PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________

ANDY KERR, Colorado State Representative; NORMA V. ANDERSON; JANE M. BARNES, member Jefferson County Board of Education; ELAINE GANTZ BERMAN, member State Board of Education; ALEXANDER E. BRACKEN; WILLIAM K. BREGAR,

member Pueblo District 70 Board of Education; BOB BRIGGS, Westminster City Councilman; BRUCE W. BRODERINS, member Weld County District 6 Board of Education; TRUDY B. BROWN; JOHN C. B UECHNER, Ph.D., Lafayette City Councilman; STEPHEN A. BURKHOLDER; RICH ARD L. BYYNY, M.D.; LOIS COURT, Colorado State Representative; THE RESA L. CRATER; ROBIN CROSSAN, member Steamboat Springs RE-2 Board of Education; RICHARD E. FERDINANDSEN; STEPHANIE GARCIA, member Pueblo City Board of Education; KRISTI HARGROVE; DICKEY LEE HULLINGHORST, Colorado State Representative; NANCY JACKSON, Arapahoe County Commissioner; CLAIRE LEVY, Colorado State Representative; MARGARET MARKERT, Aurora City Councilwoman, a/k/a Molly Markert; MEGAN J. MASTEN; MICHAEL MERRIFIELD; MARCELLA L. MORRISON, a/k/a Marcy L. Morrison; JOHN P. MORSE, Colorado State Senator; PAT NOONAN; BEN PEARLMAN, Boulder County Commissioner; No. 17-1192 FILED United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit



### July 22, 2019

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court2 WALLACE PULLIAM; FRANK WEDDIG, Arapahoe County Commissioner; PAUL WEISSMANN; JOSEPH W. WHITE; CHEYENNE

WELLS RE-5 SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION; SUSAN LONTINE; DENVER COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION; K.C. BECKER; BOARD OF COUNTY

COMMISSIONERS OF BOULDER COUNTY; BOULDER VALLEY

SCHOOL DISTRICT RE-2 BOARD OF EDUCATION; GUN NISON COUNTY

METROPOLITAN RECREATION DISTRICT; LESLIE HEROD; PUEBLO

CITY DISTRICT 60 BOARD OF EDUCATION; CHRISTOPHER J. HANSEN; GUNNISON WATERSHED

RE-IJ SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION; COLORADO SPRINGS DISTRICT 11 BOARD OF EDUCATION;

POUDRE SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION; PUEBLO COUNTY

SCHOOL DISTRIC T 70 BOARD OF EDUCATION; WILLIAM G. KAUFMAN,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

JARED POLIS, Governor of Colorado in his official capacity, *

Defendant - Appellee.

* When the action began, the Gove rnor of Colorado was John Hicke nlooper. While this action was pending, on January 8, 2019, Jared Polis became the governor

of Colorado. Because the Governor is sued in his official capa city, we substitute

Governor Polis for Governor Hic kenlooper per Fed. R. App. P. 43 (c)(2).3 ------------------------------

COLORADO ASSOCIATION OF

SCHOOL BOARDS AND COLORADO

ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL EXECUTIVES; THE COLORADO

UNION OF TAXPAYERS FOUNDATION; MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION,

Amici Curiae.

________________ _________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Colorado (D.C. No. 1:11-CV-01350-RM-NYW)

________________ _________________

David E. Skaggs, Dentons US LLP , Denver, Colorado (Lino S. Lipi nsky de Orlov, Dnetons US LLP, Denve r, Colorado, Herbert L awrence Fenster and Shannon Tucker, Covington & Burling LLP, Washington, D.C., Michael F. Feeley, S arah M. Clark, Carrie E. Johnson, and Cole J. Woodward , Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schre ck LLP, Denver, Colorado, and John A. Herrick, De nver Colorado, with him on the briefs), for PlaintiffsAppellants.

Frederick R. Yarger, Solicitor G eneral (Cynthia H. Coffman, Att orney General, Glenn E. Roper, Deputy Solicitor General, M egan Paris Rundlet, Assistant Solicitor General, Kathleen Spalding, S enior Assistant Attorn ey General, Stephanie Lindquist Scoville, Senior Assistant Attorney Gener al, and Matthew D. Grove, Assist ant Solicitor General, with him on the brief), Office o f the Attorney General for the State of Colorado, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee.

Shannon Wells Stevenson and Kyle W. Brenton, Davis Graham & Stu bbs LLP, Denver, Colorado, filed an Amici Curiae brief in support of Plaintiffs- Appellants.

Steven J. Lechner and Cody J. Wisni ewski, Mountain States Legal Foundation, Lakewood, Colorado, filed an ami ci brief in support of Defendan t-Appellee.

________________ _________________

Before BRISCOE

, SEYMOUR , and HOLMES , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________4 SEYMOUR , Circuit Judge.

________________ _________________

This case has a long history. Th e issue currently before us is whether certain

school districts, a special distr ict board, and/or a county com mission have standing to

challenge Colorado’s Taxpayer B ill of Rights (“TABOR”). Colo. Const. art. X, § 20.

TABOR allows the people of Color ado to raise or prevent tax inc reases by popular

vote, thereby limiting the power o f Colorado’s legislative bodi es to levy taxes. On a

motion to dismiss for lack of subject matte r jurisdiction pursu ant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(1), the district court held that plaintiffs had Article I II standing but that they

lacked political subdivision stan ding and prudential standing. Accordingly, the court

dismissed the complain t. Plaintiffs appeal.

This case is rife with difficult issues, and we applaud the dis trict court for its

attempts to “don waders” and ge nerate some cognizable structure out of the sludge.

Nevertheless, we conclude that it could not properly reach its conclusions at this

stage of litigation. Because we hold that the political subdiv ision plaintiffs are not

barred by standing require ments, we reverse.

I.

Plaintiffs contend that TABOR d enies them a “re publican form of government” as

guaranteed by Congress in the Col orado Enabling Act, ch. 139, 1 8 Stat. 474 (1875)

(“Enabling Act”), because it take s power from the legislature a nd puts it into the hands of

the people of Colorado in violation of the Guarantee Clause, see U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4,5 and the Enabling Act as enfor ced by the Supremacy Clause, see U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.

In one of our prior opinions, we held that certain individual l egislator plaintiffs had

standing to make this claim and that the claim was not a nonjus ticiable political question.

See Kerr v. Hickenlooper , 744 F.3d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 2014) (“ Kerr I ”). On appeal,

the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the matter to us for fur ther consideration in

light of its opinion in Arizona State Legislature v. Ar izona Indep. Redi stricting Com’n

,

135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015). See Hickenlooper v. Kerr , 135 S. Ct. 2927 (2015).

On remand, we held that the indi vidual legislator plaintiffs la cked standing

because they were asserting an institutional injury. Kerr v. Hickenlooper , 824 F.3d 1207,

1211 (10th Cir. 2016) (“ Kerr II ”). We instructed the district court to determine whether

any other plaintiffs had standing. Back at the district court, plaintiffs amended their

complaint to add certain additi onal entities: eight school boar ds, the Board of County

Commissioners of Boulder County, and a special district board. As noted, the district

court thereafter dismissed the complaint.

TABOR prevents the state legi slature and local entities from e nacting new taxes or

raising taxes except by popular v ote. Particularly significant to plaintiffs in this case,

TABOR prohibits state and local governments fro m appropriating revenue in exce ss of

the prior year’s spending, and it requires the state and local governments to refund

taxpayers for revenues appropriate d in excess of the prior year ’s spending. Colo. Const.

art. X, § 20(7)(a) & (d). TABOR also causes plaintiffs to incu r costs from presenting

matters to voters. Plaintiffs allege that these requirements i nhibit them from performing6 their mandated responsib ilities under Colorado law. See, e.g. , Colo. Const. art. XIV. 1

As a condition of admitting Colo rado to the Union, Congress re quired that the

state’s constitution “shall be re publican in form.” 18 Stat. 4 74. This language mimics

the language from the Guarantee Clause of the United States Con stitution. See U.S.

Const. art. IV, § 4. Under the S upremacy Clause, federal law c ontrols when federal and

state law are in conflict with one another. U.S. Const. art. V I, § 2. Plaintiffs contend that

TABOR denies them the republi can form of government required of the state of Colorado

by the Enabling Act and is thu s unconstitutional under the Supr emacy Clause.

II.

We review the district court’s “dismissal for lack of standing de novo,

applying the same standard use d by the district court.” Petrella v. Brownback , 697

F.3d 1285, 1223 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omit ted). “[A]s in all

standing inquiries, the critical question is whether at least o ne petitioner has alleged

such a personal stake in the out come of the controversy as to w arrant his invocation

of federal-court jurisdiction.” Horne v. Flores , 557 U.S. 433, 445 (2009) (emphasis

in original); see also Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found. , 454 U.S. 151, 160 (1981);

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. , 429 U.S. 252, 264 n.9

(1977). Thus, if at least one p laintiff can demonstrate standi ng, we need not consider

1 In Colorado, the burden of adop ting budgets and funding govern ment programs falls on the representati ves of the state , including p laintiffs in this case.

See Colorado Territorial Act of 1861 , ch. 59, 12 Stat. 176 §§ 4, 6, 7; Enabling Act §§ 3, 4; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 30-11-103 (2017) (county governments); Co lo. Rev. Stat. § 30-11- 101 (2017) (special districts).7 standing for the other plaintiffs . The district court determin ed that the political

subdivision plaintiffs establish ed Article III standing and def endants do not contest

this conclusion on appeal. Even so, the district court dismiss ed the action for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction beca use it concluded that two indep endent doctrines

barred these plaintiffs: political subdivision st anding and pru dential standing. The

issue before us is whether these other limitations indeed precl ude the political

subdivision plaintiffs fro m establishing standing.

III.

We begin by determining whethe r there are “prudential standing ” limitations

preventing plaintiffs from cha llenging TABOR. Plaintiffs argue that in light of the

Supreme Court’s decision in Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Sta tic Control Components, Inc. , 572

U.S. 118 (2014), the district c ourt erred in examining these pr udential concerns on a Rule

12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lac k of subject matter jurisdict ion. 2 We agree. In

2 Defendant argues that we shoul d review plaintiffs’ prudential standing arguments only for pl ain error because the y failed to argue pru dential standing in

district court. Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc. , 634 F.3d 1123, 1128 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[I]f the theory simply wasn’t r aised before the district cour t, we usually hold it forfeited.”). We disa gree. Plaintiffs raised prudential stand ing arguments in their brief in opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss before the district court. See Aplt. App. at 1489–90. In doing so, they specifically addresse d Lexmark and the three principles implicated in prudential standing, “the genera l prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’ s legal rights, the rule barr ing adjudication of generalized grievances more appr opriately addressed in the repr esentative branches, and the requirement that a plaint iff’s complaint fall within th e zone of interests protected by the law invoked.” Lexmark , 572 U.S. at 125.8 Lexmark , the Supreme Court described th e label “prudential standing” a s “misleading”

and “inapt.” 3 See id. at 125, 127 n.3. “Alth ough the jurisprudenc e surrounding stand ing

and jurisdiction has at times b een muddled, we have clearly hel d that prudential standing

is not a jurisdictional limitation . . . .” Niemi v. Lasshofer , 770 F.3d 1331, 1345 (10th Cir.

