U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

45–666 PDF 2008

S. HRG. 110–635

THE SITUATION IN IRAQ AND PROGRESS MADE

BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IN MEETING

BENCHMARKS AND ACHIEVING RECONCILIATION

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 8, 9, AND 10, 2008

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

(

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia, 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

MICHAEL V. KOSTIW, Republican Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

THE SITUATION IN IRAQ AND PROGRESS MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IN

MEETING BENCHMARKS AND ACHIEVING RECONCILIATION

APRIL 8, 2008

Page

Petraeus, GEN David H., USA, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq .......... 7

Crocker, Ambassador Ryan C., United States Ambassador to Iraq .................... 21

THE SITUATION IN IRAQ AND PROGRESS MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IN

MEETING THE BENCHMARKS AND ACHIEVING RECONCILIATION

APRIL 9, 2008

Bacevich, Andrew J., Professor of International Relations and History, Boston 

University ............................................................................................................. 95

Keane, GEN John M. USA (Ret.), Senior Managing Director, Keane Advisors, 

LLC ........................................................................................................................ 100

Malley, Robert, Middle East and North Africa Program Director, International Crisis Group .......................................................................................... 105

THE SITUATION IN IRAQ, PROGRESS MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IN MEETING BENCHMARKS AND ACHIEVING RECONCILIATION, THE FUTURE U.S. MILITARY

PRESENCE IN IRAQ, AND THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

APRIL 10, 2008

Gates, Hon. Robert M., Secretary of Defense ........................................................ 161

Mullen, Admiral Michael G., USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff .................. 165

(III) 

(1)

THE SITUATION IN IRAQ AND PROGRESS 

MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IN 

MEETING BENCHMARKS AND ACHIEVING 

RECONCILIATION 

TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room SD–

106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy, 

Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, 

Clinton, Pryor, Webb, McCaskill, McCain, Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, Chambliss, Graham, Cornyn, Thune, Martinez, and 

Wicker. 

Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional 

staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Thomas K. McConnell, 

professional staff member; Michael J. McCord, professional staff 

member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican 

staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; 

David G. Collins, research assistant; Paul C. Hutton IV, research 

assistant; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; David M. 

Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff 

member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; Lynn F. 

Rusten, professional staff member; and Dana W. White, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Ali Z. Pasha, and 

Brian F. Sebold. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman and 

Jay Maroney, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to 

Senator Reed; Bonni Berge, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R. 

Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator 

Clinton; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. 

Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen C. Hedger, assistant 

to Senator McCaskill; Richard H. Fontaine, Jr., assistant to SenVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:23 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\45666.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
2

ator McCain; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony 

J. Lazarski and Nathan Reese, assistants to Senator Inhofe; Todd 

Stiefler, assistant to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to 

Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator 

Chambliss; Andrew King, assistant to Senator Graham; Lindsey 

Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; Brian Polley, assistant to Senator 

Cornyn; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Brian W. 

Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez; and Erskine W. Wells III, 

assistant to Senator Wicker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. 

First, let us welcome General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, 

we thank you for joining us today. We thank you for your service 

to our Nation, and please express our deep gratitude to the men 

and women serving in Iraq, both in our Armed Forces, and the civilian agencies of our Government. We look forward to your report 

and recommendations as to where we go from here. 

Until recent attacks on the Green Zone, heightened attacks on 

our forces, and violent events in Basrah and Baghdad, the surge, 

along with other factors, appeared to have achieved some success 

in reducing violence in Iraq. 

This newly increased violence raises questions about the military 

success of the surge, but more significantly, the purpose of the 

surge as announced by President Bush last year, which was to give 

the Iraqi leaders breathing room to work out a settlement, has not 

been achieved. That reality lead many of us to, once again, challenge President Bush’s policy. 

During my recent trip to Iraq, just before the latest outbreak of 

violence, a senior U.S. military officer told me that he asked an 

Iraqi official, why is it that we’re using our U.S. dollars to pay your 

people to clean up your town, instead of you using your funds? The 

Iraqi replied, ‘‘As long as you are willing to pay for the cleanup, 

why should we do it?’’ 

This story crystallizes a fundamental problem of our policy in 

Iraq. It highlights the need to change our current course in order 

to shift responsibility from our troops and our taxpayers to the 

Iraqi Government, and force that government to take responsibility 

for their own future politically, economically, and militarily. 

Our current open-ended commitment is an invitation to continuing dependency. An open-ended pause, starting in July, would 

be just the next page in a war plan with no exit strategy. 

Another senior U.S. military officer in Iraq put it 2 weeks ago, 

it’s time to take the training wheels off and it’s time to take our 

hands off the Iraqi bicycle seat. 

The Bush administration’s strategy has been built on the assumption that, so long as we continue to provide the Maliki Government with plenty of time, military support, and financial assistance, they will take responsibility for Iraq and its people. 

The major political steps that they need to take have not yet 

been taken by the Iraqis, including establishing a framework for 

controlling and sharing oil revenues, adapting an election law so 

that provincial elections can take place, and considering amendments to their constitution. 

3

Even the few small political steps that have been taken by the 

Iraqis are in jeopardy because of the incompetence and obsessively 

sectarian leadership of Mr. Maliki. 

Last week, this incompetence was dramatized in a military operation in Basrah. Far from being the defining moment that President Bush described, it was a haphazardly planned operation, carried out apparently without meaningful consultation with the U.S. 

military or even key Iraqi leaders, while Maliki made unrealistic 

claims, promises, and threats. 

In January of last year, when President Bush announced the 

surge, he said the Iraqi Government planned to take responsibility 

for security across Iraq by the end of 2007. The President also 

pledged to hold the Iraqi Government to a number of other political 

benchmarks which were supposed to be achieved by the end of 

2007. Instead of forcefully pressing for political progress, President 

Bush has failed to hold the Maliki Government to their promises, 

showering them instead with praise that they are bold and strong. 

The President has ignored the view of his own military leaders. 

A State Department report less than 5 months ago included the 

quote, ‘‘the intransigence of Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government is 

a key threat facing the United States’ efforts in Iraq, rather than 

al Qaeda terrorists, Sunni insurgents, or Iranian-backed militia.’’ 

Now violence appears to be on the rise, and President Bush is 

once again taking pressure off of Maliki if he announces that reductions of our troops will be halted in July, and that the pause 

is open-ended. 

On the economic side, 5 years after the war began, skyrocketing 

oil prices have swelled Iraqi oil revenues beyond all expectation. 

Iraq now has tens of billions of dollars in surplus funds in their 

banks, and in accounts around the world, including about $30 billion in U.S. banks. 

The Iraqi leaders and bureaucrats aren’t spending their funds. 

The result is, that far from financing its own reconstruction as the 

administration promised 5 years ago, the Iraqi Government has left 

the U.S. to make most of the capital expenditures needed to provide essential services and improve the quality of life of Iraqi citizens. 

American taxpayers are spending vast sums on reconstruction efforts. For example, the U.S. has spent over $27 billion to date on 

major infrastructure projects, job training, education and training, 

and equipping of Iraqi security forces (ISFs). 

On the other hand, according to the Special Inspector General for 

Iraq Reconstruction, the Iraqi Government budgeted $6.2 billion for 

its capital budget in 2006, but spent less than a quarter of that. 

As of August 31, 2007, the Iraqi Government has spent somewhere 

between 4.4 percent, according to the Government Accountability 

Office, and 24 percent according to the White House, of its $10 billion capital budget for 2007. 

As of last Thursday, the United States is paying the salaries of 

almost 100,000 Iraqis who are working on the reconstruction. To 

add insult to injury, in addition to spending tens of billions of U.S. 

dollars on reconstruction, American taxpayers are also paying $3 to 

$4 a gallon for gas here at home, much of which originates in the 

Middle East, including Iraq. 

4

The Iraqi Government seems content to sit by, build up surpluses, and let Americans reconstruct their country and let Americans foot the bill. But the American people surely aren’t content 

with that, and the Bush administration shouldn’t be either. 

Militarily, 5 years after the war began, the Iraqi Army now numbers 160,000 soldiers, over 60 percent of whom, according to our 

own statistics, are capable of taking the lead in operations carried 

out in conjunction with U.S. troops. 

However, in 4 key Northern Provinces where the Iraqis have 

50,000 trained soldiers, the United States forces number 20,000. 

We were told on our recent visit that from December 29, 2007 

through March 16, 2008, there were 110 combined U.S.-Iraqi operations of a company size, or greater, and that the Iraqi Army led 

in just 10 of those 110 operations. 

As the fighting in Basrah and Baghdad demonstrates, we are 

being drawn deeper into what General Raymond T. Odierno described here last week as an intercommunal conflict. That conflict, 

which has nothing to do with al Qaeda and everything to do with 

a civil war, appears to be brewing. 

There is a consensus among the President’s supporters and critics alike that there is no military solution to this conflict and there 

will be no end to it unless the Iraqi political leaders take responsibility for the country’s future. 

An announcement of an open-ended pause on troop reductions, 

starting in July, would simply send the wrong message to the Iraqi 

leaders. Rather, we need to put continuous and increasing pressure 

on the Iraqis to settle their political differences, to pay for their 

own reconstruction effort with their oil windfalls, and to take the 

lead in conducting military operations. 

The way to do that is to adopt a reasonable timetable for a 

change in mission and redeployment of our troops. Gradually shifting responsibility to the Iraqis for their own future—politically, 

militarily, and economically—is our best hope for a successful outcome in Iraq and represents, finally, an exit strategy for most of 

our troops. 

Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome back 

to our two distinguished witnesses. 

We’ve come a long way since early 2007 and quite a distance, 

even, since General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker appeared 

before our committee last September. We owe these two patriotic 

Americans a debt of gratitude for their selfless service to our country. 

At the beginning of last year, we were engaged in a great debate 

about what to do in Iraq. Four years of mismanaged war had 

brought us almost to the point of no return. Sectarian violence in 

Iraq was spiraling out of control, life had become a struggle for survival, and a full-scale civil war seemed almost unavoidable. Al 

Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was on the offensive and entire Iraqi provinces 

were under the control of extremists. 

Yet, rather than retreat from Iraq and face, thereby, the terrible 

consequences that would ensue, we chose to change strategies to 

5

try to turn things around. Instead of abandoning Iraq to civil war, 

genocide, and terror, and the Middle East to the destabilizing effects of these consequences, we changed the strategy and sent additional troops to carry it out. By the time our two witnesses testified 

in September, it had become clear that these new efforts were succeeding. 

Since the middle of last year, sectarian and ethnic violence, civilian deaths, and deaths of coalition forces have all fallen dramatically. This improved security environment has led to a new opportunity; one in which average Iraqis can, in the future, approach 

more normal political and economic life. 

Reconciliation has moved forward, and over the weekend, Sunni, 

Shiite, and Kurdish leaders backed the Prime Minister in a statement supporting his operation in Basrah, and urging the disbandment of all militias. 

Much, much more needs to be done, and Iraqi leaders need to 

know that we expect them to show the necessary leadership to rebuild their country, for only they can. But today, it is possible to 

talk with real hope and optimism about the future of Iraq and the 

outcome of our efforts there. 

While the job of bringing security to Iraq is not finished, as the 

recent fighting in Basrah and elsewhere vividly demonstrated, 

we’re no longer staring into the abyss of defeat and we can now 

look ahead to the genuine prospect of success. 

Success: the establishment of a peaceful, stable, prosperous, 

democratic state that poses no threats to its neighbors and contributes to the defeat of terrorists, this success is within reach. With 

success, Iraqi forces will take responsibility for enforcing security 

in their country, and American troops can return home with the 

honor of having secured their country’s interests at great personal 

cost, and of helping other people achieve peace and self-determination. 

That’s what I hope every American desires for our country and 

for our mission in Iraq. But should the United States, instead, 

choose to withdraw from Iraq before Iraq’s security is established 

we will exchange for this victory a defeat that is terrible and 

longlasting. 

AQI will claim victory, and increase its efforts to promote sectarian tensions, pushing for a full-scale civil war. It could descend 

into genocide and destabilize the Middle East. Iraq would become 

a failed state and it could become a haven for terrorists to train 

and plan their operations. 

Iranian influence would increase substantially in Iraq, and Iran 

would encourage other countries to seek accommodation of Tehran 

at the expense of our interests. 

An American failure would almost certainly require us to return 

to Iraq, or draw us into a wider, far, far costlier war. 

On the other hand, when the Iraqis are able to build on the opportunity provided by recent successes, they will have a chance to 

leave in Iraq a force for stability and freedom, not conflict and 

chaos. In doing so, we will ensure that the terrible price we are 

paying in the war, a price that has made all of us sick at heart, 

has not been paid in vain. 

6

Our troops can leave behind a successful mission, and our Nation 

can leave behind a country that contributes to the security of 

America and the world. To do this, we must continue to help the 

Iraqis protect themselves against the terrorists and the insurgents. 

We must press ahead against al Qaeda, the radical Shiite militias, and the Iranian-backed special groups. We must continue to 

support the Sunni volunteers and the Iraqi Awakening as they 

stand up to AQI. We must continue to build the ISFs so they can 

play an ever-stronger and more neutral role in suppressing violence. 

This means rejecting, as we did in 2007, calls for a reckless and 

irresponsible withdrawal of our forces at the moment when they 

are succeeding. I do not want to keep our troops in Iraq a minute 

longer than necessary to secure our interests there. Our hope, my 

hope, is an Iraq that no longer needs American troops, and I believe we can achieve that goal, perhaps sooner than many imagine. 

But I also believe the promise of withdrawal of our forces, regardless of the consequences, would constitute a failure of political and 

moral leadership. 

Achieving our goals in Iraq will require much more than a military effort. Arab neighbors should increase their investment and 

engagement, including an overdue dispatch of ambassadors to 

Baghdad. We should encourage greater United Nations (U.N.) involvement, building on the work that representatives have done on 

Kirkuk recently. 

Iraqis must continue the reconciliation that has helped dampen 

violence over recent months, and they need to move a portion of 

their budget surpluses into job creation programs, move toward an 

end to their reliance on outside sources of aid, and look for other 

ways to take on more of the financial burdens currently borne by 

American taxpayers. 

This is especially important as the Government of Iraq continues 

to take in revenues it finds difficult to disburse through its own 

government channels. One way they begin to do this is by contributing significantly to the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) which pays for the employment of reconstruction 

projects throughout the country. This is a start. Other programs of 

this type can and should be funded by the Iraqis themselves. 

By giving our men and women in uniform the time and support 

necessary to succeed in Iraq, we have before us a hard road. It is 

a privilege beyond measure to live in a country served so well by 

these individuals. The sacrifices made by these patriots and their 

families are incredibly great, and the alternative path is, in the 

end, a far costlier one. 

As we convene this hearing, and as we continue to debate our future in Iraq, Americans continue to risk everything to accomplish 

their mission on our behalf. Given the untold cost of a failure and 

the benefits offered by success, Congress must not choose to lose 

in Iraq. We should choose instead to succeed. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Again, a warm welcome to you, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. 

General Petraeus, will you begin? 

7

STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, COMMANDER, 

MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, 

and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to 

provide an update on the security situation in Iraq, and to discuss 

the recommendations that I recently provided to my chain of command. 

Since Ambassador Crocker and I appeared before you 7 months 

ago, there has been significant, but uneven, security progress in 

Iraq. Since September, levels of violence and civilian deaths have 

been reduced substantially. AQI and other extremist elements have 

been dealt serious blows, the capabilities of ISF elements have 

grown, and there has been noteworthy involvement of local Iraqis 

and local security. 

Nonetheless, the situation in certain areas is still unsatisfactory 

and innumerable challenges remain. Moreover, as events in the 

last 2 weeks have reminded us, and as I have repeatedly cautioned, 

the progress made since last spring is fragile and reversible. 

Still, security in Iraq is better than it was when Ambassador 

Crocker and I reported to you last September, and it is significantly better than it was 15 months ago when Iraq was on the 

brink of civil war and the decision was made to deploy additional 

forces to Iraq. 

A number of factors have contributed to the progress that has 

been made. First, of course, has been the impact of increased numbers of coalition and Iraqi forces. We’re well aware of the U.S. 

surge, let us recognize that Iraqis also conducted a surge, adding 

well over 100,000 additional soldiers and police to the ranks of the 

security forces in 2007 and slowly increasing its capability to deploy and employ these forces. 

The second factor has been the employment of coalition and Iraqi 

forces in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations across the 

country, deployed together to safeguard the Iraqi people, to pursue 

AQI, to combat criminal elements and militia extremists, to foster 

local reconciliation, and to enable political and economic progress. 

Another important factor has been an attitudinal shift among 

certain elements of the Iraqi population. Since the first Sunni 

Awakening in late 2006, Sunni communities in Iraq increasingly 

have rejected AQI’s indiscriminate violence and extremist ideology. 

These communities also recognize that they cannot share in 

Iraq’s bounty if they didn’t participate in the political arena. Over 

time, awakenings have prompted tens of thousands of Iraqis, some 

former insurgents, to contribute to local security, the so-called Sons 

of Iraq. With their assistance and the relentless pursuit of AQI, the 

threat posed by AQI, while still lethal and substantial, has been reduced significantly. 

The recent threat in Basrah, southern Iraq, and Baghdad underscored the importance of a ceasefire declared by Muqtada al-Sadr 

last fall, another factor in the overall reduction in violence. 

Recently, some militia elements became active again, but an alSadr stand down did resolve the situation to a degree. The flareup also highlighted the destructive role Iran has played in funding, 

training, arming, and directing the so-called Special Groups, and 

generated a renewed concern about Iran in the minds of many 

8

Iraqi leaders. Unchecked, the Special Groups pose the greatest 

long-term threat to the viability of a democratic Iraq. 

As we look to the future, our task together with our Iraqi partners will be to build on the progress achieved and to deal with the 

many challenges that remain. I do believe that we can do this 

while continuing the ongoing drawdown of the surge forces. 

In September, I described the fundamental nature of the conflict 

in Iraq as a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities 

for power and resources. This competition continues, influenced 

heavily by outside actors. Resolution remains the key to producing 

long-term stability in Iraq. 

Various elements push Iraq’s ethno-sectarian competition toward 

violence. Terrorists, insurgents, militias, extremists, and criminal 

gangs pose a significant threat. Al Qaeda senior leaders who still 

view Iraq as the central front in their global strategy send funding, 

direction, and foreign fighters to Iraq. 

Actions by neighboring states compound Iraq’s challenges. Syria 

has taken some steps to reduce the flow of foreign fighters from its 

territory, but not enough to shut down the key members of AQI. 

Iran has fueled violence, as I noted, in a particularly damaging 

way, through its lethal support for these Special Groups. 

Finally, insufficient Iraqi governmental capacity, increased sectarian mistrust, and corruption add to Iraq’s problems. These challenges and a recent week’s violence notwithstanding, Iraq’s ethnosectarian competition in many areas is now taking place more as 

debate and less through violence. 

In fact, the recent escalation of violence in Baghdad and Southern Iraq was dealt with, temporarily at least, by most parties acknowledging that the rational way ahead is through political dialogue, rather than street fighting. 

As I stated at the outset, though Iraq remains a violent country, 

we do see progress in the sectarian arena. As this chart (slide 1) 

illustrates, for nearly 6 months, security incidents have been at a 

level not seen since early to mid-2005, though the level has spiked 

in recent weeks as a result of the fighting in Basrah and Baghdad. 

[The chart referred to follows:] 

9

The level of incidents has already begun to turn down again, 

though the period ahead will be a sensitive one. As our primary 

mission is to help protect the population, we closely monitor the 

number of Iraqi civilians killed through the violence. As this chart 

(slide 2) reflects, civilian deaths have decreased over the past year 

to a level not seen since the early 2006 Samarra Mosque bombing 

that set off a cycle of sectarianism violence that tore apart the fabric of Iraqi society in 2006 and early 2007. 

This chart (slide 2) also reflects our increasing use of Iraqi-provided reports, with the top line reflecting coalition and Iraqi data, 

and the bottom line reflecting coalition return data only. 

[The chart referred to follows:] 


408ful1.eps
10

No matter which data is used, civilian deaths due to violence 

have been reduced significantly, but more clearly needs to be done. 

Ethno-sectarian violence is a particular concern in Iraq as it is 

a cancer that continues to spread if left unchecked. As the box at 

the bottom left of this chart (slide 3) shows, the number of deaths 

from ethno-sectarian violence has fallen since we testified last September. A big factor has been a reduction of deaths by sectarian 

violence in Baghdad. Density blocks for this are shown in the box 

depicting Iraq’s capital over time. 

[The chart referred to follows:] 


408ful2.eps
11

Some of this decrease is, to be sure, due to sectarian hardening 

of certain Baghdad neighborhoods. However, that is only a partial 

explanation, as countless sectarian fault lines and numerous mixed 

neighborhoods still exist in Baghdad and elsewhere. 

In fact, coalition and Iraqi forces have off loaded along the fault 

line, to reduce the violence and enable Sunni and Shiite leaders to 

begin the long process of healing into their local communities. 

As this next chart (slide 4) shows, even though the number of 

hard-core violent attacks increased in March as AQI lashed out, 

the current level of attacks like this remains far below its height 

a year ago. Moreover, as we have helped improve security and focused on enemy networks, we have seen a decrease in the effectiveness of such attacks. 

[The chart referred to follows:] 


408ful3.eps
12

The number of deaths due to ethno-sectarian violence, in particular, remain relatively low, demonstrating the enemy’s inability 

to reignite the cycle of ethno-sectarian violence. 

The emergence of Iraqi volunteers to help secure their local communities has been an important element. As this chart (slide 5) depicts, there are now over 91,000 Sons of Iraq, Shiite as well as 

Sunni, under contract to help coalition and Iraqi forces protect 

their neighborhoods and secure infrastructure and roads. 

[The chart referred to follows:] 


408ful4.eps
13

These volunteers have contributed significantly in the savings of 

vehicles not lost because of reduced violence, not to mention the 

priceless lives saved, that far outweigh the costs of the Iraqi contracts. 

The Sons of Iraq have also contributed to the discovery of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and weapons in explosive caches. As 

this next chart (slide 6) shows, we have already found more caches 

in 2008 than we found in all of 2006. 

[The chart referred to follows:] 


408ful5.eps
14

Given the importance of the Sons of Iraq, we’re working closely 

with the Iraqi Government to transition the ISFs into other forms 

of employment, and over 21,000 have already been accepted into 

the police force or other government jobs. This process has been 

slow, but it is taking place, and we will continue to monitor it carefully. 

Al Qaeda also recognizes the significance of the Sons of Iraq, and 

they rely on this to target it and reveal it. However, these attacks, 

in addition to widespread use of women, children, and the handicapped as suicide bombers, have further alienated AQI from the 

Iraqi people. The tenacious pursuit of AQI, together with AQI’s loss 

of global support in many areas, has substantially reduced its capability, numbers, and freedom of movement. This chart (slide 7) displays the key military effect of the effort against AQI, and its insurgent allies. As you can see, we’ve reduced considerably the areas 

in which al Qaeda enjoys support and sanctuary, but clearly there 

is more to be done. 

[The chart referred to follows:] 


408ful6.eps
15

Having noted that progress, al Qaeda is still capable of lethal attacks, and we must maintain relentless pressure on the organization, on the networks outside Iraq that support it, and on the resource flows that sustain it. 

This chart (slide 8) lays out a comprehensive strategy that we, 

the Iraqis, and our interagency and international partners are employing to reduce what AQI needs. As you can see, defeating AQI 

requires not just actions by our elite counterterrorist forces, but 

also major operations by coalition and Iraqi conventional forces, a 

sophisticated intelligence effort, political reconciliation, economic 

and social programs, information operations initiatives, diplomatic 

activity, the employment counterinsurgency principles and detainee 

operations, and many other actions. 

[The chart referred to follows:] 


408ful7.eps
16

Related to this effort, I applaud Congress’s support for additional 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets in the 

upcoming supplemental, as ISR is vital to the success of our operations in Iraq and elsewhere. 

As we combat AQI, we must remember that doing so not only reduces a major source of instability in Iraq, it also weakens an organization that al Qaeda’s senior leaders view as a pool to spread its 

influence, and forment regional instability. 

Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri have consistently advocated exploiting the situation in Iraq, and we have also seen AQI 

involved in destabilizing activities in the wider Mid-East Region. 

Together with the ISFs, we have also focused on the Special 

Groups. These elements are funded, trained, armed, and directed 

by Iran’s Quds Force, with help from Lebanese Hezbollah. It was 

these groups that launched Iranian rockets and mortar rounds at 

Iraq’s seat of government 2 weeks ago, causing loss of innocent life 

and fear in the capital, and requiring Iraqi and coalition actions in 

response. 

Iraqi and coalition leaders have repeatedly noted their desire 

that Iran live up to the promises made by President Ahmadinejad 

and other senior Iranian leaders to stop their support for the Special Groups. However, nefarious activities by the Quds Force have 

continued, and Iraqi leaders now clearly recognize the threat they 

pose to Iraq. We should all watch Iranian actions closely in the 

weeks and months ahead, as they will show the kind of relationship Iran wishes to have with its neighbor, and the character of future Iranian involvement in Iraq. 

The ISFs have continued to develop since September, and we 

have transferred responsibilities to Iraqi forces as their capabilities 

and conditions on the ground have permitted. 


408ful8.eps
17

Currently, as this chart (slide 9) shows, half of Iraq’s 18 provinces are under provincial Iraqi control. Many of these provinces, 

not just the successful ones in the Kurdish regional government 

area, but also a number of Southern Provinces have done well. 

[The chart referred to follows:] 

Challenges have emerged in some other areas, including, of 

course, Basrah. Nonetheless, this process will continue, and we expect Anbar and Qadisiyyah Provinces to transition in the months 

ahead. 

Iraqi forces have grown significantly since September, and over 

540,000 individuals now serve in the ISFs. The number of combat 

battalions capable of taking the lead in operations, albeit with 

some coalition support, has grown to well over 100 (slide 10). These 

units are bearing an increasing share of the burden, as evidenced 

by the fact that ISF losses have recently been three times our own. 

We will, of course, conduct careful after-action reviews with our 

Iraqi partners in the wake of recent operations, as there were units 

and leaders found wanting in some cases, and some of our assessments may be downgraded as a result. 

[The chart referred to follows:] 


408ful9.eps
18

Nonetheless, the performance of many units was solid, especially 

once they got their footing, and gained a degree of confidence and 

certain Iraqi elements proved quite capable. 

Underpinning the advances of the past year has been improvements in Iraq’s security institutions. An increasingly robust Iraqirun training base enabled the ISFs to grow by over 133,000 soldiers and police over the past 16 months, and the still-expanding 

training base is expected to generate an additional 50,000 Iraqi soldiers and 16 Army and Special Operations Battalions through the 

rest of 2008, along with 23,000 police and 9 National Police Battalions. 

Additionally, Iraq’s security ministries are steadily improving 

their ability to execute their budgets. As this chart (slide 11) 

shows, in 2007, as in 2006, Iraq’s Security Ministry spent more on 

their forces than the United States provided through the ISF Fund 

(ISFF). We anticipate that Iraq will spend over $8 billion on security this year, and $11 billion next year. This projection enabled us 

recently to reduce significantly our ISFF request for fiscal year 

2009 from $5.1 billion to $2.8 billion. 

[The chart referred to follows:] 


408ful10.eps
19

While improved, ISFs are not yet ready to defend Iraq or maintain security throughout the country on their own. Recent operations in Basrah highlighted improvements in the ability of the 

ISFs to deploy substantial numbers of units, supplies, and replacements on very short notice. They certainly could not have deployed 

a division’s-worth of army and police units on such short notice a 

year ago. 

On the other hand, the recent operations also underscored the 

considerable work still to be done in the area of logistics, force 

enablers, staff development, and command and control. 

We also continue to help Iraq through the U.S. Foreign Military 

Sales (FMS) Program. As of March 2008, the Iraqi Government has 

purchased over $2 billion worth of equipment and services of American origin through FMS. Since September, and with your encouragement of the organizations and the FMS process, delivery has 

improved as the FMS system has strived to support urgent wartime requirements. 

On a related note, I would ask that Congress consider restoring 

funding for the International Military Education and Training Program, which supports education for mid- and senior-level Iraqi 

military and civilian leaders, and is an important component of the 

development of the leaders Iraq will need in the future. 

While security has improved in many areas, and the ISFs are 

shouldering more of the load, the situation in Iraq remains exceedingly complex and challenging. Iraq can face a resurgence of AQI, 

or additional Shiite groups could violate Muqtada al-Sadr’s ceasefire order, and return to violence. 

External actors, like Iran, could stoke violence within Iraq, and 

actions by other neighbors could undermine the security situation, 

as well. 


408ful11.eps
20

Other challenges result, paradoxically, from improved security 

which has provided opportunities for political and economic 

progress, and improved services at the local, provincial, and national levels. 

But the improvements have also created expectations that 

progress will continue. In the coming months, Iraq’s leaders must 

strengthen governmental capacity, execute budgets, pass additional 

legislation, conduct provincial elections, carry out a census, determine the status of disputed territories, and resettle internally displaced persons and refugees. These tasks would challenge any government, much less a still-developing government, tested by war. 

The CERP, the State Department’s Quick Response Fund, and 

the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 

programs enable us to help Iraq deal with its challenges. 

To that end, I respectfully ask that you provide us, by June, the 

additional CERP funds requested in the supplemental. These funds 

have an enormous impact. As I noted earlier, the salaries paid to 

the Sons of Iraq alone cost far less than the cost savings in vehicles 

not lost due to the enhanced security in local communities. Encouragingly, the Iraqi Government recently allocated $300 

million for us to manage as Iraqi CERP, to perform projects for 

their people, while building their own capacity to do so. The Iraqi Government has also committed $163 million to gradu- ally assume Sons of Iraq contracts, $510 million for small business 

loans, and $196 million for a joint training, education, and reintegration program. 

The Iraqi Government pledges to provide more as they execute 

the budget passed 2 months ago. Nonetheless, it is hugely important to have our resources continue, even as Iraqi funding begins 

to outstrip ours. 

Last month, I provided my chain-of-command recommendations 

for the way ahead in Iraq. During that process, I noted the objective of retaining and building on our hard-fought security gains, 

while we draw down to the pre-surge level of 15 brigade combat 

teams. I emphasized the need to continue work with our Iraqi partners to secure the population, and to transition responsibilities to 

the Iraqis as quickly as conditions permit, but without jeopardizing 

the security gains that have been made. 

As in September, my recommendations are informed by operational and strategic considerations. The operational considerations 

include recognition that the military surge has achieved progress, 

but that that progress is reversible. ISFs have strengthened their 

capability, but still must grow further. The provincial elections in 

the fall, refugee returns, detainee releases, and efforts to resolve 

provisional boundary disputes and Article 140 issues will be very 

challenging. 

The transition of Sons of Iraq into ISFs or other pursuits will require time and careful monitoring. Withdrawing too many forces 

too quickly could jeopardize the progress of the past year, and performing the necessary tasks in Iraq will require sizable conventional forces, as well as Special Operations Forces and advisor 

teams. 

The strategic considerations include recognition that the strain 

on the U.S. military, especially on its ground forces, has been conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:23 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\45666.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
21

siderable. A number of security challenges inside Iraq are also related to significant regional and global threats. 

A failed state in Iraq would pose serious consequences for the 

greater fight against al Qaeda, for regional stability, for the already existing humanitarian crisis in Iraq, and for the efforts to 

counter-malign Iranian influence. 

After weighing these factors, I recommended to my chain of command that we continue the drawdown of the surge combat forces, 

and that upon the withdrawal of the last surge brigade combat 

team in July, we undertake a 45-day period of consolidation and 

evaluation. At the end of that period, we will commence a process 

of assessment to examine the conditions on the ground, and over 

time, determine when we can make recommendations for further 

reductions. 

This process will be continuous, with recommendations for further reductions made as conditions permit. This approach does not 

allow establishment of a set withdrawal timetable, however, it does 

provide the flexibility those of us on the ground need to preserve 

the still-fragile security gains our troopers have fought so hard, 

and sacrificed so much, to achieve. 

With this approach, the security achievements of 2007 and early 

2008 can form a foundation for the gradual establishment of sustainable security in Iraq. This is not only important to the 27 million citizens of Iraq, it is also vitally important to those in the Gulf 

Region, to the citizens of the United States, and to the global community. It clearly is in our national interest to help Iraq prevent 

the resurgence of al Qaeda in the heart of the Arab world, to help 

Iraq resist Iranian encroachment on its sovereignty, to avoid renewed ethno-sectarian violence that could spill over Iraq’s borders 

and make the existing refugee crisis even worse, and to enable Iraq 

to expand its role in the regional and global economies. 

In closing, I want to comment briefly on those serving our Nation 

in Iraq. We have asked a great deal of them and of their families, 

and they have made enormous sacrifices. My keen personal awareness of the strain on them, and on the force as a whole, has been 

an important factor in my recommendations. Congress, the executive branch, and our fellow citizens have done an enormous amount 

to support our troopers and their loved ones, and all of us are 

grateful for that. Nothing means more to those in harms’ way than 

the knowledge that their country appreciates their sacrifices and 

those of their families. 

Indeed, all Americans should take great pride in the men and 

women serving our Nation in Iraq, and in the courage, determination, resilience, and initiative they demonstrate each and every 

day. It remains the greatest of honors to soldier with them. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, General Petraeus. 

Ambassador Crocker? 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RYAN C. CROCKER, UNITED 

STATES AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

Ambassador CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members 

of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today to proVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:23 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\45666.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
22

vide my assessment on political, economic, and diplomatic developments in Iraq. 

When General Petraeus and I reported to you in September, I 

gave my considered judgment on whether our goals in Iraq were 

attainable. Can Iraq develop into a united, stable country with a 

democratically-elected government operating under the rule of law? 

Last September, I said that the cumulative trajectory of political, 

economic, and diplomatic developments in Iraq was upwards, although the slope of that line was not steep. Developments over the 

last 7 months have strengthened my sense of a positive trend. Immense challenges remain and progress is uneven, and often frustratingly slow, but there is progress. 

Sustaining that progress will require continuing U.S. resolve and 

commitment. What has been achieved is substantial, but it is also 

reversible. 

Five years ago, the statue of Saddam Hussein was toppled in 

Baghdad. The euphoria of that moment evaporated long ago, but 

as Iraq emerges from the shattering violence of 2006 and the early 

part of 2007, there is reason to sustain that commitment and the 

enormous investment we have made in the lives of our young men 

and women and our resources. 

Let me describe the developments upon which I base such a judgment. 

The first is at the national level, in the form of legislation and 

the development of Iraq’s parliament. In September, we were disappointed that Iraq had not yet completed key laws. In the last 

several months, Iraq’s parliament has formulated, debated vigorously, and in many cases, passed legislation dealing with vital 

issues of reconciliation and nation-building. 

A pension law extended benefits to individuals who had been denied them because of service with the previous regime. The accountability and Justice Law, de-Baathification reform, passed 

after lengthy and often contentious debate, reflects a strengthened 

spirit of reconciliation, as does a far-reaching amnesty law. 

The Provincial Powers Law is a major step forward in defining 

the relationship between the Federal and Provincial Governments. 

This involved a debate about the fundamental nature of the State, 

similar in its complexity to our own lengthy and difficult debate 

over States’ rights. 

The Provincial Powers Law also called for provincial elections by 

October 1, 2008, and an electoral law is now under discussion that 

will set the parameter for those elections. All major parties have 

announced their support for elections, which will be a major step 

forward in Iraq’s political development, and will set the stage for 

national elections in late 2009. 

A vote by the Council of Representatives in January to change 

the design of the Iraqi flag, means the flag now flies in all parts 

of the country for the first time in years. The passage of the 2008 

budget, with record amounts for capital expenditures ensures that 

the Federal and Provincial Governments will have the resources for 

public spending. 

All of this has been done since September. These laws are not 

perfect and much depends on their implementation, but they are 

important steps. 

23

Also important has been the development of Iraq’s Council of 

Representatives (COR) as a national institution. Last summer, the 

parliament suffered from persistent and often paralyzing disputes 

over leadership and procedures. Now, it is successfully grappling 

with complex issues and producing viable tradeoffs and compromise 

packages. 

As debates in Iraq’s parliament become more about how to resolve tough problems in a practical way, Iraqi politics have become 

more fluid. Those politics still have a sectarian bent and basis, but 

coalitions have formed around issues, and sectarian political 

groupings, which often were barriers to progress, have become 

more flexible. 

Let me also talk about the intangibles; attitudes among the Iraqi 

people. In 2006 and 2007, many understandably questioned whether hatred between Iraqis of different sectarian backgrounds was so 

deep that a civil war was inevitable. The Sunni Awakening Movement in Anbar, which so courageously confronted al Qaeda, continues to help keep the peace in the area, and keep al Qaeda out. 

Fallujah, once a symbol for violence and terror, is now one of 

Iraq’s safest cities. The Shiite holy cities of Najaf and Karbala are 

enjoying security and growing prosperity in the wake of popular rejection of extremist militia activity. The Shiite clerical leadership, 

the Marja’iyyah, based in Najaf, has played a quiet, but important, 

role in support of moderation and reconciliation. 

In Baghdad, we can see that Iraqis are not pitted against each 

other purely on the basis of sectarian affiliation. The security improvements of the past months have diminished the atmosphere of 

suspicion and allowed for acts of humanity that transcend sectarian identities. 

When I arrived in Baghdad a year ago, my first visit to a city 

district was to the predominantly Sunni area of Dora. Surge forces 

were just moving into neighborhoods still gripped by al Qaeda. 

Residents were also terrorized by extremist Shiite militias. 

Less than a year later, at the end of February, tens of thousands 

of Shiite pilgrims walked through those same streets on the way 

to Karbala to commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Hussein. 

Sunni residents offered food and water as they passed through, and 

some joined the pilgrimage. 

News from Iraq in recent weeks has been dominated by the situation in Basrah. Taken as a snapshot, the scenes of increasing violence and masked gunmen in the streets, it is hard to see how the 

situation supports a narrative of progress in Iraq, and there is still 

very much to be done to bring full government control to the 

streets of Basrah and eliminate entrenched extremist, criminal, 

and militia groups. 

But when viewed with a broader lens, the Iraqi decision to take 

on these groups in Basrah has major significance. First, a Shiite 

majority government, led by Prime Minister Maliki, has demonstrated its commitment to taking on criminals and extremists, 

regardless of identity. 

Second, ISFs led these operations in Basrah, and in towns and 

cities throughout the south. British and U.S. elements played important roles, but these were supporting roles, as they should be. 

24

The operation in Basrah has also shaken up Iraqi politics. The 

Prime Minister returned to Baghdad from Basrah shortly before 

General Petraeus and I left for Washington, and he, confident in 

his decision, was determined to press the fight against illegal 

groups. But he is also determined to take a hard look at lessons 

learned. 

The efforts of the government against extremist militia elements 

have broad political support, as a statement April 5 by virtually all 

of Iraq’s main political leaders—Sunni, Shiite, and Kurd—made 

clear, in support of Prime Minister Maliki’s Government. 

A wild card remains the Sadrist Trend, and whether the Iraqis 

can continue to drive a wedge between other elements of the Trend 

and Iranian-supported Special Groups. A dangerous development 

in the immediate wake of the Basrah operation was what appeared 

to be a reunification between Special Groups and mainline Jaysh 

al-Mahdi (JAM). We also saw a potential collapse of the JAM freeze 

in military operations. 

As the situation unfolded, however, Muqtada al-Sadr issued a 

statement that disavowed anyone possessing heavy weapons, which 

would include the signature weapons of the Special Groups. This 

statement can further sharpen the distinction between members of 

the Sadrist Trend, who should not pose a threat to the Iraqi state, 

and members of the Special Groups, who very much do. 

One conclusion I draw from these signs of progress is that the 

strategy that began with the surge is working. This does not mean 

that U.S. support should be open-ended, or that the level and nature of our engagement should not diminish over time. It is in this 

context that we have begun negotiating a bilateral relationship between Iraq and the United States. 

In August, Iraq’s five principal leaders requested a long-term relationship with the United States, to include economic, political, 

diplomatic, and security cooperation. The heart of this relationship 

will be a legal framework for the presence of American troops, 

similar to that which exists in nearly 80 countries around the 

world. 

The Iraqis view the negotiation of this framework as a strong affirmation of Iraqi sovereignty, placing Iraq on par with other U.S. 

allies and removing the stigma of Chapter 7 status under the U.N. 

charter, pursuant to which coalition forces presently operate. 

Such an agreement is in Iraq’s interest and ours. U.S. Forces will 

remain in Iraq beyond December 31, 2008, when the U.N. resolution presently governing their presence expires. Our troops will 

need basic authorizations and protections to continue operations, 

and this agreement will provide those authorizations and protections. 

The agreement will not establish permanent bases in Iraq, and 

we anticipate that it will expressly foreswear them. The agreement 

will not specify troop levels, and it will not tie the hands of the 

next administration. Our aim is to ensure that the next President 

arrives in office with a stable foundation upon which to base policy 

decisions, and that is precisely what this agreement will do. Congress will remain fully informed as these negotiations proceed in 

the coming weeks and months. 

25

Mr. Chairman, significant challenges remain in Iraq. A reinvigorated cabinet is necessary, both for political balance and to improve 

the delivery of services to Iraq’s people. Challenges to the rule of 

law, especially corruption, are enormous. Disputed internal boundaries, the Article 140 process, must be resolved. The return of refugees and the internally displaced must be managed. The rights of 

women and minorities must be better protected. Iraqis are aware 

of the challenges they face, and are working on them. 

Iraq’s political progress will not be linear. Developments which 

are, on the whole, positive, can still have unanticipated or destabilizing consequences. The decision to hold provincial elections, 

vital for Iraq’s democratic development and long-term stability, will 

also produce new strains. Some of the violence we have seen recently in Southern Iraq reflects changing dynamics within the Shiite community as the political and security context changes. Such 

inflection points underscore the fragility of the situation in Iraq, 

but it would be wrong to conclude that any eruption of violence 

marks the beginning of an inevitable backslide. 

In terms of economics and capacity-building, in September, I reported to you that there had been some gains in Iraq’s economy 

and in the country’s efforts to build capacity to translate these 

gains into more effective governance and services. Iraqis have built 

on these gains over the past month, as is most evident in the revival of marketplaces across Iraq, and the reopening of long-shuttered businesses. 

According to a Center for International Private Enterprise poll 

last month, 78 percent of Iraqi business owners surveyed expect 

the Iraqi economy to grow significantly in the next 2 years. 

With improving security and rising government expenditures, the 

International Monetary Fund projects that Iraq’s gross domestic 

product will grow 7 percent in real terms this year, and inflation 

has been tamed. The dinar remains strong, and the Central Bank 

has begun to bring down interest rates. Iraq’s 2008 budget has allocated $13 billion for reconstruction, 

and a $5 billion supplemental budget this summer will further invest export revenues in building the infrastructure and providing 

the services that Iraq so badly needs. 

This spending also benefits the United States. Iraq recently announced its decision to purchase 40 commercial aircraft from the 

U.S. at an estimated cost of $5 billion. As Iraq is now earning the 

financial resources it needs for bricks and mortar construction 

through oil production and export, our assistance has shifted to capacity development and an emphasis on local and post-kinetic development through our network of Provincial Reconstruction Teams 

(PRTs) and ministerial advisors. 

The era of U.S.-funded major infrastructure projects is over. We 

are seeking to ensure that our assistance, in partnership with the 

Iraqis leverages Iraq’s own resources. Our 25 PRTs throughout 

Iraq have been working to improve provincial and local governance 

capabilities, particularly in budget design and execution. They are 

also helping to establish critical linkages between provincial and 

Federal Governments. Our PRTs are great enablers, and we are 

working to ensure their continued viability as our forces redeploy. 

The relatively small amounts that they disburse through Quick ReVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:23 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\45666.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
26

sponse Funds have major impacts on local communities, and congressional support is important, as it is for other vital programs in 

the fiscal year 2008 global war on terrorism supplemental request. 

Iraq increasingly is using its own resources to support projects 

and programs that we have developed. It has committed approximately $200 million in support of a program to provide vocational 

training for Concerned Local Citizens who stood up with us in the 

Awakening. 

Our technical assistance advisors have helped design new procurement procedures for Iraq’s Oil Ministry. We developed the 

technical specifications from which Iraq’s State-owned oil company 

will build new oil export platforms and underwater pipelines worth 

over $1 billion. 

In Baghdad, in the last 3 months, the municipality has stepped up to take over labor contracts worth $100 million that we had 

been covering under the Community Stabilization Program to clean 

the street. 

Like so much else, Iraq’s economy is fragile, the gains reversible, 

and the challenges ahead, substantial. Iraq will need to continue 

to improve governmental capacity past national level, improve hydrocarbon legislation, improve electrical production and distribution, improve the climate for foreign and domestic investment, create short- and long-term jobs, and tackle the structural and economic problems of the vital agricultural sector. We will be helping 

the Iraqis as they tackle this challenging agenda, along with other 

international partners including the U.N. and the World Bank. 

In terms of regional and international dynamics, Mr. Chairman, 

along with the security surge last year, we also launched a diplomatic surge focused on enhancing U.N. engagement in Iraq, anchoring the international compact with Iraq, and establishing an 

expanded neighbors process which serves as a contract group in 

support of Iraq. 

The U.N. has taken advantage of an expanded mandate granted 

to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) to increase the scope of its activities and the size of its staff. Under dynamic new leadership, UNAMI is playing a key role in preparing 

for provincial elections, and in providing technical assistance to resolve disputed internal boundaries. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has returned international staff to Iraq to 

assist with the return of internally displaced persons and refugees. 

The international compact with Iraq provides a 5-year framework 

for Iraq to reform its economy and achieve economic self-sufficiency 

in exchange for long-overdue Saddam-era debt relief. Preparations 

are underway for a ministerial-level compact meeting in Sweden 

next month; 74 nations were represented at last year’s gathering 

in Egypt. 

Iraq’s neighbors also understand they have a major interest in 

Iraq’s future. Turkey hosted the second ministerial meeting of 

Iraq’s neighbors in November, and Kuwait will host the third meeting later this month. In addition to all of Iraq’s neighbors, these 

expanded Neighbor’s Conferences also include the permanent five 

members of the Security Council, the Arab League, and the G–8. 

Support from Arab capitals has not been strong, and must improve for the sake of Iraq and the sake of the region. Bahrain’s reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:23 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\45666.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
27

cent announcement that it will return an Ambassador to Baghdad 

is welcome, and other Arab States should follow suit. Iraq is a 

multi-ethnic state, but it is also a founding member of the Arab 

League and an integral part of the Arab world. Last month, Iraq 

hosted a meeting of the Arab Parliamentary Union, bringing the 

leaders of Arab parliaments and consultative councils to Iraq for 

the first major inter-Arab gathering since 1990. It was noteworthy 

that the meeting was held in the Kurdish city of Irbil, under the 

recently redesigned Iraqi flag, highlighting both the remarkable 

prosperity and stability of Iraq’s Kurdish region and the presence 

of the Iraqi Federal State. 

We hope that this event will encourage more active Arab engagements with Iraq, and we expect Prime Minister Maliki’s effort 

against extremist Shiite militias in Basrah will receive Arab support. 

The presence of the Kurdistan Workers Party terrorist organization in the remote mountains of Iraq along the Turkish border has 

produced tension between Turkey and Iraq, and led to a Turkish 

cross-border operation in February, including movement of Turkish 

ground forces into Iraq. 

At the same time, both governments are working to strengthen 

their ties, and Iraqi President Talabani made a successful visit to 

Turkey in March. 

Syria plays an ambivalent role. We have seen evidence of efforts 

to interdict some foreign fighters seeking to transit Syria to Iraq, 

but others continue to cross the border. Syria also harbors individuals who finance and support the Iraqis insurgency. Iran continues 

to undermine the efforts of the Iraqi Government to establish a stable, secure state through the training of criminal militia elements 

engaged in violence against ISFs, coalition forces, and Iraqi civilians. 

The extent of Iran’s malign influence was dramatically demonstrated when militia elements—armed and trained by Iran—

clashed with Iraqi Government forces in Basrah and Baghdad. 

When the President announced the surge, he pledged to seek and 

destroy Iranian-supported lethal networks inside Iraq. We know 

more about those networks, and their Quds Force sponsors than 

ever before, and we will continue to aggressively uproot and destroy them. 

At the same time, we support constructive relations between Iran 

and Iraq and are participating in a tripartite process to discuss the 

security situation in Iraq. Iran has a choice to make. 

Looking ahead, Mr. Chairman, almost everything about Iraq is 

hard. It will continue to be hard as Iraqis struggle with the damage and trauma inflicted by 35 years of totalitarian Baathist rule. 

But hard does not mean hopeless, and the political and economic 

progress of the past few months is significant. 

These gains are fragile, however, and they are reversible. Americans have invested a great deal in Iraq, in blood as well as treasure, and they have the right to ask whether this is worth it, whether it is now time to walk away and let the Iraqis fend for themselves. Iraq has the potential to develop into a stable, secure, 

multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian democracy under the rule of law. 

28

Whether it realizes that potential is ultimately up to the Iraqi people. Our support, however, will continue to be critical. 

I said in September that I cannot guarantee success in Iraq. That 

is still the case, although I think we are closer. I remain convinced 

that a major departure from our current engagement would bring 

failure, and we have to be clear with ourselves about what failure 

would mean. Al Qaeda is in retreat in Iraq, but it is not yet defeated. Al Qaeda’s leaders are looking for every opportunity they 

can to hang on. Osama bin Laden has called Iraq ’’the perfect 

base,‘‘ and it reminds us that a fundamental aim of al Qaeda is to 

establish itself in the Arab world. It almost succeeded in Iraq, we 

cannot allow it a second chance. 

It is not only al Qaeda that would benefit. Iran has said publicly, 

it will fill any vacuum in Iraq, and extremist Shiite militias will 

re-assert themselves. We saw them try in Basrah and Baghdad 2 

weeks ago. In all of this, the Iraqi people would suffer on a scale 

far beyond what we have already seen. Spiraling conflict could 

draw in neighbors with devastating consequences for the region 

and the world. 

Mr. Chairman, as monumental as the events of the last 5 years 

have been in Iraq; Iraqis, Americans, and the world ultimately will 

judge us far more on the basis of what will happen, then what has 

happened. In the end, how we leave and what we leave behind will 

be more important than how we came. Our current course is hard, 

but it is working. Progress is real, although still fragile, and we 

need to stay with it. 

Mr. Chairman, in the months ahead, we will continue to assist 

Iraq as it pursues further steps towards reconciliation and economic development. Over time, this will become increasingly an 

Iraqi process, as it should be. Our efforts will focus on increasing 

Iraq’s integration, regionally and internationally, assisting Iraqi institutions, locally and nationally, to strengthen the political process, promote economic activity, and support the U.N. as Iraq carries out local elections toward the end of the year. 

These efforts will require an enhanced civilian commitment and 

support from Congress and the American people. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to recognize and thank all of 

those who serve our country in Iraq—military and civilian. Their 

courage and commitment, at great sacrifice, has earned the admiration of all Americans. They certainly have mine, and it is my 

honor to be there with them. 

Thank you, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. We’re going to have a 6-minute round of questions. 

General, after the brigade combat teams added by the surge are 

removed in July, leaving somewhat more U.S. troops in Iraq than 

before the surge. Nonetheless, you’ve recommended at that time to 

your chain of command that there then be a 45-day period of evaluation. 

After that period, which takes us to September, you recommend 

commencing a process of assessment and then, over time, determine when you can make recommendations for further reductions. 

Now, that is a clear, open-ended pause. 

29

Forty-five days, first, to evaluate, and then you’ll commence a 

process of assessment. I’m not sure what the difference between 

evaluation and assessment is, but then there’s some open-ended 

process of assessment. Over time, there will be another determination. 

Now, it seems to me, what you’ve given to your chain of command is a plan which has no end to it. You do not use the word, 

which Secretary Gates used twice, which is that it would be a brief 

pause, and I assume that’s intentional. Do you agree with Secretary Gates that it will be a brief pause, or not? Do you use the 

term brief? 

General PETRAEUS. What Secretary Gates has described, as I understand it, is a brief period of consolidation and evaluation. 

Chairman LEVIN. He used the term brief pause. He used the 

term brief pause, General. At any rate, without going into that; 

specifically, in February, he used the term brief pause. But, you’re 

not using the term brief, is that correct? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I’m not using the word brief nor the word 

pause. What I stated was a 45-day period for consolidation and 

evaluation as to examine the situation on the ground, do the battlefield geometry, consult with Ambassador Crocker on what might be 

called the political-military calculus, and then conduct the assessments. When the assessment is at a point that the conditions are 

met to recommend reduction of forces, then that’s what we would 

do. 

So, the bottom line, sir, is after this period in which we do the 

assessments, and as the conditions are met for further reductions, 

then we make those recommendations. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you have any estimate at all as to how long 

that second period is going to take? Are you giving us any idea as 

to how long that will take? You say ‘‘over time.’’ Could that be a 

month? Could that be 2 months? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, it could be less than that. 

Chairman LEVIN. Could it be more than that? 

General PETRAEUS. It could be more than that. Again, it’s when 

the conditions are met. 

Chairman LEVIN. I understand. 

General PETRAEUS. Then we can make a recommendation for further reductions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Could it be 3 months? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, again, at the end of the period of consolidation and evaluation, it could be right then or it could be longer. 

[Audience disturbance.] 

Chairman LEVIN. General, we’re going to ask you this question 

again; could it be as long as 3 months? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, it could be. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay, that’s all I’m asking. 

General PETRAEUS. It is when the conditions are met. 

Chairman LEVIN. I understand, but I just asked you a direct 

question; could that be as long as 3 months? 

General PETRAEUS. It could be, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Could it be as long as 4 months? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, it is when the conditions are met, again. 

30

Chairman LEVIN. Now, next question; if all goes well, what 

would be the approximate number of our troops there at the end 

of the year? Let’s assume conditions permitted things to move 

quickly. What, in your estimate, would be the approximate number 

of American troops there at the end of the year? Just say if you 

can’t give us an estimate. 

General PETRAEUS. Right. Sir, I can’t give you an estimate. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. You’re not going to give us an estimate on that. 

Next question. General, an April 3 article in the New York Times 

said that before the Iraqi Government’s assault on the Mahdi Army 

in Basrah, you counseled Prime Minister Maliki, ‘‘We made a lot 

of gains in the last 6 to 9 months that you’ll be putting at risk.’’ 

The article also states that you advised him not to rush into a 

fight without carefully sizing up the situation and making adequate preparations. Now, did he follow your advice? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, he laid out a plan that would, in fact, incorporate that advice. 

Chairman LEVIN. He followed your advice, then? 

General PETRAEUS. Once the forces got into Basrah, they ended 

up going into action more quickly than was anticipated. 

Chairman LEVIN. Would you say that Maliki followed your advice? 

General PETRAEUS. I would not. No, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. In your professional judgment, was the Iraqi 

Government operation in Basrah properly and carefully planned, 

and were the preparations adequate? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, there is no question but that it could 

have been better planned, and that the preparations could have 

been better. We’ve already done initial after-action reviews on that, 

in fact, there and also in Baghdad. 

Chairman LEVIN. I understand the report that came afterward. 

But, I wonder if we could get a direct answer to my question. Could 

you give me a direct answer? In your judgment was the Iraqi Government operation in Basrah properly and carefully planned, and 

were the preparations adequate? Could you give me a direct answer? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, the answer is, again, it could have been 

much better planned. It was not adequately planned or prepared. 

Again, it was laid out to us, the objectives were described, and in 

fact, the process as it was laid out was logical, but I’ve not seen 

too many combat operations that have gone as they were planned, 

and this was not one either. 

The forces were deployed very rapidly, and before all conditions 

were set, as they might have been, they were in combat. 

Chairman LEVIN. General, to summarize in terms of where I 

think that testimony leads me to conclude—I will base my statement on your testimony—it was inadequately planned, it was inadequately prepared, it was followed by the use of American troops 

on that kind of planning, and that is totally unacceptable to me. 

I think that this open-ended pause that you have recommended 

takes the pressure off Iraqi leaders to take responsibility for their 

own country. 

Senator McCain. 

31

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Petraeus, again, news reports said that Prime Minister 

Maliki only informed you shortly before the operation, is that correct? In Basrah? 

General PETRAEUS. It is, Senator. We had a heads up in a Friday 

night meeting where we, in fact, were planning to resource operations in Basrah on a longer-term basis. The following Saturday, 

we had a meeting during which he laid out the plan that he had 

to deploy forces. He laid out the objectives, the lines of operations 

that he was going to operate along, and stated that he was moving 

there on Monday, himself. 

Senator MCCAIN. It was not something that you had recommended. 

General PETRAEUS. It was not something I recommended, no, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. News reports indicate that over 1,000 Iraqi 

Army and Police deserted or underperformed during that operation. 

This is 4 months after Basrah achieved provincial Iraqi control, 

meaning that all provincial security had been transferred to ISFs. 

What’s the lesson that we’re to draw from that? That 1,000 Iraqi 

Army and Police deserted or underperformed? 

General PETRAEUS. What happened was, in one case, a brigade 

that literally had just come out of Unit Set Fielding was pressed 

into operation. The other lesson is a recurring one, and that is the 

difficulty of local police operating in areas where there is serious 

intimidation of themselves and of their families. 

Senator MCCAIN. Suffice it to say, it was a disappointment. 

General PETRAEUS. It was, although, it is not over yet, Senator. 

In fact, subsequent to the early days, they then took control of the 

security at the different ports, they continued to carry out targeted 

raids, the operation is still very much ongoing, and it is, by no 

means, over. 

Senator MCCAIN. The Green Zone has been attacked in ways 

that it has not been for a long time, and most of that is coming 

from elements that leave Sadr City, or from Sadr City itself, is that 

correct? 

General PETRAEUS. That’s correct, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. What are we going to do about that? 

General PETRAEUS. We have already taken control of the area 

that was the principle launching point for a number of the 107-millimeter rockets into Baghdad, and have secured that area. Beyond 

that, again, ISFs are going to have to come to grips—politically as 

well as militarily—with the issue of the militia, and more importantly, the Special Groups. 

Senator MCCAIN. What do you make of Sadr’s declaration of a 

cease-fire? 

General PETRAEUS. As with the cease-fire that was proclaimed in 

the wake of the militia violence in Karbala in August of last year, 

it is both to avoid further damage to the image of the Sadr Movement which, of course, is supposed to care for the downtrodden 

and, obviously, is a religiously-inspired movement, but which has 

been hijacked, in some cases, by militias. In fact, other elements 

have used it to cloak their activities, as well. 

If I could, Senator, also point out that along with the operations 

in Basrah, there were operations in a number of other provinces in 

32

Southern Iraq, all precipitated by this outbreak in militia violence. 

In Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah, Illa, Wasit, Dhi Qar and Muthanna, 

the ISFs actually did well, and in some cases did very well and 

maintained security. 

The same is true in Baghdad, although again, even there, the 

performance was uneven in some cases. 

Senator MCCAIN. There are numerous threats to security in Iraq. 

Do you still view AQI as a major threat? 

General PETRAEUS. It is still a major threat, though it is certainly not as major a threat as it was, say, 15 months ago. 

Senator MCCAIN. Certainly not an obscure sect of the Shiites, 

overall? 

General PETRAEUS. No, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Or Sunnis, or anybody else. Al Qaeda continues 

to try to assert themselves in Mosul, is that correct? 

General PETRAEUS. It is, Senator. As you saw on the chart, the 

area of operation of al Qaeda has been greatly reduced in terms of 

controlling areas that it controlled as little as a year and a half 

ago, but clearly, Mosul and Ninawa Province are areas that al 

Qaeda is very much trying to hold on to. All roads lead through the 

traditional capital of the north. 

Senator MCCAIN. They continue to be a significant threat? 

General PETRAEUS. They do, yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Ambassador Crocker, in your statement, you 

talked about a long-term relationship with Iraq, such as a security 

arrangement, diplomatic, economic, et cetera, that we have with 

some 80 countries. You envision this after we succeed in this conflict, is that correct? Would you talk a little bit about that? Elaborate a little more? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, sir. I would actually envision it as 

helping us to succeed in the conflict. 

The effort will have two elements; one will be a Status of Forces 

Agreement (SOFA). That will be, as I said, approximately like what 

we have with 80 other countries. It will have some unique aspects 

to give our forces the authorities to continue operations after the 

end of 2008. 

There will also be a broader Strategic Framework Agreement, 

first called for by the Iraqi leadership last August, and then reflected in the Declaration of Principles that Prime Minister Maliki 

and President Bush signed in November. This will cover, in addition to security, the political, the economic, the cultural, and the 

whole spectrum of our relations. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Finally, General Petraeus, Mosul continues to be a battle, is that 

correct? 

General PETRAEUS. It does, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. Who are the major adversaries in Mosul? It’s 

a mixed population? 

General PETRAEUS. The major adversaries are AQI, Ansar alSuna, Jaish al-Mahdi, and some related Sunni extremist organizations that all are allies of AQI. 

Senator MCCAIN. It was once said that al Qaeda cannot succeed 

without control of Baghdad, and they can’t survive without control 

of Mosul, is that an oversimplification? 

33

General PETRAEUS. A little bit, but not completely, sir. Again, it 

would be a significant blow to al Qaeda and in fact, the degree to 

which they’re fighting reflects how much they want to retain the 

amount of presence that they do have in the greater Mosul area. 

Senator MCCAIN. Finally, I hope in response, because my time is 

expired, could we talk a little bit more about the Iranian threat, 

particularly their stepped up support of various elements that are 

Shiite extremists in Iraq, particularly the role they’ve played in 

Basrah, as well as the southern part of the country? I’ve used up 

my time. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Senator Kennedy. 

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you. 

Thank you for your service. 

Ambassador Crocker, listening to you talk about this bilateral 

agreement with Iraq, I’m reminded that Secretary Gates told the 

Senate Armed Services Committee, ‘‘the agreement will not contain 

a commitment to defend Iraq,’’ but as long as America maintains 

10,000 troops there, there’s little distinction between a treaty. 

He has indicated that, of course, in 1953, Congress ratified the 

SOFA with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a 

treaty. We have 140,000 men and women over there, so this isn’t 

insignificantly different from those 84 other countries, and I think 

the record’s very clear. Are you in agreement with what Secretary 

Gates has told this committee? 

Just quickly, if you would, please? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I am, sir. It is our intention to negotiate 

the SOFA as an executive agreement. We do not intend to provide 

any binding commitments that would trigger the advice and consent process with the Senate. 

Senator KENNEDY. Well, that’s going to be another issue that 

we’re going to have to come back to. 

So, you’re not going to follow what has been done previously by 

President Eisenhower. Even under President Reagan, Congress approved agreements for the observer group in the Sinai Desert. 

You’re not going to follow their precedent? 

Ambassador CROCKER. We’re going to keep Congress fully informed. I understand there are some briefings scheduled for the 

coming few days. 

Senator KENNEDY. All right. 

In listening to the testimony this morning, General Petraeus, it 

seems clear that the administration describes one Iraq, while we 

see another. The President sees an Iraq in which Iraqis want to 

make political accommodations, if only the security would allow it, 

but most Americans see an Iraq in which the premise of the President’s policy has been proven hopelessly wrong, and will continue 

to be wrong as long as the commitment of our military remains 

open-ended. 

The President sees an Iraq where progress is being made in 

neighborhoods, villages, towns, and cities across Iraq. But most 

Americans see an Iraq in which 4 million refugees have been displaced from their homes, their homes have been destroyed, neighborhoods ethnically cleansed, and overtaken by militia. 

34

The President and the Vice President describe an Iraq whose oil 

would pay for the needs of its people, but most Americans see an 

Iraq that is sitting on billions in oil revenues, while the American 

taxpayer spends billions to fund Iraq’s reconstruction. 

A year ago, the President argued that we wouldn’t begin to withdraw troops from Iraq because there was too much violence. Now, 

the President argues we can’t begin to withdraw troops because violence is down. Whatever the conditions on the ground, the President’s arrows always point in the same direction, to an open-ended 

commitment of our troops. American people deserve to know when 

the arrows will finally point to an exit from Iraq, and it’s time to 

put the Iraqis on notice that our troops will not remain forever, so 

they will take the essential steps to resolve their differences. 

Just to come back to a question that was asked earlier, Ameri- cans want to know, after we have spent approximately $24 billion 

in training Iraqi troops in 5 years, when are these forces going to 

be ready and willing to stand up and fight on their own so that the 

Americans don’t have to fight for them, as we’ve seen with the 

1,000 that effectively deserted or left their units? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, they are fighting and, as I mentioned, dying for their country in substantial numbers. Their losses, 

again, are some three times our losses of late, and I might add that 

the Sons of Iraq losses are between two and a half and three times 

our losses in addition to that. So they’re very much fighting, and 

they are very much dying for their country. 

They have, indeed, taken on the security tasks in a substantial 

number of provinces, and they are shouldering more of the burden 

in a number of the others. 

In Basrah, there were not just the units that didn’t do well, there 

were also units that did do well, and there were also units that did 

do very well. This is tough, tough combat. When forces are new and 

go into it, they do bow at times before they steady. We saw that 

in Basrah and we saw that to some degree in Baghdad. 

Senator KENNEDY. Well, of course, there’s 4,000 Americans that 

have died, as well, and 30,000 that have been wounded, as well. 

Now, you mentioned that the battle in Basrah was to take on the 

criminals and extremists. Aren’t we in there to battle al Qaeda? 

General PETRAEUS. Basrah, Senator, is a Shiite area, and it has 

a small Sunni community. 

Senator KENNEDY. But we’re over in Iraq to take on al Qaeda, 

and here we have the Maliki Government moving in here to battle 

inter-sectarian violence that’s taking place, which many believe can 

enhance the possibilities of civil war. 

Let me ask you a question; were you at any meetings with the 

Vice President, Ambassador Crocker, where the issue of the Basrah 

invasion took place? 

Ambassador CROCKER. It was not discussed. 

Senator KENNEDY. It wasn’t discussed at all during the Vice 

President’s visit to Baghdad? The possibility of Maliki going into 

Basrah was not discussed? You were not at any meetings where 

the Vice President was present, or where this was discussed in his 

presence? 

Ambassador CROCKER. It was not discussed in any meeting I attended, no, sir. 

35

Senator KENNEDY. General? 

General PETRAEUS. Same, Senator. 

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, my time’s up. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much. 

Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I commend you for your public service, and I mean 

that in a very sincere way. I’ve had the opportunity to meet with 

you and work with you, in-country, and back here in the continental limits of the United States. 

I also want to say that I felt your statements were very informative and strong and clear. It reflects your own compassion for our 

forces, and you added the civilians who are abroad, Mr. Ambassador, and their families here at home. I should also like to add 

a word for all of those thousands and thousands of Americans who 

are trying to care for the wounded, and to provide compassion for 

their families. 

I want to go back to your statements and frame a simple question. 

General, you said the following, ‘‘With this approach, the security 

achievements of 2007 and 2008 can form a foundation for the gradual establishment of sustainable security in Iraq. This is not only 

important to the 27 million citizens of Iraq, it is also vitally important to the Gulf Region,’’ and then you added, parenthetically, ‘‘to 

the citizens of the United States.’’ 

Mr. Ambassador, you said the following, ‘‘Americans have invested a great deal in Iraq, in blood, as well as treasure, and they 

have the right to ask whether it’s worth it.’’ 

I would hope that you could frame a short message at the moment, both of you, to the American people, in response to the same 

question I asked of you last year, General. Is all of this sacrifice 

bringing about a more secure America? 

General PETRAEUS. I’ve thought more than a bit about that, Senator, since September, and though I continue to think it’s a question perhaps best answered by folks with a broader view, and ultimately will have to be answered by history, I obviously have 

thoughts on it and on the importance of achieving our objectives in 

Iraq. 

Iraq has entailed a huge cost. Our men and women in uniform 

have made enormous sacrifices, over 4,000 of them, the ultimate 

sacrifice. The expenditure has been very substantial in numerous 

other respects, including the strain on the overall force and the opportunity costs in terms of not being able to focus more elsewhere. 

Having said that, there is no longer a ruthless dictator in Iraq 

who threatened and invaded his neighbors, and who terrorized his 

own people. Beyond that, the seeds of a nescient democracy have 

been planted in an Arab country that was the cradle of civilization. 

Though the germination of those seeds has been anything but 

smooth, there has been growth. 

All of this, again, has come at great cost. I recognize that the 

overall weighing of the scales is more than difficult, and believe it 

is best done at this point by someone up the chain with a broader 

perspective. Ultimately, it can only be answered by history once the 

outcome in Iraq is determined. 

36

Having said all of that, I believe the more important question at 

this point is how best to achieve our important interests in Iraq. 

Interests that do have enormous implications, as I mentioned, for 

the safety and security of our country, 27 million Iraqis, the MidEast region, and the world with respect to al Qaeda, the spread of 

sectarian conflict, Iranian influence, regional stability, and the 

global economy. 

I do believe that we have made important progress in Iraq over 

the past year, and I believe the recommendations Ambassador 

Crocker and I have provided are the best course to achieve our important objectives in Iraq. 

Senator WARNER. My time on the clock is moving very quickly, 

it was a fairly simple question. Does that translate into greater security for those of us at home? I pointed out this morning indications that up to 80 percent of the Americans just don’t accept the 

premise at this point in time that it’s worth it. Can you now, just 

in simple language, tell us, yes, it is worth it? It is making us safer 

here at home? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, I do believe it is worth it, or I would 

not have, I guess, accepted it. You do what you’re ordered to do, 

but you sometimes are asked whether you’d like to or are willing 

to take on a task. I took on the task—the privilege—of command 

of Multi-National Force-Iraq because I do believe that it is worth 

it, and I do believe the interests there are of enormous importance 

to our country, not just to the people of Iraq and the people of that 

region and the world. 

