S. HRG. 110–666

NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE

ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,

SECOND SESSION, 110TH CONGRESS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

NOMINATIONS OF

GEN DAVID D. McKIERNAN, USA; LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA; LTG 

WALTER L. SHARP, USA; GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA; LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA; HON. NELSON M. FORD; JOSEPH A. 

BENKERT; SEAN J. STACKLEY; FREDERICK S. CELEC; MICHAEL B. 

DONLEY; GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF; AND GEN. DUNCAN J. 

McNABB, USAF

FEBRUARY 6; APRIL 3; MAY 22; JUNE 26; JULY 22, 2008

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

(

NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, SECOND SESSION,

110TH CONGRESS

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46–092 PDF 2008

S. HRG. 110–666

NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE

ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,

SECOND SESSION, 110TH CONGRESS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

NOMINATIONS OF

GEN DAVID D. McKIERNAN, USA; LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA; LTG 

WALTER L. SHARP, USA; GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA; LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA; HON. NELSON M. FORD; JOSEPH A. 

BENKERT; SEAN J. STACKLEY; FREDERICK S. CELEC; MICHAEL B. 

DONLEY; GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF; AND GEN. DUNCAN J. 

McNABB, USAF

FEBRUARY 6; APRIL 3; MAY 22; JUNE 26; JULY 22, 2008

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

(

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

MICHAEL V. KOSTIW, Republican Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

Page

FEBRUARY 6, 2008

Vote on Certain Pending Military Nominations ................................................... 1

APRIL 3, 2008

Nominations of GEN David D. McKiernan, USA, for Reappointment to the 

Grade of General and to be Commander, International Security Assistance 

Force, Afghanistan; LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, for appointment to 

the Grade of General and to be Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army; 

and LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA, for appointment to the Grade of General 

and to be Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea ...................................................................... 5

Statement of:

McKiernan, GEN David D., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of General 

and to be Commander, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan ........................................................................................................................ 12 

Odierno, LTG Raymond T., USA, for Appointment to the Grade of General 

and to be Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army ............................................ 13 

Sharp, LTG Walter L., USA, for Appointment to the Grade of General and 

to be Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/

United States Forces Korea ................................................................................ 13

MAY 22, 2008

Nominations of GEN David H. Petraeus, USA, for Reappointment to the 

Grade of General and to be Commander, United States Central Command; 

and LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, for Appointment to the Grade of 

General and to be Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq ............................. 101

Statement of:

Petraeus, GEN David H., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of General 

and to be Commander, United States Central Command ................................ 105

Odierno, LTG Raymond T., USA, for Appointment to the Grade of General 

and to be Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq ............................................ 111

MAY 22, 2008

To Consider Certain Pending Military Nominations ............................................ 215

(III)

Page

IV

JUNE 26, 2008

Nominations of Hon. Nelson M. Ford to be Under Secretary of the Army; 

Joseph A. Benkert to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security 

Affairs; Sean J. Stackley to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition; and Frederick S. Celec to be Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological 

Defense Programs ................................................................................................ 219

Statement of:

Ford, Hon. Nelson M., to be Under Secretary of the Army .................................. 223

Benkert, Joseph A., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security 

Affairs .................................................................................................................... 224

Stackley, Sean J., to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition ...................................................................................... 225

Celec, Frederick S., to be Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear 

and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs ............................................... 225

JULY 22, 2008

Nominations of Michael B. Donley to be Secretary of the Air Force; Gen. 

Norton A. Schwartz, USAF, for Reappointment to the Grade of General 

and to be Chief of Staff, United States Air Force; and Gen. Duncan J. 

McNabb, USAF, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be 

Commander, United States Transportation Command .................................... 339

Statement of:

Stevens, Hon. Ted, U.S. Senator from the State of Alaska .................................. 344

Donley, Michael B., to be Secretary of the Air Force ........................................... 346

Schwartz, Gen. Norton A., USAF, for Reappointment to the Grade of General 

and to be Chief of Staff, United States Air Force ............................................. 348

McNabb, Gen. Duncan J., USAF, for Reappointment to the Grade of General 

and to be Commander, United States Transportation Command .................... 348

Conrad, Hon. Kent, U.S. Senator from the State of North Dakota ..................... 368

APPENDIX ............................................................................................................... 485 

(1)

VOTE ON CERTAIN PENDING MILITARY 

NOMINATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:46 a.m. in room SD–

106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy, Reed, 

Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Pryor, Webb, Warner, 

Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, Chambliss, Dole, Cornyn, Thune, and 

Martinez. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and Mary 

J. Kyle, legislative clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional 

staff member; Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Gabriella Eisen, counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton Green, professional 

staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Thomas 

K. McConnell, professional staff member; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. 

Noblet, professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican 

staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; 

David G. Collins, research assistant; Gregory T. Kiley, professional 

staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; 

Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff member; Sean G. Stackley, professional staff member; Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff member; Diana G. 

Tabler, professional staff member; Richard F. Walsh, minority 

counsel; and Dana W. White, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Jessica L. Kingston, Benjamin L. Rubin, 

and Brian F. Sebold. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman and 

Jay Maroney, assistants to Senator Kennedy; James Tuite, assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator 

Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Bonni 

Berge, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple and Caroline 

Tess, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R. Vanlandingham, 

assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator 

2

Bayh; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen C. Hedger, assistant to 

Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum 

and Todd Stiefler, assistants to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, 

assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; David 

Hanke, assistant to Senator Cornyn; John L. Goetchius and Brian 

W. Walsh, assistants to Senator Martinez; and Erskine W. Wells 

III, assistant to Senator Wicker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Since a quorum is now present, before I call on 

you, Secretary Gates, I will ask the committee to consider a list of 

782 pending military nominations. They’ve all been before the committee the required length of time. Is there a motion to favorably 

report those nominations? 

Senator WARNER. So moved. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is there a second? 

Senator INHOFE. Second. 

Chairman LEVIN. It’s been moved and seconded. All in favor say 

aye? [A chorus of ayes.] 

Opposed, nay? [No response.] 

The motion carries and those nominations will be reported to the 

Senate. Thank you. 

[The list of nominations considered and approved by the committee follows:]

MILITARY NOMINATIONS PENDING WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES 

COMMITTEE WHICH ARE PROPOSED FOR THE COMMITTEE’S CONSIDERATION ON FEBRUARY 6, 2008. 

1. In the Marine Corps there is one appointment to the grade of major (Lester 

W. Thompson) (Reference No. 902). 

2. In the Army there are 16 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with 

Gerald K. Bebber) (Reference No. 968). 

3. In the Navy there is one appointment to the grade of captain (Thomas J. 

Harvan) (Reference No. 1104). 

4. In the Navy there is one appointment to the grade of captain (John G. 

Bruening) (Reference No. 1105). 

5. In the Air Force there are three appointments to the grade of brigadier general 

(list begins with Col. Mark A. Ediger) (Reference No. 1142). 

6. In the Army there are two appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel and 

below (list begins with Manuel Pozoalanso) (Reference No. 1174). 

7. MG Joseph F. Fil, Jr., USA to be lieutenant general and Commanding General, 

Eight U.S. Army/Chief of Staff, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea (Reference No. 1192). 

8. Brig. Gen. Cecil R. Richardson, USAF, to be major general (Reference No. 

1201). 

9. Col. Robert G. Kenny, USAFR, to be brigadier general (Reference No. 1202). 

10. In the Air Force Reserve, there are two appointments to the grade of brigadier 

general (list begins with Daniel P. Gillen) (Reference No. 1203). 

11. In the Air Force Reserve, there are six appointments to the grade of major 

general (list begins with Robert Benjamin Bartlett) (Reference No. 1204). 

12. In the Air Force Reserve, there are nine appointments to the grade of brigadier general (list begins with Robert S. Arthur) (Reference No. 1205). 

13. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Chevalier 

P. Cleaves) (Reference No. 1207). 

14. In the Air Force Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel 

(Jawn M. Sischo) (Reference No. 1208). 

3

15. In the Air Force Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel 

(Joaquin Sariego) (Reference No. 1209). 

16. In the Air Force Reserve, there are four appointments to the grade of colonel 

(list begins with John A. Calcaterra, Jr.) (Reference No. 1210). 

17. In the Air Force Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade of colonel 

(list begins with Jerry Alan Arends) (Reference No. 1211). 

18. In the Air Force Reserve, there are five appointments to the grade of colonel 

(list begins with Donnie W. Bethel) (Reference No. 1212). 

19. In the Air Force Reserve, there are 11 appointments to the grade of colonel 

(list begins with Paul A. Abson) (Reference No. 1213). 

20. In the Air Force Reserve, there are 14 appointments to the grade of colonel 

(list begins with Mari L. Archer) (Reference No. 1214). 

21. In the Air Force Reserve, there are four appointments to the grade of colonel 

(list begins with William A. Beyers III) (Reference No. 1215). 

22. In the Air Force Reserve, there are six appointments to the grade of colonel 

(list begins with Robert R. Cannon) (Reference No. 1216). 

23. In the Air Force Reserve, there are 176 appointments to the grade of colonel 

(list begins with Vito Emil Addabbo) (Reference No. 1217). 

24. In the Air Force, there are two appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

(list begins with Azad Y. Keval) (Reference No. 1218). 

25. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

(Lance A. Avery) (Reference No. 1219). 

26. In the Air Force, there are four appointments to the grade of colonel and 

below (list begins with Billy R. Morgan) (Reference No. 1220). 

27. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Inaam A. 

Pedalino) (Reference No. 1221). 

28. In the Air Force, there are 62 appointments to the grade of major (list begins 

with Demea A. Alderman) (Reference No. 1222). 

29. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Theresa D. 

Clark) (Reference No. 1223). 

30. In the Air Force, there are 113 appointments to the grade of major (list begins 

with Lee E. Ackley) (Reference No. 1224). 

31. In the Air Force, there are 129 appointments to the grade of major (list begins 

with Said R. Acosta) (Reference No. 1225). 

32. In the Air Force, there are two appointments to the grade of major (list begins 

with Jason E. MacDonald) (Reference No. 1226). 

33. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Jeffrey P. Short) 

(Reference No. 1227). 

34. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Saqib 

Ishteeaque) (Reference No. 1228). 

35. In the Army, there are three appointments to the grade of major (list begins 

with Wanda L. Horton) (Reference No. 1229). 

36. In the Army, there are five appointments to the grade of colonel and below 

(list begins with David J. Barillo) (Reference No. 1230). 

37. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Joseph B. Dore) 

(Reference No. 1231). 

38. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (William J. Hersh) (Reference No. 1232). 

39. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (James 

C. Cummings) (Reference No. 1233). 

40. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Eugene 

W. Gavin) (Reference No. 1234). 

41. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Bruce H. Bahr) (Reference No. 1235) 

42. In the Army Reserve, there are seven appointments to the grade of colonel 

(list begins with David A. Brant) (Reference No. 1236). 

43. In the Army Reserve, there are two appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Harold A. Felton) (Reference No. 1237). 

44. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Anne M. Bauer) (Reference No. 1238). 

45. In the Army Reserve, there are four appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Deborah G. Davis) (Reference No. 1239). 

46. In the Army Reserve, there are 37 appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Ruben Alvero) (Reference No. 1240). 

47. In the Army Reserve, there are nine appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Ronald L. Bonheur) (Reference No. 1241). 

48. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Gerard P. Curran) (Reference No. 1242). 

4

49. In the Army Reserve, there are two appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Jeffrey A. Weiss) (Reference No. 1243). 

50. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Charles S. Oleary) (Reference No. 1244). 

51. In the Army Reserve, there are 10 appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Patrick S. Allison) (Reference No. 1245). 

52. In the Army Reserve, there are 30 appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Edward B. Browning) (Reference No. 1246). 

53. In the Army Reserve, there are 51 appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Sandra G. Apostolos) (Reference No. 1247). 

54. In the Marine Corps, there are two appointments to the grade of lieutenant 

colonel (list begins with Russell L. Bergeman) (Reference No. 1248). 

55. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of captain (John M. Dorey) 

(Reference No. 1250). 

56. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander (list begins with Thomas P. Carroll) (Reference No. 1252). 

57. In the Navy, there are four appointments to the grade of commander and 

below (list begins with David J. Robillard) (Reference No. 1253). 

58. Lt. Gen. Douglas M. Fraser, USAF, to be lieutenant general and Deputy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (Reference No. 1260). 

59. RADM Mark E. Ferguson III, USN, to be vice admiral and Deputy Chief of 

Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education, N1, Office of 

the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Naval Personnel (Reference No. 1261). 

60. VADM John C. Harvey, Jr., USN, to be vice admiral and Director, Navy Staff, 

N09B, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Reference No. 1262). 

61. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Orlando Salinas) (Reference No. 1263). 

62. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Debra 

D. Rice) (Reference No. 1264). 

63. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Robert 

J. Mouw) (Reference No. 1265). 

64. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Rabi L. Singh) 

(Reference No. 1266). 

65. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of commander (Michael 

V. Misiewicz) (Reference No. 1267). 

66. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander 

(John A. Bowman) (Reference No. 1268). 

67. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander 

(John A. Bowman) (Reference No. 1269). 

Total: 782.

[Whereupon, at 9:47 a.m., the committee adjourned.] 

(5)

NOMINATIONS OF GEN DAVID D. McKIERNAN, 

USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE 

OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, 

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE 

FORCE, AFGHANISTAN; LTG RAYMOND T. 

ODIERNO, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE 

GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE VICE 

CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY; 

AND LTG WALTER L. SHARP, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL 

AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS 

COMMAND/COMBINED FORCES COMMAND/

UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA 

THURSDAY, APRIL 3, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m., in room 

SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Warner, 

Inhofe, Graham, Cornyn, and Thune. 

Committee staff member present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director. 

Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; 

Daniel J. Cox, professional staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; 

Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J. McCord, professional 

staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and William K. 

Sutey, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican 

staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; Paul 

C. Hutton IV, research assistant; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional 

staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Diana G. 

Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority 

counsel. 

Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Kevin A. Cronin, and 

Ali Z. Pasha. 

6

Committee members’ assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman and 

Jay Maroney, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator 

Bill Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator 

Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Brian 

Polley, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Jason Van Beek, assistant to 

Senator Thune; and Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. 

Today the committee considers the nominations of three distinguished senior military officers: General David McKiernan, the 

nominee for Commander, International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF), Afghanistan; Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, the 

nominee for Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army; and Lieutenant General Walter Sharp, the nominee for Commander, United 

Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States 

Forces Korea. 

We all know that the long hours and the hard work put in by 

our senior military officials at the Department of Defense (DOD) 

require commitment and sacrifice not only from our nominees, but 

also from their families. We appreciate your and their willingness 

to bear that burden. 

Each of our nominees has served this country in the military for 

more than 30 years. Their successful careers can be seen in the positions in which they serve today: Commanding General, U.S. 

Army Europe, and 7th Army Germany; Commanding General, III 

Corps and Commander Multi-National Corps-Iraq; and Director of 

the Joint Staff at the Pentagon. 

When confirmed, each of our nominees will be responsible for 

helping DOD face critical challenges. General McKiernan will take 

command of the ISAF, Afghanistan, at a time when independent 

reviews indicate that the mission to stabilize Afghanistan is faltering, leading to a strategic stalemate between coalition forces and 

the Taliban-led insurgency, and that in the words of one of those 

independent reviews, the violence, insecurity, and opium production have risen dramatically as Afghan confidence in their government and its international partners falls. 

The next ISAF commander will face significant challenges within 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance as well. 

The Bucharest Summit has resulted in some additional troop commitments by allies to the Afghan conflict, but shortfalls remain in 

NATO members’ commitments to provide the troops, helicopters, 

and other assets needed to meet ISAF mission requirements. 

In addition, some nations place restrictions on the use of their 

national forces, which reduce the ISAF commander’s ability to deploy these forces as necessary. 

General Odierno will become Vice Chief of Staff at a time when 

the Army is highly stressed by continuing operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. Equipment and people are increasingly worn out, and 

the readiness of our nondeployed units has steadily declined. 

7

General George Casey, the Army Chief of Staff, has said, ‘‘Today’s Army is out of balance. The current demand for our forces exceeds the sustainable supply.’’ 

Earlier this week, General Richard Cody, the current Vice Chief 

of Staff, testified before our Readiness and Management Support 

Subcommittee that ongoing deployments are inflicting ‘‘incredible 

stress on soldiers and families and pose a significant risk’’ in his 

words to the All-Volunteer Army. 

As daunting as it will be to meet current readiness needs, the 

next Vice Chief of Staff will also be faced with the necessity to 

modernize the Army to meet national security requirements of the 

future. It will not be easy to modernize and transform the Army 

to meet these future requirements while improving current readiness and sustaining an Army fully engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Finally, General Sharp will be the first U.S. Commander to assume command in Korea since North Korea became a nuclear 

weapons state. It will be his responsibility to ensure that U.S. conventional forces continue to provide a strong deterrent to North Korean military action and that the military alliance with South 

Korea remains robust. 

I know our nominees look forward to these challenges. 

We look forward to these hearings, and also we would welcome 

each of our nominees introducing any of their family members who 

might be with them today. 

Senator Warner. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER 

Senator WARNER. I think General Sharp is the only one that has 

family with him this morning. General, would you introduce your 

wife of 34 years? 

General SHARP. Thank you, sir. I am honored to be joined today 

by my wife, Joanne, of 34 years. We were married right out of West 

Point, and I definitely would not be sitting here today without her 

support. 

Sir, with your indulgence, I would also like to introduce my executive assistant, Cherylanne Anderson, who is also here today with 

my wife and to thank her and really the thousands of others like 

her that work and make sure that our offices run smoothly so that 

we do what we can do to protect and defend. I would like to thank 

her and recognize her also. 

Chairman LEVIN. We welcome both of them and thank both of 

them. 

Senator WARNER. General McKiernan, I believe your family is 

still in Europe, that is your residence at this time. Is that correct? 

General MCKIERNAN. Yes, Senator Warner. My immediate family 

could not join me today, but I am very proud that my sister, Kathe 

Carney, and one of her sons, Sean Carney, are here today. She is 

a special education teacher here in Northern Virginia. I am very 

proud of her. 

Senator WARNER. We thank you. 

General Odierno, in my visits with you, you always make reference to your family. They are somewhere today. Back at your 

post, I believe? 

8

General ODIERNO. Yes, sir. My wife of 32 years, Linda, who is 

my high school sweetheart and who has been through a lot and volunteered much of her time and her efforts to the Army and our soldiers and their families. I could not do it without her, as well as 

the dedication of my children, who have always been dedicated to 

the Army themselves. 

Senator WARNER. Your son, sir? How is he? 

General ODIERNO. Sir, he is doing very well. He is currently getting his masters degree at New York University in New York City, 

has done very well recovering from his injury, and I am very proud 

of his service and how he has handled his injury as part of the Iraq 

war. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, General. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to say much of my statement will go 

in the record. I have not too strong a voice here this morning, but 

I recognize 100 years of service to America in uniform before us 

and we are fortunate in this country to have individuals, together 

with their families, that provide this dedication. It is the very foundation of our national security, the men and women who proudly 

wear their arms and uniforms and their families. 

General McKiernan, we had a very excellent consultation when 

you visited my office. We have visited together on previous assignments you have had. In fact, Senator Levin and I visited you on 

one of our trips to Kuwait and the Iraqi situation. 

Now, in Afghanistan, General, as I talked with you, there is the 

problem, of course, of the force levels. The President of France, to 

his great credit, I think, is announcing today an augmentation of 

forces. Two battalions of marines are going over as a consequence 

of the shortfall of other nations in their force levels. That was directly testified to before this committee here not long ago in another hearing. 

But there is growing concern about the Taliban’s resurgence and 

the presence of the cross-border sanctuaries in Pakistan. The easy 

access that the insurgents have to cross various parts of that border severely complicate the ability not only to protect our forces but 

to conduct the campaigns over there to return to the people of Afghanistan this country. 

I also addressed to you the question of narcotics related by our 

distinguished chairman. I have spent a great deal of time in the 

past couple of months on this subject. I have had the opportunity 

to consult with prime ministers, ambassadors, a lot of senior officers of our uniformed forces, and junior officers. What concerns me 

is that each year this level of narcotics has gone up. Now, that is 

hardly the image, the picture, a benchmark of achievement that 

our forces, together with NATO and the other combatant forces, 

want to send to the world. We went there to enable that country 

to reestablish itself to have a democracy. 

My most severe concern is that the increase each year allows increases in money that is drained off from the farmer’s field to the 

ultimate destination of those drugs. Those monies are providing 

arms. The Taliban and other insurgent groups are able to take 

their cut and buy arms and use those weapons against our forces. 

There is not a one of us in this room who have not gone to the 

funerals of our brave men and women who have lost their lives, 

9

and visited others who are wounded. When we try to comfort them, 

I find it particularly difficult with this Afghani situation when I 

say to myself this soldier could well have lost his life, his limb as 

a consequence of weaponry directed at him and paid for out of this 

drug trade. 

I wrote the President a letter—I do not intend to release it at 

this time—urging that at this ongoing NATO conference, he ensure 

that is becoming a top-level agenda item. I will soon find out 

whether, in fact, without that letter those NATO heads of state address this problem. I think it is unconscionable not only for the 

United States but of all governments involved in this Afghani operation not to address full-level attention to it. 

It is primarily a problem that should be confronted by the Karzai 

government. I understand that there has been a battalion established to be in training to work on this problem at this time, but 

that should have been done years ago. 

I urge you, General McKiernan, as you take up your responsibilities, to unrelentlessly bring this to the attention of your superiors 

wherever they may be. 

The national caveat issue is a subject at the NATO conference. 

Let us see what is provided because it puts an instability in the 

command and control of these forces where it is well recognized 

and known that certain nations do not have caveats and they are 

undertaking the majority of the high-risk operations. To me it conveys a completely inaccurate image of NATO and its ability to do 

out-of-area operations if some forces are going to be responsible for 

the heavy lifting and others to do whatever their countries permit 

them to do. 

I commend Secretary Robert Gates. I think he is one of the finest 

Secretaries of Defense we have ever had; I have had the privilege 

of working with and have known almost a dozen now, and I would 

put him at the very top in the way he has stood up for his forces 

and the principles for which we are fighting in both Afghanistan 

and Iraq. 

General Jim Jones, the former NATO Supreme Allied Commander and Commandant of the United States Marine Corps; and 

Ambassador Thomas Pickering of the Afghan Study Group sponsored by a distinguished organization, the Center for the Study of 

the Presidency, under the direction of David Abshire, published reports on these questions, and I am going to quote General Jones’ 

report: ‘‘Make no mistake, NATO is not winning in Afghanistan.’’ 

I hope you have the opportunity to review those reports. They are 

very clear in the concerns that they have. 

I have also, Mr. Chairman, had the privilege of meeting with the 

Ambassador from Denmark and others connected with that country, and I want to say for the record here today Denmark has more 

than 600 troops in southern Afghanistan standing side by side with 

the British in one of the most dangerous areas in Afghanistan. 

Again, Secretary Gates went by on his way to this NATO conference and visited the country of Denmark. He singled it out because it is a small country, but those forces are an integral part 

of the fighting force. They are there with no caveats. Unfortunately, some have mixed them in with that group of nations which 

have caveats. But let us make it clear on our record today. As SecVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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retary Gates said, ‘‘This is an ally who, in my opinion, is really 

punching above its weight, and I want to visit and basically thank 

them for that.’’ 

General McKiernan, we wish you good luck, your distinguished 

career ably qualifies you to take on this responsibility and to move 

it towards achievement of our goals, and part of that will be the 

commencement of a significant lessening of the drug trade. It is not 

going to go away overnight, but it has been rising in output production every single year for the last 4 years. 

General Odierno, Senator Levin and I have had the opportunity 

to visit you many times. I remember on my first trip, you were in 

the room. At that time, you did not have quite as many stars as 

you have now, and you were among the general officers who were 

in the back row, but I remember your impressive statements to us 

at that time. It is funny how you can remember those days to this 

day. Your career has won the hearts and minds of the soldiers and 

the families that you have been associated with these many years, 

and you will join the Chief of Staff of the Army in this challenging 

task of rebuilding our Army. 

I would like to say at this time, Mr. Chairman and members of 

the committee, I think General Cody has done a fine job. One of 

the things I admire about General Cody is he grabs that telephone, 

certainly in the 6 years I was chairman, and he rifles through his 

messages without hesitation. I hope you will follow on in that same 

way. 

All the members of this committee and I think throughout Congress, other members, are very conscious of the need to put a lot 

of emphasis on rebuilding this Army, to do what we can to see that 

our forces who are deployed not only have all the equipment they 

need, but have some certainty as to the time of that commitment 

of how long they will be overseas. 

While you may not be able to speak with specificity this morning, 

I did hear the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs last night state that 

in his professional judgment, we monitor daily the situation over 

there, but thus far, the turbulence that we have experienced—I say 

‘‘we’’—all the Afghan fighting forces experienced here in the past 

month or so in the Basra region—is not going to change the schedule to bring back those brigades and take it down to 15 brigades 

in July. 

Now, he had to leave the door open, as any prudent chairman 

would, and I am sure you would. I hope we can achieve that, and 

simultaneously with achieving that, I hope we can go from the 15-

month tour to the 12-month tour and probably a slightly larger period of time than 12 months back at home in retraining and spending some time with the family. 

Mr. Chairman, I will close out here with a comment or two about 

General Sharp. I have had the privilege of visiting with him. You 

are taking on an interesting job in an area which I spent a little 

time as a youngster many years ago at age 22. It is still as cold 

over there today as it was when I was there, and I expressed that 

to your lovely wife. 

It has been a half a century that our forces have been in there. 