2014) (citing Wilderness Soc. v. Kane Cnty ., 632 F.3d 1162, 1168 n.1 (10th Cir. 2011)

(en banc)). Accordingly, the dis trict court should not have ev aluated defendant’s motion

to dismiss for lack of subject mat ter jurisdiction on the basis of prudential standing. See

VR Acquisitions, LLC v. Wasatch Cnty ., 853 F.3d 1142, 1146 n.4 (10th Cir. 2017).

IV.

Properly situating the prudentia l standing inquiry does not com plete our

analysis. The district court also found that, independently of prudential standing

concerns, the political subdivisi on plaintiffs are barred by po litical subdivision

standing restrictions. 4

3 Lexmark made clear that the first two p rinciples previously labelled a s prudential standing are not indepe ndent jurisdictional hurdles. See id . at 128 n.4 (clarifying that the zone-of-int erests test “does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction” but is a question of whether plaintiff has a vali d cause of action), 127 n.3 (generalized grievances are “barred for constitutional reas ons, not ‘prudential’ ones”). If the last principle—t he limitation on third-party st anding—retains any potency at this stage of litiga tion, that inquiry is inextricab ly intertwined with the merits of the present case. See infra.

4 As an initial matter, plaintiffs note in their opening brief t hat “[it] is not entirely clear whether ‘political subdivision st anding’ should be treated doctrinally as another subcategory of prudential standing.” Aplt. Br. At 9–10 . In the most recent precedential case on point, we ac knowledged there is “serious r eason to doubt” whether political subdivision sta nding is a jurisdictional limi tation. City of Hugo v.9 It is true that political subdivi sions generally lack standing to sue their creating

state. Housing Authority of Kaw Tribe of Indian s of Oklahoma v. City of Ponca City

,

952 F.2d 1183, 1188 ( 10th Cir. 1991). But “ the Supreme Court a nd courts of appeals

have shied away from erec ting an absolute bar.” City of Hugo v. Nichols , 656 F.3d

1251, 1256 (10th Cir. 2011). In certain circumstances we have held that political

subdivisions have standing, and tw o cases guide our analysis: City of Hugo, and

Branson v. Romer , 161 F.3d 619 (10th Cir. 1998) . The district court and plaint iffs

differ in their interpretations of the scope of these holdings. 5 Because we conclude

Nichols , 656 F.3d 1251, 1255 (10th Cir. 2011); cf. Brian P. Kennan, Subdivisions, Standing and the Supremacy Clause: Can a Political Subdivision Sue its Parent State

Under Federal Law? , 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1899 (2005) (noting Supreme Court’s precedential “political subdivisi on standing” cases were actual ly decided on the merits and not as jurisdictional issues). City of Hugo concluded that it was nevertheless bound by this court’ s prior decision casting the d octrine as one of jurisdictional standing. Id . at n.4 (referring to Branson v. Romer , 161 F.3d 619 (10th Cir. 1998)).

5 The dissent agrees with the dis trict court’s understanding of City of Hugo : the federal statute being enforced m ust be “directed at protecting political subdivisions.” Dissent at 4 (citation omitted). Declaring plaintiffs make “vi rtually no argument that if a ‘directed at protecting’ requi rement applies, it is satisfied ,” the dissent concludes they have waived this dispositive issue. Id. at 7–8 (emphasis in original). But the dissent itself accentuates the key word here: the dispute is “i f” such a requirement applies. Plaintiffs’ explanation for why the district court is wrong regarding the application of our political s ubdivision standing precedents is that the district court erred in discerning the a pplicable legal standard. See, e.g ., Aplt. Br. at 26 n.13 (“The District Court erred in concluding that more is needed for a po litical subdivision to

sue. It stretched the Branson II Court’s dicta to impose two additional requirements for political subdivision standi ng . . . . Beyond granting inap propriate weight to dicta, such requirements represent a br oad expansion of precedent that confuses the standing analysis.”) (e mphasis in original) . Nonetheless, plai ntiffs’ analysis with respect to their satisfaction of the statutory “zone of interes ts” test also speaks to this “directed at protecting” require ment as it is presented by the district court. They10 that under either proffered formul ation the district court erre d in dismissing these

claims on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion , we need not determine the pre cise reach of these

precedents.

Plaintiffs assert the essence of City of Hugo and Branson is that “a political

subdivision has standi ng to bring a constitutional claim agains t its creating state

when the substance of its claim r elies on the Supremacy Clause and a putatively

controlling federal law.” Branson , 161 F.3d at 628. They identify the dispositive

question as whether the right s ought to be vindicated was “writ ten to protect

individual rights, as opposed to collective or structural right s.” Id. Arguing that the

political subdivision plainti ffs here, like those in Branson , seek to vindicate federal

rights that are statutory, struc tural and collective rather tha n constitutional, individual

and contractual, they urge the conclusion that as in Branson the political subdivision

plaintiffs here have standing. T he government does not contest that employing this

interpretation of our precedents c asts the present political su bdivision plaintiffs under

the precedential force of Branson rather than City of Hugo . Therefore, if this

interpretation of our case law is to be applied, these plaintif fs are not barred by

political subdivision sta nding considerations.

Alternatively, the district cour t, the government, and the diss ent all read City

of Hugo as requiring that “the federal st atute being enforced must be ‘ directed at

have responded to the district court’s political subdivision st anding analysis sufficiently to avoid waiver.11 protecting political subdivisions.’” 6 Kerr v. Hickenlooper , 259 F. Supp. 3d 1178,

1188 (D. Colo. 2017) (“ Kerr ”) (citing City of Hugo , 656 F.3d at 1257). Scrutinizing

plaintiffs’ assertion that “th e political-subdivision plaintiff s are seeking to enforce

rights granted to them in the Enabling Act,” id. at 1188, the distric t court countered

6 Plaintiffs and the Amici Curiae both raise credible concerns a bout this rule being drawn from our political s ubdivision standing precedents. City of Hugo ’s analysis focused on whether substantive constitutional rights can be the basis for political subdivision standing and did not itself engage in any statutory analysis. Our precedents thus provide no workab le standards regarding what la nguage a statute
must include for it to be “dir ected at protecting political sub divisions” or how such a rule should be applied. See Amicus Br. of Colo. Ass’n of Sch. Bds. & Colo. Ass’n of Sch. Execs. at 12. Moreover, cour ts are already required to ex amine whether a plaintiff’s claims fall within t he “zone of inte rests” of a fed eral statute when determining whether that plain tiff has a cause of action, see Lexmark , 572 U.S. at 128, and “[s]hoehorning a more str ingent requirement for direct statutory protection into the political subdivision an alysis would render the Suprem e Court’s well

established zone of interests test superfluous.” Aplt. Br. at 26 n.13. This reading of City of Hugo ’s holding is also contrary to two limiting trends of the Supreme Court and lower c ourts: to limit the doctrine of political subdivision standing, see City of Hugo , 656 F.3d at 1265 (Matheson , J., dissenting), and the more recent emphasis on federal courts ’ “virtually unflagging” oblig ation to hear and

decide cases within t heir jurisdiction, see Lexmark , 572 U.S. at 127 n.3, 128 n.4 (limiting the application of pru dential standing doctrines as s ubject matter jurisdiction inquiries); see also Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus , ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2347 (2014) (di scussing, but not resolving, pr udential ripeness

doctrine’s tension with the fed eral courts’ “virtually unflaggi ng” obligation); Fourth

Corner Credit Union v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City , 861 F.3d 1052, 1059 n.1 (10th Cir. 2017) (Matheson, J., concurring) (citing Supreme Cou rt’s choice not to resolve this tension, but contin uing to apply ripeness doctrine as binding precedent), 1076 n.13 (Bacharach, J., concurring) (same); Fowler v. Guerin , 899 F.3d 1112, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Suprem e Court’s choice not to resol ve this tension and likewise declining to resolve t he continuing vitality of ripene ss doctrine). In declining to determine the p roper test for political subdivi sion standing, we

do not resolve these concerns. E ven so, we call attention to t hem as supplementary support for our holding that th ese plaintiffs should not have b een dismissed on these grounds.12 that the Enabling Act’s require ment that the Colorado constitut ion be “republican in

form” was not designed for such plaintiffs. Ins tead, the distr ict court concluded that

nearby language in the Enabling Ac t revealed the requirement of “republican in

form” as being granted to “the people of Colorado.” Id. at 1191 (emphasi s added). It

surmised that the political subdi vision plaintiffs had been gra nted no statutory rights

to vindicate this interest, and that they were accordingly barr ed by political

subdivision standing.

But we cannot decisively deter mine if the political subdivision plaintiffs here

are excepted from the usual ba r to political subdivision standi ng because doing so

would require impermissibly delv ing into the merits of the case . Establishing who

was intended to benefit from the Enabling Act’s “republican in form” requirement

necessarily begs the question of what a “Republican Form of Government” is, which

is the issue ultimately to be r esolved if any court ever succee ds in reaching the merits

of this case. See Largess v. Supreme Judicial Court for State of Massachusetts , 373

F.3d 219, 226 (1st Cir. 2004) (pr oceeding to merits to review s cope and meaning of

“Republican Form of Government”) . Even the district court modu lated its conclusion

that “republican in form” does not extend rights to the politic al subdivision plaintiffs

by stating that it so finds “ba sed on the present record.” Kerr , 259 F. Supp. 3d at

1190–91. But the present record is insufficient to support thi s determination.