Senator WARNER. Mr. Ambassador, how do you answer it? Is it 

providing a greater security here at home? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Sir, I’ll try and answer that at two levels. 

First, in the little over a year that I have been in Iraq, we have 

seen a significant degradation of al Qaeda’s presence and its abilities. Al Qaeda is our mortal and strategic enemy. So, to the extent 

that al Qaeda’s capacities have been lessened in Iraq, and they 

have been significantly lessened, I do believe that makes America 

safer. 

The second level at which I would try and answer that is that 

Iraq remains a work in progress. I said in my statement that I believe there has been significant progress. I believe that it is worth 

continuing our efforts there, and I believe very strongly that any 

alternative course of action to that which we have laid out deserves 

the most careful scrutiny by the American people and their representatives, because the consequences could be extremely grave. 

Senator WARNER. Let me quickly ask a second question, if I may. 

On the Strategic Framework Agreement, and SOFA, both very important, you said, and I took this note, ‘‘the strong interests and 

benefits that flow to Iraq.’’ Are we utilizing this framework of negotiations to leverage a greater acceleration, a greater momentum by 

the Iraqi Government towards achieving the basic goals, be they 

legislative or military? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I think the negotiations of the Strategic 

Framework Agreement, which is the broad agreement that covers 

political and economic and other aspects, will be an opportunity to 

have that kind of discussion. Those talks are not yet underway, 

37

we’re awaiting the Iraqi decision on who their negotiators will be 

on that. But I certainly see that as an opportunity. 

Senator WARNER. To advance the reconciliation that is needed, 

we all recognize that a military solution is not possible here. It’s 

only through a political one, and I look upon these as an opportunity to say to the Iraqis, ‘‘this is your chance, if we want a greater momentum towards political reconciliation.’’ Can you tell us if 

that will be an element of the negotiations? 

Ambassador CROCKER. It certainly would be my intention to 

make it so in the context of the Strategic Framework Agreement. 

Senator WARNER. I thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

General and Ambassador, thank you for your extraordinary service in the cause of freedom in Iraq. 

I must say, your testimony is encouraging and yet quite realistic, 

and in my opinion, not overstated. You’ve told us that the strategy 

associated with the surge is working, progress has been made, but 

it’s entirely reversible, you’ve been very frank about some of the 

problems that we still face. 

I say what I’m about to say with respect to my colleagues who 

have consistently opposed our presence in Iraq. As I hear the questions and the statements today, it seems to me that there’s a kind 

of hear no progress in Iraq, see no progress in Iraq, and most of 

all, speak of no progress in Iraq. The fact is there has been 

progress in Iraq, thanks to extraordinary efforts by the two of you, 

and all of those who serve under you on our behalf. 

I wish we could come to a point where we could have an agreement on the facts that you are presenting to us; the charts you’ve 

shown, the military progress, the extraordinary drop in ethno-sectarian violence, the drop in civilian deaths, the drop in American 

deaths, and the very impressive political progress in Iraq since last 

September. 

Hey, let’s be honest about this, the Iraqi political leadership has 

achieved a lot more political reconciliation and progress since September than the American political leadership has. So, we have to 

give some credit for that. 

I repeat, I wish we could have an agreement on the facts which 

you’ve presented. You work for us. I don’t distrust those facts, and 

I wish we could go from an agreement on those facts, to figure out 

how we can move to more success so we can bring more of our 

troops home. Now, that’s apparently not going to happen in the 

near future. 

I want to ask you a question about Iran, because both of you 

have spoken with grave seriousness about the continuing Iranian 

threat. Senator Kennedy asked a question about the Iraqi Government initiative in Southern Iraq, and said there was no al Qaeda 

there, as you said, General Petraeus, there is no al Qaeda there. 

But there are Iranian-backed Special Forces that, from what you’ve 

told us today, continue to threaten what is our real goal, in Iraq, 

which is not just to defeat al Qaeda, it’s to help stand up a selfgoverning, self-defending Iraqi Government. 

38

Let me ask you first, are the Iranians still training and equipping Iraqi extremists who are going back into Iraq and killing 

American soldiers? 

General PETRAEUS. That is correct, Senator. In fact, we have detained individuals, 4 of the 16 so-called master trainers, for example, are in our detention facility. You may recall that last year we 

detained the head of the Special Groups, and also the Deputy Commander of the Lebanese Hezbollah Department 2800, which is 

working with the Iranian Quds Force to train, equip, fund, and also 

direct these Special Groups. 

The Special Groups’ activities have, in fact, come out in greater 

relief during the violence of recent weeks. It is they who have the 

expertise to shoot rockets more accurately, shoot mortars more accurately, and to employ some of the more advanced material—the 

explosively-formed projectiles and the like—that have not just 

killed our soldiers, and Iraqi soldiers, but also have been used to 

assassinate two Southern Governors in past months. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General PETRAEUS. Two Southern Police Chiefs. 

So they are a serious concern. I believe that this was brought out 

in greater relief for the Iraqi Government, as well, because they 

have conveyed directly to their Iranian interlocutors their concerns 

about the activities of the Quds Force with the Special Groups, and 

recognize the very clear threat that they present to security in 

Iraq. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Is it fair to say that the Iranian-backed Special Groups in Iraq are responsible for the murder of hundreds of 

American soldiers and thousands of Iraqi soldiers and civilians? 

General PETRAEUS. It certainly is, I do believe that is correct. 

Again, some of that also is militia elements who have then subsequently been trained by these individuals, but there’s no question 

about the threat that they pose, and again, about the way that has 

been revealed more fully in recent weeks. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Ambassador Crocker, picking up on something General Petraeus just said, though we all have questions 

about the recent Iraqi Government initiative under Prime Minister 

Maliki’s leadership in the south, in Basrah, is it not possible that 

there’s something very encouraging about that initiative, which is 

that it represents a decision by the Maliki Government in Baghdad 

to not tolerate the Iranian-backed militias, essentially running 

wild, and trying to control the south of his country? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, that’s an excellent question. As 

I look at the Basrah operation, I look at it through a political lens, 

obviously, more than I can a military lens. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Ambassador CROCKER. General Petraeus has described some of 

the military’s perspectives of that. The political ramifications, I 

think, are distinctly more positive because that is exactly the signal 

that the operation has sent within Iraq and, one would hope, in the 

region, that this Iraqi Government is prepared to go after extremist 

militia elements, criminal elements, of whatever sectarian identity 

they may be. 

I know, for example, that ISFs are simultaneously engaged now 

in Basrah against Iranian-backed Shiite extremists, and are enVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:23 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\45666.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
39

gaged in Mosul against al Qaeda and its Iraqi supporters. I think 

that is important. 

The reflection of that has been seen in the level of political unity 

behind the Prime Minister. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Ambassador CROCKER. I mean, there was the meeting of the Political Council of National Security on Saturday, and this brings together the President, the two Vice Presidents, the Speaker, the two 

Deputy Speakers of parliament, the Prime Minister, the Deputy 

Prime Minister, and the heads of all major parliamentary blocks. 

They unanimously developed a 15-point statement that included 

support for the Prime Minister in these efforts; it called for the disarming and an elimination of all militia elements, and it had a 

strong message, warning of outside interference in Iraq’s affairs. 

So I think these are all highly positive developments that the 

government can continue to build on as it moves ahead with the 

other elements of the reconciliation agenda. 

Again, I can’t predict that this will take us to a new level in Iraq, 

but it is, from a political perspective, distinctly encouraging. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

All of us feel so strongly about the valor of our young troops. I 

will be attending a funeral at Arlington at 3 o’clock today for a 

Staff Sergeant, Christopher Hake, from Enid, OK. I just gave a 

tribute to him on the floor. There’s so many others who are truly 

heroes. I think we need to keep repeating that, and reminding ourselves of the great service that they’re performing. 

Let me just ask a couple of questions on the detainee issue, I 

don’t think that’s come up yet. I know that some on the far left are 

going to try to paint a picture that the United States of America 

and our troops are somehow brutal and torturing detainees, and I 

think this is something that is going to be coming back, and they’re 

going to try to make people believe this, yet it’s not true. I recognize, initially, like Abu Ghraib, there’s some that did not perform 

well, but after that, that act has been cleaned up. 

I just got back from, I think my 14th trip in that area, but I was 

very careful to go to Camp Cropper and Camp Bucca, these are the 

largest detainee facilities that are there. 

Lieutenant General Stone, I think, has done an outstanding job 

there, General Petraeus, and he was good enough to let me have 

a free hand to go through both of these facilities. 

In doing so, I had an interpreter, and actually had interviews 

with some of these detainees, asking each one of them the question, 

‘‘Have you ever been abused, mistreated?’’ I got nothing but positive answers. In fact, they were very, very positive toward us. 

I’d like to have you make any comments you might make concerning the progress that’s been made in the way that the detainees are treated. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, Senator, there’s been enormous change 

for the better in the detainee facilities. One focus, in fact, was to 

conduct counterinsurgency operations in the detainee facilities. In 

40

other words, you cannot allow the irreconcilables to be with the 

reconcilables. You have to get the talk fury out of these large compounds, which you saw, of hundreds of detainees, and not allow 

them to prosthelitize, intimidate, and to take out physical abuse of 

their fellow detainees who don’t willingly go with them and in fact, 

to avoid a situation where you have a training ground for the terrorist camp of 2008 or 2009. 

We separated the irreconcilables, we are now providing education, there’s always been good healthcare, good food, and good 

conditions. Also, in fact, to the point that there are over 100 who 

have actually requested to stay on in detention after their actual 

time was up, after their Reintegration Review Board, because they 

wanted to complete either job training or civilian education or some 

of the religious training that is offered in these facilities. 

Again, this has been an enormous change, and General Stone 

and his team have done wonderful work in this regard. It has resulted, most importantly, in a recidivism rate, a return to Bucca or 

Cropper, if you will, that is very, very small compared with what 

it used to be. We track that because we have the biometrics on 

each of the individuals who have been in our facilities. 

So, it’s an enormous shift, it is something we are trying to capture in our doctrinal manuals so that we can continue to build on 

this, and to perform detainee operations in a much enhanced way 

over what was done before. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes, that was my observation. 

Ambassador Crocker, in your opening statement, you referred to, 

I believe, Ahmadinejad making the statement that, if something 

happens where we leave precipitously that there would be a vacuum, and he would fill that vacuum. You didn’t take much time 

after that to say what would happen. Either one of you want to 

comment on what would happen if they were to fill that vacuum? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, I think the developments in 

Baghdad and Basrah over the last couple of weeks have been very 

instructive on a number of levels. I commented on one of them in 

response to Senator Lieberman’s question. It is also very important 

in what it shows us of what Iran is doing. Because the general 

level of violence is down, we could see, I think, much more sharply 

defined, what Iran’s role is in the arming and equipping of these 

extremist militia groups. 

What it tells me is that Iran is pursuing, as it were, a 

Lebanization strategy; using the same techniques they used in Lebanon to co-opt elements of the local Shiite community, and use 

them as basically instruments of Iranian force. That also tells me, 

sir, that in the event of a precipitous U.S. withdrawal, the Iranians 

would just push that much harder. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes, they said they would do that. 

Last question here, as you well know, down at Camp Bucca, 

that’s real close to Basrah where all of this was taking place, and 

I was there right after that took place. I’m a little confused, there’s 

a lot of criticism over the way they performed. According to our 

troops over there, they were real pleased that they came in when 

they did with their troops and demonstrated very clearly that 

they’re willing to take on that responsibility. 

41

The impression I got from the troops that were there is that the 

Iraqis did what they should do, and they performed very well. 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I don’t want to overstate the performance. However, the Iraqi people down there, by and large, were 

grateful for the action by the ISFs, by the decision that Prime Minister Maliki took to, in fact, confront militia, criminals, gangs, or 

whatever it might be. 

In fact, as I mentioned, the operation is by no means complete. 

It is continuing, it continues to grow on a much more deliberate 

basis, instead of the fairly more rapid sudden basis in which it was 

started, and where there was some faltering at the beginning, as 

I mentioned. 

They now control the different ports, for example, they control 

some key areas through which smuggling of weapons, as well as 

other contraband used to go. So, again, I’m not surprised to hear 

that comment. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes, okay. My time’s expired. But for the record, 

I’d like to kind of get your opinion as to where we are right now 

in the numbers, the sheer numbers of the ISFs. It’s my understanding we’re at about 140,000 now, we want to get up to around 

190,000, but maybe a status, for the record. 

General PETRAEUS. I’d be happy to. 

[The information referred to follows:]

The total number of assigned Iraqi security forces as of April 30, 2008, is 561,963. 

This includes forces in the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defense, and the 

Counterterrorism Bureau in the categories listed in the below table. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


408ful12.eps
42

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Petraeus, do you believe that the Mahdi Army will voluntarily disband and disarm at the request of the Prime Minister? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, some elements of the Mahdi Army could 

be incorporated into legitimate employment and other legitimate 

activities. 

Now, standing down at the direction of the Prime Minister is 

something that would undoubtedly result in violence. However, as 

you may have seen recently, Muqtada al-Sadr has said that he 

would stand down the force at the request of the marjiya, the senior Shiite clerics in Najaf. We’re just going to have to see how that 

plays out in the months ahead. 

Senator REED. But, unless he is instructed by the senior Shiite 

clergy, he would likely resist that which would lead, in your words, 

to accelerated violence within the Shiite community. 

General PETRAEUS. It depends, again, how it’s done, Senator. If 

you can do this gradually over time, with the force in the background that is capable of taking out action and providing alternatives. 

The key here is actually providing some other means of livelihood. The same problem that we had in a number of the different 

Sunni communities that were in the grip of al Qaeda. 

Senator REED. Well, after the attack in Basrah, where the Prime 

Minister committed to destroy these elements, and then he had to 

withdraw, I think this is less of an employment problem than an 

existential problem of political survival, one or the other. In those 

terms, unless there’s a voluntary compliance by the Mahdi Army, 

the alternatives for violence seem to be quite significant. 

Let’s assume that’s the case; will you participate with your military forces in supporting the government? 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, there is some voluntary standing 

down already, Senator. A number of the Sadr political leaders, in 

fact, have been engaging, and do not want to bring the violence. 

Everyone has looked into the abyss and said, ‘‘This does not look 

good, let’s step back and let’s see if there is some alternative that 

can be followed.’’ 

Senator REED. What’s the alternative? 

General PETRAEUS. The alternative is the incorporation in the 

political process, and over time, providing some avenue for these 

young men to participate in the economy, and so forth. That has 

actually worked in a number of neighborhoods. 

Senator REED. Like? 

General PETRAEUS. Like West Rasheed and a variety of southern 

communities. 

Senator REED. I think that’s the same dilemma, and it’s been a 

dilemma now for a year or more with respect to the Sons of Iraq 

where they’re still being paid by us, and they’re now being assumed, at least 60,000 of them, into the apparatus of the state of 

Iraq. 

General PETRAEUS. Over, actually, it’s well over 20,000 now, Senator. 

Senator REED. Sixty thousand have still not been? 

43

General PETRAEUS. I believe it’s over 90,000 actually that are on 

the rolls right now, and that will either be transitioned between 20 

and 30 percent to the ISFs, and the issue there is often illiteracy 

and/or physical disability. 

Then the Iraqi Government has pledged funds, as I mentioned in 

my opening statement, to retraining programs, to education programs, and to other job employment programs. 

Senator REED. So I can assume you and the Ambassador are giving advice to Maliki to go slow, to incorporate the Mahdi Army into 

the economy and political life of Iraq over many months. Is that the 

advice you’re giving him? Or are you giving him any advice at all 

that seems to contradict what he tried to do in Basrah? 

General PETRAEUS. Basrah did go much more suddenly than we 

expected, Senator. There’s no two ways about it. 

Senator REED. Okay. 

General PETRAEUS. In fact, the report is a good account, I think 

that it is accurate to say that he thought perhaps it would be a bit 

more like when he went to Karbala back last year and the sheer 

presence and so forth would be adequate. That was clearly not the 

case in Basrah. 

Now, in Basrah what has to be done, and they have just announced, for example, a $100 million program to begin addressing 

these kinds of issues and to get some alternatives to the young men 

down there to toting a gun on a street corner. 

Senator REED. It seems to me that Basrah illustrated the ultimate conflict between Sadr and Maliki, and the elected government. That’s a conflict they tried to resolve militarily. They failed 

because the military forces failed, and because people got very 

nervous that it was spinning out of control. But that ultimate conflict is still there, it’s the existential conflict with respect to the 

Shiite community, and the potential violence in my mind, it’s very 

real, and we’ll be engaged somehow, either on the sidelines watching or swept up in it. 

Let me switch to the Ambassador for a moment. 

Mr. Ambassador, is the Mahdi Army the only Shiite organization 

that is receiving assistance, cooperation, and has significant contacts on a routine basis with the Iranians? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I don’t think so, Senator. 

Senator REED. Who else might be having that kind of contact? 

If not military training, then a dialogue, money moving back and 

forth for other reasons? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Those are two different aspects, and I’ll 

address them separately. 

There are other militia groups down in Basrah. One militia organization is called Thar-Allah, The Vengeance of God, whose leader, 

incidentally, is now in detention. They almost certainly get support 

from Iran, as does something called Iraqi Hezbollah. That does not 

necessarily imply a connection to Lebanese Hezbollah, but again, 

an extremist militia. 

Iran has used the tactic as we’ve seen in Lebanon. 

Senator REED. Would that include the Isqi elements, Badr Brigade? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I’d put that in the second category. 

Iran has a dialogue with—— 

44

Senator REED. Everyone? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Everyone. 

Senator REED. In the Shiite community. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Right. 

Senator REED. It’s a mutual dialogue. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Not just the Shiite community. 

Senator REED. No. 

Ambassador CROCKER. What has happened with the Supreme 

Council and Badr is that they’ve basically gotten out of the overt 

militia business, it’s now the Badr Organization. Many of its elements did integrate with the ISFs. 

Senator REED. Thank you, my time’s expired. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’d like to thank both of you for your service. General Petraeus, 

I know this is your third year in Iraq. You’ve given your great 

abilities and commitment to our country because you were asked 

to serve, and you’ve done so excellently and progress has been 

made. When, a little over a year ago, you were confirmed here to 

go there, I think there was a feeling that we needed to give General Petraeus a chance one more time. The numbers show that you 

have made extraordinary progress, it seems to me. 

I asked you at that time, when things looked rather grim, I 

asked you, did you believe that we had a realistic chance to be successful in Iraq, and you said you did, or you wouldn’t take the job. 

After this period of time there, now, a little over a year, how 

would you evaluate our prospects for success today? 

General PETRAEUS. As I said, Senator, in my statement, there 

are innumerable challenges in Iraq in the way ahead, but I do believe that we have made progress, and I also believe that we can 

make further progress if we are able to move forward, as I’ve recommended. 

Senator SESSIONS. I just wanted to thank you for an extraordinary demonstration of military leadership, and also I think we 

would share an affirmation of the American military who, under 

difficult circumstances, have performed so magnificently. To see us 

move from a time when I think this country was deeply concerned 

about our prospects in Iraq, to a period where we’re seeing real 

progress, and I think we should listen to you about how to enhance 

that progress. Because this is a policy of the United States of 

America, it’s a policy we voted on by three-fourths of both Houses 

of Congress, and we’re making progress towards success, and we 

need to listen to those who helped get us there, about how we can 

maintain it. 

Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, I am curious about 

this activity, the action in Basrah and the south, when Prime Minister Maliki sent troops there. I appreciate your comments to Senator Lieberman, Ambassador Crocker, about the fact that there 

seems to be in that action a demonstration that the central government is willing to take on Shiite extremists, even though they are, 

at base, a Shiite-supported government. So, they’re taking on, in 

some sense, some of their own base support, that many on this 

45

panel, over the months, have complained they’re not willing to do. 

It seems to me that they did do that. 

Now, it does appear that they could have been more effective, 

perhaps, with better planning. But does this suggest that a significant event has occurred? Is Prime Minister Maliki developing some 

confidence now? Does his government see itself as a national Government of Iraq and is prepared to use military force to defend the 

concept of the country of Iraq? Is that an important thing that’s 

happened here? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, I believe it is. That certainly is 

the reaction that we’re seeing from Iraq’s political leadership. I was 

in intensive contact with them during this period before our departure, as was General Petraeus, and the change in tone from other 

leaders toward the Prime Minister and his government is marked. 

They do see him as taking a strong stand against illegal elements 

without regard to their sectarian identity, and that has had enormous impact on the Sunnis, on the Kurds, as well as other Shiites. 

So, I’m pretty cautious about labeling defining moments or watersheds. In fact I’m real cautious, and I certainly won’t call what 

we’ve seen there, that. That will be visible only in retrospect. But, 

I do think it is important. 

Senator SESSIONS. General Petraeus, the American military is 

just magnificent in after-action reports, analyzing what went wrong 

brutally honestly. Are the Iraqis actually evaluating what they did 

in Basrah, and do you think there’s any prospects that they’ve 

learned from that? 

General PETRAEUS. In fact, we’ve already run an after-action review, or they ran an after-action review, actually, in Baghdad, 

based on the actions in Baghdad at the same time. 

Most of the participants in Basrah are still engaged in operations, and we will get to an after-action review with them, although we’ve done a macro-level one, obviously, with some pretty 

basic conclusions about the need for a more deliberate setting of 

conditions. That’s the kind of approach that we take to set conditions, if you will, before you conduct an operation, and those conditions, in this case, were not as deliberately set as they might have 

been. 

Senator SESSIONS. Finally, with regard to Iranian influence, how 

would you describe the situation in Basrah, in the south, in the 

Shiite community? How is that influenced by Iran, and to what extent has Iran been strengthened or weakened as a result of this 

military action? 

General PETRAEUS. The bulk of the weaponry certainly came 

from Iran Senator. Again, they’re very signature items that you see 

in the hands of the Special Groups, and of some of their militia allies; the explosively-formed projectiles, 107-millimeter rockets, and 

a variety of other items. We have seen those all repeatedly. 

As to Iran’s strengthening, or not, I think again, this is still very 

much ongoing. At the end of the day, Iran clearly played a role as 

an arbiter, if you will, for talks among all of the different parties 

to that particular action. Whether that strengthened them, or also 

made them realize that their actions have been destructive in helping a country they want to succeed, presumably the first Shiite-led 

46

democracy, whether that gives them a good sense, or causes them 

also to draw back, I think, is very much in question right now. 

The Ambassador might have a view on that. 

Ambassador CROCKER. It’s not something I could really give a definitive response to, but I would point out some things that are important to watch. 

The militia actions, by and large, were very unpopular among 

Iraqis, and that is why the Prime Minister has gotten such broadbased political support. It is universally known or believed that the 

Iranians were behind them, so that unhappiness descends on them 

a bit, too. 

I think one might look for a reconsideration in Tehran, as to just 

where they want to go in Iraq, because over the long term, as General Petraeus suggests, their interests, I think, are best served by 

the success of this state and this government. No country, other 

than Iraq itself, suffered more under Saddam Hussein than did 

Iran with that brutal 8-year war. So, they should be thinking strategically, and the reaction to the militias they support, I would 

hope would lead them to do that. 

I note the statement by the Iranian government today actually 

condemning the indirect fire attacks on the international zone. I’m 

not sure what to make of it at this point, but it does underscore 

that Iranian influence in Iraq, while malign and destabilizing, is 

limited. Iraq is, in its essence, an Arab nation. Iraqi Shiite, Arab 

Shiite, died by the hundreds of thousands in the Iran/Iraq war defending their Arab state of Iraq against an Iranian enemy. 

So there are some constraints on Iran, and this would be an excellent time for them to reassess what is ultimately in their own 

long-term interests. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

General and Mr. Ambassador, I want to express my deep gratitude and appreciation for your service to our country, and also that 

of our military personnel who have served so well there. 

General, the Army has been operating with a 15-to-12 deployment to home station ratio for some time now, and has indicated 

its desire to immediately shift to a 1-to-1 ratio, and if possible to 

a 1-to-2 ratio. 

Part of the effort to achieve these numbers has been the increase 

in Army end strength. But these forces will not be available for deployment for some time. In the new to medium term, especially if 

a decision is made to freeze further troop withdrawals, the strain 

on equipment, on our forces, and on their families, as well, will 

continue. 

My question to you, General, is it your understanding that most 

of the soldiers that will return for subsequent deployments to Iraq 

are getting about 6 months quality time with their families over a 

31⁄2 year period? 

General PETRAEUS. My expectation would have been that it 

would be more than that, Senator. There’s no question that there 

are individuals who are in their third tour in Iraq since it began, 

but they happen to be individuals that either stayed in a unit that 

47

did just cycle back through, did not go off to another assignment 

in the Army somewhere, didn’t go off to a school, or what-have-you. 

Again, the Army would be the one best to answer what the average dwell time is across the force. There’s no question that certain 

individuals in certain units, if they have stayed in those units over 

time, may now be on their third tour in Iraq. There’s no question, 

as well, that a 15-month tour is very, very difficult on a soldier and 

on a family. As I mentioned, the strain on the force is something 

that I very much took into account when I recommended the continuation of the drawdown of the surge, and the way ahead, as 

well. 

I might note that there is something very special to soldiers 

about doing what they are doing, however. The 3rd Infantry Division in Iraq right now on its third tour. You’ll recall that it spearheaded the advance to Baghdad in the very beginning, in the liberation of Iraq, and is now back for its third tour. That division 

just met its reenlistment goal for the entire year at about the halfway mark in this fiscal year. 

So, despite how much we are asking of our young men and 

women in uniform, they do recognize both the importance of what 

they’re doing, and I guess this very intangible of being part of the 

brotherhood of the close fight, if you will, which is truly unique and 

special. They have continued to raise their right hand to volunteer. 

We are very concerned about one subset of the population, and 

that is the young captains, of whom we’ve asked a great deal, as 

well, and that is one that the Army is looking very hard at. 

I’m personally keenly aware of the stress. I have actually, with 

respect, been deployed now for 41⁄2 years, since 2001, on operations 

alone, not to mention training and other activities. There’s no question about the toll that it takes, and the challenges that it presents, 

not just to the soldiers, but to their families. 

Senator AKAKA. General, given your perception of the security 

conditions in Iraq, how long before you feel we will be able to meet 

the Army’s desired dwell ratio? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, again, that has to be a question for the 

Army. I don’t know their force generation plans, what their projections are for the bringing on of additional brigade combat teams. 

I know that their initial goal is to try to get back to a 12-month 

deployment. I’d certainly support that, but they’re the ones that are 

the generators of the force, not me. 

Senator AKAKA. General, as chairman of the Readiness and Management Subcommittee, I am especially concerned that testimony 

that comes from combatant commanders outside of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) indicate that operations in Iraq are affecting the readiness of their forces to be able to both train for and 

meet potential crises in their respective areas of operation. 

A recent deterioration of relations between North and South 

Korea highlight the increased risks borne by the United States, 

should that situation continue to worsen to the point that military 

involvement is required. 

Additionally, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves testified that due to the high operations tempo of our Reserve Forces there is an ‘‘appalling gap’’ in readiness for Homeland 

Defense. Clearly there is widespread agreement in the Defense DeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:23 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\45666.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
48

partment that this level of U.S. troop commitment is 

unsustainable. 

In your view, General, at what point must the military, in effect, 

hand over the majority of security responsibilities to the Iraqis so 

that the burden can be more equitably shared between our two 

countries, so that we can begin the reset of our forces, that is so 

long overdue? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, as I mentioned in my opening statement, there are already many multiples of ISFs serving in the Iraqi 

Police, Border Police, Army, small Air Force, Navy, and so forth. 

In fact, it is ISFs who are the cops on the beat, who are performing 

a vast number of tasks. 

To be sure, our forces still have the unique capabilities in certain 

areas, when going against al Qaeda and other extremist elements, 

and obviously we have the enablers; air support, and some 

logistical capabilities and others, that the Iraqis do not yet have, 

but are working on. 

In fact, one item during Basrah was that their C–130 fleet 

ferried an awful lot of the supplies and casualties to and from 

Baghdad and Basrah. So, again, they are gradually, slowly expanding. 

By the way, they want to buy U.S. C–130s, and have asked to 

be able to buy the C–130J more quickly than, I think, the original 

response has been that it would be available. 

So they are already shouldering an enormous burden. It is being 

handed to them, more all the time. But clearly, as we have seen, 

they need assistance in a number of different areas, and that’s 

what we are providing. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you for your responses, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Akaka. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

General, 41⁄2 years of deployment truly represents extraordinary 

sacrifice, and I want to begin my comments by thanking you and 

Ambassador Crocker for your service. It’s been courageous, it’s been 

extraordinary. 

General, for years this committee has heard that progress is 

being made in the training and equipping of Iraqi forces. Each 

year, military commanders come before us, and they tell us that 

Iraqi troops are becoming more and more capable. Today, for example, you testified that the number of combat battalions capable of 

taking the lead in operations has grown to well over 100. 

Success always seems to be just around the corner when it comes 

to training and equipping of Iraqi forces. Yet, when put to the test, 

the Iraqi forces have performed very unevenly, and it’s very disturbing to me to read the press reports that more than 1,000 Iraqi 

soldiers refused to fight, fled, or abandoned their positions during 

the battle in Basrah. 

Ultimately, as the Ambassador has said this morning, the fate of 

Iraq is up to the Iraqi people. My concern is, as long as we continue 

to take the lead in combat operations, rather than transitioning to 

more limited missions, the Iraqis are never going to step up to the 

plate and fight for their country. 

49

So my question to you is, why should American troops continue 

to take the lead in combat operations at this point, after years of 

training and equipping the Iraqi forces? After spending tens of billions of dollars on training and equipping of Iraqi forces? 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, Senator, in Basrah, we did not 

take the lead. Basrah is a Province that is under Iraqi control, the 

sovereign Iraqi Prime Minister made a decision to confront a challenge. It was not just a political challenge, this is a militia gang—

criminals who were threatening the population. He then deployed 

forces very rapidly, frankly, more rapidly than we thought they 

could deploy. Over the course of a week, the Iraqis deployed the 

combat elements of a division. 

Then they moved very rapidly into combat operations, again, too 

rapidly, most likely, without setting all of the proper conditions and 

so forth. 

But they were in the lead. We did provide some close air support, 

attack helicopters. We augmented their C–130 fleet, their helicopters were also ferrying in and out of Basrah, as well, but we 

clearly did provide a number of enablers. They do not yet have ISR 

platforms, they don’t have counter-fire radar, they don’t have a sufficiently robust expeditionary logistics structure, they do now provide their own logistics at their own bases, at their own police 

academies, and all of the rest of that. But again, taking the next 

step is doing it after you’ve deployed the better part of a division’s 

worth of combat forces; two brigades within about 36 hours of notification, another later in that week. 

They are actually taking the lead in Anbar Province in a number 

of different places. There’s a guiding hand there, but one of the 

largest reductions in the reduction of surge forces will come in 

Anbar, which you’ll recall, of course, in the fall of 2006 was assessed as lost, and then through the awakening, through the combat operations, additional forces, and so forth, Iraqi, as well as coalition, over time, it has become the province that is actually relatively peaceful, and actually on the road toward prosperity. 

Again, it is a process, rather than a light switch, and when the 

going has gotten tough, or where it requires more sophisticated application of force, we have had to help them out. 

Senator COLLINS. But 1,000 troops? 

General PETRAEUS. It’s 1,000 out of I don’t know how many tens 

of thousands, actually, were there. Confronted by very, very tough 

militia elements, and in fact, because of the position into the forces 

where they were able to get overwhelmed by larger groups of the 

militia, put them into an untenable situation. So, I’m not in the 

least bit apologizing for them, but I do see the situation they were 

confronted with, because of the speed with which they went into action, was very, very difficult for any troopers. 

What I would point to is that in other provinces where we have 

virtually no presence, or perhaps a Special Forces A Team, such as 

in Karbala Province, in Najaf, in Illa, in Nasiriyah, and others in 

the south where, because of the operations in Basrah, there were 

also outbreaks of militia violence. In those areas the Iraqis proved 

equal to the task, and in fact, were able to maintain security. 

The same with varying levels in certain areas of Baghdad. 

50

Senator COLLINS. Ambassador, in 2003, several of us proposed 

that the reconstruction aid to Iraq be structured as a loan rather 

than a grant. You may recall that debate. We didn’t prevail. Now, 

we look at $100 a barrel oil, an Iraqi budget that was predicated 

on $50 a barrel oil, and the Iraqis, sir, are clearly reaping a windfall from the higher oil prices. 

You mentioned that the era of our paying for major reconstruction is over. But we’re continuing to pay the salaries of the Sons 

of Iraq, in many cases, we’re continuing to pay for the training and 

equipping of Iraqi forces. I’m told that we’re even continuing to pay 

for fuel within Iraq. 

Isn’t it time for the Iraqis to start bearing more of those expenses, particularly in light of a windfall of revenues, due to the 

high price of oil? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, it is. That is something that both 

General Petraeus and I are engaged on. 

We’ve had several discussions with the Prime Minister, for example, on the importance or the need for the Government of Iraq to 

pick up the funding for employment projects, and he agrees. So, 

we’re working out the ways to do this. 

I think what we have to focus on in the period ahead is 

transitioning. It will be, like everything else in Iraq, a complex 

process. What do they have the capacity to do, how do they get the 

capacity to do it? But, I think that’s clearly the direction, not only 

should we move in, but that we are moving in. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Collins. 

Senator Bill Nelson. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I have a series of questions. If I don’t finish them 

now, I will have an opportunity to continue this afternoon in the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Please understand my comments, my questions, it is with a great deal of respect and deference to the two of you, and appreciation for your service to our 

country. 

Now, I want to frame my questions within the context of more 

than a year ago. Because the whole idea that you all presented to 

us was that the military surge would stabilize the situation so that 

the environment would be created in order for us to have political 

reconciliation over there. 

Indeed, January a year ago, in 2007, Secretary Gates said that 

he thought that by March 2007, or about 3 months after he testified, he said that he would know whether or not the surge was 

working. Well, of course, that time came and went. Then, one of 

those times you were in front of us, General, I don’t remember if 

it was in your confirmation hearing or if it was one of the reports 

that you gave back to us, you testified that the surge was necessary for political reconciliation. 

Now, I heard some disturbing testimony last week in the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee from two retired generals. One, retired Lieutenant General Odom, who said, ‘‘Violence has been temporarily reduced, but today there is credible evidence that the political situation is thus far more fragmented.’’ Then he went on to 

talk about Basrah, and so forth. 

51

Then retired four-star General McCaffrey; in response to my 

question about what’s your degree of optimism or pessimism, this 

is what he says, ‘‘It’s a hell of a mess. I mean, there’s just no way 

about it. It’s a $600 billion war, 34,000 killed and wounded. We’ve 

alienated most of the global population, the American people don’t 

support the war, and the Iraqi Government’s dysfunctional. The 

ISFs are inadequate, ill-equipped, and we have very little time—

by the way, I’m not recommending that we come out of Iraq in a 

year or 3—but that’s what’s going to happen. This thing is over. So, 

the question is how do we stage as we come out.’’ Continuing, this 

is General McCaffrey, ‘‘and you have to, at some point, hit the civil 

war in the direction of somebody who’s more likely to govern Iraq 

effectively than the current, incoherent, dysfunctional regime that’s 

in power.’’ 

So, I go back to the original predicate with which we talked 

about the surge. Has the political reconciliation happened? 

General? 

General PETRAEUS. As the Ambassador laid out, there has been 

agreement among the different political parties on a number of 

pieces of important reconciliation, if you will, laws that represent 

reconciliation. Among them is, in fact, the de-Baathification reform, 

there’s also the Provincial Powers Law, there is a Pensions Reform 

bill that is little noticed, but actually extends pension rights to tens 

of thousands of Iraqis who were shut out because of deBaathification. 

Senator BILL NELSON. That’s a step in the right direction. Now, 

the question is: have those laws been implemented? 

General PETRAEUS. I believe that the Pensions Law is, again, in 

the process of being implemented. Again, de-Baathification, they’re 

collecting the information for that. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Have those laws been implemented to the 

point that we can see in Iraq that there is this political reconciliation which is the goal in the first place, coming back to over a 

year ago, of the surge? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, if I might, I noted in my testimony when I talked about these laws, that obviously how they are 

implemented is going to be key. The Amnesty Law, part of the legislative package passed in the middle of February, is being implemented 24,000 applications for amnesty received, and about 17,000 

approved. That’s actually moved out at pretty impressive speed. 

The Provincial Powers Law comes into effect after the forthcoming provincial elections. It does not apply to the current provincial councils. The one important step it did foreshadow is an electoral law to set the conditions for those elections, that is actively 

being pursued within the Council of Ministers, and it’s a process, 

incidentally, where we’re involved at Iraqi Government request, as 

well as the U.N., to help them get it right, particularly with respect 

to the role of women in these elections. 

So there is a lot to be done, Senator, but they have passed the 

laws, and in several cases, particularly the amnesty law, we see 

them moving out pretty rapidly. 

Senator BILL NELSON. So you think we are moving toward political reconciliation? 

52

Ambassador CROCKER. I think the various elements I mentioned 

in my statement—both the national-level legislation, the way parliament works, because there was a lot of cross-block horse-trading 

going on, particularly in that February package, that gives and 

takes from all over the political groups, which of course, in many 

respects are sectarian organized—are as encouraging as the results. 

So, yes, I think they’re moving in the right direction. But, yes, 

I also believe they have an awful lot more in front of them. 

Senator BILL NELSON. I look forward to continuing this this 

afternoon. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, both of you, well done. According 

to some, we should fire you, it sounds like, that just—really nothing good has happened in the last year, and this is a hopeless endeavor. Well, I beg to differ. If I could promote you to five-stars, 

I would. 

I don’t know where to send you, you’ve been in every bad place 

there is to go, so I’d send you to a good place, Ambassador Crocker. 

I cannot tell you how proud I am of both of you. Let’s start this 

with kind of a 30,000-foot assessment. 

The surge, General Petraeus, was a corrective action, is that fair 

to say? 

General PETRAEUS. That’s correct, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. The reason it was a corrective action is, between the fall of Baghdad in January 2007, all of the trend lines 

were going in the wrong way—economic stagnation, political stagnation, increased proliferation of violence—therefore, something 

had to be done. That something was called the surge. 

Now, I just ask the American people and my colleagues to evaluate fairly from January 2007 to July 2008 and see what’s happened. The challenges are real, but there are things that have happened in that period of time that need to be understood as being 

beneficial to this country, they came at a heavy price, and al Qaeda 

cannot stand the surge. If you put a list of people that wanted us 

to leave, the number one group would be al Qaeda, because you’ve 

been kicking them all over Iraq. 

Now, the reason they came to Iraq is why, General Petraeus? 

General PETRAEUS. That al Qaeda came to Iraq, sir? 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes. 

General PETRAEUS. To establish a base in the heart of the Arab 

world, in the heart of the Middle East. 

Senator GRAHAM. Are they closer to their goal after the surge or 

further away? 

General PETRAEUS. Further away, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. If you had to pick one thing to tell the 

American people that was the biggest success of the surge, what 

would it be? 

General PETRAEUS. Probably Anbar Province and/or just the general progress against al Qaeda. 

53

Senator GRAHAM. Would it be the fact that Muslims tasted al 

Qaeda life in Iraq and Iraqi Muslims joined with us to fight al 

Qaeda? 

General PETRAEUS. I think the shift in Sunni Arabs against al 

Qaeda has been very, very significant. The rejection of the indiscriminate violence, the extremist ideology, and really, even the oppressive practices associated with al Qaeda is a very, very significant change. 

Senator GRAHAM. Is it fair to say that when Muslims will stand 

by us and fight against bin Laden, his agents, and sympathizers, 

we’re safer? 

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely. 

Senator GRAHAM. Ambassador Crocker, what is Iran up to in 

Iraq? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, I described what I believed to be 

an effort at Lebanization through the backing of different militia 

groups. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay, let’s stop there. Lebanon kicked Syria 

out a few years ago, and they tried to create some form of a democracy. Hezbollah, backed by Iran, had a say in that endeavor. Is 

that correct? 

Ambassador CROCKER. That is correct, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. They launched an attack from Lebanon against 

Israel at the time the U.N. was about to sanction Iran for their nuclear endeavors. Is that correct? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I believe so, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. So, is it fair to say that from an Iranian point 

of view, one of their biggest nightmares would be a functioning democracy in Lebanon, and a functioning representative government 

in Iraq on their borders? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Certainly their behavior would indicate 

that that may be the case. 

You make an important point. We look at Iraq as a nation in its 

own terms. The region looks at it a little bit differently. Iran and 

Syria have been cooperating over Lebanon since the early 1980s, 

over a quarter of a century. They have worked together against the 

Lebanese and against our interests. 

They’re using that same partnership in Iraq, in my view, although the weights are reversed, with Iran having the greater 

weight, Syria the lesser. But they are working in tandem together 

against us and against a stable Iraqi state. 

Senator GRAHAM. If I can walk through what I think these laws 

mean to me, and this is just my opinion. 

Provincial elections in October are important to me because it 

means that the Sunnis understand that participating in representative government seems to be in their interest, therefore they’re 

going to vote in October 2008, and they boycotted in 2005. Is that 

correct? 

Ambassador CROCKER. That’s one reason they’re important, yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay, so the Sunnis are going to come out, by 

the millions, we anticipate, to send representatives to Baghdad or 

to the Provinces rather than sending bombs. Is that correct? 

Ambassador CROCKER. That is what I would expect, yes. 

54

Senator GRAHAM. Okay, now the reason the surge has been successful to me, General Petraeus, is that the Anbar Province has 

been liberated from al Qaeda, but we’ve had a reduction in sectarian violence. Is that true? 

General PETRAEUS. That is true. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay, now this breathing space that we’ve 

been urging to have happen by better security, by my opinion has 

produced economic results not known before January 2007. Is that 

correct? The economy is improving? 

General PETRAEUS. That is correct. 

Senator GRAHAM. The Iraqis will be paying more over time to 

bear the burden of fighting for their freedom. 

General PETRAEUS. That’s correct. 

Senator GRAHAM. They will be fighting more to bear the burden 

of their freedom. Is that correct? 

General PETRAEUS. Correct. 

Senator GRAHAM. Is there any way that Iraq could be a failed 

state, and it not affect our national security? 

General PETRAEUS. No, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. What would happen if the United States began 

to remove a brigade a month out of Iraq? What would be the military consequences of such an endeavor, in your opinion, if we announced, as a nation, we’re going to withdraw a brigade out of Iraq 

every month? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, it clearly would depend on the conditions 

at that time. If the conditions were good, quite good, then that 

might be doable. 

Senator GRAHAM. At this point in time, does that seem to be a 

responsible position to take, given what you know about Iraq, to 

make that announcement now? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, I have advocated conditions-based 

reductions, not a timetable. War is not a linear phenomenon, it’s 

a calculus, not arithmetic. That is why I have recommended conditions-based reductions following the completion of the surge forces 

drawdown. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Graham, thank you. 

Senator Ben Nelson. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker, first I thank you for 

your service, and say how proud I am of the American men and 

women who are serving in the military in Iraq and elsewhere 

around the world. 

I might add that, as a proud Nebraskan, a proud American, I 

witnessed on one of the national news channels, an American—

Captain Logan Veath—embedded with the Iraqi Army in Sadr 

City, leading forth the challenge and doing a remarkable job. We’re 

all proud of him and those who he represents, as well. 

In 2003, as Senator Collins mentioned, Senator Bayh and I and 

others introduced legislation to require that at least part of the 

money that was going for reconstruction in that supplemental be 

considered a loan forgivable to a grant—part of a loan, but part of 

it also a loan to be forgivable to a grant—if the rest of the countries 

would forgive the IOUs of Iraq that they held. The administration 

blocked it, even though it passed the Senate, because they said 

55

that they were going to the donor’s conference and this would impair their ability to get the other countries, as part of the coalition, 

to be donors. 

It turned out to be a lender’s conference, in general, because the 

others did loan the money. Now we have an opportunity to go back 

and look at what Secretary Wolfowitz said in 2003, ‘‘We really 

ought to be able to get our money back from Iraq because through 

their oil revenues, they’re going to be able to pay for the war themselves, finance it themselves.’’ That was reconstruction, not the 

war, but the reconstruction. 

We have your comment, Ambassador Crocker, that they’re in a 

position soon, or something, to be able to take on that responsibility. Soon, to me, means now. What I think we should do is in 

this supplemental, and I’ll introduce legislation with others to 

make any further reconstruction money a loan. Purely and simply, 

to be repaid, not forgiven. Any other money that has been appropriated, but unspent, to date, a loan, as well. When Iraq is today on the basis of $111 barrel oil, and $3.25 and 

upwards gas at the pump here in the United States, it just does 

not seem responsible for us to continue to borrow from our grandchildren and China and other places around the world to be able 

to finance, in effect, what is their future opportunity. It seems to 

me that now is the time. 

You also, Ambassador Crocker, said that you think they should 

be doing this soon. Will there be a change in the thinking of the 

administration on this? Will they now support legislation that 

could be worked out to make that now, make soon now, into the 

future, on these future appropriations and past appropriations that 

are unspent? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, there is very much an interest in 

moving the financing from us to the Iraqis. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Well, I think you answered my question, 

but there was an interest back in 2003 when Secretary Wolfowitz 

said that they ought to be able to finance their own reconstruction. 

I’m trying to find out when the soon can be now. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, with respect to reconstruction, 

soon basically is now. 

Senator BEN NELSON. In terms of a loan? 

Ambassador CROCKER. In terms of the United States no longer 

being involved in the physical reconstruction business. 

Senator BEN NELSON. What about the money that’s in the current supplemental that’s there for reconstruction, is that structured 

as a loan? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Sir, that is not, in my definition, it is not 

for reconstruction. These are, for example, some USAID programs 

that we think are very important to stabilization. In conjunction 

with the military’s CERP spending, we will move into immediate 

post-kinetic situations and get people going with jobs and things 

like that. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Well, then let’s call it post-kinetic aid, as 

well. It seems to me that if we’re paying for what is not, let’s say, 

military hardware, because they’re picking up more of the cost, we 

ought to be looking at training costs that we’re engaged in. I just 

think that there’s a point in time, and it’s now, when we need to 

56

find a way to make sure that Iraq is financing more of its own 

present and future, rather than incurring those costs ourselves. 

When they’re adding $50 to $60 billion to surplus, at a time when 

we’re developing hundreds of billions of dollars of deficit, it just 

doesn’t make sense for us to be the financier of first resort. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Sir, as I said, I’m committed to that. At 

the same time, I don’t think you have a one-size-fits-all situation 

here. A number of our programs, particularly those that get down 

to the local level, that our PRTs, for example, identify and execute, 

the Iraqi Government is really not going to be positioned to pick 

that up, or even identify it. 

Senator BEN NELSON. I don’t care whether they can do that, we 

can pay it. Whether they can get the money out of their treasury 

or not is secondary. If we can do it, we should do it, and then they 

should repay us. 

What about the money that’s already been appropriated but 

unspent? Will that now not be spent? 

Ambassador CROCKER. If you’re talking about reconstruction—— 

Senator BEN NELSON. Reconstruction. 

Ambassador CROCKER. We’re down to like the last 2 or 3 percent 

of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund projects. These are 

things that are underway that we’re going to be bringing to completion. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Well, I think there are billions and billions 

of dollars that would fall into that category, and for me, a billion 

dollars is not pencil dust. 

Ambassador CROCKER. I understand your point, Senator, but at 

the same time, again, these are projects that are underway. I think 

we’d have to think very carefully if we want to risk a halt in ongoing completion while we try and negotiate with the Iraqis on—— 

Senator BEN NELSON. Well, I think that’s all well and good, but 

I wish we’d thought more carefully earlier, and got this set, such 

as, back in 2003. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

Senator Thune. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, Ambassador, thank you very much for your extraordinary service to our country, and thank you for your very candid 

assessment of how things are going. As always, you’ve been very 

forthright in your testimony, and we appreciate that, because I 

think it’s important that we have a good understanding of conditions as you understand them to be on the ground. We make decisions on funding both on the military level and the other benchmarks that we’re trying to achieve in regard to economic and political progress in the region. 

I’m wondering if you might be able to elaborate a little bit on the 

whole issue of the Shiite militias and the Iranian influence there. 

It seems to me, at least, that a lot of our success these past several 

months has been because of the cease-fire that the Mahdi Army 

has observed, and my question, I guess, gets at the point of whether or not Sadr really is in control, or whether the Iranians are pulling the strings there. If we’re going to continue to see reduction in 

57

violence and a lessening of American casualties and civilian casualties there, that’s going to be a big factor. 

I guess I’d be interested in knowing, General, what your impressions are about who really is in charge of these Shiite militias and 

the Mahdi Army; is it Sadr or is it the Iranians? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, let’s go back to when the original 

cease-fire was put in place in August, and that was directed by 

Muqtada al-Sadr. It was because of violence that was precipitated 

in the Holy City of Karbala by militia elements that refused to surrender their weapons before going into the shrine area. That did 

a great deal of damage to the reputation of the overall Sadr Movement, which is first and foremost a political movement, and then 

also has the associated militia. 

Added to that, over time, were connections between the militia 

and/or the Special Groups, which are these elements that are affiliated with or associated with the Sadr militia, but have been selected carefully, and then typically are paid for, trained by, and 

armed by Iran, by the Quds Force, in particular, and which do take 

direction from the Quds Force. 

The hand of Iran was very clear in recent weeks. There was a 

recognition, we think, in Iran based on people who talked to some 

of the leaders there, that in fact what was transpiring was very 

damaging not just to Iraq, not just in the violence to the Iraqi people, and not just to the reputation of the militia, but also was backfiring on Iran itself. 

In fact, I think arguably it did generate a unification in concern 

among Iraqi political leaders about Iranian activity in Iraq that 

was nowhere near as great—I would argue—just a month or so 

ago. 

As we mentioned earlier, both of us have said that it sort of 

brought out in higher relief, the activities of Iran, of the Quds 

Force in particular, and its involvement with these Special Groups, 

and with the weapons and training that they provided to them. 

Senator THUNE. Let me ask you, General, there have been some 

here who have talked about putting restrictions on or limiting 

funding for the CERP. Could you describe that program and it’s 

value to commanders in the field? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, a number of us at different times 

have stated that there’s a point in operations where money becomes your most important ammunition. Typically, it’s small 

amounts of money at local levels where, when you have all of a 

sudden the opportunity because of security improvements, you can 

very rapidly commit it again in small amounts. 

We have also used it to fund the so-called Sons of Iraq. As I had on one of the charts, I think about $16 million a month is the payroll for those individuals, on average, and I can tell you the savings 

that we have had in vehicles not lost in areas where they used to 

be lost. There’s an area south of Baghdad, southwest, that used to 

be called the ‘‘Triangle of Death.’’ That area has actually been very, 

very quiet over the course of the last 6 months, since our forces and 

Iraqi forces cleared it of al Qaeda, and then Sons of Iraq stood up 

to help secure a local community. 

It’s a big reason why we have the enormous numbers of caches 

being found. Most of them are being identified by these local indiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:23 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\45666.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
58

viduals or by local citizens who have benefited from various 

projects done by the CERP. They have seen the benefits of improved security and started to see some economic growth. Oftentimes, the pump is primed with small amounts of CERP very early 

in that process, before the Iraqi Government can reconnect to these 

communities, and get the different ministry activities out there 

helping them. 

By the way, this is the reason Iraq has committed some of its money—$300 million is its initial amount—to fund something 

called Iraqi CERP, which will help enormously and can greatly expand the impact of the overall program. 

We have a capacity out there in a lot of these communities, particularly the ones that over the course of the last year were recently cleared of al Qaeda or other extremists. We have an ability 

to spend that money, that they do not. They are now very much 

our partners in that and very much doing a cost-sharing approach, 

and beyond, over time. 

Senator THUNE. Last week the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee received testimony from the Service Vice Chiefs 

on the current readiness of the forces, and they all testified that 

military units that are deploying to you in theater are currently 

adequately trained, equipped, and ready to carry out the missions 

that you’ve assigned. As the combatant commander, is that your 

perception as well? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, I would say that this is the best 

Army that I’ve ever seen in 34 years of service. Now, it is an Army 

that is capable of what we might call full spectrum; in fact, what 

our doctrine does call full spectrum operations. Counterinsurgency 

operations include not just the stability and support operations but 

also offense and defense. 

We have, in the last year, for example, done major operations in 

places like Ramadi, Baqubah, South Baghdad, and a variety of 

other locations that have involved all of our different capabilities 

in the military, not just the soft side of stability and support operations. 

I’ve said on a number of occasions that there were two enormous 

changes that I found when I got back to Iraq in January 2007. The 

first, in February 2007, was the damage done by sectarian violence 

which tore the fabric of society; the second was how much our leaders ‘‘get it’’ about what it is that we’re trying to do over there as 

a result of all the changes made by the Services in terms of doctrine, education, preparation of units, and so forth. 

So the units are exceedingly well-trained, and they are the best 

equipped. When I look back at the fact that as a division commander, when we crossed the berm and went into Iraq, we had one 

unmanned aerial vehicle that we were all fighting over within the 

entire Corps. Now look at the enormous proliferation of ISR platforms, the enormous tools that the different intelligence agencies 

have now provided to us, the fusion of intelligence, in the way that 

Special Forces, Special Mission Elements, and conventional forces 

all work together, and literally have fusion cells, the proliferation 

of real-time situational awareness tools, just on and on and on, satellite tracking and communications. We are vastly better than 

where we were in 2003 when we went through the berm and espeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:23 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\45666.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
59

cially in terms of so-called full spectrum operations, which is what 

most of us think we’ll be involved in in the future. There are not 

too many peer competitors, as they say, out there that want to take 

us on toe-to-toe out in the desert somewhere in open tank warfare. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you all, again, very much for your service 

to our country, and please convey to those who serve under your 

command our deep appreciation for their service and sacrifice, as 

well. 

General PETRAEUS. I will, Senator. 

If I could just thank the committee for one thing, in particular, 

and that is the mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles. 

These have been lifesavers. Countless soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 

marines have been saved by these vehicles, and by the additional 

protection that they provide to the occupants. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you for that, General. 

Thank you, Senator Thune. 

Senator Clinton. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, for your 

long and distinguished service to our Nation. 

Before I ask you any questions, I just wanted to respond to some 

of the statements and suggestions that have been made leading up 

to this hearing, and even during it, that it is irresponsible or demonstrates a lack of leadership to advocate withdrawing troops from 

Iraq in a responsible and carefully-planned withdrawal. I fundamentally disagree. 

Rather, I think it could be fair to say that it might well be irresponsible to continue the policy that has not produced the results 

that have been promised, time and time again, at such tremendous 

cost to our national security and to the men and women who wear 

the uniform of the United States military. 

Our troops are the best in the world, and they have performed 

admirably and heroically in Iraq. However, the purpose of the 

surge—let’s not forget—as described by the Bush administration 

was to create the space for the Iraqis to engage in reconciliation 

and make significant political progress. 

However, since General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker last 

testified in September, even General Petraeus, as recently as 31⁄2

weeks ago, has acknowledged that the Iraqi Government has not 

made sufficient political progress. 

Our current strategy in Iraq has very real costs. We rarely talk 

about the opportunity costs, the opportunities lost because of the 

continuation of this strategy. The longer we stay in Iraq, the more 

we divert resources, not only from Afghanistan, but other international challenges, as well. 

In fact, last week, Admiral Mullen said that the military would 

have already assigned forces to missions elsewhere in the world 

were it not for, what he called, ‘‘the pressure that’s on our forces 

right now.’’ He admitted that force levels in Iraq do not allow us 

to have the force levels we need in Afghanistan. 

The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Cody, testified last 

week that the current demands for forces in Iraq and Afghanistan 

limits our ability to provide ready forces for other contingencies. 

60

Finally, the cost to our men and women in uniform is growing. 

Last week, the New York Times noted the stress on the mental 

health of our returning soldiers and marines from multiple and extended deployments. Among combat troops sent to Iraq for the 

third or fourth time, more than one in four shows signs of anxiety, 

depression, or acute stress according to an official Army survey of 

soldiers’ mental health. 

The administration and supporters of the administration’s policy 

often talk about the cost of leaving Iraq, yet ignore the greater 

costs of continuing the same failed policy. The lack of political 

progress over the last 6 months, and the recent conflict in Basrah, 

reflect how tenuous the situation in Iraq really is, and for the past 

5 years, we have continually heard from the administration that 

things are getting better, that we’re about to turn a corner, that 

there is finally a resolution in sight. Yet, each time, Iraqi leaders 

fail to deliver. 

I think it’s time to begin an orderly process of withdrawing our 

troops, start rebuilding our military, and focus on the challenges 

posed by Afghanistan, the global terrorist groups, and other problems that confront America. I understand the very difficult dilemma that any policy, with respect to Iraq, poses to decisionmakers. If there were an easy or very clear way forward, we could 

all, perhaps, agree on the facts about how to build toward a resolution that is in the best interest of the United States, that would 

stabilize Iraq, and would meet our other challenges around the 

world. 

With respect to our long-term challenges, Ambassador Crocker, 

the administration has announced that it will negotiate an agreement with the Government of Iraq by the end of July that would 

provide the legal authorities for U.S. troops to continue to conduct 

operations in Iraq. Let me ask you, do you anticipate that the Iraqi 

Government would submit such an agreement to the Iraqi parliament for ratification? 

Ambassador CROCKER. The Iraqi Government has indicated it 

will bring the agreement to the Council of Representatives. At this 

point, it’s not clear to me whether that will be for a formal vote 

or whether they will repeat the process they used in November 

with the Declaration of Principles, in which it was simply read to 

the members of the parliament. 

Senator CLINTON. Does the administration plan to submit this 

agreement to our Congress? 

Ambassador CROCKER. At this point, Senator, we do not anticipate that the agreements will have within them any elements that 

would require the advice and consent procedure. We intend to negotiate this as an executive agreement. 

Senator CLINTON. Ambassador Crocker, it seems odd, I think, to 

Americans who are being asked to commit for an indefinite period 

of time, the lives of our young men and women in uniform, the civilian employees who you rightly referenced and thanked, as well 

as billions of dollars of additional taxpayer dollars, if the Iraqi parliament may have a chance to consider this agreement that the 

United States Congress would not. 

I currently have legislation requiring Congress to have an opportunity to consider such an agreement before it is signed, and I 

61

would urge you to submit such an agreement to Congress for full 

consideration. 

General Petraeus, I know that in this March 14 interview with 

the Washington Post, you stated that no one—and those are your 

words—no one in the United States or Iraqi Governments feels 

there has been sufficient progress, by any means, in the area of national reconciliation, or in the provision of basic public services. 

Those are exactly the concerns that my colleagues and I raised 

when you testified before us in September. 

I remember well your being asked how long would we continue 

to commit American lives and treasure if the Iraqis fail to make 

political gains. In response, you said that if we reach that point in 

a year, you would have to think very hard about it. It would be difficult to recommend the continuation of this strategy, and there 

clearly are limits to the blood and treasure we can expend in an 

effort. Well, we’re halfway through the year, and as many of us 

predicted, and as you yourself stated, we still do not see sufficient 

progress. 

What conditions would have to exist for you to recommend to the 

President that the current strategy is not working? It seems apparent that you have a conditions-based analysis, as you set forth in 

your testimony, but the conditions are unclear. They certainly lack 

specificity, and the decision points, with respect to these conditions, 

are also vague. 

So how are we to judge, General Petraeus, what the conditions 

are, or should be, and the actions that you and the administration 

would recommend pursuing based on them? 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, Senator, if I could just comment 

on that Washington Post article. What I said was that no one was 

satisfied with the progress that had been made, either Iraqi or 

American. I then went on and actually ticked off a number of the 

different areas in which there had been progress, and talked about 

the different laws that Ambassador Crocker has rightly identified 

in a number of other areas that there’s been progress, although not 

satisfactory progress, as I mentioned, in the eyes of either Iraqis 

or Americans. 

So, that was the thrust of what I was getting at there, because 

there has indeed been progress in the political arena, and there actually has been progress in a variety of the other arenas, as Ambassador Crocker laid out in his opening statement. 

With respect to the conditions, Senator, what we have is a number of factors that we will consider, by area, as we look at where 

we can make recommendations for further reductions beyond the 

reduction of the surge forces that will be complete in July. These 

factors are fairly clear. There’s obviously an enemy situation factor. 

There’s a friendly situation factor with respect to Iraqi forces, local 

governance, even economic and political dynamics, all of which are 

considered as the factors in making recommendations on further 

reductions. 

Having said that, I have to say, it’s not a mathematical exercise, 

there’s not an equation in which you have coefficients in front of 

each of these factors. It’s not as mechanical as that. At the end of 

the day, it really involves commanders sitting down, also with their 

Iraqi counterparts and leaders in a particular area, and assessing 

62

where it is that you can reduce your forces, so that you can make 

a recommendation to make further reductions. 

That’s the process, there is this issue and in a sense this term 

of battlefield geometry. As I mentioned, together with Ambassador 

Crocker and Iraqi political leaders, there’s even sort of a politicalmilitary calculus that you have to consider in establishing where 

the conditions are met and make further reductions. 

Senator CLINTON. If I could just ask one follow-on question, Mr. 

Chairman? 

In response to a question by Senator Levin regarding when you 

knew of Prime Minister Maliki’s plans to go into Basrah, you said, 

and I was struck by it so I wrote it down, that you learned of it 

in a meeting where the meeting’s purpose was planning to resource 

operations in Basrah on a longer-term basis. 

Clearly, until relatively recently, Southern Iraq has not been 

within our battlefield geometry. Southern Iraq was originally the 

responsibility of the British. They have clearly pulled back and 

were not, so far as I can glean from the press reports, very actively 

involved in the most recent operations. 

What did you mean by the resources you were planning to deploy, and over what length of time? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, what we had been working on with 

the Iraqi National Security Advisor, Ministers of Defense and Interior, was a plan that was being developed by the commander of the 

Basrah Operational Command, General Mohan, which was a fairly 

deliberate process of adding to the resources there on the military 

side and other areas. Then there was a phased plan over the course 

of a number of months, during which different actions were going 

to be pursued. 

Prime Minister Maliki assessed that that plan was taking too 

long, determined that the threats that had emerged since provincial Iraqi control, in terms of the criminal elements connected to 

the militia and so forth, were such that more immediate action was 

taken. As a sovereign country’s leader, commander in chief of his 

armed forces, he decided to direct the much more rapid deployment 

of forces from other locations to Basrah. That is what he did. He 

moved up the timetable and compressed the different activities 

that we had been planning to resource over time. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Clinton. 

Senator Martinez. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you very much for your excellent service to our 

country. I also want to remark how dramatic a difference it is 

today, and the reports that you bring us, General Petraeus, from 

what we had seen when we were last together here in September. 

I think it’s undeniable that dramatic, significant progress has 

been made, particularly as it relates to al Qaeda. For that I think 

you both should be strongly commended, and we thank you. 

Ambassador Crocker, if I may follow up on the SOFA, I would 

like to just have you explain to the committee, first of all, it isn’t 

your prerogative about what course this follows in terms of whether it comes to Congress or not. Is that not correct? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, it would depend on the elements 

of the agreement. 

63

Senator MARTINEZ. In fact, these are routinely done between the 

United States and allied countries where we may have forces stationed? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, sir. There are more than 80 of them, 

and as the chairman noted, only the NATO SOFA has gone before 

the Senate because of the special commitments that we undertook 

in that. 

Senator MARTINEZ. So other than NATO, these do not necessarily, or ever, come before the Senate? So, in other words, it’s 

nothing unusual for this one not to come before the Senate, because 

others do not, as well? 

Ambassador CROCKER. That is correct, sir. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Let me ask you, if I may, about the diplomatic interaction with Iran. I know that I continue to be concerned, 

as I know you are, about their involvement. The December 18 talks 

have been suspended or postponed; can you tell us about the status 

of those potential conversations with Iran going into the future? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Several days ago, the Iraqi Foreign Ministry announced that they were working on arrangements for another round of talks. We have indicated to the Iraqi Government 

previously that we would be prepared to participate in such talks, 

at the request of the Iraqi Government, and if, in the judgment of 

the Iraqi Government, they might possibly improve the security situation. 

So, as it stands now, the Government of Iraq is making efforts 

to see if it can schedule something, and if they can, we’ll be there. 

Senator MARTINEZ. But the Government of Iran seems to be a little reticent to engage in these talks. Is that what I hear from you? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, sir. We’ve been through a number of 

efforts since December, as you point out, and each time something 

seems to get in the way of the Iranian schedulers. 

Senator MARTINEZ. I know for a long time we’ve talked about the 

need for us to engage and talk to Iran. I guess it’s difficult to talk 

to someone who doesn’t want to talk back, or whose actions may 

not be in good faith. In that regard, General Petraeus, you mentioned earlier about 107-millimeter rockets that were being fired 

upon the international zone in Baghdad. Do we have any idea 

where the insurgent groups in Iraq are getting these 107-millimeter rockets to fire? 

General PETRAEUS. They come from Iran, Senator. As I mentioned, we have found large numbers of them in weapons caches. 

We recently, in fact, just south of Baghdad found 45 more in a single weapons cache that also had several thousands of pounds of explosives in it. 

They have come from Iran, there’s no question about it, and we 

have individuals in detention who have explained the entire process that goes on with the Special Groups—how they are brought 

over there, how they are recruited, trained, how they are funded—

and we’ve captured one of the senior heads of the Special Groups, 

and a number of other of their leaders and financiers, all of whom 

were supported by the Iranian Quds Force. We also have members 

of the Quds Force in detention. 

Senator MARTINEZ. So they are participating—the Quds Force 

from Iran—in recruitment, training, and financing, all but the exeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:23 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\45666.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
64

cution, and I suppose even in some instances, maybe, the execution 

of attacks upon our forces, as well? 

General PETRAEUS. I can’t speak to the execution directly, there’s 

a clear sense that there has been direction of attacks, and of dialing up and dialing down at different times. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Now, we’ve heard some discussion recently in 

the media that perhaps Iran had a role in the truce, as it was 

called, in Basrah in recent days. Can you comment on that? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, there has been speculation I 

would have to say, honestly, I simply don’t know. I think the statement by Muqtada al-Sadr can be explained in Iraqi terms, just as 

his original cease-fire announcement in August and its renewal in 

February were. 

I think that he and the other members of the Sadr political trend 

are as aware as anyone that the Jaish al-Mahdi Special Groups activities, politically, did not play to their advantage at all. What 

we’ve maybe seen through this statement, and through some of his 

subsequent actions and statements, is an effort to distance himself 

from those extremist elements. I think that would make sense. 

The Sadr movement, in its inception, touched a deep vein in Iraq. 

It was populist, it was Iraqi nationalists, and it was Arab nationalists. It’s kind of lost its moorings somewhat in recent years, with 

this gravitation toward Iran. What we may be seeing now—if 

you’re explaining this in Iraqi terms—is an effort to move away 

from the Iranian-backed, and I would say controlled, Special 

Groups and move back into the Iraqi political forum. I would certainly hope that’s the case. 

Senator MARTINEZ. My time is up, but I would like to just close 

with a comment that some would suggest that we should withdraw 

troops from Iraq so that we might send them to Afghanistan. I 

would really prefer to see our NATO partners pick up their share 

of the load in Afghanistan, rather than just shift our troops from 

one country to another. 

Thank you both very much. I admire greatly the work that you’re 

doing. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Martinez. 

Senator Pryor. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me start, if I may, General Petraeus with one of your charts. 

We have it on page 10 of our packet, where you show several bar 

graphs here. One thing I noticed immediately is the national police 

do not have any operational readiness assessment 1 (ORA–1) units. 

Also, I noticed that with the military, really, if you look at it, the 

green, the Level 1 and Level 2 areas have not grown much, maybe 

a little bit. In fact it looks like the green maybe is a little smaller, 

and the yellow is a little larger than it was as little over a year 

ago. 

I would expect that we would see more progress on the military 

front in these categories. Why haven’t we seen more progress? 

General PETRAEUS. There’s actually a very simple explanation for 

that, Senator. When a unit gets to ORA–1 level, which means that 

it meets certain goals in terms of personnel fill, leader fill, vehicles, 

maintenance, training, and a variety of other categories, the Iraqis 

tend to take leaders from these organizations and use them to form 

65

new organizations. Mathematically, then, they just fall below the 

level that is required to meet the criteria for ORA–1. 

That does not mean that unit may not be in the lead. The fact 

that a unit may not have entire fill of its leaders is not at all uncommon in Iraq because there is a shortage of commissioned and 

noncommissioned officers, in particular. That’s the toughest part of 

growing a force as rapidly as they have, is finding qualified commissioned and noncommissioned officers. 

Senator PRYOR. Is that how you would recommend to them that 

they do, that they peel their leaders off of their best units? 

General PETRAEUS. I actually think it does make sense, Senator. 

They’re not trying to mathematically get to ORA–1, they’re trying 

to get as many units as they can that are reasonably capable. I 

think that is a sensible way to do that. 

Now, they do have very high-end units that are exceedingly capable, arguably the best counterterrorist forces in the region, certainly the most experienced. I’m not sure, by the way, all of them 

meet ORA–1. They may not meet all of the mathematical criteria, 

but they are certainly extremely good. They as well will take leaders from that to form other new elements. 

Senator PRYOR. Let me ask about another one of your charts. 

This is the caches found and cleared, which I think is a great chart. 

Generally, I think that’s very good news, however, I do have a 

question. When you see this big up-tick in the number of caches 

found and cleared, it’s great that we’re finding them, that’s great—

but does it also mean that there’s just more weapons flooding into 

Iraq than we’ve ever seen before? 

