Filed 4/6/16 S.C. v. B.L. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

S.C.,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

B.L.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D068562

 (Super. Ct. No. ED94188)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Selena Dong 

Epley, Judge. Affirmed.

Gretel Smith, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

B.L., in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.

B.L. (Mother) appeals from an order denying a restraining order against S.C. 

(Father), the father of her minor child (Child). Mother argues the court erred by: (1) 

proceeding with a hearing on the restraining order in her absence despite her request for a 

continuance; (2) failing to consider a protective order from Arkansas, in violation of the 
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Uniform Interstate Family Support Act; and (3) failing to consider evidence of child 

abuse and a prior restraining order against Father. We affirm the order. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mother provided a limited appellate record, designating only the minutes from 

three hearings and the findings and order from one. She did not include the petition for 

restraining order from which this appeal arises or any of the hearing transcripts.

However, this court previously issued an unpublished opinion on a petition for writ of 

mandate arising out of the same underlying case. (S.C. v. Superior Court of San Diego 

County (May 27, 2015, D067906).) We derive our factual summary from the submitted 

record and the previous unpublished opinion.

Child was born to Mother and Father in 2009. Mother and Father dispute the 

details of their relationship but it appears Mother, Father and Child lived together for a 

number of years after Child's birth. The relationship between Mother and Father ended in 

2014 and, shortly thereafter, Father filed a petition to establish paternity, requesting sole 

legal and physical custody of Child. Upon Father's filing of the petition, an automatic 

restraining order took effect, preventing either parent from removing Child from 

California. 

Mother opposed Father's petition, claiming Father had no parental rights, and

requested the court award her sole legal and physical custody of Child. While the 

petition for paternity was pending, Mother and Father stipulated to Mother having 

temporary sole legal custody and primary physical custody with weekly visitation by 

Father. 
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In February 2015, Mother received an offer of employment in Arkansas and 

requested a move-away order allowing her to move Child to Arkansas. It appears that 

Mother then moved Child to Arkansas before the court decided the move-away request, 

and in violation of the previously issued automatic restraining order. Despite the 

violation, the court granted Mother's move-away request on April 1, 2015, but because 

Mother had moved Child away prematurely, granted Father 30 days of parenting time to 

run from April 1 to May 1, 2015. 

Father filed a petition for writ of mandate and a request for an immediate stay of 

the April 1, 2015, move-away order. This Court granted the stay and notified Mother it 

was considering issuing a writ in the first instance. On May 15, 2015, before this court 

issued its opinion on Father's writ petition, the trial court conducted a hearing that Father 

attended in person and Mother attended via telephone from Arkansas. It appears Child 

was still in Arkansas, as the court ordered Mother to return to California with Child. A

judge from Arkansas was also present via telephone and indicated (1) California had 

subject matter jurisdiction, (2) Arkansas declined to assume jurisdiction, and (3) 

Arkansas would dismiss its case. The trial court confirmed California had "exclusive and 

continuing jurisdiction." Shortly thereafter, on May 27, 2015, this court issued a writ of 

mandate directing the trial court to vacate its April 1, 2015 order granting Mother's moveaway request. 

At some point before June 1, 2015—the record does not indicate the exact date—

Mother filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order in California. At a 

custody hearing on June 1, 2015, with both Mother and Father present, the court 
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confirmed a hearing on the restraining order set for June 8, 2015. The court also ordered 

Mother to provide Father with an address where Child was staying and issued a 

temporary emergency order awarding Mother and Father joint legal custody and Father 

primary physical custody of Child pending trial on the issue of paternity. 

Father appeared at the June 8, 2015 hearing but Mother did not. The court 

dismissed and denied Mother's request for a domestic violence restraining order noting 

the moving party was not present, gave Father full legal custody and primary physical 

custody of Child pending the trial on paternity set for August 2015, and ordered Mother 

to return Child to San Diego. The court's minutes from June 8, 2015, also contain a note 

stating "TRO previously denied." 

Mother appeals. 

DISCUSSION

I. Appellate Principles

On appeal, we presume the lower court's ruling is correct and, where the record is 

silent, indulge all presumptions and inferences to support that ruling. (Denham v. 

Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) We affirm the judgment if any possible 

grounds exist for the trial court to have reached its factual conclusions. (Gee v. American 

Realty & Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416.) 

As the party seeking reversal, the appellant has the burden to provide an adequate 

record to overcome the presumption of correctness and show prejudicial error. (See 

Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 132 (Aguilar).) In doing 

so, the appellant must provide supporting citations to the factual record and must support 
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each point by argument and citation of authority where available. (See Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), (C); City of Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 

1211, 1239.) In the absence of a reporter's transcript, we cannot evaluate issues requiring 

a factual analysis and must presume "the trial court acted duly and regularly and received 

substantial evidence to support its findings." (Stevens v. Stevens (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 

19, 20 (Stevens); see Pringle v. La Chapelle (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1003; Hodges 

v. Mark (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 651, 657.)

Although Mother is not represented by an attorney in this appeal, she is held to the 

same standards as an attorney. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985; 

Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543.)