Throughout their various pleadi ngs, plaintiffs maintain that a “Republican

Form of Government” extends pro tections directly to these polit ical subdivision

plaintiffs that TABOR unconstit utionally intrudes upon. They o ffer several hooks13 hinting at their arguments on th e merits of the case, including the observations that

the Enabling Act recognized the existence of both counties and public schools prior

to Colorado’s statehood, and that the constitution Colorado ado pted pursuant to the

Enabling Act embodied an interde pendent structure between the s tate and its existing

political subdivisions. See Aplt. Reply Br. at 21 n.13. 7 Notably, plaintiffs allege that

a “fully effective legislature is an essential component of a R epublican Form of

Government,” and that the TABOR A mendment’s substantial interfe rence with the

Colorado General Assemb ly’s taxing power “renders [it] unable t o fulfill its

legislative obligations . . . . [and] similarly undermines the Republican Form of

Government for all subordinate l evels of government in the stat e.” Aplt. App. at

1447 (Complaint at ¶108). They fu rther argue that a “Republica n Form of

Government” necessarily extends to each lower lev el of government because

acceptance of the contrary would be get complete evasion of this requirement through

the delegation of powers to subor dinate levels of government th at were not equally

7 See also, e.g ., Aplt. Br. at 7–8 (“[T]he requi rement for a ‘republican form of government’ applies not only on t he state government but also t o the state’s local governments. The Enabling Act, together with the Colorado Cons titution enacted in compliance with the requirements of the Enabling Act, created a n integrated structure of government. . . .”), id. at 27 n.15 (“Colorado’s Co nstitution established a republican form of government tha t was grounded in a structure that embodied a purposeful interdependence betw een the state and its political subdivisions. The Constitution expressly considered school boards and county gove rnments. . . . The

historic existence of the Politic al Subdivision Plaintiffs is o f a piece with Colorado’s republican form of governme nt and its origins.”), id . at 36 (“From i ts outset, and presumably inherent in its accep tance into the Union, the Color ado Constitution’s guarantee of a republican governme nt entailed an interdependent relationship between state government and lo cal political subdivisions with the inherent authority to raise and spend revenue.”).14 “republican in form.” Id. at 1424 (Complaint at ¶11). P laintiffs have informed us

that their case on the merits “w ill offer extensive historical evidence of and legal

proof for the proper meaning of the Guarantee Clause and ‘Repub lican Form of

Government.’” Aplt. Reply Br. at 25 n.15.

In response, both the government and the district court valiant ly struggle to

conclusively establish that the political subdivision plaintiffs are not the beneficiaries

of a “Republican Form of Governme nt.” They extend various conj ectural standards

in doing so, including that the c onstitutional guarantee of a r epublican form of

government is a guarantee to the state that does not extend to individuals, Aple. Br.

at 20, 8 and that this guarantee is to the people of the state, Kerr , 259 F.Supp. 3d at

8 Tellingly, one of the cases the government cites for this prop osition is Largess , in which the First Circuit explicitly decided it could not deny individuals standing under the Guarantee Cl ause because the standing issue was “intertwined and inseparable from the merits of the underlying claim.” Largess , 373 F.3d at 224. The underlying claim was that the Gu arantee Clause extends rights t o individuals in at

least some circumstances and the First Circuit footnoted the cl arification that “the Guarantee Clause makes the guara ntee of a republican form of go vernment to the

states ; the bare language of the Clau se does not directly confer any rights on

individuals.” Id . at 225 n.5. Notwithstanding th is skepticism as to whether

individuals would ever have enfo rceable rights under the Guaran tee Clause, the First Circuit held that plaintiffs had standing. It then proceeded to analy ze the Guarantee Clause and ultimately hold that the Largess plaintiffs did not hav e enforceable rights under the Guarantee Clause, leav ing open the question whether a ny individuals could ever have enforceable rights un der the Guarantee Clause. See generally id . at 226– 229. Critically for our analysi s, the First Circuit’s review o f the scope of the “Republican Form of Government” guarantee did not take place un til after the recognition that this particular question was interwoven into t he initial standing inquiry. Here, in contrast, the merits of the case are not bef ore us. The dissent’s efforts to distingui sh this case as irrelevant ar e unconvincing. Although the standing inquiries in Largess and our case differ, t he nature of these inquiries are equally intertwined with the merits in both cases

.15 1191. Citing a variety of reasons , the district court declared it “does not believe” that

the requirement of a Constitution “republican in form” stretche s to the politicalsubdivision plaintiffs. But each proposed rationale is insuffi cient to extricate the

standing inquiry from the case on the merits, which is not pres ently before us on this

appeal from the grant of a moti on to dismiss for lack of subjec t matter jurisdiction

under Rule 12(b)(1). See Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker , 450 F.3d 1082,

1088 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc) ( “For purposes of the standing inquiry, the question

is not whether the alleged injury rises to the le vel of a const itutional violation. That is

the issue on the merits. For sta nding purposes, we ask only if there was an injury in

fact, caused by the challenged ac tion and redressable in court. ”), cert. denied , 549

U.S. 1245 (2007); Day v. Bond , 500 F.3d 1127, 1137 ( 10th Cir. 2007) (“‘For

purposes of standing,’ we noted [in Walker ], ‘the question cannot be whether the

Constitution, properly interprete d, extends protection to the p laintiff's asserted right

or interest,’ because that would be a determination of the meri ts of the plaintiffs'

claim under the guise of an evalu ation of their standing.”).

The district court forged on, c oncluding that “the political su bdivision

plaintiffs cannot be seeking to enforce a right to a Constituti on ‘republican in form’

because they have no such right ” and it “is not their injury to assert.” Kerr , 259 F.

Supp. 3d at 1191, 1192. This conc lusion is problematic for two reasons: first, to

some extent it contradicts the court’s earlier finding that the political subdivision

plaintiffs have personally suffere d a concrete injury directly at the hand of TABOR;

second, and more importantly, thi s is now dabbling in the merit s of this case.16 Granted, we have previously expla ined that “the term ‘legally p rotected interest’

must do some work in the standi ng analysis ... [and] has indepe ndent force and

meaning, without any need to open the door to merits considerat ions at the

jurisdictional stage.” Walker , 450 F.3d at 1093. We have not explained what that

independent force and meaning ar e but, in any event, the presen t case falls nowhere

near the illustrative list of sit uations we provided in which a n asserted “legally

protected interest” is not recognized. 9

The district court cited Day to try to unwind the meri ts from the jurisdictional

issue, stating that the standing issue of whether political sub division plaintiffs “are

enforcing rights granted to the m by the Enabling Act” is “a com pletely different

inquiry to whether a Republican f orm of government has been und ermined by

TABOR.” Kerr , 259 F. Supp. 3d at 1192. But t he distinction between these t wo

inquiries dissolves when traced b ack to the root question: both inquires require first

determining the meaning and pur pose of the phrase “republican i n form.” The

standing question and merit quest ion here are not two separate and independent

issues, analogous to Day , but are instead comparable to Walker: the merits of the

plaintiffs’ claims mirror the st anding inquiry as it is framed by the district court. See

9 “For example, a person complain ing that government action wil l make his criminal activity mor e difficult lacks standing because his int erest is not legally protected. A person suing to re quire enforcement of the law ag ainst his neighbor lacks standing, even if he is adve rsely affected by his neighbo r's conduct, because no one has a legally protected int erest in the prosecution of anot her. Finally, a plaintiff whose claimed legal right is so preposterous as to be legally f rivolous may lack standing on the ground that the r ight is not legally protected. ” Walker , 450 F.3d at 1093 (internal quotation mark s and citations omitted).17 Day , 500 F.3d at 1138. “[T]he circumst ances of this case present a rare instance in

which the standing issue is inter twined and inseparable from th e merits of the

underlying claim.” Largess , 373 F.3d at 224; see also Paper, Allied-Indus., Chem.

And Energy Workers Int'l Un ion v. Cont'l Carbon Co. , 428 F.3d 1285, 1292 (10th Cir.

2005) (“The underlying issue in d etermining whether the jurisdi ctional question is

intertwined with the merits is whether resolution of the jurisd ictional question requires

resolution of an aspect of the s ubstantive claim.”) (internal b rackets and citation omitted);

Sizova v. Nat. Inst. of Standards & Tech. , 282 F.3d 1320, 132 4 (10th Cir. 2002)

(“[S]ubject matter jurisdiction and the merits are considered t o be intertwined when

subject matter jurisdiction is dep endent upon the same statute which provides the

substantive claim in the case. ”) (internal brackets, quotation mark, and citation omitted);

10 cf. Kennan, supra note 4 (arguing that questions of whether political subdivisio ns

should be barred from bringing su it because it would impede sta te sovereignty can

10 The dissent believes that po litical subdivisi on standing requi res a searching analysis of the relevant federal statute’s intended beneficiari es “as part of a threshold jurisdictional standing inquiry . . . . [i]rrespective of w hether this may sometimes

resemble a merit s analysis.” Dissent at 12 (emphasis in origin al). However, this ignores our cases recognizing th at it is sometimes appropriate to decide a jurisdictional issue at a later s tage in the proceeding if that issue is intertwined with

the merits of the case. In the sa me manner, it is noteworthy t hat even where our precedents cast the political subdi vision standing doctrine as jurisdictional, they address it at later stages in l itigation and with access to con siderably more information than entailed by th e Rule 12(b)(1) motion here. See City of Hugo , 656 F.3d at 1254 (district court granted summary judgment); Branson , 161 F.3d at 627 (district court held hearing on plaintiffs’ request for prelimi nary injunction, then issued “very careful and thoro ugh opinion” following cross-moti ons for summary judgment).18 only be determined by addressing the merits of the subdivision’ s claims that state

action violates the Supremacy Clause).

The various conclusions the dist rict court and parties draw reg arding

“republican in form” are not of mo st interest to our analysis. Rather, it is the attempt

itself which betrays the fundame ntal hitch—that these standing arguments turn on the

merits of plaintiffs’ claims, namely the meaning, scope, and in tended beneficiaries of

the Enabling Act’s requirement t hat Colorado’s constitution be “republican in form.”

See Aplt. Reply Br. at 24. We are not commenting on the validity or weight of any of

these arguments but merely high lighting the degree of uncertain ty present at this

stage. See Schramm v. Oakes , 352 F.2d 143, 149 (10th Ci r. 1965) (holding standing

inquiry to be intertwined with t he merits because “[b]ased then on what we have, we

are unable to say with any degree of legal certainty that the a ppellants could not

make out a valid cause of action” ). The merits of these issues were not presented to

the district court and are not b efore us. We thus cannot say w ith confidence what is

entailed by the Enabling Act’s requirement for a government “re publican in form,”

and neither can we say with confidence what is not.