We went in there in 1950. I left in 1952. What troubles me about 

that situation over there is that we have been working a half cenVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
11

tury-plus, and yet we still cannot get their command and control, 

their training of the South Korean forces up to a level where they 

can take operational control (OPCON). As I told you, the latest estimate is 2012. 2012. That is 62 years if you add it up from the 

date that we went into South Korea to help liberate that country. 

I find that unacceptable and I hope that perhaps you, together 

with our diplomatic representatives over there, can shorten that 

time and let them get on with it because the people of our country, 

while we are ready to make the sacrifices to help others achieve 

their freedom and stability—certainly South Korea has an enormous economic stability. It ranks in the top 10 nations of the world 

in terms of their gross national product, and they ought to be able 

to have a commensurate military establishment to support the 

growth and progress of that country. I hope you will accept my 

comments this morning as a challenge to work on reducing that 

date down from 2012. 

I thank the chair and the indulgence of the members as I have 

chatted a few minutes here. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Thank you, Senator Levin. 

I join you in welcoming General McKiernan, General Odierno, and General Sharp. 

The breadth and depth of experience possessed by these nominees—both in the 

Army and while serving in joint commands—is extraordinary. I thank each of them 

for their service and their commitment to continue serving in these key positions. 

General McKiernan, you bring a most impressive professional record to one of the 

most demanding military positions. 

Success in Afghanistan remains a critical national security requirement for not 

only the United States, but the international community. Today, there is no doubt 

that progress has been made in Afghanistan since 2001. 

U.S. efforts, together with the service of 25 North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) allies and 15 partner countries have assisted the Afghan people in securing 

their freedoms and rebuilding their nation. 

However, there is growing concern about the Taliban’s resurgence; the presence 

of cross-border sanctuaries in Pakistan; the commitment of our NATO allies to what 

is likely be a longer military presence in Afghanistan; and the capacity of the Afghan government to achieve self governance. However, in my opinion, the greatest 

concern is the escalating opium economy. You should be prepared to discuss the 

counternarcotics strategies in Afghanistan. 

August 2008 marks the fifth anniversary of NATO’s presence in Afghanistan. In 

the session of the NATO Heads of State and Government summit held today, the 

agenda item is Afghanistan. 

President Karzai, Secretary-General of the U.N., and other major international organizations working in Afghanistan, including the European Union and the World 

Bank will be present. The broad international participation demonstrates that the 

way ahead in Afghanistan requires a comprehensive approach in bringing together 

improvements in governance, reconstruction, development, and security. 

There is also unease about the security situation in Afghanistan, the size of the 

NATO military commitment in Afghanistan, and the performance of NATO member 

countries in International Security Assistance Force. This committee has often addressed the troubling issue of national caveats and commended Secretary Gates for 

his warning in February that ‘‘the alliance evolving into a two-tiered alliance, in 

which some are willing to fight and die to protect people’s security, and some are 

not.’’ 

General Jim Jones, the former NATO supreme allied commander, and co-chair—

with Ambassador Thomas Pickering—of the Afghanistan Study Group Report which 

was sponsored by the Center for the Study of the Presidency, went even further and 

said: ‘‘Make no mistake; NATO is not winning in Afghanistan.’’ You should be prepared to discuss the findings of the Afghanistan Study Group, among other studies. 

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to join Secretary Gates in this recent praise of 

Denmark. Denmark has more than 600 troops in southern Afghanistan, standing 

12

side by side with British in one of the most dangerous areas in Afghanistan. Secretary Gates said, ‘‘This is an ally who, in my opinion, is really punching above its 

weight, and I want to visit and basically thank them for that.’’ 

General Odierno, you have been referred to in at least one media account as the 

‘‘Patton of Counterinsurgency’’—the leader who took the theory and vision and put 

them into action. The war continues, but your record as the Commander of the 

Multi-National Corps-Iraq from May 2006 to February of this year brought welcome 

success in putting al Qaeda forces on the defensive, providing protection to the civilian population, engaging the Sunni population in Anbar province, and significantly 

lowering the rates of violence. 

Your personal and professional experiences make you perhaps the best qualified 

officer in the Army to join General Casey and Secretary Geren in carrying out the 

critically important tasks of recruiting, training, equipping, and organizing our 

great Army at a time of enormous stress on the force. General Cody, the current 

Vice Chief, testified before the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee 

2 days ago. He testified about a ‘‘resilient’’ Army, but one that is stressed to the 

maximum and lacking shock absorbency—that is—the capability to respond to 

emergent crises or additional demands. 

I brought with me the famous James Montgomery Flagg recruiting poster that 

was introduced in World War I and relied on again in World War II to urge young 

men and women to join the Army. I’d note that a similar poster that appeared at 

that time for the Navy and Marines stated ‘‘I need you.’’ I think we all have a duty 

to turn to those eligible to serve today in our magnificent All Volunteer Army, and 

their families, and convey this message in the strongest terms. We want them and 

we need them—we want them for service to country. 

General Sharp, you have served since August 2005 as Director of the Joint Staff 

and undoubtedly are eager to get back to the field. The joint mission in Korea has 

not waned in importance since I took my turn on Active Duty over 50 years ago. 

I am encouraged by the commitment to turn operational control of the Republic of 

Korea armed forces over to the South Korean military leaders in 2012, as testified 

to recently by General Bell, but I wish it would happen sooner. I wish you great 

success in your new assignment as Commander, U.S. Forces Korea.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Senator Warner. 

General McKiernan?

STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID D. MCKIERNAN, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE 

COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE 

FORCE, AFGHANISTAN

General MCKIERNAN. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, other 

distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 

I am truly honored to be here today. 

I would like to thank the Secretary of Defense and the President 

for nominating me for this important NATO command position. If 

confirmed by the United States Senate, I can pledge to you that 

every ounce of my leadership ability will go into what is certainly 

a continuing tough, challenging mission set in Afghanistan, to include, as Senator Warner rightfully points out, the counternarcotics 

challenges. 

I also would like to take this opportunity to thank the Senate 

Armed Services Committee for your steadfast and truly magnificent support to all our men and women in uniform these past several years. We could not be doing what we are doing globally without your support. 

With that, I will stand by for any questions from the committee 

this morning. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, General McKiernan. 

General Odierno? 

13

STATEMENT OF LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE VICE 

CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY 

General ODIERNO. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, and distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here with you this morning. 

As Commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq, I had the honor of 

speaking with many of you during a number of congressional visits 

to the Iraqi theater of operations, and I am so well aware of your 

dedicated support to our soldiers serving there, your faith in their 

outstanding abilities, and your understanding of the many sacrifices they and their families endure for the sake of their country, 

comrades, and loved ones. For all of this, I thank the members of 

the committee for your support and steadfast commitment of them. 

I am humbled and honored on my nomination to be the next 

Army Vice Chief of Staff. I serve with a tremendous sense of awe 

for the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, leaders, and families who 

have served alongside of me, and I am inspired by what they have 

accomplished. I am hopeful for what they will be able to accomplish 

in the years ahead. It is truly, without a doubt, the best army in 

the world. I consider myself blessed with the chance to continue 

serving in its ranks, and if confirmed, I will do so with the integrity, commitment, and drive that such a special position of trust 

and responsibility demands. 

Thank you so much for allowing me to be here today. With that, 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to answering your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, General Odierno. 

General Sharp? 

STATEMENT OF LTG WALTER L. SHARP, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/COMBINED FORCES 

COMMAND/UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA 

General SHARP. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, distinguished 

members of this committee, I also thank you for the opportunity to 

appear here today. 

I am deeply honored to be nominated by the President and the 

Secretary of Defense for the responsibility to serve as the next 

Commander, United Nations Command; Commander, Republic of 

Korea, United States Combined Forces Command; and Commander 

of U.S. Forces Korea. 

I would also like to thank this committee for your continued support to our men, women, and their families who selflessly serve our 

great Nation both at home and around the world. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I look forward to working closely 

with this committee and its members and with our strong partner 

in the Republic of Korea during the challenges that we face in the 

months and years ahead. 

Sir, I stand by for your questions. 

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, would you indulge me for a 

minute? 

Accompanying General Sharp today is Mrs. Abell, the wife of 

Charlie Abell, who was a former soldier and former presidential appointee to DOD, and most importantly, he was the Staff Director 

14

of the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee. I welcome 

you, Mrs. Abell. Please pass on the very best to your husband. We 

may have to recall him. 

Chairman LEVIN. Give him the good news, though, would you? 

[Laughter.] 

Let me ask you the standard questions first to each of our witnesses. You can respond together. 

First, have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

General MCKIERNAN. Yes, sir. 

General ODIERNO. Yes, sir. 

General SHARP. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken 

any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

General MCKIERNAN. No, sir. 

General ODIERNO. No, sir. 

General SHARP. No, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Will you ensure that your staff complies with 

deadlines established for requested communications, including 

questions for the record in hearings? 

General MCKIERNAN. Yes, sir. 

General ODIERNO. Yes, sir. 

General SHARP. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and 

briefers in response to congressional requests? 

General MCKIERNAN. Yes, sir. 

General ODIERNO. Yes, sir. 

General SHARP. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal 

for their testimony or briefings? 

General MCKIERNAN. Yes, sir. 

General ODIERNO. Yes, sir. 

General SHARP. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify, upon request, before this committee? 

General MCKIERNAN. Yes, sir. 

General ODIERNO. Yes, sir. 

General SHARP. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree to give your personal views when 

asked before this committee to do so even if those views differ from 

the administration in power? 

General MCKIERNAN. Yes, sir. 

General ODIERNO. Yes, sir. 

General SHARP. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree to provide documents, including 

copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner 

when requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult with 

the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

General MCKIERNAN. Yes, sir. 

General ODIERNO. Yes, sir. 

General SHARP. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you all. 

15

We will have a 10-minute round for our first round. 

Admiral Michael Mullen was quoted in the press yesterday as 

saying, ‘‘Having forces in Iraq at the level that they’re at doesn’t 

allow us to fill the need that we have in Afghanistan.’’ 

Let me ask both General Odierno and General McKiernan. Do 

you agree with Admiral Mullen? General Odierno? 

General ODIERNO. Sir, what I would say initially is we do understand that what the Army is able and the Marine Corps are able 

to provide now is about at the level we can sustain over time. In 

order to provide additional forces, there would be some give and 

take between priorities in other contingencies. I think we would 

have to consider that as we continue to provide forces, if an increase in forces is necessary. 

Chairman LEVIN. When you say there has to be some give and 

take, in other words, you are saying, in terms of the allocation of 

forces to Iraq and Afghanistan. Is that what you are referring to? 

General ODIERNO. Yes, sir, or other contingencies as well. 

Chairman LEVIN. What would the other contingencies be? 

General ODIERNO. For example, Korea. If we would decide to 

take risk there or some other place where we might have to have 

forces available in the future. But as of today, Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Chairman LEVIN. General McKiernan, do you agree with Admiral 

Mullen? 

General MCKIERNAN. Mr. Chairman, I do agree with Admiral 

Mullen, and the challenge is exacerbated by the current shortfalls 

in filling the combined joint statement of requirements by NATO. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, in terms of more troops going to Afghanistan, is that going to be difficult to pull off if the force levels in Iraq 

are maintained at the pre-surge level of about 140,000 troops, General McKiernan? 

General MCKIERNAN. Sir, I think it will continue to be a challenge for all the reasons that General Odierno just mentioned. 

Chairman LEVIN. What about trying to reduce the deployment 

tours from 15 months to 12 months? If all we are going to have is 

a 12-month dwell time for the Army, is that going to be difficult? 

Is that going to be possible if we are going to have more troops 

going to Afghanistan or if we keep our force level in Iraq at 

140,000, General McKiernan? 

General MCKIERNAN. Sir, the senior leadership I think unanimously agrees that 15-month deployments are too long, and they 

are not sustainable. Our goal is certainly to reduce the boots-onthe-ground time to 12 months and try to get eventually to a 1 to 

2 ratio, but with the requirements as they are today, that is extremely hard with the size of the military we have. 

Chairman LEVIN. Will that be extremely hard if we keep that 

troop level in Iraq at the pre-surge level of 140,000? 

General MCKIERNAN. I think it will be challenging, sir. I cannot 

answer whether we can get it down to 12 months. 

Chairman LEVIN. General McKiernan, the deployment of an additional 3,200 marines to Afghanistan was announced as a onetime deal for the next 7 months. If there are no further large troop 

reductions in Iraq, will there be U.S. forces available to replace 

those marines at the end of the current 7-month deployment? 

16

General MCKIERNAN. Sir, in terms of brigade combat teams or 

replacement for the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, not to my 

knowledge is there a force that can be missioned for that following 

the deployment of the marines. 

Chairman LEVIN. General Odierno, General Cody yesterday testified before our Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee 

that the ongoing deployments are inflicting ‘‘incredible stress on 

soldiers and families,’’ and in his words, ‘‘pose a significant risk to 

the All-Volunteer Army.’’ He said also that he has never seen our 

lack of strategic depth to be where it is today. 