General PETRAEUS. That may be a factor, but I think the bigger 

factor, Senator, is that we were in areas where we were not present 

before. If you look at that chart, you can see the progression, as 

we cleared certain areas, for example, southeast, southwest of 

Baghdad, Anbar Province, Diyala Province, and a number of areas 

where we had either little presence or no sustained presence and 

there was no ISF presence. 

As we have gone into those areas, as we have, in a sense, reliberated some of these areas from al Qaeda or other extremist elements, the people have actually told us where these weapons were, 

because they don’t want them in their communities. 

Senator PRYOR. Let me ask you about Iran. Iran’s come up in 

several contexts here at this hearing, one of those is providing 

weapons. We’ve heard about them providing training, even training 

trainers who can go in and be insurgents or be terrorists inside 

Iraq. Iran should be a concern to all Americans, because Iran is not 

our friend. If Iran continues to have a great influence in Iraq, we 

may end up at the end of the day with an Iraq that is not our 

friend, as well. So, I think we need to be very, very careful about 

Iran. 

Let me ask about Muqtada al-Sadr. I understand he has very 

close ties inside Iran. I’ve read somewhere where he’s trying to attain the status of Ayatollah, and he’s been doing some study in 

Iran. I read recently where, when the Iraqi Government asked him 

to disband his militias if they wanted to participate in the political 

process there, he said he would have to talk to clerics. I got the 

impression those were clerics inside Iraq and inside Iran. 

66

General PETRAEUS. In Iraq, sir. In Najaf. 

Senator PRYOR. My concern with him—and maybe I’m reading 

too much into some of these stories I’ve been reading—but is he 

trying to set himself up as the future Ayatollah of Iraq? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, virtually the entire year that I’ve 

been in Iraq, he has been in Iran. It’s one of the reasons I spoke 

earlier about some confusion, it seems to me, within the Sadr 

Trend, as to what it actually stands for and where it’s going. 

He has clearly a very concrete association with Iran now through 

his presence there, and his religious studies in the city of Qom. 

Then of course the Iranian connection to the Jaish al-Mahdi Special Groups is now undeniable. 

None of this, as I look at it, contributes at all to the receptivity 

within Iraq of the Sadr Trend. So, it would seem to me that if he 

is seeking a future in Iraq, given the roots of this movement, going 

back to the 1990s, as I said, as a populist Iraqi and Arab nationalist movement, he certainly doesn’t seem to be going about it in 

the right way. 

Senator PRYOR. General Petraeus, one last question. You’ve requested that Congress support a supplemental appropriation for 

Iraq, and I will do that, by the way. Hasn’t Congress given you everything you’ve asked, and the military everything you’ve asked, 

for Iraq? 

General PETRAEUS. It certainly has, Senator. As I made a point, 

earlier, of specifically thanking you for the MRAP vehicles, especially, for the ISR and for a number of other cases. With respect 

to the CERP, it was merely the urgency of having that by June, 

because that is a hugely important enabler for our commanders 

and troopers on the battlefield. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, sir. 

Senator PRYOR. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Pryor. 

Senator Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony. 

It’s been pointed out by previous questioners, the dramatic difference that has occurred in Iraq since the surge began, and since 

you last made your presentation to Congress. There’s no question 

that the situation is better now. It’s better than when the surge 

began, and it’s better than in September. It would take a major 

suspension of disbelief to conclude otherwise, to conclude that 

things are not much improved. 

Your testimony has been very measured and honest. According 

to what we’re told, progress is fragile but it is undeniable and in 

large part, I would say to the efforts of you two gentlemen who 

have testified today. 

The question now before this Congress and this country is, do we 

proceed with this proven strategy of success? Or, on the other 

hand, in the face of this demonstrated progress, do we leave with 

our goals still not yet attained and secured? 

I think history would view this Congress as very foolish if we 

leave now and refuse to embrace the success that we’ve seen. 

67

I appreciate, General Petraeus, that you emphatically said that 

our efforts in Iraq are worth it. I think the American people need 

to be told that. As Senator Warner put the question in a somewhat 

different nuance; is our effort in Iraq helping to provide security for 

Americans where we live today? 

I understood your answer to be yes, yes it is. I would simply 

point out that depriving al Qaeda of a major victory indeed does 

promote the security of Americans here at home. Protecting American credibility also protects American security here at home. It is 

very much in our national security interest to show that America 

stands behind its friends and that America stands behind its word. 

So we’re unanimous, also, in our appreciation and thanks for the 

troops. I appreciate the chairman and the ranking member starting 

off in that vein, and I think that’s been echoed by every member 

of the committee. 

I was told that the average age of a combat soldier in Iraq is 

about 20 years old. General, is that pretty much correct? 

General PETRAEUS. That sounds about right to me, yes, Senator. 

Senator WICKER. When I was given that fact, it struck me what 

that means. That means that basically, most of these 20-year-olds 

made the decision to participate in this war around 2006. That was 

at a time when our prospects in Iraq were at their lowest. That 

was at a time when public opinion and public support for our involvement in this effort were at their lowest. 

So it makes it all the more remarkable that these young people 

would step forward and volunteer during that timeframe. It just 

makes me consider them actually, in the tradition of Abraham Lincoln, who persevered with the war effort at a time when public 

opinion was against him, or in the tradition of George Washington, 

who never really had more support than one-third of the colonists 

during our effort for American independence. It makes me really 

proud of the sense of history that these young Americans must 

have, if they’re willing—at a time when public opinion is really 

against it—to step forward and say, ‘‘We believe in this effort.’’ 

So, if you could—and this will be, I think, the only question I’ll 

have time to ask you in light of the time I’ve taken as a preface—

please give us a profile of these troops, General? What motivates 

them to enlist? After they’ve been over there, and they have an opportunity to get out, what motivates them to reenlist? Are they 

watching us today? Do some of them have an opportunity to listen 

to this telecast? What do they want to hear from us? What do they 

want to hear from the elected representatives of the American people? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, first I’ve mentioned on a number of 

occasions that I believe Tom Brokaw had it right when he was with 

us one day in the early part of Iraq when, after spending some 

time out seeing the myriad tasks that our troopers are performing, 

he said that, ‘‘This is surely the new greatest generation.’’ I think 

that subsequent deployments and deployments and deployments 

have underscored the validity of that assessment. 

I think the members of this force enlist for the usual reasons 

that soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsman have 

raised their right hand as civilians to become servicemembers. 

They enlist to do something that’s bigger than self. It’s certainly a 

68

sense of patriotism, the desire to better themselves, to seek opportunities that are possible to them serving in uniform. 

In combat, I think that they serve most of all for the trooper on 

their left and right, and feel very privileged that that individual is 

a fellow American soldier, coalition soldier, and in some cases, Iraqi 

soldier. 

But this concept of the brotherhood of the close fight is a very, 

very special feeling. It’s a very unique fraternity, if you will, and 

it is something that all who have experienced, I think, are changed 

in a way for it. 

It is one of the reasons that they have raised their right hand 

again. As I mentioned, the 3rd Infantry Division there right now 

on its third tour in Iraq, has already achieved its reenlistment goal 

for the entire fiscal year. 

So, for all of those reasons, you find the explanation of why 

someone originally raises his or her right hand, and why they do 

it again. Knowing the sacrifice, knowing the idea that you enlist 

the soldier and reenlist the family, the families do sacrifice very, 

very much. 

It’s not just our troopers who are watching, and they do have an 

opportunity to watch, and they do, by the way, watch this, I guess 

more than I thought they would. Because in an email world, you’d 

be amazed at the number of emails that you get—you probably 

would not—but I get emails from a number of members of the 

Multi-National Force-Iraq of all ranks. There’s feedback, oftentimes, from these kinds of sessions. 

You ask, what do they want? They just want the American people to appreciate what they’re doing, to support their service, and 

to ensure that they and their families will be looked after in an 

adequate fashion. 

As I mentioned in my opening statement, the support of the 

American public has been absolutely wonderful, and we are all very 

grateful to all American citizens, to Congress, to the executive 

branch, and others for repeatedly showing how much they do appreciate the great service of these young men and women of what 

I think really is the new greatest generation. 

Thank you. 

Senator WICKER. Please convey to them our heartfelt appreciation, and also to their families. 

General PETRAEUS. I will, sir. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Wicker. 

Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me, obviously, comment on the sacrifice that both of you are 

making and the thousands other men and women like you that are 

working on behalf of our country in Iraq. Let me also mention the 

76 Missourians and their families who have paid the ultimate sacrifice. 

I’d like to focus a minute on the financial sacrifice of our country. 

It is a burr in the saddle of the American people that the Iraqi 

Government has a budget surplus, and we have a massive budget 

deficit. Yet we are paying and they are not. 

I’d like to focus in on the SOFA for you, Ambassador Crocker. 

69

For you, General Petraeus, I’d like to focus in on the Sons of 

Iraq. The Sons of Iraq is one of your charts today, and the success 

that you have had related to employing some 90,000 Sunnis with 

American tax dollars—— 

General PETRAEUS. Shiite and—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Excuse me, Shiite and Sunni, but primarily 

Sunni. 

General PETRAEUS. It’s about 20 percent Shiite, and about 80 

percent, or so, Sunni. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. The 80 percent, they are viewed as 

primarily a Sunni group, in regards to the politics in Iraq, and 

that’s the point I want to make is that we’re spending about $200 

million a year, paying these people twice the average salary you 

would make in Iraq, and I’m trying to figure out how we get the 

Iraqi Government to pay that price, as opposed to the American 

taxpayer. 

Obviously, there was a quote in the Washington Post not long 

ago from one of these Sons of Iraq that said that they were late 

in getting their money. They’re going to be patient, but if they don’t 

get their money quickly, they’ll suspend and quit, and then they’ll 

go back to fighting Americans. 

So, we have paid these folks and they are not fighting us, but 

the question is, how long are we going to be paying them in order 

to keep them from fighting us? What chances do we have of making 

the Iraqi Government use some of their budget surplus to fight 

them? 

For you, Ambassador Crocker, in Japan, Korea, and Germany, 

which has been referenced in political circles as to our involvement 

in Iraq long-term, in our agreements there, they are offsetting the 

costs of our bases. Those countries are paying the American Government to offset some of the costs of our bases. Are you going to 

negotiate in the SOFA, that the Iraqi Government start offsetting 

some of the costs of our temporary bases, that is envisioned that 

are going to become theirs, if and when we ever get out of there? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, on the Sons of Iraq, as I mentioned 

in my opening statement, we actually fund those with the CERP, 

and in fact, the Iraqi Government just allocated $300 million for 

us to manage as Iraqi CERP. That will offset a number of our other 

projects and allow us to focus more on the Sons of Iraq, for which 

they have committed now $163 million to gradually assume their 

contracts, over $500 million for small business loans that can be 

applied to some of these, and nearly $200 million for training and 

education and reintegration programs. 

So there are a number of initiatives ongoing with the Iraqi Government, in addition to the absorption of 20, 30 percent—we’ll have 

to see how much it is over time—of the Sons of Iraq into the legitimate ISFs, either into local police, or in some cases into the Iraqi 

Army. 

This started in Anbar Province and that’s where we have been 

most advanced in terms of moving them into the roles. It is much 

more challenging, I think understandably so, as you mentioned, 

primarily a Sunni organization particularly at the outset because, 

of course, we needed them in areas where al Qaeda was originally, 

which were Sunni areas. When they moved into locations such as 

70

in Baghdad neighborhoods, where we saw the Awakening take 

place in some of those neighborhoods, then you’re near Shiite/Sunni 

fault lines. Then you have much more concern, I think, legitimately 

on the part of a Shiite-led government. 

They’ve worked their way through that, there were recently several thousand who were picked up on contract and then 

transitioned into the ISFs. 

So, that process is underway and I think we’re seeing more and 

more burden-sharing, cost-sharing, if you will, and they have committed that they would provide more, as their own supplementals 

are addressed over the course of the next several months. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, the SOFA talks are just getting 

underway, and I believe this committee, among others, will be receiving a briefing in the near future. 

It’s an interesting point. We’ll need to take that aboard and see 

what might be possible. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I think it’s tremendously important, Ambassador, that we make a good-faith effort to begin to force the Iraqi 

Government to start spending their money to support the temporary bases that we have in Iraq. There’s no excuse that the people of Japan and Germany and Korea are helping pay, and the people of Iraq need to be doing the same thing. 

If they refuse to, I think that would be a very illuminating point 

for the American people. If they’re not willing to pay for that which 

we have said will be theirs when we leave, then I think that would 

be a very interesting moment of recognition for Americans as to 

how we are actually viewed in the country of Iraq. 

Let me also, just briefly, get your take on the Basrah situation. 

It is my understanding, and I don’t think this has really been distilled down for most Americans, that really, Sadr won politically, 

in terms of the confrontation in Basrah, that their willingness to 

do reconciliation was being played from a winning hand, not from 

a losing hand. This was about the political power of Maliki versus 

Sadr, and that he won; not Maliki. That it was really one of these 

moments where Maliki could not deliver any kind of crushing blow 

to Sadr, and that they really, the Mahdi Army stood down because 

they had done the political damage they needed to do to Maliki. Is 

that incorrect? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, I would actually give it a different reading. 

What we’ve seen since the events in Basrah is very broad-ranging political support in Iraq for Maliki. I had mentioned, in response to a previous question, that last Saturday a group called the 

Political Council for National Security—this is a body that includes 

the President, the two Vice Presidents, Prime Minister, Deputy 

Prime Minister, Speaker and Deputy Speakers of parliament, and 

leaders of all of the parliamentary blocks—met and came out with 

a strong statement of support for the government. There were 15 

points, but the most important were: support for the government 

in its fight against extremist militia groups; a call for the disbanding of all such groups; and a strong statement calling on outsiders to cease interfering in Iraq’s affairs, a clear reference to 

Iran. 

71

So this is still a process in evolution. But, the way I would read 

it right now is that it has definitely strengthened support for 

Maliki, as he is perceived as prepared to go into action against extremist Shiite, as well as al Qaeda and others. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I appreciate that there is some support for 

Maliki. Is it completely wrong to say that in terms of the actual 

incidents that occurred in Basrah, that Sadr ended up with a 

stronger hand than Maliki at the end of the day? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Again, Senator, it’s a complex situation 

that still has to play out. My read at this time of the positions that 

Muqtada al-Sadr has taken is that he is trying to put some distance between himself and these Jaish al-Mahdi Special Groups. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Because, there has been a pretty sharp 

negative—not only political, but popular—reaction against these 

militia groups. So I think he’s motivated, trying to say, ‘‘it isn’t us.’’ 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay, thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. 

Senator Chambliss. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, again we just can’t overstate the fact of how much 

we appreciate your service to America. 

General Petraeus, I’ve had the privilege of visiting with you any 

number of times in theater, and each time, irrespective of what the 

challenge that is ahead of you, you’ve responded in a very professional way, a way in which makes us all proud to be an American. 

Ambassador Crocker, it’s refreshing to know that there are folks 

like you who are career diplomats, and you have a number of them 

under your leadership, that are performing such a valuable service 

in this particular time of crisis. 

To both of you and your families, we just thank you for a great 

job. 

I’m particularly impressed, too, General Petraeus, at your comments on the 3rd Infantry Division. We’re obviously looking forward to those folks returning to Fort Stewart and to Fort Benning, 

and what a great job they’ve done over there. From the very first 

day of the beginning of this conflict, they were there and they continue to perform magnificently. 

I noticed in your statements, compared to what you talked about 

when you were here in September, the percentage of time that 

you’ve spent on military operations versus the time that you spend 

on what’s happening on the governmental side and the civilian side 

is remarkably different. 

When you were here in September, we were primarily talking 

about an update on the military perspective, and what had happened, and where we’re going. 

Now, thank goodness, we’re here listening to you talk about the 

improvements that have been made on the Iraqi civilian side. If 

that’s not encouraging to every American, then they just have not 

been listening to what’s been going on in this conflict. 

I want to focus for a minute, General Petraeus, on a particular 

project that you have had under your jurisdiction, and it’s the 

project where the commanders that are underneath you have had 

the opportunity to engage with proprietors all across Iraq, and to 

72

make grants to those individuals, or loans, however you may want 

to characterize them, of up to, I think, $2,500 to put those folks 

back in business. 

Would you talk a little bit about how that program has worked, 

the success of that program, and what’s been the reaction, which 

I personally have seen from Iraqi proprietors, but what’s been the 

overall reaction of Iraqis to the American military as a result of 

that program? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, it has been very positive. The small business grants—USAID does small business loans—have really 

primed the pump in a number of areas. As you can achieve security 

in an area, a lot of these are in the Multi-National Division Center 

area that the 3rd Infantry Division is the headquarters of. As they 

have cleared and then held areas, the way to start the building 

again, as quickly as possible, oftentimes is these very small business grants or loans. 

They have been very, very successful. They obviously engender 

enormous goodwill, because we are already there well before the 

Iraqi Government can get in there and start to prime the pump 

with basic services, and this just starts the whole process, and it 

does it very, very rapidly. It is, yet again, another reason why there 

have been so many weapons caches found in so many different 

areas. They are grateful for what our soldiers are doing, and they 

show their gratitude in, among other ways, pointing out where 

IEDs are, in some cases and showing them where weapons caches 

are in others. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. There’s been some comments here this 

morning, and comments in the press of late by some folks, regarding whether or not this truly has been a success, this surge or the 

new strategy, whatever we call it, that began under your leadership a little over a year ago. 

But I would note that AQI certainly is our primary enemy, they 

have been the focus of our attention in Iraq. What percentage of 

Iraq was AQI located in 2006, compared to where they are today? 

General PETRAEUS. As I showed in the one slide during the opening statements, Senator, in late 2006, AQI had substantial presence, and even control in significant areas of the Euphrates River 

Valley through Anbar Province, in a number of the areas for which 

3rd Infantry Division assumed responsibility in Multi-National Division Center, in the so-called throat of Baghdad, just south and 

southeast of Baghdad. 

Several different major neighborhoods in Baghdad extended up 

the Diyala River Valley to Baqubah, beyond that, and then a variety of areas in the Tigris River Valley and then on up to Mosul in 

Ninawa. 

Over time, the grip of AQI in a number of those areas has been 

reduced, and in fact, the violence in those provinces then came 

down very substantially, with the one exception, and that exception 

is Ninawa Province in the far north. That is the attention of the 

main effort, if you will, of the effort against AQI by conventional 

and Special Operations Forces on the Iraqi and the coalition side. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Another measuring stick, I think, is the participation of Iraqi citizens alongside our coalition forces in defending their country and prosecuting attacks against AQI. 

73

Have we seen an increase in the percentage of Iraqi citizens participating in the prosecution of the conflict against AQI versus 

where we were in 2006? 

General PETRAEUS. We have very much, Senator. Again, a lot of 

this started in late 2006, with the first Sheikh and tribe sort of 

courageously saying, ‘‘Will you stand with us if we decide to stand 

against al Qaeda? We’ve had enough of the damage that they have 

done, we don’t believe in the extremist ideology that they offer.’’ 

The indiscriminate violence wrecked havoc in the Euphrates River 

Valley and other locations. 

That was the first manifestation of this. Then over time, that 

built. It arguably reached critical mass in the Euphrates River Valley and the Ramadi Region. It rippled up and down that. In early 

to mid-2006 or 2007, Ramadi was cleared in a very substantial operation mid-March to mid-April. That just kept moving around. 

It was a willingness to reject al Qaeda on the part of Sunni communities because of the damage that they had done, and a recognition that they could not share in the bounty that is Iraq. You can’t 

win if you don’t play. You can’t share in the enormous resources 

that Iraq has, if you’re not participating. 

That, of course, also is why they so keenly want to see provincial 

elections in so many of these different communities where Sunni 

Arabs boycotted the vote in 2005. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. My time is up, Mr. Ambassador, but could 

you give me a quick answer as to whether or not the Iranians are 

participating in the economy of Iraq, as well as from a standpoint 

of participating militarily? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, yes they are. A lot of goods move 

from Iran into Iraq, foodstuffs, consumer goods, and Iranians are 

also involved in some project development, particularly in different 

cities in the south. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

After we complete the first round, we will excuse our witnesses 

and not have a second round so that our witnesses have at least 

a little break before their afternoon hearing. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Mr. Chairman, may we thank you, on our 

side, for again, their appearance, in a very thorough hearing this 

morning. 

Chairman LEVIN. I think we have three or four more Senators. 

First, Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

For the record, I would like to point out then when we talk about 

the success in al-Anbar being sort of the greatest event from the 

surge, for purposes of history, we should remember that that 

Awakening began before the surge was announced. I know that for 

a fact, because my son was there as a Marine rifleman through the 

period of September 2006 through May 2007, and was following it 

with some interest as it was moving forward. 

I hope I can get two questions in here during this period, but 

gentlemen, I’m on the Foreign Relations Committee, so we’ll see 

how far we can go and we’ll all take a lunch break and come back. 

General, I’d like to thank you for the way that you characterized 

the service of our people in the military today. I think there’s been 

74

far too much politicizing of what our people have done. As someone 

who grew up in the military, served in it, and has more than one 

family member in it right now, I think it’s fair to leave politics out 

of what our people are doing. There are people in the United States 

military today who feel one way, people that feel another way, and 

people who have no political views at all. Quite frankly, combat 

was the most apolitical environment I’ve ever been in. People want 

to work together and do their job, and I think it was really refreshing to hear you take that approach today. 

I’m very concerned about the strain on the force. It isn’t reflective, so much, of motivation. As you indicated, we have great people and we have a career force that continues to reenlist. It goes 

more to the stewardship of all of us who are making these policies, 

in terms of how we’re using people, and how these experiences are 

going to impact them downstream in their lives. 

On the one hand, we have reenlistment rates that are high. On 

the other hand, we have articles such as the one that came out in 

the New York Times the other day with 27 percent of the career 

noncommissioned officer force, that has had multiple deployments, 

having difficulties at some level. 

That’s one of the reasons that I introduced the dwell-time 

amendment last year, to try to put some perspective, just to put a 

safety net under this, while the politics of the war were being discussed. It’s another reason I have introduced, and pushed so hard, 

this GI Bill. You mentioned, General, Tom Brokaw visiting and 

saying this was the next greatest generation. I think the least we 

can do is to give these people the same shot at a true future as we 

gave the so-called greatest generation, by giving them the ability 

to pursue education of their choice and to really have a future. 

When I’m thinking about all of that and I’m looking at the numbers that we’re seeing, where it looks like after this next increment 

of troops are allowed to go home, we’re going to probably be having 

10,000 more people remain in Iraq than were there at the beginning of the surge; that’s what I’m seeing, anyway. We’re going to 

have like 141,000 until this next increment is brought into place. 

I start wondering how we’re going to do that and still meet the 

demands that are outside of Iraq. When I look at the situation inside Iraq, I know, Ambassador Crocker, you mentioned that al 

Qaeda’s capabilities in Iraq have been significantly degraded over 

the past year. Al Qaeda is a part of an international terrorist 

movement that is, by its definition, mobile. I don’t think we can say 

that the situation with international terrorism has improved in 

Pakistan and Afghanistan and those areas. 

You mentioned, quite correctly, that many Iraqi Shiites, in the 

hundreds of thousands, as you commented, stood up and fought 

against Iran when called upon to do so during the Iran/Iraq war. 

We should consider that when we work through Iranian influence 

in Iraq, in fact, Iraq seems well ahead of us, in terms of seeking 

a fuller relationship with Iran. Part of the problem from my perspective, quite frankly, has been this administration, the way that 

it has approached possible aggressive diplomatic relationships with 

Iran. 

But when you look at all of that, the concern that I have is that 

keeping that level of force in Iraq and looking at the other situaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:23 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\45666.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
75

tions, particularly Afghanistan; where are we going to get these 

people? 

I’m curious, General, as to the level of agreement that you have 

in this plan from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? 

General PETRAEUS. Both Admiral Fallon, the then-CENTCOM 

commander, and the chairman were fully supportive of the recommendations that I made, and of course made through them, to 

the Secretary and ultimately to the President. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. 

We’ll be having a hearing with Admiral Mullen this week, and 

I would like to be able to pursue that with him. 

Ambassador Crocker, with respect to the Strategic Framework 

Agreement, we’ve had two different documents that have been kind 

of discussed almost in a way in this hearing that people may think 

that it’s one document, when clearly it is not. 

I have a couple of questions on that. One is, I read your testimony where you say this is clearly no permanent basis, but I’m not 

sure, really, what that term means anymore. 

Can you tell us what would have been in this document that 

would have elevated it to the point, that from the administration’s 

perspective, it would have required congressional approval? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, I’m not a lawyer or a constitutional specialist. I am advised by those individuals, so I can’t give 

you the whole universe of issues that might be involved, but some 

of them are obvious. 

The kind of provision that is in the NATO SOFA, the formal security commitment, that raises that particular SOFA to the level 

of advice and consent by the Senate. That is not what we intend 

in this current exercise. 

Senator WEBB. We’ve been trying to look at what the specific 

wording in the document is, and to this point, it has not been 

shared with us. But it’s been my understanding that there is a security commitment in the agreement. 

Ambassador CROCKER. No, sir, there isn’t. The SOFA negotiation 

itself is still in its very early stages. Although we have briefed the 

Strategic Framework Agreement to the Iraqi leadership, we have 

not yet sat down for a formal discussion. 

Senator WEBB. Well, that would be the document that we, in 

Congress, would be initially concerned with, rather than the SOFA. 

I’ll save this for the afternoon, because my time has run out. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Webb. 

Senator Cornyn. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, it’s good to see you 

again. I had the honor of visiting you and many of the Texas troops 

and many other men and women in uniform in January, and good 

to see you then, and good to see you here today. 

I want to start by asking, General, the purpose of the counterinsurgency strategy, sometimes now called the surge, was to give 

the Iraqis the basic protection—to protect the Iraqi population and 

to give the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi people the chance to develop their own political arrangements, so that, as in the words of 

76

the Iraq Study Group, we would leave them with the capacity to 

govern and to defend themselves. 

Would you accept my summary? 

General PETRAEUS. I would, Senator. 

Senator CORNYN. Or maybe state it better than I did. 

General PETRAEUS. No, I think that’s fine, sir. 

Senator CORNYN. That leads me to Ambassador Crocker, to the 

benchmarks. I know there’s been a lot of debate, and I seem to recall some of your writing, about whether the benchmarks that the 

United States Government laid down in 2007 were really the appropriate measures, but let’s just set that argument aside for a 

minute and just talk about what sort of success the Iraqi Government has had in meeting those 18 benchmarks that we identified 

in 2007. 

It’s my recollection that they have successfully completed 12 of 

those 18 benchmarks. Can you either correct me, or clarify and expand upon the developments in that area? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I think that’s about right, Senator. We’re 

actually just going through a process now, between us out in Baghdad and folks back here, in reevaluating the status of the benchmarks. But clearly they have gained some real momentum after an 

admittedly slow beginning. 

Amnesty is a benchmark, for example, accountability and justice, 

de-Baathification reform is a benchmark, provincial powers in its 

election dimension is a benchmark. So in the space of just a little 

over 1 month, we saw them achieve three really significant new 

benchmarks. 

Senator CORNYN. General Petraeus, I remember General Odierno 

who, of course, has served with you in Iraq, and is Commander of 

III Corps in Fort Hood. Pending his nomination as Vice Chief of 

Staff of the Army, I remember him saying what he thought the 

American people wanted to see out of Iraq was progress. Progress. 

Would both of you characterize what we have seen over the last 

year in Iraq, both from a military and security standpoint, as well 

as from a political reconciliation standpoint, as progress? 

General PETRAEUS. I would, Senator. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Yes. Yes, very much, Senator. 

Senator CORNYN. I want to just ask a question about the consequences of failure in Iraq, because of course, we all want our 

troops to come home as soon as they can. I think, giving both sides 

the benefit of the doubt, I would say the disagreement is over 

whether it’s based on a political or a timetable, which I would call 

political, without regard to conditions, and those of us who believe 

that it ought to be conditions-based reduction in our troops. 

You touched on this, I believe a little bit, both of you did, in your 

opening statement, but I think it’s worth repeating because I think 

the connection that, as you pointed out, General Petraeus, our 

troops not only want to know that we appreciate them, but I think 

their families and they want to understand how their sacrifice is 

directly connected with our safety and security here at home. 

Sometimes, I think that gets lost in the debates here on Capitol 

Hill. 

Traveling to Afghanistan, as I did in January before I came to 

Iraq, I of course was reminded of what happened in that failed 

77

state after the Soviet Union left, where the Taliban and al Qaeda 

basically used that as an opportunity to organize, train, and launch 

attacks, most notoriously on September 11, 2001. 

So you see the consequences of a failed state in Iraq, were we 

to withdraw before conditions would allow it, before Iraqis could 

govern and defend themselves, increasing the probability that Iraq 

could, in fact, become a similar failed state to Afghanistan from the 

standpoint of allowing space, time, and opportunity for al Qaeda 

and other terrorist organizations to reorganize and plot and potentially export similar attacks against the United States or our allies? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, as I mentioned, not achieving our 

goals, our interests in Iraq indeed could lead al Qaeda to regain 

lost territory, we could see a resumption of the kind of ethno-sectarian violence that tore the country apart in 2006 and into early 

2007. 

No telling what can happen in terms of the Iranian influence 

piece, and then just general regional stability challenges, not to 

mention the connection with the global economy. 

So there are enormous interests at stake, and that was why I 

sought to lay those out earlier. 

Senator CORNYN. We recently hit 4,000 dead in Iraq as a result 

of armed combat, 373 of those have called Texas home, my home 

State. I recently went to a memorial service for a young, 24-yearold soldier named Jose Rubio, who lost his life in Iraq. 

At that memorial service, as you would expect, everyone in the 

family was sad, and of course we all grieve with them for their loss. 

But, I think his family took considerable comfort in knowing that 

Jose Rubio was doing something he believed in, something important, and something that contributed to the safety and security of 

his family back here, at home, as well as the rest of the American 

people. 

Do you believe that young soldiers like Jose Rubio are making 

such a contribution to the safety and security of their families back 

home and the American people? 

General PETRAEUS. I do, Senator. 

Senator CORNYN. I thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Cornyn. 

Senator Bayh. 

Senator BAYH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your patience and your testimony here 

today, and most of all, for your service to our country. We may 

have some differences of opinion about the way forward in Iraq, but 

none us questioned your service to our country, or the candor of 

your testimony today. So, I’m grateful to you for that. 

I have the privilege of serving on the Select Committee on Intelligence as well as the Senate Armed Services Committee, and I’m 

struck, when reading the most recent National Intelligence Estimate—which we can’t discuss here in detail today, but both reading that and listening to your testimony here today and listening 

to some of the dialogue about how all of this is subject to differing 

interpretations. 

78

I would just ask you the question; isn’t it true that a fair amount 

of humility is in order in rendering judgments about the way forward in Iraq, that no one can speak with great confidence about 

what is likely to occur? Is that a fair observation? 

General PETRAEUS. It’s very fair, Senator, and it’s why I have repeatedly noted we haven’t turned any corners, we haven’t seen any 

lights at the end of the tunnel. The champagne bottle has been 

pushed to the back of the refrigerator, and the progress, while real, 

is fragile and is reversible. 

Senator BAYH. In fact, reasonable people can differ about the 

most effective way forward. Is that not also a fair observation? 

General PETRAEUS. I don’t know whether I would go that far, sir. 

Obviously, I think there is a way forward, I’ve made a recommendation on that, and so—— 

Senator BAYH. General, you would not mean to say that anyone 

who would have a different opinion is, by definition, an unreasonable person? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, lots of things in life are arguable, 

and certainly there are lots of different opinions out there. But 

again, I believe that the recommendations that I have made are 

correct. 

Senator BAYH. Here’s the reason for my question, gentlemen. 

Just as I acknowledge your honor and patriotism, which I think is 

absolutely appropriate, I hope you would acknowledge the honor 

and patriotism of those who have a look at this very complex set 

of facts, and simply have a different point of view. As you both are 

aware, some argue that, to not embrace the assessment that you’re 

giving us, is, in fact, to embrace defeat or to embrace failure in 

Iraq. I simply would disagree with those characterizations, and 

that was the reason for my question to you. 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, we fight for the right of people to 

have other opinions. 

Senator BAYH. As we should, and so I appreciate your candor 

with regard to that. 

So, let me ask you about some of the policies that may be subject 

to differing interpretations. You’ve been asked about all of them, I 

think, here. 

Chairman, I’ve never seen so many people be glad to see me before, here, I’m the last one. I guess there’s some benefits to being 

last. 

The question of opportunity costs was raised, and in the intelligence world, at least for the foreseeable future, they tell us that 

we are much more likely to be subject to a terrorist strike emanating from Afghanistan, or possibly the tribal regions of Pakistan, 

than we are Iraq. 

Yet, we are currently spending five times as much in Iraq as we 

are in Afghanistan on a monthly basis, we have five times as many 

troops stationed in Iraq as we do in Afghanistan currently. How do 

you square that when the threat, currently, is greater in terms of 

terrorist strike from one place, and yet we’re devoting five times 

the amount of resources and troops to a different place? Some 

might look at that and argue that our resources are being 

misallocated. 

79

Ambassador CROCKER. I’d just make a couple of observations on 

that, Senator, and again, as you know because you visited me, I am 

former Ambassador to Pakistan. I am not really in a position to 

speak authoritatively about conditions there, but again, the circumstances in Pakistan are such that it’s not going to be a question 

of U.S. troops in Pakistan. The al Qaeda threat out of that border 

area is indeed significant. 

Senator BAYH. Afghanistan and Pakistan are subjects for another 

day, but since this is all tied up in the global effort against extremism and terror, things have not been going as well as we would 

hope in Afghanistan. We’re not going to have troops in Pakistan. 

Still, resources are finite, and they do have an impact. Some might 

look at this and say, ‘‘Why are we devoting five times the amount 

of resources to a place that is not, at this point, the principal 

threat?’’ 

Ambassador CROCKER. In part, Senator, to be sure that it doesn’t 

become that. 

I noted in my testimony that Osama bin Laden fairly recently referred to Iraq as the perfect base for al Qaeda. It is a reminder of 

that, for al Qaeda, having a safe base on Arab soil is extremely important. They got close to that in 2006. 

Senator BAYH. They apparently have one now in the tribal areas 

in Pakistan. 

But in any event, Ambassador, I appreciate your responses, and 

I would only caution us to not take our marching orders from 

Osama bin Laden, and it might occur to some that he says these 

things because he wants us to respond to them in a predictable 

way, and we should not do that for him. But, that’s another subject. 

Just two or three other things, gentlemen. Again, thank you. 

Ambassador, I have high regard for you. On the subject of political reconciliation, I think it is a fair comment, on my part, that 

the balance of the opinion in the intelligence world would not be 

quite as optimistic as some of the observations that have been 

given to us here today. 

My question is; does not that, and I use the word open-ended 

commitment and I know that you would say our commitment is not 

open-ended, and yet without any sort of estimate of any kind of 

endpoint, I don’t know how else you define it, in some ways, enable 

some of the political dysfunction we have in Iraq, by basically saying, ‘‘We’re there as long as it takes, we’re going to invest as much 

money as it takes.’’ Does that not take some of the impetus off of 

them to make the hard compromises that only they could make? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Again, I am the first to say, going back 

to your initial comments, that Iraq is both hard and it’s complicated. In this particular aspect, it’s my judgment based on the 

year that I’ve been there, that we get political progress when Iraqi 

political leaders and figures are feeling more secure, rather than 

less, that they are more likely to make the kinds of deals and compromises that we saw in February with that legislative package, 

when they and their communities do not feel threatened. 

It would be my concern that, if they were to sense that we’re 

moving away from a conditions-based approach in our presence and 

our actions, that they would then be kind of looking over our heads 

80

to what might possibly happen next without us there. They’d be 

moving away from compromise, not toward it. 

Senator BAYH. Chairman, I just have two brief questions if I 

could be permitted. 

General, my question to you is, I’ve asked this directly of some 

of our leading experts in the intelligence arena, and my question 

was, on a global net basis, is our presence in Iraq creating more 

extremists and terrorists than we are eliminating within Iraq? 

The answer they have given me is that they believe that we are 

actually creating more than we are eliminating. Creating more on 

a global basis then we’re eliminating in Iraq. What would your response to that be? 

General PETRAEUS. I’m not sure I would agree to that, Senator, 

but my responsibilities are Iraq, not the greater global responsibilities. Obviously, I’m a four-star general, I have strategic thoughts, 

and again, I would just differ with that particular assessment. 

I think at this point that we have rolled back, as I mentioned, 

AQI in a number of different areas. The Ambassador rightly pointed out that Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri have repeatedly pointed out in various forms of communication, not just those for the 

open world, that Iraq is the central front of their global war of terror. In that regard, I think that is where we must roll them back. 

Senator BAYH. My final question, gentlemen, is this. I noticed, 

and Senator McCain is no longer here, it was his opinion that success, I think, in his words, ‘‘was within reach.’’ Another quote was, 

‘‘success would come sooner than many imagine.’’ 

Now, I don’t want to get you sucked into the Presidential campaign and ask you to respond to that directly, but many Americans 

are going to look at your testimony here today and all of this proceeding in these questions. They’re asking themselves, ‘‘What does 

all this mean about the way forward? Is success truly almost at 

hand, or is this a commitment without end?’’ 

So, my final question to you would be, is it not possible to at 

least offer some rough estimate about when we will be able to, 

after this brief pause, recommence extricating ourselves by withdrawing more troops from Iraq, down to some longer-term level? Is 

it just impossible to offer any rough estimate? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, if you believe as I do, and the commanders on the ground believe that the way forward on reductions 

should be conditions-based and it is just flat not responsible to try 

to put down a stake in the ground, and say, ‘‘this is when it will 

be or that is when it will be,’’ with respect. 

Senator BAYH. I understand that, General. Many Americans will 

listen to that and believe this to be an open-ended commitment because by definition, we won’t know until we get there, and there 

have been so many ups and downs in this thing. I think it’s a fair 

estimate to say that when this began, most did not assume that 

we’d be sitting here 5 years on with the conditions that we currently have. 

So, again, I’m just trying to give the American people a fair judgment about where we stand and what the likely way forward is, 

and I guess the best answer to that is, we’ll know when we get 

there and we don’t know when we’re going to get there. 

81

General PETRAEUS. Senator, as I just said, we have, we believe 

the appropriate way, based on the military commanders on the 

ground, to sustain and build on the progress that has been 

achieved over the course of the last 12 or 15 months, is to make 

reductions when the conditions allow you to do that, without unduly risking all that we’ve fought so hard to achieve. 

Senator BAYH. We don’t know when that point will be. 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, when the conditions are met is 

when that point is. Again, that’s the way that lays out. Unless you 

want to risk and jeopardize what our young men and women have 

fought so hard to achieve over the last 12 or 15 months, then we 

need to go with a conditions-based approach. That’s why I made 

that recommendation, obviously. 

Senator BAYH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, I would just conclude by, I understand your position, I 

know why you take the position you do. You can understand the 

position that leaves the American people in as they try and assess 

the way forward. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Bayh. 

Gentlemen, it’s been a long morning for you. We appreciate your 

service and your appearance here today. 

We will stand adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

1. Senator LEVIN. General Petraeus, in a letter to the military personnel in MultiNational Force-Iraq on May 10, 2007, you wrote in part that ‘‘Some may argue that 

we would be more effective if we sanctioned torture or other expedient methods to 

obtain information from the enemy. They would be wrong.’’

If a soldier in Iraq had reason to believe that a detainee in his custody had information about an impending attack on the soldier’s unit, and the soldier thought that 

gaining that information could save the lives of his fellow soldiers, would military 

necessity allow him to use interrogation techniques that would otherwise not be permitted under the Geneva Conventions? 

General PETRAEUS. Military necessity does not allow a soldier to use interrogation 

techniques not authorized by the Geneva Conventions. Article 27 of Geneva Convention IV requires that Protected Persons/Civilian Internees ‘‘shall at all times be 

treated humanely’’ by the Protecting Power. This requirement is an extension of the 

standards that must be applied to an Enemy Prisoner of War under Article 13 of 

Geneva Convention III. 

While the Geneva Conventions does not detail an explicit list of what constitutes 

humane or inhumane treatment, the Department of the Army Field Manual 2–22.3 

details approved interrogation approaches that do not violate the humane treatment 

standard. Soldiers must follow this field manual under all circumstances.

AIRBORNE INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

2. Senator LEVIN. General Petraeus, in your statement you mentioned shortfalls 

in airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Are 

these capabilities urgently needed? 

General PETRAEUS. ISR platforms are essential to our operations, as persistent 

surveillance is required to identify, track, target, and kill or capture insurgents, and 

to minimize friendly force and civilian casualties. Congress and Secretary Gates 

have been staunch supporters of our ISR requirements, and the resources we have 

received have been critical to the success of our commanders. 

Despite this support, however, we still have unmet requirements and additional 

capabilities are urgently needed. Shortfalls in ISR decrease our ability to conduct 

multiple, simultaneous operations and therefore may diminish our ability to mainVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:23 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\45666.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
82

tain our hard-won momentum. We also expect ISR requirements in Iraq to increase 

rather than decrease in the near-term as Iraqi forces assume more responsibility for 

security and a smaller coalition force continues to transition from leading, to 

partnering, to an ISR-intensive overwatch role. Despite the growing capability of the 

Iraqi security forces (ISFs), the Iraqis do not yet have the ISR platforms they would 

need to be able to conduct fully independent operations across Iraq. I am working 

closely on these issues with Program Analysis and Evaluation Director Brad 

Berkson who directs the ISR Task Force for Secretary Gates. Director Berkson’s 

most recent set of recommendations of actions to increase ISR is very encouraging. 

I am also working with another ISR Task Force overseen by Director Berkson to 

help identify and prioritize the needs in the ISR arena to support conventional 

forces over the longer term.

3. Senator LEVIN. General Petraeus, the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken 

many actions to accelerate and surge all available unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 

systems to meet Central Command’s (CENTCOM) requirements for additional surveillance aircraft. Despite this surge, a substantial shortfall remains, which will not 

be filled for some time. From your perspective, is it necessary to wait until the UAV 

systems, such as Predator, Warrior, and Shadow, can meet the expanded requirement or would CENTCOM prefer that the requirement be met as soon as possible 

with small manned aircraft? 

General PETRAEUS. Our desire is to meet ISR shortfalls as quickly as possible. Together with CENTCOM, we are approaching the ISR problem from a holistic point 

of view and are concerned less with the air vehicle itself than with how the air vehicle fits into the larger ISR system-of-systems to achieve desired effects. Comprehensive solutions are required, and these must take into account the platform’s support 

infrastructure; sensor capabilities; communications bandwidth; and processing, exploitation, and dissemination architectures. It is also valuable to have a variety of 

systems which enable the flexibility in employment our operations require. 

Small manned aircraft acquired from the commercial sector are already being employed to help fill the ISR platform shortage, and we will continue to take advantage of such options where they make sense. They are not, however, the complete 

answer to our ISR shortfalls, and we are working with the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense ISR Task Force to determine which platforms are most effective in meeting our ISR needs.

4. Senator LEVIN. General Petraeus, if a large number of small manned aircraft 

were acquired to temporarily fill this operational need until the UAV systems become available, what might be done with the manned aircraft when CENTCOM no 

longer needs them? 

General PETRAEUS. Although we currently have a shortfall in ISR assets in Iraq, 

should we reach the point when particular assets become unnecessary, I would advise my chain of command regarding the availability of those assets. Though I understand that there are also shortfalls in ISR elsewhere in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility, decisions on the employment of ISR assets outside of Iraq are beyond 

my brief as the Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander. I would defer to those who 

have better visibility on, and the responsibility for, our worldwide ISR requirements.

5. Senator LEVIN. General Petraeus, might the manned aircraft be good candidates to provide to Iraqi forces for intelligence support? 

General PETRAEUS. As we advise and support the development of ISR capability 

in the ISFs, we seek to focus on Iraqi requirements rather than specific platforms. 

As with our own posture, comprehensive solutions are required. Given the nascent 

state of Iraqi ISR capabilities, issues of particular concern include a given platform’s 

support infrastructure and training requirements. 

Small, manned aircraft may be part of the solution to Iraq’s ISR needs, and, in 

fact, the ISR platforms currently in use by the Iraqis are of this type. In decisions 

about the procurement of additional capabilities, much will depend on the characteristics of specific systems and the extent to which these characteristics meet Iraqi 

needs. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

MUQTADA AL-SADR

6. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, the recent violent activity in Basra under 

the direction of Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr, and the apparent inability of ISFs 

83

to confront his militias effectively, are of great concern to me. Of even greater concern is how quickly the violence was reduced once al-Sadr ordered them to lay down 

their arms. To what degree does al-Sadr control the overall level of violence in the 

country, since it would appear to most of us that his word, and not the presence 

of increased numbers of U.S. forces on the ground, is what defines a week of increased bloodshed and insecurity? 

General PETRAEUS. The Sadrist ceasefires have indeed contributed to a reduction 

in violence in Iraq, but they came after their militia took serious losses from combat 

with the ISFs and coalition forces. Of greater long-term importance than al-Sadr’s 

decisions themselves, therefore, are the factors that led him to declare the 

ceasefires. One of the primary factors has been the intense pressure on Jaysh alMahdi (JAM) and the Special Groups (SG). Iraqi-led, coalition-enabled forces have 

targeted criminal militias and their mafia-like activity, and Iraqi leaders have demonstrated their willingness to take on militias. Recent, ongoing operations in Basra 

and Sadr City have proven exceedingly lethal to JAM/SG members; over 770 JAM/

SG members were killed in and around Sadr City alone. Iraqi and coalition forces’ 

activity in large part compelled Sadr’s decision to lay down arms. Another important 

factor in Sadr’s decisions is his need for support from the base of the Shiite Sadrist 

movement. Atmospherics in Basra and Sadr City indicate that most residents were 

tired of the violence and of the militia’s mafia-like activities and desired a return 

to normalcy. Sadr’s decisions to lay down arms in both locales were in part acknowledgments of this trend toward the popular rejection of violence (a trend that Iran, 

whose Qods Force funds, trains, and equips the militia Special Groups, also recognized). Indeed, many leaders of the Sadrist movement are increasingly leaning toward participation in the political process as a way to give voice to the legitimate 

concerns of the poor, urban, disenfranchised Shiite that they represent.

IRAQI GOVERNMENT

7. Senator AKAKA. Ambassador Crocker, there has been a lot of criticism of the 

Iraqi Government for not doing enough in terms of taking responsibility for the future of their country. Their demonstrated inability to effectively allocate their budget resources to address reconstruction and provide essential services, and their 

failed efforts to diplomatically engage the various factions within the country and 

bring about reconciliation, are two of the major concerns. Given what we did not 

fully understand prior to the 2003 invasion about the cultural divides within Iraq, 

would you say that we have expected too much from the Maliki Government? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Iraq’s leaders have many difficult problems to tackle, and 

it will take time to resolve them. We must not underestimate the ongoing challenges 

posed by the gravity of the circumstances and the fragility of the security environment. Nevertheless, we believe that the Iraqi political leadership is now on the right 

track and has the ability to achieve the needed results. They are making important 

progress on national reconciliation that will be essential if Iraq is to become a stable, united, and democratic country. They can attain this goal with continued support and encouragement from us and the international community. 

In the last few months, there have been significant political and security accomplishments that greatly advance the prospects for real national reconciliation. Regular meetings of the recently established Executive Council (President, Prime Minister, and both Vice Presidents) have expanded discussions on and improved prospects for consensus on key issues. There have been active efforts to bring Sunni 

ministers from the Tawafuq Party back into the cabinet. Prime Minister al-Maliki’s 

security campaigns in Basrah and Sadr City garnered widespread political and popular support in Iraq—and also sent a positive signal to regional countries concerned 

about the Maliki Government’s willingness to confront Shia extremists who had operated with relative impunity. The central government has channeled some $3.5 billion to the provinces, addressing a key source of sectarian tension—a fair distribution of Iraq’s vast resources, including petroleum revenue—thereby strengthening 

provincial-central government ties. 

The Iraqi Government is moving ahead on other fiscal decisions necessary to meet 

the Iraqi peoples’ needs and improve the country’s economic situation. The passing 

of the budget law in February, following extensive debate and compromises in the 

Council of Representatives, was an important milestone. The government’s ability 

to provide essential services is improving, and we have seen improvements in the 

Government of Iraq’s ability to allocate and spend its own financial resources on 

Iraq’s reconstruction and security. In 2005, for example, Iraq’s capital budget was 

$5 billion. In 2008 it is $13.1 billion with the possibility of up to $5 billion more 

in supplemental funds. Similarly, the Iraqi Government has increased allocations 

84

for security ministries from $2.1 billion in 2005 to approximately $9 billion in 2008. 

There have been improvements in capital and security budget execution at all levels 

of the government. 

Challenges remain and Iraqi political leaders still need to make some difficult 

compromises to advance the stability and prosperity essential for democracy in Iraq. 

Among the most important of these compromises is a package of national hydrocarbons legislation that will establish mechanisms to regulate Iraq’s oil and gas sectors, as well as guidelines by which oil revenue is equitably shared. Agreement on 

this legislation would open the way for further reconciliation and economic development. Other complex problems that the Iraqis must tackle include resolution of the 

status of Kirkuk, decisions on Iraq’s federal structure, and the future of refugees 

and internally-displaced persons. 

The Iraqi Government and the people of Iraq have great expectations for their future. We and Iraq’s other international partners will support them in their endeavors.

8. Senator AKAKA. Ambassador Crocker, assuming they are capable of achieving 

some sort of real political progress, where is the plan to put conditions on U.S. and 

coalition assistance and hold the Iraqis accountable for failure to reconcile their differences? 

Ambassador CROCKER. We are pressing Iraqi political leaders across the board to 

accelerate actions necessary to promote national reconciliation—by passing legislation in key areas, completing constitutional reform, broadening participation by all 

of Iraq’s communities in the political process, and improving the delivery of basic 

services. The United States and Iraq are negotiating a Strategic Framework, intended to reflect shared United States and Iraqi political, economic, and security interests going forward. International agreements like the International Compact with 

Iraq (ICI) promote Iraqi progress in key reconciliation-related areas like economic 

self-reliance, good governance, rule of law, and civil society. 

Iraqi steps to promote national reconciliation are indeed essential if Iraq is to become a stable, united and democratic country. The goals are attainable with continued support and encouragement from us and the international community. 

In fact, we believe that the Iraqi political leadership is now largely on the right 

track and that there have been significant accomplishments that greatly advance 

the prospects for lasting national reconciliation; specifically, these include the passage of key legislation on amnesty, the budget, de-Baathification reform, provincial 

powers (including setting a date for provincial elections), as well as Prime Minister 

al-Maliki’s recent moves against illegal armed groups in Basrah and Baghdad. 

In the end, the Iraqi Government is accountable to the Iraqi people, not to us. 

Provincial elections later this year and national elections to follow will test the government’s standing with the Iraqi people. Iraq’s leaders understand the urgent need 

to show their fellow citizens that they can govern effectively and that conditions of 

daily life will improve. We will continue our efforts to assist Iraqis to build the 

united, stable, and prosperous country they want while we recognize that progress 

toward this end must be made by the Iraqis themselves. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK PRYOR

TROOP WITHDRAWAL

9. Senator PRYOR. General Petraeus, the war in Iraq has resulted in numerous 

pieces of legislation calling for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. However, 

one thing has remained constant in the language used by both parties: ‘‘except for 

military personnel needed for: (1) force protection, (2) counterinsurgency operations, 

and (3) training of ISFs.’’ As the commander of the Multi-National Force-Iraq, how 

many troops do you think satisfy this language? 

General PETRAEUS. At the present time, we have achieved the conditions to enable 

us to support current policy goals while drawing down to 15 U.S. Brigade Combat 

Teams by July 2008. Indeed we have, with our Iraqi counterparts, helped reduce 

the number of security incidents to levels not seen since 2004. If there were a 

change in policy, such that the only goals were those listed in the language above, 

we would undertake a comprehensive planning effort and make recommendations 

on appropriate force levels given the situation at that time. This planning effort 

would require dialogue and clarification with regard to policy objectives and acceptable risk. This planning effort would also need to take into account operational and 

strategic considerations. 

85

As I stated in my testimony, operational considerations include recognition of the 

following: the military surge has achieved significant progress, but that progress remains fragile and uneven; ISFs have strengthened their capabilities, but still must 

grow further; provincial elections are expected to occur this fall; refugee returns, detainee releases, and efforts to resolve provincial boundaries disputes and Article 140 

issues will be challenging; the transition of Sons of Iraq (SOI) into the ISFs or other 

pursuits will require time and careful monitoring; and withdrawing too many forces 

too quickly could jeopardize the progress of the past year. 

A number of strategic considerations would also affect the planning process. These 

would include recognition that a number of the security challenges inside Iraq are 

also related to significant regional and global threats, and that a failed state in Iraq 

would pose serious consequences for the greater fight against al Qaeda, for regional 

stability, for the already existing humanitarian crisis in Iraq, and for efforts to 

counter malign Iranian influence. An additional strategic consideration is the fact 

that the strain on the U.S. military, especially on its ground forces, has been considerable in recent years. 

Without dialogue and clarification regarding policy objectives and acceptable risk, 

and without an assessment of the relevant operational and strategic considerations 

at the time, only a rough estimate of force levels is possible. Nevertheless, the language above still suggests a requirement for sizable conventional forces, Special Operations Forces, and adviser elements.

FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT AND STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT

10. Senator PRYOR. Ambassador Crocker, in March, Admiral Fallon provided his 

written testimony to Congress in advance of his appearance before the committee. 

He stated ‘‘the United States is planning to normalize long-term bilateral relations 

through a framework agreement that reflects our shared political, economic, cultural, and security interests, as well as a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The 

documents will allow us maximum flexibility to assist the Government of Iraq in 

the fight against al Qaeda, develop its security forces, and combat harmful influences inside Iraq while, at the same time, protect our own forces.’’ What is the status of those two agreements, the framework agreement and the SOFA? Do you anticipate that they will be sent to the Senate for advice and consent? 

Ambassador CROCKER. We continue to negotiate the terms of our bilateral strategic and security relationship so as to address both United States and Iraqi interests. Specific texts remain in flux and continue to evolve. We intend to share text 

with the congressional committee leadership before any agreement is concluded. In 

the interim, we will continue to provide briefings to members and staff to update 

on the progress of negotiations and the process by which agreements will be 

reached. 

We expect to conclude the framework agreement and agreement on status of 

forces as executive agreements, and do not anticipate that they will be sent to the 

Senate for advice and consent. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ELIZABETH DOLE

OVEREXTENSION OF THE MILITARY

11. Senator DOLE. General Petraeus, I think that it is necessary to step back for 

a moment and place the war in Iraq within the context of projected long-term defense spending. I am increasingly concerned that because long-term defense spending is projected to be profoundly inadequate, we may lack the funds to complete the 

planned expansion of the Army and Marine Corps. 

If we are serious about fielding an adequately-sized force, then let us not simply 

agree that the current situations in Iraq and Afghanistan are difficult. Let us speak 

with a clear voice to the American people and to this administration and the next 

that our forces must be expanded, and let us agree not to pursue these objectives 

at the expense of other important areas within future defense budgets. If we are 

to actually address this problem, then we must ensure that the overall defense 

budget is adequate rather than merely acknowledge the problems that our troops 

confront when defense spending is insufficient. In such cases, rhetoric is a poor substitute for action. 

But I want to take this larger point and put it into the context of Iraq and get 

to the bottom line of whether or not in your opinion, our forces are overextended. 

Specifically, let’s focus on what Admiral Mullen stated last week, that current force 

levels in Iraq prevent us from deploying a sufficient number of troops to AfghaniVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:23 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00089 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\45666.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
86

stan. In your opinion, how much longer can the surge be sustained before it does 

irreparable harm to the force? 

General PETRAEUS. I am grateful for Secretary Gates’ efforts and Congress’ support to ensure we have had the forces and resources we need for what have been 

very intensive operations. Clearly, the surge and multiple overseas deployments 

have strained the Active and Reserve components. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have been particularly demanding on our ground forces, and many 

servicemembers have completed or are in the midst of second or third deployments. 

This is obviously difficult for them and their families. My own family is well acquainted with this challenge, as I have now been deployed for more than 41⁄2 years 

since 2001. Reset of equipment also remains a challenge. Although it is beyond my 

brief to assess the overall health of the Services, this remains a subject about which 

I am concerned and on which I will continue to engage in dialogue with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Chiefs. Despite the challenges, our 

soldiers continue to display incredible resilience. The annual Mental Health Assessment Team survey completed last fall indicated that morale in Iraq improved this 

past year, and the 3rd Infantry Division, which is completing its third tour in Iraq 

now, has already met its reenlistment goal for the entire year. We can anticipate 

that these positive trends will continue as force levels in Iraq come down to presurge levels. Already we have withdrawn without replacement three Army brigades, 

two Marine battalions, and the Marine Expeditionary Unit; a fourth Army Brigade 

has transferred responsibility for its sector and is in the process of redeploying.

TROOP WITHDRAWAL

12. Senator DOLE. Ambassador Crocker, many of the major decisions made concerning our military and political efforts in Iraq, or any war, are based on best professional assessments. What is your best assessment of the consequences, both for 

Iraq and for the region, if we withdraw before ISFs possess the capability to maintain stability in the country? 

Ambassador CROCKER. A premature drawdown of our forces would have devastating consequences. This could include a rapid deterioration of local security initiatives and the disintegration of ISFs resulting in a marked increase in violence, 

further ethno-sectarian displacement and refugee flows, and alliances of convenience 

by Iraqi groups with internal and external forces to gain advantages over their rivals. Such a drawdown would exacerbate already challenging regional dynamics, especially with respect to Iran. Ultimately, a precipitous withdrawal could increase 

the probability that coalition forces would have to return to Iraq to confront an even 

more dangerous enemy.

ADVISOR PROGRAM IN IRAQ

13. Senator DOLE. General Petraeus, we had an extensive advisor program in 

Vietnam. After much effort, we’ve realized that a similar program in Iraq would 

yield profound benefits, especially in terms of maximizing our limited number of 

personnel and their value in training Iraqi forces. An experienced group of advisers 

embedded in an Iraqi battalion, for example, is a profoundly valuable combat multiplier. In your professional opinion, why is there opposition to establishing and sustaining a dedicated training cadre—at least for the duration of the war? 

General PETRAEUS. There is fairly widespread agreement in our military today regarding the importance of advisory work in our counterinsurgency operations, and 

our Services have made significant efforts to prepare servicemembers for this role. 

As an example, our Military Training and Transition Teams are composed of 10–

15 personnel who undergo significant training prior to their arrival in Iraq. Teams 

that are separately sourced by the Army, Navy, and Air Force attend 2 months of 

training at Fort Riley, KS, and then 10 days of training at Camp Buehring, Kuwait, 

while Marine teams train at Twentynine Palms, CA. Teams that deploy as parts 

of units conduct training at their home station, and also participate in training exercises to include Combat Training Center rotations and Mission Readiness Exercises. 

All teams, regardless of how they are resourced, also attend an additional week’s 

training at the Phoenix Academy in Taji, Iraq before conducting a 10-day transition 

with outgoing teams. The advisory effort is overseen by the Iraqi Advisory Group, 

commanded by a brigadier general, which supports transition teams through their 

arrival in Iraq, in-theater training, and redeployment. This extensive training and 

integration process augments team members’ tactical expertise and relevant experience and allows them to best pass on that expertise to Iraqi forces. Significant enVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:23 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00090 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\45666.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
87

ergy and funds have also been invested in implementing a robust and rapid lessons 

learned processes. 

As we assist in the development of ISFs, our troopers play a critical role in teaching, coaching, and mentoring their Iraqi counterparts. They do this as part of transition teams, but also as their units partner with Iraqi units in operational, training, 

and mentoring relationships. 

The advisory efforts currently underway in Iraq are having the desired effect. 

Transition teams have significantly assisted Iraqi units in action, helping in planning and other staff functions while providing access to key coalition combat 

enablers. Together with unit partnerships, advisory teams have helped to move over 

100 ISF battalions into an ‘‘in the lead’’ role. As Iraqi forces continue to develop, 

coalition forces will continue to transition into more advisory roles; at some point, 

as one of my brigade commanders recently told me, ‘‘We will all be advisors.’’

It is not clear that the creation of a dedicated training cadre, or advisory corps, 

would produce results better than those being achieved by our current efforts. In 

general, the best advisors are those with recent, relevant experience in units similar 

to the units they seek to develop. Instead of creating a separate force, it may be 

preferable to incentivize and reward critical advisory work. To that end the Chief 

of Staff of the Army recently announced several important personnel actions that 

reflect the importance attached to the advisory effort.

PRIVATE SECURITY FIRMS

14. Senator DOLE. General Petraeus, private security firms have attracted more 

than their share of controversy over the past year. The largest private firm, 

Blackwater, is located in North Carolina. I agree entirely that private security personnel must operate under the control of our military. But my point is to ask for 

your opinion of the contributions that these firms and their people make to the overall effort. How important of a role do these firms play in maintaining security across 

Iraq? 

General PETRAEUS. Private Security Contractors (PSCs) and their employees 

make critical contributions to the overall effort in Iraq. These contractors provide 

static security for coalition facilities, key infrastructure, and reconstruction projects, 

and they provide mobile security for large convoys, work details, and individual 

high-ranking officials. The use of PSCs to meet these defensive security needs enables more of our military forces to focus on active counterinsurgency and combat 

operations. 

An inability to continue to use PSCs would be enormously disruptive to our effort 

to achieve U.S. goals in Iraq. Replacing DOD contractors with military personnel 

would require approximately 7,300 additional military personnel to be trained and 

deployed to Iraq, plus additional forces to provide the expanded logistical support 

required. These figures do not include the requirements for the dedication and training of additional military personnel to support rotational requirements, nor the addition of equipment and vehicles such as MRAPs used by contractors, which are 

needed by our combat forces. The loss of PSCs would delay the drawdown of U.S. 

forces, could delay the ability of the Army to reduce combat tours from 15 months 

to 12 months, and would require a special training and certification program to be 

developed and implemented. The continued use of PSCs can help us sustain the significant security progress that has been made in Iraq as the level of security incidents across Iraq for the past month is the lowest it has been for more than 4 years, 

and we continue to transition additional responsibilities to the Iraqi Government 

and ISFs.

ETHNIC CONFLICT

15. Senator DOLE. General Petraeus, we are receiving mixed reports on the 

progress of ISFs during recent fighting in Basra, around Sadr City, and elsewhere. 

Some number of Iraqi soldiers, and a great number of Iraqi police, threw down their 

weapons, refused to fight, or actually fought alongside militia forces. In some instances, these men refused to fight against neighbors, as they were from the same 

communities. In some instances, ethnic allegiances still hold. In some cases, soldiers 

received calls on their cell phones from old colleagues telling them that if they 

fought, their families would be murdered. I appreciate that it takes years to create 

a national army, and that many of the recent problems were rooted in planning 

problems. That said, what is your response to these recent events, and what would 

you recommend to further ensure that soldiers and police think like Iraqis and less 

88

like members of one of the various ethnic groups? Is that even doable given Iraq’s 

ethnic makeup and the long history of conflict between Sunnis and Shia? 

General PETRAEUS. Although many Iraqi units performed very well during operations in Basra and Sadr City, some others performed poorly in the initial stages, 

especially in Basra. Some of those who failed to fight adequately did so as a result 

of inexperience, while others did so as a direct result of ethnic/sectarian allegiance 

or pressure. The 52nd Brigade of the 14th Division, which was a new unit just out 

of initial training, had the most widespread difficulties. That unit has since been 

provided replacement leaders and troopers and been retrained, and it is now back 

in the fight in Basra and doing well. The strong performance of other, more experienced units suggests that ethnic/sectarian allegiances can be overcome through the 

training and professionalization of security forces. Toward this end, we are 

partnering with Iraqi leaders to institutionalize norms of professionalism, including 

non-sectarianism. For example, the Iraqi National Police just instituted a Code of 

Ethics for its forces, and the Ministries of Interior and Defense have not hesitated 

to remove leaders and troopers who did not measure up in combat operations. 

ISF have demonstrated their growing capability and capacity in recent operations. 

In Basra, Mosul, Sadr City, and other locations in Iraq, ISF are conducting clearance operations as well as intelligence-driven raids, successfully extending the Iraqi 

Government’s presence and control, removing huge amounts of arms, munitions, 

and explosives from circulation, and capturing key militant leaders. Iraqi forces 

have, for example, found over 170 caches in Sadr City alone in the past month or 

so. These operations have demonstrated increased planning capability, mobility, and 

tactical competence, as well as an ability to conduct simultaneous major operations 

throughout the country. Thanks to improved security and ISF capability, 8 of 16 

Iraqi provinces are under Provincial Iraqi Control and 2 more provinces are due to 

transition by the end of June 2008. 

Professionalization of armed forces alone, however, will not eliminate ethno-sectarian tension and conflict in Iraq. Ultimately, the Iraqi people must decide to move 

beyond the use of violence to address their concerns, including ethnic-sectarian concerns. In large part, this is already happening. Ethno-sectarian violence has fallen 

dramatically in Iraq over the last year, signifying that Iraqis have decided to step 

back from the brink of civil war. This reduction in ethno-sectarian violence is attributable not just to the increased Iraqi and coalition force presence and decreased al 

Qaeda in Iraq and militia capabilities, but also to the increasing rejection of violence 

by the Iraqi people. This progress has shown us that ethnic conflict in Iraq is not 

inevitable and progress is possible.

FUNDING FOR SUNNI SECURITY FORCES

16. Senator DOLE. Ambassador Crocker, I cannot stress enough how important it 

is that Iraqi political reconciliation must proceed with a decidedly greater sense of 

urgency than we have observed to date. Furthermore, I find it appalling that Prime 

Minister Maliki refuses to adequately fund the Sunni security forces recently formed 

in Anbar province and elsewhere, while tens of billions of dollars in Iraqi oil revenue 

sit in a New York bank. I find it nearly impossible to understand that Mr. Maliki 

would subordinate to some other concern the fact that instability in Anbar and elsewhere jeopardizes the safety of the Shiite population. His failure in this area jeopardizes all that has been achieved. Please share your thoughts on the subject. 

Ambassador CROCKER. We are pressing Iraqi political leaders across the board to 

accelerate actions necessary to promote national reconciliation—by passing legislation in key areas, completing constitutional reform, broadening participation by all 

of Iraq’s communities in the political process, improving the delivery of basic services, and imposing order evenhandedly. International agreements like the ICI elicit 

Iraqi progress in key reconciliation-related areas like economic self-reliance, good 

governance, rule of law, and civil society. 

Extremists and criminal groups are resisting government control in several provinces, including Mosul, Basra, and Baghdad. As of April 2008, the Government of 

Iraq was conducting operations to suppress the extremists and criminal groups in 

each of those provinces. Such operations open the door for rapid progress towards 

national reconciliation. Iraqi security operations against predominantly Shia groups 

encourage former Sunni oppositionists to see the Government of Iraq as evenhanded 

in the application of the law. The main Sunni political coalition, Tawafuq, has boycotted the government for several months, but Prime Minister Maliki’s moves 

against Shia groups should facilitate the end of this boycott. 

At the same time, the Government of Iraq’s ability to eliminate the Shia criminal 

groups’ sanctuaries can reduce those groups’ capacity to resist government control. 

89

Given the close ties between these criminal groups and Shia political opposition to 

the Government of Iraq, suppression of the criminal groups could then lead to submission of Shia oppositionists. 

The Government of Iraq, under Prime Minister Maliki’s direction, has in fact 

taken many steps to fully fund ISFs in Anbar and elsewhere. For example, the Ministry of Interior is now fully funding the Anbar police payroll. Likewise, equipment 

shortages for the Anbar police are being resolved. At the grass roots level, the Iraqi 

Government and the coalition are working with thousands of members of the 

‘‘SOI’’—locally-hired, community-based auxiliaries—who reject extremism and work 

with established authorities to stabilize Iraq. The SOI program enhances the ability 

of Iraqi and coalition forces to interact with local residents and obtain information 

on insurgents and illegal militia activity, and protect key infrastructure. 

The Government of Iraq certainly understands that security in one province affects the security in other provinces. As noted above, Prime Minister Maliki’s Government is undertaking security operations to reduce instability and increase the 

rule of law throughout Iraq, and the Government of Iraq is performing these operations in a non-sectarian manner which facilitates national reconciliation.

[Whereupon, at 1:55 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 

(91)

THE SITUATION IN IRAQ AND PROGRESS 

MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IN 

MEETING THE BENCHMARKS AND ACHIEVING RECONCILIATION 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 9, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room SH–

216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) 

presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy, 

Lieberman, Reed, E. Benjamin Nelson, Webb, McCain, Warner, 

Sessions, Collins, Chambliss, Graham, and Thune. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional 

staff member; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; and 

William K. Sutey, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican 

staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; Paul 

C. Hutton IV, research assistant; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; and Dana W. 

White, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Kevin A. Cronin, and 

Brian F. Sebold. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Bethany Bassett and 

Sharon L. Waxman, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Colleen J. 

Shogan, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant 

to Senator Reed; Andrew R. Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator 

Ben Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Richard H. Fontaine, Jr., assistant to Senator McCain; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; 

Todd Stiefler, assistant to Senator Sessions; Meghan Simonds and 

Mark J. Winter, assistants to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, 

assistant to Senator Chambliss; Andrew King, assistant to Senator 

Graham; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; and Jason Van 

Beek, assistant to Senator Thune. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. 

Let us first welcome our panel of witnesses to continue our committee’s series of hearings this week on the situation in Iraq. 

92

Yesterday, we heard from General Petraeus and Ambassador 

Crocker. Tomorrow afternoon we will hear from Secretary of Defense Gates and Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. 