This uncertainty is particularly apparent when we examine the p aucity of

jurisprudence concerning the sc ope and meaning of guarantees to a “Republican

Form of Government.” As tellingl y described by the First Circu it,

scholars have interpreted this [r epublican form of government] portion of the Guarantee Clause in numerous, o ften conflicting, ways. And Joh n Adams himself, twenty years after ra tification of the Constitution, c onfessed that he

“never understood” what the Guar antee Clause meant and that he “believ[ed]

no man ever did or ever will.”19 Largess , 373 F.3d at 226–27 (citations omitted); see also Aplt. Reply Br. at 16 n.7

(citing Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 175–77 (1874 )). There can be no doubt

that disentangling these answer s will be an immense task; howev er, this is not a task

to be undertaken on a Rule 12( b)(1) motion such as this.

We sympathize with the reality t hat “standing doctrine sometime s has a

frustratingly metaphy sical quality.” Walker , 450 F.3d at 1097. But “a federal court’s

obligation to hear and decide cas es within its jurisdiction is virtually unflagging.”

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. , 572 U.S. at 126; see also Odom v. Penske Truck Leasing Co.,

L.P. , 893 F.3d 739, 743 (10t h Cir. 2018) (citing Lexmark to construe prudential

restraints narrowly) . Irrespective of whether or not a republi can form of government

is eventually found to be guarant eed to these particular plaint iffs, the district court

cannot properly reach this issue as a juri sdictional matter. B ecause these political

subdivision plaintiffs have Artic le III standing and cannot be irrefutably barred by

alternative standing doctrines , the district court should not h ave dismissed the

complaint for a lack of subj ect matter jurisdiction.

We REVERSE and REMAND to the dis trict court for further proceed ings.1 7

- 1 1 9 2

, K e r r v

. P o l i s

H O L M E S

, C i r c u i t J u d g e , d i s s e n t i n g

.

I r e s p e c t f

u l l y d i s s e n t

. U n l i k e t h e m a j o r i t y , I w o u l d a f

f i r m t h e d i s t r i c t

c o u r t ’ s j u d g m e n t b a s e d o n t h e p o l i t i c a l

- s u b d i v i s i o n s t a n d i n g d o c t r i n e

. F o r t h e

p o l i t i c a l

- s u b d i v i s i o n p l a i n t i f f s ( “ P l a i n t i f

f s ” ) t o h a v e s t a n d i n g , o u r d e c i s i o n i n C i t y

o f H u g o v

. N i c h o l s , 6 5 6 F

. 3 d 1 2 5 1 ( 1 0 t h C i r

. 2 0 1 1 )

, r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e y s e e k t o

e n f o r c e a f e d e r a l s t a t u t e d i r e c t e d a t p r o t e c t i n g o r s p e c i f i c a l l y p r o v i d i n g r i g h t s t o

p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n s ( s o m e t i m e s r e f e r r e d t o c o l l e c t i v e l y h e r e i n a s t h e “ d i r e c t e d

a t p r o t e c t i n g ” r e q u i r e m e n t )

. T h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t r u l e d a g a i n s t t h e m o n t h i s

d i s p o s i t i v e i s s u e , a n d t h e i r a r g u m e n t c h a l l e n g i n g t h a t r u l i n g i s s o m e a g e r a s t o

c o n s t i t u t e w a i v e r

. M o r e o v e r , t h e i r a r g u m e n t

— i n s o f a r a s I a m a b l e t o p i e c e i t

t o g e t h e r

— a l s o f

a i l s o n t h e m e r i t s

. T h e m a j o r i t y t r u n c a t e s i t s a n a l y s i s b e f o r e

r e a c h i n g t h e s e i s s u e s , r u l i n g t h a t d o i n g s o w o u l d r e q u i r e “ i m p e r m i s s i b l y d e l v i n g

i n t o t h e m e r i t s o f t h e c a s e

. ” M a j

. O p

. a t 1 2

. H o w e v e r , o u r p r i o r c a s e s c o u n s e l

t h a t a c o u r t m u s t c o n s i d e r t h o s e i s s u e s i n a n s w e r i n g t h e t h r e s h o l d q u e s t i o n o f

s t a n d i n g a n d t h a t i t m a y d o s o w i t h o u t i m p e r m i s s i b l y i m p l i c a t i n g t h e m e r i t s

.

A c c o r d i n g l y , I r e s p e c t f u l l y d i s s e n t

.

A s w e o b s e r v e d i n B r a n s o n S c h o o l D i s t r i c t R E

– 8 2 v

. R o m e r , 1 6 1 F

. 3 d 6 1 9

( 1 0 t h C i r

. 1 9 9 8 )

, i t i s “ w e l l

- s e t t l e d ” i n t h i s c i r c u i t t h a t a p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n

“ m a y n o t b r i n g a f

e d e r a l s u i t a g a i n s t i t s p a r e n t s t a t e ” o n t h e b a s i s o f c e r t a i n

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s

. I d

. a t 6 2 8

. H o w e v e r , B r a n s o n a l s o d e s c r i b e dl i m i t a t i o n s o n t h i s b a r : n o t a b l y , i t s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e b a r a p p l i e s o n l y “ w h e n t h e

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n t h a t s u p p l i e s t h e b a s i s f o r t h e c o m p l a i n t w a s w r i t t e n t o

p r o t e c t i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s , a s o p p o s e d t o c o l l e c t i v e o r s t r u c t u r a l r i g h t s

. ” I d

. I n

p a r t i c u l a r , t h e B r a n s o n c o u r t w a s u n a b l e t o l o c a t e a n y S u p r e m e C o u r t d e c i s i o n

b a r r i n g a s u b d i v i s i o n f

r o m a s s e r t i n g “ t h e s t r u c t u r a l p r o t e c t i o n s o f t h e S u p r e m a c y

C l a u s e

. . . a g a i n s t i t s c r e a t i n g s t a t e

. ” I d

. a t 6 2 9

.

T h e p o l i t i c a l

- s u b d i v i s i o n p l a i n t i f f s i n B r a n s o n ( C o l o r a d o s c h o o l d i s t r i c t s )

b r o u g h t j u s t s u c h a v i a b l e c h a l l e n g e , p r i m a r i l y t o s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e s

m o d i f y i n g t h e t e r m s u n d e r w h i c h a s t a t e l a n d b o a r d w o u l d m a n a g e i t s h o l d i n g s

.

I d

. a t 6 2 7

. S p e c i f

i c a l l y , t h e l a n d b o a r d w a s n o l o n g e r r e q u i r e d t o m a n a g e i t s

h o l d i n g s t o s e c u r e t h e “ m a x i m u m p o s s i b l e a m o u n t ” f o r a p u b l i c s c h o o l f

u n d ;

r a t h e r , t h e b o a r d w a s s i m p l y r e q u i r e d t o m a n a g e i t s h o l d i n g s t o “ p r o d u c e

r e a s o n a b l e a n d c o n s i s t e n t i n c o m e o v e r t i m e

. ” I d

. T h e p l a i n t i f

f s c h a l l e n g e d t h e s e

c h a n g e s “ u n d e r t h e S u p r e m a c y C l a u s e a n d t h e C o l o r a d o E n a b l i n g A c t

, ” a n d t h e

B r a n s o n c o u r t c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e c h a l l e n g e c o u l d p r o c e e d

. I d

. a t 6 2 9 ; s e e a l s o i d

.

a t 6 3 0 ( “ [ O ] u r h o l d i n g s i m p l y a l l o w s a p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n t o s u e i t s p a r e n t s t a t e

w h e n t h e s u i t a l l e g e s a v i o l a t i o n b y t h e s t a t e o f s o m e c o n t r o l l i n g f e d e r a l l a w

. T h e

S u p r e m a c y C l a u s e g u a r a n t e e s n o l e s s

. ” )

. I n r e a c h i n g t h i s c o n c l u s i o n , B r a n s o n

n o t e d t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f

f s w e r e b o t h “ s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n d e p e n d e n t ” o f t h e s t a t e o f

C o l o r a d o a n d

, “ [ m ] o s t i m p o r t a n t l y , ” t h e y w e r e “ ‘ e s s e n t i a l l y ’ t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s o f

2t h e f

e d e r a l t r u s t a t i s s u e

. ” I d

. a t 6 2 9

. T h a t i s , t h e E n a b l i n g A c t h a d g r a n t e d

m i l l i o n s o f a c r e s o f “ s c h o o l l a n d s ” t o t h e S t a t e o f C o l o r a d o f o r “ t h e s u p p o r t o f t h e

‘ c o m m o n s c h o o l s , ’ ” a n d “ [ t ] o d a y ’ s p u b l i c s c h o o l d i s t r i c t s a r e t h e d i r e c t p o l i t i c a l

d e s c e n d a n t s o f t h o s e 1 9 t h C e n t u r y ‘ c o m m o n s c h o o l s

. ’ ” I d

.

N e a r l y t h i r t e e n y e a r s l a t e r , o u r c o u r t d e c i d e d C i t y o f H u g o

. T h e r e , w e

o b s e r v e d t h a t t h e S u p r e m a c y C l a u s e i s n o t i t s e l f t h e s o u r c e o f a n y f e d e r a l r i g h t s ;

i n s t e a d

, i t s e c u r e s f

e d e r a l l y p r o t e c t e d r i g h t s w h e n t h e y c o n f l i c t w i t h s t a t e l a w

.

6 5 6 F

. 3 d a t 1 2 5 6

. A s s u c h

, “ a p l a i n t i f f a l l e g i n g a S u p r e m a c y C l a u s e c l a i m i s

a c t u a l l y a l l e g i n g a r i g h t u n d e r s o m e o t h e r f e d e r a l l a w , w h i c h t r u m p s a c o n t r a r y

s t a t e l a w b y o p e r a t i o n o f t h e S u p r e m a c y C l a u s e

. ” I d

. A f t e r s u m m a r i z i n g o u r c a s e

l a w r e g a r d i n g p o l i t i c a l

- s u b d i v i s i o n s t a n d i n g ( i n c l u d i n g B r a n s o n )

, C i t y o f H u g o

w a s u n a b l e t o f

i n d “ a s i n g l e c a s e i n w h i c h t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t o r a c o u r t o f

a p p e a l s h a s a l l o w e d a p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n t o s u e i t s p a r e n t s t a t e u n d e r a

s u b s t a n t i v e p r o v i s i o n o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n

. ” I d

. a t 1 2 5 7

. “ I n s t e a d

, c o u r t s h a v e

a l l o w e d s u c h s u i t s o n l y w h e n C o n g r e s s h a s e n a c t e d s t a t u t o r y l a w s p e c i f i c a l l y

p r o v i d i n g r i g h t s t o m u n i c i p a l i t i e s

. ” I d

. ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) ; s e e a l s o i d

.