Do you agree with General Cody? 

General ODIERNO. What I would say is I have had a chance to 

experience this in my most recent assignment, first as the MultiNational Corps-Iraq Commander and also as III Corps Commander 

as a force provider, that we are, in fact, out of balance. What I have 

seen as the Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq is that we receive forces that are, in fact, well trained, equipped, and at the 

proper levels, but as the III Corps Commander, I also see that the 

forces that are left behind do not have all the equipment they need. 

They do not have the people they need to help to respond to other 

contingencies. So there is a stress there on the force that is fairly 

consistent. 

Chairman LEVIN. Fairly consistent. What does that mean? You 

mean fairly heavy? 

General ODIERNO. Fairly heavy, yes, sir. 

I would also say that one of the hardest recommendations I had 

to make as the Multi-National Corps-Iraq Commander was the extension of the surge forces that I knew would lead to 15-month 

tours in Iraq as I made that recommendation up my chain of command. I realized that, in fact, 12 months is our goal and 12 months 

is what we need to try to get to in order to have a viable, sustainable Army over the long-term. We have to continually work to 

move towards that. There are a number of ways we can do that, 

by reducing the requirements and also to continue to grow the 

Army, that it gives us the additional forces in order to continue to 

meet the needs of our national security. 

Chairman LEVIN. General Odierno, when these recent events 

took place in Basra, I think you were already gone, but I think you 

have enough background and you were close enough to it to perhaps be able to answer this question. Do you know whether or not 

Prime Minister Maliki took the steps that he took in Basra after 

consultation with the U.S. Army? 

General ODIERNO. Mr. Chairman, I do not know for sure. I really 

only know about the reports that we both have probably read in 

the newspapers. I have not talked to any of the leaders there to 

know, in fact, if he did operate independently without consultation 

or not. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you think it would have been wise for him 

to consult with us prior to his venture into Basra, if in fact he did 

not? 

General ODIERNO. Yes, I think it is important, the partnership 

with us working these issues. First, it is a positive step that we 

want to try to deal against these nongovernmental groups, militias. 

That is a very important piece. But it is also important with the 

17

partnership that we have full consultation as we conduct operations within Iraq. 

Chairman LEVIN. That consultation take place sufficiently prior 

to the action on his part so that he can consider whatever advice 

we give him? 

General ODIERNO. Yes, it should. We should be part of that process. 

Chairman LEVIN. General Odierno, do you think it is useful to 

keep pressure on the Iraqi political leaders to reach political settlements on the outstanding key issues? 

General ODIERNO. I think it is important. As I have stated before, Mr. Chairman, we have security at a certain level now. In 

order to continue to improve the security in Iraq, it not only takes 

the use of continued military forces, but also improvement in economic, political, and basic services, and it is important that the 

Government of Iraq and its leaders step up and continue to work 

these very significant issues to the Iraqi people themselves. I believe by doing this, it would continue to reduce the passive support 

for any insurgent forces or militias that are left within Iraq. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you think it is useful for us to remind them 

of the importance of their doing that? 

General ODIERNO. I think it is always important to do that, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. General McKiernan, I want to discuss the drug 

issue in Afghanistan with you. Senator Warner has laid out the 

problem, and that problem is real and apparently growing. 

Part of the solution relates to going after the labs that produce 

these drugs. The small farmers are looking for small amounts of 

money that they get, which is more than they are able to get from 

other crops, and we obviously want to try to work with them to 

substitute crops. But the big money is made by the people who run 

these laboratories, the higher-ups, and we have not gone after the 

labs. There have been some rumors that some of these labs are off 

limits because of some kind of political connections with leaders in 

Kabul. 

I am wondering whether you are willing to look at that issue to 

report to us whether or not there is any reluctance, restraint, or 

restriction on our forces in terms of going after those labs where 

most of the problem resides and where most of the money is being 

produced? Would you make an independent assessment of that and 

give us your assessment as to whether there is any truth to the 

fact that there is some reluctance or restraint upon our forces, the 

Afghan forces or any other forces in terms of shutting down those 

labs? 

General MCKIERNAN. Mr. Chairman, I can assure you, if confirmed, I will certainly make that assessment and provide that information back to this committee. I share your concern and Senator 

Warner’s concern that this problem is a problem for the international community. It is a problem for Afghanistan. ISAF has a 

mandate to provide certain support to the Afghan Government to 

work the counternarcotics problem, and if we have actionable intelligence of opium labs, I certainly think that should be part of the 

ISAF mandate. I will make that assessment and come back to this 

committee. 

18

Chairman LEVIN. That is very important that you do that, and 

we are counting on you to do that. Thank you. 

Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to accommodate 

our colleague from Texas, as I will be here with you until the conclusion of the hearing. 

Chairman LEVIN. I am happy to do that. 

Senator Cornyn. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Warner, I appreciate your usual courtesy. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. Again, let me reiterate what we have all said, but we cannot say enough. Thank you 

for your service to our country and the people that serve under 

your command. We are in their debt. 

I wanted to ask two lines of questions. First, General McKiernan, 

perhaps as Commander of U.S. Army Forces in Europe, you would 

be able to comment on a story that appeared today in the New 

York Times where the President had secured the backing of NATO 

for a robust missile defense system. NATO leaders adopted a communique saying that ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to allied forces’ territory and populations. It will also recognize the substantial contribution to the protection of allies to be 

provided by the U.S.-led system, according to senior officials who 

spoke on condition of anonymity ahead of the statement’s release. 

First, do you agree that ballistic missile proliferation poses a 

threat to the United States, as well as our allies? 

General MCKIERNAN. Sir, I certainly agree with that statement. 

I have not worked personally with the theater missile defense question in Europe to any great degree. So I am not familiar with too 

many of the specifics about that. But the threat is certainly there. 

Senator CORNYN. I appreciate that very much. 

General Odierno, let me ask you. We talked briefly about this in 

my office when you were kind enough to drop by. Welcome back to 

the United States. 

General ODIERNO. Thank you, sir. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you for your service in the III Corps and 

Fort Hood, as well as Commander of Multi-National Forces in Iraq. 

I asked you in my office, when you were kind enough to come by 

about the Iraqi assault on Basra, how you viewed that. I mentioned 

to you that while there is some indication in the New York Times 

today that the Iraqis did not necessarily consult with their American allies, that it actually, to my perception, demonstrated the sort 

of acceptance of responsibility and an Iraqi initiative against these 

Iranian-backed militias that could be viewed as a positive development, while we recognize they were not able to handle this independently and required U.S. support, which is frankly not a surprise. 

Could you tell me whether you believe that this sort of initiative 

against Iranian-backed militias, euphemistically called ‘‘special 

groups,’’ is a positive or a negative? 

General ODIERNO. If I could just say as the conflict in Iraq continues to evolve, it changes over time. Although there is still terrorism and insurgency, it is much less than it was. The bigger 

threat is the communal struggle for power which in my view is 

19

being fueled by Iranian support to the special groups. One of the 

things that will have to be tackled is these militias that are 

equipped, funded, and trained by either Iran’s Quds Force or Iranian surrogates within Iraq. 

The Government of Iraq stepping up to take action against these 

groups in my mind is an important step of eliminating these nongovernmental security organizations that are trying to sustain control over the population. So I think for that, it is a very important 

step forward. Obviously, we would much rather be able to resolve 

these through reconciliation and peaceful ways instead of having to 

use force. In that way, I think it is a positive step forward. 

Senator CORNYN. Prime Minister Maliki called these militias 

criminals and gang leaders. Would you agree or disagree with his 

comments? 

General ODIERNO. I think there is a mixture. I think as we continue to analyze the threat, there are some that I believe are clearly Iranian surrogates that have a very specific purpose to destabilize the Government of Iraq because Iran thinks a weak Government of Iraq is in their best interest. Then there are criminals that 

are out there that, in fact, are thugs, have organized crime, and are 

flat-out criminals trying to extort money from the population. So it 

is a mixture of both. 

Senator CORNYN. I have just two more questions for you, General 

Odierno. 

First of all, let me just quote the words of President John F. Kennedy who once remarked that ‘‘the cost of freedom is always high, 

but Americans have always paid it. One path we shall never choose 

and that is a path of surrender or submission.’’ 

There are some who suggest that the cost of the war in Iraq is 

too high, and that we should spend the money that we are spending supporting the troops and on ongoing operations in Iraq on 

other things here domestically. But as a military leader, without 

commenting maybe on the specifics, I would like for you to comment on how you view the cost of protecting our freedom and that 

of our allies and whether you feel like we can put a cost/benefit 

analysis on that from a strictly financial point of view. 

General ODIERNO. Senator Cornyn, first of all, I want to make 

sure it is clear that I understand the costs involved, the cost monetarily, but more importantly to me, the costs in lives of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, as well as those who have been 

wounded and who will forever have a scar to bear because of this 

war and will never forget their sacrifices. 

But it is always difficult to put a price tag on what I believe to 

be the security of our Nation. I do believe that the Middle East is 

an extremely important place for us to ensure that we maintain the 

security of our country. I will leave it at that, sir. 

Senator CORNYN. My last question really has to do with that. I 

think there are some who have suggested that what we are doing 

in Iraq is irrelevant to our security here on the mainland of the 

United States. What is your opinion? 

General ODIERNO. I would say that Iraq is an important place, 

as well as Afghanistan, in the Middle East. The Middle East is a 

place that we all know there has been a lot of violence over the last 

several years. It has created violence around the entire world. I 

20

think it is important for us to establish what I believe to be a selfreliant government that is stable, that is committed to governance 

representing all its people, denied as a safe haven for terrorists, 

and integrated into the national community as an engine of security and economic development. I believe establishing a strategic 

partnership within the Middle East with these countries is extremely important for the security of the United States. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you very much, each of you, and good 

luck. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Cornyn. 

Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General McKiernan, when I look back on the history of the 

United States’ participation in terms of operating as a part of a coalition force, we certainly did it in France. We did it in World War 

II. We did it in Korea, as a matter of fact. 

NATO evolved out of that concept of coalition forces operating together. It took a long time before NATO realized that it had to expand its authority to what we term ‘‘out-of-area operations.’’ You 

know the history of that as well as I do. Europe had certainly a 

comparative period of stability that enabled NATO to take on these 

out-of-area operations. 

The first was the Balkans, and I believe on the whole that the 

record of NATO’s performance there was quite good. It continues 

to some extent. 

But this question in Afghanistan has not worked as we had all 

hoped. I am wondering if you would join me in saying that if we 

do not succeed—I do not call it winning and victory, but just succeed with the basic goals of enabling the Afghan government to establish a democratic form of government. They have it in framework now and they are trying to work the pieces together. 

As a matter of fact, in my last trip over there, they just finished 

putting the legislature together. I remember President Karzai 

grumbling about the insubordinate members of their legislature. 

Do you recall that, Senator? 

Chairman LEVIN. I do and it reminded me of home. 

Senator WARNER. Yes, yes, it did. 

But I fear that if NATO does not enable this country to succeed 

in its goals, that the commitment of the nations of the world to continue NATO will be truly tested. Or to put it in a blunt way, this 

could end up with the demise of NATO as we have known it these 

many years, a half century. 

Where do you rank the seriousness of attaining the goals in Afghanistan in relation to the continuation of NATO? 

General MCKIERNAN. First of all, I share your sentiments. I 

think that the success of the NATO mission of ISAF in Afghanistan 

is directly linked really to the relevancy of NATO as a global security means in the 21st century. As you know, sir, I served in the 

NATO headquarters in the early days in the Balkans, and I think 

NATO was successful and continues to be successful in the Balkans, specifically Kosovo, today. 

I think there is certainly the capacity and the capability for 

NATO to succeed in Afghanistan. However, there is a question of 

21

will in terms of getting all the right contributions so that we build 

the right capacity to execute the mission. 

Senator WARNER. I would go so far as to say that that will, which 

you properly and carefully pointed out, is not among the uniformed 

persons of NATO. It, frankly, resides in the several governments 

that train, equip, and send those troops to NATO. I am not about 

to open up all the chapters of European history, but frankly, their 

legislatures, the heads of state and government of many of the European nations simply are not able. They may well have the will, 

the heads of those governments, but the legislatures, for whatever 

reason, are not giving those heads of State and governments the 

type of support they need. 

I think, from time to time, some of us have to sound the alarm 

because while NATO is the most extraordinary and the most successful military alliance in the history of mankind in my judgment, 

there could well be a reexamination of the very significant participation, about 25 percent, of this Nation in NATO. 

I can remember—and I am sure the chairman can remember, if 

you will listen to what I am saying here, when we were young Senators, I can recall going to the floor to defend NATO. There were 

some of our most distinguished colleagues questioning the continuation of NATO at a great cost to the American people and the 

major portions of our military. I will not name the names, but it 

is in the record if anybody wants to look at it. They said NATO has 

finished its mission. Europe is secure and it is time that we redirected those expenditures and those forces to other requirements of 

the United States. 

