of 

activities and objectives stated in the IG Act. Those objectives and 

activities include audits that result in recommendations to improve the 

economy and efficiency of NASA’s programs and operations with 

measurable cost savings, as well as receiving whistleblower complaints. 

Comment 8. 

Our review compared the NASA OIG’s total budgetary resources to 

NASA’s total budgetary resources for fiscal years 2003 through 2007 to 

determine whether the OIG’s budgets were increasing or decreasing 

relative to NASA’s overall budgets. As stated in our report, the OIG’s 

budget as a percent of NASA’s budget increased from 0.15 to 0.17 percent

during this period. The NASA IG states that $3.5 million in funding was 

shifted from NASA to the OIG to pay for financial audits but cites this as 

having no actual impact on funds available for OIG operations. We 

disagree that these funds do not contribute to the resources available for

OIG operations. The NASA IG is subject to the Chief Financial Officers Act 

of 19901

 which specifies that the IG is responsible for the financial 

statement audits of the agency. The increase of $3.5 million provides 

resources in the OIG’s budget for these mandated audits. As stated in our

report, over the 5-year period we reviewed the OIG’s budgets kept pace

with or were slightly better than NASA’s budgets as a whole. In addition, 

when compared to other OIGs for fiscal year 2007, the NASA OIG ranked 

11th out of 30 agencies in the ratio of the OIGs’ budgets to their agencies’

budgets.

Comment 9. 

 1

Pub. L. No. 101-576, 104 Stat. 2838 (Nov. 15, 1990). 

Page 71 GAO-09-88 NASA Office of Inspector General
Appendix V: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 72 GAO-09-88 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Jeanette M. Franzel, (202) 512-9471 or franzelj@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Jackson Hufnagle, Assistant 

Director; Francis Dymond; Jacquelyn Hamilton; Jason Kirwan; and 

Clarence Whitt made key contributions to this report. 

 NASA Office of Inspector General

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

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