( h a r m o n i z i n g p r i o r c a s e s f i n d i n g s t a n d i n g a n d o b s e r v i n g t h a t

, i n t h o s e c a s e s , “ t h e

s o u r c e o f s u b s t a n t i v e r i g h t s w a s a f e d e r a l s t a t u t e d i r e c t e d a t p r o t e c t i n g p o l i t i c a l

s u b d i v i s i o n s , a n d t h e S u p r e m a c y C l a u s e w a s i n v o k e d m e r e l y t o g u a r a n t e e , a s a

s t r u c t u r a l m a t t e r , t h a t f

e d e r a l l a w p r e d o m i n a t e s o v e r c o n f l i c t i n g s t a t e l a w ”

3( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) )

. B e c a u s e t h e c l a i m s i n C i t y o f H u g o w e r e b a s e d o n a

s u b s t a n t i v e p r o v i s i o n o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , i

. e

. , t h e d o r m a n t C o m m e r c e C l a u s e , a n d

b e c a u s e “ t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n d o e s n o t c o n t e m p l a t e t h e r i g h t s o f p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n s

a s a g a i n s t t h e i r p a r e n t s t a t e s , ” s t a n d i n g w a s l a c k i n g

. I d

. a t 1 2 5 7

– 5 8

.

H e r e , p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n s o f t h e S t a t e o f C o l o r a d o c h a l l e n g e C o l o r a d o ’ s

T a x p a y e r B i l l o f R i g h t s ( “ T A B O R ” ) u n d e r t h e C o l o r a d o E n a b l i n g A c t a n d t h e

S u p r e m a c y C l a u s e , c o n t e n d i n g t h a t T A B O R c o n t r a d i c t s t h e E n a b l i n g A c t ’ s

r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t C o l o r a d o m a i n t a i n a “ r e p u b l i c a n f o r m o f g o v e r n m e n t

. ” 1 S e e

A p l t s

. ’ A p p

. , V o l

. X I I

, a t 1 4 2 4

, 1 4 2 6

, 1 4 4 8 ( F o u r t h A m

. C o m p l

. , f i l e d D e c

. 6

,

2 0 1 6 )

. T h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t a n a l y z e d t h e c a s e u n d e r B r a n s o n a n d C i t y o f H u g o ,

r u l i n g t h a t t h e P l a i n t i f

f s d i d n o t e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e y w e r e s e e k i n g t o e n f o r c e “ a n y

r i g h t s g r a n t e d t o t h e m u n d e r t h e E n a b l i n g A c t

. ” I d

. a t 1 5 7 5

– 8 4 ( O p

. & O r d e r ,

d a t e d M a y 4

, 2 0 1 7 ) ; s e e i d

. a t 1 5 7 8 ( “ C i t y o f H u g o e x p l a i n s t h a t t h e f

e d e r a l

s t a t u t e b e i n g e n f

o r c e d m u s t b e ‘ d i r e c t e d a t p r o t e c t i n g p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n s

. ’ ”

( q u o t i n g C i t

y o f H u g o , 6 5 6 F

. 3 d a t 1 2 5 7 ) )

. T h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t r e v i e w e d s e v e r a l

p a r a g r a p h s o f t h e F o u r t h A m e n d e d C o m p l a i n t t h a t t h e P l a i n t i f f s h a d c i t e d

,

1 A l t h o u g h t h e F o u r t h A m e n d e d C o m p l a i n t a l l e g e s t h a t T A B O R a l s o

r u n s a f o u l o f o t h e r l a w s , e

. g

. , t h e f e d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n ’ s a n a l o g o u s G u a r a n t e e C l a u s e a n d C o l o r a d o ’ s s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n , A p l t s

. ’ A p p

. , V o l

. X I I

, a t 1 4 4 7

– 4 9

, t h e
P l a i n t i f f s ’ p o l i t i c a l

- s u b d i v i s i o n s t a n d i n g a r g u m e n t s a r e p r e m i s e d o n t h e E n a b l i n g
A c t a n d S u p r e m a c y C l a u s e , A p l t s

. ’ O p e n i n g B r

. a t 2 4

– 2 5

.

4c o n c l u d i n g t h a t m o s t o f t h e s e p a r a g r a p h s s i m p l y m a d e “ n o m e n t i o n o f r i g h t s

b e i n g g r a n t e d i n t h e E n a b l i n g A c t t o t h e [ P l a i n t i f f s ]

. ” I d

. a t 1 5 7 9

.

I n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ’ s v i e w , t h e F o u r t h A m e n d e d C o m p l a i n t ’ s o n l y

“ p o t e n t i a l l y r e l e v a n t p a r a g r a p h s ” w e r e P a r a g r a p h s 3 0 a n d 3 4

. I d

. a t 1 5 8 0

.

P a r a g r a p h 3 0 c o n t e n d e d t h a t t h e E n a b l i n g A c t r e q u i r e d “ u s e o f

, a n d r e v e n u e f

r o m ,

t h e f e d e r a l l a n d s c e d e d t o t h e S t a t e u p o n a d m i s s i o n a s a s t a t e t o b e d e d i c a t e d t o

‘ t h e s u p p o r t o f c o m m o n s c h o o l s ’ ( S e c t i o n 7 )

, ‘ s u p p o r t o f a S t a t e u n i v e r s i t y ’

( S e c t i o n 1 0 )

, a n d ‘ t h e t w o s e c t i o n s o f l a n d i n e a c h t o w n s h i p h e r e i n g r a n t e d f o r t h e

s u p p o r t o f c o m m o n s c h o o l s

. . . t h e p r o c e e d s t o c o n s t i t u t e a p e r m a n e n t

s c h o o l

- f u n d

, t h e i n t e r e s t o f w h i c h t o b e e x p e n d e d i n t h e s u p p o r t o f c o m m o n

s c h o o l s ’ ( S e c t i o n 1 4 )

. ” I d

. a t 1 4 3 0 ( o m i s s i o n i n o r i g i n a l )

. A n d

, a c c o r d i n g t o

P a r a g r a p h 3 4

, T A B O R p r e v e n t s “ t h e S t a t e a n d i t s l o c a l s c h o o l d i s t r i c t s f r o m

f u l f i l l i n g t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s , d e r i v e d f r o m t h e o r i g i n a l s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n , a n d i t s

d e r i v a t i o n f

r o m t h e E n a b l i n g A c t

, a d e q u a t e l y t o f u n d t h e p u b l i c s c h o o l s o f t h e

S t a t e

. ” I d

. a t 1 4 3 1

.

T h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e s e a l l e g a t i o n s w e r e i n s u f f i c i e n t t o

e s t a b l i s h s t a n d i n g

. P r e l i m i n a r i l y , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t r u l e d t h a t n o n e o f t h e s e

p r o v i s i o n s p r o v i d e d a n y s u c c o r t o P l a i n t i f f s n o t a s s o c i a t e d w i t h p u b l i c s c h o o l s ,

i

. e

. , b o a r d s o f c o u n t y c o m m i s s i o n e r s o r s p e c i a l d i s t r i c t s

. S e e i d

. a t 1 5 8 0

. I t a l s o

o b s e r v e d t h a t t h e b r i e f

i n g o n t h i s i s s u e w a s l i m i t e d

, a n d t h a t t h e P l a i n t i f f s

5“ m a [ d ] e n o e f f o r t ” t o e x p l a i n h o w t h e c i t e d p a r a g r a p h s o f t h e F o u r t h A m e n d e d

C o m p l a i n t

, a n d t h e a u t h o r i t i e s t h e r e i n , g a v e r i s e t o s t a n d i n g

. I d

. M o r e o v e r , t h e

d i s t r i c t c o u r t r e

j e c t e d t h e P l a i n t i f

f s ’ r e l i a n c e o n S e c t i o n 1 0 o f t h e C o l o r a d o

E n a b l i n g A c t b e c a u s e n o n e o f t h e m a r e s t a t e u n i v e r s i t i e s , a n d i t r e j e c t e d t h e

P l a i n t i f f s ’ a l l e g a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g S e c t i o n s 7 a n d 1 4 o f t h e E n a b l i n g A c t a s

i n a p p o s i t e

. S e e i d

. a t 1 5 8 1

– 8 2

. T h a t i s , w h i l e S e c t i o n s 7 a n d 1 4 c o n c e r n

“ s u p p o r t o f c o m m o n s c h o o l s , ” t h e y d o n o t i m p l i c a t e t h e r i g h t t o a “ r e p u b l i c a n

f o r m o f g o v e r n m e n t ” s o u g h t t o b e e n f o r c e d h e r e ; i n o t h e r w o r d s , u n l i k e t h e s u i t

b r o u g h t i n B r a n s o n , t h i s s u i t d o e s n o t d i r e c t l y c o n c e r n t h e l a n d

- t r u s t a n d f u n d i n g

i s s u e s a d d r e s s e d b y t h e s e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e E n a b l i n g A c t

. S e e i d

. T h e d i s t r i c t

c o u r t a l s o o b s e r v e d t h a t

, a l t h o u g h t h e E n a b l i n g A c t d o e s e x p r e s s l y c o n t e m p l a t e a

s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t i s “ r e p u b l i c a n i n f o r m , ” t h e E n a b l i n g A c t c o u n s e l s t h a t s u c h

a c o n s t i t u t i o n i s f

o r “ t h e p e o p l e o f [ C o l o r a d o ]

, ” s e e 1 8 S t a t

. 4 7 4 § § 4

– 5 ( 1 8 7 5 )

,

w i t h n o s p e c i f

i c m e n t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n s

. A p l t s

. ’ A p p

. , V o l

. X I I

, a t

1 5 8 3

.

O n a p p e a l

, t h e P l a i n t i f f s c o n t e n d t h a t t h e i r s u i t p a s s e s m u s t e r u n d e r

B r a n s o n , a n d i n d e e d i s m o r e l i k e t h a t c a s e t h a n l i k e C i t y o f H u g o , b e c a u s e t h e y

s e e k t o v i n d i c a t e s t r u c t u r a l r i g h t s , n o t i n d i v i d u a l o n e s

. A p l t s

. ’ O p e n i n g B r

. a t 2 3

.

I n a f o o t n o t e , t h e y a r g u e t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i m p e r m i s s i b l y “ s t r e t c h e d ” d i c t a i n

B r a n s o n ( n o t C i t

y o f H u g o ) t o r e q u i r e t h a t t h e y s u e t o e n f o r c e a s t a t u t e “ d i r e c t e d

6a t p r o t e c t i n g p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n s

. ” I d

. a t 2 6 n

. 1 3

. T h e y a l s o c o n t e n d t h a t C i t y

o f H u g o i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e b e c a u s e t h e c l a i m i n C i t y o f H u g o w a s “ a n ‘ i n d i v i d u a l ’

c l a i m u n d e r t h e t e r m i n o l o g y o f B r a n s o n ” a n d t h a t t h e i r c l a i m i s d i s t i n c t f r o m t h a t

i n C i t y o f H u g o b e c a u s e t h e i r c l a i m r e l i e s o n a f e d e r a l s t a t u t e ( t h e E n a b l i n g A c t )

,

r a t h e r t h a n a s u b s t a n t i v e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n

. I d

. a t 2 3

, 2 8

– 3 0

.