So maybe out of this hearing can come some little message to 

NATO. They are not there forever. They are there only so long as 

they can perform and achieve the goals that we have assigned to 

them. I say ‘‘we.’’ I mean collectively the 25 member nations. 

Unless you have a comment, I will move to another question. Do 

you basically endorse what I had to say? 

General MCKIERNAN. I do, Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you. 

General Odierno, another great institution we have is the AllVolunteer Force, and some of us are getting somewhat concerned 

about the absolute necessity of the Army to begin to somewhat 

lower the requirements of those recruits coming in to meet the 

needs as established by quotas. I for one—and I would state it 

right here—would rather have a smaller Army composed of the 

right people who can continue to preserve the concept of the AllVolunteer Force than to begin to bring in people that fall considerably below the standards that we have been able to maintain for 

this Army and the other military forces, the Navy, the Air Force, 

and the Marine Corps, these many years. 

First, your own view about the All-Volunteer Force. 

General ODIERNO. Senator Warner, first, I think it is critical that 

we continue to maintain an All-Volunteer Force. I think it has 

proven over time the quality of the force that we have been able 

to put together and the dedication of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, 

and marines that are a part of it and how they have been able to 

perform over, specifically here recently, the last 7 years. I think it 

is important that we want to maintain that for the long term, sir. 

22

Senator WARNER. I can just speak for myself. You will recall in 

World War II, the draft was adopted by Congress by one vote. 

Today, I do not think Congress would consider, under the current 

circumstances and the commitments we have abroad now, any concept of returning to compulsive military training, be it a draft or 

some other concoction that we might come up with. That is not 

going to be the case. 

That puts a special responsibility on your shoulders. You are a 

trustee of that Army. You are not just the Vice Chief. The longterm view of what you are doing today is going to shape that Army 

of tomorrow and the future. I, frankly, urge you to make certain 

that whatever requirements you have to readjust, let us say, in 

terms of recruiting will not result in any risk to the All-Volunteer 

Force or bring the perception and quality of the Army down. 

After all, the concept of military training, military operations is 

very simple. It is dependent on the person that you are working 

with. You call it an ‘‘Army of One,’’ which is quite a good slogan, 

but it is really in that foxhole. One sleeps while the other is on 

duty. Aboard ship, some sleep while the others are on duty. You 

are dependent on your fellow soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines 

to do their duties at such times as you may have to get the needed 

rest that you need to carry out. If you begin to put into that foxhole 

people who cannot establish that mutual trust and bond, I think 

you will see this thing getting worse. It is a problem. 

How would you judge the morale of the Army today? It is really 

interesting, the quotes of Eisenhower and George Marshall. I love 

history. Marshall said morale is a state of mind. It is steadfastness 

and courage and hope. It is confidence and zeal and loyalty. Eisenhower once said in war morale is everything. After 6 years of now 

conflict, what is your judgment as to the morale of the United 

States Army? 

General ODIERNO. I would just comment, Senator Warner, that 

over the last 15, 16, 17 months, as I have observed up close and 

personal the performance of all our servicemembers of all the Services in Iraq, their dedication, their steadfast commitment, their loyalty to their mission, and their dedication to complete their mission 

has never wavered. We can talk a lot about how you show morale, 

but how you show it is doing your job every single day without hesitation, the fact that you want to follow your leaders, the fact that 

you will do anything for your teammates, the person to your right, 

the person to your left, under very difficult conditions. We witness 

that every single day. 

I used to tell people when I was the corps commander over there 

that when I was feeling bad or I thought I was down, the first 

thing I would do is go visit our soldiers or our marines. 

Senator WARNER. That would build you back up. 

General ODIERNO. It built me back up when I had a chance to 

hang out with them because of their dedication and loyalty. 

Senator WARNER. Let me close out here on my time. We have 

talked this morning about the necessity to go from the 15-month 

to the 12-month tour. To what extent can you say now your level 

of confidence that we can achieve that transition from 15 to 12 by 

early this summer? 

23

General ODIERNO. Senator, I am going to leave that to others to 

make that determination, but I would just say that——

Senator WARNER. Well, you will be a part of that decisionmaking. 

General ODIERNO. I will. 

I would just say our goal is to get down to 12-month tours as 

soon as we possibly can. We fully realize that 12-month tours is the 

maximum length that we should have our tours, and so our goal 

is to push that as fast as we possibly can. 

Senator WARNER. Good. 

General McKiernan, back to the drug problem in Afghanistan. 

We have had programs here in American agriculture where we put 

land into retirement and pay farmers a certain amount of money 

for keeping it in retirement. 

Now, it seems to me that we could establish sort of a delta between what that farmer is getting for an opium crop and what he 

would get for another crop which is less cash, and we would just 

go in there and subsidize the difference between those two crops. 

If you look at the dollars involved, it is nickels and dimes compared 

to the overall value of that crop as it begins to move up and eventually is dispersed, a lot of it, into Europe. 

I cannot understand why Europe does not see this Afghanistan 

operation as central to their security not only from the standpoint 

of a breeding ground for terrorism, but also the drugs that are infiltrating into Europe. 

Start with some very simple program. Stop the poppies. Try turnips, whatever, potatoes. Whatever you get for that crop of potatoes, if it is less than the poppy crop, here is the cash. If we can 

choke it off right there in the field, I think we could make some 

progress. 

I do not feel that we should do the spraying because I have done 

some agriculture myself. That could result in working to the detriment of the water supply for human consumption if you put that 

much spray around in some of those provinces. 

I just think we ought to come up with some innovative ideas, and 

I am ensured by our discussions together and your testimony this 

morning you are going to devote your time to it. But as one old 

farmer who lost a lot of money farming, I can tell that is one way 

to get at it. Retire that land or pay them the delta between the 

crops. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner. 

Senator Thune. 

Senator WARNER. There is a man down there that understands 

agriculture, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator THUNE. Not tobacco farming, however, Senator. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to associate myself with 

the remarks of the Senator from Virginia. 

Senator WARNER. We had a lot of peanuts, and you have eaten 

those. 

Senator THUNE. That is exactly right. 

But I do want to associate myself with the comments from the 

Senator from Virginia with regard to NATO. NATO is a club that 

everybody wants to be in but nobody wants to do the work. The 

numbers keep getting larger. We keep adding member nations to 

24

that organization, but its effectiveness I think is very much in 

question if we are not able to step up to some of the challenges we 

face around the world, particularly in places like Afghanistan. 

General McKiernan, General Odierno, and General Sharp, thank 

you. Each of you has had incredibly impressive and distinguished 

careers, and we thank you for your service to the country. Each of 

you has spent a long time overseas in support of your country, and 

we thank you for your and your families’ sacrifice. We appreciate 

everything you do for our country’s freedoms. 

General McKiernan, you stated in your response to the committee’s advance policy questions that some of the challenges that you 

will face as Commander of ISAF are under-resourcing and constrained forces. You also go on to state that fully resourcing military requirements and removing remaining caveats will be a major 

focus, and that we should look closely at options for deploying additional brigade combat teams to Afghanistan. 

How many more brigade combat teams do you anticipate you will 

need to continue the mission? 

General MCKIERNAN. Sir, if confirmed, I would need to be on the 

ground to make an assessment for specific numbers, but again, it 

is a fact that the requirements stated by current commanders there 

in Afghanistan—that those requirements have not been filled 

through the NATO force generation process. So specific numbers of 

brigades or other military capabilities—I cannot give you the exact 

numbers today. It would be part of an assessment I would need to 

make. But we certainly need to build more capacity not just in the 

military line of operation, but also in the developmental and governance lines of operation. There is more capacity that has to be 

built there in Afghanistan. 

Senator THUNE. What else do you anticipate requesting that has 

not already been identified, if confirmed in the position? 

General MCKIERNAN. Senator, I am not sure if there is anything 

besides what has already been identified, but what has already 

been identified, as you correctly state, is more than just ground 

combat capability, but it is also more aviation, more intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance capability, additional operational 

mentoring and liaison teams, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, et 

cetera. So those requirements that are already validated and are 

waiting to be filled I think is the starting point. 

Senator THUNE. You also stated that there have been recent reductions in the number and severity of caveats with regard to some 

of our NATO allies in Afghanistan. Could you describe in more detail what those reductions are? 

General MCKIERNAN. I really do not think there necessarily have 

been reductions in caveats. I think what I meant to say in that 

statement, if I did not, is that we need to continue to work to remove caveats because what they end up ultimately doing is degrading NATO’s advantages in terms of mobility, fire power, 

sustainment, and intelligence. We have to, I think, work to continue to remove those caveats. 

Senator THUNE. Are some of the caveats worse than others? 

General MCKIERNAN. I think so. Certainly military contributions 

that are precluded really from conducting combat operations make 

25

it very difficult for those same forces to be effective in a counterinsurgency environment. 

Senator THUNE. General Odierno, General Casey has argued that 

we are in an era of persistent conflict. Assuming that he is correct, 

do you see any utility to the concept of standing provincial reconstruction teams, in other words, teams that are ready to deploy on 

a moment’s notice? 

General ODIERNO. One of the recommendations I made coming 

out of Iraq was that we should take a look at how we might do that 

so they can be deployable, no notice, as we continue to look at potential contingencies in the future because I believe with any contingency we might run into, it would be important for us to immediately be able to have an interagency team on the ground to help 

us work the socioeconomic, political issues that ultimately are 

linked to operations. 

Senator THUNE. What about standing operational mentor teams 

or standing embedded training teams? Is that something you foresee? 

General ODIERNO. The one thing I would say is what I want is 

the Army has centered around brigade combat teams, and I believe 

our brigade combat teams we want to be full spectrum in nature 

where they can accomplish a variety of missions. It is important for 

us to do that to get the efficiency out of our Army. So in order to 

get the efficiency out of our Army, what we want is units that can 

do a number of things. I think through task organization and other 

kinds of things, they can conduct those type of operations as well 

as combat operations. We want that flexibility within our force so 

we get the most out of our leaders and our soldiers. 

Senator THUNE. General Sharp, one of the questions that was 

posed to you by the committee in its advance policy questions regarded the missile defense systems and capabilities that you believe are needed to meet the operational needs of U.S. Forces Korea 

and Combined Forces Command. That is, I think, on page 6 of your 

advance policy questions responses. You responded that among 

other things, continued development of the airborne laser is needed 

to provide the layered, systematic missile defense capability required to protect critical United States facilities in the Republic of 

Korea. 

Could you expand a little bit further on why you believe development of the airborne laser is needed to meet the operational needs 

of U.S. Forces Korea? 

General SHARP. Sir, I think as you look across the entire missile 

defense spectrum, you have to have a layered defense that starts 

from space and works all the way down to Aegis and other groundbased systems to intercept the missiles. I believe the airborne laser 

is a critical part of that ballistic missile enterprise to be able to 

allow for that effective defense. 

Senator THUNE. Looking at the readiness challenge, what do you 

see as the major challenge to readiness? Are the challenges with 

personnel, equipment, or training, and given events in Iraq and Afghanistan, are we resourcing our forces in Korea correctly? 

General SHARP. Sir, the forces that are in Korea today, the U.S. 

forces that are there today, are properly trained and equipped to 

be able to accomplish the task and the mission that we have workVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
26

ing with our Republic of Korea allies to defend the peninsula. Likewise, the Republic of Korea forces are also very well trained and 

very well equipped. They are an outstanding military, and they are 

also prepared to defend the Republic of Korea. 

The forces that we would deploy from the United States, if we 

had to go do that conflict today, are not as well trained, as General 

Casey has said, because they are training on the missions that they 

have to do in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are counter-insurgency 

experts of the world. But we are confident that we would be able 

to deploy those forces and we would be able to win in the Republic 

of Korea with our Republic of Korea allies. 

One other point I would like to make. Because of the amount of 

Reserve Forces that we have deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, Reserve and National Guard, I personally believe right now they are 

the best trained that they have ever been trained because we have 

used them in combat environments. They would be also a key component of any conflict in Korea. 

Senator THUNE. Do you have any major concerns with transferring wartime OPCON to the Republic of Korea? 

General SHARP. General Bell has worked very closely with our allies, and I believe that he has an excellent plan of exercises. He has 

an excellent plan working with the Republic of Korea to make sure 

that they have the capabilities that they need from surveillance to 

command and control to the ability to be able to, at a high level, 

command the fight. I am confident that by 2012, which is the currently agreed upon time to transfer, we will be ready and the Koreans will be ready to take control of that fight. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you all very much and thanks again for 

your service. We look forward to a speedy confirmation process, and 

godspeed in your new endeavors. Thank you for what you do. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Thune. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I came at the beginning of this and then left and went to the 

floor and talked for 30 minutes, having just come back 3 days ago 

from Iraq and from Africa, giving my assessment of it. This was 

my 18th trip into that theater. So I do not think I am going to ask 

you what you have already been asked before because my staff has 

kind of gone over some of the interests that I had. 