Today, we’re going to hear from three distinguished witnesses: 

Dr. Andrew Bacevich, professor of international relations and 

history at Boston University, has written extensively on U.S. national and military strategies and on the situation in Iraq. He is 

a retired Army officer and a Vietnam veteran. 

General Jack Keane is a former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army 

who has visited Iraq several times. He has testified before the committee previously on this very subject, and is surely an expert on 

the subject. 

Dr. Robert Malley has also written on the situation in Iraq from 

his position as Middle East and North Africa Program Director at 

the International Crisis Group. He is a former member of the staff 

of the National Security Council (NSC). 

It’s clear from General Petraeus’s testimony yesterday that the 

administration’s open-ended commitment in Iraq is going to continue, now reinforced by an open-ended pause. General Petraeus 

has recommended to his chain of command that there be a 45-day 

period of consolidation and evaluation, in his words, which will 

then be followed by a ‘‘process of assessment,’’ which will determine, over time, when he can make recommendations for further 

reductions. 

General Petraeus was unwilling to estimate how long this period 

of assessment would last, and would not even agree that it could 

be concluded in 3 or 4 months and then redeployment would recommence. This is a far cry from what Secretary Gates described in 

February as a projected ‘‘brief pause.’’ Moreover, General Petraeus 

was unwilling to venture an estimate of U.S. troop strength in Iraq 

at the end of the year, even if all goes well. 

It was also clear from General Petraeus’s testimony that Prime 

Minister Maliki’s action in Basrah once again demonstrated Prime 

Minister Maliki’s incompetence. I asked General Petraeus about an 

April 3 article in the New York Times which said that, before the 

Iraqi Government’s assault on the Mahdi army in Basrah, that he, 

General Petraeus, had counseled Prime Minister Maliki, saying, 

‘‘We made a lot of gains in the past 6 to 9 months that you’ll be 

putting at risk.’’ I also asked General Petraeus about that same article’s statement that he advised Prime Minister Maliki not to rush 

into a fight without carefully sizing up the situation and making 

adequate preparations. General Petraeus acknowledged that Prime 

Minister Maliki did not follow his advice, that the operation was 

not adequately planned or prepared. In effect, U.S. troops, with no 

control over an Iraqi operation in a province which had already 

been turned over to Iraqi control, were drawn into the fight when 

that operation went bad. 

It is also clear from Ambassador Crocker’s testimony that, after 

5 years of training and equipping the Iraqi security forces (ISFs), 

and after 5 years of reconstruction, it is still the American taxpayer 

who is shouldering the greatest economic burden in Iraq, while 

tens of billions of dollars in Iraqi money sit in bank accounts 

around the world. 

93

There is a vast agreement—I believe there is a consensus—that 

there is no military solution to the situation in Iraq, no matter how 

dedicated our troops may be, and no matter how much military 

success they achieve. To maximize success in Iraq, the Iraqi Government must take control—politically, economically, and militarily. The Iraqis must make the political compromises to bring all 

factions into the political system and effect political reconciliation. 

They must spend their own oil revenues to improve the lives of all 

Iraqi citizens. They must take the military initiative, using the 

training and equipment that we’ve provided them, to subdue the 

politically irreconcilable and criminal elements in Iraqi society. We 

cannot do for the Iraqis—what they must do for themselves. The 

open-ended commitment that the administration maintains, now 

reinforced by a suspension of further U.S. troop reductions beginning in July, works against getting the Iraqis to take responsibility 

for their own country. 

We look forward to hearing our witnesses’ assessment of the security situation in Iraq, the political progress in Iraq, and any recommendations that they may have with respect to a future U.S. 

military, political, diplomatic, and economic strategy for Iraq and 

the larger region. 

Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I join you in welcoming our distinguished panel this morning, 

and I want to thank them for their presence here and their willingness to share their views about U.S. policy and strategy in Iraq. 

Yesterday, we heard from Ambassador Crocker and General 

Petraeus on progress in Iraq and their views of the way forward. 

We still have difficulties, as demonstrated by the recent fighting in 

Basrah and Baghdad. Yet, the gains outlined yesterday, in security, political, and economic terms, are real. 

Tomorrow, the President will address the Nation to provide further information on his decisions about the way ahead in Iraq, to 

be followed soon thereafter by the testimony before this committee 

by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. 

With all of these inputs into our policymaking process, Congress 

will face, again, the choice it confronted last year. We can build on 

the progress we have seen, acknowledging that there will be setbacks and new difficulties, and give our men and women in uniform the time and support necessary to carry out their mission, or 

we can choose to set a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops 

from Iraq, leading to our failure there, and presenting us with the 

terrible consequences that I believe will ensue. 

As our witnesses no doubt recall, last year many observers predicted that the surge would fail. Yet, since the middle of last year, 

sectarian and ethnic violence, civilian deaths, and deaths of coalition forces have all fallen dramatically. This improved security environment has led to a new opportunity, one in which average 

Iraqis can, in the future, approach a more normal political and economic life. Reconciliation has moved forward, and over the weekend Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish leaders backed the Prime Minister 

94

in a statement supporting his operation in Basrah and urging the 

disbarment of all militias. Much, much more needs to be done, and 

Iraq’s leaders need to know that we expect them to show the necessary leadership to rebuild their country, for only they can. But, 

today it is possible to talk with real hope and optimism about the 

future of Iraq and the outcome of our efforts there. 

Success—the establishment of a peaceful, stable, prosperous, 

democratic state that poses no threat to its neighbors and contributes to the defeat of the terrorists—I believe is within reach. With 

success, Iraqi forces can take responsibility for enforcing security in 

their country, and American troops can return home with the 

honor of having secured their country’s interests, at great personal 

cost, and of helping another people achieve peace and self-determination. 

I hope our witnesses this morning will address the ways in which 

America can best achieve success in Iraq, and articulate, as well, 

the likely costs of our failure there. 

My view has been clear. Should the United States choose to withdraw from Iraq before adequate security is established, we will exchange for victory a defeat that is terrible and longlasting. Al 

Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) would proclaim victory and increase its efforts 

to provoke sectarian tensions, pushing for a full-scale civil war that 

would descend into genocide and destabilize the Middle East. Iraq 

would become a failed state that could become a haven for terrorists to train and plan their operations. Iranian influence would increase substantially in Iraq and encourage other countries to seek 

accommodation with Tehran at the expense of our interests. An 

American failure would almost certainly require us to return to 

Iraq or draw us into a wider and far costlier war. 

If, on the other hand, we and the Iraqis are able to build on the 

opportunity provided by recent successes, we have the chance to 

leave in Iraq a force for stability and freedom, not conflict and 

chaos. In doing so, we will ensure that the terrible price we have 

paid in the war, the price that has made all of us sick at heart, 

has not been paid in vain. Our troops can leave behind a successful 

mission. Our Nation can leave behind a country that contributes to 

the security of America and the world. 

I know the witnesses this morning will have a great deal of insight to impart on these vitally important issues, and I look forward to their testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain. 

Again, let us thank our witnesses for being here, for their work 

on this and so many other issues, for their long histories of good 

important advice to this Nation in many, many different fora. 

First, we’ll call on Dr. Bacevich. I think it would be good if you 

could limit your testimony to 10 minutes or less so that there will 

be plenty of time for questions. I’m referring to all three witnesses, 

not just you, Dr. Bacevich. 

Thank you for being here. Dr. Bacevich? 

95

STATEMENT OF ANDREW J. BACEVICH, PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND HISTORY, BOSTON UNIVERSITY 

Dr. BACEVICH. Thank you for the opportunity to present my 

views to this committee. 

I’ll focus my remarks on two issues: first, near-term prospects in 

Iraq; and then, second, the war’s larger strategic implications. 

The bottom-line assessment to which I will return is this: The 

United States today finds itself with too much war and too few 

warriors. We face a large and growing gap between our military 

commitments and our military capabilities, and something has to 

give. 

Let me begin with the current situation in Iraq. Although violence there has decreased over the past year, attacks on coalition 

and ISFs continue to occur at an average rate of 500 per week. 

This is clearly unacceptable. The likelihood that further U.S. efforts will reduce the violence to an acceptable level, however one 

might define that term, appears remote. 

Meanwhile, our military capacity, especially our ability to keep 

substantial numbers of boots on the ground, is eroding. If the surge 

is working, as some claim, then why not sustain it? Indeed, why 

not reinforce that success by sending another 30,000 or 60,000 or 

90,000 reinforcements? The answer to that question is self-evident: 

because the necessary troops don’t exist. The cupboard is bare. 

Furthermore, recent improvements in security are highly contingent. The Shiite militias, Sunni insurgents, and tribal leaders who 

have agreed to refrain from violence in return for arms, money, 

and other concessions, have by no means bought into the American 

vision for the future of Iraq; their interests do not coincide with our 

own, and we should not delude ourselves by pretending otherwise. 

It is as if, in an effort to bring harmony to a fractious, dysfunctional family, we have forged marriages of convenience with as 

many of that family’s members as possible. Our disparate partners 

will abide by their vows only so long as they find it convenient to 

do so. 

Unfortunately, partial success in reducing the level of violence 

has not translated into any substantial political gains. Recall that 

the purpose of the surge was not to win the war, in a military 

sense. General Petraeus never promised victory. He and any number of other senior military officers have assessed the war as militarily unwinnable. 

On this point, the architects of the surge were quite clear: the 

object of the exercise was not to impose our will on the enemy, but 

to facilitate political reconciliation among Iraqis. 

A year later, signs of genuine reconciliation are few. In an interview with the Washington Post less than a month ago, General 

Petraeus said that, ‘‘No one in the U.S. Government feels that 

there has been sufficient progress by any means in the area of national reconciliation.’’ 

While it may be nice that the Kurds have begun to display the 

Iraqi flag alongside their own, to depict such grudging concessions 

as evidence of an emerging national identity is surely to grasp at 

straws. 

So, although the violence has subsided somewhat, the war remains essentially stalemated. Iraq today qualifies only nominally 

96

as a sovereign nation-state. In reality, it has become a dependency 

of the United States, unable to manage its own affairs or to provide 

for the well-being of its own people. 

The costs to the United States of sustaining this dependency are difficult to calculate with precision, but figures such as $3 billion 

per week and 30 to 40 American lives per month provide a good 

approximation. 

What can we expect to gain in return for this investment? The 

Bush administration was counting on the Iraq war to demonstrate 

the viability of its freedom agenda and to affirm the efficacy of the 

Bush doctrine of preventive war. Measured in those terms, the war 

has long since failed. Rather than showcasing our ability to transform the greater Middle East, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) has 

demonstrated just the opposite. Using military power as an instrument for imprinting liberal values in this part of the world has produced a failed state while fostering widespread antipathy towards 

the United States. Rather than demonstrating our ability to eliminate emerging threats swiftly, decisively, and economically, the 

Iraq war has revealed the limits of American power and called into 

question American competence. The Bush doctrine hasn’t worked. 

Saddam is long gone, but we’re stuck. Rather than delivering decisive victory, preventive war has landed us in a quagmire. 

The abject failure of the freedom agenda and the Bush doctrine 

has robbed the Iraq war of any strategic rationale. The war continues, in large part because of our refusal to acknowledge and confront this loss of strategic purpose. 

Now, there are members of this committee who have written of 

their admiration for Reinhold Niebuhr. I happen to share in that 

admiration. Perhaps not surprisingly, Niebuhr has much to say of 

relevance on this issue. He once observed that, ‘‘Even the wisest 

statecraft cannot create social tissue. It can cut, sew, and redesign 

social fabric to a limited degree, but the social fabric upon which 

it works must be given.’’ 

In Iraq, to the extent that any meaningful social fabric has ever 

existed, events have now shredded it beyond repair. Persisting in 

our efforts to stitch Iraq back together will exhaust our Army, divert attention from other urgent problems at home and abroad, and 

squander untold billions, most of which we are borrowing from foreign countries. 

Therefore, the best way to close the gap between too much war 

and too few warriors is to reduce our commitments. That means 

ending the U.S. combat role in Iraq. It means exerting ourselves 

primarily through diplomatic means to limit the adverse consequences caused by our ill-advised crusade in Iraq. It means devising a new strategy to address the threat posed by violent Islamic 

radicalism to replace the failed strategy of the freedom agenda and 

the Bush doctrine. 

Now, there are people of goodwill, I know, who will disagree with 

this assessment. They will insist that we have no choice but to persevere in Iraq. They will further insist that restoring the social fabric of Iraq remains an imperative. To the extent that this counsel 

carries the day, then the predictable result will be to exacerbate 

even further the problem of having too much war for too few warriors. 

97

Now, war is the realm of uncertainty. There’s always the chance 

of catching some lucky break. Perhaps next year the Iraqis will get 

their act together and settle their internal differences. Such developments are always possible. They are also highly unlikely. 

When it comes to Iraq, a far more likely prospect is the following. 

If the United States insists on continuing its war there, the United 

States will get what it wants: the war will continue indefinitely. 

According to General Petraeus, a counterinsurgency is typically a 

10- to 12-year proposition. Given that assessment, and with the 

surge now giving way to a pause, U.S. combat operations in Iraq 

could easily drag on for another 5 to 10 years. In that event, the 

conflict that already ranks as the second longest in our history will 

claim the title of longest. Already our second most expensive war, 

it will become, in financial terms, the costliest of all. On one point, 

at least, Donald Rumsfeld will be able to claim vindication: Iraq 

will, indeed, have become a long slog. 

Now, for the United States to pursue this course would, in my 

judgment, qualify as a misjudgment of epic proportions. Yet, if our 

political leaders insist on the necessity of fighting this open-ended 

war, then they owe it to those who have already borne 5 years of 

combat to provide some relief. Bluntly, if those in Washington are 

unable or unwilling to reduce the number of wars in which U.S. 

forces are engaged, then surely they ought to increase the number 

of warriors available to fight them. 

Today, in a nation that, according to President Bush, is ‘‘at war,’’ 

approximately one-half of 1 percent of the population is in uniform. 

Double that figure, and the problem of too much war for too few 

warriors goes away. The United States will then have the troops 

necessary to sustain Iraq and also Afghanistan for years to come. 

Now, I do not want to minimize the challenges, political as well 

as economic, inherent in any such effort to expand our military, because they would be large. But, I will insist that continuing on our 

present course, in which soldiers head back to Iraq for their third 

and fourth combat tours while the rest of the country heads to the 

mall, will break the Army before it produces policy success. Worse, 

our present course, in which a few give their all while most give 

nothing, is morally indefensible. 

If the Iraq war is as important as some claim, then sustaining 

the war merits a commitment on the part of the American people 

both to fight the war and to pay for it. If neither the American people nor their political leaders are willing to make such a commitment, then the war clearly does not qualify as genuinely important, 

and our loudly proclaimed determination to support the troops 

rings hollow. The choice is one that we can no longer afford to 

dodge. It’s either less war or more warriors. 

I urge the members of this committee to give this matter the attention it deserves. I thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Bacevich follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. ANDREW J. BACEVICH

Thank you for the opportunity to present my views to this committee. I will focus 

my remarks on two issues: near-term prospects in Iraq and the war’s larger strategic implications. 

The bottom line assessment to which I will return is this: the United States today 

finds itself with too much war and too few warriors. We face a large and growing 

98

gap between our military commitments and our military capabilities. Something has 

to give. 

Let me begin with the current situation in Iraq: Although violence there has decreased over the past year, attacks on coalition and Iraqi security forces continue 

to occur at an average rate of 500 per week. This is clearly unacceptable. The likelihood that further U.S. efforts will reduce violence to an acceptable level—however 

one might define that term—appears remote. 

Meanwhile, our military capacity, especially our ability to keep substantial numbers of boots on the ground, is eroding. If the surge is working as some claim, then 

why not sustain it? Indeed, why not reinforce that success by sending another 

30,000 or 60,000 or 90,000 reinforcements? 

The answer to that question is self-evident: because the necessary troops don’t 

exist. The cupboard is bare. 

Furthermore, recent improvements in security are highly contingent. The Shiite 

militias, Sunni insurgents, and tribal leaders who have agreed to refrain from violence in return for arms, money, and other concessions have by no means bought 

into the American vision for the future of Iraq. Their interests do not coincide with 

our own and we should not delude ourselves by pretending otherwise. 

It is as if in an effort to bring harmony to a fractious, dysfunctional family, we 

have forged marriages of convenience with as many of that family’s members as possible. Our disparate partners will abide by their vows only so long as they find it 

convenient to do so. 

Unfortunately, partial success in reducing the level of violence has not translated 

into any substantial political gains. Recall that the purpose of the surge was not 

to win the war in a military sense. General Petraeus never promised victory. He 

and any number of other senior officers have assessed the war as militarily 

unwinnable. 

On this point, the architects of the surge were quite clear: the object of the exercise was not to impose our will on the enemy but to facilitate political reconciliation 

among Iraqis. 

A year later signs of genuine reconciliation are few. In an interview with the 

Washington Post less than a month ago, General Petraeus said that ‘‘no one’’ in the 

U.S. Government ‘‘feels that there has been sufficient progress by any means in the 

area of national reconciliation.’’ While it may be nice that the Kurds have begun 

to display the Iraqi flag alongside their own, to depict such grudging concessions 

as evidence of an emerging national identity is surely to grasp at straws. 

So although the level of violence has subsided somewhat, the war remains essentially stalemated. Iraq today qualifies only nominally as a sovereign nation-state. In 

reality it has become a dependency of the United States, unable to manage its own 

affairs or to provide for the well-being of its own people. As recent events in Basra 

have affirmed, the Iraqi army, a black hole into which the Pentagon has poured 

some $22 billion in aid and assistance, still cannot hold its own against armed militias. 

The costs to the United States of sustaining this dependency are difficult to calculate with precision, but figures such as $3 billion per week and 30 to 40 American 

lives per month provide a good approximation. 

What can we expect to gain in return for this investment? The Bush administration was counting on the Iraq War to demonstrate the viability of its Freedom Agenda and to affirm the efficacy of the Bush Doctrine of preventive war. 

Measured in those terms, the war has long since failed. Rather than showcasing 

our ability to transform the Greater Middle East, Operation Iraqi Freedom has demonstrated just the opposite. Using military power as an instrument for imprinting 

liberal values in this part of the world has produced a failed state while fostering 

widespread antipathy toward the United States. 

Rather than demonstrating our ability to eliminate emerging threats swiftly, decisively, and economically—Saddam Hussein’s removal providing an object lesson to 

other tyrants tempted to contest our presence in the Middle East—the Iraq War has 

revealed the limits of American power and called into question American competence. The Bush Doctrine hasn’t worked. Saddam is long gone, but we’re stuck. 

Rather than delivering decisive victory, preventive war has landed us in a quagmire. 

The abject failure of the Freedom Agenda and the Bush Doctrine has robbed the 

Iraq War of any strategic rationale. The war continues in large part because of our 

refusal to acknowledge and confront this loss of strategic purpose. 

Now there are members of this committee who have written of their admiration 

for Reinhold Niebuhr. I share in that admiration. Perhaps not surprisingly, the 

great Protestant theologian has much to say of relevance to this issue. Niebuhr once 

observed that ‘‘even the wisest statecraft cannot create social tissue. It can cut, sew, 

99

and redesign social fabric to a limited degree. But the social fabric upon which it 

works must be ‘given’.’’ 

In Iraq, to the extent that any meaningful social fabric has ever existed, events 

have now shredded it beyond repair. Persisting in our efforts to stitch Iraq back together will exhaust our army, divert attention from other urgent problems at home 

and abroad, and squander untold billions, most of which we are borrowing from foreign countries. 

Therefore, the best way to close the gap between too much war and too few warriors is to reduce our commitments. That means ending the U.S. combat role in 

Iraq. It means exerting ourselves, primarily through diplomatic means, to limit the 

adverse consequences caused by our ill-advised crusade in Iraq. It means devising 

a new strategy to address the threat posed by the violent Islamic radicalism, to replace the failed strategy of the Freedom Agenda and the Bush Doctrine. 

This reformulation of strategy should begin with an explicit abrogation of preventive war. It should include a candid recognition that invading and occupying an Islamic nation in hopes of transforming it qualifies as a fantasy. 

There are people of good will who will disagree with this assessment. They will 

insist that we have no choice but to persevere in Iraq—although to say that the 

world’s sole superpower has ‘‘no choice’’ in the matter suggests a remarkable failure 

of imagination. They will insist further that restoring the social fabric of Iraq—engineering the elusive political reconciliation that will stabilize the country—remains 

an imperative. 

To the extent that this counsel carries the day, then the predictable result will 

be to exacerbate even further the problem of having too much war and too few warriors. 

War is the realm of uncertainty. There’s always some chance of catching a lucky 

break. Perhaps next year the Iraqis will get their act together and settle their internal differences. Perhaps next year Congress will balance the Federal budget. Such 

developments are always possible—they are also highly unlikely. 

When it comes to Iraq, a far more likely prospect is the following: if the United 

States insists on continuing its war there, the United States will get what it wants: 

the war will continue indefinitely. According to General Petraeus, a counterinsurgency is typically a 10- to 12-year proposition. Given that assessment, and with 

the ‘‘surge’’ now giving way to a ‘‘pause,’’ U.S. combat operations in Iraq could easily 

drag on for another 5 or 10 years. A large-scale U.S. military presence might be required for two or three decades. 

In that event, the conflict that already ranks as the second longest in our history 

will claim the title of longest. Already our second most expensive war, it will become 

in financial terms the costliest of all. On one point at least, Donald Rumsfeld will 

be able to claim vindication: Iraq will indeed have become a ‘‘long slog.’’ 

For the United States to pursue this course would in my judgment qualify as a 

misjudgment of epic proportions. Yet if our political leaders insist on the necessity 

of fighting this open-ended war, then they owe it to those who have already borne 

5 years of combat to provide some relief. 

Bluntly, if those in Washington are unable or unwilling to reduce the number of 

wars in which U.S. forces are engaged, then surely they ought to increase the number of warriors available to fight them. 

Today, in a nation that according to President Bush is ‘‘at war,’’ approximately 

one-half of 1 percent of the population is in uniform. Double that figure and the 

problem of too much war for too few warriors goes away. The United States will 

have the troops necessary to sustain Iraq (and Afghanistan) for years to come. 

I do not want to minimize the challenges, political as well as economic, inherent 

in any such effort to expand our military. They would be large. But I will insist that 

continuing on our present course in which soldiers head back to Iraq for their third 

and fourth combat tours while the rest of the country heads to the mall will break 

the army before it produces policy success. Worse, our present course—in which a 

few give their all while most give nothing—is morally indefensible. 

If the war in Iraq is as important as some claim, then sustaining that war merits 

a commitment on the part of the American people, both to fight the war and to pay 

for it. If neither the American people nor their political leaders are willing to make 

such a commitment, then the war clearly does not qualify as genuinely important. 

Our loudly proclaimed determination to ‘‘support the troops’’ rings hollow. 

The choice is one that we can no longer afford to dodge: it’s either less war or 

more warriors. I urge the members of this committee to give this matter the attention it deserves. 

Thank you.

100

Chairman LEVIN. We thank you, Dr. Bacevich, for your statement. 

General Keane? 

STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN M. KEANE, USA (RET.) SENIOR 

MANAGING DIRECTOR, KEANE ADVISORS, LLC 

General KEANE. Senator Levin, Senator McCain, and members of 

the committee, thank you for permitting me to provide some 

thoughts today on our situation in Iraq. 

I just returned from Iraq at the end of March, and visited three 

times during 2007. Let me say that the character of my visits is 

to spend considerable time with the Iraqi people, their sheikh and 

tribal leaders, as well as time with our U.S. and Iraqi military and 

civilian leaders, and, of course, our troops. 

It is not my purpose today to repeat the assessment provided by 

General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker during their lengthy 

testimony yesterday. However, I would like to emphasize some 

points of my own assessment, albeit similar to theirs, and draw 

several conclusions and implications. 

First and foremost, we have the most talented and capable leadership team in Iraq, represented by General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. Nothing in my 40-plus years in national security 

compares to this extraordinary team, who provide the very best of 

leadership to their marvelous teammates and troops. 

Let me begin by saying that our strategy in Iraq is working. 

Frankly, it is doing so beyond our initial expectations. The security 

turnaround in Iraq from the hell of 2006 and 3 years of failed strategy is one of the most stunning achievements in the annals of 

counterinsurgency practice. It was achieved in a matter of months, 

versus the years I thought it would take to turn around one of the 

most formidable insurgencies the west has ever faced. 

Fundamental to that success was the use of proven counterinsurgency practices to protect the people with sufficient amount of 

Iraq and U.S. troops. This was a catalyst for the widespread Sunni 

Awakening Movement, which is truly underappreciated here in the 

United States. What really happened is, the sheikhs and tribal 

leaders decided they could not achieve their political objectives 

with al Qaeda in fighting the United States and the Government 

of Iraq. As such, the overwhelming majority of Sunni insurgent 

leaders made four strategic decisions: (1) to stop the violence; (2) 

to leverage the U.S. leaders to influence the Government of Iraq; 

(3) to reconcile with the Government of Iraq; and (4) provide their 

‘‘sons,’’ to work with us and the Iraqis to help defeat al Qaeda and 

protect their own people. 

These results are the very best one could expect in fighting an 

insurgency. Your opponent not only surrenders, but comes to your 

side to assist. 

The entire Arab Muslim world is aware of the Sunni rejection of 

al Qaeda, the first major occurrence ever where the people have rejected al Qaeda and their barbaric hold on them. 

Additionally, in a recent poll, over 90 percent of Sunnis are expected to participate in the political process in the 2008 provincial 

election and in the general election in 2009. What does that tell us 

about reconciliation? Clearly, the Sunnis are politically reconciling 

101

with the Government of Iraq, and the Government of Iraq is providing some assistance. 

The implication of this is that the central region of Iraq is relatively secure, and now the United States and Iraqi forces are focusing their efforts on the remaining presence of al Qaeda in the 

north. In my view, al Qaeda is already operationally defeated, and 

the final campaign against al Qaeda is underway as we speak. We 

will complete that defeat of al Qaeda in the months ahead in 2008. 

Make no mistake, this is genuine progress, and it has led to a 

significant conclusion. We cannot lose militarily in Iraq, as we were 

on the verge of doing in 2006. Al Qaeda and the remaining 

hardliner Sunni insurgents cannot mount an offensive that they 

could sustain which would threaten the regime. 

Are we finished? No. But, we and the Iraqis have the momentum, we are on the offense, and we can finally see that winning in 

Iraq is now a likely outcome. 

The remaining major security challenge in Iraq is in the south, 

where we must counter the significant Iranian influence. The Iranians have a comprehensive political, economic, diplomatic, and 

military strategy to accomplish two objectives: (1) to cause the 

United States to fail in Iraq and withdraw prematurely, and (2) to 

support a stable, but weak, Government of Iraq which is aligned 

with Iran as a result of their foothold and leverage in the south of 

Iraq. As such, the Iranians have been working their strategy since 

2003, and have made some progress these last 2 years because of 

our understandable preoccupation with al Qaeda, to rescue ourselves from the jaws of defeat in 2007, as well as the British pullback, which gave the Iranians and their militias a free hand. 

Admittedly, Maliki has taken a much needed first step to address 

this problem. As impulsive as he was, and while the planning and 

coordination was inadequate, this is the right course of action. We 

should not be quick to judge the success of a campaign by the first 

few days of action, when we know this is the beginning of a campaign which will last for months. My view is, the campaign in the 

south will not be as difficult as the fight against al Qaeda and the 

Sunni insurgents. Indeed, Maliki’s political position has been considerably enhanced, because all the major political parties are supporting Maliki against the Sadrists, who are now isolated. In fact, 

this weekend Maliki announced that you cannot participate in the 

upcoming elections if your political party has a militia. This has 

thrown the Sadrists into disarray. 

All that said, it is critical to succeed. It is in the United States 

national interests to defeat Iran in Iraq. To do so, we need a U.S. 

national and regional strategy. General Petraeus, Ambassador 

Crocker, and Mr. Maliki cannot do this by themselves. The strategy 

should have a political, diplomatic, economic, and military component. 

In Iraq, there is much potential as we squeeze the militias militarily and politically. As I said, I believe it’ll be much easier than 

the al Qaeda and the Sunni insurgents. We can do much to influence the sheikhs and the tribal leaders to turn around, as the 

Sunnis did in the central region. In fact, Sheikh Muhazem, a leader 

of the Tamimi tribe in the south, which is one of the largest tribes 

in Iraq, stretching from Basrah to Diyala, is, as we gather here, 

102

turning against the Iranian influence and taking on the Jaish alMahdi (JAM). Maliki is encouraging Muhazem, and is providing financial and military support. This is significant, because we have 

the potential to reduce the fighting much more rapidly, as happened in the central region with the Sunnis. 

In any event, the Iraqis and the U.S. forces will bring the south 

under security control prior to the provincial elections in the fall, 

in my view. 

The surge or counteroffensive was always intended to buy time 

so that the Iraqis could make political and economic progress. This 

is happening. While there is much to be done, the progress is definable. How can anyone conclude there is no political progress, when, 

number one, the Sunnis are reconciling with a Shiite-dominated 

government, they stopped the violence, and are providing 91,000 of 

their ‘‘sons’’ to assist us? This, after all, was the intent of the much 

discussed national legislative benchmarks. Number two, as to the 

benchmarks, we, the United States Government, browbeat the Government of Iraq into submitting to a legislative agenda. After we 

have achieved some basic security, the Government of Iraq has 

made impressive political progress, passing 12 of the 18 benchmarks and making progress on 5 others. Significantly, four of the 

six legislative benchmarks, to include de-Baathification, amnesty, 

semi-autonomous regions, and provincial powers, are passed. Why 

is it so difficult to acknowledge that both these points—Sunni reconciliation and major national legislation—represent significant political progress? 

Much of the discussion and debate surrounds how fast we should 

reduce our forces. The fact is, we are reducing our combat forces 

some 25 percent in 2008. I believe there will be further reductions 

in 2009. We should prepare ourselves that we may not reduce our 

forces further in 2008, because of the major operations in the north 

and south, and we do not want to squander the gains in central 

Iraq. 

Our leaders in Iraq want to reduce our forces, as we all do. But, 

they simply want it to be measured. Two realities drive them: the 

fact that in the past we overestimated Iraqi capabilities to take 

over, and the fact that we underestimated enemy capabilities. They 

do not want to make those mistakes again. Erring on the side of 

caution makes sense, particularly in view of our hard-earned success. 

It is a myth to suggest that by withdrawing rapidly, somehow 

that will force the Iraqis to make progress they would not make by 

our presence. Anyone who truly knows the situation in Iraq and 

the Iraqi leaders realizes it is the American presence that has 

aided the Iraqis to make the progress they have made and will continue to make. Our encouragement, tough-mindedness, and genuine assistance are major factors in that success. 

To leave and abandon them forces them into isolation, not reconciliation. It brings out their worst fears, driven by their paranoia 

about the past, that the Shiites are on their own and all their enemies are around them. What is needed is our continued, but not 

open-ended, presence to further our mutual objectives. 

One final point about our ground forces. I welcome the comments 

of Dr. Bacevich, that we need to expand them. They are not only 

103

magnificent, but are performing to a standard not seen in any previous conflict. They are not a broken force, or near broken. Their 

discipline, morale, competence, behavior, and courage is extraordinary, and it is so with the knowledge that many Americans do 

not support the war, but do support them. 

Are they stressed, and their loved ones as well, by the repeated 

deployments? Of course they are. This is a proud, resilient force 

that has no quit in it. They have a dogged determination to succeed. We are fighting two wars that are in our national interests, 

and I have known, since September 11, that our force, which I was 

a part of, was committed to protect the American people by staying 

on the offense against our enemies. They want to win, and they 

will. They do not want to be a party to choosing defeat or to be a 

part of an Army or Marine Corps that suffers a humiliating defeat. 

That stark reality will break the force. Fighting protracted wars 

in our history has always stressed our forces. Doing what we can 

to reduce the impact is critical. But, choosing victory is, hands 

down, the best answer. 

I said, earlier, we cannot lose militarily, and that should be clear; 

but we can lose politically because we lose our will here at home, 

we lose our determination to work through difficulty and uncertainty. I ask you to find the will and, yes, the courage our soldiers 

display routinely to persevere and to not give in to understandable 

frustration and to support the judgments of our gifted commander 

and ambassador. 

Thank you. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Keane follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN JOHN M. KEANE, USA (RET.) 

Mr. Chairman, ranking member and members of the committee. Thank you for 

permitting me to provide some thoughts today on our situation in Iraq. I just returned from Iraq at the end of March and visited three times during 2007 (February, May, and August). 

Let me say that the character of my visits is to spend considerable time with the 

Iraqi people, their Sheik and Tribal leaders, as well as, time with our U.S. & Iraqi 

military and civilian leaders and, our troops. 

It is not my purpose, today, to repeat the assessment provided by General 

Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker provided during their lengthy testimony yesterday. However, I would like to emphasize some points of my own assessment, albeit 

similar to theirs, and draw several conclusions and implications. 

First and foremost, we have the most talented and capable leadership team in 

Iraq represented by General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. Nothing in my 40-

plus years in national security compares to this extraordinary team who provide the 

very best of leadership to their marvelous teammates and troops. 

The security turnaround in Iraq, from the hell of 2006 and 3 years of failed strategy, is one of the most stunning achievements in the annals of counter-insurgency 

practice. It was achieved in a matter of months vs. the years it normally takes to 

turnaround one of the most formidable insurgencies the west has ever faced. Fundamental to that success was the use of proven counterinsurgency practice, to protect 

the people, with sufficient amount of Iraq and U.S. troops. This was a catalyst for 

the widespread Sunni awakening movement, which is truly under appreciated here 

in the U.S. What really happened is the Sheiks and Tribal leaders decided they 

could not achieve their political objectives with the al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), in fighting the U.S. and the Government of Iraq (GOI). As such, the overwhelming majority 

of Sunni leaders made four strategic decisions to: (1) stop the violence; (2) leverage 

the U.S. leaders to influence the GOI; (3) reconcile with the GOI; and (4) provide 

their ‘‘sons’’ to work with us and the Iraqis to help defeat the AQI and protect their 

own people. These results are the very best one could expect in fighting an insurgency; your opponent not only surrenders, but comes to your side, to assist. The entire Arab Muslim world are aware of the Sunni rejection of AQI, the first major ocVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:23 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00107 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\45666.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
104

currence, ever, where the people have rejected the AQI and their barbaric hold on 

the them. Additionally, in a recent poll over 90 percent of Sunnis are expected to 

participate in the political process in the 2008 provisional election and in the general election in 2009. What does that tell us about reconciliation? Clearly the Sunnis 

are politically reconciling with the GOI and the GOI is assisting. 

The implication of this is that the central region of Iraq is relatively secure and 

now the U.S. and Iraqi forces are focusing their efforts on the remaining presence 

of AQI in the north. In my view, the AQI are already operationally defeated and 

the final campaign against AQI, is underway as we speak. We will complete the defeat of AQI in the months ahead in 2008. 

Make no mistake this is genuine progress and has led to a significant conclusion. 

We cannot lose militarily in Iraq, as we were on the verge of doing in 2006. The 

AQI and remaining hardliner Sunni insurgents cannot mount an offensive, that 

they could sustain, which would threaten the regime. Are we finished, no, but we 

and the Iraqis have the momentum, we are on the offense and we can finally see 

that winning in Iraq is, now, a likely outcome. 

The remaining major security challenge in Iraq is in the south where we must 

counter the significant Iranian influence. The Iranians have a comprehensive political, economic, diplomatic and military strategy to accomplish two objectives: (1) to 

cause the U.S. to fail in Iraq and withdraw prematurely; and (2) to support a stable 

but weak GOI, which is aligned with Iran as a result of their foothold and leverage 

in the south of Iraq. As such, the Iranians have been working their strategy since 

2003 and have made some real progress these last 2 years because of our understandable preoccupation with AQI, to rescue ourselves from the jaws of defeat in 

2007, as well as the British pull-back, which gave the Iranians and their militias 

a free hand. 

Admittedly, Maliki, has taken a much needed first step to address this problem. 

As impulsive as he was and while the planning and coordination was inadequate 

this is the right course of action. We should not be quick to judge the success of 

a campaign by the first few days of action when we know this is the beginning of 

a campaign which will last for months. My view is, the campaign in the south will 

not be as difficult as the fight against AQI and the Sunni insurgents. Indeed 

Maliki’s political position has been considerably enhanced because all the major political parties are supporting Mailiki against the Sadirists, who are now isolated. In 

fact, this weekend Maliki announced that you cannot participate in the upcoming 

elections if your political party has a militia. This had thrown the Sadirists into disarray. 

All that said, it is critical to succeed. It is in the U.S. national interests to defeat 

Iran in Iraq. To do so, we need a U.S. national and regional strategy to defeat Iran 

in Iraq. General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker and Mr. Maliki cannot do this by 

themselves. This strategy should have a political, diplomatic, economic and military 

component. In Iraq there is much potential as we squeeze the militias militarily and 

politically, they will fold much easier than AQI and Sunni insurgents. We can do 

much to influence the Sheiks and Tribal leaders to turnaround as the Sunnis did 

in the central region. In fact Sheik Muhazem a leader of the Tamimi tribe in the 

south, which is one of the largest tribes in Iraq, stretching from Basra to Dyala, 

is as we gather here, turning against the Iranian influence and the JAM. Maliki 

is encouraging Muhazem and is providing financial and military support. This is 

significant, because we have the potential to reduce the fighting much more rapidly, 

as happened in the central region with the Sunnis. In any event, the Iraqis and U.S. 

forces will bring the south under security control, prior to election in the fall. 

The surge or counter-offensive was always intended to buy time so that the Iraqis 

could make political and economic progress. This is happening and while there is 

much to be done, the progress is definable. How can anyone conclude there is no 

political progress when: (1) the Sunnis are reconciling with a Shia dominated government, stopped the violence, and are providing 91,000 of their sons to assist us. 

This after all was the intent of the much discussed national legislative benchmarks. 

(2) As to the benchmarks, we the U.S. Government, ‘‘brow-beated’’ the GOI into submitting to a legislative agenda. After we achieved some basic security, the GOI has 

made impressive political progress—passing 12 of 18 benchmarks and making 

progress on 5 others. Significantly, four out of six legislative benchmarks including, 

debathification, amnesty, semi-autonomous regions and provincial powers are 

passed. Why is it so difficult to acknowledge that both these points, Sunni reconciliation and major national legislation, represent significant political progress? 

Much of the discussion and debate surrounds how fast we should reduce our 

forces. The fact is we are reducing our combat forces some 25 percent in 2008. The 

fact is there will be further reduction for sure in 2009. We should prepare ourselves 

that we may not reduce our forces further in 2008 because of the major operations 

105

in the north and south while not squandering the gains in central Iraq. Our leaders 

in Iraq want to reduce our forces, as we all do, but they simply want it to be measured. Two realities drive them, the fact that in the past we overestimated Iraqi capabilities to take over and the fact that we under estimated enemy capabilities. 

They do not want to make those mistakes again. Erring on the side of caution 

makes sense, particularly, in view of our hard-earned success. It is a myth to suggest by withdrawing rapidly, somehow, that will force the Iraqis to make progress 

they would not make by our presence. Anyone who truly knows the situation in Iraq 

and the Iraqi leaders, realizes that it is the American presence that has aided the 

Iraqis to make the progress they have made and will continue to make. Our encouragement, tough-mindedness and genuine assistance are major factors in that success. To leave and abandon them, forces them into isolation, not reconciliation. It 

brings out their worst fears, driven by their paranoia about the past, that the 

Shia’s, are on their own and their enemies are all around. What is needed is our 

continued, but not open-ended, presence to further our mutual objectives. 

One final point, about our ground forces; not only are they magnificent but are 

performing to a standard not seen in any previous conflict. They are not a broken 

force or near broken. Their discipline, morale, competence, behavior and courage is 

extraordinary and it is so with the knowledge that many of the American people 

do not support the war, but do support them. Are they stressed and their loved ones 

as well, by the repeated deployments, of course they are. But this is a proud, resilient force, that has no quit in it, they have a dogged determination to succeed. We 

are fighting two wars that are in our national interest and I have known since September 11, our force, which I was a part of it, was committed to protect the American people by staying on the offense against our enemies. They want to win, and 

they will, they do not want to be a party to choosing defeat, or to be a part of an 

Army or Marine Corps that suffers a humiliating defeat. That stark reality will 

break the force. Fighting protracted wars in our history has always stressed our 

forces. Doing what we can do to reduce the impact is critical but choosing victory 

is hands-down the best answer. 

I said earlier we cannot lose militarily and that should be clear, but we can lose 

politically because we lose our will, here at home, lose our determination to work 

through difficulty and uncertainty. I ask you to find the will, and yes the courage, 

our soldiers display routinely, to persevere, to not give in to your understandable 

frustration and to support the judgments of our gifted commander and ambassador. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General Keane. 

Dr. Malley? 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT MALLEY, MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH 

AFRICA PROGRAM DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS 

GROUP 

Dr. MALLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of 

the committee. 

This hearing comes at yet another important time in our debate 

over the future of our strategy in Iraq. Some argue that the surge 

has been a success, and therefore, we should perpetuate our stay. 

Others argue that it has been a failure, and therefore, we need to 

leave promptly. 

In my view, it’s the wrong question, addressed in the wrong way, 

and it inevitably will lead to wrong answers. The question of troop 

level and the pace of our withdrawal should be the dependent variable, not the independent variable. 

The real question is how and to what extent our troop presence 

is serving coherent, articulable, policy objectives. 

I was a surge skeptic. I admit, and I am happy to admit, that 

the surge has exceeded, by far, my expectations, in terms of what 

it could achieve. Part of it is because of the planning that was 

done, partly for reasons that were serendipitous, and partly coincidental. But, at the core I believe it reflects a conceptual revolution 

at the heart of the military. Our military commanders in Iraq disVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:23 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00109 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\45666.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
106

played, for the first time, real and sophisticated understanding of 

the dynamics in Iraq, which gave them the ability to carry out new 

policies and take advantage of new dynamics. As a result, as General Keane just described, the violence is down, areas have been 

pacified, and the sectarian war that was unfolding in 2005–2006 

has virtually come to a halt. The end result is that the prospect of 

a single, devastating civil war has been replaced by the reality of 

smaller, more manageable ones. 

But, if I’m no longer a surge skeptic, I remain very much a skeptic of the policy it’s purported to serve. 

Yesterday, we heard testimony from General Petraeus and my 

friend Ambassador Crocker, and the key questions that they were 

asked were: What’s the objective of our policy? To what end are we 

pursuing our military enterprise? Until when? I was left—and I 

don’t think I’m alone—profoundly frustrated and dissatisfied by the 

answers we got. 

Therefore, my sense today is that, after 4 years, where the U.S. 

administration pursued a lofty strategy about building a democratic Iraq and transforming the region, but obviously had no realistic tactics to achieve that goal, today, for the first time, we have 

smart, intelligent, subtle tactics, only to find ourselves bereft of a 

strategy that they’re supposed to serve. 

The starting point, for me, needs to be two fundamental realities, 

and from there we need to devise a clear policy. 

Reality number one is that a U.S. withdrawal at this time under 

these conditions—a failed state, a fragmented polity, with interference from foreign countries, with the fragility of Iraq and the 

rise of jihadism—would be a huge setback to U.S. interests, and I 

think we cannot deny that fact. It would leave Iraq as a failing 

state. It would probably lead to escalating internecine and sometimes perhaps horrific violence. It would lead to regional involvement in Iraq at a time of great tension in the Middle East. Ultimately, it would weaken our posture in the Middle East. That’s reality number one. 

But, there is reality number two, which is that our continued 

presence every day that we remain in Iraq also comes with a very 

heavy price tag. There’s a human toll I don’t need to evoke any further. There is the drain on our resources. Our military is overstretched. Our readiness is being undercut. Our room to maneuver 

in other critical issues, such as dealing with Iran, is automatically 

limited when we are so taken by the combat in Iraq, and our standing, our prestige, and our credibility throughout the region is being 

eroded. 

Both realities are true, and we have to take both of them into 

account. That leads me to say that our policy objective should be 

to create a local environment in Iraq and a regional environment 

in the region that would minimize the damage to our interests, to 

the Iraqis’ well-being, and to the regional environment, as a whole, 

of the inevitable departure of our troops. That’s the task that U.S. 

policymakers should be pursuing. How do we minimize the damage 

to ourselves, to the Iraqis, and to the region of a departure that’s 

going to have to take place probably sooner rather than later? 

If that’s the objective, two things, in my view, need to be at the 

core of U.S. policy. 

107

First, we need to press the Iraqi Government, our Iraqi allies, to 

take the steps they have not taken up until now. They’re the ones 

who could change the Iraqi local environment, not us. 

Second of all, we need to devise a more coherent regional strategy in order to lessen the tensions and make sure that when we 

leave Iraq, Iraq doesn’t become a magnet for foreign interference 

and doesn’t become a source of further instability throughout the 

region. 

Is the U.S. policy currently pursuing either one of those objectives? I see no evidence that it is. For me, two facts, two startling 

facts, put this in stark relief. 

The first fact is that our best Iraqi allies in the surge, those who 

have allowed the progress that’s been made, have not been the people we brought to power, the people we’ve provided with military 

and financial resources, the people who we protect. The people who 

have been our best allies are the former insurgents, our former enemies. In fact, the ones who we brought to power, protect, and promote are obstacles and are threatening the success of the surge, because they are dithering in putting in place the kind of policies 

that the surge was supposed to lead to. 

So, what our U.S. troops have been able to achieve through their 

military actions, the Iraqi Government is threatening to undo because of its political dithering. That’s a stunning indictment, to 

think that those who have helped us are those who we used to be 

fighting, and those who are standing in the way are those who 

could not survive, who could not be in power without our support. 

So, we have done our part with the surge. Our allies have not. 

Our allies are threatening, every day by their actions, the sustainability of the surge. By not bringing together a political compact, 

they risk alienating the Sons of Iraq, the Awakening Councils, and 

the concerned local citizens who may see, in the end, that they 

don’t have a possible partner in this government. If they don’t create neutral, nonpartisan state institutions, then you’ll find the 

tribes will simply become another force in a multilayered conflict. 

If they take action, as they did in Basrah—and I’ll come back to 

that later—they risk undoing the benefits of Muqtada al Sadr’s 

unilateral cease-fire. Time and again, we’re seeing, through their 

actions, that they are threatening the gains that we achieved. 

Now, the second fact that I think brings into stark relief the 

problems that our policy faces is that our allies in Iraq, those same 

allies I just was describing, are also the allies of our arch enemy, 

Iran. Iran, who we claim is trying to destabilize Iraq, and Iran who 

we claim is our number-one enemy in the region. So, we’re fighting 

Iran while our Iraqi partners are partnering with Tehran. We’re 

siding in this Iraqi intra-civil war with Iran’s allies. 

These two fundamental contradictions, inconsistencies, and the 

incoherence at the heart of our policy tells me, as starkly as it 

could, that we do not have a coherent policy, that our troops are 

performing admirably, but not in pursuit of a policy that anyone 

could articulate. Therefore, what it means is that they are being 

forced to carry a disproportionate burden—in many ways, the exclusive burden—in pursuit of unreachable goals, inconsistent objectives, and an inordinate and rising cost. 

108

There is an alternative policy, I believe, and it has to be articulated around three fundamental pillars. The first is to put more 

pressure on Maliki’s Government, real pressure. The second is to 

engage in real regional diplomacy, including and especially with 

Iran and Syria. The third is to transition towards a longer-term 

nonmilitary commitment investing in Iraq’s resources. 

As to the first, as I said, the key is to put pressure on our allies 

to do what they have been asked to do, time and again, and have 

not done. Despite all the benchmarks that we could recite, they 

have not created a national compact, they have not reached out in 

the way they need to, they have not created a nonsectarian, impartial state. They’re not even on the way towards doing it. 

To be credible, if we do want to put pressure on this government, 

we, the United States, have to be comfortable with the prospect of 

withdrawing from Iraq, even under less than auspicious circumstances. Unless and until we are convinced that we are prepared to take that step, there’s no reason for the Maliki Government to believe it, and there’s no reason for Maliki and his people 

to take any risk. Why should they? For what reason should they 

alienate their own constituency, threaten their fragile coalition, 

when they know that we’re there to stay, they know that we won’t 

ask them any questions, they know there’s no consequences for 

their inaction, and they know we will continue to back them up. 

This is not a matter of benchmarks or artificial deadlines. That’s 

not what I’m saying. I’m saying that we have to be blunt with the 

Maliki Government, that if they don’t do what we’ve asked them 

to do for several years, we cannot stay. It’s not necessarily our first 

choice, but it will be the inevitable one. We can’t tie our success 

to Maliki’s survival. We can’t be hostage to what he does or doesn’t 

do. Given the gap between what U.S. troops can do and what needs 

to be done in Iraq, in fact, paradoxically the greatest leverage our 

troops have is the threat that they might withdraw and take away 

the support that they’re giving to the Government of Maliki. There 

are other ways in which we need to turn from unconditional support to conditional support. We should stop all assistance to units 

of their army, to Iraqi commanders in the field who we know to be 

partisan, sectarian, and pursuing partisan and sectarian agendas. 

We should condition our assistance to any equip-and-train mission 

to proper vetting of the security forces. 

The second pillar is regional diplomacy. We can’t try both to stabilize Iraq and destabilize Iran. Those two policies are at war with 

one another. We have to choose. If we want to stabilize Iraq, we’re 

going to have to come to terms with Iran’s role in Iraq, which is 

deep and which will become even deeper. They have cultural, historical, military, and religious tools that we simply lack. They are 

there, and they’ll be there for a very long time. So, if our priority 

is Iraq, we need to enter into tough bargaining with Iran. Iraq will 

be one of the issues on the table, but not the only one. 

The third, as I said, and there’s more in my testimony, is a longterm commitment to Iraq’s depleted human resources. 

What happened in Basrah, for me, is a microcosm of everything 

that’s gone astray, everything that went astray. It was initiated by 

the Iraqi Government without our agreement, and it was ended by 

the Iranian regime without our involvement. It was an episode of 

109

an intra-Shiite civil war in which we were dragged in as if we had 

no influence, no leverage, and no say. To me at least, it was dumbfounding. 

So, to conclude, the question is: Is our mission on the path to 

minimizing the cost to our strategic interests, to the Iraqi people’s 

well-being, and to regional stability of a withdrawal that, sooner or 

later, must occur, or are we simply postponing the most likely scenario: Iraq’s collapse into a failed state, protracted violence, and 

foreign meddling? We should be clear, either there’s a national 

compact and reconciliation and steps toward a nonsectarian, nonpartisan state and state institutions, in which case we will negotiate the terms of our departure and the pace of our departure, or 

those steps are not taken and we have no business continuing with 

this war. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Malley follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. ROBERT MALLEY

Mr. Chairman: Let me begin by expressing my deep appreciation for the invitation to testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee. This hearing comes at 

an important time, when some argue that the surge’s success dictates continuation 

of the U.S. military presence while others claim the surge’s underlying failure commands a relatively prompt military withdrawal. 

The issue and the stakes involved merit a different deliberation. I long have believed that the matter of troop levels, which absorbed so much of the debate 1 year 

ago and maintains its centrality today, is a misleading question that has spawned 

misguided answers. On its own, and in the absence of significant policy changes, the 

addition of troops can have an impact, perhaps even an important one. But, by its 

very nature, that impact inevitably will be temporary, reversible and inadequate. 

The surge is a case in point. Its achievements—some planned, some serendipitous, 

others purely coincidental—should not to be belittled. The military campaign calmed 

areas that had proved particularly violent and inaccessible, such as Anbar and several Baghdad neighborhoods and essentially halted sectarian warfare. Sunni leaders, both tribal elements and former insurgent commanders, turned against al 

Qaeda in Iraq and reached deals with U.S. forces. Until recently at least, the 

Sadrist movement abided by a unilateral ceasefire and avoided confronting coalition 

troops. All in all, U.S. commanders in the field displayed a degree of sophistication 

and knowledge of local dynamics without precedent during the long course of this 

war. The end result can be summed up as follows: the prospect of a single, devastating civil war has given way to the reality of a series of smaller, more manageable ones. 

But the question is: then what? What higher purpose will these successes serve? 

Are they putting the United States on a path that will allow it to minimize the costs 

to our strategic interests, the Iraqi people’s well-being and regional stability of a 

withdrawal that, sooner or later, must occur? Or are they simply postponing what 

still remains the most likely scenario: Iraq’s collapse into a failed and fragmented 

state, protracted and multi-layered violence, as well as increased foreign meddling 

that risks metastasizing into a broader proxy war? 

As late as yesterday, we still have not received convincing answers to these fundamental questions. For the first 4 years of this war, the administration pursued a 

lofty strategy—the spread of democracy throughout the Middle East; Iraq as a regional model—detached from any realistic tactics. The risk today is that, having finally adopted a set of smart, pragmatic tactics, it finds itself devoid of any overarching strategy. 

The tactical successes associated with the surge offer a fragile but genuine opportunity to reassess our overall approach and put the emphasis where it needs to be: 

steps by the U.S. administration to credibly pressure the Iraqi Government and 

alter the regional climate. This entails ceasing to provide the Iraqi Government with 

unconditional military support; using our leverage and the threat of withdrawal to 

encourage progress toward a broad national compact and a non-sectarian, impartial 

state; designing a long-term program of cooperation to replenish Iraq’s depleted 

human resources; and, importantly, engaging in real diplomacy with all of its neighbors, Iran and Syria included. 

110

If, however, this administration or its successor is not prepared to undertake such 

a paradigm shift, then our Nation has no business sending its men and women in 

harm’s way. It has no business squandering its resources on a multilayered civil 

war. It will be time to bring this tragic policy to a close through the orderly withdrawal of American troops. 

Mr. Chairman, at the outset it is important to recognize what has occurred since 

the surge was announced and which exceeded many observers’ expectations, mine 

and my colleagues included. My assessment is based on the longstanding fieldwork 

performed by the International Crisis Group’s staff and consultants who have been 

in Iraq repeatedly, inside and outside the Green Zone, in contact with officials, militiamen, insurgents and ordinary citizens, almost without interruption since the war 

began. 

The surge in some cases benefited from, in others encouraged and in the remainder produced a series of politico-military shifts affecting the Sunni and Shiite communities. One of the more remarkable changes has been the realignment of tribal 

elements in Anbar, known as the Awakening Councils or sahwat, and former insurgents, now referred to as Sons of Iraq. This was largely due to increased friction 

over al Qaeda in Iraq’s brutal tactics, proclamation of an Islamic State and escalating assaults on ordinary Iraqis labeled traitors or apostates (including policemen, 

civilians, and mere cigarette smokers). Opting to break with al Qaeda, they chose 

to cooperate with the U.S. 

In both cases, tribal and insurgent decisions were aided by enhanced military 

pressure on al Qaeda resulting from augmented U.S. troops and in both instances 

U.S. forces displayed far greater subtlety and sophistication than at any prior point. 

All parties benefited. U.S. forces gained access to the tribes’ and former insurgents’ 

in-depth knowledge of local topography and human environment; conversely, groups 

collaborating with the coalition typically ended up with greater control over relevant 

areas. As a result of cooperation between the Awakening Councils, the Sons of Iraq 

and U.S. forces, large areas of Anbar were pacified and Baghdad neighborhoods regained a measure of stability. 

Among Shiites, the most significant evolution was Muqtada al-Sadr’s August 2007 

unilateral ceasefire. The decision was made under heavy U.S. and Iraqi pressure 

and as a result of growing discontent from Muqtada’s own Shiite base. The Sadrists 

were victims of their own success. Throughout 2006 and early 2007, the movement 

was on a steady rise, controlling new territory, attracting new recruits, accumulating vast resources and infiltrating the police. But there was a flip side. The vastly 

increased wealth, membership and range of action led to greater corruption, weaker 

internal cohesion and a popular backlash. Divisions within the movement deepened, 

splinter groups—often little more than criminal offshoots—proliferated. As a result, 

anti-Sadrist sentiment grew, including among Muqtada’s constituency. 

The U.S. surge worsened the Sadrists’ situation, checking and, in some instances, 

reversing the Mahdi Army’s territorial expansion. The August 2007 clashes in 

Karbala between members of Muqtada’s movement and the rival Shiite Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) further eroded the Sadrists’ standing. In reaction, 

Muqtada announced a 6-month freeze on all Mahdi army activities which he subsequently prolonged in February 2008. The decision reflects a pragmatic calculation 

that a halt in hostilities would help Muqtada restore his credibility, give him time 

to reorganize his forces and wait out the U.S. presence. Sunni and Shiite ceasefires 

were mutually reinforcing, as the need to defend one’s community from sectarian 

attacks receded. Sectarian warfare largely came to an end. 

Other factors account for the reduction in violence. These include a welcome shift 

in U.S. military posture toward population protection, shifting forces from large 

bases to the frontlines of the unfolding civil war, establishing neighborhood patrols 

and in particular filling the security vacuum in Baghdad. They also include the less 

welcome fact that, by the time the surge was in place, sectarian-based armed groups 

had divided up the capital into separate fiefdoms in which they held their increasingly homogenized population hostage. All in all, however, the surge benefited from 

a conceptual revolution within the U.S. military leadership, which gave U.S. forces 

the ability to both carry out new policies and take advantage of new dynamics. Had 

it remained mired in past conceptions, propitious evolutions on the ground notwithstanding, we would today be facing a very different and bleaker situation. 

On their own, absent an overarching strategy for Iraq and the region, these tactical victories cannot turn into genuine successes. Yet, as far as one can tell, the 

tasks being performed by U.S. troops are disconnected from a realistic, articulated 

political strategy vis-a ́-vis Iraq or the region. What objectives are U.S. troops trying 

to accomplish? What is an acceptable endstate? What needs to be done and by 

whom? None of these questions has an answer, and they expose the limits of the 

surge’s tactical success. 

111

Without genuine efforts by the Maliki Government to reach a new political compact, the surge’s achievements are insufficient. By President Bush’s own standards, 

the military surge was useful only to the extent it led the Iraqi Government to forge 

a national consensus, recalibrate power relations and provide Sunnis in particular 

with a sense their future is secure. Observers may legitimately differ over how 

many of the administration’s eighteen benchmarks have been met. None could reasonably dispute that the government’s performance has been utterly lacking. The 

government’s inadequate capacity cannot conceal its absence of will: True to its sectarian nature, and loath to renounce its exclusive hold on power, the Maliki Government has actively resisted moving toward compromise. Why not? It has no logical 

reason to alienate its core constituency and jeopardize its fragile political makeup 

when inaction has no consequence and the U.S. will always back it up. 

A small number of agreements have been reached and are regularly trumpeted 

by the administration. But they have made virtually no difference. In the absence 

of a basic political consensus over the nature of the state and distribution of power 

and resources, passage of legislation is only the first, and often the least meaningful 

step. Most of these laws are ambiguous enough to ensure that implementation will 

be postponed or the battle over substance converted to a struggle over interpretation. In the absence of legitimate, representative and effective state and local institutions, implementation by definition will be partisan and politicized. To date, such 

has been the fate of, inter alia, the constitutional review, the Justice and Accountability Law, and the Provincial Powers Law—each one giving rise to controversy, 

some having done more harm than good, and none being meaningfully carried out. 

What matters is not chiefly whether a law is passed in the Green Zone. It is how 

the law is carried out in the Red Zone. 

Without establishment of a more inclusive, less partisan and sectarian Iraqi political and security structure, the surge’s achievements are reversible. Among Sadrist 

rank and file, impatience with the ceasefire already is high and growing. They 

equate it with loss of power and resources, believe the U.S. and ISCI are conspiring 

to weaken the movement and eagerly await Muqtada’s permission to resume the 

fight. The Sadrist leadership has resisted the pressure, but in light of recent events 

in Basra and Sadr City, this may not last. The answer is not military. The Sadrists 

are as much a social as they are a political or military phenomenon. They enjoy 

wide and deep support, particularly among young Shiites. Excessive pressure, particularly without political accommodation by current power-holders, is likely to trigger both fierce Sadrist resistance in Baghdad and an escalating intra-Shiite civil 

war in the south. Again, those trends have been much in evidence over recent 

weeks. 

Among Sunnis, mood and calculations also could readily alter. The turn against 

al Qaeda is not necessarily the end of the story. While some tribal chiefs, left in 

the cold after Saddam’s fall, found in the coalition a new patron eager to provide 

resources, this hardly equates with a genuine, durable trend toward Sunni Arab acceptance of and participation in the political process. For them, as for the Sons of 

Iraq in general, it is chiefly a tactical alliance—forged to confront an immediate 

enemy (al Qaeda) or the central one (Iran). Any accommodation has been with us, 

not between them and the government. It risks coming to an end if the ruling parties do not agree to greater power sharing and if Sunnis become convinced the U.S. 

is not prepared to side with them against Iran or its perceived proxies; at that point, 

confronting the greater foe (Shiite militias or the Shiite-dominated government) 

once again will take precedence. 

Even al Qaeda in Iraq cannot be decisively defeated through U.S. military means 

alone. While the organization has been significantly weakened and its operational 

capacity severely degraded, its deep pockets, fluid structure, and ideological appeal 

to many young Iraqis mean it will not be irrevocably vanquished. The only genuine 

and sustainable solution is a state that extends its intelligence and coercive apparatus throughout the territory, while offering credible alternatives and socio-economic opportunities to younger generations. 

Without steps to build a more effective, legitimate central state, the surge’s 

achievements could portend a serious strategic setback. The U.S. is bolstering a set 

of actors operating at the local level, beyond the realm of the state or the rule of 

law and imposing their authority by sheer force of arms. The tribal awakening in 

particular has generated new fault lines in an already divided society as well as new 

potential sources of violence in an already multilayered conflict. Some tribes have 

benefited heavily from U.S. assistance, others less so. This redistribution of power 

almost certainly will engender instability and rivalry between competing tribes, 

which in turn could give rise to intense feuds—an outcome on which some insurgent 

groups are counting. None of this constitutes steps toward consolidation of the central government or institutions; all could very easily amount to little more than U.S. 

112

boosting specific actors in an increasingly fragmented civil war. In sum, short-term 

tactical achievements could pose a threat to Iraq’s long-term stability. 

Without cooperation from regional actors, the surge’s achievements are vulnerable. Iraq’s neighbors were not at the origin of, or even played a major part in, 

Iraq’s catastrophe. But the situation is such that sustainable stability is impossible 

without their consent. If dissatisfied, the sahwat or Sons of Iraq could seek help 

from neighboring Arab states seeking to promote their influence, counter Iran, or 

pursue a sectarian, Sunni agenda. Iran has the greatest ability to sabotage any U.S. 

initiative and its help is required to pressure insurgents and militias to pursue a 

political path. U.S. troops can seek to contain this influence, but they are pushing 

against the tide. Tehran’s role is there to stay and, over time, deepen, exercised 

through myriad channels—military, but also religious, cultural, economic and humanitarian. Tehran enjoys strong ties to actors across the political system, both 

within and outside the government. If the goal is to reduce Iran’s destabilizing efforts and reach some accommodation over Iraq’s future, this can only be done 

through U.S. diplomatic engagement with Tehran and negotiations over all issues. 

The bottom line is that it cannot be up to U.S. troops to achieve prerequisite of 

success: a legitimate, functioning government; credible, effective institutions; a less 

hostile regional environment. Those goals, if they can be accomplished at all, only 

can be done by Iraqis and by hard-headed U.S. diplomacy. This is not a military 

challenge in which one side needs to be strengthened and another defeated. It is 

a political one in which new local and regional understandings need to be reached. 

That is not occurring. Instead, far from being a partner in an effort to achieve a 

new compact or stem violence, our allies in the government are one side in a dirty 

war over territory, power, and resources. Likewise, far from engaging Tehran, the 

administration has objected to genuine, broadbased negotiations, placing it in the 

awkward position of relying on Iranian allies in Baghdad while at the same time 

developing a tough anti-Iranian strategy for the region. 

Mr. Chairman, three critical observations derive from this analysis. 

First, the United States’s best allies during the surge have not been the parties 

we brought to power, protected and supported. They have instead been former leaders of the insurgency and armed groups who, for their own reasons, chose to side 

with us. That in itself represents a stunning indictment of U.S. policy to date. It 

means we have been unable to pressure those over whom we possess the greatest 

leverage. 

Second, the reason the U.S. lacks this leverage is that it has not convinced itself—

and perforce its Iraqi allies—that it eventually might have to withdraw even in the 

absence of strategic success. This does not mean the U.S. should announce its departure now or espouse a timetable or rigid benchmarks. It means, however, that 

the administration should be prepared to live with the consequences of withdrawal 

if the Iraqi political class fails to make rapid, substantive progress toward political 

accommodation and establishment of non-partisan, non-sectarian state institutions. 

It means the U.S. must be prepared to bluntly convey that sentiment to its Iraqi 

interlocutors. For as long as the U.S. ties its fate to that of its Iraqi allies, it will 

remain hostage to their ineptitude or ill-will. Given the mismatch between what 

U.S. forces can do and what needs to be done, their greatest utility paradoxically 

may lie in the credible threat of withdrawal. 

Third, the United States’s allies in Iraq are also allies of Iran which is our and, 

we claim, also one of Iraq’s greatest foes. Ironically, we have been siding with Iran’s 

partners in the intra-Shiite civil war . That points to yet another fundamental contradiction at the core of our policy: the U.S. cannot simultaneously pursue the competing and self-defeating goals of stabilising Iraq and destabilising Iran. It must 

choose. 

Prolonging the military mission makes sense only if part of a strategy that is coherent, sets achievable goals, puts the onus on the Iraqi Government and its allies 

to take long-overdue steps, and accepts the need for a U.S. regional approach, including engagement with Iran and Syria and redefinition of our objectives in the 

Middle East. Absent such overarching policy objectives, U.S. troops are being asked 

to carry a disproportionate burden to attain unreachable and inconsistent objectives 

at inordinate and rising cost. 

The recent Basra operation is a microcosm of all that is astray in the current approach. The battle was initiated by the Iraqi Government without our agreement 

and halted by the Iranian regime without our involvement. Maliki informed coalition officials only a few days prior that he intended to target militias in the south. 

His protestation to the contrary notwithstanding, the operation was neither broadly 

aimed at all militias nor narrowly focused on so-called special groups. Militants 

linked to the Fadhila party were untouched, despite years of violently flouting the 

law. Nothing was done to the Badr organisation, ISCI’s militia which, according to 

113

some reports, may even have fought alongside government forces. Without question, 

the target was the Sadrists and ISCI’s as well as Maliki’s purpose was to cut them 

down to size in advance of provincial elections scheduled for October. As the Iraqi 

Government seeks to replicate the tribal model to the south, and encourage tribes 

to take on the Mahdi Army, potential sources of internecine violence will multiply. 

The struggle was another episode in the ongoing intra-Shiite civil war, a harbinger 

of what awaits much of the country if current trends continue. 

For the U.S., the downsides were legion. The affair reversed timid U.S. efforts to 

reach out to the Sadrists. It threatened their tenuous ceasefire and led to lethal 

rocket attacks on coalition personnel in the Green Zone. It wholly contradicted the 

notion of an impartial, non-politicised state. It called into question the tentative security and stability Baghdad and other parts of the country. It ended up boosting 

the Sadrists—who showed the strength of their organisation; Muqtada—whose stature grew among his followers; and Iran—which mediated the truce. Meanwhile, 

Iraqi forces performed poorly, unable to dislodge the Sadrists from their southern 

strongholds and victims of a high number of defections. 

Yet, throughout the U.S. appeared at best passive, more often complicit. It allowed its airpower and Special Forces to be dragged into an intra-Shiite power 

struggle at the worst possible time, with the least possible coordination and resulting in the worst possible outcome. Despite Iraqi reliance on U.S. political and military support, the administration acted as if it had no leverage, no influence and no 

say. The episode was nothing short of dumbfounding. 

Mr. Chairman, in seeking to define concrete, achievable goals for our troops, I believe we must begin with acknowledgment of two basic realities. 

First, a U.S. withdrawal under existing conditions—an Iraq dominated by armed 

militias, sectarian forces and a predatory political class; the collapse of the state apparatus, the lack of any political accommodation; the rise of jihadism; an extraordinary refugee crisis; and a regional context more polarized and tense than ever before—would constitute a stark and perilous setback. It would leave Iraq as a failing 

state, set the stage for escalating and perhaps horrific violence and invite regional 

involvement and radicalism that will further damage our posture in the Middle 

East. 

But, second, that a continued U.S. military presence carries a heavy price tag as 

well. With each passing day, the human toll mounts. Precious resources are expended. Our military is overstretched and our readiness undercut. U.S. margin of 

maneuver on other critical national security issues is further limited. Our influence 

and credibility in the region and throughout the world continue to erode. 

The objective it follows should be to create a local and regional environment that 

minimize the damage flowing from the departure of our troops that, sooner rather 

than later, must occur, A strategy that seeks to capitalise on the surge’s achievements to promote that goal would rest on the following three pillars:

1. A new forceful approach that puts real pressure and exercises real leverage on all Iraqi parties, government included. The ultimate goal would 

be overhaul of the sectarian political system and establishment of a more 

equitable and inclusive compact, agreed upon by all relevant actors—e.g., 

government, militias, and insurgent groups—on issues such as federalism, 

resource allocation, internal boundaries, de-Baathification, the scope of the 

amnesty, the makeup of security forces, and the timetable for a U.S. withdrawal. 