I w o u l d r e

j e c t a n y a r g u m e n t t h a t C i t y o f H u g o i s i n a p p l i c a b l e

. W h i l e i t i s

t r u e t h a t C i t

y o f H u g o d i r e c t l y a d d r e s s e d e n f o r c e m e n t o f t h e d o r m a n t C o m m e r c e

C l a u s e , C i t

y o f H u g o e x p r e s s l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d t h a t c l a i m f r o m o n e w h e r e “ t h e

s o u r c e o f s u b s t a n t i v e r i g h t s w a s a f e d e r a l s t a t u t e d i r e c t e d a t p r o t e c t i n g ” o r

“ s p e c i f i c a l l y p r o v i d i n g r i g h t s t o ” p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n s , a n d

, c r i t i c a l l y , i t

o b s e r v e d t h a t o u r c a s e s ( a n d

, i n d e e d

, a l l t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t a n d c o u r t o f a p p e a l s

c a s e s i t c o u l d f

i n d ) h a v e a l l o w e d p o l i t i c a l

- s u b d i v i s i o n s t a n d i n g o n l y i n t h e

p r e s e n c e o f t h e l a t t e r s h o w i n g

. S e e 6 5 6 F

. 3 d a t 1 2 5 7 ( e m p h a s e s a d d e d )

. C i t y o f

H u g o a l s o o p i n e d t h a t “ B r a n s o n s i m p l y c a n n o t b e r e a d t o e m b r a c e t h e n o t i o n t h a t

u s e o f t h e t e r m s ‘ c o l l e c t i v e ’ a n d ‘ s t r u c t u r a l ’ m e a n t t o r e f e r t o a n y t h i n g o t h e r t h a n

t h e s i t u a t i o n w h e r e a p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n h a s b r o u g h t s u i t a g a i n s t i t s p a r e n t t o

v i n d i c a t e s u b s t a n t i v e f

e d e r a l s t a t u t o r y r i g h t s t h r o u g h t h e S u p r e m a c y C l a u s e

. ” I d

.

a t 1 2 6 2

. T h u s , o u r m o s t r e c e n t c o m p r e h e n s i v e e x p l o r a t i o n o f t h i s i s s u e , C i t y o f

H u g o , r e q u i r e s a p o l i t i c a l

- s u b d i v i s i o n p l a i n t i f f ’ s “ s t r u c t u r a l ” c l a i m t o b e

u n d e r g i r d e d b y a s t a t u t e p r o v i d i n g i t w i t h r i g h t s t o e n f o r c e

.

7B e c a u s e C i t y o f H u g o a p p l i e s , t h e P l a i n t i f f s m u s t s e e k t o e n f

o r c e a f e d e r a l

s t a t u t e “ d i r e c t e d a t p r o t e c t i n g p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n s ” o r “ s p e c i f i c a l l y p r o v i d i n g

r i g h t s t o ” t h e m

. I

d

. a t 1 2 5 7

. H a v i n g t r a i n e d i t s a t t e n t i o n o n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g C i t y

o f H u g o , h o w e v e r , t h e O p e n i n g B r i e f m a k e s v i r t u a l l y n o a r g u m e n t t h a t t h i s

“ d i r e c t e d a t p r o t e c t i n g ” r e q u i r e m e n t i s s a t i s f i e d

. I n s t e a d

, t h e O p e n i n g B r i e f

g e n e r a l l y r e i t e r a t e s t h e n a t u r e o f t h e P l a i n t i f f s ’ c l a i m s , i

. e

. , t h e y “ a l l e g e t h a t

T A B O R v i o l a t e s t h e p r o v i s i o n o f t h e E n a b l i n g A c t r e q u i r i n g a r e p u b l i c a n f o r m o f

g o v e r n m e n t

, a n d t h a t s u c h v i o l a t i o n i s a c t i o n a b l e a g a i n s t t h e s t a t e u n d e r t h e

S u p r e m a c y C l a u s e , ” A p l t s

. ’ O p e n i n g B r

. a t 2 4

, a n d t h e y “ s e e k t o e n f o r c e a c l a i m

u n d e r t h e E n a b l i n g A c t : t h e r i g h t t o a r e p u b l i c a n f o r m o f g o v e r n m e n t

, ” i d

. a t 2 8

.

I n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e s e c u r s o r y a r g u m e n t s , t h e P l a i n t i f f s c i t e e s s e n t i a l l y t h e

s a m e p a r a g r a p h s o f t h e F o u r t h A m e n d e d C o m p l a i n t t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o u n d

u n a v a i l i n g ; y e t

, s i g n i f

i c a n t l y , t h e y o f

f e r n o e x p l a n a t i o n a s t o w h y t h e d i s t r i c t

c o u r t ’ s a n a l y s i s o f t h e l e g a l i m p o r t o f t h e s e p a r a g r a p h s w a s w r o n g

. S e e i d

. a t 2 4

,

2 8

. I n l i g h t o f t h i s l i m i t e d a r g u m e n t

, I w o u l d d e e m t h e i s s u e w a i v e d

. S e e

, e

. g

. ,

U n i t e d S t a t e s v

. C o o

p e r , 6 5 4 F

. 3 d 1 1 0 4

, 1 1 2 8 ( 1 0 t h C i r

. 2 0 1 1 ) ( c i t i n g “ w e l l

s e t t l e d ” p r i n c i p l e t h a t “ [ a ] r g u m e n t s i n a d e q u a t e l y b r i e f e d i n t h e o p e n i n g b r i e f a r e

w a i v e d ” ( q u o t i n g A d l e r v

. W a l

- M a r t S t o r e s

, I

n c

. , 1 4 4 F

. 3 d 6 6 4

, 6 7 9 ( 1 0 t h C i r

.

1 9 9 8 ) ) ) ; s e e a l s o R e e d

y v

. W e r h o l t z , 6 6 0 F

. 3 d 1 2 7 0

, 1 2 7 5 ( 1 0 t h C i r

. 2 0 1 1 ) ( “ T h e

8a r g u m e n t s e c t i o n o f P l a i n t i f f s ’ o p e n i n g b r i e f d o e s n o t c h a l l e n g e t h e c o u r t ’ s

r e a s o n i n g o n t h i s p o i n t

. W e t h e r e f o r e d o n o t a d d r e s s t h e m a t t e r

. ” )

.

I n a n y e v e n t

, t h e l i m i t e d a r g u m e n t t h a t I c a n d i s c e r n i s u n a v a i l i n g

. I t s e e m s

t h a t

, i n t h e P l a i n t i f

f s ’ v i e w , B r a n s o n e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t p o l i t i c a l

- s u b d i v i s i o n

s t a n d i n g i s b r o a d l y a v a i l a b l e f o r c l a i m s u n d e r t h e E n a b l i n g A c t

, a n d t h e y a r e

s i m p l y f o l l o w i n g t h e t r a i l b l a z e d i n t h a t c a s e : “ H e r e , a s i n t h e B r a n s o n l i t i g a t i o n ,

t h e [ P l a i n t i f

f s ] c l a i m t h e p r o t e c t i o n s a f f o r d e d u n d e r a f

e d e r a l s t a t u t e , t h e E n a b l i n g

A c t

, w h i c h i m p o s e s t h e s t r u c t u r a l r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t C o l o r a d o ’ s g o v e r n m e n t b e

‘ r e p u b l i c a n i n f

o r m

. ’ ” A p l t s

. ’ O p e n i n g B r

. a t 2 4 ; s e e a l s o i d

. a t 2 7 ( “ T h a t s a m e

E n a b l i n g A c t c o n d i t i o n e d C o l o r a d o ’ s a d m i s s i o n i n t o t h e U n i o n u p o n i t s e n a c t m e n t

o f a c o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t w a s ‘ r e p u b l i c a n i n f o r m

. ’ ” )

. B u t t h e P l a i n t i f f s e l i d e a k e y

d i s t i n c t i o n r e l i e d u p o n b y t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t a n d c o n s i s t e n t w i t h b o t h B r a n s o n a n d

C i t y o f H u g o : t h e i s s u e s i n B r a n s o n d i r e c t l y i m p l i c a t e d s p e c i f i c p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e

E n a b l i n g A c t p r o v i d i n g l a n d s “ f o r t h e s u p p o r t o f t h e ‘ c o m m o n s c h o o l s , ’ ” o f

w h i c h t h e s c h o o l

- d i s t r i c t p l a i n t i f f s w e r e “ d i r e c t p o l i t i c a l d e s c e n d a n t s

. ” 1 6 1 F

. 3 d

a t 6 2 9

. I n d e e d

, B r a n s o n d e e m e d i t “ [ m ] o s t i m p o r t a n t [ ] ” t h a t t h e s c h o o l d i s t r i c t s

w e r e “ e s s e n t i a l l y ” t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s o f t h e l a n d t r u s t t h a t h a d b e e n a f f e c t e d b y

s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e s

. I d

. H e r e , i n c o n t r a s t a n d a s t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t

c o r r e c t l y o b s e r v e d

, t h e r e i s n o s i m i l a r l y c l o s e l i n k b e t w e e n t h e “ r e p u b l i c a n f o r m

o f g o v e r n m e n t ” t h a t t h e P l a i n t i f f s c l a i m T A B O R c o n t r a v e n e s a n d t h e l a n d

9m a n a g e m e n t a n d f u n d i n g i s s u e s a d d r e s s e d i n t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e E n a b l i n g A c t

t h a t t h e P l a i n t i f

f s c i t e d i n t h e i r F o u r t h A m e n d m e n t C o m p l a i n t a n d c o n t i n u e t o r e l y

o n

. S e e A p l t s

. ’ A p p

. , V o l

. X I I

, a t 1 5 8 1

– 8 2

. I a l s o a g r e e w i t h t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t

t h a t

, t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e E n a b l i n g A c t e x p r e s s l y r e q u i r e s a r e p u b l i c a n f o r m o f

g o v e r n m e n t

, i t d o e s n o t s u g g e s t t h a t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t i s d i r e c t e d a t p r o t e c t i n g o r

s p e c i f i c a l l y p r o v i d i n g r i g h t s t o C o l o r a d o ’ s p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n s

. I d

. a t 1 5 8 2

– 8 3

.