I would like to start off with General McKiernan—and I appreciate your coming by so we had a chance to visit before this meeting. A lot of reports claim that the insurgency is growing in Afghanistan and that the security situation is deteriorating. However, in December, General McNeil said—and I was there at that 

time in December—‘‘My view of the security situation is that it is 

not deteriorating like other people say. It is showing exactly what 

it is. There is insurgency here. There is a strong international and 

indigenous force going after it, and you are going to have contacts.’’ 

Do you generally agree with that statement? 

General MCKIERNAN. I do generally agree with that, sir. I think 

there are certainly no signs that the insurgency is ready to collapse, and I believe that the environment there in Afghanistan 

today reflects an interlinkage between the insurgency, terrorism, 

27

corruption at various levels, and criminal activity. I think all of 

those have to be factored into the approach that ISAF takes in the 

mission. 

Senator INHOFE. When you say the criminal activity, it is my observation that one of the differences between Iraq and Afghanistan 

is that there is just no central authority there. Afghanistan is kind 

of a convoluted grouping of cities and local administrations, and 

there is a lot of corruption there and there is no central place 

where you can really attack this. Is that accurate? 

General MCKIERNAN. I would agree that the history of Afghanistan is really a history of local autonomy. So a strong central government is not exactly the historical trend in Afghanistan. 

Senator INHOFE. Does that not create a problem, though? You do 

not have a strong Federal Government where you can go to one 

place as opposed to trying to work around the edges. 

General MCKIERNAN. I think it is part of the challenge. The challenge is not only building capacity and coherence between governance development and security. But it is developing institutions 

that were not there previously. 

Senator INHOFE. A few months ago I was privileged to go with 

General Jones. It was his last trip there. That is essentially the assessment that he had of the situation. 

When I was over there 3 days ago, I met with your replacement 

at the Multi-National Corps, General Austin, and we talked about 

the recent violence down in Basra. I know you have already talked 

about this before I came in. But we were down at Buka, which is 

right next to Basra, and we had talked to an awful lot of people, 

even a lot of the troops on the ground. The response that Prime 

Minister Maliki had down there and the fact that he took a level 

of control I thought was good, but some people are criticizing the 

fact that he was the one who went down and did it and he did not 

do the job properly. 

What is your assessment of what he did on that crackdown in 

Basra? 

General ODIERNO. Sir, I would just say again, as I said earlier, 

the communal struggle for power is growing more and more within 

Iraq. We still have some terrorism and insurgency. But it is about 

Shia-on-Shia violence. It is about those nongovernmental entities 

that are trying to exert their influence. Some of them are Iraniansupported and backed by funding, weapons, and equipment from 

Iran. It is important that the government understands that they 

have to take action against these groups in order for the governmental entities, the police force, the army, and others, to be the 

ones who in fact provide security. So from that aspect, I think it 

is important that they understand this problem and they understand that action has to be taken. 

Having not been there, I am not sure what the level of coordination was that went on, but I do believe it is a partnership and we 

should do all of these things as partners. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. It appeared that that is the first time they 

really did take the initiative. At least, it seemed that way to me. 

Just for a minute—I was talking about this on the floor a minute 

ago—the Iranian threat that is over there. Back when there were 

a lot of resolutions about leaving, it got a lot of attention there. 

28

About that time, Ahmadinejad made the statement that when we 

leave—at that time, he was convinced that we would leave and 

that would create a vacuum and he would be able to fill that vacuum. I agree that he would like to do it. 

But what would the Iraqi people’s response be if they were to 

look at the Iranians coming in and filling that vacuum? 

General ODIERNO. My assessment is that I believe the Iraqi people, the large, large, large majority, are very nationalistic, and they 

want Iraqis to solve Iraqi problems. They do not want interference 

from Iran and want them filling any vacuums. So I believe, for the 

most part, the Iraqis want to be involved in the solutions. 

I would just say that I get some concern because you could make 

the argument that, in fact, through some of the Iranian support 

that goes on in Iraq, they are creating the instability. Then they 

are saying they want to come in and fill the vacuum to correct the 

instability. So I think we have to make sure we understand that 

very carefully, and I think we have to watch that extremely carefully. 

Senator INHOFE. It was not too many years ago that they were 

launching missiles back and forth on each other, killing hundreds 

of thousands of people. 

I heard Senator Thune talking to you, General Sharp, a little bit 

about some of the things that were going on over there in terms 

of Korea and Korea’s capability. I have always been concerned 

about their capability. I always remember, because I was on this 

committee, and I remember in August 1998 when we were trying 

to get an assessment. We had come out with our assessment at 

that time—that was 1998—as to how long would it be until the 

North Koreans would have a multistage rocket that could reach the 

United States, and they came back. I have the documentation. It 

was around 12 to 15 years. That was on August 24, 1998. On August 31, 7 days later, they fired one. 

I say that because how comfortable are you and our intelligence 

as to exactly what capability they have and what they are going 

to do with it. 

General SHARP. Sir, we are never comfortable that we have 

enough intelligence. They do continue to surprise us. That is why 

we and the Koreans need robust capability in order to be able to 

defend that peninsula. You have seen—and I think we have fairly 

good evidence—that we do believe there is enough plutonium that 

they could have and probably have created some nuclear weapons 

that are in North Korea right now. 

In a closed session, we could go into more details of exactly what 

we do know and where we think we have holes in that intelligence. 

But there are holes, and as I said, we need to make sure that we, 

the United States and the Republic of Korea, are prepared to win 

that conflict, which I do believe we are today, but it requires the 

continued commitment of all of us and the Koreans. 

Senator INHOFE. The other day in a subcommittee hearing, I 

commented that I did not think they were making the progress 

they should be making with the Czech Republic and Poland. I 

found out later that it appears that they are making great progress 

right now, and I am glad I was wrong. 

29

Finally, General Sharp, several of the programs that I have really pushed hard are the 1206, 1207, 1208, 1210 train and equip programs and the International Military Education and Training 

(IMET) programs. In fact, it was our attitude up till the last reauthorization bill that when we invite people to come over—and I do 

not think there is anything that solidifies for the future better relations for their officers, whatever the country is, Africa or anyplace 

else, to be training with ours. I think the IMET program has been 

very successful. 

But we had the attitude that we are doing them a favor when 

we do that, and that is because we had this restriction that you 

cannot come over unless they sign an Article 98. I put language in 

last time with the argument that they are doing us a favor more 

than we are doing them a favor because if they are not over here 

training with us, there is always the Chinese and others who 

would like to get their hands on them and participate in that kind 

of training activity. So we have taken away that requirement. 

Lastly, we want to increase that program. 

What is your feeling about that program and the success of it? 

General SHARP. Sir, thanks to your leadership, I agree completely with the way you are going. I think it is critical for us and 

really for the world. One of the critical things that came out of the 

findings of the last Quadrennial Defense Review was that we really 

need to build partnership capacity around the world. We are no 

longer having programs just to give money away to buy friends. We 

need to have programs so that militaries around the world are prepared, capable, and willing to be able to go and help in all types 

of conflicts from peacekeeping operations to what we are doing in 

Iraq and Afghanistan today. The programs that you mentioned are 

critical to that. 

IMET is critical specifically because of its ability to be able to 

fund military officers and noncommissioned officers to be able to 

come to the United States to go to our schools so that we can learn 

from each other and to be able to better interoperate in present 

and future conflicts. 

Sir, I thank you for your leadership. 

Senator INHOFE. Those relationships endure. 

Do you agree generally with what General Sharp is saying? 

General MCKIERNAN. I do, sir, absolutely. 

Senator INHOFE. The last thing I would say—my time has expired—would be on the Commanders Emergency Relief Program 

(CERP) which we have been wanting to expand both in the funding 

level as well as the geographic level, to be able to get other places. 

Would each one of you agree that that is a good idea? 

General SHARP. Absolutely. 

General ODIERNO. If I could, sir. I would just say it becomes even 

more important as we look at the reduction of our forces, that in 

fact the use of our money in order to move forward, as I talked earlier about continued economic revitalization of basic services becomes more important. So the money that the commanders have to 

do that becomes an important tool. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

30

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I get to walk in and 

ask questions. That is great. 

To all of you, thank you for your service. 

General Odierno, congratulations on what I think is going to be 

seen in history as a very eventful tour of duty regarding the last 

year. 

The one thing that I have on my mind is this tension we have 

with the pressure on the Army and the outcome in Iraq. From a 

morale point of view, I know that the force has been strained, but 

generally speaking, how does the force feel, from your point of view 

as a commander, about the operations and the reasons we are 

there? 

General ODIERNO. What I would say first is, again, I judge morale on how soldiers, marines, and others perform on the ground, 

and every day that they are there, they are dedicated to doing their 

job. They are dedicated to protecting each other. I would say that 

over the last 12 months for sure, that they really have seen some 

viable progress going on inside of Iraq, and they understand that, 

in fact, that progress has been made. They feel that they can continue to make that progress. 

Senator GRAHAM. Regarding Iran, as I understand Iraq in the 

last year, Anbar Province has substantially changed for the better. 

Is that correct? 

General ODIERNO. Yes, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. The awakening, as it is being called, the Sunni 

Awakening—I think the event that started it was a sheik came to 

a colonel and said, I have had it with these al Qaeda guys. I am 

ready to help you. Is that generally what happened? 

General ODIERNO. Much communication. That is correct, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. The colonel, pretty much on his own initiative, 

said, okay, we are going to put a tank in front of your house. 

General ODIERNO. That is pretty close, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. The point is that you had al Qaeda overplaying 

their hand, driving the population toward us, and the reaction of 

the colonel was to provide that individual better security, to reinforce his willingness to fight al Qaeda. Is that correct? 

General ODIERNO. It is, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. That general model was used in Anbar that we 

would increase military capacity and try to peel people away from 

al Qaeda. From that, we have gotten now what is called the Sons 

of Iraq. Is that correct? 

General ODIERNO. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Tell me how the Sons of Iraq has changed 

things in Anbar? 

General ODIERNO. First, I would say, again, people are willing to 

come forward and looking for security, rejecting al Qaeda. The 

change that occurred was the rejection of al Qaeda throughout 

Iraq, starting in Anbar, the elimination of the passive support that 

al Qaeda had for a long time. What I mean by passive support is 

not that you supported them, but you did not do anything to help 

us to get after them. That changed. Like you said, they got tired 

of how al Qaeda was treating them and rejected their ideologies 

and what they stood for. 

31

So what happened was once they were able to get security provided to them and they came to the coalition forces to help, once 

we continued to provide security for them, they then continued to 

come forward more and more and they wanted to be part of the 

process of going after al Qaeda in Anbar Province. 

Senator GRAHAM. Would you say there is a direct link between 

our willingness to reinforce and provide security to Anbar Province 

and the population’s boldness to say no to al Qaeda? 

General ODIERNO. As we became more aggressive in what I call 

liberating the major cities in Anbar, finishing with Ramadi in 

March/April 2007, they started to come more and more forward. 

One of the key components, as we asked for additional forces, was 

the addition of two Marine battalions that we would put in Anbar 

so we could control the Euphrates River Valley and all of the population centers along the Euphrates River Valley in order to exploit 

the success that had begun by this action you talked about. 

Senator GRAHAM. Let us talk about Baghdad. The strategy in 

Baghdad, as I understand it, was to get troops out into joint security stations, out behind the walls into neighborhoods. Is that correct? 

General ODIERNO. It is, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Can you tell us about a joint security station? 

Why such a thing exists, and how that has affected the battle in 

Baghdad? 

General ODIERNO. Not only was it additional forces but it was 

our change in strategy to get our forces among the population to 

create confidence between the population and security forces. 

The joint security stations were established so we could have a 

place where coalition forces, Iraqi Army, and Iraqi police would operate together, would operate among the population. So they felt 

more secure so they could come forward with information, feel 

more secure about opening shops, feel more secure about their 

daily lives, and then also build confidence between Iraqis and their 

own security forces, confidence with their own police and their own 

army over time. 

It also developed better relationships between coalition forces 

and the Iraqi population because on a daily basis, they would interact with each other, and it made a very significant difference as we 

continued to move forward in Baghdad. 

Senator GRAHAM. Now, there is a statement being made that sectarian violence in the last year of Sunni and Shia violence has dramatically been reduced. Is that an accurate statement? 

General ODIERNO. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. What do you account for that? 

General ODIERNO. It is a number of things. I think, again, it is 

first providing security to each other. It is a fact that people realize 

that in the beginning of 2007, we would not tolerate sectarian violence from either side, either Shia or Sunni. Most Iraqis are not 

sectarian. There were a few conducting many of the operations. 

We went after the leaders who in fact were, in my mind, encouraging sectarian violence for their own gains. Al Qaeda was trying 

to accelerate sectarian violence because they saw that as a way to 

continue to destabilize Iraq as it continued to move forward. So we 

went after al Qaeda. We had some Shia extremists that were supVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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ported by Iranians and others who were conducting sectarian violence. We went after them. 

The population realized this and they started to understand this. 

They realized that we were going to eliminate this sectarian violence. Since then, it has dropped dramatically. 

Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, I do not mean to take much 

time. How long do we have? 5 minutes? 

Chairman LEVIN. 10 minutes. 

Senator GRAHAM. 10 minutes, okay. Thank you. 

Economic activity in Iraq. I flew over Baghdad with General 

Petraeus in February, just a little over a month ago. You said you 

saw 180 soccer games? I stopped counting, but it was a lot. We all 

know Baghdad. There is no place in Iraq that is completely normal 

in terms of what we would like it to be. But it was astonishing to 

me, in flying over Baghdad, the amount of activity. 

Have you seen an economic improvement as a result of better security? 

General ODIERNO. Obviously, we have seen the markets grow. In 

fact, most of the time, it is about 10-fold. We saw places where, 

frankly, there were no shops open to where now there are 300 to 

400, whether it be the Doura market in southern Baghdad, Shorja 

market in eastern Baghdad, and Shula in western Baghdad. So a 

significant increase. What you had was an increase in goods being 

sold, but also, obviously, a precipitate increase in retail goods that 

would be developed. 

Senator GRAHAM. As you know, I have been very interested in 

the prisoner issue, and I want to compliment you and General 

Stone for coming up with—I think it will be seen in history as one 

of the most novel approaches to dealing with the prison population, 

having a counterinsurgency program in the prison where you educate prisoners. We are providing education to every prisoner at 

Camp Buka and Camp Crawford. Exposure to moderate influences 

in terms of the Koran, and basically trying to give people a second 

chance on life for those that we feel like we can let go. I just want 

to recognize your work there and compliment you. 

On the political front, the amnesty law, the deBaathification law, 

the provincial elections, and a $48 billion budget. In your opinion, 

what does that mean, if anything, for the future of Iraq? What 

would account for these breakthroughs? 

General ODIERNO. First, again, I believe the fact that we improved the security, it enabled the political factions within the 

Iraqi Government now to start focusing on what I believe to be significantly important political issues. One is, obviously, the distribution of the wealth to all of the provinces through the budget, 

through the allocation of reconstruction funds. Second was the 

passing of the provincial election law. In addition, the accountability and justice law, which was basically the old deBaathification law, then the amnesty law. 

Now what we have to continue to focus on is the implementation 

of these laws, which is the next step. We have the laws passed. It 

is now most important that we go through the implementation of 

these. 

Senator GRAHAM. Very briefly, as I understand the law about a 

limited amnesty, the Shias and the Kurds are saying to at least 

33

some Sunnis, we are going to create a process where you were 

fighting us last year, but we are going to let you go home and start 

over. 

General ODIERNO. That is right. Not only Sunnis, but also Shia 

and other people. That is correct. 

Senator GRAHAM. In the south, the Iranian influence in Iraq is 

constructive or not? 

General ODIERNO. For the most part, I would say that it is clear 

to me that they continue to fund. They continue to train. They continue to provide weapons to extremist groups in order, in my mind, 

to destabilize and weaken the Government of Iraq. 

Senator GRAHAM. Finally, if Iran were engaging in constructive 

behavior as a neighbor, what impact would it have on Iraq, if any? 

General ODIERNO. It could have significant impact. They are 

neighbors. They can help each other. It is important for stability 

of the region. I see it as a critical piece as we move forward, that 

they become much more constructive in their help with Iraq. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham. 

Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to 

ask this additional question. 

General McKiernan, as we look back over the history of our operations in Afghanistan—I say ‘‘our,’’ that is the combined operation 

of forces that are aligned with us—we see, I think, an ever-increasing dependence upon support, a strong partnership with Pakistan. 

The relationship between Karzai and Musharraf was not the best 

at times. It is a little early, I expect, for us to try and assess how 

the new government is going to work in this area. 

But I think this record should reflect what you know very well. 

Our supply lines are dependent in large measure on the cooperation of the Pakistani Government and people. We use its ports, its 

airfields to logistically care for our forces and, I presume, the greater proportion of the NATO forces. 

Now, you are going to have to be a part-time ambassador. Let 

me ask that question. Are you prepared to become a part-time ambassador? Should we call the Foreign Relations Committee up and 

just have you have a second hearing on this? 

General MCKIERNAN. Sir, I am not advocating a second hearing 

on anything. [Laughter.] 

But there is a quarterly Tripartite Commission which as you 

know, the Commander of ISAF and the Chief of Defense in Afghanistan and the Chief of Staff of the Army in Pakistan get together 

and talk about mutual security interests along the border. I for 

one—and I know General McNeil agrees that there can be no successful, by any metrics, outcome in Afghanistan without dealing 

with the sanctuaries right across the border in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the northwest frontier province. 

Senator WARNER. We currently have in the United States a very 

competent U.S. Ambassador, Ambassador William Wood, a personal acquaintance, as I understand, of our Staff Director, Mike 

34

Kostiw. We were talking about him yesterday. Have you worked 

with him thus far? 

General MCKIERNAN. Sir, I have not, but I could tell you, if confirmed, I would hope to have an absolutely linked-at-the-hip relationship with the United States Ambassador. 

Senator WARNER. I appreciate that. I think one of the great high 

water marks has been General Petraeus and our U.S. Ambassador 

in Iraq, and I think it is essential that you have a comparable relationship with Ambassador Wood. 

Thank you very much and good luck to each of you. I think the 

record should also show—how much time have you spent in your 

area of responsibility (AOR) before your new AOR, Afghanistan? 

General MCKIERNAN. Sir, I have probably made about half a 

dozen trips over there to see U.S. forces that we have provided 

from Europe that are operating in Afghanistan. 

Senator WARNER. General Odierno? 

General ODIERNO. I have spent a little over 30 months in Iraq 

over the last several years both serving there, then also several 

months visiting around the region. 

Senator WARNER. When you were in your capacity as a Military 

Advisor to the Secretary of State, you spent a lot of time there? 

General ODIERNO. I have spent a lot of time in the Middle East, 

in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, all of those countries, sir. 

Senator WARNER. General Sharp, you had a tour in Korea? 

General SHARP. Yes, sir, almost 21⁄2 years working for a former 

boss. General John H. Tilleli, Jr., was the commander in chief 

there at that time, and then also 17–18 months up in the 2nd Infantry Division as an assistant division commander. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you. We are fortunate, Mr. Chairman, 

of that background of experience. 

I thank the chair. 

Chairman LEVIN. We are, indeed. Thank you, Senator Warner. 

General Odierno, I think what you testified to, if I understand 

it, is that there is a number of reasons for the reduction in violence 

in terms of sectarian violence that we saw, one of them being the 

increase in the number of U.S. forces, another one being the change 

in the strategy for those forces, another one being the ability to exploit the success of the event that took place when the Sunni 

Awakening took place. Is that fair? 

General ODIERNO. That is fair, sure. 

Chairman LEVIN. So there is a number of reasons for the reduction in that sectarian violence? 

General ODIERNO. That is fair. 

Chairman LEVIN. At the same time, you told us today that the 

biggest threat now in many parts of Iraq is the increase in the communal struggle for power. Would you describe that struggle and 

why that is the biggest threat? 

General ODIERNO. I would. Mr. Chairman, as we have been able 

to reduce the threat of al Qaeda, although they are still capable of 

conducting attacks in Iraq—I do not want to ever downplay that 

at all. They are still capable, but their capacity has been reduced. 

The insurgency in itself, as it was in 2004–2005, is reduced. 

What we are seeing now is a struggle for power as the country 

moves forward, a struggle between Shia communities, some strugVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
35

gle between Shia and Sunni, struggle between the Kurds and the 

Sunnis. It is about controlling parts of the country or having influence in parts of the country for the future as the country continues 

to move forward. 

Our goal in all of this is for that to happen peacefully through 

communication, through diplomatic efforts internal to the country. 

However, the history of the Middle East and Iraq in some cases 

causes them sometimes to want to use violence, and we have to be 

able to continue to work that issue. I think as we continue to make 

progress in Iraq, again the threat will evolve. This is what I believe 

to be how it is evolving today as a communal struggle. 

The only other thing I would caveat, Mr. Chairman, is you have 

the external influences from Iran and also from other forces such 

as al Qaeda and other forces still trying to influence using Syria 

and other places. 

Chairman LEVIN. For that violence to be resolved, is it still true 

that there needs to be a political settlement? 

General ODIERNO. It does. A big part of it has to do with the political piece of it. 

Chairman LEVIN. There has been some progress, a couple steps 

forward and then some steps back, on the political side, but is it 

still true that for there to be an election on October 1, that there 

has to be a provincial elections law passed? Is that still true? 

General ODIERNO. It is, Mr. Chairman. They really have to pass 

the specifics of how they will conduct the election, and it is about 

implementation, as I have talked about. 

Chairman LEVIN. As well as implementation of the laws that 

have been passed. Is it still true that there has not been a provincial elections law passed? I think you misspoke. I think what has 

passed—and correct me if I am wrong. There is a provincial powers 

law. 

General ODIERNO. I misspoke. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. That has passed. That is the one which requires implementation? 

General ODIERNO. That is right. 

Chairman LEVIN. That specified that there would be an election 

on October 1, but without a provincial elections law, that election 

will not take place. 

General ODIERNO. That is correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. So we still have to put some pressure on the 

Iraqis to pass the critical provincial elections law for those elections 

of October 1 to occur. 

How important is it that there be elections on October 1? 

General ODIERNO. I think, first, the provincial elections are one 

of the most important things that must take place. As most of us 

remember, there are Sunnis that did not participate, and in fact, 

there were many Shia who did not participate in the last set of 

elections that currently elected the provincial leaders. So the provincial elections happening as soon as possible in my mind will 

make people in the provinces believe they are represented by those 

who truly are part of their province and represent the people. 

Therefore, it is extremely important it happens as soon as possible. 

Chairman LEVIN. But the date specified in the other law is October 1. Is that correct? 

36

General ODIERNO. That is correct, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. It is important that that date be met? 

General ODIERNO. I think it is very important we try to meet 

that date. 

Chairman LEVIN. As I gather, there is a real possibility that that 

date will not be met. Would you say that that is a real possibility? 

General ODIERNO. I cannot comment, Mr. Chairman. I do not 

know that. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. 

There are also constitutional changes which are supposed to have 

been considered by now. Is that correct? 

General ODIERNO. They are supposed to continually review the 

constitution. 

Chairman LEVIN. Has that commission met and made recommendations yet? 

General ODIERNO. It is unclear. I can get back to you for the 

record on that. 

[The information referred to follows:]

Mr. Chairman, at the time of my testimony, the Iraqi Constitutional Review Committee had not yet met.

Chairman LEVIN. All right. It is my understanding they have 

not, but you can confirm that for the record. 

General McKiernan, you have spoken a lot about Afghanistan. I 

wonder if you can summarize where we are on it. Would you say 

that the overall level of security among the Afghan people is moving forward, backward, or sideways? 

General MCKIERNAN. Sir, I think it depends on the geography. 

I think where we have most of our U.S. forces in Regional Command East, I think it is moving forward. I think in Regional Command South, specifically in the Helmand/Kandahar area, I think it 

is in question. I think there is continued need, as I have said this 

morning, for building capacity, coherence, and dealing with the 

problem along the Pakistani-Afghan border. 

Chairman LEVIN. Would you say that the insurgency has yet 

been contained in Afghanistan? 

General MCKIERNAN. Sir, until I have the opportunity to make 

an assessment on the ground, I do not know if I could say that it 

has been contained. 

Chairman LEVIN. General, you and I spoke in my office about 

this question of decoupling the Iraqi and the Afghanistan issue because of the problem which exists in some countries in Europe 

where popular support has been lost for the Afghan mission based 

on opposition to the war in Iraq and that there might be value in 

decoupling rhetorically, perhaps budget-wise, but at least rhetorically, and in terms of diplomacy, for both reasons, we could perhaps get greater support in Europe, a greater focus on Afghanistan, 

if we made that decoupling. Would you comment on that? 

I believe you also in your answer to prehearing questions stated 

that the public opposition in a number of European countries has 

contributed to the loss of support for engagement in Afghanistan. 

Would you comment on that? 

General MCKIERNAN. Sir, I think from my experience in the last 

21⁄2 years in Europe, in terms of decoupling Iraq and Afghanistan 

37

in the minds of our European allies, I think that is certainly something we ought to try to do in our strategic communications. 

I also think that we have to continue to encourage our European 

allies to understand that the threat in Afghanistan and across the 

border to the south is their threat as well. I do see a need to decouple in the international community. Our discussions also were 

whether we decouple in some of our processes back here in the 

United States. My statement at that time—and I continue to believe it—is in terms of application of resources, we have to balance, 

at least in the DOD, globally. So it is very hard to decouple Iraq 

from Afghanistan. 

Chairman LEVIN. In that sense. 

General ODIERNO. In that sense. 