Pressing the Iraqi Government and its allies is key. As noted, the U.S. 

must move away from unconditional support and use the credible threat of 

military withdrawal if the government does not compromise, fairly implement new legislation or take steps toward impartial state institutions. Our 

position should be clear: continued U.S. presence depends on whether there 

is movement in this direction. If the compact is not reached or implemented, the U.S. would significantly accelerate the withdrawal of forces 

that then will have lost their main purpose. Conversely, if and when a compact is reached, a responsible schedule and modalities of coalition withdrawal should be negotiated and agreed upon. 

There are practical, short-term consequences as well. The U.S. should 

only support Iraqi military operations consistent with its own goals and 

strategy; base training and assistance on the professionalism and non-partisan behaviour of its Iraqi recipients; and shun sectarian ministers or 

army units and their commanders. Likewise, the U.S. should condition its 

help to expand and equip the security apparatus on a strict vetting process 

and retraining program. 

2. A new multilateral strategy that focuses on the region and includes engagement with Iran and Syria. The ultimate goal would be to diminish tenVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:23 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00117 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\45666.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
114

sions and polarisation while agreeing on rules of the game for outside powers to ensure that a U.S. withdrawal trigger neither a regional scramble for 

power in Iraq nor a local scramble for patrons by Iraqis—either of which 

would cause greater instability and loss of American influence. In principle, 

neighbouring countries and other regional powers share an interest in containing the conflict and avoiding its ripple effects. But, divided by opposing 

agendas, mistrust and lack of communication, they so far have been unable 

to coordinate their policies to that effect. Most damaging, given Iran’s enormous sway in Iraq, has been competition between the U.S. and Iran and 

the conviction in Tehran that Washington is seeking to build a hostile regional order. Broad reassessment of U.S. regional policy will be required, 

as will wide-ranging negotiations with Iran, whose influence will not be 

checked militarily but mainly through tough bargaining. 

There are other regional dimensions. The explosive question of the 

Kurdistan region’s boundary with the rest of Iraq obliges the U.S. to define 

a clear and coherent relationship with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally, Turkey, and its Kurdish friends. It cannot address the question 

of al Qaeda in particular and jihadi salafism more generally without looking at its sources in Arab Gulf States. 

3. A long-term commitment to invest in and replenish Iraqi human resources. Our obligations and responsibility will not end after our troops 

have left. Iraq’s human resources have been sapped by years of sanctions, 

warfare and post-war mismanagement. Much of the qualified middle class 

lives in exile or is stuck in professional stagnation. The educational system 

is eviscerated. Universities are dysfunctional, children barely learn how to 

read and girls have been particularly victimised. Blanket de-Baathification 

removed experienced managers. Civil war dynamics in urban centres 

purged them of less sectarian and more open-minded professionals. Oil-rich, 

Iraq today is also humanly bankrupt. It will take decades to recover and 

rebuild. 

To this end, Iraqis need training of civil servants, scholarships and agreements with foreign universities. Refugees also must be tended to. Many belonged to Iraq’s middle class and fled precisely because they were non-sectarian, were unaffiliated with any given militia, and therefore lacked the 

necessary protection. They should not be abandoned, left to stagnate and 

languish but rather be prepared for their return. Exile should be used to 

hone new skills that will facilitate their eventual social reintegration. There 

is every reason to assist host countries—Syria included—in that endeavor.

This scenario does not constitute a clearcut victory under any realistic definition. 

But, in all likelihood, it represents the optimal outcomes at this late stage. At the 

very least, it is consistent with obligations incurred toward those who were sent to 

wage this war and toward those on whose soil it has, for their enduring misfortune, 

been waged.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Dr. Malley. 

Let’s try 8 minutes for our first round of questions. 

I want to do something a little bit unusual, for me at least, and 

that’s to spend my time asking our witnesses to react to each other’s testimony. This is very powerful testimony from all three of 

you. It’s very different. 

I want to start with you, Dr. Bacevich. If you would just take a 

couple of minutes, if you feel free, to comment on General Keane 

and any comment that you have on Dr. Malley’s testimony. I’m 

going to ask each of you to spend a couple of minutes commenting 

on the other witnesses’s testimony. 

Dr. BACEVICH. I understand, Senator. 

I guess in response to General Keane I would want to raise two 

issues. 

The first issue is time. We’ve already been in Iraq, engaged in 

a war for over 5 years. Even to the extent that the surge has 

achieved some amount of improvement in the security situation, we 

have a long, long, long road ahead of us. The question of how long 

that road is, and I mean in terms of approximations. Nobody can 

115

say that it’s going to be 18 months or it’s going to be 24 months. 

But to some degree, the wisdom of continuing to go down this path 

has to be related to how long that road is, because the farther we 

go, the more it costs monetarily, the more it costs in terms of 

American lives. It seems to me that there’s a tendency not to want 

really to address that issue directly. How long is it going to take? 

The second thing is that there’s a real need, I think, to try to 

place the Iraq war back in some kind of a larger strategic context. 

What I was trying to suggest in my remarks is that the Iraq war 

came out of a particular vision of U.S. strategy that was devised 

by the Bush administration in the 6 to 12 months following September 11, probably best expressed in the national security strategy of 2002, and that OIF was intended to demonstrate the viability of that approach to dealing with the larger threat of violent Islamic radicalism. 

In that context, it seems to me, this war has failed. This war 

does not provide us a paradigm or a model that somehow we are 

going to employ elsewhere in order to deal with that larger strategic threat, in order to make sure that another September 11 on 

a worse scale doesn’t happen. 

So, it sort of raises the question: What is the U.S. grand strategy? My own sense is that the perpetuation of the Iraq war doesn’t 

lead to a strategy, doesn’t produce a set of principles to help us understand how we’re going to deal with the threat posed by 

Islamism. In many respects, the perpetuation of the Iraq war actually provides an excuse not to address that overarching question of, 

what are our guiding strategic principles? 

That would be my response to General Keane. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Dr. Bacevich. 

General Keane? 

General KEANE. Yes. Thank you. 

I totally agree that we do not have a national strategy dealing 

with the war against radical Islam, given the fact that we will 

probably spend most of this century on that issue. I look back at 

the Cold War, where we did have a national strategy, one of containment, which transcended Presidents and different persuasions 

from political parties, but, in a general sense, different administrations supported that national strategy, that led to successful prosecution of the cold war. We are lacking that. There’s no mistake 

about it. 

In terms of Iraq itself, I disassociate my comments with Dr. 

Bacevich that what we need to do is simply begin de-escalation and 

withdrawal from Iraq. I would agree with that if it was measured 

based on the realities and the situation on the ground. 

In terms of the Army at large, I totally agree that the Army is 

too small. We have probably known that since the late 1990s, if 

we’re totally honest with ourselves about this. We took too deep a 

cut as a result of the peace dividend from the end of the Cold War 

and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Then we made another major mistake, post-September 11, that we did not grow our 

ground forces. 

Now, in fairness to all of you, nobody was putting in front of you 

a proposal to grow our ground forces post-September 11, either. 

That’s the reality of it. Even the service that I am associated with 

116

was not fighting to grow the ground forces inside the Department 

of Defense (DOD) post-September 11, either. I just want to put 

those facts out there. 

The reality is, we are too small to counter the threats that are 

in front of us. The fact is the form of warfare by many of our opponents has changed. They know they cannot contest us directly with 

military arms and organizations, and they want to expose our 

vulnerabilities, which lead, by definition, to more protracted wars. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Dr. Malley? 

Dr. MALLEY. Just three quick comments on the testimony by 

General Keane. 

As I said, I think the surge has produced more than I would have 

expected, but we shouldn’t fool ourselves, the reconciliation has 

been with us, not with the Iraqi Government. That’s what this is 

about, and that’s why it’s not sustainable unless there is real reconciliation with the government. 

Second point. Yes, a number of benchmarks have been met, and 

some legislation has passed, but that really is not the measure of 

whether there is actually the building of a state that’s legitimate 

and functional and recognized by all. These are pieces of paper that 

are being signed. Nothing has yet to be implemented. Most of the 

time, whatever is signed then gives rise to postponement of implementation or argument over implementation, which is simply another way to argue over the underlying legislation itself. 

Finally, on the operation in Basrah, which I continue to think 

was a very ill-thought-out enterprise. This was not a broadbased 

enterprise against militias. Some militias were participating in it. 

Ishmic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) which is allied with Maliki, 

was participating on the other side of the battle; nor was it narrowly focused on the so-called special groups. Let’s call it what it 

was, it was another step in an internal Shiite civil war. The target 

was Muqtada al Sadr. I think that could have real consequences 

for us. 

Chairman LEVIN. Some months ago, according to the DOD document, the State Department, interviewing senior military commanders, said the following, that ‘‘senior military commanders now 

portray the intransigence of Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government as 

the key threat facing the U.S. effort in Iraq, rather than al Qaeda 

terrorists, Sunni insurgents, or Iranian-backed militias.’’ 

Do you agree with that, Dr. Bacevich? 

Dr. BACEVICH. I probably basically subscribe to that proposition, 

but would want to, I guess, expand on it a little bit. I’m not sure 

that there’s any major group in Iraq that actually signs up to our 

vision of what Iraq is supposed to look like, whether you’re talking 

Sunnis, whether you’re talking Shiites, whether you’re talking 

Kurds, or whether you’re talking tribes. One of the likely fallacies 

of our efforts, at this point, is to assume that those who say they 

side with us, those who support us, those who take our money in 

return for setting down their arms, share our long-term purposes. 

In many respects—and, I think, here I agree with Dr. Malley—

what the surge has done is to encourage a revival of tribalism to 

endorse the existence of groups that possess arms and probably 

have very little intention of surrendering those arms, and thereVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:23 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00120 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\45666.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
117

fore, allowing the central state to ever exercise a monopoly of violence. 

So, I think my bottom-line point here is that we may be deluding 

ourselves in thinking that any amount of cajoling or encouragement or bribery can actually persuade different groups to buy into 

our vision of a legitimate, coherent Iraqi nation-state. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do either of you have any comment on that? 

My time is up. If you could make it brief. 

General KEANE. Yes. In reference to the Maliki Government, it’s 

a challenge, to be sure. They’ve been growing in this position. 

They’re certainly frustrating to work with. Maliki has probably got 

about a year and a half left in office. The Sunnis will be enfranchised in the next government. There’ll be considerably more participation in it from that community. The coalition will change 

rather dramatically. 

But, the fact of the matter is, at our urging and with our assistance, Maliki has made some progress here. Pensions are now being 

paid, as well as amnesty for those who were fighting the government. He’s permitting them to come back into the government 

through the de-Baathification program and to participate in the social fabric of life. That is the beginning of a government connecting 

with those who were disenfranchised. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Dr. Malley, do you just want to——

Dr. MALLEY. I would, of course, echo that view and say, not only 

because of its intransigence, it’s part of what’s preventing——

Chairman LEVIN. Oh, the view that I quoted? 

Dr. MALLEY. Yes, absolutely. But, also because the Iraqi Government’s intransigence is what is threatening to undo the gains that 

have been made with Sunnis against al Qaeda and with the ceasefire with the Mahdi army. 

Chairman LEVIN. I’ve arranged with Senator Reed to take the 

gavel for about 45 minutes. 

First, Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank the witnesses for being here. 

General Keane, was Prime Minister Maliki’s move into Basrah 

ill-advised or ill-timed? 

General KEANE. That’s a great question. I think, from our perspective, we probably would have waited until the spring to conduct that operation. But at the end of the day, this is Maliki’s 

country. He’s impulsive. He got a lot of information just prior to 

that. I think he finally came to grips with the scale of the Iranian 

influence and the fact that it is threatening his regime, and how 

Sadr is tied into that influence. That resulted in the precipitation 

of that operation. 

Our commanders were working on a campaign for the south for 

some time, and had discussions with him, and I think it’s through 

those discussions that illuminated the scale of the problem. 

So, yes, it would have been better if he waited a little bit further 

so we could have set the conditions, but the fact is, we had to get 

after this anyway. Now we’re after it. It didn’t start out right, but 

I’m convinced it will finish right. 

118

Senator MCCAIN. In order to understand the adversaries, these 

are basically Shiite militias, a lot of which have been influenced by 

the Iranian training, supplies, and equipment. Is that correct? 

General KEANE. That’s absolutely true. They’re not the only militias there, but the Iranians are influencing both sides. They do it 

through training, they do it through laundering money, and they 

do it through diplomatic influence. They take some of the sheikh 

and tribal leaders, and bring them over to Iran to show them that 

Iran is a stable country, friendly to them. Their malign influence 

has been growing for some time in the south. 

Senator MCCAIN. In Mosul, where we have another battle raging, 

my understanding is it’s going to go on for a couple or 3 months, 

it is al Qaeda—Sunni extremists, primarily that we’re struggling 

against there. 

General KEANE. Yes, there are two security operations in front 

of us. One is in Mosul, which are the remnants of al Qaeda. This 

is not the al Qaeda that we were fighting in Anbar Province or the 

al Qaeda that was in Baghdad and certainly not the al Qaeda that 

was in Baqubah. We will finish that campaign, in my judgment, in 

a few months. I think then the command itself will be able to 

admit that AQI are operationally defeated. I believe they already 

are, but that campaign will finish it and remove any doubt about 

it. 

Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Bacevich, do you have a differing view on 

that tactical situation on the ground? 

Dr. BACEVICH. No, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Malley? 

Dr. MALLEY. Just, again, to come back to the question of Basrah. 

I think there are two questions. It appears to be ill-timed, and your 

questioning, yesterday, I think, of General Petraeus brought out 

that we would have done it differently and at a different time. 

I think it goes deeper. It was not just ill-timed, it was ill-conceived. This was not an operation, as I said, against militias. ISCI 

has a Badr Corps. It was formed by the Iranians, it’s funded by the 

Iranians. They were not going after militias, they were going after 

a particular group. They didn’t go after Fadhila, which also has a 

militia which has been flouting the law in Basrah for a long time. 

Maliki should not have been involved in it. We should not have 

been involved in it and dragged into it with our air support and 

special forces, which may cost us in other ways. 

Dr. BACEVICH. Senator? 

Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Bacevich, yes, but could I just say before 

you comment on that; I want to express all of our sympathy for the 

tragic loss of your son, and thank you for his service to our Nation. 

I would like for you to comment on that. But, also would you 

comment on your testimony, where you said we should have vigorous diplomatic efforts. How would you envision that? Would that 

also include face-to-face talks with the Iranians? 

Dr. BACEVICH. Yes, sir. Could I go back to the previous issue just 

for a second? 

Senator MCCAIN. Sure. 

Dr. BACEVICH. I hate to make one of these horrible Vietnam comparisons, but when I was reading the news reports about the 

Basrah operation, I have to admit the thing that came to mind was 

119

Lam Son 719, which, remember, well into the Vietnamization 

project, this was supposed to be the unveiling of the new Army of 

the Republic of Vietnam. 

Senator MCCAIN. Incursion into Laos. 

Dr. BACEVICH. Right. It turned out that it didn’t go well. It does 

seem to me that there’s some, at least, echos of that. I mean, we’ve 

been trying hard for 5 years to build up the ISFs, and all I know 

is what I read in the newspapers, but it’s hard to see that their 

performance was especially distinguished, which again brings us 

back to the time issue that it would appear to me that we have a 

long, long time before we’re going to have that force built up to the 

level it’s going to be able to handle the security requirements. 

Yes, sir, I did refer, in my comments, to diplomatic effort. I do 

subscribe, I think, in general terms, to the proposal made by the 

Iraq Study Group almost a year and a half ago, which I take to 

be based on an assumption that would have to be tested, but an 

assumption that there is a common interest in the region. 

Senator MCCAIN. How do you test it? 

Dr. BACEVICH. You test it by beginning discussions with other regions in the Nation. A common assumption is that we have a common interest in stability. We share a common interest in avoiding 

having Iraq or the disintegration of Iraq end up promoting a larger 

chaos in the region. Yes, sir, I believe that one would necessarily 

have to include Iran in that conversation. 

Senator MCCAIN. Just to clarify, again, that the insurgency in 

Mosul is al Qaeda. There are other Sunni extremists, as well, 

aren’t there, that they’re battling against in Mosul? 

General KEANE. Yes, they are aligned with some Sunni 

hardliners that are still fighting us. So, they do have some Sunni 

support structure, as they had in other provinces, as well. 

Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Malley, I’d be interested in your comment 

about direct talks with the Iranians, and also any comment about 

the situation in Mosul, as well. 

Dr. MALLEY. On the Iranians, obviously, we have talks with 

them already. They’re limited in Iraq. 

Senator MCCAIN. Yes, but I think you would agree there’s a difference between the kind of encounters that Ambassador Crocker 

has had, as opposed to a full-blown face-to-face discussion. 

Dr. MALLEY. Absolutely. 

My view is, it is a fallacy that we tend to view engagement as 

a prize that we withhold or nonengagement as a punishment that 

we inflict. I think we should be negotiating, with tough, tough positions, and not sacrificing our principles with Iran or with Syria. 

In the case of Iran, as I said earlier, I don’t see how we could 

stabilize Iraq at the same time as we’re trying to destabilize Iran. 

Iran is closer, has more ties, has influence in the government, in 

the opposition, in the tribes, and in the militias. We can’t simply 

pretend that’s not the case. 

I think we’re going to have to talk to them. We’re going to have 

to negotiate with them on the full range of issues, whether it’s the 

nuclear issue, whether it’s Iraq, or whether it’s the support for militant violent groups in the region. That’s going to have to be done, 

because, so far, the alternative, which has been not to talk to them, 

certainly has not served their interests. 

120

Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Bacevich, finally, you made reference to the 

Vietnam war, and I think we are all in agreement about how overstressed the military is, and how tough it’s been, and the unwise 

reductions in the size of the military that took place in the 1990s, 

the so-called peace dividend. Would you argue that a defeated military also has some devastating effects that take a long time to 

cure? 

Dr. BACEVICH. Yes, sir. But, I’d agree with General Keane that 

there’s no way we can possibly be defeated, and a strategy of deliberate, phased withdrawal, to my mind, does not constitute defeat. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

My time is up. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED [presiding]. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Kennedy. 

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you. 

Thank all of you. 

I’d like to come back to get your views on this, Iran in Iraq. 

We’ve heard a great deal about it during the testimony of General 

Petraeus. We’ve heard a great deal about the radiant support of 

various kinds of units that are out there threatening the security 

of American forces. We have allies who are over there, who are welcoming the Iranians in celebration of their leadership. We have Iranian diplomatic leadership that evidently played a role, in terms of 

establishing a cease-fire, which we’ve welcomed. It seems that we, 

as a country, never anticipated, in the involvement of the war that 

we have in Iraq, the role of Iran. Maybe we did, but maybe we 

didn’t. Either we ignored it or we didn’t anticipate it. 

Dr. Malley was talking briefly about this in response to the other 

question; but it does seem to me that we ought to have a better 

kind of understanding about whose side are they on and how we 

ought to be dealing with the process, because it does seem to me 

that they are convenient targets. Maybe they should be. What 

should we be thinking, and how should we be dealing with it? 

I’ll start with Dr. Malley, and then if each of you would take a 

couple of minutes on it. I appreciate it. 

Dr. MALLEY. Several comments. First, it’s true that throughout 

this war we’ve tended to look to outside causes for the failures that 

we’ve faced. One day it’s Iran, one day it’s Syria, then we find another. I think there is that tendency, whereas so many other problems are homegrown. 

That being said, there’s little doubt that Iran is pursuing what 

can be described as a policy of managed, and sometimes less managed, chaos in Iraq. They see us tied down. They don’t want us to 

turn our attention to them. They think we are bleeding, strategically and militarily. So, it’s perfectly logical for them to be pursuing 

a policy of investing in as many actors as they can in Iraq. They’ve 

been proficient at this for a long time, much more proficient than 

we could ever be working with the Kurds, the Shiites, or with militias inside and outside of government, including militias that are 

fighting each other. They used to do that in Lebanon, as well. 

They’re very good at it, and they’ll continue to do it. 

The question is: What do we do? What is our approach? I always 

judge a policy by whether it succeeds or fails. Iran is continuing its 

121

meddling in Iraq, and it’s harmful meddling in Iraq, in terms of our 

interests. It’s continuing to enrich uranium, it just announced that 

it’s going to expand it. It’s continuing to support Hamas and 

Hezbollah. None of the criteria that we would judge to see whether 

our approach of containment and isolating and not talking, whether it’s succeeded, points to success. On every single criteria, things 

are the same or getting worse. At a minimum, that argues for reassessment, and I would say it argues for the kind of tough, cleareyed negotiations, bargaining with the Iranians, to see whether, in 

fact, we can reach agreement on an end state for Iraq which is not 

either one of our ideal situations, but with which we both could 

live, perhaps even the ways in Iranians and us have similar interests in Iraq. Neither one of us wants to see it descend into chaos 

and spill over into Iran. 

So, I think we need to have that discussion. It hasn’t taken place. 

There’s so many reasons, from the nuclear proliferation to stability 

in the Middle East, and, most of all, the security of our troops in 

Iraq, why that discussion needs to begin. 

Senator KENNEDY. General Keane? 

General KEANE. Yes, Senator. As I indicated before, one of the 

problems we had, certainly, with the change in strategy in Iraq, we 

were completely preoccupied with al Qaeda and the threat of the 

Sunni insurgents and the fact that they were winning and our policy was failing and Baghdad was a bloodbath. So, that has preoccupied us for 2 years, to rid ourselves of that. Obviously that has 

occurred. 

Meanwhile, the British were pulling back from the south, and we 

lost a lot of our situational awareness as that has occurred, and we 

turned it over to the Iraqis. While they have some human intelligence, they don’t have the enablers that we do. So, a lot of what 

was happening in the south, we did not have the kind of resolution 

that we should have. Nonetheless, we know that Iranians’ goals are 

very clear: they want us to fail in Iraq, and they want a stable government in Iraq that’s friendly and aligned with them; but aligned 

with them is very important, and not aligned with the United 

States. 

I think the essential problem—I do agree with Dr. Malley, here—

is that we do not have a national policy, in terms of defeating Iran 

in Iraq, or a regional strategy to deal with that. We should not 

leave this up to General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker to work 

this out by themselves. They are a part of that fabric, and they 

have some of the tools to apply, for sure; but, we need a broader 

path than that to help them with that strategy. I do think we can. 

We have to, certainly, understand what are Iran’s interests here. 

The fact that they want a stable Iraq, as we do, is a beginning for 

both of us to deal with this issue. 

Senator KENNEDY. Dr. Bacevich? 

Dr. BACEVICH. Again, I think the place to begin is trying to ask 

the larger strategic question. I mean, it seems to me that, to a very 

great extent, we tend to still think of Iran as this seat or source 

of Islamic revolution that they are intent on exporting around the 

world. I mean, after September 11, when President Bush lumped 

Iran into the so-called Axis of Evil, this sort of revived this image 

122

of a state with which we can have nothing to do, and that poses 

a threat to our vital interests. I think the basic image is false. 

The Islamic revolution in Iran is a failure. They’re not going to 

export their revolution anywhere. Iran does not pose a threat to 

our vital interests. Iran is a mischiefmaker. In that sense, therefore, it seems to me that we should be more able, more willing, as 

I think Dr. Malley was suggesting, to try to at least understand, 

not necessarily empathize or agree with, how they define their security requirements and their security concerns, which are real, 

and then use that as a point of departure for engaging in a dialogue. A dialogue is not simply waving the white flag. A dialogue 

is a serious, tough-minded negotiation that tries to determine 

whether or not we have some common interests that can at least 

alleviate the kind of hostile relationship that we’ve had for the last 

30 or 40 years. 

The Iranians are not going to go away. They’re going to be the 

neighbor of Iraq for as long as there is Iraq. So, it’s quite understandable, it seems to me, that the Iraqis are going to have a rather particular view of Iran that may well differ from our own. 

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much. 

My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Kennedy. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, panelists, for your testimony. 

Dr. Bacevich, I would think about your statement that a strategy 

of deliberate, phased withdrawal does not constitute defeat, I would 

say that it doesn’t necessarily constitute defeat, but it could precipitate a defeat. It is a withdrawal policy, as I understand it, at 

least the one that’s being discussed publicly around here, that’s a 

withdrawal not tied to the conditions on the ground, and I believe 

it could put us in a position of defeat, which Dr. Malley says would 

be very detrimental to the United States and the region. 

General Petraeus has his Ph.D. at Princeton University and was 

number one in the General Staff College class. He has been 3 years 

in Iraq. He was in Mosul with the 101st. He trained the Army for 

a year on another tour. Now, he came back and wrote the 

counterinsurgency manual for the United States of America. He 

has testified here that, in his view, a withdrawal should be tied to 

the conditions on the ground. 

General Keane, thank you for your participation in helping to 

draft the surge policy. I know that was a philosophy you thought 

would work. You did not believe our current policy was working. 

General Petraeus and General Odierno and others have executed 

that, and it has, as Dr. Malley said, achieved more than any of us 

would have thought possible. 

So, I have to tell you, when faced with a choice, I’m going with 

General Petraeus’ recommendation. If he needs a few months, he 

says a pause, I think he’s entitled to have that. I believe, despite 

all the difficulties that we’ve had, and I have to tell you, 2 years 

ago I was worried, I was very concerned about the status of our situation in Iraq, and I remain concerned about it. I certainly favor 

the withdrawal of our troops as soon as we can possibly do so. 

123

General Keane, you have provided an optimistic view here. 

You’re a four-star general, 37 years in the military, not a Pollyanna. You see progress being made, real progress being made. Senator Collins, yesterday, sort of asked a question I think Americans 

are asking, ‘‘Okay, the violence is down, but what are we looking 

at, 2, 3, 4 years down the road? Can we see further troops withdrawn, and can we see a stable Iraq?’’ 

Give us your best judgment, based on your experience and the 

number of times you’ve been over there—I don’t know how many, 

but quite a few—give us your best judgment of what we can expect 

to achieve and what kind of result might occur if we follow the 

Petraeus recommendations. 

General KEANE. Yes. Thank you, Senator. 

I understand some frustration. I mean, our leaders coming before 

this panel are reluctant to cast too much of a crystal ball, here, into 

the future, because they also know that previous leaders have done 

that, and have lost credibility in doing it, because of events that 

are not controllable sometimes in Iraq, and so, I understand that. 

But, when I look at this situation, we have really turned a corner 

here, and the strategy is working. The security situation that we 

all wanted to have has enabled the Maliki Government to make 

some genuine political progress with reconciliation. I mean, that is 

actually happening, and I know that for a fact, because I talked to 

the people who are the beneficiaries of that. So that, I am convinced of. 

Now, there’s still a check in the mail with some of that, to be 

sure, because we have more implementation of the national legislation to take place. But, the big decision has been made by the 

Maliki Government, and that is that the Sunnis and the Sunni 

leadership, they know, is going to be a part of the fabric of their 

government and the fabric of Iraq, and they understand that, despite the fact that many of those Sunnis repressed them for 35 

years. This has been a difficult psychological, emotional hurdle for 

them to get over. There are still residue of paranoia and fears there 

as a result of it, to be sure. 

But, when I look at this situation, we will finish al Qaeda this 

year in the north. The situation in the south, despite the serious 

Iranian influence, we do have to deal with the Shiite militias and 

bring the level of violence down, regardless of who those militias 

are. That will happen. It’s not as formidable a task as dealing with 

al Qaeda and a Sunni insurgency. That will happen in 2008, as 

well. I think the intent is certainly to drive that so that in the fall 

of this year, the elections all over Iraq, but particularly in areas 

where there’s still violence, that the elections in the south will be 

a free and open election and people will be able to express themselves. That, I think, is a very attainable goal. 

In my own mind, I don’t think we should probably reduce forces 

any more in 2008 than the 25 percent we’re going to take, but if 

General Petraeus thinks that we can do more because the situation 

has improved dramatically, so be it. My judgment tells me that’s 

not going to be the case. 

However, in 2009 I do think we’ll continue to reduce our forces, 

and I believe that probably late 2009 or 2010, the mission for our 

forces in Iraq—and this is important—will change. We will not be 

124

protecting the people, which absorbs a lot of force levels. The ISFs 

will be doing that. Our mission will transition to one of assisting 

and training them, and no longer protecting the people. That 

brings the force levels down rather significantly, and also the casualties are changed; if there is still violence in Iraq, it will be at 

a level that the ISFs can handle. 

Now, I don’t believe this is an open-ended commitment to Iraq. 

I think what should be open-ended to Iraq is our political alliance 

with them and the fact that we do want to have a long-term security relationship with Iraq, but certainly we don’t need to have 

forces in Iraq at the levels that we’re at now on some open-ended 

contract. The conditions on the ground are going to change favorably that will permit us to continue to reduce our forces. 

Now, does that come close to what you were seeking, sir? 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, it certainly does. Would you say then, 

that with regard to withdrawal, DOD, General Petraeus, actually, 

and certainly Members of Congress, would like to see our troops 

withdrawn? The debate is over what rate, perhaps, or just how 

fast, and, really, how much of a gap do we have between the competing visions politically that we’re hearing about on the question 

of withdrawal, in your opinion? 

General KEANE. Well, I agree with that. I think much of the discussion has to do with the pace and the rate of reducing our forces. 

It’s a given we’re going to reduce our forces. General Petraeus 

knows that, Ambassador Crocker knows that. But, they want to do 

it on a measured basis, they want to do it based on the Iraqis’ capability to take over, and also the enemy situation on the ground. 

That’s reasonable, in my judgment, and particularly in view of the 

mistakes that we have made in the past in this area. Certainly 

they are influenced by those mistakes. I think it’s prudent that the 

command comes before you and say they want to err on the side 

of caution here, and they want to take a measured approach to 

this, and they want to take a pause, and consolidate and evaluate 

where we are. 

Nobody in Iraq knows what the impact of the 25-percent reduction of our combat forces will be. To give you a sense of it, in Baghdad we will go from 30 U.S. battalions to 20. A third of the U.S. 

battalions will be gone. That’s happening as we speak. In Anbar 

Province, we will go from 15 U.S. battalions to 6. Now, anybody 

looking at that knows that’s a significant military reduction. We 

believe that the Iraqis will mitigate that, in terms of their own capabilities. We also believe that, because of the Sons of Iraq program and the Sunni insurgency, and the leaders who are helping 

us, that that is another mitigation. Those things should hold and 

permit us to make that reduction without any increase in violence; 

actually, with the violence going down. That’s the goal. But, nobody 

knows for sure if that’s going to happen. 

So, I think it’s prudent for General Petraeus to say, ‘‘Look, I 

want to see what’s going on, here. I want to see if those assumptions we’re making are holding,’’ and make certain of that before 

we take what could be unacceptable risks and reduce our forces 

further. I think that’s what this is about. What they’re doing 

makes sense to me. 

125

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you very much, all of you. The surge 

was a bitter pill for us. We were hoping we were on a downward 

trend at that point, but the success of the surge has exceeded our 

expectations to date. I thank you for your projections of the future, 

I think sometimes our military leaders are afraid to give theirs because it looks like they can’t be certain; they don’t want to be accused of being a liar if they turn out to be incorrect. Thank you for 

your experience and your advice. 

Senator REED. Senator Ben Nelson. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Keane, the transition you’re talking about is very comparable to what Senator Collins and I and others have proposed 

with the transition from providing security in Baghdad at the level 

we’ve been providing it, doing it alone, but by bringing in the alMaliki Government security forces to provide more of their own security to transition, so that we can put more combat troops in the 

north, and we would have had, if we had done this previously, 

more combat troops in the south, which probably would have avoided what happened. While we commend Prime Minister al Maliki 

for standing up to the militias in the south, we wish that the result 

had been better at the beginning, and perhaps it will work out over 

time. 

But, couldn’t we be beginning that process of transitioning now? 

Aren’t we, in effect, doing it? Why don’t we admit that we are, in 

effect, doing that, and, at the same time, build toward the residual 

force, so we know what we can do? Wouldn’t that be a better way 

of planning what the future in Iraq is? The conditions on the 

ground would dictate how fast you can go, and the commanders on 

the ground can make the decisions so that we don’t arbitrarily set 

dates, but can’t we at least begin and ask for a planning process 

that would start the transition as soon as possible, in my opinion, 

now? 

General KEANE. The transition has begun, Senator. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Then we had the resistance to Nelson-Collins type of legislation, which said that that’s what we should be 

doing, and we proposed that a year ago? 

General KEANE. I think that the command does not want to be 

tied down by any timetable. 

Senator BEN NELSON. We didn’t have a timetable. 

General KEANE. They don’t want to be tied down for when missions have to change. 

Senator BEN NELSON. We didn’t put that, either. 

General KEANE. They want maximum flexibility because they’re 

dealing with an enemy, and the enemy has a vote on what we’re 

doing. 

But, in terms of transition, to be clear here, we have places in 

Iraq, a number of them, where the Iraqis are clearly in the lead 

now, and we are in a supporting role, and we have made those 

transitions. That will be a gradual transition. 

Now, they want to be measured about this, because we’ve made 

mistakes about this in the past. It’s easy to get impressed with 

your own plan and to start seeing results that may not be there, 

and that’s happened to us. So, these commanders know that, and 

126

they go through a very detailed evaluation of what the Iraqis military capability is. They are transitioning them. 

Senator BEN NELSON. That’s why we’ve said that the forces on 

the ground and conditions on the ground would dictate how fast 

this would go without a timetable. But, we’ve had resistance to the 

legislation, which has absolutely surprised me, because the only 

timetable that we put in there was that the transition should begin 

immediately and have goals to be achieved over some period of 

time, but conditions and commanders on the ground would dictate 

when and how and under what circumstances. I guess I was puzzled then, and I’m puzzled now, as to what the opposition was to 

our bill. 

I’d like to go to questions. Dr. Bacevich, I believe you said that 

Iran is a mischiefmaker. But, in terms of Hezbollah and Hamas 

and what they’ve been able to do in the region, at what point are 

mischiefmakers very successful in providing terrorism, at least 

within the region? Are we understating their impact when we say 

mischiefmakers, or do we have to say that they’re full-fledged terrorists supporting state-sponsored terrorists for the region? 

Dr. BACEVICH. Senator, I’ll stick with mischiefmaker, but I don’t 

mean to imply they are trivial, or be dismissed or ignored; I don’t 

mean that at all. I understand the importance of noting their support for terrorist organizations, but those organizations don’t pose 

anything remotely like an existential threat to the United States 

of America. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Well maybe not existential, but in terms 

of the turmoil of the Middle East, it does have an impact on us in 

many respects. Maybe, perhaps, it’s not existential. 

Dr. BACEVICH. Yes, sir. Again, I’m not trying to suggest ignoring 

that, but it does seem to me that one needs to take a broader view 

of Iran than simply to say that this is a country that supports 

Hezbollah and Hamas. This is a country that, as I said earlier, has 

failed in its effort to sponsor the spread of revolution. It’s a country 

that does have serious national security considerations. We cannot 

ignore the history, Iran does have reason to view the United States 

as something other than a friendly democracy wishing the people 

of Iran well. So, I would not want the fact—and it is a fact—of 

their support for Hezbollah and Hamas to somehow act as kind of 

a veto or the determinant of what U.S. policy toward Iran would 

be. 

Senator BEN NELSON. General Keane, General Shinseki advocated that a larger force would be necessary to go into Iraq, and 

that advice was not followed. If that advice had been followed and 

a larger force had been placed in Iraq at the very beginning, and 

had been maintained there at higher levels, would there have been 

a need for the surge? 

General KEANE. Yes, because there was much more of a problem 

than just force level. Now, to be quite accurate, General Shinseki’s 

comments about size of force, actually, before this committee, as 

you probably know——

Senator BEN NELSON. Yes, I was here. 

General KEANE. —and a result of Senator Levin’s questioning of 

him, and it had to do with the size of the force to provide stability 

127

and support operations in what was called phase 4, after the invasion, just to be specific about it. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Okay. 

General KEANE. One of the things I think we did, as military 

leaders—and I was there at the time—is, I think we let down the 

Secretary of Defense and also the administration, in the sense that 

when we were dealing with the invasion plans that General Franks 

was putting together, none of us, and particularly the ground leaders, who have a little bit more sense of this, challenged the possibility that Saddam Hussein could choose not to surrender and to 

continue to fight us through other means. If we had done that, that 

would have caused us to think through the assumptions of what 

that is, the nature of that war, and then what kind of a force would 

we need after the invasion if such a thing occurred. I think it also 

would have spun us up on a lot of what we had forgotten about this 

kind of war itself. We would not have stopped Saddam from doing 

it. We’ve talked to all of his leaders; we have them in detention. 

We know that 6 months prior to the invasion they were making 

those plans, now. But, the fact is we would have been better prepared for it when it did occur, and maybe we would not have made 

as many policy mistakes that first year that we made. I mean, we 

still suffer from that incredible sequence of major policy errors that 

we made in the first year, and I think possibly we could have been 

in better shape for all of that. 

I think we bear some responsibility, ourselves. It’s a shared responsibility, civilian and military leaders, certainly when it comes 

to war plans and execution of national policy. But, in the same respect, this is our lane, and we know a lot about it, and I don’t think 

we did as good a job here as we could have. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Mr. Chairman, if I could just follow up on 

that. 

I remember, in a closed session, before the invasion of Iraq, asking Secretary Feith to give us some indication of what plans were 

in place to keep security if, in fact, the decision has been made to 

go in, or it hasn’t been made and it is ultimately made to go into 

Iraq. What is the plan for phase 2? I received a stack of papers 

sometime, I think, in August, after phase 2 was obviously not succeeding because we weren’t prepared to help them keep the peace, 

we had fired the military, and things were in shambles. 

General KEANE. Yes. That doesn’t surprise me. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It seems to me that the question that we’re all facing is: Will the 

pause in the drawdown of troops after July allow for continued 

progress, or does it ease the pressure on the Iraqis to continue to 

take over more responsibility for their own security and to continue 

to meet the political and economic benchmarks that everyone 

agrees are essential for the long-term stability of Iraq? So, I’d like 

to ask each of you your judgment on that question. What is the impact of the pause of not continuing to drawdown in a gradual and 

responsible way, but, rather, holding back? There’s a lot that’s 

going to occur during that period if it goes beyond the 45 days that 

128

General Petraeus indicated is likely, yesterday. We run into, for example, the provincial elections that are going to occur in October, 

if they occur as scheduled. So, I’d like to get an assessment from 

each of you on what you believe the consequences of the pause will 

be. 

We’ll start with you, Doctor. 

Dr. BACEVICH. Well, the pause is not a policy. The pause is really 

just a way of avoiding, I think, or deferring, fundamental policy decisions. But, I have to say, I personally don’t think that the pause 

will matter much, one way or the other. I say that because this is, 

I think, one of the areas where General Keane and I would just 

radically disagree with one another—I don’t believe that we’re really in charge in Iraq. I don’t really believe that the efforts that are 

being made by U.S. officials or U.S. commanders to promote reconciliation really are shaping the course of events. I think events 

are much more likely to be shaped by the Iraqis themselves, and, 

again, not to repeat myself, that the various groups in Iraq are responding to their own particular agendas, so that, in the larger 

sense, Iraq is going to follow a trajectory that’s going to be determined by Iraqis. The notion that staying a little bit longer or 

slightly accelerating the rate of U.S. withdrawal, or pausing the 

rate of withdrawal, is going to make a major difference strikes me 

as simply a fundamental misreading of the situation. 

If there is one thing that the Iraq war ought to have taught us, 

it is that American power is far more limited than we imagined 

back in the salad days of the 1990s, when we were proclaiming 

that we were the world’s only superpower, an indispensable nation. 

It ought also have taught us that our capacity to understand these 

societies, to understand the dynamics that sort of shape the way 

they evolve, is not all that great. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

General Keane? 

General KEANE. Yes. I think it certainly is a temporary situation. 

In my own view, its intended purpose will be accomplished. General Petraeus will be given the opportunity to assess whether the 

ISFs are able to mitigate the reduction that’s taking place and, 

therefore, take over responsibilities that heretofore we had. Also, 

the so-called Sons of Iraq program, in terms of its viability; is that 

still supporting our efforts? That will take some time to understand 

that. I think it probably takes longer than 45 days. 

I also think, Madam Senator, that we should prepare for the 

likelihood that we may not resume reductions, in 2008, which, in 

my view, may be the case. Why is that? We want to reduce, so why 

does that make any sense? Well, the fact of the matter is, we have 

three major events that are occurring in 2008 that we’re very much 

involved in, two military and one political. 

One is, we want to finish al Qaeda off, up in Mosul. We think 

we will do that in a number of months, and actually we think it’ll 

probably be completed around the fall timeframe. But, there are 

variables there. The enemy has a vote. We will finish them, but it 

may take longer. Our judgment is, it will not. 

The operation in the south, which is just beginning, and let me 

say that, we can be so super-critical of military operations. You 

heard General Petraeus say that the operation in the south in 

129

many of the provinces that the ISFs performed very well; and in 

some of them, they did not, and it was uneven. So, we know 

enough about this ISF to know that their improvement has been 

very steady, and, overall, they’re going to acquit themselves well in 

what they are doing, in my view. But, it will take some time. As 

I said before, this is not al Qaeda, and this is not mainstream 

Sunni insurgents we’re dealing with. We have to shut down the 

level of violence and the gangs and the thugs down there, and I believe a lot of them are going to run from the force levels that we 

will apply. That should be completed before the fall election, which 

is what Maliki’s motivation is, here. But, it may not. 

Then we have the fall election itself. This is a watershed political 

event in Iraq that will change Iraq for years to come, because this 

Maliki Government that everyone is kicking is willing to share 

power and decentralize some of its authority with those provinces, 

which means those provinces will have real budgets, money will 

have to be distributed, there’ll be a percentage and a framework to 

do all of that, and there will be significant demands being placed 

on a central government by those provincial leaders, who are duly 

elected by the people in those provinces. We want that watershed 

political event to succeed. Our opponents in Iraq will want it to 

fail, and we cannot let that happen. We don’t even want it to be 

delayed. We don’t want it to go into 2009. That watershed experience is important to us. So, that’s the third major thing that we 

have to do in 2008. During this, General Petraeus and his commanders are assessing the impact of the 25-percent combat force 

reduction. 

So, I think, in my own mind, we should not be too optimistic 

that: (1) he will be able to do that assessment in a short period of 

time; or (2) that, as a result of his assessment, he’s going to come 

back and say that he’s going to continue to reduce forces in 2008. 

I think the plate is very full for us in 2008, and we are taking a 

fair amount of risk with the 25-percent reduction that’s already ongoing. 

That’s the most frank answer I can give you. Does that answer 

your question, Senator? 

Senator COLLINS. It does. Thank you. 

Dr. Malley? 

Dr. MALLEY. Senator, as I said in my testimony, I believe in pressure. I believe we have to pressure the Maliki Government, and I 

also believe that probably the most potent form of pressure we 

have is the question of our troops. 

That said, I’m not a big believer in subtle signals; I much prefer 

blunt language. I’m not sure that whether we pause or don’t pause, 

as has been said earlier, is really going to convey the message we 

want to convey. We don’t know how Maliki would read the pause 

or a further withdrawal. We don’t know how he would react or how 

other Iraqis might react. Would they see it as a signal that we’re 

actually serious about withdrawing, and therefore, try, perhaps, to 

find other allies elsewhere? Would, on the contrary, they see this 

as a reason to take more responsibility? 

As I said, a signal such as this, I think, is going to get lost in 

translation. I think there needs to be blunt language, a clear message to Maliki, not that we’re withdrawing 25 percent or more, but, 

130

‘‘We cannot stay if you don’t take certain steps,’’ and we should be 

clear about what those steps are: passing and then implementing 

certain legislation; cleaning up some of the security sector that has 

been infiltrated by sectarian groups; and reaching out to some of 

the Sunnis who are looking for jobs; those are the concerned citizens. We should have clear tests for reaching a broad national compact. If he doesn’t do them, then we should say, and we should be 

clear about it, ‘‘Then our troops cannot stay, because then you’re 

asking us to stay for an enterprise that has no end and that has 

no purpose.’’ But, I’m not a big believer in subtle signals, at this 

point. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Senator Collins. 

In 5 years of effort and extraordinary sacrifice by our service 

men and women, there are some, I think, strategic consequences 

that are becoming more palpable. One, ironically, is that we replaced a despicable government in Baghdad, but an implacable foe 

of the Iranians, with a government that is very friendly to the Iranians personally, politically, culturally, and religiously. So, General 

Keane, if our national need is to define a strategy to defeat Iran 

in Iraq, how do we do it with the present Government of Maliki, 

which is extremely sympathetic and personally connected to the 

Iranian Government? Do we replace them with a Sunni Government? Do we replace them at all? What do we do? 

General KEANE. Well, I think it’s a good question, and a reasonable one. 

First of all, this government will be replaced through a general 

election, in any event, in less than 2 years. I’m talking about the 

Maliki coalition. 

Second, it’s been, I think, very fascinating to watch Maliki since 

he took office, and the weakness of his coalition and the growth of 

him in that office. Listen, it’s been frustrating for our people who 

deal with it. Much of it’s two steps forward and one back, and then 

one forward and two back, to be sure. 

Maliki is a realist, like the other national leaders are. Iran is a 

neighbor, they’re always going to be there. The fact is, the United 

States is not always going to be there. That is probably a harsh reality. 

The point is also, and this sometimes is lost, they are Iraqi nationalists, and they feel very strongly about that. They do not want 

to be in bed with the Iranians. They do not want the Iranians to 

have undue influence in their country. They do not want the Iranians using leverage and the assault that they’ve made on the 

south—politically, diplomatically, and economically—to have that 

kind of influence on the central government. 

Now, they also have relations with Iran, and that’s to be sure, 

and they have ties to it. Some of them lived in Iran during the terrible periods of Saddam Hussein. But, at the end of the day, my 

view is, they are nationalists, they clearly want to be aligned with 

the United States of America, they clearly want a long-term security relationship with the United States of America. They believe 

their future is with us in that region. At the same time, they want 

to have good relationships with their neighbors, and Iran is one of 

them. 

131

Senator REED. Dr. Malley, your comments? You seem to suggest 

that that might be incompatible to some degree. 

Dr. MALLEY. I would certainly agree with your comments. I think 

we do have, today, a policy that’s at war with itself. I don’t understand how we could be saying, on the one hand, that Iran is the 

major threat to Iraq—which it may be; I’m not going to argue that 

point, one way or another—but that our allies in Iraq view themselves as very closely tied to Iran. You described it very well, that 

there are so many ways in which, in particular, Mr. Hakim and his 

party were born, bred, and flourished in Iran. So, the notion that 

we now have a part of the Shiites turning against the Iranians by 

turning against Muqtada al Sadr, I think, is just wrong. You have 

both sides that are supported by Iran. 

Again, if you look at the case of Lebanon, that’s not unique. Both 

Hezbollah and Amal were supported by Iran, and at some point 

they were at war with one another, and Iran played one against 

the other, and sometimes mediated. 

But the notion that this is what’s happening now, that the 

Maliki Government is disentangling itself from Iran, I think, is 

wrong. Again, I think that’s why, ultimately, we’re going to have 

to find some accommodation with Iran, or at least we’re going to 

have to try. I don’t want to sound Pollyannaish. It may be that our 

interests are too incompatible. But we’re going to have to go to the 

source, we’re going to have to try, because right now we have a 

government in Iraq in which we are investing huge sums and military personnel that is allied with the party we say is threatening 

our interests in the region and our interests in Iraq more than anyone else. 

Senator REED. I want to ask Dr. Bacevich the same question, but 

I want to follow up quickly with just another question. If the 

Maliki Government is successful in suppressing the Sadr militias, 

which they view as their threat from the Shiite side, would they 

turn their attention to Sunni militias? Would they turn their attention to try to reduce these Concerned Local Citizens (CLC) groups 

that we’re sponsoring, either directly or overtly? Or would the 

CLCs see themselves as being under undo pressure now that a militia group has been successfully eliminated from the scene? 

Dr. MALLEY. Well, first, I actually don’t believe in the suppression of the Sadrist militia. I think it’s a social phenomenon as 

much as a military one, and it has far deeper roots, incidentally, 

than either Maliki or Hakim has. I think we’re seeing that, just in 

the reaction to the events in Basrah. 

Senator REED. Which means, if there was a free and open election, they’d do pretty well? 

Dr. MALLEY. This brings me to a very important point about the 

elections. Part of what’s happening now may well be an effort by 

Maliki and Hakim to make sure that those elections either don’t 

take place, because there’s too much chaos, or are postponed, or 

against someone, because you disenfranchise the Sadrists, the 

Sadrists can’t compete. I don’t know any expert who doesn’t believe 

that the Sadrists are going to do much better in this election than 

ISCI will. 

Senator REED. But the question about going out to the Sunni 

community? 

132

Dr. MALLEY. It’s a good question. I don’t know the answer to 

that. I think what may well happen is, the Sunni community, if it 

doesn’t see, in the government and Maliki and his allies, steps that 

it believes are necessary to reach a compact they may turn. Right 

now, they’ve decided the greater enemy is al Qaeda, and they could 

postpone the fight against the government. Once al Qaeda’s out of 

sight, or once they believe that the U.S. is not putting enough pressure on the Maliki Government or on Iran, they may turn their 

sights to the government and to the Shiite militias. 

Senator REED. Dr. Bacevich, the same vein. You made the point, 

which I must confess I agree with, that the template for this operation was the transformation of Iraq as a beacon of freedom and 

free-market economics that would essentially propagate almost 

automatically throughout the region. I think, at this juncture, 

that’s not the case. What seems to be emerging is a much more 

powerful Iran with a long-term, not only interest, but staying 

power. In fact, I think comments, even of General Keane, are correct that their staying power is probably as strong or stronger than 

ours, because of their proximity and their self-interests. Why don’t 

you comment on that line of questioning. 

Dr. BACEVICH. I think General Keane’s made the key point, 

wherein he was referring to the long run. I think in trying to understand the way the Iraqi/Iranian relationship is likely to evolve, 

we should look to the long run. The long run is that an Arab nation 

is not going to want to be a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Persians. 

It seems to me that, at least on the fringes, one of the justifications offered by those who want to continue the war is that for us 

to change course at this point would give a big win to the Iranians. 

I think there’s no question that the Iranians have done well as a 

consequence of our blunders. But if you look at the long run, I 

would expect that Iraq is going to serve as some kind of a counterweight to Iran, and that’s going to be in the interests of the stability of the region, and probably will be in the interests of the 

United States, as well. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. My time’s expired. 

Chairman LEVIN [presiding]. Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I welcome this distinguished panel. Very many have profited by 

your, I think, very sage and wise comments this morning. 

I want to start off with our good friend, General Keane. I have 

before me a transcript of the hearings before the Senate Armed 

Services Committee, Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee, and General Cody, who was your successor as the Vice 

Chief, said as follows, ‘‘The current demand for forces in Iraq and 

Afghanistan exceeds our sustainable supply of soldiers, of units and 

equipment, and limits our ability to provide ready forces for other 

contingencies.’’ Do you agree with that? 

General KEANE. I don’t want to get into a contest with Dick 

Cody, who I have tremendous regard for. 

Senator WARNER. No, that’s the purpose you’re here, to get into 

these——

General KEANE. No, you know me, I’m always going to give you 

a straight answer, Senator. 

133

Senator WARNER. All right. Well, let’s have it. 

General KEANE. I’m just sort of warming up to it a little bit, all 

right? [Laughter.] 

Senator WARNER. Well, I’m cold steel, and I want to get the answers. 

General KEANE. I mean, I’m talking about a friend, as well as 

a colleague. 

Yes, there’s an element of truth in that statement, certainly, but 

here’s my view of it. The United States Army is certainly stressed 

by this war. We’re fighting two wars, and it’s understandable that 

it would be, as we have always been in wars of consequence that 

take time. That’s number one. 

Number two is, the Chief of Staff of the Army is on record saying 

that he can sustain 13 combat brigades almost indefinitely, and I 

agree with that. Now, at what price would that be remains to be 

seen. I believe this force is tough and resilient, and they’re going 

to continue to make the commitment to volunteer and be a part of 

it. 

In terms of other missions, here’s where I come out on that. First 

of all, the Air Force and the Navy are largely not involved. The 

Army and the Marine Corps are very much involved. If we had an 

emergency someplace else, that would require all non-engaged 

Army and Marine Corps to respond, regardless of deployments, because it is an emergency. That would depend, for the Army, on the 

availability of equipment as much as it is the availability of people. 

Nonetheless, I am convinced they would be able to respond. 

Then you get to this other question that’s always been troubling 

to me, the implication of that is that we should do something about 

our involvement in Iraq or in Afghanistan, and particularly Iraq, 

because that’s really the contentious issue. What we should do is, 

out of consideration for what General Cody is speaking about—and 

I’m not suggesting he suggested this—but the implication is that 

what we need to do is pull our troops out of Iraq so we’ll be ready 

in the event something else happens. That makes no sense to me. 

Senator WARNER. I think we’re getting astray, here. It’s a fairly 

straightforward, clear pronouncement of a man who is in a position 

to make those judgments. I draw to your attention, and I’ll ask 

unanimous consent to place it in the record, here a statement by 

the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, 

perhaps you’re aware of that statement, took the same basic conceptual thought. He is concerned about other contingencies around 

the globe, which, at this time, in his professional judgment, require 

deployment of additional U.S. forces. 

Chairman LEVIN. It will be placed in the record. 

[The information referred to follows:]

What immediately comes to mind is additional forces for Afghanistan. I’ve said 

Afghanistan is an economy-of-force campaign and there are force requirements there 

that we can’t currently meet. So, having forces in Iraq don’t—at the level they’re 

at—don’t allow us to fill the need that we have in Afghanistan. 

Equally broadly around the world, there are other places we would put forces—

or capabilities, not so much brigade combat teams as other kind of enabling capabilities or small training teams, that we just can’t because of the pressure that’s on 

our forces right now in the Central Command. I think we’ll continue to be there 

until, should conditions allow, we start to be able to reduce our force levels in Iraq.

134

Senator WARNER. We’ll have the Secretary of Defense and Admiral Mullen tomorrow, but I just wanted to get your views on that. 

Dr. Bacevich, I listened to you, and I agree 100 percent, we’re not 

in control in Iraq. When I look back at World War II, my recollection is, we went into these areas that we conquered, Germany and 

so forth, we declared martial law and took charge and ran it until 

such time as they manifested the capability to go out and establish 

their governments. The transition was fairly smooth. 

Here, we roared in under the concept of democracy, and planted 

the democracy tree, and elections were held, and the rest is history. 

I think the Maliki Government does pretty much as it pleases, in 

my judgment; and that’s regrettable. I don’t suggest that our Department of State and DOD aren’t trying to do everything possible 

to leverage that government to accelerate political reconciliation. 

I happen to have a personal thesis. If suddenly the Iraqi people 

and this government awaken to the fact that if we stopped our internecine fighting, went down and began to produce the natural resources in this country, and take the funds from those natural resources and rebuild our cities, you could create an Iraq which 

would be the envy of the whole Middle East, in terms of structure 

and education and medicine and care for its people. But, we’re in 

this deadlock of these centuries-old animosities and hatred between 

these people, riddled with corruption, and it’s difficult. 

I commend our forces, the men and women of the Armed Forces 

and their families. They have taken a tremendous sacrifice to give 

the Iraqi people this chance. We haven’t given up on trying to 

make it come through. 

General Keane, I was interested, you just referred to the south, 

and you called the groups down there a bunch of thugs and so 

forth. I agree with you. This is what troubles me about the way we 

conduct these hearings and the terms that we use. We have to remember, they go out of here, and the media, in large measure, accurately transmits what’s said. 

I grew up in a generation which I knew what, basically, an army 

was. An army is composed of a divisional headquarters, a series of, 

in the old days, regiments, now you have your combat teams and 

whatever it is, battalions, and on down. We keep calling this the 

Mahdi army. General Keane, it’s not an army, by any means of the 

interpretation and the use of that term which has been used for 

decades. Am I correct? 

General KEANE. Which army, Senator? 

Senator WARNER. We call Sadr’s outfit the Mahdi army. It’s not 

an army, it’s a disparate bunch of people that he’s cobbled together 

through spiritual inspirations, and they’re fighting. It’s not an 

army. They don’t have a divisional headquarters, they don’t have 

regiments, and they don’t have training areas. I mean, what is it 

that we’re fighting over there? 

General KEANE. That’s one of the factions in the south, certainly, 

is the JAM. 

Senator WARNER. Right. We call it the Mahdi army. 

General KEANE. Which is the military side of his Organization of 

the Martyr Sadr. I’ve never referred to it as an army. There’s good 

and bad parts to it. There’s real thugs and killers in that, and some 

of them have been directly fighting U.S. forces present in Iraq, and 

135

there’s others that are defensive militia, who are there to protect 

the people on the streets. 

Senator WARNER. But, here’s my difficulty. We have spent 5 

years training the Iraqi army, and this committee has put untold 

authorizations out for whatever was needed to do it. We now have 

a couple of hundred thousand Iraqi soldiers. There they are. They 

have training camps, practice ranges, armaments, everything. 

They’re fighting this group, call it what you want, the Mahdi army 

and these other militias, which don’t have any of that infrastructure. Yet, what they seem to have is a will to fight and die. Therein 

is their secret weapon and the thing that’s making it effective, as 

we’re struggling, the coalition forces, and so forth, against those 

people. 

Now, how do you describe that will to fight? 

General KEANE. Well, I think that’s true in some of the people 

that we’ve been fighting. Certainly, al Qaeda has reflected that 

will, some of the Sunni mainstream insurgents had that kind of determination, and certain members of the Shiite extremists have it, 

particularly those in the special groups that have been trained in 

Iran and are further committed. They have a low-tech system, certainly, that’s being used against the most powerful military in the 

world, and this is classic insurgency business, here. The fact of the 

matter is that they use the people to shield them and to protect 

them, and that is why the change in strategy that we brought to 

Iraq recently has worked so well. That’s how you defeat them, Senator. You don’t defeat them just by killing them, you defeat them 

by isolating them from the people, so the people themselves reject 

them. 

Senator WARNER. Then I think we should stop calling them the 

Mahdi army. 

Dr. BACEVICH. May I comment, Senator? 

Senator WARNER. Yes. 

Dr. BACEVICH. I think a more accurate term would be militia. 

Senator WARNER. That’s correct. Militia. 

Dr. BACEVICH. Which is also frequently used. The term is apt. A 

militia really is the people armed. 

Senator WARNER. That’s the concept of this country itself. In the 

1700s, we had militias. 

Dr. BACEVICH. Yes, sir. When you think of our history, and the 

fact that, in many respects, the forces that collected around Boston 

in 1775 in the aftermath of Lexington and Concord, the people 

armed were a militia. 

Senator WARNER. They coalesced into George Washington’s army. 

Dr. BACEVICH. Yes, sir, but it’s the militia men, a militia is very 

difficult to extinguish. One can imagine that, through the use of 

conventional military power, you have defeated a militia, when, in 

fact, all you’ve done is disperse it until it gathers to fight another 

day. I personally fear that, to some degree, what we see to be the 

recent success in Iraq is simply that the militia has gone to ground 

or, for its own reasons has chosen to stop fighting for now, and 

they’ll be back tomorrow. 

Senator WARNER. But, they do have an unusual will to fight. 

They fight with less armaments, less protection, and less equipVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:23 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00139 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\45666.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
136

ment. But they fight, and that’s what we’re experiencing down 

there. 

Dr. BACEVICH. Yes, sir. 

Senator WARNER. It’s just tragic that we had 1,000 Iraqi soldiers—that’s what was reported—defect in the heat of battle down 

in this Basrah situation the other day. I’m just wondering, does 

anybody know about what accountability any of those officers have 

been held to, and what Maliki’s doing about it? 

General KEANE. May I just comment on that, Senator? 

Senator WARNER. Yes. 

General KEANE. I mean, there were 15,000 troops involved in 

that operation. 

Senator WARNER. Right. 

General KEANE. Most of those defections came from the malign 

police force. I was down there 2 weeks ago talking to the police 

chief, a former army division commander by the name of Jalil. Very 

good soldier. I said, ‘‘What’s your problem?’’ and he said, ‘‘My biggest problem, General, is that 80 percent of my police force is maligned with some form of militia or another, and I can’t trust them. 

If we try to do anything down here that requires police support,’’ 

he said, ‘‘they’re going to roll on me. They will align themselves 

with their militia.’’ 

Now, that is part of those 1,000 that took place there, and there 

was also some problems with some of the army forces that went 

into Basrah. But, the overwhelming majority of the forces did not 

defect. 

Senator WARNER. Performed quite well. 

General KEANE. Some of their performance was uneven. This is 

pretty typical of the Iraqi army. Now, when they’re with us and 

partnering with us, they do very well. A number of them have been 

able to perform independent operations, and there’s been a lot of 

progress there. 

So, don’t take that little headline and make it something worse 

than what it really is because it’s not. 

Senator WARNER. No, I fully recognize it was a relatively small 

thing. But, it is significant. 

One last point, and I’ll give up my time, here. 

I grew out of a generation of World War II. I claim no personal 

glory myself, but I saw that. Sixteen million men and women were 

trained to fight in that 5-year period. We’ve now crossed that with 

Iraq. Those units were trained, and they were ready to go into battle in 6 or 7 months. We’ve been training these Iraqis for 5 years. 

I just cannot understand how we can continue to accept, ‘‘Oh, well, 

they’ve just begun, and they’re just doing this.’’ Five years of investment, giving them, as far as I know, every possible economic 

support that they needed to do that. 

Dr. MALLEY. May I comment on that? 

Senator WARNER. Yes. 

Dr. MALLEY. I think it brings me back to your former question. 

I think what the Mahdi militia has, which the army doesn’t have, 

or many parts of the army don’t have, is loyalty to a cause, and 

which is why they’re prepared to die for it, which the army doesn’t 

have, to a large extent. It’s not a matter of military training, it’s 

a political question. Do they have something they’re loyal to? Are 

137

they loyal to their sect? Are they loyal to their profession? Or are 

they loyal to a central state that’s viewed as legitimate? Until you 

reach that threshold, I think you’re going to find the same frustration that you’ve found, and you’re going to compare them unfavorably to those members of a militia that have a real cause and a 

real will to fight for it. 

General KEANE. I disagree with some of that. The ISFs, and particularly the army, have made significant progress. They are extraordinary in battle. They display tremendous courage. We have 

not had a refusal of a major unit in Iraq in some time. The only 

problem we’ve had is just recently in Basrah, and a lot of that had 

to do with police, as opposed to army forces. 

There’s tremendous will to fight in that force. In my last visit to 

Iraq, I did not find a single battalion or brigade commander who 

did not point out to me an Iraqi unit that they were proud of and 

thought they could fight on their own. That was different than visits in 2007. This slope may not be fast enough for any of us, but 

the slope is an improving slope, for sure. 

I’m convinced that we’re going to be able to transition to the 

Iraqis and bring our combat forces out of there, because they will 

have the capability to do that. But, we need a little bit more time 

to do it. 

Senator WARNER. Well, everybody says, ‘‘We need a little bit 

more time.’’ Can you definitize ‘‘need a little bit more time’’? 

General KEANE. As I said before, I think we’ll make further reductions in 2009, below where we are right now. 

Senator WARNER. Of U.S. forces? 

General KEANE. In our forces, and then I think, probably in 

2010, we’ll transition our mission, which is no longer protect-thepeople counterinsurgency, and we’ll start to do more of training the 

ISFs, to finish the training that they need, and that would mean 

that they begin to take over much of the responsibilities that we 

have. This cannot be done overnight, but the progress is there. If 

we take the measured course that General Petraeus has laid out 

for us, I think it is very likely we’re going to have a favorable outcome in Iraq. 

Senator WARNER. My time is up. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks, to the witnesses. 

I want to ask a few questions, General Keane, through this perspective, which you alluded to, which is, in the midst of all the controversy about the war, there’s no one that really wants to stay 

there in a conflict forever. This is really, ultimately, a question of 

what pace do we withdraw our forces, and based on what standards, and, implicitly, what kind of condition do we leave behind? 

So, with that context, I do want to ask you about a few of the 

arguments that we hear in this debate for essentially not following 

General Petraeus’s counsel yesterday, leaving it to conditions on 

the ground, in his judgment, during this period of consolidation and 

evaluation, but pressing harder for an earlier withdrawal. 

One is what Senator Warner was asking you about, I want to ask 

you to go back to it, which is stress on the Army. You have 37 

138

years, yourself, of experience in the U.S. Army leadership, and 

you’ve kept very close to what’s happening in Iraq. So, I want to 

invite you to go back to what you were saying, because there are 

people who say, because of the stress on the Army, we should be 

withdrawing more rapidly, almost regardless of conditions on the 

ground. As a matter of fact, I think people would say ‘‘regardless 

of conditions on the ground.’’ I want you to work that through. How 

would you balance the stress on the Army against the mission we 

have in Iraq? 

General KEANE. Well, certainly that premise, that because of the 

stress on the Army, which one would expect to have, and which we 

did have in all the major wars we have fought of consequence, and 

particularly those that were lengthy. In some of those wars, we actually broke the Army, because the purpose of that event was justified by that expenditure. That’s the harsh reality of it. 

In this case, national interests at stake, the security of the American people, I believe, are directly related to these two wars that 

we are fighting. So, it has purpose and meaning to us, regardless 

of what the motivation was to go in initially. Our Army is stressed 

by that, primarily because it is not large enough to be able to endure both of these conflicts. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Agreed. 

General KEANE. We should realize that is the elephant in the 

room here with us, and never let go of that, and help these two institutions grow. 

That said, I don’t believe for a minute that what we should do 

is take risk in Iraq with our force-reduction program to relieve the 

stress on the Army or the Marine Corps. I don’t know how risking 

a humiliating defeat in Iraq would ever help those two institutions 

maintain the viability that they need if they, in fact, have suffered 

a humiliating defeat. I was part of something like that, as a platoon leader and company commander coming out of the Vietnam 

war, and then as a major, watching us lose that war. The psychological and emotional impact on the officers and noncommissioned 

officers, the professional corps of the military, was very significant. 

We lost our way for a while, to be frank about it, and you know 

that. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

General KEANE. Nobody wants to be a part of a force like that. 

The other thing is, this vague notion that we need the forces to 

do something else. What are we really talking about, here? Are we 

talking about Pakistan, with ground forces? I think not. Are we 

talking about the Pacific Rim, with ground forces? I think not. Are 

we talking about more forces for Afghanistan? Yes. Do we need 

more forces in Afghanistan? We do. That’s true. I think those forces 

will be available for deployment in Afghanistan eventually, but not 

right now from the United States. Afghanistan, let’s be frank about 

it, is a secondary effort compared to Iraq. Iraq has a higher priority. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I want to come to that with you in a minute. 

I agree with everything you’ve said. It seems to me that to risk a 

defeat based on the best counsel of our commanders on the ground, 

by accelerating the withdrawal of our forces from Iraq sooner than 

they advise because we need to have forces available for some posVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:23 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00142 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\45666.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
139

sible potential speculative conflict somewhere else doesn’t make 

any sense. 

The second point is the one that Senator McCain, I think, was 

making in his earlier question, which is, yes, the Army is under 

stress, you’re worried about breaking a force; but you can break a 

force, and probably more likely will break a force, by letting that 

force be defeated. The morale of our troops in Iraq today is very 

high. There is tremendous pride in what is being accomplished. If 

you want to break it, pull out the rug from under them. 

I want to ask you to go to Afghanistan, because here is a second 

argument made for a congressionally-mandated accelerated withdrawal from Iraq, and I’ll try to state the argument fairly, that we 

are essentially fighting the wrong fight, that we are engaged more 

deeply in the less consequential of the battlefields in the global war 

on terrorism in Iraq, and, as a result, we have taken our eye off 

the ball, we have lost our focus on the key battlefield, which is Afghanistan. 

I know that you have visited Afghanistan and Pakistan. So, I 

want you to give me your response to the argument that we’d be 

better off taking troops out, regardless of conditions on the ground. 

I may be overstating the case; but regardless of the advice of commanders on the ground, to put them into Afghanistan as soon as 

possible, because that’s the main event, regardless of what happens 

in Iraq. 

General KEANE. Yes. Afghanistan certainly is important to us, 

and I would never want to diminish what we’re trying to achieve 

there. We have problems in Afghanistan, but al Qaeda is not the 

central enemy in Afghanistan. What has taken place there is the 

Taliban have resurged, and they’re trying to come back, and 

they’ve made some inroads in the south, and the government is 

very weak in the south. This is not of the crisis stage in Afghanistan that we were dealing with in Iraq in 2006, when al Qaeda and 

the Sunni insurgents created the bloodbath in Iraq and were 

threatening regime survival. That is the important distinction. 

There is no threat to regime survival in Afghanistan. There is a 

problem in Afghanistan in the south. It is aided and abetted by the 

Pakistanis because there is a Taliban safe haven in Pakistan that 

we’re all familiar with. 

Two things can be done in Afghanistan. One is, eliminate that 

sanctuary, and two is, provide some additional forces in the south. 

I think that was the basis for the President’s discussion at the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the week before last, to get 

more forces to do that, and also for the additional marine forces. 

Here’s the other point I want to make. If we are talking about 

pressuring General Petraeus so that he provides another brigade or 

two for 2008, that would not be decisive in Afghanistan, but it 

could be very decisive in Iraq, in terms of what the consequences 

of that reduction could be. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me ask you a final question, just on 

that. My time’s up, so I’m going to ask you to be as brief as you 

can. Take the argument on the other side of this to what I think 

is its logical conclusion. If we started to forcibly withdraw, or mandate a withdrawal of our troops from Iraq, risking defeat there, 

and, in fact, are defeated, and we do it because we want to focus 

140

on Afghanistan, what would the effect on the war in Afghanistan 

be if, essentially, chaos developed in Iraq? 