O u r p o l i t i c a l

- s u b d i v i s i o n s t a n d i n g c a s e s r e q u i r e a p l a i n t i f f t o s h o w t h a t i t s

c l a i m s a r e u n d e r g i r d e d b y a f e d e r a l s t a t u t e d i r e c t e d a t p r o t e c t i n g o r p r o v i d i n g

r i g h t s t o i t

. T h e P l a i n t i f f s h a v e n o t s a t i s f

i e d t h i s s t a n d a r d ; i n d e e d

, t h e y p r e s e n t

v e r y l i m i t e d a r g u m e n t o n t h i s i s s u e a n d m a k e o n l y f e e b l e c h a l l e n g e s t o t h e d i s t r i c t

c o u r t ’ s r u l i n g

. B e c a u s e t h e p o l i t i c a l

- s u b d i v i s i o n s t a n d i n g b a r i s a n i n d e p e n d e n t

j u r i s d i c t i o n a l b a r , I w o u l d a f f i r m t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ’ s r u l i n g s o l e l y o n t h i s b a s i s

.

C f

. S i n o c h e m I

n t ’ l C o

. v

. M

a l a y s i a I n t ’ l S h i p p i n g C o r p

. , 5 4 9 U

. S

. 4 2 2

, 4 2 5 ( 2 0 0 7 )

( h o l d i n g t h a t f

e d e r a l c o u r t c o u l d d i s m i s s c a s e o n f o r u m n o n c o n v e n i e n s g r o u n d s

w i t h o u t c o n c l u s i v e l y d e c i d i n g i s s u e s o f s u b j e c t

- m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n )

.

T h e m a j o r i t y m a k e s a d i f

f e r e n t d e t e r m i n a t i o n , o p i n i n g t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t

“ c o u l d n o t p r o p e r l y r e a c h i t s c o n c l u s i o n s a t t h i s s t a g e o f l i t i g a t i o n

. ” M a j

. O p

. a t

4

. B e f o r e I d i s c u s s m y r e a s o n s f o r d i v e r g i n g f

r o m t h e m a

j o r i t y ’ s v i e w s , I n o t e

s e v e r a l i s s u e s w h i c h a r e l e f t u n r e s o l v e d b y t h e m a

j o r i t y ’ s o p i n i o n

. F i r s t

, a l t h o u g h

t h e m a j o r i t y e v i n c e s s o m e u n c e r t a i n t y a s t o w h e t h e r p o l i t i c a l

- s u b d i v i s i o n s t a n d i n g

10i s p r o p e r l y c o n s i d e r e d a t y p e o f “ p r u d e n t i a l s t a n d i n g ”

— n o t a b l y , i n t i m a t i n g t h a t

L e x m a r k I

n t e r n a t i o n a l

, I

n c

. v

. S t a t i c C o n t r o l C o m p o n e n t s

, I

n c

. , 5 7 2 U

. S

. 1 1 8

( 2 0 1 4 )

, m a y h a v e p u t i n d o u b t o n w h e t h e r t h i s f o r m o f s t a n d i n g i s a j u r i s d i c t i o n a l

b a r , s e e M a

j

. O p

. a t 8

- 9 n

. 4

, 1 1 n

. 6

— t h e m a j o r i t y u l t i m a t e l y f

o l l o w s o u r p r i o r

c a s e s t h a t t r e a t p o l i t i c a l

- s u b d i v i s i o n s t a n d i n g a s a j u r i s d i c t i o n a l m a t t e r , a n d i t t h u s

a n a l y z e s p o l i t i c a l

- s u b d i v i s i o n s t a n d i n g e n t i r e l y s e p a r a t e l y f r o m p r u d e n t i a l

s t a n d i n g

. S e e C i t

y o f H u g o , 6 5 6 F

. 3 d a t 1 2 5 5 n

. 4 ( o b s e r v i n g t h a t B r a n s o n “ c a s t s

t h e m a t t e r [ o f p o l i t i c a l

- s u b d i v i s i o n s t a n d i n g ] a s o n e o f j u r i s d i c t i o n a l s t a n d i n g ” )

.

S e c o n d

, a l t h o u g h t h e m a j o r i t y v o i c e s c o n c e r n s a b o u t t h e c o n t o u r s a n d w o r k a b i l i t y

o f a p p l y i n g t h e “ d i r e c t e d a t p r o t e c t i n g ” c o m p o n e n t o f C i t y o f H u g o , i t e x p r e s s l y

d e c l i n e s t o “ r e s o l v e ” t h e s e c o n c e r n s ( a l b e i t w h i l e c i t i n g t h e m a s “ s u p p l e m e n t a r y

s u p p o r t ” f

o r i t s r e s u l t )

. M a

j

. O p

. a t 1 1 n

. 6

. T h i r d

, i t d e c l i n e s t o d e t e r m i n e t h e

“ p r e c i s e r e a c h ” o f B r a n s o n a n d C i t y o f H u g o o r c h o o s e d e f

i n i t i v e l y b e t w e e n t h e

d i f f e r i n g r e a d i n g s o f

f e r e d b y t h e P l a i n t i f

f s a n d t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t b e c a u s e , i n i t s

v i e w , “ u n d e r e i t h e r p r o f f e r e d f o r m u l a t i o n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d

. ” I d

. a t 1 0

.

I n s t e a d

, t h e c r u x o f t h e m a j o r i t y ’ s a n a l y s i s i s t h a t “ [ e ] s t a b l i s h i n g w h o w a s

i n t e n d e d t o b e n e f

i t f r o m t h e E n a b l i n g A c t ’ s ‘ r e p u b l i c a n i n f o r m ’ r e q u i r e m e n t

n e c e s s a r i l y b e g s t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h a t a ‘ R e p u b l i c a n F o r m o f G o v e r n m e n t ’ i s ,

w h i c h i s t h e i s s u e u l t i m a t e l y t o b e r e s o l v e d i f a n y c o u r t e v e r s u c c e e d s i n r e a c h i n g

t h e m e r i t s o f t h i s c a s e

. ” I d

. a t 1 2

. I n o t h e r w o r d s , i n t h e m a j o r i t y ’ s v i e w ,

11g r a p p l i n g w i t h t h e “ d i r e c t e d a t p r o t e c t i n g ” c o m p o n e n t o f C i t y o f H u g o w o u l d

r e q u i r e “ i m p e r m i s s i b l y d e l v i n g i n t o t h e m e r i t s o f t h e c a s e

. ” I d

. a t 1 2

.

I p a r t w a y s w i t h t h e m a

j o r i t y h e r e

. O u r c a s e s d o g e n e r a l l y e m p h a s i z e t h e

i m p o r t a n c e o f d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b e t w e e n t h e s t a n d i n g i n q u i r y a n d m e r i t s i s s u e s , w i t h

t h e l a t t e r i n c l u d i n g t h e e l e m e n t s o f a c l a i m a n d w h e t h e r t h a t c l a i m h a s b e e n

s u c c e s s f u l l y s t a t e d

. S e e i d

. a t 1 5

– 1 6 ; s e e a l s o

, e

. g

. , D a y v

. B o n d

, 5 0 0 F

. 3 d 1 1 2 7

,

1 1 3 7 ( 1 0 t h C i r

. 2 0 0 7 ) ( “ ‘ F o r p u r p o s e s o f s t a n d i n g , ’

. . . ‘ t h e q u e s t i o n c a n n o t b e

w h e t h e r t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , p r o p e r l y i n t e r p r e t e d

, e x t e n d s p r o t e c t i o n t o t h e

p l a i n t i f f ’ s a s s e r t e d r i g h t o r i n t e r e s t

, ’ b e c a u s e t h a t w o u l d b e a d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e

m e r i t s o f t h e p l a i n t i f

f s ’ c l a i m u n d e r t h e g u i s e o f a n e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e i r s t a n d i n g

. ”

( q u o t i n g I

n i t i a t i v e & R e

f e r e n d u m I

n s t

. v

. W a l k e r , 4 5 0 F

. 3 d 1 0 8 2

, 1 0 9 2 ( 1 0 t h C i r

.

2 0 0 6 ) ( e n b a n c ) ) )

. H o w e v e r , t h e c a s e s t h e m a j o r i t y r e l i e s o n d o n o t i n v o l v e t h e

p o l i t i c a l

- s u b d i v i s i o n s t a n d i n g d o c t r i n e o r t h e e m b e d d e d “ d i r e c t e d a t p r o t e c t i n g ”

r e q u i r e m e n t

. I n t h a t c o n t e x t

, a s I h a v e s e t f o r t h s u p r a , C i t y o f H u g o i s o u r

p r i m a r y g u i d e p o s t

. T h a t c a s e r e i t e r a t e s t h a t p o l i t i c a l

- s u b d i v i s i o n s t a n d i n g i s

j u r i s d i c t i o n a l

, s e e 6 5 6 F

. 3 d a t 1 2 5 5 n

. 4

, a n d r e q u i r e s a p o l i t i c a l

- s u b d i v i s i o n

p l a i n t i f f t o s h o w

— a s p a r t o f a t h r e s h o l d j u r i s d i c t i o n a l s t a n d i n g i n q u i r y

— t h a t i t

s e e k s e n f o r c e m e n t o f a f

e d e r a l s t a t u t e d i r e c t e d a t p r o t e c t i n g o r s p e c i f i c a l l y

p r o v i d i n g r i g h t s t o p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n s l i k e i t

, i d

. a t 1 2 5 7

. T h u s , i n a n a l y z i n g

s t a n d i n g i n t h i s s p e c i f

i c c o n t e x t

, C i t

y o f H u g o r e q u i r e s a f

e d e r a l c o u r t t o a n a l y z e

12t h e n a t u r e o f t h e c l a i m o r r i g h t s a t i s s u e , a t l e a s t a s f a r a s i s n e c e s s a r y t o

d e t e r m i n e w h o m a y s e e k t o e n f o r c e t h e m

. I r r e s p e c t i v e o f w h e t h e r t h i s m a y

s o m e t i m e s r e s e m b l e a m e r i t s a n a l y s i s , i t i s p r e c i s e l y w h a t C i t y o f H u g o

c o n t e m p l a t e s

.