II. Legal Principles Governing the Restraining Order

The Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA), Family Code1 section 6200 et 

seq., permits the trial court to issue an ex parte protective order enjoining a person from, 

among other things, threatening, contacting or coming within a specified distance of 

another. (§ 6320.) Whether the court grants or denies a request for an ex parte order 

under section 6320, the court is required to hold a noticed hearing within 25 days of the 

date of the order. (§§ 240, 242, 6320.5, subd. (b).) Subdivision (a) of the former section 

243, effective in June 2015, required "[w]hen the matter first comes up for hearing, the 

 

1 Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references are to the Family Code. 
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petitioner must be ready to proceed."2 (§§ 240, 242, subd. (a), former § 243, subd. (a)

(amended by Stats. 2015, ch. 411, § 5, p. 3719).) Former section 243, subdivision (b) 

required service of a copy of the petition, the temporary order, if any, and the notice of 

hearing on respondent at least five days before the hearing and, under subdivision (c) of 

that section, if the petitioner failed to comply with subdivision (a) or (b), the court was to

dissolve the order. (Id., subds. (b) & (c).) An order granting or denying a restraining 

order is void if the court issues the order in violation of a party's due process rights to 

notice and an opportunity to be heard. (See Brown v. Williams (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 

182, 186, fn. 4.) 

The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to grant a domestic 

violence restraining order. (Gonzalez v. Munoz (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 413, 420; 

Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1505.) We review the trial court's 

ruling for abuse of that broad discretion, which occurs only if the court's ruling exceeds 

the bounds of reason, fails to apply correct legal standards, or is without substantial 

support in the evidence. (S.M. v. E.P. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1265; Gonzalez,

supra, at p. 420.) 

III. Analysis

Mother argues that the court erred in proceeding with the hearing on her request 

for a restraining order without providing her adequate notice. However, Mother and 

Father were both present at a hearing on June 1, 2015, at which the court confirmed the 

 

2 Sections 243 and 245 were amended in 2015, with the changes taking effect on 

January 1, 2016. (Stats. 2015, ch. 411, § 5, p. 3719.) 
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June 8, 2015 hearing on the restraining order. Despite the court's confirmation of the 

hearing date with both parties, Mother failed to appear at the June 8 hearing to present 

her case and, in her absence, the Court properly denied and dismissed the restraining 

order request. (See § 6320.5, subd. (b), former § 243, subds. (a), (b) & (c) (amended by 

Stats. 2015, ch. 411, § 5, p. 3719).) 

Mother contends she did not appear on June 8, 2015, because the court did not 

notify her that it had denied her request for a continuance, which she alleges she filed

because she had not served Father with the petition at least five days before the hearing.

However, there is no evidence of a request for continuance in the record and, as the 

record does not support Mother's assertion, we must resolve this ambiguity in favor of the 

judgment. (Aguilar, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 132.) Further, Mother's failure to serve 

Father is of no moment because Father was on notice of the request and the June 8

hearing, and was present on June 8, 2015, ready to proceed. Even if Mother had

requested a continuance as she asserts, absent notice the court had granted the

continuance—which she does not allege she received—she should have appeared at the 

previously confirmed hearing. Mother had adequate notice of the hearing and an 

opportunity to be heard. The court did not violate her due process rights by proceeding 

with the hearing and denying her request for a restraining order in her absence. 

Mother also contends Arkansas issued a protective order protecting her and Child

and argues the court did not take the validity of the Arkansas protective order into 

consideration, thereby violating the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) 

(Fam. Code, § 5700.101 et seq., previously Fam. Code, § 4900 et seq.). Mother does 
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not provide any authority or specify what portion of the UIFSA she contends the court

violated and, more fundamentally, there is no evidence in the record indicating Arkansas 

issued such a protective order. Instead, the record indicates the court in Arkansas 

declined to assume jurisdiction, dismissed the case in that state, and indicated California 

had subject matter jurisdiction, which the court in California confirmed. Further, if the 

court was aware of a previously issued protective order from Arkansas, we must presume 

the court acted duly and considered it when denying Mother's request for a restraining 

order. (See Stevens, supra, 129 Cal.App.2d at p. 20.) For these reasons, Mother has not 

established the court erred by failing to consider the validity of a protective order from 

Arkansas. (See Aguilar, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 132.)

Mother also asserts the court was aware of a previous restraining order protecting 

her from Father, photos she submitted, and investigation reports from DHS and CPS 

concerning Child, but denied her an opportunity to present these items for review. 

However, the record does not include any of these items, without a transcript, there is no 

record of whether the court considered any of them. Again, we must view the record 

before us and presume the court acted duly. (See Stevens, supra, 129 Cal.App.2d at p.

20.) Here the record suggests it was Mother's own failure to appear, rather than any error 

by the court, that prevented her from presenting her case. 

Finally, to the extent Mother intended to dispute the custody arrangement set forth 

in the June 8, 2015 order, that portion of the order is not properly before this court on 

appeal. Mother does not specifically raise any arguments or provide any authority 

regarding that portion of the order, as required on appeal. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 
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8.204(a)(1)(B).) In any event, the portion of the order regarding custody was 

temporary—a further hearing on the custody arrangement being set for August 2015—

and not subject to appeal. (See Smith v. Smith (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1090 

[explaining a temporary custody order is interlocutory by definition and not appealable].)

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Respondent is awarded his costs on appeal.

HALLER, J.

WE CONCUR:

BENKE, Acting P. J.

IRION, J.