General KEANE. Well, I mean, certainly suffering a humiliating 

defeat is not going to help you prosecute another war with a similar adversary, nor does it help you with the relationship of our allies, who count on the United States to be there when they say 

they’re going to be there. It certainly encourages our adversaries 

and the radical Islamists, and al Qaeda, in particular. But, also, I 

think one of the enduring qualities that we have about us is our 

reliability and our commitment, and we stick with them, even 

though there’s a degree of difficulty, uncertainty, and sacrifice 

that’s associated with it. There’s no country in the world that has 

ever made the degree of sacrifices that we have made to help other 

beleaguered nations in the world. The record’s extraordinary. To 

back away so that we could help another friend a number of miles 

away makes no sense to me, in terms of taking that kind of risk. 

It endangers the United States and puts us further at risk in the 

world. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, General. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this 

hearing. Number one, I thought you did an excellent job yesterday, 

as chairman. That was one of the best hearings I’ve attended. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator GRAHAM. It was thoughtful and full of difficult issues. 

I really enjoy our discussions here, because people in decisionmaking capacities have to have some framework from which to 

work off of. I think one of the fundamental questions that I have 

to address, as a Senator, and where I want to go with this: Is Iraq 

part of a global struggle now, or a more isolated event? For us to 

come to grips with where to go, I think we have to come to grips 

with our failures. 

General Keane, is it fair to say that the surge is corrective action 

being taken because of the past strategy failing? 

General KEANE. Yes. Absolutely. We made a decision to transition to the ISFs, so they, in fact, could defeat the insurgency. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

General KEANE. We never made the decision to defeat it ourselves. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do the other two witnesses generally agree 

with that, that our first 4 years here were going backwards, not 

forward? 

Dr. MALLEY. Yes. 

Dr. BACEVICH. Yes, sir, I agree. But, beyond that, I think that 

the initial decision to invade Iraq was a mistake. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well noted. But, I have to make a decision. I 

can’t go back in time. If I could go back in time, there are a lot 

of things I would do differently. The first thing I would do is, when 

the Soviets left Afghanistan, I would have done things differently, 

because vacuums are going to be filled. That’s the one thing I’ve 

learned, Dr. Malley, is that in this ideological struggle—and that’s 

what it is; it’s not a capital to conquer or a navy to sink or an air 

141

force to shoot down, it’s an ideological struggle. We paid a heavy 

price, I think, once the Soviets left, people filled in that vacuum. 

My biggest fear now, Dr. Bacevich, is that whatever mistake we’ve 

made in the past, the first job I have is not to compound that mistake. So, my premise is that we can have an honest disagreement 

about what we should have done, and I would argue a bit that 

leaving Saddam Hussein in power after ignoring 17 United Nations 

(U.N.) resolutions, given his history, is not a status quo event, that 

you can’t go back in time and say, ‘‘We shouldn’t have invaded,’’ 

without some consequence, in terms of this regime that we replaced 

living off the Oil-for-Food Program. I don’t think it was a static situation. I think very much that the U.N. would become a lesser 

body than it is today if you allow dictators like Saddam Hussein 

to constantly ignore them. But, that’s a legitimate debate, and that 

debate’s behind us. 

Now, what to do now? The new strategy is a result from failure. 

The new strategy bought into the idea, as I understand it, General 

Keane, that the missing ingredient in Iraq was not a lethargic 

Iraqi people, indifferent to their fate, that was relying upon us to 

do everything, but an Iraqi people under siege that could not develop military capacity as they’re being attacked and fought at the 

recruiting station, and an Iraqi Government that was under siege, 

where sectarian violence knocked politicians down. The way to 

break through, in terms of military capacity and political progress, 

was to provide better security. Is that the underpinning theory of 

the surge? 

General KEANE. Yes, absolutely. The general election was held in 

December 2005, and constitutional referendum in October-November. Maliki was forming his government from January through the 

end of March 2006, when the Samarra Mosque bombing occurred, 

in February, with the single purpose and the intent to provoke the 

Shiite militias into an overreaction, as a result of that mosque 

bombing, to undermine the government. So, our problem that we 

had was a security situation, and the compromise that we had 

made in the past, of not putting security first as a necessary precondition to political and economic progress, had failed. We had to 

put security first. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, let’s look forward. There are two points 

in time, from the fall of Baghdad to January 2007. I think any objective observer would say that strategy failed to produce results. 

Reconciliation is a word. If you look at other conflicts in history, 

you name the civil strife, whether it be religious-based or ethnically-based, there has to be a level of looking forward, versus 

backward. 

Now, what’s happened from January 2007 to the present day? I 

would argue, and I would like to hear your thoughts on this, that 

the amnesty law that’s yet to be implemented, but about to be implemented, is a giant step forward, in this regard. It’s the Shiites 

and the Kurds saying to the Sunnis that are in jail that took up 

arms against the new Iraq, against the Iraq where Shiites and 

Kurds would have a bigger say, 17,000 people have had their applications for amnesty approved, out of 24,000 who have applied. Is 

that not an act of sectarian forgiveness that is a precondition to 

reconciliation? Isn’t that something that is a positive trend? 

142

General KEANE. In my mind, that and other programs like it that 

the Iraqis are implementing is all about reconciliation. I don’t believe we’re going to have this national compact, as Dr. Malley is 

suggesting, of some kind of Kumbaya event. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

General KEANE. That’s not the way this is going to take place. 

This is a tribal society, and it’s not going to work that way. This 

is significant, in what you are suggesting, and so is deBaathification. 

Senator GRAHAM. Now, I’m from South Carolina, so we know 

about civil war. It started in my State. So, we can’t rewrite our history. All those struggles they’re having in Iraq have been known 

to other people. 

Now, let’s talk about the provincial election law. If it becomes a 

reality, and I don’t want to keep us here any longer, Mr. Chairman, 

but the point that gives me optimism now, versus before the surge, 

is that there has been some actions taken in Baghdad that are 

positive, in my opinion. The provincial election law was agreed to 

by all the major parties, and it’s a chance to vote in October 2008. 

From what I can understand, based on my visits to Anbar, the 

Sunnis are going to take this opportunity, this time around, to participate in elections. To me, that is a statement by the Sunnis to 

the Shiites and the Kurds that there is a better way to relate to 

each other, ‘‘We’re going to use the ballot box to send elected representatives to the provinces, and eventually to Baghdad.’’ Isn’t 

that a major step forward, a sea change in Sunni relationship to 

the central government and to the people at large? 

General KEANE. It absolutely is. I had in my statement that a 

poll has been taken among the Sunnis, and they indicate that 90 

percent of them will vote in the provincial elections, and a similar 

amount in the general election in 2009. So, what is that saying? 

That is saying that the Sunni people themselves are reconciling 

with the Government of Iraq. They want to participate in the political process. They know this is a Shiite-dominated government, but 

they want to enter that process. Overwhelmingly, the majority of 

the Sunni insurgent leaders are part of that process now. 

Senator GRAHAM. Let’s take the budget. Now, the one thing that 

Senator Levin and I have in common is that we understand the 

value of money in politics. Senator Levin is a very good representative for the State of Michigan, because Michigan gets their fair 

share, and I try to do the same for South Carolina. But, the $48-

billion budget that was recently passed, to me, is a major move forward, simply because money, in politics, is power. 

You’re having the Sunnis and the Shiites and the Kurds agreeing 

to divide up the resources of the Nation. To me, that is a statement 

by each group that, ‘‘I am entitled to some of this money, but so 

are you.’’ That is something that is encouraging. We’re a long way 

from having this thing resolved the way we would like, but I would 

argue, General Keane, because of you and others, that we’ve turned 

it around, and that we’re moving in the right direction. 

From a political point of view, I can tell you, as a politician, 

when you share money with other people, you see value in the role 

they play. 

143

So, I would just like to end this, Mr. Chairman, with the idea 

that better security has led to economic, political, and military 

progress, but for me to say that the war has been won and over 

would be a gross misstatement. I do believe we’re going to leave, 

as you say, General Keane, here’s what drives my train, gentlemen. 

I know, from a historical point of view, Dr. Malley, that I will not 

be judged by the date the troops came home. But, the people who 

follow behind me will judge me and others during this time in history by what we left behind in Iraq. I am confident that the only 

way we’re going to win the war as a whole against radical Islam 

is defeat it where you find it. Al Qaeda was not in Iraq before we 

invaded, you’re right, but they’re there now. I do believe that one 

of the success stories of the last year and a half is that they have 

been punished. The Muslims in Iraq took up arms against al 

Qaeda, and anytime that happens, America and the world is safer. 

Does anyone disagree with that? 

Dr. Bacevich? 

Dr. BACEVICH. Sir, I hope this is one of these things where we 

can have an honest disagreement. 

Senator GRAHAM. Absolutely, we can. 

Dr. BACEVICH. I just don’t share the optimism about reconciliation. What I would say is, if indeed everybody in Iraq is keen on 

reconciling, then let’s get out of the way, let’s let them reconcile 

and be able, therefore, to achieve the success. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you think we’re standing in the way of 

them reconciling? 

Dr. BACEVICH. I do think that, to some degree, our presence becomes an excuse, a crutch, something that different groups can use 

to play with. 

Senator GRAHAM. I gotcha. 

Dr. BACEVICH. To my mind, the insistence that we hear from 

General Petraeus about taking the pause, the counsel from General 

Keane about not being too hasty now and putting at risk anything 

that we’ve gained, all is suggestive of, perhaps, some doubts on 

their part that this reconciliation express train is moving quite that 

rapidly. That would be my concern. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, I think they have honest doubts. I don’t 

know the eventual outcome. I see progress. But, my point was 

about the Anbar environment changing, where Iraqi Muslims rejected al Qaeda, apparently, and aligned with us. To me, that is a 

positive step in the overall war on terror. Do you agree? 

Dr. BACEVICH. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

General Keane? How significant is that? 

General KEANE. Excuse me, sir? 

Senator GRAHAM. How significant is what happened in Anbar 

vis-a-vis al Qaeda? 

General KEANE. Oh, I think it’s a stunning achievement, and 

very well appreciated in the Arab world, when you talk to people 

in other countries. It is the first time that a majority of people have 

rejected al Qaeda at the expense of their own lives. Essentially, 

that message is carried around the Arab Muslim world. When you 

pick up the traffic of al Qaeda themselves, they talk about it in 

terms of a defeat, themselves, by the Sunnis, ‘‘We’ve been defeated 

144

by the Sunnis in Iraq.’’ They’re reluctant to admit, ‘‘The Americans 

are killing us,’’ but, ‘‘We’ve been defeated by the Sunnis in Iraq.’’ 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You’ve been more 

than generous with your time. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, gentlemen, it’s been a great discussion. You’re helping our country. Thank you for coming. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham. 

By the way, Dr. Malley, did you want to add anything? 

Dr. MALLEY. Just on this process of reconciliation, I’d make two 

points. 

I believe, as General Keane said, that reconciliation is not a moment, it’s a process. My doubt is whether this Iraqi Government 

and its allies are seriously, genuinely engaged in that process. 

There are a number of laws, I would say some may be more optimistic about whether they’re going to be implemented, and whether 

the implementation will be nonpartisan, as opposed to politicized, 

which happened to de-Baathification or to the amnesty law. My 

view is, we have to keep the government’s feet to the fire and provide real pressure, which I haven’t seen so far, to make sure that 

these steps are genuinely taken, rather than simply, ‘‘Let’s sign a 

piece of paper, because that’s what Vice President Cheney asked us 

to do, but the minute they turn around, we’re going to do it our 

way.’’ 

Chairman LEVIN. That’s the whole issue here. It’s not whether 

or not we want to maximize chances of success in Iraq. Everybody 

wants to do that. The suggestion that the other side of the coin 

from the current policy is a dismal defeat in Iraq is ignoring the 

argument, which is made by at least two of our witnesses here 

today, I believe, that the way to maximize success in Iraq is to put 

pressure on the Iraqis to work out a political settlement. 

Everybody agrees there’s no military solution here. Everyone 

mouths the words, ‘‘There’s no military solution.’’ Some people 

mean it. Some people, I don’t think really understand what they’re 

saying. If there’s no military solution here, then we have to force 

a political solution. Then the question is: How do you do it? That’s 

where the big divide is; more and more troops, or keeping the 

troops there in the hope of creating some kind of an atmosphere 

where the politicians can work out a solution. That’s what the supporters of the status quo and the current policy is. Those of us who 

feel that the only way to get a political solution is to force the politicians to reach a political solution by ending this open-ended commitment, which is clearly open-ended, there is no end that is projected for it; even this so-called pause, which, by definition, means 

a brief period. When you look up the term ‘‘pause’’ in the dictionary, it means a relatively brief period. 

Yesterday, General Petraeus destroyed that idea, that the pause 

is going to be brief. What is it? Forty-five days, it’s going to be examined, I think. That takes you to the middle of September. Then 

there is an indeterminate period to assess. No end in sight. 

I even asked General Petraeus, yesterday, ‘‘What if things go 

well? Would you then say we will begin to reduce again?’’ He would 

not even say that. I said, ‘‘What if things go well by the end of the 

year? Can you then say we will start our reductions again then?’’ 

He would not make a commitment. It doesn’t make any difference 

145

to this policy whether things go well or things go terribly; the answer is the same, ‘‘Maintain your military presence,’’ even though 

the consensus is, ‘‘There’s no military solution.’’ 

Now, I think a majority of the American people do not want a 

precipitous withdrawal. That is also used by the supporters of the 

status quo, that, ‘‘The opponents of this policy want a precipitous 

withdrawal.’’ No, they don’t. They want a planned, careful, 

thought-out timetable that gives the Iraqi political leaders the opportunity to reach a political settlement. That is what has been 

proposed. That’s what got 53 votes in the U.S. Senate. That’s what 

has a majority vote in the House of Representatives. Not something 

which is precipitous, immediate, but something which has a plan 

to it, which ends this open-endedness which the Iraqi political leaders think they have a commitment to. 

General, you said it shouldn’t be open-ended. But, I don’t see how 

the current policy is anything but open-ended. We had a statement 

by Secretary Gates, not too long ago, that it was his plan to continue these reductions after the surge. That’s out the window. Then 

he said it would be a brief pause. That apparently is out the window. We had the President of the United States say that by the 

end of 2007 we would turn over the security of the country to the 

Iraqis. That’s what he said would happen when he introduced the 

pause in early 2007. We have not turned over security in key areas. 

Obviously, we have, in peaceful areas. But, in the key areas, we 

have not. 

I visited the north of Iraq, 3 weeks ago. In those 4 provinces up 

there, we were told that there were 110 combined operations in the 

previous 3 months. There were more Iraqi troops up there than 

American troops. Seventy percent, or 60 percent of the Iraqi troops 

were able to take the lead in a combined operation. That’s the statistics which we’ve been given. So, there’s as many Iraqi troops in 

those four provinces capable of taking the lead in combined operations as there are American troops. Yet in only 10 out of 110 combined operations did the Iraqis take the lead. That’s 9 percent. 

Economically, they are building up these huge surpluses. These 

incredible surpluses being built up at $100-a-barrel oil; 2 million 

barrels a day are exported by Iraq, and we’re still paying for most 

of their reconstruction? 

If you want to talk about dependency, that is what is continuing, 

here. It is a dependency on our presence and our money. Militarily, 

in those four provinces at least, we’re still taking the lead 90 percent of the time, despite the ability of their troops to do so. Economically, we’re still spending more for their reconstruction. Politically, we can talk all about these benchmarks having been met. No, 

they haven’t been met. Most of the ones that have been, where the 

legislation has been adopted, depend on implementation. They have 

not, in many cases, been implemented yet. 

Senator Graham talked about this provincial elections law. Well, 

there’s a provincial power law, but there is not yet a provincial 

elections law. That depends upon the Iraqi legislative body acting. 

They have not yet acted to put into place the machinery that will 

allow those October 1 elections to take place. 

I think you would all agree it’s important that those elections do 

take place. I think everybody believes it’s important that they take 

146

place. But, there’s a real question as to whether they will take 

place or not. I’m not saying that based on just my assessment, 

that’s based on the assessments of those who have the responsibility to make these kinds of assessments. 

So, all in all, what we come down to is not the question of whether or not it’s important to, ‘‘leave Iraq in better condition than we 

found it,’’ whether or not it’s important that it be a stable place. 

I think everybody wants that. The question is whether or not the 

current course that we’re on, with all of our eggs in the Maliki basket, and when he fights a different part of the Shiite community, 

we’re with him. 

We are right in the middle of a sectarian conflict. It was General 

Odierno, the other day, that called this an intercommunal struggle. 

Do you agree with that, General, this is an intercommunal struggle 

in Basrah? 

General KEANE. Certainly, there are 42 different militia organizations in and around Basrah alone. But, you have to draw back 

from that and take a look at what really happened. We had no control there. The Brits pulled out of there 2 years ago, and militia 

groups took over and maligned the police force. So, what are we 

doing? We’re going down there to provide security and control so 

that, yes, the political process can move forward. That’s what it’s 

about. 

Chairman LEVIN. Yes, but we went down there, not because they 

followed our advice; despite our advice. General Keane, I think you 

used a term, which is a very interesting term I found, back, I 

think, a few days ago, when you said that Maliki is, ‘‘way in front 

of the military realities on the ground.’’ 

You acknowledge, and I think General Petraeus acknowledged, 

yesterday, it took a couple of times to ask him, and we’re dragged 

in with Maliki. 

General KEANE. But, Senator, what we’re talking about here is 

probably a month or 2. That’s the only difference. We have a campaign that’s going to last a number of months to gain control of the 

southern provinces before the provincial election. General Petraeus 

was working on that plan, I believe, raising in front of the Iraqi 

leadership all of the issues in the south, as a result of the many 

meetings he was having, some of which he was having while I was 

there. 

Chairman LEVIN. He lays out a plan which is thoughtful, which 

is building up pressure. What happens to the guy we’re supporting? 

He trashes the plan by a precipitous action. Maliki undermines the 

plan which Petraeus had laid out, and we just simply continue to 

defend Maliki. 

General KEANE. So, you don’t want to give him any credit. 

Chairman LEVIN. Maliki, for what? 

General KEANE. We’ve been beating this guy up for 2 years, saying, ‘‘This thing is not just about Sunnis and al Qaeda, this is really about Shiite extremists.’’ 

Chairman LEVIN. Let’s go through the credits——

General KEANE. So, he steps up to the plate and starts to do 

something about it. Yes, it’s a little ill-conceived, and it wasn’t 

properly planned. In the long run, let’s focus on how it ends and 

not how it began. 

147

Chairman LEVIN. I agree with that. But, when you say ‘‘give him 

a little credit,’’ I don’t give him credit for precipitously going to the 

plate and swinging wildly. No, I don’t. Because it raises a question 

as to what his motive is and whether or not there’s a political motive in his mind, in terms of the power struggle he is in, politically, 

perhaps, with the Sadrists. So, it raises a big question as to his motivation. The wisdom of putting all of the eggs in the basket of 

someone who clearly is not someone who is nonsectarian, who has 

his own political ax to grind. So, that is where I have a lot of problems. 

General KEANE. Well, I’m going to be the last to say that he’s 

not—— 

Chairman LEVIN. It’s not a matter of whether or not we want to 

succeed. This isn’t a question of whether or not you want to succeed in Iraq. The question is whether or not the Maliki course of 

action, which we are totally locked at the hip on, is the right way 

to go. That’s the specific question. Or whether not we should end 

this open-ended commitment and let Maliki and others know, 

‘‘Folks, we’ve been there 5 years, we’re spending $12 billion a 

month, we’ve lost 4,000-plus troops, this is longer than World War 

II, we’ve given you an opportunity.’’ Now we’re saying, objectively, 

the first 3 years were wasted, now we’re saying that? There were 

some of us that were saying that was the wrong course, 3 years 

ago. But, we were then told, ‘‘You’re defeatists. You want to surrender.’’ That’s what we heard, 4 years ago, 3 years ago, 2 years 

ago. No, we don’t. We want to succeed as much as anybody else. 

The question is: Does this course that we’re on lead to a conclusion 

which is a good conclusion, or does this lead to greater and greater 

intercommunal conflict? That’s the issue. 

It’s an issue where we have different points of view, and yesterday, by the way, when General Petraeus was asked, ‘‘Could reasonable people differ on this issue?’’ he would not even concede that 

reasonable people could reach a different conclusion than he did, I 

have to tell you, I was struck by that. I was so sure that General 

Petraeus would say, ‘‘Of course reasonable people can differ.’’ All 

three of you are reasonable people, sitting at this table, and you 

differ with each other. Does that mean you’re not reasonable people? You’re all reasonable people. You have very strong opinions 

that differ with each other. But, not to concede that somebody who 

differs with his approach, which is just a continuation of an openended commitment that those people are reasonable, it seems to 

me, showed the lack of a balance on his part to see the other side 

of this issue and to at least acknowledge the possibility, even 

though he disagrees with it, that the best course of action here may 

be to force the Iraqis to use the only leverage we have, which is 

our presence and the departure of most of our troops as a way of 

forcing them to accept a consensus position, ‘‘There is no military 

solution, there is only a political solution.’’ 

Now, I’ve talked long enough, and I haven’t taken time for my 

colleagues, but I want to give all of you a chance to sum up. Why 

don’t we go in the same order 

Dr. Bacevich? 

Dr. BACEVICH. I guess I would sum up just with two points. It’s 

a great honor for me just to come and be part of this event. My 

148

frustration stems from the fact that the subject is Iraq, and the 

subject ends up being narrowly Iraq, and therefore, the conversation tends not to get around to the larger strategic questions. 

I’ll repeat a point I made earlier, that, in my judgment at least, 

the continuation of this war serves to preclude a discussion over 

what ought to be our response to violent Islamic radicalism, given 

the failure of the Bush strategy, given the failure of the freedom 

agenda, and the failure of the doctrine of preventive war. General 

Keane himself acknowledged, earlier on, we don’t have a strategy. 

As important as this war is, and trying to find a way to get out 

of it, it is the absence of a strategy, and really an absence of a clear 

understanding of how great or how limited the threat posed by violent Islamic radicalism that simply has been lost. 

I guess I would recommend to you, Senator, that some part of the 

conversation, at some point, should get to these larger strategic 

issues. 

But, thank you very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Dr. Bacevich. 

General Keane? 

General KEANE. Thank you. Just briefly. 

I share your frustration and the frustration of other members of 

the committee, in terms of the time of our involvement here and 

the thought that what really goes on is, we’re just kicking the can 

down the road some more. But, the fact of the matter is, there really is a new strategy at play, it has worked to resolve a lot of the 

major conflict in the central region. We will finish al Qaeda this 

year. I’m also convinced we’re going to bring stability in the south. 

It’s not as tough a problem as what we dealt with in the central 

region. 

Maliki now, for the first time ever, has the backing of all the political parties behind him in what he’s doing in the south, except 

for the Sadrist Party. That is something, in and of itself. 

Let’s be honest, our government browbeat Maliki into the national legislative agenda. Then, last time General Petraeus and 

Ambassador Crocker were here, we were beating up on them because they didn’t do any of it. Now they’ve done 12 of 18, and 4 

of the 6 significant legislative ones that will have dramatic impact 

on the people. Now we’re beating them up to say it hasn’t been implemented. 

To get to where they were took months of compromise and negotiations, and you know far better than me, in terms of getting complicated major sovereign-state issues like that passed, and they did. 

That deserves some recognition and some credit. If executed, and 

I believe it will be, it will change Iraq, as will the provincial elections, as will amnesty and the de-Ba’athification laws. 

Yes, I am optimistic. This is not an open-ended contract, Senator. 

It is not. I mean, our policy is to transition to the ISFs. 

Chairman LEVIN. That’s been true for years. 

General KEANE. Your frustration is that for 3 years we had the 

wrong policy. That’s true. We have the right policy now, and we 

will transition to the ISFs. But, you’re not going to get General 

Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker in here and lay out a time 

schedule on when that’s going to be. They have too many variables 

to cope with. But, at the same time, I can provide you a framework 

149

for that, because I’m not accountable, the way they are, and I’m 

convinced it’s pretty close. We will transition, and I think if you 

put the two schedules out on a piece of paper, I’m not sure they’re 

all that different, except for the crowd that wants a precipitous immediate withdrawal. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay, thank you, General Keane. 

Dr. Malley? 

Dr. MALLEY. Senator, I would start where you left off, which is 

that this is not a military struggle in which there are parties to be 

defeated and parties that are going to win. This is a political struggle in which deals are going to have to be made, for the most part, 

putting al Qaeda aside. That’s what this is about. That’s where we 

have to decide whether our mission makes sense or not. 

My fear, as I said earlier, is that we may have wise tactics, but 

we don’t have a strategy. We don’t have a strategy to achieve 

achievable goals. The real onus has to be on the Maliki Government, on the Iraqi Government. 

This military mission has a point and has a purpose only if it is 

set in the context of a strategy, achievable goals, where we put the 

onus on the Iraqi Government to do what it needs to do, and where 

we have a regional strategy, so that whenever we leave, we do it 

in an environment that is less polarized and less tense. But again, 

to echo what you said, I think we’ve done more than our part. Now 

it’s up to them. 

Chairman LEVIN. Gentlemen, you’ve been great. This kind of discussion is exactly what I know our colleagues relish and welcome, 

regardless of their own predilections, which the American people, 

I think, are really into, in terms of a debate on Iraq policy again, 

and that’s healthy. 

We will stand adjourned, with our gratitude. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS

DRAWDOWN OF TROOPS

1. Senator COLLINS. Dr. Bacevich, General Keane, and Dr. Malley, will a pause 

in the drawdown after July ease the pressure on the Iraqis to make progress in 

meeting these important political and economic benchmarks? 

Dr. BACEVICH. The question assumes that actions on our part—whether sending 

more troops to Iraq or pulling some of them out—can fundamentally affect the behavior of the Iraqi Government. I’m not sure that I buy that assumption. It’s far 

more likely that Iraqi politics have a dynamic that derives from domestic Iraqi considerations related to ethnic, tribal, and sectarian identity. In short, whatever the 

trajectory of Iraqi politics, whether toward democracy or authoritarianism or chaos, 

they will decide and we will find ourselves cast largely in the role of spectators. 

General Keane did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will 

be retained in committee files. 

Dr. Malley did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be 

retained in committee files.

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

2. Senator COLLINS. General Keane, one of the most important benchmarks is the 

need to increase the number of Iraqi security force (ISF) units capable of operating 

independently. The news reports that 1,000 Iraqis either refused to fight or simply 

abandoned their posts during the Basra offensive are troubling to me and indicate 

that despite the time and funding we have put into training and equipping the Iraqi 

troops, we are not seeing the results we hoped for. Furthermore, both United States 

150

and Iraqi commanders stated in January that the ISF would not be ready to secure 

Iraq from internal threats until 2012, and from external threats until 2018–2020. 

It strikes me that the problem may not be one of resources and training, but of 

motivation—in other words, that Iraqis may be less willing to take responsibility for 

their own security because they know U.S. forces are there indefinitely to back them 

up. 

Why, in your opinion, has the ISF performed so unevenly? 

General Keane did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will 

be retained in committee files. 

3. Senator COLLINS. General Keane, we heard General Petraeus testify yesterday 

that the security situation in Iraq has improved since the implementation of the 

surge and that the number of combat battalions capable of taking the lead in operations has grown to well over 100. 

The report issued by the Independent Commission on the ISF, chaired by retired 

Marine Corps General and former Commandant of the Marine Corps, James Jones, 

suggests that coalition forces could begin to be adjusted, realigned, and re-tasked 

as the ISF becomes more and more capable. General Jones’ report stated that U.S. 

forces could soon be retasked to better ensure territorial defense of the state by concentrating on the eastern and western borders and the active defense of critical infrastructures essential to Iraq. 

This is very similar in many ways to the transition of mission proposed by the 

Iraq Study Group, and also proposed in legislation by Senator Ben Nelson and me. 

We have suggested that our troops transition their mission and focus on border security, counterterrorism operations, training and equipment of Iraqi troops, and protecting Americans and American infrastructure. 

Under what conditions should the U.S. military begin a realignment of the mission in Iraq? 

General Keane did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will 

be retained in committee files.

[Whereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 

(151)

THE SITUATION IN IRAQ, PROGRESS MADE 

BY THE GOVERNMENT IN IRAQ IN MEETING 

BENCHMARKS AND ACHIEVING RECONCILIATION, THE FUTURE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN IRAQ, AND THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN 

THURSDAY, APRIL 10, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m. in room SH–

216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) 

presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy, 

Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, 

Pryor, Webb, Warner, Sessions, Collins, Graham, Cornyn, Thune, 

and Wicker. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional 

staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, 

professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff 

member. 

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican 

staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; Paul 

C. Hutton IV, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L. 

Niemeyer, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional 

staff member; and Dana W. White, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Kevin A. Cronin, and 

Jessica L. Kingston. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman and 

Jay Maroney, assistants to Senator Kennedy; James Tuite, assistant to Senator Byrd; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; 

Bonni Berge, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R. Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; 

Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; M. Bradford Foley, 

assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator 

Webb; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. 

Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Todd Stiefler, assistant to 

Senator Sessions; Jane Alonso and Mark J. Winter, assistants to 

152

Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator 

Chambliss; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; David Hanke 

and Russell J. Thomasson, assistants to Senator Cornyn; Jason 

Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; and Erskine W. Wells III, 

assistant to Senator Wicker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good afternoon, everybody. 

On behalf of the committee, let me welcome you, Secretary Gates 

and Admiral Mullen. We appreciate your willingness to appear before the committee this afternoon. We thank you for a lifetime of 

service to this country. 

The issue before us isn’t whether or not we want to succeed in 

leaving Iraq stable and secure. We all seek that goal. The question 

is how to maximize the chances of success and whether the course 

that we’re on is the right one. 

Since the beginning of this conflict, we’ve tried repeatedly to get 

this administration to change course and to put responsibility on 

the Iraqi leaders for their own future, since just about everybody 

agrees there is no military solution, and only a political settlement 

among the Iraqis can end the conflict. The administration has repeatedly missed opportunities to shift that burden to the Iraqis. 

In September—excuse me, in January 2007, President Bush said, 

in announcing the surge, that, ‘‘The Iraqi Government plans to 

take responsibility for security in all of Iraq’s provinces by November 2007.’’ Clearly, the Iraqis have not taken the lead on security 

in ‘‘all of Iraq’s provinces.’’ As a matter of fact, as of March 2008, 

the Iraqi Government had not assumed security responsibility for 

the most populous provinces. As the fighting in Basrah demonstrated, the Iraqi security hold in provinces for which it is responsible is tenuous at best. 

In February of this year, Secretary Gates said that there was 

within the Department, ‘‘a broad agreement that the drawdown 

should continue,’’ as the added presurge brigades left. Secretary 

Gates, in his written statement to the committee this afternoon, refers to a period of consolidation and evaluation as a ‘‘brief pause.’’ 

Now, that stands in contrast to what General Petraeus said to this 

committee 2 days ago. Under questioning, General Petraeus pointedly refused to use either the word ‘‘brief’’ or ‘‘pause’’ to describe 

how long reductions might be suspended under the approach that 

he was recommending to the President. 

General Petraeus’s recommendation was that there be a ‘‘45-day 

period of consolidation and evaluation,’’ beginning in July, which 

would then be followed by a ‘‘process of assessment, which would 

determine, over time’’—those are his words—when he can make 

recommendations for further reductions. 

In September, in other words, according to General Petraeus’s 

recommendation, a period of assessment would just begin. General 

Petraeus repeatedly refused to estimate how long that assessment 

period would last or how low U.S. troop levels in Iraq might be by 

the end of the year, even if all goes well, which was the question 

put to him. 

What recommendation did President Bush adopt a few hours 

ago? General Petraeus’s open-ended approach or Secretary Gates’s 

153

brief pause? The answer is, since the President said that General 

Petraeus ‘‘will have all the time he needs,’’ and even went so far 

as to say that ‘‘some have suggested that this period of evaluation 

will be a pause’’ and that is misleading, to use the President’s 

words. 

In summary, instead of a continuous reduction beyond presurge 

levels, or even a brief pause, what the President did today was to 

reinforce America’s open-ended commitment in Iraq by suspending 

troop reductions in July for an unlimited period of time. 

The administration’s current policies are perpetuating Iraq’s dependency on the United States—politically, economically, and militarily; and they take the pressure off the Iraqis to reach a political 

solution. The administration has repeatedly expressed its unconditional support for the excessively sectarian government of Prime 

Minister Maliki. Key legislation for reconciliation, including a hydrocarbon law, elections law, and amendments to the constitution, 

have not been passed. The success of other laws will depend upon 

their implementation. 

Our continuing funding of Iraq’s reconstruction makes utterly no 

sense, particularly in light of Iraq’s cash surplus resulting from the 

export of 2 million barrels of oil a day. Prior to the start of the Iraq 

war, the administration told Congress that Iraq would be able to 

finance its own reconstruction through oil revenues, and that they 

would be able to do that in fairly short order. Five years later, U.S. taxpayers have paid at least $27 billion for 

reconstruction activities, while Iraq has reaped the benefits of skyrocketing oil prices. Iraq now has tens of billions of dollars in surplus funds in their banks in accounts around the world, including 

about $30 billion in U.S. banks. 

Furthermore, according to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, the Iraqi Government budgeted $6.2 billion for its 

capital budget in 2006, but spent less than a quarter of that. The 

President said today that ‘‘Iraqis, in their recent budget, would outspend us on reconstruction by more than 10 to 1.’’ However, as of 

August 31, 2007, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Iraqi Government has, in fact, spent only a fraction 

of its $10.1-billion capital budget for 2007. 

Senator Warner and I wrote to the GAO on March 6, asking the 

Comptroller General to look into why the Iraqi Government is not 

spending more of its oil revenue on reconstruction, economic development, and providing essential services for its own people. 

Ambassador Crocker told this committee, on Tuesday, that ‘‘The 

era of U.S.-funded major infrastructure projects is over,’’ and the 

U.S. is no longer ‘‘involved in the physical reconstruction business.’’ 

However, as of last Thursday, the U.S. Government is paying the 

salaries of almost 100,000 Iraqis who are working on reconstruction. Listen to this, at the same time that Ambassador Crocker was 

saying what he said, that the U.S. is no longer involved in the 

physical reconstruction business, and the President today adding 

that ‘‘American funding for large-scale reconstruction projects is 

approaching zero,’’ just this week the committee received a notice 

from the Department of Defense (DOD) that it intends to increase 

U.S. funding for reconstruction for this year by over 50 percent by 

reallocating $590 million of Iraqi security force funds previously 

154

designated for training and equipping and sustaining of the Iraqi 

security forces. The notice that we received from the DOD, from 

the comptroller there, is that the increased funding would be used, 

for example, to build 55 new Iraqi police stations. 

I sent a letter to Secretary Gates earlier today, and we notified 

his comptroller yesterday, requesting that the DOD’s notice to us 

of its plan to use these additional U.S. taxpayer monies to pay for 

Iraqi reconstruction be withdrawn. 

[The information referred to follows:] 


410ful1.eps
155

Chairman LEVIN. Supporters and critics of the Iraq war may disagree over much of the administration’s policy, but can’t we at least 

agree that a country which is awash in cash as the price of oil tops 

$110 a barrel, that Iraq should be using the resources that they 

have to pay for their own reconstruction? 

Again, I welcome our witnesses. I thank them for coming here. 

I know just how difficult their schedule is, and our schedule may 

be comparable to theirs today, since, as of a few minutes ago, we 

had a number of votes scheduled that are going to be stacked to 

begin in a few minutes, and I think that we’ve requested that that 

be changed, that they be delayed until later in the afternoon. But, 

as of now, there is no change. 

Senator Warner. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I join you and other members of the committee in giving you a 

warm welcome and thanks to both of you. 

I’ve had quite a few years experience. It’s been an honor to work 

with the Secretaries of Defense and the Chairmen. I think history 

will record the two of you one of the finest teams that ever served 

the country. 

Secretary Gates, I don’t see your arm in a sling. You’re back in 

every way. You’re going to swing at us a little bit, I hope. Don’t 

feel deterred. 

I also want to thank the service men and women under your 

command, and their families, particularly those families who have 

lost loved ones and those families who are loyally trying to nurse 

back to health the wounded. This country owes them a great debt 

of gratitude. 

This week, we had testimony by General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. I thought it was well prepared. The hearings explored, I believe, all facets, whether or not the answers meet the 

requirements of, individual or collectively, remains to be seen, but 

they came forward and did a real strong effort in that vein. 

We had witnesses yesterday before this committee with some different perspectives on the situation in Iraq. 

I want to commend you, Mr. Chairman, for having a full hearing 

schedule on this very important subject. 

Lastly—that’s Iraq and Afghanistan—lastly, Mr. Secretary, I 

wrote a letter to the President, with a copy to you—and I’ll ask 

unanimous consent that that letter be placed in the record following my opening remarks——

Chairman LEVIN. It will be. 

Senator WARNER.—expressing my grave concern about the narcotrafficking in Afghanistan. It has increased every year. Today, it’s 

so full of drugs getting out of that country, it’s meeting, as I understand it, almost 90 percent of the marketplace. Now, I know you’ve 

tried hard, Mr. Secretary, but the letter asked this matter be 

raised to the top levels of the the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conference, because I think it deserves no less. I find 

it unconscionable that narcotics trafficking, which money is taken 

out of as it proceeds to leave Afghanistan and—goes directly into 

156

the hands of the Taliban, the insurgents, to buy weapons, which 

are used against NATO forces, our independent forces, and other 

allies struggling to achieve the goals in Afghanistan of enabling 

that country to exercise the reins of sovereignty over their people 

and their land. 

I would hope today that you could tell us what NATO did about 

that. I understand, from your able staff, that there was strong consideration, and I think I and my colleagues are very anxious to get 

those reports. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’ll ask to put in a statement by Senator McCain and a further statement of my own. 

But, let’s get to the hearing. We’re anxious to hear from our witnesses. 

Chairman LEVIN. The statement you referred to, of Senator 

McCain, will be made part of the record, as will your letter, as well 

as my letter to Secretary Gates, requesting the withdrawal of this 

shift of $600 million for additional reconstruction projects in Iraq. 

They’ll all be made part of the record. 

[The prepared statements of Senator McCain and Senator Warner follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen to 

the committee. These are challenging times in our Nation’s history and Mr. Chairman, I cannot think of two better men to serve our country and lead our brave men 

and women in uniform. I am grateful for your service and I thank you for testifying 

before us today on U.S. strategy and policy in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

On Tuesday, we heard from Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus on 

progress in Iraq and their thoughts on our way forward. We still face difficulties 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, but we are making progress in both Iraq and Afghanistan. 

While there has been recent fighting in Baghdad and Basra, violence overall is down 

in Iraq. NATO’s recent decision to add troops to Afghanistan is a welcomed and 

positive development for our ongoing fight against al Qaeda and a resurgent 

Taliban. The security, political, and economic gains outlined this week by General 

Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker are real. 

Today, the President addressed the Nation about his way ahead in Iraq, and 

today, we have two men, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, who are supremely aware of the challenges our forces and our policymakers face this year. Congress has a choice—as it did last year—to choose to build 

on the progress we have made or set a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops 

from Iraq resulting in ultimate defeat. 

Last year, many observers predicted that the surge would fail. Yet, sectarian and 

ethnic violence, civilian deaths, and deaths of coalition forces have all fallen dramatically since the middle of last year. This improved security environment presents 

an opportunity for an average Iraqi, in the future, to embrace a more normal political and economic life. Reconciliation is happening. Over the weekend, Sunni, Shia, 

and Kurdish leaders backed the Prime Minister in a statement supporting his operation in Basra and disbanding all the militias. No doubt, much more needs to be 

done and Iraq’s leaders need to know that we expect them to demonstrate the necessary leadership to rebuild their country. But today, it is possible to talk with real 

hope and optimism about the future of Iraq and the results of our efforts there. 

Iraq and Afghanistan lie at the heart of the region. A success in Iraq and Afghanistan means both nations are stable, prosperous, democratic states that do not 

threaten their neighbors and assist in combating terrorists and religious tolerance 

must triumph over violent radicalism. 

Whether Iraq or Afghanistan become stable democracies, or sink back into chaos 

and extremism, the outcome will have long-term implications for this critical part 

of the world as well as our Nation. 

This is broad strategic perspective on our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many 

people ask how do we succeed in Iraq and Afghanistan? The critics said we couldn’t 

meet our goals in Iraq—that they were unachievable. They were wrong a year ago 

and they are wrong now. Since June 2007, sectarian and ethnic violence in Iraq has 

157

been reduced by 90 percent. Overall civilian deaths have been reduced by more than 

70 percent. Deaths of coalition forces have fallen by 70 percent. People are going 

back to work. Markets are open. Oil revenues are climbing. Inflation is down. Iraq’s 

economy is expected to grow by roughly 7 percent in 2008. Political reconciliation 

is occurring across Iraq at the local and provincial grassroots level. Admittedly, political progress at the national level has been too slow, but there is progress. 

I know that the witnesses this morning face formidable challenges and what often 

seems like insurmountable obstacles, but I am confident that they will discuss ways 

in which America can succeed in Iraq and detail the likely costs of our failure to 

Iraq and the region. If the United States chooses to withdraw from Iraq before adequate security is established, we will exchange for victory a defeat that will have 

long lasting and terrible consequences for ourselves, our friends and the region. If 

Iraq or Afghanistan becomes a failed state, they could become a haven for terrorists 

to train and plan their operations. In Afghanistan, it would be a case of history repeating itself—a chance no one is willing to take. Iran’s influence would increase 

in Iraq and would encourage other countries to seek accommodation with Tehran 

at the expense of our national interests. 

However, if we and the Iraqis can build on our successes, we have a chance to 

make Iraq a force for stability and freedom, not conflict and chaos, in doing so, our 

troops can leave with pride and our Nation can leave behind countries that contribute to the security of America and the world. I know that our distinguished witnesses possess a lifetime of experience and insight, and I look forward to their testimony. 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Mr. Chairman, I join in welcoming Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen back before this committee. I commend the continued skilled manner in which both have 

carried out their duties and responsibilities during these challenging times. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for scheduling the series of hearings this week. On 

Tuesday we received the report from Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus. 

Yesterday, we had a very good discussion with witnesses from outside government 

on their evaluation of the situation in Iraq and policy alternatives for the way forward. 

The committee, I believe, is pleased with the decision announced today by President Bush that he will reduce Army combat tours in Iraq from 15 months to 12 

months. I presume our witnesses opinions on this issue were taken into consideration before the President made his final decision. 

The hearings held this week, coupled with the President’s announcement, will 

yield an equally intensive line of questioning. The remaining issue, that of dwell 

time, or the time a servicemember will return from deployment and remain at his 

or her home station, must also be addressed. 

Speaking for myself, I have further lines of inquiry that I have formulated from 

these recent events. 

First, the military surge largely produced the intended results as announced by 

the President in his address on January 10, 2007 and provided the Iraq Government, ‘‘the breathing space it needs to make progress.’’

The second part of the surge was the expectation that the Iraqi Government 

would make progress on national reconciliation. I acknowledge that some progress 

has been made. However, regrettably, the Maliki Government appears largely unable, or not inclined, to achieve national reconciliation based upon top-down political 

accommodation. From a long-term perspective, the prospect of establishing a secure 

and stable Iraq that rests upon a patchwork of local arrangements is not heartening. 

Additionally, the American people, every day, mourn the loss of life and limb and 

the hardship imposed on the military families. I believe many Americans are also 

growing increasingly impatient with Iraq’s sectarian squabbling; Iraq’s dilatory political delays; and impatient with the vast sums of U.S. funds that are being spent 

on Iraq’s reconstruction at a time when Iraq’s oil revenues and their surplus funds 

in banks continues to grow. 

I look forward to hearing the evaluation of the witnesses and the reasonable effort 

of reconciliation that will take place in the coming months. 

Finally, there is increasing attention towards the negotiations between the United 

States and Iraq on a Strategic Framework Agreement which would include a Status 

of Forces Agreement. With regards to these negotiations, I urge the witnesses to advocate for the fullest consultation between the administration and Congress. 

158

Turning to Afghanistan, I am increasingly concerned that our goals there, and the 

gains achieved so far, have been placed in jeopardy by the continuing growth of the 

drug trade in Afghanistan. The profits from that trade are being used to purchase 

arms for the Taliban and other insurgent groups which are, in turn, being used 

against U.S., NATO, and other partnered forces. I, myself, find this unconscionable 

and believe it has to be addressed immediately at the highest levels. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to place into the record a letter I sent to the President, prior to the NATO summit, to address this issue at the highest levels. I look 

forward to hearing what steps, at the NATO summit, were taken to address this 

critical problem. 

[The information for the record follows after the prepared statement of Senator 

Warner.] 

It has been 9 weeks since our witnesses last appeared before the committee. Since 

then, the following events have occurred: the NATO Summit in Bucharest; the resignation of Admiral Fallon; the elections in Pakistan; and continued accounts of disturbing Iranian activity—all of which have bearing on our discussions today on Iraq 

and Afghanistan. 

During these 9 weeks, the committee also conducted a number of hearings which 

addressed the readiness of our Armed Forces. 

Six years of war have placed strain on the Armed Forces. In these hearings, the 

most disquieting statement—for me—came from General Cody, Vice Chief of Staff 

of the Army. At a Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee hearing on 

April 1, General Cody provided the following testimony: ‘‘Lengthy and repeated deployments with insufficient recovery time at home station have placed incredible 

stress on our soldiers and on their families, testing the resolve of the All-Volunteer 

Force like never before.’’

As we approach the 35th anniversary of the establishment of the All-Volunteer 

Force, we must be ever mindful that the All-Volunteer Force is a national treasure 

we must preserve. 

Our witnesses should expect to address these concerns with the committee. 

Before closing, I would like to acknowledge a very significant event earlier this 

week. It was the presentation of the Medal of Honor to the parents of Petty Officer 

Michael Anthony Monsoor, a Navy SEAL. In September 2006, Petty Officer Monsoor 

laid down his life in Iraq for his fellow team members. America owes him and his 

family a debt that can never be repaid. 

This is why, everyday, Americans honor the service and sacrifice of all those who 

have given life and limb in Iraq and Afghanistan—as well as the sacrifices of their 

families. 

Chairman Levin, thank you.

159


410ful2.eps
160


410ful3.eps
161

Chairman LEVIN. Secretary Gates? 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE 

Secretary GATES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator 

Warner. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here to discuss the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. As always, I thank the members of the committee for your 

support of the DOD, but, more importantly, for your support of our 

men and women in uniform. While there have been, and will continue to be, debates over our strategy in these campaigns, I know 

we are all unified in our admiration for those who have volunteered 

to serve. 

As you have heard from Ambassador Crocker and General 

Petraeus, violence in Iraq has declined dramatically since this time 

last year. In addition to the drop in U.S. casualties, we have seen 

a dramatic and encouraging decline in the loss of Iraqi civilians. 

Ethnosectarian deaths are down approximately 90 percent; and 

overall civilian deaths, 70 percent. 


410ful4.eps
162

At the same time, the Iraqi security forces have provided a surge 

of their own to complement U.S. and coalition efforts. Though the 

recent operations in Basrah revealed shortcomings of Iraq’s security forces, it is important to remember that, a year ago, they 

would not have been capable of launching a mission of that scale. 

At this time, half of Iraq’s provinces have attained provincial 

Iraqi control. The next province we anticipate moving into that category is Anbar, a remarkable development, considering the grim 

situation—security situation in that province, 18 months ago. The 

Iraqi forces will shoulder more of the burden as we reduce our 

forces over time. 

On the economic front, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 

expects real gross domestic product growth in Iraq to exceed 7 percent this year. Oil exports are above prewar levels and generated 

almost $40 billion for Iraq in 2007. These numbers reflect improvements that are having a tangible impact on the lives of Iraqis. 

These economic gains also mean that Iraqis should shoulder evergreater responsibility for economic reconstruction and equipping 

their forces. 

In recent months, we have seen the Government of Iraq make 

meaningful progress in the legislative arena, as you heard from 

Ambassador Crocker. These legislative measures are not perfect, 

and certainly have their shortcomings. Clearly, these laws must be 

implemented in a spirit of reconciliation, or at least accommodation. Still, we ought not ignore or dismiss what has been achieved. 

Just as there is real progress to report, there are also substantial 

reasons to be cautious. Al Qaeda in Iraq, though on the defensive, 

remains a lethal force. It is trying to regenerate itself, and will continue to launch gruesome terrorist attacks. There will be difficult 

days for Iraqis and coalition forces alike in coming months. 

All of this, both the good and the bad, both progress and potential regression, was on our minds as we considered our options, 

going forward. In order to advise the President, I again asked for 

individual assessments and recommendations from the Commander 

in Iraq, from the Commander of Central Command (CENTCOM) 

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President received recommendations face-to-face with General Petraeus, Admiral Fallon, Admiral 

Mullen, and each of the Service Chiefs. Though all bring different 

perspectives, from the institutional military to the operational military, all concurred with General Petraeus’s recommendations and 

the course the President has chosen in Iraq. 

Presently, three of the five surge brigades have departed Iraq. 

The other two are scheduled to depart by the end of July. At this 

point, it is difficult to know what impact, if any, this reduction will 

have on the security situation. A brief pause for consolidation and 

evaluation following a return to presurge troop levels will allow us 

to analyze the process and its effects in a comprehensive way. 

I do not anticipate this period of review to be an extended one, 

and I would emphasize that the hope, depending on conditions on 

the ground, is to reduce our presence further this fall. 

But, we must be realistic. The security situation in Iraq remains 

fragile, and gains can be reversed. I believe our objectives are 

achievable. The gains that have been made over the past year, at 

163

no small cost in blood and treasure, should not be allowed to unravel through precipitous actions. 

Whatever you think of how we got to this place, the consequences 

of failure, of getting the endgame wrong, are enormous. Some have 

lamented what they believe was an unwillingness to listen to our 

military professionals at the beginning of the war. I hope that people will now not dismiss as irrelevant the unanimous views of the 

field commander, the CENTCOM commander, and the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. All of the Nation’s most senior military officers endorse 

this step-by-step path forward. As I told the President, I also support these recommendations. 

A final observation. I have 8 months left in this position. We continue to find ourselves divided over the path forward in Iraq. This 

is not a surprise. The truth is, perhaps excepting World War II, all 

of our country’s wars have been divisive and controversial here at 

home. That is the glory of our democracy, and gives the lie to the 

notion we are a warlike people. 

It was my hope, 16 months ago, that I could help forge a bipartisan path forward in our Iraq policy that would sustain a steadily 

lower, but still adequate and necessary, level of commitment for 

the years needed to yield an Iraq that is an ally against extremists 

and can govern and defend itself. I continue to harbor this hope for 

a bipartisan path, and I will continue to work for it. 

But, I do fear that understandable frustration over years of war 

and dismay over the sacrifices already made may result in decisions that are gratifying in the short term, but very costly to our 

country and the American people in the long term. 

We were attacked from Afghanistan in 2001, and we are at war 

in Afghanistan today, in no small measure because of mistakes this 

Government made, mistakes I, among others, made in the endgame 

of the Cold War there, some 20 years ago. If we get the endgame 

wrong in Iraq, I predict the consequences will be far worse. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Gates follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I appreciate the opportunity to be here 

to discuss the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. As always, I thank the members 

of the committee for your support of the Department of Defense, but, more importantly, your support of our men and women in uniform. While there have been—

and will continue to be—debates over our strategy in these campaigns, I know we 

are all unified in our admiration for those who have volunteered to serve. 

Let me begin with a few words about Afghanistan. 

Last week, I attended the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in 

Bucharest with the President and the Secretary of State. Progress was made in 

some key areas:

• First, NATO leaders unanimously reaffirmed the importance of success in 

Afghanistan and renewed their commitment to the International Security 

Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. This alone is a very significant event 

when one considers that domestic opposition in Europe has hardened as 

operational demands have greatly increased in the 17 months since NATO 

leaders met at Riga. Despite the challenges, NATO partners are standing 

together and standing firm; 

• Underlining this point, a strategic vision document was adopted that lays 

out the alliance’s goals over the next 3 to 5 years; 

• A senior U.N. representative was appointed to coordinate development 

and reconstruction efforts; and 

164

• Several allies pledged additional forces, most notably France, who will deploy a battalion to the volatile eastern part of the country.

These elements made Bucharest a successful summit with regard to Afghanistan 

and demonstrated that members of the alliance take their obligations seriously. 

Members of Congress have expressed frustration to me over NATO’s shortcomings 

in the Afghanistan campaign—from force levels to caveats. I have had a few sharp 

things to say on these subjects myself. We continue to face serious challenges on 

the ground in Afghanistan. 

But it is important to remember the substantial, indeed heroic, contributions of 

many allies—in particular those operating in the southern part of the country. 

Before heading to Bucharest last week, I visited Denmark to meet with the Danish leadership and offer my thanks and appreciation for their efforts. Denmark—

a country of about 5.5 million people and a total defense budget of $4 billion—is 

truly ‘‘punching above its weight’’ in Afghanistan. Their troops are in the fight and 

taking casualties—including two in the days that preceded my visit. I had a chance 

to meet privately with some Danish soldiers who had served in Helmand Province—

a long-time Taliban stronghold. The soldiers told me that their efforts made a real 

difference by pushing back the enemy and by improving the lives of the local population. Senator Warner, I appreciated your kind words about Denmark last week. 

We are grateful to Denmark and all of our allies—and in particular the British, 

the Canadians, the Australians, the Dutch, the Romanians, and the Estonians—who 

have stepped up over the past year to take on some of the most difficult and dangerous missions in Afghanistan. Their contributions are truly impressive. 

Now to the main topic of this hearing—Iraq. 

In the past 2 days, you have heard from Ambassador Crocker and General 

Petraeus. Earlier today, the Nation heard from the President. I welcome the opportunity to contribute my views—as well as answer any questions you may have. 

Last year, when the President announced an increase in troops, an overhaul of 

our strategy, and a new leadership team, many were skeptical whether these 

changes could fundamentally alter the situation in Iraq. 

I believe the record shows that the fundamentals have changed, and that the 

United States is in a very different place in Iraq today—a better place, but one with 

significant challenges still ahead. 

We have always said that there is no purely military solution to the many problems facing Iraq. But a basic level of security for the Iraqi people is a necessary 

precondition for progress to take place on other fronts. Since the full surge forces 

became operational last June—just 10 months ago—we have seen security gains accompanied by movement in the political, economic, and governance arenas, both at 

the local and national level. 

As you heard from Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, violence has declined dramatically since this time last year. In addition to the drop in U.S. casualties, we have seen a dramatic—and encouraging—decline in the loss of Iraqi civilians: ethno-sectarian deaths are down approximately 90 percent, and overall civilian 

deaths 70 percent. 

At the same time, Iraqi security forces have provided a ‘‘surge’’ of their own to 

complement U.S. and coalition efforts. Though the recent operations in Basra revealed some shortcomings of Iraq’s security forces, it is important to remember that 

a year ago they would not have been capable of launching a mission of that scale. 

At this time, half of Iraq’s provinces have attained Provincial Iraqi Control. The 

next province we anticipate moving into that category is Anbar—a remarkable development considering the grim security situation in that province 18 months ago. 

The Iraqi forces will shoulder more of the burden as we reduce our forces over 

time. I would reiterate that the United States has no desire to keep a large number 

of troops in Iraq indefinitely or have permanent bases. The Status of Forces Agreement being negotiated will put us on a path to a more ‘‘normal’’ security relationship with Iraq—one that more closely resembles the arrangements we have with 

other allies and partners. 

On the economic front, the IMF expects real GDP growth in Iraq to exceed 7 percent this year. Oil exports are above pre-war levels and generated almost $40 billion 

for Iraq in 2007. These numbers reflect improvements that are having a tangible 

impact on the lives of Iraqis. To cite one example, the Narhwan Brick Factory Complex has quadrupled its workforce since January to 15,000. Similar efforts to revive 

industry are moving forward—aided by increasing foreign investment. These economic gains also mean that Iraqis should shoulder ever greater responsibility for 

reconstruction and equipping their forces. 

In recent months, we have seen the Government of Iraq make meaningful 

progress in the legislative arena as well. Iraq’s political leaders have passed:

165

• A pension law; 

• An amnesty law; 

• A provincial powers law; 

• A justice and accountability law; and 

• Their 2008 budget.

These legislative measures are not perfect and certainly have their shortfalls. 

Clearly these laws must be implemented in a spirit of reconciliation, or at least accommodation. Still, we ought not ignore or dismiss what has been achieved. 

Just as there is real progress to report, there are also substantial reasons to be 

cautious. Al Qaeda in Iraq, though on the defensive, remains a lethal force. It is 

trying to regenerate itself and will continue to launch gruesome terrorist attacks. 

There will be difficult days for Iraqis and coalition forces alike in coming months. 

Similarly, the presence of militias and criminal gangs remains troubling—as does 

the ongoing influence of Iran. The operation in Basra and its aftermath also raises 

a number of legitimate questions. Even so, there is still a great deal to be said for 

the Government of Iraq’s decision to confront the problem. 

All of this—both the good and the bad, both progress and potential regression—

was on our minds as we considered our options going forward. In order to advise 

the President, I again asked for individual assessments and recommendations from 

the commander in Iraq, Central Command, and the Joint Chiefs. The President received recommendations from General Petraeus, Admiral Fallon, Admiral Mullen, 

and each of the Service Chiefs. Though all bring different perspectives—from the 

institutional military to the operational military—all concur with the course the 

President has chosen in Iraq. 

Presently, two of the five surge brigades have left Iraq. The other three are scheduled to depart by July. At this point it is difficult to know what impact, if any, this 

reduction will have on the security situation. A brief pause for consolidation and 

evaluation following a return to pre-surge troop levels will allow us to analyze the 

process and its effects in a comprehensive way. I do not anticipate this period of 

review to be an extended one, and I would emphasize that the hope is conditions 

on the ground will allow us to reduce our presence further this fall. But we must 

be realistic. The security situation in Iraq remains fragile and gains can be reversed. 

I believe the President’s plan offers the best way to achieve our strategic goals:

• A unified, democratic and Federal Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself; 

• An Iraq that is an ally against jihadist terrorism and a net contributor 

to security in the Gulf; and 

• An Iraq that helps bridge the sectarian divides in the Middle East.

I believe our objectives are achievable. The gains that have been made over the 

past year—at no small cost in blood and treasure—should not be allowed to unravel 

through precipitous actions. The repercussions of getting it wrong now likely would 

haunt us in the future. 

Whatever you think of how we got to this place, the consequences of failure—of 

getting the end game wrong—are enormous. Some have lamented what they believe 

was an unwillingness to listen to our military professionals at the beginning of this 

war. I hope that now people will not dismiss as irrelevant the unanimous views of 

the field commander, Central Command Commander, and Joint Chiefs. All of the 

Nation’s most senior military officers endorse this step-by-step path forward. I support these recommendations.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Mr. Secretary. 

Admiral Mullen? 

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, 

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

Admiral MULLEN. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, distinguished 

members of this committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

I thank you also for your continued support of the men and 

women of the United States Armed Forces. I’ve been spending a lot 

of time with our troops these last 6 months, as I know many of you 

have as well. It’s apparent to me that they and their families know 

how much you care, and that, regardless of which side of the aisle 

166

you represent, you actually do represent all of them. We are grateful. 

I know you’ve heard extensive testimony this week by Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus about Iraq, and I know you’re 

interested in the military challenges we face in other places, such 

as Afghanistan. So, let me get right to it. 

The Joint Chiefs and I fully supported the recommendations 

made by General Petraeus to the chain of command, that he complete the withdrawal of all surge brigades and that he be given 

time to evaluate and assess his situation before making any further 

force-structure decisions. That seemed prudent to me. 

It’s not a blank check. It’s not an open-ended commitment of 

troops. It’s merely recognition of the fact that war is unpredictable. 

That’s why we also advised the President and Secretary Gates that 

General Petraeus’s assessments of conditions on the ground be continuously made, rather than on a fixed schedule. More frequent 

views of exactly how we are doing, from a security perspective, is, 

in my view, the only way to ensure we make the right decisions 

at the right time. It is the speed and uncertainty of this war, not 

just the enemy itself, that we are battling. Such has always been 

the case in counterinsurgencies. Witness the lethal influence of 

Iran, the stepped-up attacks in the Green Zone, and the operations 

ongoing today in Basrah. 

I give a lot of credit to General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker for their brilliant leadership over the past year. They understand, and have solved, many of the complex challenges of waging 

war against terrorists and extremists, while at the same time helping to build the foundations of a new nation. It’s tough, grueling, 

messy, and, yes, even lengthy work. 

The surge of forces assisted them in that effort. It has, without 

question and by any measure, helped to improve security. But, the 

surge was never intended to be the remedy for all things Iraq. It 

is designed, rather, to give our military leaders the forces they 

need to execute more effective tactics—which it did—and to provide 

Iraqi leaders the opportunity to work toward political reconciliation 

and economic progress—which it also did. 

That such progress has been slower and of mixed success is, I believe, more a function of the difficulties of a representative government in Iraq than it is of the level of security enabled by military 

operations. 

Our troops can open many doors, but they cannot force Iraqi 

leaders through them. As the last of the surge brigades come home, 

the U.S. military in Iraq will be focused on keeping those doors 

open on assisting the development of more and faster progress and 

on helping the Iraqi security forces defend their own country. 

I can’t be perfectly predictive, but I see no reason why we cannot 

accomplish these goals while also keeping open the option of an informed drawdown of forces throughout the remainder of the year. 

Such options are critical, because, while Iraq is rightly our most 

pressing priority right now, it is not the only one. I need the rest 

of our military focused on the rest of our challenges, which are, in 

this dangerous world, many and formidable. 

With the bulk of our ground forces deployed to Iraq, we’ve been 

unable to prepare for, or deploy for, other contingencies in other 

167

places. We are not training to full-spectrum capabilities. We are 

not engaging sufficiently with partner militaries. We cannot now 

meet extra force requirements in places like Afghanistan. 

Six years of war have certainly sharpened one side of our sword. 

We now have in our ranks the expertise of some of the most combat-experienced troops we’ve had in our history. But, the other side 

of the blade, the major-combat and full-spectrum side, needs sharpening, and we must turn this around. 

A quick word about Afghanistan. I’m deeply concerned. The 

Taliban is growing bolder, suicide attacks are on the rise, and so 

is the trade in illegal narcotics. In this economy-of-force operation, 

we do what we can. But, doing what we can in Afghanistan is not 

doing all that we should. 

We recently sent 3,500 marines to the south in Afghanistan. 

They are there and already making a difference. But they’re not 

enough. Requirements exist there that we simply cannot fill, and 

won’t likely be able to fill until conditions improve in Iraq. 

Continued NATO involvement and the commitment of more 

American forces, such as those the President has recently pledged, 

will remain vital to the long-term security of Afghanistan and our 

national interests there. 

Let me conclude here, if I may, by echoing the Secretary’s sentiments on the quality of our men and women in uniform. I’ve never 

seen them better. Though I hear and feel the strain they are bearing in each of my encounters, I cannot deny that they are driven 

by a sense of mission and purpose. They believe in what they’re 

doing, they know they’re having an impact, and they want to serve. 

We must, from a leadership perspective, give them not only the 

tools to do so, but also the guidance, the counseling, the medical 

care, the support, and the time to do so safely and efficiently. 

The President’s announcement today that Active-Duty Army deployments will be cut from 15 to 12 months is a welcomed first step 

in preserving the health of our forces, and I am grateful for his decision, as are the brave soldiers in our Army. 

Again, thank you for the continued support and leadership of 

this committee, as well as on behalf of our people and their families, and for your time today, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Admiral. 

The first vote is on. We have about 41⁄2 minutes left in that first 

vote, plus the 5-minute extra time which we’re provided. I think 

I’m going to try to get my questions in, and those who get back in 

time can pick up from there. If there’s nobody here, we will just 

stand adjourned for a few moments until we get back. You both are 

old pros at this problem, and we appreciate your understanding. 

We’ll have a 7-minute round. 

Secretary Gates, your testimony, says that a brief pause for evaluation following the return to a presurge level will allow some 

analysis, you don’t anticipate this period of review to be an extended one. Now, it’s very different, your words, from those of General Petraeus. We pressed him very, very hard on whether or not 

he would describe his recommendation as a ‘‘brief pause.’’ He pointedly refused to do that. He would not use the word ‘‘brief,’’ he 

would not use the word ‘‘pause.’’ You used both. 

168

Then he has, in his recommendation, an ‘‘open-ended, unlimited 

period of time.’’ The way he phrased it was that after a 45-day period, which gets him to September, during which he would do some 

evaluation, at that point he would ‘‘begin’’—now we’re in September—he would ‘‘begin a process of assessment,’’ and then, over 

time, would determine what recommendations to make. 

Now, were you aware of General Petraeus’s testimony to that effect when you prepared your own testimony? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Are you aware of the fact that he refused to 

use the term ‘‘brief pause’’—as a matter of fact, refused to put any 

kind of an estimate of time on his own reviews and assessments? 

Were you aware of that? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. I think, to the average reader, here, there’s a 

difference. Now, you can say that you support his recommendations, but there’s no way you can paper over that difference between your saying you—hoping for a brief pause and his saying 

we’re going to begin a period, open-ended, and that, over time, 

starting in September, there may be some recommendations. 

Would you agree that there’s a difference here? You may want to 

describe why there’s a difference, but would you at least acknowledge that there is some difference here in the way you described 

this upcoming period? 

Secretary GATES. There certainly is a difference in the way we’ve 

described it. When I visited Baghdad in February, I spent quite a 

bit of time with General Petraeus, and he went through the—if you 

will, the geometry of the battlefield as he contemplated the five 

surge brigades coming out and how he would be spreading the 

forces out, or pulling back from some places, or changing who was 

responsible for security, moving it to the Iraqis, and so on. He 

made, I thought, a compelling case that once the five surge brigades were out, at the end of July, that there should be a period 

of—what I referred to in talking to the press at the time, a period 

evaluation and consolidation so we could see what the impact of 

having withdrawn a quarter of the brigade combat teams would be. 

I continue to believe that that period of consolidation and evaluation makes sense. My view is that, in the context of a full year, and 

the fact that we went through a period, in December, January, 

February, or thereabouts, where we went 21⁄2 to 3 months or so 

without any drawdowns, that a period of a month to 6 weeks or so 

made sense, in terms of just seeing what the impact was. Does the 

security situation hold with the withdrawal of those brigade combat teams? 

My view is that he should be in a position, at the end of that 

40-day—45-day period of evaluation and consolidation, to make a 

determination whether a next-further drawdown could take place 

of a brigade combat team or some elements thereof. I think that 

when he talks about a continuing period of evaluation, what he is 

talking about is that he will be making this kind of an assessment, 

beginning—in my view—in mid-September, making a decision, in 

terms of whether to make a further drawdown then, or whether to 

wait 2 or 3 more weeks or a period of time before making an addiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:23 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00172 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\45666.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
169

tional judgment whether a subsequent drawdown or an initial further drawdown should be made. 

I think, as the Chairman and I have both pointed out, if the conditions continue to improve in Iraq, as we have seen them improve 

over the last 14 or 15 months, then we believe the circumstances 

are in place for him to be able to recommend continuing 

drawdowns. But while we have used different words, I think that 

that certainly is my understanding and my expectation. 

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Secretary, these are his words, ‘‘At the end 

of that period’’—that’s 45 days—‘‘we will commence a process of assessment to examine the conditions on the ground and, over time, 

determine’’—that is an unlimited period of time. There’s nothing in 

there about 30 days or 40 days. I particularly said, ‘‘Could that be 

a month?’’ He won’t answer. ‘‘Could that be 2 months?’’ ‘‘I don’t 

know.’’ ‘‘Could that be 3 months?’’ ‘‘It may be.’’ 

Now, I know you must have been familiar with General 

Petraeus’s testimony, and it is very different from what you’re saying here and what, apparently, you recommended to the President. 

I think we ought to acknowledge it openly. I’ll let you characterize 

your own testimony in this regard. But, there clearly is a difference. The question I’m asking you is, are you aware of the fact 

that General Petraeus refused to use the term ‘‘brief’’ or ‘‘pause,’’ 

and he refused to use any idea of a time period for that second period that began in September—you’re aware of the fact of his refusal? 

Secretary GATES. One of the benefits of being Secretary of Defense, I suppose, is that I am more allowed to hope than the field 

commander is. 

Chairman LEVIN. I hope you’re doing more than hoping. I hope 

you’re giving a hardheaded assessment of what you are recommending to the President. 

Secretary GATES. What I’ve just described to you, Mr. Chairman, 

is what I have recommended to the President, and I believe it is 

consistent with the decisions the President has made. 

Chairman LEVIN. When the President today, rejected the use of 

the word ‘‘pause’’—you used the word ‘‘pause’’ in your testimony. 

The President explicitly, in his statement, refuses to use the word 

‘‘pause.’’ 

Secretary GATES. I think they were in reference to different 

things. My statement of ‘‘pause’’ was pause in the drawdowns. The 

President was very explicit that we were not going to pause in our 

operations in Iraq. 

Chairman LEVIN. The other question I wanted to ask you has to 

do—talking about ‘‘hope,’’ you said, in September 2007, you hoped 

that we could get down to 100,000 troops in Iraq by January 2009. 

Do you still have that hope? 

Secretary GATES. No, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Finally, on the funds, on the reconstruction 

funds—Mr. Secretary, I find this, frankly, to be extraordinary, to 

put it mildly, that we have Ambassador Crocker coming before us, 

2 days ago, saying that the United States is no longer involved in 

the physical reconstruction business. The same day, we get a letter 

from the DOD, asking us to shift almost $600 million into reconVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:23 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00173 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\45666.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
170

struction. Today, the President says that we’re just about down to 

zero, in terms of reconstruction. 