I n o t e f u r t h e r t h a t f

a l l i n g b a c k o n B r a n s o n i s o f n o a v a i l t o t h e m a j o r i t y ’ s

p o s i t i o n : a l t h o u g h a “ d i r e c t e d a t p r o t e c t i n g ” r e q u i r e m e n t i s n o t c l e a r l y s t a t e d i n

t h a t c a s e , B r a n s o n s t i l l c o n s i d e r e d a n d u l t i m a t e l y f o u n d “ [ m ] o s t i m p o r t a n t [ ] ” t o

i t s a n a l y s i s t h e f

a c t t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f

f s w e r e “ ‘ e s s e n t i a l l y ’ t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s o f t h e

f e d e r a l t r u s t a t i s s u e

. ” 1 6 1 F

. 3 d a t 6 2 9

. T h u s , o u r p r e c e d e n t c e r t a i n l y p e r m i t s ,

a n d i n m y v i e w r e q u i r e s , a c o u r t t o d e t e r m i n e a f e d e r a l s t a t u t e ’ s b e n e f

i c i a r i e s a s

p a r t o f i t s s t a n d i n g a n a l y s i s a n d c o n t e m p l a t e s t h a t a c o u r t m a y m a k e s u c h a

d e t e r m i n a t i o n w i t h o u t i m p e r m i s s i b l y i m p l i c a t i n g t h e m e r i t s

. I r e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t

t h a t t h e m a

j o r i t y , i n c o n c l u d i n g o t h e r w i s e , f a i l s t o c o r r e c t l y a p p l y t h i s p r e c e d e n t

.

N o r d o e s t h e m a

j o r i t y a t t e m p t t o p e r s u a s i v e l y d i s t i n g u i s h t h i s p r e c e d e n t

, m u c h

l e s s d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t i t h a s b e e n s u p e r s e d e d b y s u b s e q u e n t S u p r e m e C o u r t

a u t h o r i t y

. 2

2 I f i n d i r r e l e v a n t t h e a n a l y s i s i n L a r g e s s v

. S u

p r e m e J u d i c i a l C o u r t f

o r S t a t e o f M a s s a c h u s e t t s , 3 7 3 F

. 3 d 2 1 9 ( 1 s t C i r

. 2 0 0 4 ) ( p e r c u r i a m )

, w h i c h t h e

m a j o r i t y r e p e a t e d l y c i t e s

. S e e M a j

. O p

. a t 1 2

- 1 4

, 1 3 n

. 7

. L a r g e s s ’ s o s t e n s i b l y

r e l e v a n t s t a n d i n g a n a l y s i s , w h e r e t h a t p a n e l r u l e d s t a n d i n g w a s “ i n t e r t w i n e d [ w i t h ] a n d i n s e p a r a b l e f r o m t h e m e r i t s o f t h e u n d e r l y i n g c l a i m , ” c o n c e r n e d

w h e t h e r t h e p l a i n t i f

f s s h a r e d “ a n u n d i f

f e r e n t i a t e d h a r m w i t h o t h e r v o t e r s , ” 3 7 3

F

. 3 d a t 2 2 4

, n o t t h e p o l i t i c a l

- s u b d i v i s i o n s t a n d i n g d o c t r i n e

. O f c o u r s e , t h i s o u t

13M u c h o f t h e m a j o r i t y ’ s d i s q u i e t s e e m s t o b e b a s e d o n a p e r c e i v e d l a c k o f

“ w o r k a b l e s t a n d a r d s ” a n d i t s v i e w t h a t “ d i s e n t a n g l i n g ” t h e m e a n i n g o f

“ r e p u b l i c a n f

o r m o f g o v e r n m e n t ” w i l l b e a n “ i m m e n s e t a s k ” n o t a m e n a b l e t o

r e s o l u t i o n i n t h e c o n t e x t o f a R u l e 1 2 ( b ) ( 1 ) m o t i o n

. M a j

. O p

. a t 1 1 n

. 6

, 1 8 ; s e e

a l s o i d

. a t 1 2 ( s t a t i n g t h a t t h e s e i s s u e s c a n n o t b e r e s o l v e d o n “ t h e p r e s e n t r e c o r d ”

a n d t h a t t h e P l a i n t i f

f s ’ b r i e f i n g “ h i n t [ s ] a t ” c o m p l e x m e r i t s a r g u m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g

t h e m e a n i n g o f t h i s p h r a s e ) ; i d

. a t 1 3 ( s u g g e s t i n g t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t a n d t h e

S t a t e “ v a l i a n t l y s t r u g g l e t o c o n c l u s i v e l y e s t a b l i s h ” t h a t t h e P l a i n t i f f s a r e n o t

b e n e f i c i a r i e s o f a “ r e p u b l i c a n f o r m o f g o v e r n m e n t ” ) ; i d

. a t 1 7 ( c i t i n g “ t h e d e g r e e

o f u n c e r t a i n t y p r e s e n t a t t h i s s t a g e ” )

. I d i s a g r e e : a s I o b s e r v e d s u p r a , t h e

P l a i n t i f f s h a v e m a d e v i r t u a l l y n o a r g u m e n t a t t h i s s t a g e t h a t

, i f a “ d i r e c t e d a t

p r o t e c t i n g ” r e q u i r e m e n t a p p l i e s , i t i s s a t i s f i e d

. S e e a l s o i d

. a t 1 7 ( a p p e a r i n g t o

a c k n o w l e d g e t h a t a r g u m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g t h e “ m e a n i n g , s c o p e , a n d i n t e n d e d

b e n e f i c i a r i e s ” o f t h e “ r e p u b l i c a n i n f o r m ” r e q u i r e m e n t “ w e r e n o t p r e s e n t e d t o t h e

d i s t r i c t c o u r t a n d a r e n o t b e f o r e u s ” )

. O u r p o l i t i c a l

- s u b d i v i s i o n s t a n d i n g c a s e s

a n d g e n e r a l s t a n d i n g p r i n c i p l e s b o t h c o u n s e l t h a t i t i s t h e P l a i n t i f f s ’ b u r d e n t o

s a t i s f y t h i s s t a n d a r d

. S e e

, e

. g

. , U t a h A s s ’ n o

f C t y s

. v

. B u s h

, 4 5 5 F

. 3 d 1 0 9 4

, 1 1 0 0

o f

- c i r c u i t d e c i s i o n a l s o d i d n o t p u r p o r t t o a p p l y ( a n d i n f a c t p r e d a t e d ) o u r c o u r t ’ s d e c i s i o n i n C i t

y o f H u g o , w h i c h i s b i n d i n g p r e c e d e n t

.

14( 1 0 t h C i r

. 2 0 0 6 ) ( o b s e r v i n g t h a t p a r t y s e e k i n g t o i n v o k e j u r i s d i c t i o n m u s t

e s t a b l i s h s t a n d i n g )

.

A d d i t i o n a l l y , c o m p l e x i t y a l o n e d o e s n o t p e r m i t a c o u r t t o f o r e s t a l l t h e f

u l l

e v a l u a t i o n o f j u r i s d i c t i o n a l i s s u e s

. E a r l i e r i n t h i s l i t i g a t i o n , a p a n e l e v a l u a t e d t h e

“ j u s t i c i a b i l i t y h u r d l e ” o f t h e p o l i t i c a l

- q u e s t i o n d o c t r i n e u n d e r a s i x

- f a c t o r t e s t

,

e v a l u a t i n g a t l e n g t h

, f

o r e x a m p l e , w h e t h e r t h e f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e o f

a “ r e p u b l i c a n f

o r m o f g o v e r n m e n t ” i s t e x t u a l l y c o m m i t t e d t o a n o t h e r b r a n c h

,

w h e t h e r j u d i c i a l l y d i s c o v e r a b l e a n d m a n a g e a b l e s t a n d a r d s e x i s t f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g

t h a t g u a r a n t e e , a n d w h e t h e r e v a l u a t i n g t h e i s s u e r e q u i r e s m a k i n g p o l i c y

d e t e r m i n a t i o n s

. K e r r v

. H i c k e n l o o p e r , 7 4 4 F

. 3 d 1 1 5 6

, 1 1 7 2

, 1 1 7 6

– 8 1 ( 1 0 t h C i r

.

2 0 1 4 )

, c e r t

. g r a n t e d

, j u d g m e n t v a c a t e d o n o t h e r g r o u n d s , 1 3 5 S

. C t

. 2 9 2 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) ;

s e e a l s o M

o r g a n v

. M c C o t t e r , 3 6 5 F

. 3 d 8 8 2

, 8 8 7 ( 1 0 t h C i r

. 2 0 0 4 ) ( o b s e r v i n g t h a t

“ t h e q u e s t i o n o f j u s t i c i a b i l i t y i m p l i c a t e s t h i s c o u r t ’ s j u r i s d i c t i o n ” )

. A n d i t d i d s o

w i t h s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n t o n o t “ r e a c h i n g o r c o n s i d e r i n g t h e m e r i t s

. ” S e e K e r r , 7 4 4

F

. 3 d a t 1 1 7 9

. I s e e n o r e a s o n w h y

— i f r e q u i r e d

— a s i m i l a r l y s e a r c h i n g a n a l y s i s

m i g h t n o t b e u n d e r t a k e n i n t h i s c o n t e x t

, a n d s i m i l a r l y f i n e d i s t i n c t i o n s m i g h t n o t

u l t i m a t e l y b e d r a w n b e t w e e n s t a n d i n g a n d m e r i t s i s s u e s , i n e v a l u a t i n g w h o m t h e

E n a b l i n g A c t ’ s r e q u i r e m e n t o f a r e p u b l i c a n f o r m o f g o v e r n m e n t w a s d i r e c t e d a t

p r o t e c t i n g o r s p e c i f

i c a l l y p r o v i d i n g r i g h t s t o

.

15T o b e s u r e , t h e r e m a y b e c o n c e i v a b l e a r g u m e n t s f o r r e e v a l u a t i n g o r

c a b i n i n g o u r p o l i t i c a l

- s u b d i v i s i o n s t a n d i n g d o c t r i n e

. B u t t h e m a j o r i t y d o e s n o t

m e a n i n g f

u l l y g r a p p l e w i t h t h o s e a r g u m e n t s h e r e , l e t a l o n e e x p r e s s l y a d o p t t h e m

.

I n s t e a d

, t h e m a

j o r i t y p u r p o r t s t o a c c e

p t t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l

, d e c i s i o n a l r u b r i c l a i d

o u t i n o u r p o l i t i c a l

- s u b d i v i s i o n s t a n d i n g c a s e s b u t t h e n e f f e c t i v e l y d e p a r t s e n t i r e l y

f r o m t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f t h a t r u b r i c i n r e s o l v i n g t h i s c a s e

. I c a n n o t t r a v e l t h i s

p a t h

.

T h e r e f

o r e , f o r t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , I r e s p e c t f u l l y d i s s e n t

.

16