Now, it is unconscionable for a country with tens of billions of dollars of surplus money sitting in bank accounts—$30 billion, 

probably, in ours alone; they sell 2 million barrels of oil a day at 

$110-plus a barrel; we’re paying $3.50, on the average for gasoline—they’re building up these huge surpluses, we have this huge 

national deficit and debt, we’re paying for their reconstruction, and 

the President is saying that they’re getting down to zero in reconstruction, the same week his DOD is asking us to pour an additional $600 million into reconstruction. 

I don’t know if you’ve gotten the letter yet—apparently you 

didn’t—but, we mentioned this to your Comptroller yesterday, that 

this is very troubling to me. If I had the power, as chairman, as 

I do in some areas, to actually disapprove a reprogramming request, I would disapprove this. I don’t have that power in this area, 

because of a particular law that was passed. But, we do have the 

power to request that you withhold this shift of funds, and that you 

consider, during this period, whether or not you really want to 

make that kind of a shift. I think it’s unconscionable. It runs smack 

into what the President assured the American people today. It runs 

exactly contrary to what the Ambassador said, 2 days ago. It just 

rubs everybody that I know of, of both parties, the wrong way. This 

is not a partisan issue. This is a commonsense issue about American dollars. 

When you get my letter, would you please promptly get back—

reconsider what the President said today and what Ambassador 

Crocker said, and I would hope you would withdraw that notice of 

a shift. 

Secretary GATES. I will certainly respond to your letter, Mr. 

Chairman. I will say, the reprogramming was for the Commander’s 

Emergency Response Programs (CERP). 

Chairman LEVIN. No, it’s not, those are not CERP funds. No, no, 

no. 

Secretary GATES. And——

Chairman LEVIN. We’re all for the CERP funds. That’s not this 

issue. 

Secretary GATES. But, I believe the reprogramming, Mr. Chairman, is for the CERP. 

Chairman LEVIN. No, the CERP doesn’t build Iraqi police stations, 55 police stations. 

Secretary GATES. Well, I was unaware of the police stations, but 

it is certainly—I mean, the CERP is, basically, in the very short 

term, to give employment to Iraqis so they’ll put their guns down 

and stop shooting at our soldiers. 

Chairman LEVIN. We’re all for the CERP fund. Everybody, I 

think, here has basically supported the CERP fund. 

Secretary GATES. It may be the definition of the projects under 

the CERP. I don’t know if the Chairman knows. 

Chairman LEVIN. No, I just don’t think that’s what this is, and 

we’ll give you a copy of this letter so you can take a look at it, if 

you want to today. That’s not this issue. This is $600 million for 

construction of the size of police stations. 

Senator Kennedy. 

171

Senator KENNEDY [presiding]. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, in your opening comments, you talked about how 

your desire to have a bipartisan effort during the time as the Secretary of Defense—I think you should know, as well as Admiral 

Mullen, that many of us have differences with regards to the policy 

in Iraq, but I think all of us have enormous respect for your service, Admiral Mullen’s and your comments, both, what you believe 

is in the best interest for the security of the country. We have our 

differences, but I think you should obviously know that members 

of this committee owe both of you the highest possible regard. 

Let me, just for a moment, continue what Chairman Levin has 

mentioned and why I think there is at least a degree of confusion. 

Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the ‘‘brief pause,’’ and I think you 

used the word ‘‘for consolidation and evaluation, and I do not anticipate this period of review to be an extended one.’’ President 

Bush, today, said in his statement, ‘‘Petraeus will have all the time 

he needs for consolidation and evaluation.’’ It is that dichotomy 

which brings the frustration, at least to me, and that, I think, is 

underlying the point that was being raised by the chairman. I 

think you’ve answered him. Unless there’s something else that you 

want to say on it, I’ll move on. I think it is that difference between 

what the President has said and what you have said. The chairman 

was talking about the difference between what General Petraeus 

himself had said before the committee. I think it’s this difference 

that brings some confusion and some frustration, in terms of looking at this. 

Secretary GATES. I actually think, Senator Kennedy, that there’s 

really not a substantive difference here. I think that the place 

where we all start is the ‘‘decisions will be made.’’ The place where 

General Petraeus, the President, and I all start is—and the chairman—is that decision will be made, in terms of subsequent 

drawdowns, based on the conditions on the ground. We intend to 

continue that process of evaluation. My view is, clearly the President, I think, was saying that he will defer to General Petraeus’s 

evaluation of the situation on the ground, in terms of—and his continuing assessment of that—in terms of decisions on any further 

drawdowns. I agree with that statement, and I certainly support 

that statement. 

My view is that the period of evaluation and consolidation is a 

45-day period that General Petraeus has referred, and then I think 

he makes the initial judgment, right then, whether or not further 

drawdowns are possible at that point. He will continue to make 

that judgment all through the fall. 

Senator KENNEDY. Admiral Mullen, listening to your testimony, 

you were talking about the doors being opened in Iraq, you said, 

‘‘We can open doors. We can’t force Iraqis to go through the doors. 

We can keep the doors open.’’ It’s just that kind of open-endedness 

that is of great concern to many of us, because it looks like what 

we are saying is that we are holding American service men and 

women hostage to the willingness of Iraqi politicians to make the 

political accommodations that are necessary in order to reach some 

kind of resolution there. 

172

How long are we going to keep these doors open? Many of us believe that we have kept them open long enough and that we should 

say to the Iraqis it’s time for them to assume responsibility for 

their security and for their defense. Now we’re just saying we are 

going to keep the doors open, and it appears to many of us that 

we’re going to keep the doors open while American service men and 

women are fighting and dying, and while the Department of Treasury is open to pour additional funds into the sands of Iraq. 

Admiral MULLEN. Senator, in the other part of my statement—

I certainly wanted to be clear that I don’t see this as a wide-open 

commitment, an unending commitment. When I’ve previously testified here, I’ve talked about how the military solution is not going 

to be the one that solves all this; we can provide the security so 

there can be progress. That has clearly happened with the surge, 

the effects of the surge. The security has improved remarkably, and 

in that timeframe, there actually has been movement in the political realm. Not too many people, myself included, would have said, 

last summer or last fall, that the Iraqi Government would have 

passed these four laws which they have passed. They’ve made 

progress. There are still other ones that they have to pass. That 

there are clearly limits, in terms of how long we would provide that 

kind of security. One of the messages that I hope to send in this 

is the sense of urgency that they continue to move as rapidly as 

possible to provide for their own security—and their security forces 

have improved dramatically; to pass the laws that need to be 

passed, in terms of their own government; and to politically reconcile—and that’s happened, both locally, provincially, as well as 

nationally, not like we’d like it to. So, it’s really in that context that 

I’m talking about when I talk about having those doors open. They 

must take advantage of that. 

Senator KENNEDY. There seem to be different views on those 

matters, Admiral, but let me move on, because we know that we 

have had statements that were made today about the President—

which I welcome—who talks about shortening the deployment of 

our soldiers from 15 months to 12 months. We had Secretary 

Gates, on April 4. You confirmed that the President committed to 

our NATO allies the U.S. would send a significant additional contribution in troops to Afghanistan. I certainly welcome that. 

All of us know, and Admiral Mullen has talked about this—the 

stress that is being put on our service men and women. Even if 

you’re rotating the five brigades out of Iraq, those individuals have 

effectively burned up their time, and now we’re talking about 

shortening the time from 15 months to 12 months, we’re talking 

about the additional kinds of personnel that are going to be necessary in Afghanistan. 

So, let me ask you, either Admiral Mullen or Secretary Gates—

Admiral, you talked about, ‘‘The military must reduce the stress on 

the Army and the Marine Corps, or risk crossing an invisible red 

line.’’ Secretary Gates, haven’t we already crossed that red line and 

over-strained our troops? If we haven’t crossed the red line, when 

do you think we will? Admiral Mullen, I’d like to hear from you, 

too. 

Secretary GATES. I do not think we’ve crossed that red line. 

Clearly, the force is under strain, their families, in particular, are 

173

under strain. Admiral Mullen’s been to the theater more recently 

than I have, but I was there just a few weeks ago, and morale is 

high, they are determined and committed. We are watching all of 

the indicators, in terms of the health of the force, very carefully. 

I think all of the Chiefs would tell you that we are not past that 

red line. But, particularly with the Army and the Marine Corps, we 

are watching very carefully, and that’s one of the reasons why we 

put such a premium on being in a position to reduce the deployment time for troop—for units that are deploying after the first of 

August to 12 months, so they can have—and that they will have 

12 months at home. 

Senator KENNEDY. Admiral? 

It’s difficult to see, with the stress that is on the military at the 

present time, the increased demand you’re going to have, reducing 

the amount of time that they’re going to be in rotation, and also 

putting additional kind of numbers into Afghanistan that you don’t 

increase the kinds of pressure. 

Secretary GATES. Senator——

Senator KENNEDY. Let me just—there is no other member of the 

Senate here, so let me just use up——

Secretary GATES. Could I just respond——

Senator KENNEDY. Sure, please. 

Secretary GATES.—to the comment about Afghanistan? 

Senator KENNEDY. Okay. 

Secretary GATES. I made that comment, Senator, and encouraged 

the President to make the commitment he did, after long discussions with the Joint Chiefs, in full awareness of General Petraeus’s 

recommendations, but also out of confidence that American troop 

levels in Iraq will be lower in the course of 2009. 

Senator KENNEDY. I think you responded to the chairman asking 

about whether you thought the numbers were going to be down, 

and you indicated you didn’t think so, in Iraq. 

Secretary GATES. No, I did not. I expressed the hope that they 

would be. 

Senator KENNEDY. On another subject, on this long-term security 

commitment, in the discussions that we had, Secretary Gates, on 

Iraq in a February 6 hearing of the committee, you said that there 

ought to be a great deal of openness and transparency to Congress. 

You gave the committee your word that the Senate would have an 

opportunity to review it before it was implemented. So, many of us 

welcomed that commitment—I’d like to ask you whether you believe Congress should have the opportunity to approve or disapprove any agreement, regardless of what it’s called, if it affects 

our troops. With the country so deeply involved in Iraq and the Nation so deeply divided, shouldn’t we in Congress have a right to be 

able to vote on the nature of any long-term security commitment? 

Secretary GATES. Senator Kennedy, as we discussed in February, 

the agreement that is under negotiation is a standard Status of 

Forces Agreement (SOFA). It will make no commitments. It commits the new President, in January, to nothing. It will not involve 

bases, it will not involve troop levels, and it will not involve security commitments to the Iraqis. I would say that if an agreement 

emerged in some way that impacted treaty-making authorities of 

the Senate, then obviously it would need to be sent up here, but 

174

as long as it conforms to the standard kind of SOFAs, of which we 

have some 90 or 100 in place, none of which have been ratified by 

the Senate, I would think it is not necessary. 

But again, I think the important thing, because of the involvement and the controversy associated with the war in Iraq, it’s very 

important for the executive branch to be very open with Congress 

as we go forward with the negotiation of this SOFA. 

Senator KENNEDY. In 1953 we ratified the SOFA with NATO, 

and President Eisenhower didn’t bypass Congress. Congress even 

approved the Compact on Free Association during the Reagan administration, where we didn’t have the kind of velocity and the 

strong feeling with regards to troops. There’s precedent, and given 

the fact—the enormous power of this issue, the fact of American 

troops—I mean, if we have American troops in those areas, whether we have the agreements or there are not going to be agreements, 

they’re going to be affected by whatever is understood by the Iraqi 

Government. So, it does seem to me that this is certainly something that ought to be considered by Congress. 

My time has expired. Thank you very much. 

Senator WARNER [presiding]. I thank my colleague. 

I was very taken aback by your testimony, Mr. Secretary. That 

testimony reflects your belief of accountability in public office and 

your candor about the mistakes made. I want you to know, having 

been the chairman of this committee during most of that period, I 

accept the same level of responsibility for some of those mistakes, 

as do you, even though you came later on. We have to go forward 

in a manner that we think is best for the long-term interests of our 

national security. I judge in both you and Admiral Mullen, a willingness to, on a daily basis, look at all the options and do what we 

can to achieve the goals of enabling that country to exercise the 

reins of sovereignty. 

I was thinking about the SOFA that’s coming up and the Strategic Framework Agreement which is going to accompany two 

agreements. It sort of states that they’re in a category of other nations of the world where we have SOFAs. It’s a point of pride, as 

well as a point of resolving things that are needed by both the 

United States and Iraq. 

It seems to me that, therein might be some leverage to achieve 

a greater degree of reconciliation. They’ve done some reconciliation. 

We know what it is. But, it’s far short of what I believe the President and yourself had in mind in January, when the surge was 

launched. Clearly the surge provided, as the President said, the 

breathing space, but it simply has not resulted in the measure of 

reconciliation that we literally entrusted to Maliki and the rest of 

his government. 

So, are these agreements a means by which to gain some leverage? 

Secretary GATES. Senator Warner, I think we ought to use anything we can find in the toolbox to try and encourage the Iraqis to 

move forward on reconciliation. My own view is that we may 

have—things began to come together and to move—after what 

seemed like many months of stalemate in Baghdad, they moved 

several of these pieces of legislation, all within a period of a few 

weeks, earlier this year. 

175

One of the things we’re seeing is, all of the different elements in 

Iraq congratulating Maliki on taking on the situation in Basrah—

the Kurds, Sunnis, and others. So we may be seeing a growing belief in Iraq, that the Government of Iraq is not sectarian, and that 

it does represent the interests of all Iraqis. So, this is clearly a 

work in progress, but I think it has accelerated in recent weeks, 

and we will need to continue doing everything that we can to push 

that process along. 

I would just say, in addition, I think that the team that you had 

in front of this committee, 2 days ago, or 3 days ago, of Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, is unlike anything I’ve seen 

since I joined the government, 42 years ago, in terms of being on 

exactly the same page and working with the Iraqi Government in 

trying to push them along in exactly the direction that you’re describing. 

Senator WARNER. Those two extraordinary public servants are 

working together as a team, like two strong horses trying to pull 

the wagon with the problems in it. That came through, time and 

time again, and I’ve had the privilege of working, certainly with 

the Ambassador for many years. He used to come up here and be 

part of the briefing team, before we even went into Iraq. I have a 

high degree of confidence in his judgment. I think he, likewise, is 

very pragmatic, recognizes mistakes were made—both of them—

and that they stand accountable and with candor, they acknowledge it. 

But back to the drug issue I raised with you. You had the opportunity to see my letter to——

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. 

Senator WARNER.—the President. I sent a copy to you. If you 

could enlighten me. Again, my concern was that this issue is so serious, in the minds of this Senator, that it had to be elevated—you 

had the heads of State and government there, and this was the 

forum, because we cannot stand by and just not do positive steps 

to rachet down, substantially—maybe we can’t all do it in 1 year, 

but substantially eliminate those funds that are flowing to the aggressors that are fighting our troops and the troops of NATO. 

Secretary GATES. It is clearly a huge problem. It came up in two 

different forums in Bucharest, first in a meeting of the foreign and 

defense ministers of the countries that are all in Regional Command South. The importance of dealing with it, the importance of 

an integrated strategy, the importance of particularly going after 

the labs, after the large landowners, and working with the Afghans, and trying to get rid of corrupt officials. It then came up 

again in the meeting that the heads of government had with President Karzai, and a number——

Senator WARNER. Actually, really the buck stops on his desk, in 

my judgment. 

Secretary GATES. Yes. 

Senator WARNER. It is his responsibility with his police and his 

other mechanisms of internal security. 

Secretary GATES. As part of the Afghan Compact, in February 

2006, primary responsibility for dealing with the narcotics problem 

passed to the Afghan Government. Now, they have a counternarcotics force with an authorized size of about 3,000, and they 

176

have about 2,100 onboard. They have some helicopters—a dozen or 

so helicopters. They’re working with the Drug Enforcement Agency, 

they’re working with us. But, also, the United Kingdom and NATO 

are trying to figure out how we can support them to do a better 

job. Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe is working on 

a plan, has addressed this issue on how the International Security 

Assistance Force (ISAF) can do a better job of supporting the Afghan Government. The results of that assessment are classified, 

but I’d be happy to provide it to you and to the committee for the 

record. 

[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Secretary GATES. There is clearly an understanding on the part 

of the NATO governments, from the heads of government on down, 

of the importance of this, and I will tell you, they were very direct 

with President Karzai in the meeting in Bucharest. 

Senator WARNER. I will avail myself of that opportunity, and that 

pleases me. 

Admiral, would you like to comment on that? 

Admiral MULLEN. Just that it’s as critical as you say it is, Senator Warner. It is a concern that troops in the field have, and actually some of our troops are very involved in meeting this challenge, 

as well, particularly some of the labs and that kind of work. It is 

something that is very much on their minds, and that a long-term 

comprehensive, effective strategy be put in place is critical to a successful outcome in this country. 

Senator WARNER. The current senior officer in the country—I 

know him as a matter of fact, on earlier visits he was stationed 

there—he has spoken out very frankly on this. I had a long talk 

with his successor, General Kern, who’s coming up for confirmation 

before this committee shortly, and he, likewise, is concerned. 

Well, we have to do something. I’ll come back, but, I mean, I 

leave this issue knowing that both of you are doing everything you 

can to reduce that threat to our troops from the drug money. 

Joe? 

Senator LIEBERMAN [presiding]. Thanks, Senator Warner. 

Thanks to you both for being here, and for your testimony and 

service. 

I appreciate the opening statements both of you made. I want to 

read from the close of your statement, Mr. Secretary. ‘‘Some have 

lamented what they believe was an unwillingness to listen to our 

military professionals at the beginning of this war. I hope that now 

people will not dismiss as irrelevant the unanimous views of the 

field commander, CENTCOM commander, and Joint Chiefs. All of 

the Nation’s most senior military officers endorse this step-by-step 

path forward. I support these recommendations.’’ 

I appreciate that, both because of the history that you referred 

to, but also because there was a lot of media speculation that there 

was intense disagreement within the military about how to go forward. I’ve been through this enough now to discount what I see in 

the media. But, the important point is that the recommendation 

General Petraeus brought before us, and that you and the President and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs have now accepted, is 

177

really the unanimous recommendation of our military leadership. 

Admiral, I’m——

Admiral MULLEN. It is. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. I appreciate that, and I think it’s very 

important that Members of Congress and the public know that, 

that the President has acted on the unanimous recommendation of 

our military leadership. 

As this is going on—and, look, I have a point of view on the war, 

that you know, and I think the report of General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker showed real progress. They didn’t overstate the 

case. It’s reversible. But, militarily, the numbers that you cited—

real progress, politically and economically, in Iraq. There are now 

different lines of questioning being raised by critics of what we’re 

doing in Iraq, one of which I think has some merit, although it may 

be overdone, and that’s the one I want to ask you to comment on, 

which is the economic side of this, the concern expressed that the 

Iraqis are now putting some money in the bank, based on the improvement in their oil output and, of course, the increase in the 

international price of oil. 

So, I wanted to ask, Mr. Secretary or Admiral, if you’d talk about 

to what extent are we asking the Iraqis, and are the Iraqis now 

picking up costs of either the military or economic part of our involvement in their country? Two, what thoughts you have about 

what more we can ask of them in the months and years ahead. 

Secretary GATES. This is one place, Senator Lieberman, where I 

think there is true bipartisan agreement——[Laughter.] 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I think you’re right. 

Secretary GATES.—across the entire political spectrum, that the 

time has come for the Iraqis to pick up the bill for their own economic reconstruction and equipping of their forces, and so on. I 

think the figures that the President was referring to today, when 

he said a 10-to-1 differential, in terms of investment, is that the 

Iraqis have $13 billion in their budget for reconstruction, and 

there’s nothing in our budget. 

I’m going to come back to the chairman of the committee, here, 

in a second, with an apology. 

But, my understanding is that in 2007, out of $2 billion in foreign assistance the State Department (DOS) got for Iraq, only 

about $520 million went for reconstruction. They’ve asked for a little less than a billion in foreign assistance. If you had the same 

proportion, it would be similar to that. 

Maybe I’m using a little of Senator Lieberman’s time to offer you 

an apology, Mr. Chairman, but I’ve been handed a note, and, as 

strange as it may seem, leading the largest and most complex organization in the world, there are actually things that go on that I 

don’t know about. The $600-million reprogramming that you talked 

about is not for CERP, and I will take a very close look at it——

Chairman LEVIN [presiding]. Thank you. 

Secretary GATES.—for the reasons that you cite. But, it gets to 

the point——

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Secretary GATES.—that Senator Lieberman has raised. I think 

this is an area where there is broad agreement, it is time for the 

Iraqis to spend some of their money. 

178

Senator LIEBERMAN. Should they be spending more of their 

money, not only on their own military costs, but on some of ours, 

which, of course, has happened in previous American involvements 

in conflicts, both in the Middle East, but also post-second World 

War, for instance? 

Secretary GATES. We haven’t really discussed that, at this point. 

The focus has really been more on their spending money on their 

own forces and on their economic reconstruction. They clearly have 

a lot of money they need to spend in those areas. We’ve now, I 

think, actually delivered about $2 billion worth of arms and equipment, under foreign military sales, to them that they bought with 

their own money. There are several billion dollars more on order. 

Their forces, we will be asking for a significantly smaller amount 

for Iraqi train-and-equip in fiscal year 2009 than we have in the 

past. 

But, the question, in terms of whether there are some of our 

costs they ought to pick up, I’m not aware that we’ve really begun 

to consider that yet. It’s been more of making—one of the concerns, 

again, the chairman raised, is getting them—they can budget the 

money, but one of the——

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Secretary GATES.—problems they’ve had is getting them to execute their budget. Part of it’s a lack of expertise, part of it is a lack 

of trained people, and part of it, in the past, has probably been politics. We think they’re making headway on all of those. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. It’s good to hear. I hope you’ll start to think 

about that, because I’m sure some of that bipartisan agreement on 

this question of the Iraqis picking up more of the costs of the conflict will be expressed, at some point in Congress, urging you to do 

that. 

I want to ask a second question. There’s been a lot of concern expressed about the negotiations going on for a SOFA for a longerterm military relationship with Iraq. I’m thinking here, let’s look 

to that day when it’s post-conflict, when our troops are not involved 

in actual combat. Obviously, there’s been a lot of controversy in the 

presidential campaign about Senator McCain’s comment that we 

may have troops there a longer time after the war is over, for 

peacekeeping. Some seem to suggest that for us to have a longerterm military presence in Iraq would be somehow dangerous or destabilizing for the region. 

I don’t want to coach the witness too much, but it does strike me 

that if one takes that position, then you have to answer the question. ‘‘What about our presence in Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, the 

United Arab Emirates (UAE), and throughout the Arab world, 

throughout the Middle East?’’ 

I wanted to ask you if you would respond to the concerns about 

a longer-term, essentially, military-to-military agreement between 

a free, sovereign Iraq and the United States of America. 

Secretary GATES. I think that first of all, the states and their—

and I’ll invite Admiral Mullen to comment—I think, with one exception, virtually all of the states in the region would like to see 

the United States maintain some kind of a presence in Iraq, and 

not just as a stabilizing force, but to continue the hunt for al 

Qaeda, to continue going after—helping the Iraqi Government go 

179

after extremists, and so on. So, we are talking, at least in my opinion, of a force that is a fraction of the force that we have there now. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Admiral Mullen, do you want to add to 

that? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes. Senator, most believe we will need a longterm presence there, that is, as the Secretary said, obviously much, 

much smaller than we have had. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Admiral MULLEN. I’ll just use the Basrah operation as an example. While they moved a division’s worth of forces, there are capabilities they just don’t have yet—the intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and logistics, and there are a lot of them—what we 

call enablers, so that they can take care of their own security. So, 

there will be some of that. This is a sovereign country and if they 

want training assistance, which is what we do routinely in lots of 

countries around the world, that would be part of this. I would expect that would be part of this, as well. 

This is a part of the world that is as unstable as any, and so, 

to the degree that our forces have that kind of footprint that provide the kind of stabilizing influence that we often do, I would expect us to be there. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary Gates, I assume that the one 

country in the region that you would guess doesn’t want us to have 

a long-term military presence in Iraq is Iran. 

Secretary GATES. That would be correct, Senator. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you both. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. 

Thank you, Secretary Gates, for your clarification. 

Let me just give you a couple of other numbers. We’ve expended, on reconstruction so far, $27.5 billion on just three funds; $12 billion is unspent that’s been appropriated. So, there’s another $12 

billion to look at, as to whether or not we should not tell the Iraqis 

that rather than our spending that unspent $12 billion that’s previously been appropriated, that we’re going to look to them to pick 

up that slack. That’s in addition to this ‘‘$600 million’’ letter that 

you’ll be getting. 

Let me just give you one incident that I shared with General 

Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. When I was there a month ago, 

and I was talking to one of our generals, and he said, ‘‘Senator, I 

was asking an Iraqi general, the other day, this question.’’ He said, 

‘‘I asked him, ‘Why is it that we Americans are cleaning up your 

cities at our expense?’ His answer was, ‘As long as you’re willing 

to pay for it, we’re going to let you do it.’ ’’ 

That’s the dependency. That’s what’s been created here, and 

that’s why I think there is a real feeling in the country which is 

united on that issue, and I think, a bipartisan feeling, hopefully, 

at least on that question. We appreciate your taking a close look 

at that request. 

There’s another number out there which I want to ask you about. 

By the way, on the budget, when you said that they have $13 billion in their budget for capital costs, you very properly point out 

that the issue is whether they’re going to spend it. I just want to 

reinforce that point, because in 2006 they had a budget of $6.2 bilVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:23 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00183 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\45666.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
180

lion, the Iraqi budget; they spent less than a quarter of that. In 

2007, as of August 31, they had spent, depending on which figure 

you use, either 4 percent, which is what the GAO said, or 24 percent, according to the White House computations—somewhere between 4 and 24 percent of their 2007 capital budget, which was $10 

billion. So, the issue isn’t a number that they put on the paper, it’s 

what they spend which is the critical number. They have the 

money. It’s sitting in our banks. We know that. Mr. Secretary, these are 2 million barrels of oil a day, at $110 a barrel. That’s $200 million a day. The U.N. is going around trying to get the world to pick up costs for Iraqi people who have left 

their homes, instead of the Iraqis paying for the Iraqi people who 

have left their homes. Why is it that we’re paying money, and that 

the U.N. is paying money, for Iraqi people who have been either 

removed forcefully or fled their homes—there’s 2 million in Iraq 

and 2 million out of Iraq, approximately. Someone’s going to have 

to pay for them; we understand that. But, why isn’t the Iraqi Government paying for that? That’s less than a billion dollars the U.N. 

is seeking. They get that in 5 days’ worth of oil sales. 

Secretary GATES. Well, again, Mr. Chairman, I think that, as I 

suggested to Senator Lieberman, I think a big part of the problem 

here has been the Iraqi capacity to execute their budget, not a lack 

of willingness to do it. We have, for example, just sent 12 experts 

from the Department of the Treasury to work with the different 

ministries in Iraq, to try and help them figure out, ‘‘How do you 

execute a budget? How do you get money to the provinces? How do 

you get contracts?’’ This is all new for the Iraqis. 

Chairman LEVIN. I’m sorry, it’s just not acceptable. Cutting a 

check from an account that they have in New York, Mr. Secretary, 

I just think it’s totally unacceptable that we say they don’t know 

how to cut a check. Do you know how much money they pledged 

last year to the U.N. for the support of their own Iraqi people who 

have been pushed out or fled their homes? Do you happen to have 

that article? I think it was something like $25 million. $25 million. 

That’s a pledge. I don’t even know if they followed through on the 

pledge. We have a responsibility to those people, by the way. I happen to feel that very deeply. But, my gosh, so do the Iraqis have 

a responsibility to their own people. We’re spending more of our 

money, by far, on Iraqi refugees than the Iraqi Government is 

spending. The only reason we hear on that is that they don’t have 

the capacity to cut a check to the U.N.? It doesn’t wash. It’s another example of a failure to force the Iraqi Government to take responsibility for their own country. It’s just another example of that. 

Here’s what I asked Ambassador Crocker about the number of 

employees that we have that are working on reconstruction. These 

are not your employees, these are not people working at the bases, 

these are not the Sons of Iraq, these are U.S. Agency for International Development and Army Corps reconstruction people—

100,000 people on our payroll. The President describes this as coming to an end, today? It doesn’t compute. 

What we’re going to need you to do—and I really believe that 

there’s a lot of bipartisan support for what I’m saying—I really 

need you to take a look at these monies that are in our budgets, 

that are unexpended, and—these are the DOD budgets, these are 

181

reconstruction funds. We think there’s $12 billion, at least, unexpended. If you would take a look at that and get back to this committee with what can and should be covered by the Iraqis, it would 

be very helpful. 

[The information referred to follows:]

I agree that Iraqis should pay for an increasingly greater share of the costs associated with reconstruction and stabilization. The Government of Iraq (GOI) has already assumed responsibility for the bulk of reconstruction costs. The 2008 GOI 

budget, with Iraq’s mid-year supplemental, includes more than $21 billion for capital expenditures and $11 billion for the Iraqi security forces (ISF). The U.S. fiscal 

year 2008 budget in contrast includes $3 billion for the ISF Fund (ISFF), $1.7 billion for the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP), and $50 million 

for the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO). 

In fact, the GOI has increased its spending for the ISF by about $2 billion every 

year since 2005. For 2009, the Iraqi security budget is expected to reach $11 billion. 

In addition, the GOI is increasingly using the Foreign Military Sales program to 

equip and train its forces. By building Iraqi capacity and transitioning costs to the 

GOI, we have reduced our ISFF request for fiscal year 2009 to $2.0 billion. No funds 

will be requested for TFBSO. 

The GOI began to assume responsibility for payments to the 54,000 Sons of Iraq 

(SoI) in the Baghdad area beginning October 2008, thereby covering $15.5 million 

in monthly payments previously funded through CERP. The gradual transition has 

been positive with both GOI and SoI leaders supporting the process. The GOI 

launched a $270 million Iraqi CERP in April 2008 and has provided a total of $550 

million for post-kinetic reconstruction in Basra, Mosul, Sadr City, and other cities. 

In the past, these efforts to enhance stability and cement hard-won security gains 

could have fallen to U.S. Commanders with CERP funding. 

Although recent, tentative security gains and improvements in GOI capacity have 

allowed us to hand over programs and associated costs, DOD programs remain indispensable to the U.S. Government counterinsurgency strategy. By enabling commanders in the field to respond quickly to urgent needs. CERP has proven to be 

one of our most successful counterinsurgency weapons. ISFF helps safeguard our investment in Iraq by ensuring a functional and effective 1SF. Any effort to curtail 

these programs would provide new openings for extremists to regain the initiative 

they lost in 2007, decrease our ability to build sustainable security conditions with 

the ISF, and hamper the further drawdown of U.S. forces. 

We will continue to look for activities that can and should be funded by the Iraqis. 

Transitioning these costs to an increasingly capable GOI and redeploying our troops 

as security improves and Iraqi forces assume responsibility constitute a return on 

our successes in Iraq.

Chairman LEVIN. I think it would put us on a path, which is a 

kind of path you described in your opening statement, about a desire that this be put on a bipartisan course. You told me that, the 

first day that you came in my office, when you were nominated, 

and I believed you then, and I believe you now, that that is your 

desire, to try to find a path which can get bipartisan support. This 

is a element which I believe can get bipartisan support. 

The last question, if no one else is here—I hope that—we’re going 

to have a few more coming back—I was over there at the Senate; 

I can only tell you that there are so many people, so many colleagues of mine who were there voting, stuck there, because they 

obviously wanted to be here. We did make an effort to get these 

votes delayed; I want you to know that. 

My final question has to do with Afghanistan, and it goes to you, 

Admiral, because you, I think, made reference to Afghanistan in 

your statement. You indicated, I believe, that we have inadequate 

troops, that we may need to have more troops in Afghanistan. You 

said that—at least earlier in the month, and you, perhaps, said 

something similar today, which I may have missed—that there are 

force requirements in Afghanistan that we cannot currently meet, 

182

and that the high level of forces in Iraq doesn’t allow us to fill the 

need that we have in Afghanistan. You said in December, ‘‘It’s simply a matter of resources, of capacity. In Afghanistan, we do what 

we can; in Iraq, we do what we must.’’ 

There’s going to be a reduction from a 15-month deployment to 

a 12-month deployment—very regrettably, starting in August, 

which makes it too hollow for many of us. But, nonetheless, that’s 

what the President has decided. So, this reduction is not going to 

help people who are already there. But, nonetheless, that reduction 

has been announced today by the President, to begin 4 or 5 months 

from now. How does that affect the Afghanistan picture? If you 

haven’t already answered it. If you’ve already answered that, then 

I’ll read it. But, if you have not answered that question, perhaps 

you could——

Admiral MULLEN. The reduction from 15 to 12 months most significantly affects what I believe—the health of the force, because it 

takes—these deployments, which I have believed for some time, are 

just—they’re just too long. It really isn’t going to affect availability 

for troops for Afghanistan. What will affect that is more troops 

being available, and the only relief valve that I see out there that 

would provide that, would be levels of forces in Iraq. So, I’d need 

to come down—we’d need to come down a certain number of brigades before we could start to meet the legitimate force requirements that we have in Afghanistan that we just can’t fill. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. I said that was my last question, but 

I do have one more that has to do with the militias. There’s a ban 

that the Prime Minister has placed on the Sadrists and on their 

militia. Does that ban extend to Hakim’s Badr Corps and all other 

militias, as well as to the Mahdi Army? 

Admiral MULLEN. I think it is specific, but I don’t know. 

Chairman LEVIN. Specific to what? 

Admiral MULLEN. I think it’s just to Sadr’s—to the Jaish al 

Mahdi (JAM) and to Sadr’s militia, and not to——

Chairman LEVIN. Because that would be——

Admiral MULLEN.—the Badr Corps. 

Chairman LEVIN.—that would be a real problem, if it’s only limited to his opponents, his competitors——

Admiral MULLEN. Well, I’d have to——

Chairman LEVIN.—in which 

Admiral MULLEN.—I’d have to——

Chairman LEVIN. You can double check that——

Admiral MULLEN.—check and get back——

Chairman LEVIN.—because——

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. I’ll do that. 

Chairman LEVIN.—Article 9 of the Iraqi constitution already prohibits the formation of military militia, outside of the framework 

of the armed forces. That’s a constitutional prohibition. I don’t 

know if this recently announced ban, whether it’s narrow or broad, 

will stick any more than the already existing constitutional prohibition will. I’m not particularly optimistic that it will. But, in any 

event, if it is not a broad ban for all militias, the way the constitution provides, then I think the legislation, which is the subject the 

benchmark provides, it would really create a problem, in terms of 

183

selectivity. If you could get back to us on that, that would be helpful, as well. 

[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Chairman LEVIN. I want to make sure none of my colleagues are 

on their way back. [Pause.] 

Okay, Senator Reed is on his way back, and there are others, as 

well, but he’s literally on his way. With your indulgence—you’ve 

made an apology to me today, we’re grateful for that; you are always open in that regard. I’d like to emulate you. [Laughter.] 

I apologize for this interruption. 

We will stand in recess until Senator Reed or someone else 

comes back to take the gavel. We do know he’s on his way back. 

So, we stand in recess. [Recess.] 

Senator WARNER [presiding]. I thank our distinguished witnesses 

for their indulgence today. We have had a series of votes; and, thus 

far, I’ve run back and forth and made every one. I have to leave 

shortly, but, I’d like to ask a few questions now. 

I would say to our witnesses that a number of Senators I visited 

with on the floor are coming over after, hopefully, a final-passage 

vote, here shortly. I think the staff will let us know when that vote 

begins and ends. 

Admiral Mullen, on April 2, 2008, you said, ‘‘Having forces in 

Iraq don’t, at the level they’re at, allow us to fill the need that we 

have in Afghanistan. Equally broadly, around the world there are 

other places we would put forces or capabilities, not so much brigade combat teams as other kind of enabling capabilities of small 

training teams that we just can’t, because of the pressure that is 

on our force structure now in CENTCOM. I think we’ll continue to 

be there until conditions allow us to start to be able to reduce our 

force levels in Iraq.’’ 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator WARNER. Would you expand on that, sir? 

Admiral MULLEN. Just available forces, that we have additional 

force requirements for—specifically for Afghanistan, up to three additional brigades——

Senator WARNER. Now, this is on top of the——

Admiral MULLEN. Yes. 

Senator WARNER.—marines that are going in now. 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. The marines—actually, from a fighting/combat standpoint, I’m pretty comfortable this year in Afghanistan. But, there are additional requirements we’ve had for a training brigade—so, about 3,000 trainers——

Senator WARNER. Training the Afghan——

Admiral MULLEN.—training the Afghan army and police. 

Senator WARNER.—and police. 

Admiral MULLEN. The marines are sending, basically, two battalions this year—one of them will be dedicated to training, and—

Senator WARNER. Training. 

Admiral MULLEN.—the other to combat. But, they leave in the 

November timeframe. So they’re partially filling those combat and 

training requirements right now, but those will still be there. 

184

We have a requirement for a training brigade and for up to two 

additional combat brigades in Afghanistan, down the road, and we 

need to—I mean, we have it now, and we’re not going to be able 

to fill that until we have forces that are released from other obligations, principally in Iraq, at the brigade size. 

In addition, I have requirements in other theaters around the 

world that wouldn’t necessarily be brigade combat teams, but that 

would be smaller units that do training with various militaries 

around the world or do exercises and those kinds of things, which 

are mitigating or preventative capabilities for the long term that 

we would normally be doing, some of which we are doing, but we’re 

not doing it to the level that——

Senator WARNER. The level that you——

Admiral MULLEN.—we would be. 

Senator WARNER. Yes. 

Admiral MULLEN. Most of the pressure is on the brigade combat 

teams, specifically, and the enabling—the significant enabling capabilities that it takes to fight and—in Iraq and in Afghanistan—

the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and 

also the trainers, both in Iraq, as well as Afghanistan. 

Senator WARNER. Let’s clarify. You would add those brigades. 

What percentage would that increase the United States force structure in there? Now, your force structure is divided between those 

American forces that are working with NATO—as a part of NATO; 

then we have the independent force structure out here for the U.S. 

Would those brigades be going into the NATO structure or our own 

structure? 

Admiral MULLEN. They would notionally be going in—notionally 

into the NATO structure, but, essentially—and it would be three 

brigades worth 10,000, 11,000, and 12,000 that—those kinds of 

numbers, in terms of overall size of the force. 

The other place we find ourselves is, we’re growing the Army and 

the Marine Corps at a time—from the Army to the active-Duty 

Army—I think it’s at 525,000. So, we’re drawing to 547,000 over 

the next couple of years. So, we find a great demand on the forces 

right now, at a time we’re growing. In 2 or 3 years, there’ll be more 

capability. That will provide some relief. Same in the Marine 

Corps. But that growth isn’t going to provide much relief in the 

2009 or 2010 timeframe. 

Senator WARNER. We’d better be very cautious that someone 

doesn’t translate your comments to say we may be there 3 or 4 

years more in Afghanistan. That may be the case, but I think we 

should proceed very carefully before we try and reach a benchmark 

of a date when we’re there. 

So, the augmentation of our forces, given the actions of Congress 

and the appropriations to fund to enlarge both the Army and the 

Marine Corps, as you say, will not come to full bear until late 2009, 

correct? 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, actually the growth is out to 2010 and 

2011. I mean, when we really have——

Senator WARNER. Out to 2010 and 2011. 

Admiral MULLEN.—all that capability. 

Senator WARNER. So, I was trying to focus on the interim period. 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. 

185

Senator WARNER. Do you think that we would contribute three 

combat brigades to the current NATO structure? 

Admiral MULLEN. If Iraqi forces came down far enough, that 

would be that——

Senator WARNER. I see. 

Admiral MULLEN.—and it is the judgment of the Chiefs—that’s 

the next priority. 

The third piece of this, though, is to bring some of those—a brigade home, or two, at some point, because we need to start building dwell time——

Senator WARNER. Correct. 

Admiral MULLEN.—which gets relief on the stress on the force. 

So, those are the three big pieces right now that have an extraordinary amount of pressure on our forces. 

Senator WARNER. Now, the President announced, today—you 

also mentioned it, Mr. Secretary—in the President’s speech, he 

says, we’ll also ensure that our Army units will have at least a 

year home for every year in the field. Now, with the anticipated 

augmentation of three brigades to Afghanistan, are we going to be 

able to hold tight on the tour of 12 months and a minimum of 12 

at home? 

Secretary GATES. Let me comment, and then invite Admiral 

Mullen to comment. 

The three-brigade figure comes out of a view of the ISAF commander that that’s what he could use. We were very careful in Bucharest that the President not make a specific commitment or a 

specific period of time when additional U.S. forces might be available. So, I think it’s an open question whether—how much of that 

three-brigade request the United States would be prepared to fill, 

or could fill. That decision will almost certainly need to be made 

by the next President of the United States. So, what we’re really 

talking about is capabilities here. 

But, I would say that the Chiefs feel very strongly—and I’ll let 

the Chairman speak to this—but, the Chiefs feel very strongly 

about the dwell-time issue. A big part of coming back to 12-months 

deployed is making sure they have a year at home. 

One of the things that——

Senator WARNER. At a minimum. 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. Our goal actually would be to move to 

1 year deployed, 2 years at home——

Senator WARNER. Two years at home. 

Secretary GATES.—for the Active-Duty Force, and maybe even, 

ultimately, 3 years; and, for the Guard and Reserve, 1 year mobilized, and 5 years at home, would be the goal ultimately that we’re 

headed to. Your support of our proposals for growing the Army and 

the Marine Corps are really critical to making that happen. 

Senator WARNER. Well, Congress is foursquare behind you, Mr. 

Secretary, and——

Secretary GATES. Did you want——

Senator WARNER.—you, Admiral. 

Secretary GATES.—to add anything? 

Admiral MULLEN. No, sir. This is a—we look at these requirements that we have. This goes back to the discussions we’ve had 

186

about Afghanistan being an economy-of-force campaign. We have a 

requirement for that one training brigade and two other brigades. 

Senator WARNER. This will be refined, on the occasions you have 

this period of reflection, once you draw down the surge forces. Is 

that correct? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes. 

Senator WARNER. Fine. 

On Pakistan, gentlemen—I’ll ask both of you to comment—it’s 

been a major ally in this conflict, in Afghanistan. Much of our logistics comes across the territories of Pakistan. We’ve seen quite a 

turbulence in the political structure, and it is yet to be resolved. 

At the same time, we see the threat growing from the level of insurgents up in Waziristan, on that border between Pakistan and 

Afghanistan, that there’s no diminution in that threat. How are we 

going to deal with that, Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary GATES. First of all, I think some credit is due to the 

Pakistanis, not only for allowing us the logistical supply routes and 

so on, but they’ve had over 100,000 troops deployed up in the 

northern and western part of Pakistan. I think they’ve suffered 

3,000 or so killed in action. They’ve killed a lot of terrorists up 

there. They are a force principally trained to deal with their longtime adversary to the east, and so, clearly, we have some opportunities for training. But, we also have——

Senator WARNER. Mr. Secretary, I have a problem. 

Secretary GATES.—to let the civilian——

Senator WARNER. I have 3 minutes to make it to the floor. 

Secretary GATES. Okay. 

Senator WARNER. If you’d finish that, for the record. 

Secretary GATES. Okay. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you. 

[The information referred to follows:]

Pakistan is a key partner in the war on terror and plays a major role in our longterm efforts to build a stable Afghanistan. Materials for delivery to coalition forces 

operating in Afghanistan transit through Pakistan, including approximately 40 percent of fuel and 84 percent of all containerized cargo. The security of the border region with Afghanistan, therefore, is vital to the war on terror and Pakistan’s internal security. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) border region with 

Afghanistan is a largely ungoverned space that the July 2007 National Intelligence 

Estimate (NIE) identifies as a place where Taliban and al Qaeda forces recruit, 

train, and equip fighters and infiltrate them into Afghanistan. Pakistan recognizes 

the threat posed by its rugged 1,500 mile-long border with Afghanistan and has improved security by stationing approximately 120,000 military and paramilitary 

forces there and strengthening border controls. 

Since 2001, Pakistani military and paramilitary forces have conducted 91 major 

and countless small operations in support of the war on terror; it has captured or 

killed more al Qaeda and Taliban than any other coalition partner. Following the 

increase in Pakistani military and security operations in the FATA, the number of 

retaliatory suicide bombings and ambushes increased dramatically. In response to 

these attacks Pakistan intensified its efforts to combat extremists, resulting in the 

death or capture of a number of Taliban leaders in 2007. In the past 5 years, Pakistani soldiers have sustained more than 1,400 combat deaths (700 since July 2007) 

and more than 2,400 wounded in action. 

Pakistan has recognized, however, that it cannot rid its territory of violent extremists by military means alone—it must also create an environment inhospitable 

to terrorism and extremism. In 2006, Pakistan requested U.S. support in developing 

and funding a comprehensive Sustainable Development Plan to deny terrorists the 

ability to exploit the under-governed FATA through economic and social development, and strengthening effective governance in border areas. This plan is a 9-year, 

$2 billion initiative which will provide services, upgrade infrastructure, promote the 

187

sustainable use of natural resources, and bolster commercial activity. The U.S. is 

seeking $750 million in support of infrastructure development, social welfare, and 

capacity building elements of the program over the next 5 years. The governance 

element aims to help Pakistan extend its writ into the FATA by re-establishing the 

pre-eminence in local politics of the Government of Pakistan including recognized 

tribal elders and political agents. To complement and support this effort the U.S. 

developed the Security Development Plan (SDP) for Pakistan’s Western Border 

Areas. The Department of Defense (DOD) is seeking approximately $200 million annually from a variety of authorities, including DOD counternarcotics (section 1004 

and section 1033), Global Train and Equip (section 1206), and an authority specifically designed to train and equip the Frontier Corps. The SDP is the security element of the U.S. Government’s 6-year plan that is designed to enhance the ability 

of Pakistan’s military and security forces to secure its border with Afghanistan and 

deny safe haven for extremists. 

It may be several years before Pakistan’s comprehensive strategy to render the 

remote tribal areas inhospitable to terrorists, insurgents and other violent extremists can be measured for success. However, Pakistan is making progress toward that 

goal. In the fall of 2007, positive indicators included the actions taken by the government to evict the extremists occupying the Red Mosque and its increased pressure on the Taliban leadership in Quetta. These indicators suggest Pakistan is willing to shoulder significant burdens to target the Taliban, al Qaeda, and other violent extremists who enjoy safe haven on Pakistani territory. It remains to be seen, 

however, if the newly-elected civilian government maintain pressure on these extremists and continue work to eliminate the safe havens in the border region. The 

United States stands ready to offer continued support and cooperation as Pakistan 

undertakes this difficult challenge.

Senator WARNER. May I compliment you on going through Denmark en route to the NATO conference. That country, although 

small, made a valuable contribution to this operation in Afghanistan, and their troops come and fight, just as the U.S. troops. 

Secretary GATES. I met with some of those troops when I was in 

Copenhagen. 

Senator WARNER. I know you did. Thank you. 

Excuse me, gentlemen. 

Chairman LEVIN [presiding]. Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for not only 

your testimony, but for your service. 

Secretary Gates, I was listening to your opening statement, and 

it seems now that the parameters for success in Iraq are, as you 

describe it, an ally against extremists and a nation that can govern 

and defend itself. The first point raises the curious relationship between the Iranians and the Iraqis. Are they truly an ally with us 

against what some people would call some of the extreme policies 

of the Iranians? 

Secretary GATES. I think one of the things that has happened 

over the past year or so, and perhaps one of the most significant 

outcomes of the Maliki government initiative in Basrah, is that 

they have increasingly become aware and become educated to the 

realities of what Iran is doing, in terms of meddling in Iraq, in supporting groups that are adversaries of the government, in their influence in the south, and particularly around Basrah, and their 

supply of weapons and so on to people who are opposing the government. I think that this has been a real eye-opener for them. 

I think that there has long been a religious connection between 

the two, because of the location of the holy sites. The Iraqis obviously, under Saddam Hussein, were huge adversaries of the Iranians. But, I think that the Iraqi Government today is quite aware 

and increasingly concerned about Iranian activities inside their 

country. 

188

Senator REED. Well, I think they are, but I don’t know if this is 

a recent revelation. I think you understand, probably better than 

most, that, for example, Hakim spent a great deal of the Iraq-Iran 

war in Iraq. The Badr Brigade was organized by the Iranian forces, 

presumably still have close contacts with Iranians, maybe not in a 

military capacity. But, one of the problems here is that the Iranians, as Ambassador Crocker pointed out, have close ties with 

practically every Shiite organization and with Kurdish officials, 

and I would hesitate to say maybe even Sunni officials. 

So, one of the points that was made, I think very eloquently, yesterday when we had our panel, was the conflict between attempting to stabilize Iraq, given the huge influence of the Iranians and 

suggestions by some in the administration that we consciously destabilize Iran. It was described as, basically, contradictory objectives. Would you comment on that? 

Secretary GATES. I think our focus has certainly been on trying 

to stop the Iranian activities that have involved the supply of 

weapons and improvised explosive devices that have been used 

against our troops, and we’ve been pretty aggressive in that respect. 

I think these connections with Iran, as you say, go back quite a 

ways with a number of the Shiite leaders and politicians in Iran. 

I think what they are coming to understand is that Iranian influence has a significant malicious side that is contrary to their interests as Iraqis. I think, in the past few months we’ve seen them beginning to take some actions that indicate, not only an awareness, 

but a willingness to act on it. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Admiral Mullen, the President announced, today, that tours of 

the Army will begin to phase down to 12 months, which I think is 

welcome news for many, many soldiers who are——

Admiral MULLEN. Right. 

Senator REED.—serving, and who are yet to serve. Does this require an increased call-up of National Guard and Reserve brigades 

to maintain the force structure in Iraq because we’ve shortened the 

tour of the units that are in the field now? 

Admiral MULLEN. Not in the planning that I’m aware of right 

now, it doesn’t. 

Senator REED. Is that——

Admiral MULLEN. This commences August 1. 

Senator REED. Why? 

Admiral MULLEN.—for troops deploying after August 1. 

Senator REED. As you project force levels, going through until 

next year or beyond, I presume you’re at least working on a 18-

month to 2-year cycle, are you showing a decrease in forces? Is that 

one reason why we don’t have to call on additional Reserve and National Guard components? 

Admiral MULLEN. We’re building some capability. I think, next 

year we come up two brigades. It’s about two brigades a year. 

That’s part of it. At this level, if we stayed at this level that we’re 

at right now for a long period of time, clearly just the math would 

tell you that it would potentially impact that. I just haven’t seen 

that, from a planning standpoint, at this point. 

189

Senator REED. So, if, in fact, the commitment to 12 months is irreversible, then eventually, based on force structure alone, we have 

two options—either to drop the force structure in Iraq or to significantly, or at least to increase the number of National Guard or Reserve brigades that will be called up. 

Admiral MULLEN. Clearly, if we are going to sustain this over a 

long period of time at the number of brigades we have there right 

now, that we would have that kind of impact. I think that would 

be longer-term, as opposed to immediately in front of us. 

Back to your point, we’re planned pretty well out for the next 

couple of years. 

Senator REED. At what force level are you planning? The current 

force levels for 2 years? 

Admiral MULLEN. What General Casey has said is, he can basically sustain 15 brigades in CENTCOM. So, let’s say 13 in Iraq, 2 

in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future at——

Senator REED. Twelve months. 

Admiral MULLEN.—a high-risk level specifically, particularly at 

high risk for the next 2 years. So, sort of, through the end of 2009 

and into 2010, until he builds out more brigade combat teams with 

the Army growth. 

Senator REED. Among the consequences of high risk is the lack 

of any significant Strategic Reserve. 

Admiral MULLEN. Certainly front the ground forces——

Senator REED. Ground forces. 

Admiral MULLEN.—yes, sir. We wouldn’t be put in a much different position than we are right now. 

Senator REED. There has been a great deal of discussion about 

the assumption of financial obligations by the Government of Iraq. 

Specifically, have they agreed to begin to fund the Concerned Local 

Citizens (CLCs), or the Sons of Iraq, Sunni components that we 

have organized in different parts—principally Anbar, but also 

south of Baghdad, in mixed areas? 

Admiral MULLEN. There is a commitment on the part of the Government of Iraq to provide what we’re calling Iraqi CERP to $300 

million, and they made that a few weeks ago. General Petraeus 

said recently, they’re very close to that money being made available. He also said—I was made aware, within the last few days, 

that they have an additional commitment in the CERP; I just can’t 

remember what the number is. 

Senator REED. But——

Admiral MULLEN. I couldn’t tell you, in the CERP category, 

whether that’s going to salaries. 

Senator REED. But, as I understand CERP—and my time expired—that is essentially civic-action funds. 

Admiral MULLEN. It’s both. It’s both to pay the Sons of Iraq, as 

well as to build projects. That’s one of the reasons that we—and 

General Petraeus, in particular—pushed so hard on this, is because 

he calls it his ‘‘ammunition’’ right now. It’s had such a positive impact, in terms of employing people, and providing additional security, and, obviously, providing a salary for an Iraqi family so that 

they can survive in a meaningful way until we’re sort of through 

this whole transition. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

190

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank both of you for your leadership, and from my observations, I think both of you have won the respect of the American 

people and the commentators, critics even, of our effort, and that 

speaks well of how you’ve conducted yourselves and the integrity 

you’ve shown. 

Secretary Gates, one of the complaints that we had was, ‘‘Well, 

things may be getting better, militarily—violence is down, there’s 

no doubt about that, but there has been no political progress in the 

country since the last report from General Petraeus and you.’’ But, 

you note some political progress in your written statement—a pension law, an amnesty law, a provincial powers law, a justice and 

accountability law—and they passed a 2008 budget. Would you tell 

us—just give us a rundown of how significant you think those political developments are. What are some of the political challenges 

that remain? 

Secretary GATES. Well, I think that those laws represent, if I’m 

not mistaken, four of the six benchmark laws that we all talked 

about last year. One of the interesting aspects is how three of the 

laws were passed as a package deal in a negotiation within the 

Council of Representatives. It was actual politics going on, where, 

‘‘I’ll support your bill if you’ll support my bill, if you’ll support my 

bill,’’ kind of thing. I think that, again, you’ve——

Senator SESSIONS. That’s never done in Washington. [Laughter.] 

Secretary GATES. I think that it has been interesting to watch 

the reaction of the other politicians, the non-Shiite politicians in 

Iraq, responding to Maliki’s initiative in Basrah, for all of its military shortcomings, because they saw him go after Shiite extremists. 

He has heard positive things from Sunni leaders, from Kurdish 

leaders, and so on, and it’s still a long path to reconciliation, but 

I think that there has been real progress, particularly in the last 

3 or 4 months, in terms of the political process in Iraq. It’s still a 

long way to go. The challenge is still the suspicion of the Shiite, 

it is still the feeling of the Shiite—or the Sunnis that—presumably, 

some residual hope that they could regain power someday. There 

will be the contest over politics—over elections in the provinces, 

and those will go well, I think, in those areas that are largely Shiite, Sunni, or Kurdish—it’ll get more complicated in the provinces 

where there’s a mixed population this fall. But, I think that they’re 

moving in the direction—I don’t know whether they’ll make elections in October, but I think that the judgment of our folks in the 

DOS and the intelligence community is that they’ll probably be 

able to get them done this year, the provincial elections, and then 

a national election next year. 

So, I think everyone has learned lessons from the past, and you 

heard great caution from General Petraeus and from Ambassador 

Crocker. I think you will hear caution from us, as well, in terms 

of expecting too much, too quickly. But, I do think there has been 

progress. 

Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Mullen, one of the things about a 

withdrawal—and I certainly hope that we can—if we do have this 

pause—and I’m inclined to take the advice of General Petraeus; I 

191

think his performance and his integrity and responding to our 

questions, and the success that we’ve seen, that exceeded my expectations, in the last number of months, makes me feel that we 

ought to be respectful of his opinion; so, I’m inclined to be supportive of that—but, I do believe plans for continuing the drawdown is important so that our allies and friends in Iraq don’t become dependent upon us. But, explain to us, as has been explained 

to me, both in some of the hearings and privately by generals, how 

difficult it is when you pull a brigade out of an area. The danger 

of leaving gaps in your lines, and who’s going to fill those responsibilities. Would you give us some appreciation for some of the decision difficulties that our commanders have when they take out a 

brigade in an area in Iraq? 

Admiral MULLEN. General Petraeus frequently talks of ‘‘battlefield geometry’’ as he looks at where he has forces and where he 

needs to move forces. Clearly he’s done that, both in building the 

surge—now we have three of the surge brigades who have returned 

home, and the other two will be coming out through the end of 

July. It is that battlefield geometry, obviously, that he takes into 

account, in terms of where he’s going to put people. That’s clearly 

based on the security requirements that are either right in front 

of him or that he expects in the future. He’s moved forces around 

very deftly, I believe, to handle this drawdown in a way where he’s 

very comfortable handling the drawdown, and that kind of calculus 

goes on constantly. 

At the same time—and there is, obviously, very focused discussion today on the pause and the consolidation and evaluation and 

assessment. From my perspective, I think it’s also very important 

to do this continuously, and because it is really conditions-based assessment that is actually going on, has been going on since the 

surge started to decline, as well as we’ll continue, no matter how 

many troops we have there. 

It also takes, depending on whether you’re a light brigade or a 

heavy brigade, literally—and where you are coming from and 

where you might redeploy to—depending on those factors, 45 to 75 

days to move you from where you are in Iraq to, let’s say, back 

home, or vice versa. 

So, those are all factors, planning factors that he has to take into 

consideration as he makes decisions about where he puts his forces. 

Senator SESSIONS. Would you tell the American people—what I 

hear you to be saying is that this is complex and difficult, and you 

are spending considerable time on it, in planning it so that it goes 

as effectively as we can make it go. 

Admiral MULLEN. General Petraeus is the principal architect of 

this, as the tactical guy, and he spends, along with his commanders, an extraordinary amount of time doing exactly that. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

Senator Bill Nelson. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Gentlemen, thank you, as everyone has 

said here, for your public service. 

I want to ask you about Afghanistan. We’ve recently put more 

marines in there. My question is—it’s my understanding we still 

have such a paucity of troops, not only our troops, but the entire 

192

NATO force, that, once we clear an area, that we can’t hold it. Can 

you comment to the committee about that? 

Secretary GATES. Let me make a brief comment, and then invite 

Admiral Mullen. 

First of all, it depends on the part of the country. In the north, 

where there is less of a Taliban presence, where there has been 

less violence, this is not so much of a problem. In the east, where 

we have had a very successful counterinsurgency, where most of 

our forces are located, and where we have very effective provincial 

governors, there we have been able to hold. The principal area of 

concern has been in the south. I would say that your characterization of not having enough forces to hold areas that we had cleared 

is an accurate description. I would also say that, countrywide, one 

of the shortages is for people to train the Afghan army and police. 

Admiral MULLEN. I would only echo what the Secretary said in 

that regard. If you ask the commanders there right now, their 

number-one requirement is for trainers—the Afghan army and the 

Afghan police. We’ve generated—and are doing it very rapidly—an 

Afghan army. The police are behind that, and that’s probably the 

most critical part of this. 

So, one of these two battalions of marines that are going in are 

specifically going in to train. They leave in 7 months. The fact that 

the French have now come forward and said they’re going to add 

additional troops will provide capability that we need to address 

the shortfall that we have, although it won’t meet it fully. It is 

principally in the south right now that we are most concerned, with 

respect to, certainly, combat, and that’s where the Taliban is most 

dense. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Let me ask you about Iraq. We had testimony in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week from 

a couple of retired generals—General McCaffrey and Lieutenant 

General Odom—and General Odom told about how much we are 

paying Sunnis, basically, to be on our side. He specifically mentioned some kind of council, and that it basically costs us about 

$250,000 per month for 100-square-kilometer area. Do you know 

anything about this? 

Admiral MULLEN. I didn’t see his testimony in—I think he’s 

speaking to the salaries we are paying those in what used to be the 

CLCs, and now we refer to as the Sons of Iraq, to the tune of about 

90,000 Sons of Iraq, who are providing for their own security, who 

have taken back their villages, their towns; and about 20 percent 

of them are—we’re moving them into the security forces. So, all of 

that, from my perspective, is a winning strategy, because you take 

them off the street, they’re providing for their own security, they 

can provide for their family, and, in fact, they’re moving into the 

Iraq security forces. If it is different than that, then I’d have to get 

back to you, Senator. 

Senator BILL NELSON. So, basically, his cut on it was, ‘‘Well, we 

don’t own them, we merely rent them,’’ but what you’re suggesting 

is that we’re not buying their allegiance, we’re buying their assistance. 

Admiral MULLEN. I would say there’s a mix. When I talk to commanders on the ground out there, there are those that they trust 

implicitly—vet them very hard—there are those that they trust imVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:23 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00196 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\45666.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
193

plicitly, and there are others that they keep their eyes on. So the 

impact that it’s had, in order to local security, has really been extraordinary. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Let me ask you about something General 

McCaffrey said, and I’ll quote him, ‘‘The U.S. Army is starting to 

unravel—equipment broken, National Guard is under-resourced, 

terrible retention problems, severe recruiting problems—the Army 

is too small.’’ You want to comment on that? 

Admiral MULLEN. We’re growing the Army to 547,000. The recruiting environment is challenging, although we continue to make 

the recruiting numbers, and we did so again this month. There are 

waivers, there are concerns about the waivers that are there, but 

that’s watched very carefully, and their—performance of individuals in the Army who have received waivers is consistent with the 

rest of the force, best we can tell. We watch the indicators very 

closely. Clearly, the ground forces in the Army, in particular, are 

stressed. That’s why the 15- to 12-month deployment is so important. 

That said, they’re resilient, they’re performing at an exceptionally high level, they’re succeeding now in Iraq. When you visit 

them, they send you that message. They have a skip in their step, 

which is very positive, and yet they’re looking for some relief. In 

addition to shorter deployments, they’d like to stay home longer. 

Their families are pressed very hard. 

But, I would not describe it as unraveling. General Casey has 

talked about this ‘‘invisible red line.’’ We’re not standing right in 

front of that invisible red line. It’s out there. It’s a concern that we 

all have. So, I would not use that kind of language to describe 

where we are. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Finally, Mr. Secretary, I think what folks 

like me grapple with is the political reconciliation, as to whether 

or not it, indeed, is possible. You listed a number of laws that had 

been passed. I think the true test there is the question of whether 

or not those laws are being implemented, whether they’re being executed. What about an oil law, which is a major one, because that’s 

the divvying up of the resource? Other than what you’ve pointed 

out, that they have had some politics and produced some laws, you 

want to give us any other insight into political reconciliation? 

Secretary GATES. My view is that reconciliation in Iraq is the beginning of a process that will go on for a very long time. The enmities are ancient, and had been kept in place, as they were, in many 

respects, in the old Yugoslavia, by force. Once that force was removed, all of the monsters of the past have, sort of, come back. 

I think it has taken longer than any of us would have wanted, 

but I think we are beginning to see the re-emergence of a sense of 

Iraqi nationalism, including in the Government of Iraq. I think 

that is progress. 

But for these folks to learn to work together and live together 

freely and in a democratic society is going to take some real time, 

and that is not unusual for countries that have the kind of history 

that Iraq has. I think there has been progress, and I think they 

are moving in the right direction. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

Senator Collins. 

194

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Secretary Gates, Chairman Levin raised the issue of the Iraqis 

taking over more of the expenses associated with the war, an issue 

that I brought up with General Petraeus earlier this week, and I’m 

very sympathetic to the points that the chairman made. I want to 

bring up one particular expense that just floors me that the Iraqis 

are not covering now, and that is the fuel costs. According to press 

reports, the Pentagon is paying the Iraqi Government $153 million 

a month for the fuel that’s used at a time when the Iraqis are reaping billions of dollars in unanticipated oil revenues because the 

price of oil per barrel has doubled. Isn’t that an expense that the 

Iraqis should be covering? Shouldn’t they just give us the fuel that 

we need to operate? 

Secretary GATES. First of all, I think the practical aspects are, 

they cannot give us the fuel, because they have their own shortages 

of the actual fuel. I think the real question is whether there is the 

potential for reimbursement or something along those lines. I 

would be honest with you, I think that it’s only been in recent 

weeks that we’ve been seeing the kinds of dollars, and projecting 

out the kinds of dollars, that the Iraqis may be able to accumulate. 

A certain amount of that, they have to keep in Reserves, under 

IMF agreements, but the question is—they are making a lot of 

money, they have a big budget—I mean, if you want a fundamental 

comparison between Iraq and Afghanistan, it is that Iraq, this 

year, has a budget of $50 billion and the Afghan Government will 

have revenues of $675 million. 

I think we are all beginning to come to grips with this, and I 

know the President feels strongly about this. He has weighed in 

with us, in terms of what we would propose to pay for Iraqi equipment and why we should pay for Iraqi equipment at this point. I 

think we’re just beginning to address some of the issues, in terms 

of what kinds of expenses the Iraqis ought to start taking over, in 

addition to their own reconstruction funding. 

I would just tell you we are mindful of this, but we are at the 

beginning of the process of looking at it. 

Senator COLLINS. I hope that you’ll work with us on this issue. 

Senator Nelson and I have had many conversations about this. I 

know the chairman and Senator Graham are interested, as well. 

I’ve often thought that if the group of us had succeeded in 2003 

that had wanted the reconstruction money for Iraq to be in the 

form of a loan rather than a grant, that we might have seen far 

less sabotage of the reconstruction projects if the Iraqis had had 

personal money, more of a commitment to it. I don’t know, we’ll 

never know that. I hope that you will work with us. It’s really difficult for Americans, who are struggling with the high cost of energy, to see us paying for fuel costs in a country that has the second largest oil Reserves, and has a budget that was supposed to 

be $48 billion, but now looks like it is going to have revenues of 

$60 billion because of the soaring price of oil. So, I think this really 

is an issue that we need to try to work on and come up with a solution. 

I do want to switch to Afghanistan. Your comments—your opening comments about the mistakes in American policy 20 years ago, 

and that we can’t repeat those mistakes in either Iraq or AfghaniVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:23 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00198 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\45666.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
195

stan, brought to mind the first meeting that I had with President 

Karzai in 2003. Senator Levin was there, and many of my other 

colleagues, and I’ll never forget it, because we landed at Baghram 

Air Base, we met with him in an Army tent, and his message to 

us, even back then, was, ‘‘Don’t abandon us. Don’t make the same 

mistakes that were made decades ago.’’ That’s always stayed with 

me, and in subsequent visits to Afghanistan, President Karzai has 

repeated that plea. 

That’s why I’m concerned about the reports from the Afghanistan 

Study Group and the Atlantic Council that warned very bluntly 

that we are underresourcing Afghanistan and that NATO—the Atlantic Council’s report goes so far as to say, ‘‘Make no mistake, 

NATO is not winning in Afghanistan.’’ I apologize if you covered 

this and I missed it while we were voting, but could you give us 

your best assessment of whether you expect NATO countries, other 

than ours, to step up to the plate and provide the troops that 

there’s widespread agreement it’s necessary. I know you’ve worked 

very hard and pressed so hard on that. I know you’ve gotten grief 

for that, but I applaud you for that. We do need more troops. I’m 

really worried that having to send more American troops will make 

it impossible for us to, in the long-term, sustain the 12-month deployments that all of us are desperate to see us return to. 

Secretary GATES. One of my defense minister colleagues accused 

me of megaphone diplomacy. I think that—two things. First of all, 

I think that one should not underestimate what happened at Bucharest last week. In 2006, when NATO took on the Afghan challenge, I think a lot of countries really didn’t know what they were 

getting into. I think they thought it was going to be largely peacekeeping, economic reconstruction, and so on. I think that’s one of 

the reasons why they’ve had political problems at home in trying 

to justify more forces, or why they have not been willing to do that. 

In 2008 at Bucharest, the leaders, knowing what they know now, 

still unanimously reaffirmed the challenge of Afghanistan as 

NATO’s most important operational activity. So the leaders of all 

of the NATO countries, basically said, ‘‘We have to do this.’’ President Sarkozy, at one point, referred to the importance of winning, 

and I mention him in particular, because the French made a substantial additional contribution that will be going—Regional Command East—that will allow us, then, to send some additional forces 

to Regional Command South. 

The desire of the commander—it’s not a formal requirement at 

this point—the desire of the commander in Afghanistan to have 

three additional brigades, in my view, is a requirement that NATO 

will not meet. I think we will get additional forces from a number 

of different countries. I think they will have real capabilities. But, 

I think they will not add up to another 10,000 to 12,000 troops that 

would be represented by 3 brigades. How much they will contribute, I don’t know. It will depend, in part, on election politics. 

One of the things that I initiated a year ago was getting NATO 

to approve a vision—a strategic vision statement of where we want 

to be in 3 to 5 years in Afghanistan, and what we’ve accomplished, 

and why we are there, in terms of the terrorist threat to Europe, 

that the European governments could then use in their domestic 

196

politics to try and educate their people about why the commitment 

in Afghanistan is important. 

I guess the experienced part of me would say they’re probably 

not going to make significant additional contributions. My hope 

would be, taking advantage of the Bucharest Declaration and perhaps electoral politics changing in some of the countries, that there 

could be some significant additional contributions. 

I’ll just leave it at that. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you very much. 

Admiral Mullen, I know you’ve been very concerned about this, 

as well, and have pushed very hard for the reduced deployment. I 

know my time has expired, but I’ll be interested in talking to you 

subsequently about that, as well. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Collins. 

Senator Ben Nelson. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service, and, of course, the men 

and women in uniform, both at home and abroad, and we appreciate, so much, their service, as well. 

Senator Collins, Senator Graham, Senator Bayh, and a whole 

host of us, have raised the question about making loans or seeking 

reimbursement for any direct payment for certain things. We are 

sort of reminiscing about 2003, and regretting that we didn’t get 

that in position back at that time, but the administration balked 

at it on the basis that it would affect, negatively, our going to the 

donors conference with other countries. In large part, that so-called 

donors conference turned out to be a lenders conference, with the 

exception of our effort. 

Is it possible for us to be able to work together with the administration to work out a method of reimbursement? Do you think we 

could come to an agreement as to the kinds of things that should 

be reimbursed or should the bill footed by the Iraqi Government, 

before we even approach the Iraqi Government to obtain their concurrence wherever necessary? If that’s the case, where we could 

work together, do you have an idea of the kinds of things that you 

could identify for us that might be reimbursable? For example, gasoline, the cost of training. That—in some parts, money has gone 

from reconstruction into training programs for their security purposes. So, I guess I’m just asking, can you give us some idea of the 

things you think might be reimbursable or direct payments by the 

Iraqis, so that they don’t come at the expense of the American taxpayer and borrowing from future generations? 

Secretary GATES. Senator Nelson, as I indicated to Senator Collins, we’ve, I think, just really begun—we have focused—as we 

have begun to look at the sums of money that Iraq is earning from 

the oil sales, we have, just in recent weeks, been looking at ensuring that the reconstruction funds and the military equipment for 

them are increasingly and dramatically headed in the direction of 

them picking up those costs. The subject of their reimbursing us, 

and of those kinds of things, or areas where they would pay for certain services, has not been broached yet because of this focus on 

the reconstruction and military equipment and so on. But, based on 

197

this hearing, I’m more than happy to carry the message back to the 

administration and see if we can have a look at this. 

Senator BEN NELSON. I suggested it recently. They’re a bit aware 

of it, because I suggested it to Mr. Hadley, so that it wouldn’t be 

a surprise that I intended to bring this up. 

Wouldn’t you think it would be a good idea to do it in a comprehensive fashion so we don’t do it in piecemeal—in other words, 

so we could put together a program, certain things that clearly 

would be a loan, those things that could be reimbursed today, those 

things that would be loaned for repayment in the future—wouldn’t 

it be a good idea to have it in a comprehensive fashion? 

Secretary GATES. Well, I certainly agree that if we’re going to go 

down this path, we ought to look at it comprehensively. 

Senator BEN NELSON. With some urgency, because every day 

that goes by, people pay more at the pump, and the oil was at 

$1.10, now it’s $1.12, maybe spiking up yet today. I hope not, but 

perhaps. It is a very strong drag, I think, on our economy to see 

these things occur, and then it’s sort of an injury on top of the insult, when we’re also paying for services for some other country. 

I have another area that I’d like to raise, as well. During testimony yesterday before our committee, I discussed with retired General Jack Keane who’s one of the authors of the surge strategy—

about language that Senator Collins, I, and others have wanted to 

get passed, and that is to transition the mission in Iraq out of providing security in Baghdad into providing more combat troops into 

the north to take out al Qaeda and the insurgency through 

counterinsurgent methods in the north; and, at that time—we’ve 

also proposed, for some time, a stronger emphasis in the south, 

with the militias and the Mahdi Army and other groups in the 

south. We’ve really not received any support from the administration. We’ve not set a timetable to withdraw. We set a date to start 

the process, and that would be to start it. Now, based on what I 

heard General Keane say, and what I’m hearing in the discussions 

with General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker—is that, in fact, 

that’s what’s happening. I guess my question to you is, is that 

what’s happening? Have we begun the transition of the mission 

from providing, essentially, security for the Government of Iraq in 

Baghdad to expanding it into these other areas? 

Secretary GATES. Let me comment and then invite Admiral 

Mullen to comment. 

I think we began the transition of mission with the withdrawal 

of the first surge brigade, in December. What is going to happen 

in Iraq if you’re doing this in a color graphic, the country is not 

going to turn from one color to another color for the whole country. 

It will be more of a mosaic, with different pieces of it turning at 

different times. There are already eight provinces under provincial 

Iraqi control. Anbar will probably go to provincial Iraqi control 

within a matter of weeks. So, the mission will have transitioned 

dramatically in those places, to strategic overwatch, where there 

will be relatively few troops, relatively few coalition troops, and 

their role will be very different, say, in Anbar, than it was 7 or 8 

months ago. It will be——

198

Senator BEN NELSON. If I might ask you, would that also be, perhaps, the beginning of the establishment of a residual force or a residual mission there, as well? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir, I think so. There will be places in Iraq 

where the mission has transitioned from our being in the lead and 

being in combat to a strategic overwatch, where we have a residual 

force, to other places in Iraq where we’re still engaged in combat, 

such as in Mosul and places like that. So, I believe we are in the 

process of a transition of mission, and it is taking place at different 

times and different places in Iraq. 

Admiral MULLEN. In fact, General Petraeus, when he was here 

in September, was given a mission statement that essentially was 

directed to generate this kind of transition. That’s obviously tied to 

building the Iraqi security forces. We’re up about 20 battalions now 

from where we were a year ago, in addition I think it’s about 

107,000 or so that are leading independently or leading with us 

throughout the country, all of which is part of this transition. 

There will be places where we can do it and get into an overwatch 

position very quickly; in others, it’s going to take more time. 

Senator BEN NELSON. We have stressed, with this legislation, 

that we always felt that, if it started, the question of ‘‘how fast does 

it go?’’ depended on conditions on the ground and commanders on 

the ground and success. So it was passed, even though it wasn’t 

voted on. That might be an unfair way to characterize it, but it 

does seem that, in effect, that that is now the strategy. I never understood the opposition to our legislation. But, that probably isn’t 

the first, nor will it be the last time, that I don’t understand opposition. 

Thank you very much for your answers. Appreciate it. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The whole premise of the surge was to provide better security 

and hoping that would lead to better performance by the Iraqi military and a better economy and quicker political reconciliation. In 

January 2007, the President announced that we were going to 

change strategy. Admiral Mullen, as I understand the strategy behind the surge, was to add additional combat power to bring a level 

of security to Iraq that was unknown before January 2007. Is that 

correct? 

Admiral MULLEN. There’s actually two things—not just the——

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

Admiral MULLEN. —additional combat power, but also that provide security for the Iraqi people. Really, it’s—

Senator GRAHAM. That’s right, to——

Admiral MULLEN. —the counterinsurgency——

Senator GRAHAM. —protect the population. 

Admiral MULLEN. —the counterinsurgency approach, which was 

generated at that time, as well. 

Senator GRAHAM. My premise has been that, without better security and better protection and more confidence of the Iraqi people, 

nothing is going to happen. You had political and economic stagnation before January 2007; you had, basically, Anbar province occupied by elements of al Qaeda; and widespread sectarian violence. 

199

So, the hope would be that, by protecting the Iraqi people, getting 

out behind the walls, the joint security stations, confidence would 

be built by the Iraqi people to take more action, to tell us more 

about the insurgency. 

I think, by any objective measure, it’s worked, that the military 

situation in the Anbar situation has dramatically improved, that 

the biggest success of all, from my point of view, is that the Anbar 

Iraqis rose up against al Qaeda, aligned themselves with coalition 

forces, and al Qaeda has taken a very big beating. To me, of all 

the things that could happen in the war on terror, having Muslims 

reject al Qaeda, particularly Sunni Muslims, would be a huge sea 

of change in the war on terror. I just want to compliment you both, 

and all under your command, for having brought about success 

that was not known before and has come at a heavy price. 

So, now, where to go. The SOFA that is of much discussion. The 

reason I think we need to deal with that now is, it’s my understanding the legal underpinning for our presence in Iraq is based 

on the U.N. resolution that expires in December. Is that correct? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. So, come December, the legal authority 

that we’re basing our presence upon in Iraq, dealing with security 

threats and the ability to be there, goes back to the U.N. resolution. The good news, for me, is that the Iraqi Government is saying, ‘‘We want out from Article VII—Chapter VII of the U.N. We 

want to be seen as a legitimate state, not a chaotic place,’’ and that 

will require a bilateral negotiation to continue our presence. Is that 

the game plan, here? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you know of anyplace in the world where 

thousands of American troops are stationed in a foreign country 

without a SOFA or something like it? 

Secretary GATES. No. 

Senator GRAHAM. As a matter of fact, it would be very irresponsible, wouldn’t it, to leave our troops in Iraq or any other country 

without some law governing their conduct and providing them protections? Is that correct? 

Secretary GATES. Exactly. 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. 

Secretary GATES. A SOFA is for the protection of our troops. It’s 

the ground rules under which they are in another country. 

Senator GRAHAM. Having been a military lawyer for 25 years, I 

appreciate how important that is, because when a soldier, airman, 

sailor, or marine may be caught by the host nation police forces, 

sometimes, we don’t want our folks to go into that legal system, 

and I would argue that maybe this is an occasion where we would 

want to retain jurisdiction over any offenses committed in Iraq. 

So, there is an effort to negotiate a bilateral agreement, a traditional SOFA, with the Iraqi Government. Is that correct? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. I would urge you to get that done, sooner rather than later, because the next President, whoever he or she may 

be, is not coming into office until January, and there’s a legal noman’s land beginning in December. So, I hope we can do that, and 

200

certainly not make it a treaty that needs to be ratified, and standard SOFAs are not. 

Now, about Iran—let’s think of Iraq a little more strategically. 

Iran seems to me to be hell-bent on requiring nuclear capability, 

that they are not producing power—nuclear power for peaceful purposes, or at least I don’t believe they are; I don’t trust them when 

they say they are. What would be the effect of a nuclear armed 

Iran to the region, in your opinion, Admiral Mullen and Secretary 

Gates? How would it change the balance of power? 

Admiral MULLEN. I think it would have a dramatic effect on the 

region. I worry a great deal about it generating concerns in other 

countries, who then would think they’d have to have the same capability. Clearly, that kind of capability puts Israel potentially 

under the envelope, which is——

Senator GRAHAM. Is it your understanding that the Iranian nuclear desires could eventually lead to a nuclear weapon? Or what 

are their motives? What do you think they’re up to, when it comes 

to a nuclear program? 

Admiral MULLEN. Oh, I believe they’re still trying to develop a 

nuclear weapon. 

Senator GRAHAM. What about you, Secretary Gates? 

Secretary GATES. I think they’re determined to get nuclear weapons. 

Senator GRAHAM. How much time do we have before they get 

there? Does anybody really know? 

Secretary GATES. No. You have estimates, and the estimates 

range from, the worst case, sometime maybe late next year, to——

Admiral MULLEN. 2009. 

Secretary GATES. —out several years. 

Senator GRAHAM. Israel is a very valuable ally. Is it fair to say 

that some of the attacks that are being generated from the Gaza 

Strip, in terms of rockets coming into Israel, the weaponry is coming from Iran? Are you familiar with that? 

Admiral MULLEN. I would go so far as to say that certainly Iranian support for Hamas is there. 

Senator GRAHAM. So, Iranian support for Hamas is there. It’s 

clear that the ‘‘special groups’’ that are operating in Iraq have Iranian ties. Is that correct? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. General Petraeus’s testimony was pretty stunning to me, in the sense that he said, ‘‘Now it’s not al Qaeda, it’s 

not sectarian violence that’s the biggest threat to a peaceful, stable 

Iraq, but Iranian influence.’’ Is that a fair statement, Admiral 

Mullen? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir, I think it is. 

Senator GRAHAM. Secretary Gates, do you agree with that? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Some people have said we’ve taken our 

eye off the ball when it comes to al Qaeda by being in Iraq. What 

would be the consequence to the war on terror, in general, if al 

Qaeda would have been seen to have lost in Iraq because Sunnis 

in Iraq turned on them? Would that have a benefit throughout the 

world, in terms of our struggle with al Qaeda? 

201

Secretary GATES. My opinion is, given the level of investment—

in fact, as the President said this morning, given the level of effort 

and investment that al Qaeda made in Iraq, and where they were, 

15–18 months ago, in Anbar, it would be seen, I think, throughout 

the region, as a major setback. 

Senator GRAHAM. Has anyone suggested to you that we should 

take troops out of Iraq and send them to Waziristan? No? 

Admiral MULLEN. No, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

Final question. What intrigued me about the comment about the budgets of Afghanistan and Iraq is that it—did you say it was $675 

million for all of Afghanistan? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Has anybody gone to the Iraqis and asked 

them, ‘‘there’s another nation out there struggling, trying to regain 

their freedom. Would you contribute some money to the Afghan 

people?’’ I mean, if they have $60 billion, and they’ve budgeted for 

$48 billion—I’ve never thought about that, until you mentioned it, 

but if you get a chance to talk to the Iraqis, this may be a chance 

to demonstrate to the world that they’re going to be a team player, 

here. 

So, with that thought in mind, thank you for your service. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham. 

Senator Cornyn. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, I’m not going to ask you about 

Iraq or Afghanistan. I’d like to stick a little closer to home and talk 

about our hemisphere; and specifically, Latin America. I come from 

a State with a 1,600-mile common border with Mexico, a place that, 

but for the grace of God, may have been governed by somebody unfriendly to the United States, Lopez Obrador, if he had won and 

beat President Calderon. President Calderon, of course, has been a 

good ally and worked with us; and, particularly, we’ve helped him 

fight the narcotraffickers in his own country. But, it’s still a lot of 

violence, and it’s a big challenge. 

Going a little farther south, we have another tremendous ally 

named Colombia. Recently, I had a chance to visit with Admiral 

James Stavridis, head of Southern Command—about current developments and challenges our Nation faces in his area of responsibility, which includes Latin America. I’ve read that our policy—our 

official or national policy toward Latin America has been described 

as one of benign neglect. I prefer to think that it was more unintentional, because of our concentration in other parts of the world. 

But, the Admiral made it clear to me that there’s a real threat of 

the spread of terrorism in Latin America. Of course, President 

Uribe, in Colombia, is fighting the Revoluntionary Armed Forces of 

Colombia (FARC), which has found safe haven and support in 

places like Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela and elsewhere. 

Unfortunately, today we have the news that the House of Representatives—and this is not your bailiwick, necessarily, but the 

House of Representatives has changed its rules and prevented us 

from acting on the Colombian-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. My 

question is not so much about trade, but about our national security. 

202

I would just ask both of you, if the United States were to turn 

its back on Colombia, how would this impact our national security? 

Secretary GATES. Senator, a week or 10 days ago, I published an 

op-ed on the national security implications of our relationship with 

Colombia and of the trade agreement, and I’d be happy to get you 

a copy of that. It clearly focuses on where we were in Colombia 10 

years ago. 

I will tell you, one of the biggest changes in the time since I retired from the government and came back has been what has happened in Colombia. What troubles me is that there was recognition 

of Colombia’s importance to our security, on a bipartisan basis, beginning in the Clinton administration with Plan Colombia, that has 

invested something like $5 billion of American money in Colombia 

for their security, for their police, for counternarcotics, for 

counterterrorism, and so on. We have seen a real success in Colombia in all of these ways. We have seen the kinds of connections that 

the FARC has with neighboring countries. So I believe that Colombian security is very important, and it would be a shame to see the 

progress that’s been made there put at risk because they face economic difficulties or because President Uribe suffers political consequences because his good friend the United States of America basically turned its back on him. 

Senator CORNYN. Admiral Mullen? 

Admiral MULLEN. Senator, I visited Colombia 2 months ago, I 

think, and, while I was aware from a distance how much better 

their security had gotten, it was really an incredible experience to 

go through it with their military and to see exactly what they had, 

which has in effect, become a counterinsurgency force, expanded in 

size, and taken back their own country, about 30 percent of 

which—I’m sure you know this—the local mayors, in 2002, didn’t 

live anywhere close to the towns they were mayors at; they are 

now all living in their towns. I give the Colombia leadership, President Uribe, as well as the Colombian military, great credit for 

doing this. 

They are a good friend of ours, and I do worry, and have historically worried, about how well we look to the south. This is just my 

own experience. I’m not sure benign neglect is the right answer, 

but clearly Latin America is an important part of the world for us. 

They are our neighbors, and clearly there are growing challenges 

down there, not just from the narco piece, but potentially becoming 

narcoterrorism—and the leadership, which is clearly not supportive 

in other countries—is not supportive of where we’re headed. 

So, we need Colombia, certainly from a military standpoint, to be 

a strong ally. They’ve made incredible progress, and I would hate 

to see the kind of investment that we’ve made be jeopardized, 

based on other issues which are clearly in play. 

Senator CORNYN. I think it’s not a coincidence that we’ve seen 

countries like China and Iran interested in South America and 

Latin America, generally. Of course, if my memory serves me, I believe there has been some developments about weapons production 

down in Venezuela. If I’m not mistaken, involving Kalashnikov rifles, and sales of military materiel to Venezuela by other countries. 

I would just hope that the memory of President Ahmadinejad, of 

Iran, a state sponsor of international terrorism, touring Latin 

203

America, strengthening their ties with the likes of Hugo Chavez 

and leaders of the terrorist group FARC, would cause us to wake 

up—and I’m not talking about you, I’m talking about Congress—

to wake up and realize the importance, not only of our economic 

ties, but the importance of our national security ties to a country 

like Colombia. 

I would just think that the only person who is celebrating the 

killing of the Colombia Free Trade Agreement today, at least until 

after November, is probably Castro, Chavez and all of our enemies 

in that part of the world. They’re, in effect, telling President Uribe, 

‘‘This is what you get for being a friend and ally of the United 

States.’’ Not a message we want to send, and one that’s not consistent with our national security interests. 

My time’s expired. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Cornyn. 

Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary and Admiral, for being so patient 

today. 

Admiral Mullen, a recent estimate by the Congressional Budget 

Office puts the projected cost of future operations in the global war 

on terrorism between $440 billion and $1 trillion over the next 10 

years. The lower figure is based on an assumption of 30,000 troops 

deployed to both Iraq and Afghanistan by 2010, a significant reduction from the approximately 200,000 currently engaged, an increasingly unlikely goal. 

Admiral Mullen, if realized, what impact will these expenditures 

have on the ability of the services to transform and modernize over 

the next decade so that they can effectively meet 21st-century challenges, especially with regards to future combat systems and the 

Air Force and Navy fleets. 

Admiral MULLEN. Senator, that obviously is tied very clearly to 

what the defense budget is over time. Over that same period of 

time, we’re challenged in managing the funds that we have, with 

buying what we need for the future, operating today in operations 

just as you’ve described, as well as resourcing the people who really 

make all this possible. That tension is clearly there in a timeframe. 

If our defense budget went down fairly dramatically, then those operations were still ongoing—there’s only one place to get those 

kinds of resources, and that pretty significantly takes it out of future development or reduce the number of people. Most of us believe, right now, that probably wouldn’t be a prudent move. We’re 

living in a very dangerous, unpredictable, uncertain world, and 

having the right resources to support the men and women who 

carry out these missions is absolutely vital. So, it could put a great 

deal of pressure on our future accounts, certainly our acquisition 

accounts, based on the size of the operation in an extended period 

of time. 

That said, that kind of projection, in terms of operational level, 

long-term, most of the analysis that we’ve done in the DOD look 

at some level of operations out there in a time of what we call persistent conflict. In the world we’re living in, one of my biggest concerns is that we figure out a way to resource that correctly. 

204

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Secretary and Admiral Mullen, the absence 

of attacks within Iraq is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition 

for stability. Dr. Stephen Biddle, who testified only last week, says 

that much of the reduced level of violence is due to Iraq’s becoming—and I’m quoting—‘‘a patchwork of self-defending sectarian enclaves that warily observe each other.’’ Even if a situation of reduced attacks is maintained by these regional cease-fires, the underlying problems of political and ethnic fracturing would still 

exist. These so-called cracks in the foundation of the new Iraq represent the absence of the political reconciliation that the surge was 

supposed to be able to help provide. 

My question to you, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what 

are the long-term implications for the U.S. military presence in 

Iraq if the Maliki government is unable to achieve a degree of reconciliation that will convince the warring factions to lay down their 

arms? 

Secretary GATES. Senator, first of all, I believe there has been 

some real political progress in Iraq with the passage of four of the 

six pieces of benchmark legislation. They are distributing the revenues of the oil—even though there isn’t a hydrocarbon law, they 

are distributing them according to, basically, the percentages that 

would be in the law. I think that, as I mentioned earlier, we have 

seen Maliki take action in Basrah against Shiite who were influenced by Iran, probably supported by Iran in many respects, and 

try to establish the authority of the national government down 

there. He’s been congratulated on this by the Sunni leadership, by 

the Kurdish leadership, and so on. 

They’re not one big happy family, and they won’t be for a long 

time, but I think there is progress in this respect. In some regards, 

I would say that oil will be the glue that holds Iraq together and 

provides the motive for everybody, no matter how hard things get 

from time to time, to ultimately work out their problems. I think 

they’ve made some headway on that. I believe that they will—I 

think it’ll be a mixed record, but, I think, on the whole, it is moving 

forward—more slowly than we would like, but moving forward. 

Admiral? 

Admiral MULLEN. The only thing I’d like to add to that, Senator, 

is we oftentimes focus on the national-level political reconciliation, 

which is a very important part, but there’s been considerable 

progress in reconciliation at the provincial level, as well as at the 

local level. When I, again, visit our Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams (PRT), our commanders on the ground, they speak to a lot 

of progress, and it varies, depending on where you are in the country. But, the kind of movement among the Iraqi people from the 

local-politics standpoint, that just wasn’t there a year ago. Also, 

provinces starting to connect with Baghdad, and Baghdad starting 

to connect with them, all of which is part of this, needs to move 

more quickly, but, like in many other things, I think, a year ago 

I would not have predicted it would have even gone this far. 

Senator AKAKA. Admiral, one of the security successes over the 

past 6 months has been the Sunni Awakening Movement in Anbar 

province, where former Sunni insurgents have turned on their 

former al Qaeda allies in order to bring stability back to their local 

205

neighborhoods. This practice has started spreading to other provinces, and now even includes some Shiite groups. 

However, there is now a growing concern over what may become 

the focus for those battle-hardened militia groups in the years to 

come, much like the Mujahedin soldiers the U.S. aided in Afghanistan in the 1980s against the Soviets and eventually developed into 

elements of the Taliban. My question to you, is there a concern 

that these groups will ultimately make it even more difficult for 

the central Iraqi Government to establish and maintain effective 

control over the provinces, especially given the sectarian conflicts 

which we are witnessing now? 

Admiral MULLEN. Certainly I think there is a concern along 

those lines, but it is not something that the commanders on the 

ground have spoken to as something they see in the immediate future with respect to those who are now working with us. I think 

the long-term outcome here is going to be tied to success in the 

country. Can the country come up in a way to provide the kind of 

overall economy and security, the big things we’ve talked about before, and, in fact, think of Iraq first, as opposed to the sectarian 

aspects of this, thinking that way? We’re moving in that direction, 

but it is painfully slow, and it’s just going to take some time to do 

that. The CLCs, 90,000 or so, 20 percent of which are Shiite, and 

about 20 percent of that overall force is also joining the security 

forces. So, this is all moving in the right direction. 

Can we sustain it? I think that’s the question that’s out there. 

There’s the feeling that there’s a willingness to do this, but it’s the 

entirety of the country that has to come to bear on this across all 

aspects of economy and politics, as well as security, which provide 

for a better country and a better outcome for all of the Iraqis. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Akaka. 

Senator Thune. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, thank you very much for your 

presence here today and for your service to our country, and thank 

you for your patience. I think you’re at the end of the line, here. 

Admiral Mullen, last week the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee received testimony from the Service Vice Chiefs 

on the current readiness of our forces. During that readiness hearing, I asked the Vice Chiefs about the impact on each Service that 

may occur from the delay on the passage of the second part of the 

fiscal year 2008 supplemental appropriations request. General 

Magnus, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, said that 

the delays in funding, ‘‘send a strong, unmistakable signal to our 

seasoned warriors who have been willing—and their families have 

been willing to sign them up to re-enlist.’’ Then he went on to say, 

‘‘that whenever we see a significant delay in deliberations regarding appropriations to support the pay for our armories—and I’m 

sure it’s the same for the other Services—you have a very intelligent, very professional force, and they also pause to be able to see 

what this means for them and their future.’’ 

206

Admiral, would you agree with General Magnus’s assessment of 

the messages that these delays in funding send to our troops in 

Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Admiral MULLEN. In my opening comments, I talked about the 

support that this committee and Congress has had for our men and 

women in uniform, and it’s been extraordinary, and we couldn’t be 

the military that we are without that. 

That said, this specific issue of the remaining supplemental for 

this year starts to be seen—send the kind of signals that you’ve described, or that General Magnus describe. It also impacts the institution in a way that the institution starts to react earlier than even 

the time that we figure we’re going to run out of money. So, the 

discussion now gets centered on—that we potentially could run out 

of money to pay the Army as early as June, and there—the institution starts to get poised for that, and the people start—certainly 

the troops start to worry whether that’s going to happen. 

So I would ask the committee and Congress to pass this as rapidly as possible, because it does have those kinds of effects. Clearly, 

it then has a rolling effect, if it didn’t—if funding didn’t get out 

there—into our readiness—very seriously, our readiness for the 

rest of this year. 

Senator THUNE. General Cody also—the Army Vice Chief—testified about the delay of emergency war supplemental funding and 

its effects on equipment readiness. He said that these delays have 

a ‘‘cascading impact on readiness over time.’’ Could you talk a little 

bit about the impacts of delayed funding on the equipment readiness in theater? 

Admiral MULLEN. Clearly, we’ve brought equipment back from 

theater to run through the depots to repair it. The funds that are 

spoken to in this bill are those kinds of funds, and that does have 

a cascading and cumulative effect that would, in fact, impact our 

ability to be ready to go do what we need to do in theater, and to 

refurbish it in order to continue to support what we’re doing. 

Senator THUNE. This would be for Secretary Gates or for you, 

Admiral—but, at a committee hearing last week, again, General 

Cody, the Army Vice Chief, testified that the Army is out of balance, and that the current demand for our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan exceed the sustainable supply and limits our ability to 

provide ready forces for other contingencies. We’ve heard similar 

statements that have been made, expressed by the Army Chief of 

Staff, General Casey. At the same time, Congress has been very 

supportive of initiatives that have been proposed by the Department to increase the number of ground forces, to accelerate the 

purchase of new equipment, provide recruiting and enlistment incentives, and to support the investment required to transform the 

Army into modular brigades. In addition, the President announced, 

this morning, that the Army plans to reduce deployment times in 

Iraq from 15 months to 12 months. 

All of these fixes are intended to relieve the stress and the strain 

of the current operations tempo for the Army’s ground forces. I 

guess my question is, In your opinion, does the Army have the remedies in place to improve their readiness while continuing to meet 

security requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan? If not, what more 

can be done to help the Army get themselves back in balance? 

207

Admiral MULLEN. The ‘‘grow the force’’ initiative is incredibly important, and yet, we’re still 2 or 3 years out from when we complete that. 

When General Casey speaks of the Army being out of balance, 

he focuses on the training that we’re going through now, and then 

the missions we’re executing, which principally focuses on 

counterinsurgency. So, there’s a full-spectrum aspect of this which 

we’re not able to do right now, in the Army or the Marine Corps, 

because we’re focused here. General Conway would tell you he is 

not able to do any expeditionary amphibious operations, both training—because of where he’s focused right now—and in that regard, 

out of balance, that the Army—the ground forces—and we do focus 

on the Army, and these 15- to 12-month deployments are specifically Active-Duty Army. But, we shouldn’t forget the pressure that 

the Marine Corps is under. They’ve been in a one-to-one dwell, 7 

months gone and 7 months back, for a significant period of time, 

as well. That pressure is on those forces, and it’s going to take, actually, both a ‘‘build the force’’ and a combination of that and reducing the amount of forces that are deployed, to start to build 

more dwell time, which is the next big step, so forces can go out 

for a year and come back for up to 2 years; clearly, the funding to 

refurbish the equipment and also the time, if I were back 2 years, 

to do some of this additional training. 

The other thing is, the Army, in particular, has modularized at 

an—when you consider what we’re doing in war, they have 

modularized at an incredibly fast rate—and I really applaud that—

to meet the needs for the future. 

So, we’re in a very delicate place right now, for all these things, 

and it’s the force requirements that are generating a lot of this, 

and until we get some relief there—that would be the next big step. 

Secretary GATES. Let me add one thing to that, Senator. 

I think one of the biggest differences between a conscription 

Army and an All-Volunteer Force is the attention that we need to 

pay to families. The family has become incredibly important in the 

success of the All-Volunteer Army. We hope to have, up here fairly 

soon, some initiatives that address the family needs and send messages—more messages to the families about their importance. This 

will include requests for accelerated construction of daycare centers 

and longer hours for daycare centers, and hiring preferences for—

in the whole Federal Government, for the spouses of our men and 

women in uniform, and some—potentially, the sharing of unused 

benefits and so on. So, we hope that Congress will take a close look 

at those. Congress has always been supportive of these kinds of initiatives, but paying attention to the family needs is really going to 

be important and has been, and will continue to be. 

Senator THUNE. We would welcome suggestions that you have 

about that, and look forward to working with you when you are 

prepared to submit those to us. 

So, thank you all very much, again, for your service. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Thune. 

Thank you both. It’s been a long afternoon, and very uneven, in 

terms of schedule and calendar, but that’s the U.S. Senate. You’ve 

been very understanding. 

208

Admiral? 

Admiral MULLEN. Mr. Chairman, just in the hopes that I could 

eliminate additional administrative requirements, your specific 

question about Maliki’s ban really was focused on JAM, and there 

actually are other efforts for other militias that people are trying 

to—that are—there are significant efforts to try to make them go 

away, not successful, as you——

Chairman LEVIN. Well, if you look at the—I think it’s called the 

Council of—if you look at the Iraqi—I think it’s called Presidency 

Council, but I’m not sure——

Admiral MULLEN. Right. 

Chairman LEVIN. —their—and it may have been their security 

advisor—National Security Council—their statement was ‘‘all militias.’’ There’s a huge difference. 

Admiral MULLEN. Right. 

Chairman LEVIN. It’s just not going after his own—Maliki’s only 

going after the Sadr militia, and leaving out his own. Number one, 

he’s not being consistent with the constitution. Number two, he’s 

sending exactly the wrong message, I think, in terms of even enforcement of the effort to stop all militias. Remember, the benchmark is aimed at a law to prohibit all militias. Maliki’s taken it 

onto himself a statement that, unless certain militia is disbanded, 

apparently leaving out the others, that they will not have an opportunity to participate in the October 1 elections. I’m not sure where 

he got that from. 

Could you do this, Admiral? Would you—this is really a suggestion for you, Mr. Secretary, not for the Admiral—could you double 

check that with our ambassador and see whether or not that reflects our policy and whether it reflects the Iraqi constitution? 

‘‘That’’ being to just single out one militia for the prohibition. If it 

is the Maliki position, and if it doesn’t reflect our policy—and I 

don’t think it does—or their constitution—and I don’t think it 

does—could you then express your own opinion, whatever it might 

be, to our ambassador? 

Secretary GATES. Sure, and we’ll start with making sure of what 

Maliki actually said. 

[The information referred to follows:]

There is no conflicting policy on Prime Minister Maliki’s part regarding the prohibition of militias in Iraq. The Prime Minister has indicated on a number of occasions 

that he is against militias and has ordered their disbandment as a threat to national sovereignty. Illegal militias that have refused to disband are being routinely 

targeted by Iraqi security forces for destruction. The Prime Minister has taken a 

less combative approach with members of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq 

(ISCI) than he has taken with the Sadrist Trend, whose members remain with active ties to Sadrist militias. This circumstance stems from the Sadrist group’s reticence to disarm until confronted, as during recent security operations in Basrah in 

April 2008; however, the former military wing of ISCI, the Badr Brigade militia, disarmed in 2003 following the liberation of Iraq.

• Since its founding in 1982, ISCI has been a political force in Iraq. During its 

years in exile, ISCI became an important political voice for the exiled Iraqi community. Since the liberation of Iraq in 2003, ISCI has been influential within 

the Iraqi Government, most notably within the Ministry of Interior, and to a 

lesser extent, the other segments of the Iraqi security forces. 

• Also in 2003, ISCI and the Badr leadership chose to recognize Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order Number 91 that requires all illegal militias to disband. The Government of Iraq supports this disarming and is thus synchronized 

with U.S. policy goals to disarm illegal militias. This order not only requires disbandment of illegal militias but, under certain circumstances, precludes former 

209

militia members from holding political office for a period of 3 years. CPA Order 

Number 91 directs:

• ‘‘A member of an Illegal Armed Force or Militia may not hold political 

office at any level. An individual determined to have been a member of an 

Illegal Armed Force or Militia shall be barred from holding political office 

at any level for a period of 3 years from the date such individual ceased 

to be a member of an Illegal Armed Force or Militia.’’

In a USA Today October 2006 interview, Prime Minister Maliki stated:

• ‘‘We started to deal with militias since the first day I took over as prime minister. I declared from that day one of my goals was to dissolve the militias. I 

believe there could be no true state while armed militias are operating.’’ 

• ‘‘This conviction has not changed, whether the militia is Shiite, Sunni, Arabic, 

or Kurdish. The problem is the same. The problem that we face in disbanding 

militias—and the militias have to be disbanded—is that there are procedures, 

steps that need to be taken, which take time. We have taken some important 

steps toward that end.’’

In April 2008, following Iraqi security force operations in Basrah, Prime Minister 

Maliki said:

• ‘‘The first step will be adding language to a draft election bill banning parties 

that operate militias from fielding candidates in provincial balloting this fall. 

The government intends to send the draft to parliament within days and hopes 

to win approval within weeks.’’

Prime Minister Maliki, in an interview with CNN on April 7, 2008, also said:

• ‘‘Solving the problem comes in no other way than dissolving the Mahdi Army. 

They no longer have a right to participate in the political process or take part 

in the upcoming elections unless they end the Mahdi Army.’’

The United States supports Prime Minister Maliki’s approach and shares the vision for an Iraq that is free of the violence of militia groups and other violent elements. U.S. policy is clear: the Iraqi people have a constitutional right to ‘‘participate in public affairs and to enjoy political rights including the right to vote, elect, 

and run for office.’’ However, militias and other violent groups cannot be members 

of the same democratic institutions that they work to undermine by using violence 

to kill and intimidate the people. 

In April 2008 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said:

• ‘‘First of all, I didn’t hear anybody say that the Sadrist trend, which is—you 

know, was elected, shouldn’t try again to get the votes of the Iraqi people, as 

long as they’re prepared to do it not armed. That was—that militias need to 

break up. Eventually, all armed force has to be under the state, and that’s true 

for any society, any democratic society.

Also in April 2008 U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker said:

• ‘‘Iraq is at the point in its development where the events of Basrah and Baghdad are the state asserting its authority against an extralegal or illegal militia. 

That’s certainly how Iraqis broadly are viewing this, and in that sense, it is a 

defining event. The politics of Iraq will go on. The competition between the Supreme Council and Dawa and the Sadr trend and Fadhila just to name a few 

on the Shia side, that’s going to be part of the political landscape and that’s 

what elections are all about.

U.S. policy toward the uniform elimination of militias in Iraq is synchronized with 

Iraqi policy regarding the elimination of these same militias. Prime Minister 

Maliki’s initiative in removing the threat of all militia activity from Iraq does not 

appear to show evidence of favoritism toward any one militia group. We will continue to support the efforts of the Government of Iraq to quickly and lawfully remove militias from Iraq.

Chairman LEVIN. We thank you both. It’s been a very important 

hearing for us. Thank you. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

RISK ASSESSMENT

1. Senator LEVIN. Admiral Mullen, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army General Cody, 

in testimony before the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee of the 

Senate Armed Services Committee on April 1, stated ‘‘Our readiness, quite frankly, 

210

is being consumed as fast as we can build it’’ and ‘‘I’ve never seen our lack of strategic depth be at where it is today.’’ 

At the same hearing, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps General Magnus stated ‘‘The short dwell time at home does not allow our units the time to train 

on the full spectrum missions needed to be ready for other contingencies’’ and ‘‘the 

readiness of the nondeploying units has been at a significantly lower level than the 

forward deployed forces.’’

How would you assess the risk if another contingency, such as conflict on the Korean peninsula, arose while U.S. forces remain engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Admiral MULLEN. [Deleted.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK PRYOR

SHIITE CLERIC MUQTADA AL-SADR

2. Senator PRYOR. Secretary Gates, I asked Ambassador Crocker if radical Shiite 

cleric Muqtada al-Sadr is trying to set himself up as an Ayatollah in Iraq. An article 

in the USA Today on April 10, states that ‘‘the recent spike in violence here has 

shown that the enigmatic Shiite cleric and his Mahdi Army militia continue to have 

the muscle to plunge Iraq into warfare and essentially reverse recent security gains 

made by the United States military that the Bush administration cites as a key sign 

of progress. Or as he did in August, al-Sadr can stop much for the bloodshed by 

ordering a ceasefire—and win some credit from the United States military for the 

resulting calm.’’ What are we doing to help the Iraqi Government deal with cleric 

Muqtada al-Sadr? 

Dr. GATES. We continue to work with the Government of Iraq (GOI) to protect the 

population, build the capability of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISFs), and support job 

training programs. We are also encouraging and assisting the GOI to provide essential services to the population to diminish the appeal of extremist and militia movements by promoting confidence in the Iraqi Government. These efforts have contributed to a reduction in insurgent and militia activity. We strongly support efforts by 

the GOI to bring Sadrist elements into the Iraqi Government and ISFs. At the same 

time, we continue to target criminal militia elements and Iranian supported Special 

Groups. The GOI has recently taken a more aggressive posture against criminal militia elements, and we will continue to work closely to support Prime Minister 

Maliki’s efforts in that regard.

3. Senator PRYOR. Secretary Gates, are we working on developing a plan or strategy to get him to stand down and disarm his militia? 

Dr. GATES. We continue to work with the GOI to protect the population, build the 

capability of the ISFs, and support job training programs. These efforts have contributed to a reduction in insurgent and militia activity. We strongly support efforts 

by the GOI to bring Sadrist elements into the Government and ISFs. At the same 

time, we continue to target criminal militia elements and Iranian supported Special 

Groups. The GOI has recently taken a more aggressive posture against criminal militia elements, calling for all political groups to disband armed militias. We will continue to work closely to support Prime Minister Maliki’s efforts in that regard.

4. Senator PRYOR. Secretary Gates, does the U.S. military have a strategy if he 

does not stand down or disarm and re-engages with American troops on the streets 

of Iraq? 

Dr. GATES. We retain the ability to engage any militia elements that take up 

arms against us or the GOI.

5. Senator PRYOR. Secretary Gates, concerning the decreased level of violence in 

Iraq, is this a true indication of success in Iraq or is this simply Shiite cleric 

Muqtada al-Sadr issuing an order to his militia to cease fire which he can reverse 

at any moment? 

Dr. GATES. The decrease in violence is an important indicator of progress in Iraq. 

Muqtada al-Sadr’s cease fire order is just one factor in decreasing violence levels. 

Other factors include our effort to focus on protecting the population, sustained 

counterinsurgency operations by Iraqi and coalition forces, the increased capability 

of the ISFs, and Iraqi citizens such as the Sons of Iraq turning against al Qaeda 

and helping secure their own neigborhoods. Continued Iraqi and coalition pressure 

on extremists, terrorists, criminals, and other armed groups, along with numerous 

blows to al Qaeda in Iraq’s (AQI) leadership and networks, have diminished enemy 

capability to conduct attacks.

211

OPERATIONS IN IRAQ

6. Senator PRYOR. Secretary Gates, in response to Senator Collins’ questions on 

April 9, 2008, at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing about the progress 

made by the GOI in meeting benchmarks, retired Army General John M. Keane testified that ‘‘we may not resume reductions in 2008’’ pending three significant events 

that need to take place: (1) fend off al Qaeda in Mosul; (2) stabilize the operation 

in the South of Iraq; and (3) fall election in Iraq which will be the watershed political effort in Iraq. What is your assessment of these ongoing and upcoming events? 

Dr. GATES. Operations in Mosul against al Qaeda are part of the ongoing effort 

to destroy its network and deny al Qaeda sanctuary in Iraq. Coalition forces are 

partnering with Iraqi Army and police units in Ninewa province to accomplish this 

mission. Prime Minister Maliki directed the establishment of the Ninewa Operations Center and directed additional reinforcements to Mosul to bolster the existing 

Iraq Security Forces presence there. The provinces in southern Iraq are under Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC). Therefore, the ISF are leading efforts against criminal 

militias, with Coalition enabler support. The fall provincial elections will be a significant event in Iraq’s transition to a fully sovereign and democratic nation and are 

likely to promote increased reconciliation as communities who boycotted previous 

elections participate in the political process and gain increased representation in 

their government. General Petraeus will factor these events and others into his recommendation following the 45-day period of consolidation and evaluation upon the 

withdrawal the of the last surge brigades in July 2008.

7. Senator PRYOR. Secretary Gates, do you tie these successes/failures to the 45-

day period of consolidation and evaluation and then assessment linked to the withdrawal of troops? 

Dr. GATES. At this point it is difficult to know what impact, if any, the reduction 

in surge forces will have on the security situation. A brief pause for consolidation 

and evaluation following a return to pre-surge troop levels will allow us to analyze 

the process and its effects in a comprehensive way. I do not anticipate this period 

of review will be an extended one, and I would emphasize that the hope, depending 

on conditions on the ground, is to reduce our presence further this fall. But we must 

be realistic. Conditions in Iraq remain the measure on which we will base our troop 

strength decisions, and doing that requires sober and realistic assessments of the 

effects our return to pre-surge levels have on those conditions. The security situation in Iraq remains fragile and gains can be reversed.

READINESS TO RESPOND TO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ATTACKS

8. Senator PRYOR. Admiral Mullen, the Commission on the National Guard and 

Reserve issued its final report on January 31 and cited substantial shortcomings in 

the Nation’s readiness to respond to weapons of mass destruction attacks. Do you 

agree with the Commission’s assessment? 

Admiral MULLEN. The Commission did a very thorough job looking at the WMD 

consequence management problem from a view focused on the National Guard operating under title 32 and the Reserves under title 10 authorities. The Department 

views our role in a more holistic manner, covering not only the consequence management aspect but the nonproliferation and counter proliferation elements of the 

national strategy. We consider the Active and Reserve components as integral to the 

Department’s capacity to respond in accordance with the overall Federal strategy. 

Essential to DOD’s role is interdicting WMD prior to arrival in the homeland. To 

that end, DOD participates in numerous interagency venues to identify, track, and 

interdict movement of WMD and suspect shipments from state and non-state 

proliferators. We have already met with success in several areas, creating obstacles 

for would be WMD-capable actors from gaining access to these materials. 

To be sure, the most costly and difficult aspect of the national strategy is how 

to respond in a post-detonation environment. There is a three-phased response. The 

first response phase is executed routinely at the state and local level with the National Guard WMD Civil Support Team (CST), which was directed by congress almost 10 years ago. These teams have progressively grown to number 55, with at 

least one team resident in each state. The teams routinely respond to local level 

alarms and will likely provide the first confirmation that an attack has occurred. 

The second response phase is executed with National Guard Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNE) Enhanced Response Force Packages 

(CERFP), also directed and funded by congress. There are 12 validated CERFPs 

with 5 more in various states of sourcing and validation. These units are roughly 

150 members strong, and have response capabilities that compliment the detection 

212

and assessment capabilities resident with the first on-scene elements. CERFPs provide immediate but limited duration capability in decontamination, specialized medical, technical extraction, and command and control. The CERFPs were developed 

along the model of the Marine Corps’ Chemical Biological Incident Response Force 

(CBIRF), which was a key element during the response to Anthrax attacks on the 

U.S. Senate. The size of the crisis will dictate the level of response, therefore to address our third response phase, I directed the assignment of the CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF) to USNORTHCOM. This 5000-person organization is built around an Army Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and deploys 

with self contained and supporting communications, medical, transportation, decontamination, logistical, rotary-wing aviation, and unique WMD response units. The 

Department is working to incrementally allocate forces to provide additional capabilities in the event of multiple events. 

As I previously stated, our consequence management response strategy is built on 

a combined NG, Reserve component, and Active Duty solution. The initial elements 

are predominantly NG (CST, CERFP), with follow-on forces provided from the Active Duty or Federalized Reserves. Time is a tyrant and the challenge of moving individual units across the country is exacerbated considering time to muster and traditional methods and policies for mobilization. As you are well aware the Department does not have uncommitted brigades for this mission set, so I have directed 

the JS, Services, and JFCOM to develop Reserve component sourcing solutions. This 

effort is ongoing with steady progress. 

The Department has worked to synchronize our response to support the Federal 

lead agency, which in most cases is the Department of Homeland Security. DOD elements reside with FEMA Regional offices and are incorporated in their response architecture. This effort has vastly improved our response coordination as evident in 

natural disaster scenarios, most recently the CA Wildfires. We also train along side 

our interagency partners. In May we exercised a broad series of responses in the 

National Level Exercise, and USNORTHCOM conducts similar training events twice 

a year, normally in the spring and the fall.

9. Senator PRYOR. Admiral Mullen, what actions do you believe are needed to improve the Department of Defense’s (DOD) capabilities in this area? 

Admiral MULLEN. To continue our efforts in improving DOD’s capabilities to respond to WMD attacks, the Department follows a construct based on deliberate 

planning, coordination activities, operations, and capabilities development detailed 

in the National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NMS–

CWMD). This military strategy complements the three pillars of counterpoliferation, 

nonproliferation, and consequence management set forth in the National Strategy 

to Combat WMD. 

The Department is taking aggressive actions to specifically address: protecting the 

force, improving response capabilities to support homeland defense and civil support 

consequence management, and building partnership capacity. The Joint Staff is currently conducting a CWMD Strategic Global Assessment that will address the combatant commanders’ ability to execute the strategy outlined within the NMS–

CWMD. This assessment will be used to adjust planning and influence future 

CWMD capability development. 

Protecting the Force: 

The Department’s Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) is modernizing the joint force by developing and fielding integrated and interoperable capabilities to the joint force. Modernization of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) defense capabilities will continue to enable the warfighting combatant 

commands to accomplish all of the CBRN components of the NMS CWMD. The 

CBDP addresses key doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) modernization needs described in the 

capabilities-based assessments conducted for passive defense, consequence management, WMD interdiction, and WMD elimination. Success in CWMD operations depends on the effective integration of equipment, trained personnel, and proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). The CBDP is developing capabilities that 

can be employed at home and abroad, on and off installations, with local and state 

responders, and to assist allies or other coalition partners across a range of operations. Another significant focus area the Department is addressing is the threat of 

biological warfare. Broad spectrum medical countermeasures are being developed to 

defend against genetically engineered or naturally mutating pathogens for which 

there are no current defenses along with capabilities to manage the consequence of 

major catastrophic events. 

213

Consequence Management: 

The Department remains committed to providing capabilities to mitigate the effects of WMD attacks at home and abroad. There are 55 WMD CSTs and 17 CBRNE 

Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFPs). The WMD CSTs provide CBRN 

identification, assessment and technical advice. The CERFPs provide medical, decontamination, casualty search and rescue, technical rescue and C4I. The Department has also fielded a domestic CBRN Consequence Management Response Force 

(CCMRF) to assist the Lead Agency with capabilities ranging from personnel decontamination and medical triage to air and ground transportation. Additional 

CCMRFs will be sourced in the near future to provide increased capability. The Department is also in the process of evaluating and assessing mitigation measures to 

enhance DOD’s capability to respond to CBRN incidents contained on U.S. military 

installations abroad and in support of foreign partners in the event of an overseas 

WMD attack. 

Building Partnership Capacity: 

The Department actively engages in International CBRN defense programs seeking cooperative efforts in advanced development and procurement, doctrine and requirements, and science and technology. These efforts seek to expand the Nation’s 

ability to reduce and, where possible, eliminate or minimize the threats posed by 

traditional CBRNE weapons. The Joint Staff assists in the development of international military standardization and interoperability agreements involving chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defense. The Joint Staff engages in 

numerous international organizations, including: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Joint Capability Group on CBRN Defense; the NATO CBRN Medical 

Working Group; Australia, Canada, United Kingdom and United States CBRN 

Memorandum of Agreement and Counterproliferation of WMD Bilateral Agreements 

(South Korea, Japan, United Kingdom, France, Israel, and Indonesia). These international organizations are exchanging research, development, test and evaluation 

efforts in CBRN detection, identification, sampling, protection, medical countermeasures, and modeling and simulation. They are also conducting numerous multinational Table Top Exercises that have identified capability gaps and potential 

DOTMLPF solutions.

OPERATIONAL RESERVE

10. Senator PRYOR. Admiral Mullen, what is your opinion of an Operational Reserve? Do you believe it is necessary? 

Admiral MULLEN. I believe that having an Operational Reserve is vital for our national security. There are several factors that have evolved and are common for an 

Operational Reserve. One is our continued demand for timely utilization of select 

Reserve military capability. Second, there is an ongoing paradigm shift for assured, 

predictable and responsive access to a more ready Reserve component in order to 

sustain current and future operations while still maintaining the Citizen-Warrior 

ethos of our Reserves. This means we are continuing to invest more resources in 

our Reserve components to become better manned, trained, and equipped to be readily available for mobilization and employment as cohesive units while providing predictability to families and employers. 

Each of the Military Services over the past decade and since the First Gulf War 

have continued to shift their respective Reserve components from a Strategic Force 

towards an Operational Reserve Force construct based on evolving mission capability requirements and necessity. 

The Military Services believe operationalzing their respective Reserve component 

is a necessary part of our overall National and Military Strategy to support Homeland Defense, plus current and future combat operations. We also are actively involved in reviewing the recommendations taken from the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve report that advocates reviewing the laws, policies, and 

procedures which further supports operationalzing our Reserve components.

PREPOSITIONED STOCKS

11. Senator PRYOR. Admiral Mullen, our prepositioned stocks have been drawn 

down for use in Iraq and Afghanistan and the depletion of these stocks increases 

strategic risk in that it hinders our ability to respond quickly to emerging conflicts. 

What is the DOD’s plan to reconstitute the forward deployed war stocks? 

Admiral MULLEN. Our prepositioned capabilities have been and will continue to 

be essential to sustaining the global war on terrorism. We project the current 

214

prepositioned capabilities to be fully reconstituted by fiscal year 2015, contingent on 

available resources and emergent operational requirements. Currently, most of the 

Army prepositioned equipment has been employed in support of the global war on 

terrorism. The remaining prepositioned combat capability is in a high state of readiness and the Army maintains unit sets afloat to support port opening operations to 

receive strategically deployed capabilities. By fiscal year 2015 the Army projects to 

have its full objective of three Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (HBCT), two Infantry 

Brigade Combat Teams, five Sustainment Brigades, a Fires Brigade, an Infantry 

Battalion, and associated wheeled augmentation sets, watercraft, and sustainment 

stocks. Of the Marine Corps three Maritime Preposition Squadrons, two have less 

than their full complements of equipment. They will be reconstituted through scheduled maintenance cycles and provide full capabilities in 2011 and 2012. The third 

is currently fully capable to support contingency operations. As DOD’s prepositioned 

sets are being reconstituted, the Services are updating them with equipment and 

supplies that provide balanced and flexible capabilities. These capabilities will support a range of operations from major contingency to lower spectrum operations. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

OUR NATION’S STRATEGIC DEPTH

12. Senator CLINTON. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, recently, Army Vice 

Chief of Staff General Richard Cody testified before the Readiness and Management 

Support Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on the state of 

readiness of the Army. He testified that the current demand on our forces in Iraq 

and Afghanistan ‘‘limits our ability to provide ready forces for other contingencies.’’ 

Both the Army and the Marine Corps told the committee that they are not sure if 

their forces could handle a new conflict if one came along. In particular, General 

Cody noted our Nation’s ‘‘lack of strategic depth.’’

In light of General Cody’s comment regarding our Nation’s ‘‘strategic depth,’’ what 

missions are our armed forces not performing or are incapable of performing because of their commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Dr. GATES. We continually assess the capabilities of our forces to perform against 

plans and assigned missions in all regions. These assessments, which are classified, 

are delineated in the Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress. In summary, while 

significant portions of our ground forces are currently involved in operations in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, there should be no doubt that we have formidable capabilities to 

respond around the globe in the event of another crisis. Our air and naval forces 

can respond swiftly and effectively to any armed aggression. We also have significant capabilities in our noncommitted ground force, particularly the Reserve component, which can be called upon to fully mobilize, if required, to meet urgent national 

needs. We would also call upon all the instruments of national power, to include 

diplomatic, informational, and economic, to address the situation at hand. 

Admiral MULLEN. Our Armed Forces are performing a wide array of combat and 

noncombat missions throughout the world. Although our forces are strained, we can 

perform all missions and execute all contingency plans. With the advent of combat 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff restructured DOD priorities throughout the world. This has 

affected our noncombat operations and ability to respond to a second full-spectrum 

major combat operation (MCO). 

Every year, combatant commanders determine their regional priorities and request resources to fulfill their demands. Due to our focus on combat operations in 

Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), we curtailed or 

scaled back some of our theater security cooperation (TSC) efforts and multi-lateral 

exercises. Combatant commanders continue to conduct TSC efforts throughout their 

areas of responsibility; however, fiscal year 2009 demands will not be completely 

sourced for TSC and other partnership-building activities. Sourcing deficiencies will 

not prevent combatant commanders from implementing mitigation measures to accomplish priority missions. This is no different than previous years prior to the global war on terrorism. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CLAIRE MCCASKILL

AL QAEDA AND THE SECURITY OF THE AMERICAN HOMELAND

13. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, while the bulk of 

the administration’s focus in terms of troops, resources, and taxpayer dollars has 

215

been on Iraq, it seems the most pressing threat to the homeland security of the 

United States comes from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Admiral Mullen, you 

and Central Intelligence Agency Director General Michael Hayden have publicly 

stated that a future attack on the United States will most likely come from the al 

Qaeda group operating along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in the largely 

ungoverned tribal areas. Despite these statements, our continued troop commitment 

in Iraq has affected our effort in Afghanistan. Admiral Mullen, you have stated, ‘‘in 

Afghanistan, we do what we can, in Iraq we do what we must.’’ This has led you 

to characterize our effort to stabilize Afghanistan as an ‘‘economy-of-force operation’’ 

because ‘‘our main focus, militarily, in the region and in the world right now is 

rightly and firmly in Iraq.’’ 

Can you characterize your assessment, based on all information available to you, 

of whether AQI is planning to launch, or is capable of launching, attacks on the 

United States Homeland from Iraq? 

Dr. GATES. [Deleted.] 

Admiral MULLEN. [Deleted.]

14. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, is the core organization and purpose of AQI oriented at attacks within Iraq or outside of Iraq? 

Dr. GATES. [Deleted.] 

Admiral MULLEN. [Deleted.]

15. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, did AQI exist prior 

to the United States invasion of Iraq and, if so, was it affiliated with the broader 

al Qaeda international network at that time? 

Dr. GATES. [Deleted.] 

Admiral MULLEN. [Deleted.]

16. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, if we know that al 

Qaeda is planning attacks against America from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, 

why is the effort in Afghanistan not a higher priority? 

Dr. GATES. [Deleted.] 

Admiral MULLEN. Developing a stable, free, democratic Iraq that is not a threat 

to its neighbors and is an ally on the war on terror has been the U.S. main military 

focus. An Iraq that cannot govern, defend, and sustain itself jeopardizes our vital 

national interests in the region. Further, risk associated with a drawdown from Iraq 

that is not conditions-based outweigh risk emanating from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. However, Afghanistan continues to be a top military priority. 

Their are a total of 33,000 U.S. and 29,000 coalition troops currently deployed to 

Afghanistan, the highest level since the beginning of combat operations in that 

AOR. We are also seeing a higher level of operational effort by Pakistani forces, 

which has resulted in lower levels of cross-border infiltration into Afghanistan by 

al Qaeda and Taliban forces. The U.S. and our allies in Afghanistan continue to 

work closely with Pakistan to address the cross-border movement of enemy forces 

as well as their sanctuaries along the border. 

It is important to note that both conflicts (Iraq and Afghanistan) compete for 

many of the same critical resources. As security in Iraq improves, U.S. force levels 

will decrease consistent with the commander’s assessment of conditions on the 

ground, allowing the military to reset, reconstitute, and shift focus as required by 

existing and emerging threats. As indicated by the recent U.S. Marine Corps deployment to Afghanistan, the U.S. commitment is strong and will continue to be so. The 

military will continue to press al Qaeda and its associated network in Iraq, Afghanistan and wherever else they operate.

17. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, why has the DOD 

continually acted consistent with an Iraq first policy, in terms of priorities, when 

threats to our Homeland appear most densely concentrated in Afghanistan, which 

the DOD is clearly assigning a lower priority and acknowledges is under-resourced? 

Dr. GATES. The defense of the territory of the United States, its people, and interests requires an active defense-in-depth, which includes detecting and countering 

threats at their source. Destroying the al Qaeda network remains our most immediate and important task to deter and prevent any further attacks on the homeland. 

Al Qaeda’s leaders still view Iraq as the central front in their global strategy, sending funding, direction, and foreign fighters to Iraq. Winning in Iraq, which includes 

defeating al Qaeda, is critical to our success in the long war and protecting our vital 

national interests throughout the Middle East and abroad. 

The Department is fully committed to success in Afghanistan. There currently are 

some 38,000 U.S. troops assigned to Afghanistan. More than 21,000 of these perVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:23 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00219 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\45666.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
216

sonnel are assigned to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF), while the remaining 17,000 are assigned to OEF missions, which include 

both counterterrorism and training and equipping the Afghan National Security 

Forces. Some 3,500 U.S. marines recently deployed to Afghanistan, of which more 

than 2,400 are deployed to Afghanistan’s volatile southern region. The remaining 

1,100 marines are supporting the mission to train the Afghan National Police. Our 

allies and partners also are contributing in important ways to the mission in Afghanistan. Some 30,000 non-U.S. troops are deployed throughout the country, and 

ISAF leads 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan—of which 14 

are commanded by non-U.S. force contributors. Nonetheless, more is needed—the 

ISAF Commander has identified requirements that remain unfilled. These include 

maneuver forces, air assets, Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams, and additional PRTs. The Department works closely with our allies and partners to encourage them to help fill these requirements. 

Admiral MULLEN. The defense of the territory of the United States, its people, and 

interests requires an active defense-in-depth, which includes detecting and countering threats at their source. Destroying the al Qaeda network remains our most 

immediate and important task to deter and prevent any further attacks on the 

homeland. Al Qaeda’s senior leaders still view Iraq as the central front in their global strategy, sending funding, direction, and foreign fighters to Iraq. Winning in Iraq, 

which includes defeating al Qaeda, is critical to our success in the long war and protecting our vital national interests throughout the Middle East and abroad. An Iraq 

that cannot govern, defend, and sustain itself jeopardizes our vital national interests 

in the region.

18. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, how much of AQI’s 

diminished operating capacity can be attributed to the large American troop presence in Iraq? Specifically, do you believe that the Sunni ‘‘awakening’’ that pre-dated 

the surge has significantly damaged AQI? 

Dr. GATES. [Deleted.] 

Admiral MULLEN. [Deleted.]

19. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what role has the 

Shiite Maliki Government had in making sure that al Qaeda does not have a sanctuary in Iraq? 

Dr. GATES. [Deleted.] 

Admiral MULLEN. [Deleted.]

20. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, would you agree 

that even the Iranians do not want AQI to take hold next door in Iraq? In short, 

are there not several factors other than American troop presence in Iraq that have 

destabilized AQI, and that would remain in that region even if American troops did 

not remain at pre-surge levels? 

Dr. GATES. [Deleted.] 

Admiral MULLEN. [Deleted.]

21. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what is the DOD 

doing to increase the availability of resources to ongoing operations in Afghanistan? 

Dr. GATES. We recently increased the effort in Afghanistan by deploying the 24th 

Marine Expeditionary Unit as well as 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines. The Department 

of Defense and the Joint Staff continue to look at force availability for Afghanistan. 

Admiral MULLEN. We recently increased the effort in Afghanistan by deploying 

the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit as well as 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines. The Department of Defense and the Joint Staff continue to look at force availability for Afghanistan with four principal considerations in mind;

1. Continued support for and success in Iraq. As has been clearly indicated 

by General Petraeus and reinforced by Presidents of the United States, 

forces that might become available as a result of a drawdown in Iraq must 

be well thought through in order to ensure Iraq gains are not negatively 

impacted. Joint Forces Command is continuously making assessments of 

this force balance. 

2. Health of the force. The services ability to continue to provide forces, 

whether for Iraq or Afghanistan, must be considered in terms of overall 

stress on our forces. Increasing the dwell time of our forces is a key component of any decision about resourcing Afghanistan requirements. 

3. Strategic Reserve. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of Joint 

Chiefs of Staff must also consider the Strategic Reserve for our Nation and 

217

the impact that an increase in resources to Afghanistan might have on reconstitution of Strategic Reserve to respond to other contingencies. 

4. Success in Afghanistan. The U.S. and our allies are committed to success in Afghanistan and hard decisions about resources will need to be 

made if we are to turn the tide against the insurgency and support the Afghan Government in security, reconstruction, and development. Bottomline: we are working within DOD and the IA to develop a resourcing plan 

that meets the near-term and long-term needs of the operators in Afghanistan.

FUNDING AND SUPPORT FROM OTHERS FOR OUR EFFORTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

22. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Gates, at our hearing with General Petraeus 

and Ambassador Crocker, I asked Ambassador Crocker whether our future security 

agreements with Iraq will require the Iraqis to pay for the cost of our temporary 

bases and other related expenditures. Ambassador Crocker seemed to have not previously considered such an arrangement, but appeared open to taking the idea to 

the Iraqis. As you may be aware, our long-term security agreements with many 

other countries require the host country to offset some of the cost of our bases and 

related expenditures. This is an area that is important to me because of the incredible financial burden Iraq has placed on American taxpayers. I also note, as I did 

to Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, that the United States is running a 

massive budget deficit while the Iraqis are running a budget surplus. I believe it 

crucial that the Iraqis shoulder a greater amount of the burden of securing their 

nation, including offsetting, wherever appropriate, American expenditures made to 

support operations in Iraq. 

I am also interested in how we can get our North American Treaty Organization 

(NATO) allies to make a greater financial commitment to our effort in Afghanistan. 

While I applaud France and Romania for recently adding troops to the NATO force 

in that country, as you have stated, it appears unlikely that NATO will commit a 

large number of troops to Afghanistan. Since our NATO allies are unwilling to commit troops to Afghanistan, I would like to see them make an increased financial 

commitment to the reconstruction of the country and to training the Afghan Army. 

President Bush recently announced that he plans to pledge an additional $4 billion 

in aid for Afghanistan at the international donors conference to be held in Paris in 

June. I would like to see us leverage the President’s commitment and the Paris conference to achieve a greater financial contribution from our allies. I am aware that 

the administration hopes the conference will raise a total of $12 billion–$15 billion 

to fund Afghan reconstruction projects. It is my hope that the conference will raise 

at least that much, if not more, from our allies. 

What is being done to increase Iraqi budget execution and, more importantly, to 

offset or reduce American expenditures in Iraq? 

Dr. GATES. The U.S. Treasury Department and Department of State are in the 

lead for enhancing the spending capacity of the GOI. There are 13 ministerial capacity development teams consisting of over 400 advisors working with various GOI 

ministries to improve Iraqi technical capabilities. 

A primary focus is to improve Iraqi budget execution which in turn helps the GOI 

spend its own money on reconstruction and security. This entails, but is not limited 

to: (1) documenting budget execution policies and procedures; (2) training Iraqis 

(central ministries and provincial governments) on capital budget execution; and (3) 

training U.S. personnel deployed to PRTs to improve the PRTs’ ability to assist the 

provincial governments in executing their budgets. 

As a result of these efforts, Iraqi commitments to assume financial responsibilities 

and offset U.S. Government expenditures have already expanded significantly. In 

addition to passing a capital reconstruction budget of $13 billion and security budget of $9 billion in 2008, the GOI recently funded cost-sharing initiatives for sustaining and equipping the ISF, created a fund for urgently needed reconstruction 

projects that will be coordinated with U.S. commanders, and has begun to transition 

the costs associated with the maintenance of existing U.S. Government-funded Iraqi 

facilities, among others. 

Since 2005, the GOI has increased its share of the costs associated with ISF development from 29 to 75 percent. Furthermore, due to increased Iraqi spending, the 

Department has not requested any funds for capital expenditures in fiscal year 

2008. On funding for the ISF, the Department asked for $3 billion in fiscal year 

2008 and $2 billion in fiscal year 2009. The fiscal year 2009 request is 52 percent 

less than the average ISF funding levels between fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 

2008, and does not include any funds for infrastructure.

218

23. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Gates, is it unreasonable that the United 

States should request or demand offsets from the Iraqi Government of some American expenditures in Iraq, especially when it is running a budget surplus? 

Dr. GATES. No, it is not unreasonable for the U.S. to request from the GOI increased contributions for the costs associated with capital reconstruction and development of the ISF. This is why U.S. Government officials are working with GOI to 

more effectively utilize its financial resources in support of these needs. 

We have worked closely with the Iraqis to gradually transition U.S. funding for 

ISF development as the GOI demonstrates the capacity required to support the 

transition. As a result of these efforts, the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior 

have assumed responsibility of various U.S. Government-funded acquisition and life 

support contracts and developed a number of cost-sharing agreements to offset U.S. 

expenditures in Iraq. 

Moreover, the PRTs are working with local governments and tribal councils to 

help plan, prioritize, and execute Iraqi capital expenditure budgets to further offset 

U.S. spending on ISF infrastructure and capital reconstruction projects. Therefore, 

as ministerial and provincial capacity increases and matures, U.S. Government officials will continue to work with the GOI to transfer additional funding responsibilities to the Iraqis.

24. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Gates, in what areas, such as base operations 

and support, as I have suggested, would it be appropriate to negotiate for Iraqi 

funding of the American presence in Iraq? 

Dr. GATES. It is appropriate for the GOI to assume responsibility for a greater 

share of the costs required to sustain and equip the ISF as well as the costs associated with the development of critical infrastructure, long-term capital reconstruction 

projects, delivery of essential services, establishment of vocational and technical 

training centers, and the creation of civil and public works programs throughout 

Iraq. 

It would not be appropriate for the GOI to fund U.S. base operations as such 

funding from the GOI would require Iraqi Council of Representatives’ (CoR) approval. Alongside the political risk of budget defeat in the CoR, there would be no 

way of preventing the CoR from attaching additional provisions that could affect the 

operational flexibility of U.S. forces in Iraq (i.e. requiring pre-approval of expenditures prior to execution).

25. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Gates, how extensively is the United States 

pursuing such financial assistance, in any area, from the Iraqis? 

Dr. GATES. U.S. Government officials regularly engage the Iraqi leadership on the 

need to expend a greater portion of surplus revenues on security, capital reconstruction, and strategic investments that will stimulate and sustain economic growth. 

Furthermore, as a result of the U.S. Government’s sustained engagement with 

Iraqi leaders, we expect the GOI to pass its first supplemental budget later this 

year. This estimated $4 to $5 billion supplemental will augment existing provincial 

and ministerial capital accounts of $13.2 billion, and further demonstrate the willingness of the Iraqi leadership to use surplus oil revenues to offset U.S. Government 

expenditures. 

In addition to developing a 2008 supplemental budget, the GOI recently funded 

cost-sharing initiatives for sustaining and equipping the ISF, created a fund for urgently needed reconstruction projects that will be coordinated with U.S. commanders, established vocational and technical training centers throughout Iraq and 

has begun to assume the costs associated with the maintenance of existing U.S. 

Government-funded Iraqi facilities, among others. 

We will continue to identify cost-sharing opportunities with the GOI.

26. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Gates, what specifically do you plan on doing 

in the months leading up to the Paris conference to encourage our NATO allies to 

make a greater financial commitment to Afghanistan’s reconstruction? 

Dr. GATES. The U.S. Government looks forward to joining the international community to renew our long-term commitment to Afghanistan at the June 12 Paris 

Support Conference. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice will be leading our 

delegation. Afghanistan has made enormous progress since 2001, but stability remains fragile in many parts of the country and is dependent on the continued investment of the international community. The Paris Conference is an opportunity 

to build on the international community’s renewed security commitment to Afghanistan reached at the NATO Summit in Bucharest with complementary achievements 

on the civilian side. The overarching goal of the conference is to reaffirm our longterm commitment to Afghanistan and to focus additional resources behind an effecVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:23 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00222 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\45666.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
219

tive strategy. To this end, we seek to surpass the pledge total achieved at the 2006 

London Conference ($10.5 billion) and are endeavoring to ensure that each donor 

pledges more than it did at the London Conference. The U.S. Department of State 

is leading the U.S. Government’s overall effort to increase donor contributions and 

is implementing an overall U.S. strategy to reach out to donors. My office is actively 

supporting these efforts, along with members of the United States Agency for International Development and the U.S. Department of Treasury, which include multiple 

contacts with donor governments at various official levels.

27. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Gates, do you believe the $12–$15 billion the 

administration hopes to raise is the most we can expect NATO to contribute? Why 

do you believe we cannot get them to contribute more? 

Dr. GATES. The U.S. Government seeks to surpass the pledge total achieved at 

the 2006 London Conference ($10.5 billion) at the June 12 Paris Support Conference 

and is endeavoring to ensure that each donor pledges more than it did at the London Conference. The U.S. Department of State is implementing an overall U.S. 

strategy to reach out to donors via a number of worldwide demarches, engagements 

with key leaders in capitals and at regional meetings such as, for example, the U.S.-

E.U. Summit, and continuous discussions at various levels with donor countries. We 

are optimistic that donor pledges will be substantial and will complement the security commitments reached at the NATO Summit in Bucharest.

[Whereupon, at 5:04 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

Æ