Chairman LEVIN. General McKiernan, the Atlantic Council has 

found that less than 10 cents of every dollar of aid for Afghanistan 

goes directly to the Afghan people. Assistant Secretary of State 

Richard A. Boucher at this committee’s hearing in February endorsed a program that is intended to empower rural Afghan communities to manage their own development projects. It is called the 

National Solidarity Program. This program is within the Afghanistan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development and provides small block grants directly to locally elected community development councils. They are responsible for identifying, planning, 

and managing their own development projects. Funding for the National Solidarity Program comes from the World Bank and the 

International Development Association, bilateral donors through 

the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund. 

According to a press release last December, the National Solidarity Program has provided $400 million in payments which were 

disbursed to 16,000 local community development councils in Afghanistan, and those payments have financed more than 30,000 

community development subprojects, which have improved access 

to infrastructure, markets, and services. Those councils are being 

established in all 34 provinces and the vast majority of the districts 

throughout Afghanistan. 

A University of York study in Great Britain said that the National Solidarity Program has the potential to be a beacon of good 

practice among community-driven development programs. 

So a couple questions. Are you familiar with the National Solidarity Program? In your judgment, is it a good program? 

General MCKIERNAN. Sir, I have done a lot of reading about it, 

and the people that I have talked to that work it in Afghanistan—

I would conclude that it has huge potential as a bottom-up approach for development. Coupled with programs like CERP and 

what provincial reconstruction teams do, I think in a bottom-up 

sense, it has huge potential. 

Chairman LEVIN. Will you, when you get to Afghanistan, take a 

personal look at them? If you continue to be satisfied with their 

value, can you find ways to encourage the support for those programs? 

General MCKIERNAN. Yes, sir, I will. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

General Sharp, Senator Warner commented on this 2012 date, 

and I happen to agree with him. As I mentioned to you in the ofVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
38

fice, I think that the Korean Army is capable to take command earlier and that the fears of symbolism when that happens are not 

justified by any actions which we have taken and that it is essential that you continue to see if that cannot be pushed forward. I 

know that date has been set, but that is a long way off. There is 

no reason for 4 more years to pass in my judgment—and I concur 

with Senator Warner on this—before that OPCON is transferred to 

the South Korean forces. 

I do not need you, unless you would like to, to respond, but I just 

simply want to add my voice to Senator Warner on that point and 

give you an opportunity, if you would like to comment on it. 

General SHARP. Sir, if confirmed, I do pledge to work with the 

Republic of Korea, Chairman General Kim Tae-Young, to continually push to make sure that they have the capabilities, the training necessary in order to be able to take OPCON change and to 

continually assess that between now and 2012 to make that goal. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, General. 

The Six Party Talks. Would you view them, from what you know 

of them, as constructive? 

General SHARP. Sir, they are constructive. They would be a lot 

more constructive if the North Koreans lived up to what they promised and gave a complete and open declaration, as they were supposed to do and they pledged to do by the end of last calendar year, 

which they have yet to do. But they are constructive. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you see value in military-to-military contacts with North Korea? 

General SHARP. Sir, I do. I see that military-to-military contacts 

make sure that each side understands where each other stands so 

that there is less of a chance of missteps because of 

miscommunications, and I encourage that. The North Koreans cut 

off general officer-level talks several years ago, and I would encourage that to start back up again. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you believe the right number of ground 

forces are postured—and I am talking here to U.S. ground forces—

to meet any warfighting requirements on the Korean peninsula? 

General SHARP. Sir, I believe what we currently have on the peninsula—that General Bell has worked very hard, not just numbers, but more importantly the capabilities that we have there, in 

order to be able to do the requirements in order to be able to, with 

our Republic of Korea allies, win the war, win any conflict. We do 

have the right number and the right capabilities there at this time. 

Chairman LEVIN. You would not support further reductions? 

General SHARP. Sir, again, if confirmed, I will continually assess 

that, but from what I have seen so far working with the Army, the 

capabilities that are there now are the ones that we need for the 

future. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. We thank all of you and, again, 

your families for your service, for their service to this country, and 

we look forward to a speedy confirmation process. 

We will stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to GEN David D. McKiernan, 

USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

39

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)? 

Answer. The Commander International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) is 

responsible for executing NATO’s strategy in Afghanistan as delineated in Operations Plan (OPLAN) 10302. My responsibility is to ensure that ISAF accomplishes 

its objectives and meets the reporting requirements of Supreme Allied Commander 

Europe (SACEUR) (as Commander of NATO Operations). 

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties? 

Answer. As a U.S. general officer with multiple deployment and multinational experiences, I have been closely involved with or in command of NATO and coalition 

military operations. I feel thoroughly qualified and prepared to lead this complex 

effort in Afghanistan. 

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, ISAF? 

Answer. Since nomination by the Secretary of Defense for this assignment, I have 

been able to take advantage of several opportunities to engage with key leaders and 

organizations that contribute to the campaign in Afghanistan. I will continue to do 

everything possible to prepare for this assignment in the 2 months to follow. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, ISAF, to the following: 

U.S. Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. As a U.S. Army general officer, I would be required to ensure that the 

U.S. Secretary of Defense is advised and informed on the progress of my operation 

in ISAF and any issues that need to be resolved from a U.S. perspective. While I 

would be a NATO Commander who obviously has a NATO chain of command thru 

Joint Force Commander (JFC) Brunssum and then Supreme Headquarters Allied 

Powers, Europe (SHAPE), I also would be prepared to keep U.S. Secretary of Defense familiar with appropriate operational issues. 

Question. NATO Secretary General. 

Answer. The relationship between the Commander, ISAF and the NATO Secretary General is an indirect one. As the senior international statesmen for the Alliance, he is responsible for promoting and directing the process of consultation and 

decisionmaking within the Alliance. 

Question. NATO North Atlantic Council. 

Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between the NATO North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the ISAF Commander. The NAC is the principal decisionmaking body within NATO. It is comprised of high-level national representatives 

(Ambassadors, Defense Ministers, Foreign Ministers, and Heads of State and Government) from each member country that discuss policy or operational questions requiring collective decisions. The NAC provides guidance to SACEUR for all NATO 

military operations and SACEUR subsequently passes operational military direction 

to subordinate commands. 

Question. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. The relationship between the Commander, ISAF and the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff is an indirect one. He is one of 26 NATO Chiefs of Defense 

(CHODs), who combine to form the NATO Military Committee, which serves as the 

senior military authority in NATO. The CHODs in the Military Committee are responsible for recommending to NATO’s political authorities those measures considered necessary for the common defense of the NATO area and for the implementation of decisions regarding NATO’s operations and missions. 

Question. NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. 

Answer. The relationship between the Commander, ISAF and NATO’s Supreme 

Allied Commander, Europe is a chain of command one. SACEUR is one of NATO’s 

two strategic commanders and is the head of Allied Command Operations. He is responsible to NATO’s Military Committee, the highest military authority in NATO, 

for the command, planning and conduct of all NATO military operations. SACEUR 

also identifies forces required for the mission and requests those forces from NATO 

countries, as authorized by the NAC and as directed by NATO’s Military Committee. As COMISAF, I would report directly to JFC Brunssum (Land Component 

40

Commander under SACEUR for ISAF), who subsequently reports directly to 

SACEUR. 

Question. NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation. 

Answer. Both NATO’s Strategic Commanders, SACEUR and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), carry out roles and missions assigned to them by 

the NAC or in some circumstances by NATO’s Defense Planning Committee. 

SACEUR and SACT work together to ensure the transformation of NATO’s military 

capabilities and necessary interoperability. As an operational commander in NATO, 

I will coordinate with SACT to ensure we are leveraging the capability of his staff 

and command to maximize the effectiveness of our training efforts and NATO operational capabilities in theater. 

Question. NATO Military Committee. 

Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between the NATO Military 

Committee and the ISAF Commander. The Military Committee coordinates military 

advice to the NAC on policy and strategy. As an operational commander in NATO 

I will ensure SHAPE has the best military advice possible. 

Question. Commander, U.S. Central Command. 

Answer. The Commander of United States Central Command exercises authority 

over U.S. Forces assigned to Operation Enduring Freedom, including forces assigned 

to Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC–A). As the ISAF operates within the U.S. Central Commander area of responsibility, it is essential that 

both commanders closely coordinate as necessary to accomplish assigned missions. 

Question. Commander, Combined Joint Task Force 82, Afghanistan 

Answer. Operational control of forces assigned to ISAF is exercised through the 

Regional Commanders. The U.S. is the designated lead for Regional Command East, 

and as such, COMISAF exercises control over U.S. forces assigned to RC East via 

Combined Joint Task Force-82. The 101st Airborne Division is currently 

transitioning with the 82nd Airborne Division and is expected to complete transfer 

of Authority (TOA) by 10 Apr 08. 

Question. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan. 

Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between CSTC–A commander 

and COMISAF. It is a coordinating relationship with CSTC–A which is a force provider to ISAF operations. The coordination of our efforts is absolutely critical to mutual success. CSTC–A is a force provider in the role of developing Afghan National 

Security Force capability. Our coordinating relationship will remain focused on ensuring that well trained and equipped Afghan security forces are produced, sustained and provided to the Afghan people. 

Question. United Nations Special Representative in Afghanistan. 

Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between the U.N. Special 

Representation of the Secretary General (SRSG) and Commander, ISAF; however, 

productive coordination is essential. The ISAF Commander must ensure that ISAF 

operations are creating necessary security and working in conjunction with international organizations toward necessary development and reconstruction. My relationship with the U.N. SRSG will focus on developing and implementing comprehensive regional and national strategies to benefit the Afghan government and its people. 

Question. U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan. 

Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between the U.S. Ambassador and Commander, ISAF but the requirement for close coordination and synchronization of activities is critical. The ISAF Commander and U.S. Ambassador cooperate on the development and implementation of regional and national strategy 

in Afghanistan and I will work to ensure the effectiveness of that relationship. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges and problems you would 

confront if confirmed as the next Commander, ISAF? 

Answer. Under-resourcing and constrained forces confront the Commander today 

and I anticipate facing the same challenges in my initial months as COMISAF. Coherency among the many international and interagency actors is also a primary concern that is being addressed most notably with the recent nomination of the Senior 

Representative to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Ambassador Kai 

Eide. Additionally, the security situation in Afghanistan is directly linked to security conditions in Pakistan. 

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges 

and problems? 

Answer. Fully resourcing military requirements and removing remaining caveats 

that constrain effectiveness will be a major focus. It is critical for ISAF to maximize 

41

its contribution to Afghanistan’s ability to provide and maintain a secure environment with the forces and resources provided, despite any known shortfalls. As for 

coherency, we must address the need for unity of effort through organizational 

structure, coordinated planning, responsive resourcing, useful measures of success 

and transparency among the many national and international actors. I will also 

strive to improve mutual Afghan-Pakistan security challenges through such means 

as the Tripartite Commission. 

SECURITY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

Question. Recently-released independent reports have found that NATO is not 

achieving ISAF goals in Afghanistan and that the Taliban-led anti-government insurgency has grown over the last 2 years. 

What is your assessment of the security situation in Afghanistan and the nature, 

size, and scope of the anti-government insurgency? 

Answer. The security situation in Afghanistan is very complex, and reflects 

blurred linkages between criminal, corruption and insurgency based activities. 

While it is certainly true that violence, particularly suicide attacks, is up in comparison to the past several years, the raw statistics may not tell the entire story. 

Raw total measures of violence can increase when a greater portion of that violence 

is initiated by ISAF forces. The insurgency has suffered significant casualties in the 

past year, including numerous mid- and high-level Taliban leaders. The Taliban 

have been repeatedly defeated at the tactical level since operations in Afghanistan 

began, and are no closer to their strategic goal of recapturing Kandahar than they 

were 2 years ago. The current assessment of ISAF from the past year’s activities 

is that aggressive ISAF actions in the spring of 2007 significantly degraded insurgent tempo and preempted operations. That will be repeated in 2008. Some analysts 

even assess that the Taliban adoption of suicide tactics is less of an indicator of success than an indicator of desperation and an opportunity for us to further alienate 

them from the people of Afghanistan. All said though, the insurgency is not on the 

verge of collapse, but we are not in danger of losing. Progress is being made, albeit 

at a pace that is not as great as we would like. The Afghan National Security Forces 

continue to improve capabilities and grow capacity, from having no national forces 

in 2001 to over 124,000 uniformed members today, and our allies continue to renew 

or increase their commitments to the mission. 

Question. What changes, if any, do you believe are needed in ISAF operations to 

respond to the evolving insurgency threat? 

Answer. Despite all the outstanding work that has already been achieved in Afghanistan, there is still room for improvement. Counter-Insurgency (COIN) doctrine 

tells us that one of the key elements of a successful COIN campaign is establishing 

a strong national security infrastructure and connecting the population to its government. A strong national force is critical to holding ground and denial of insurgent access to the population. The true long-term solution to the insurgency in Afghanistan is an Afghan one and it includes a strong national security force. Accordingly, one of our top priorities must be increasing and improving the Afghan National Security Force by focusing significant resources and effort on them. Creating 

a national army and police force is not a quick or easy process. The Afghan National 

Army continues to make huge gains in capability and is a respected by the Afghan 

population. Progress in development of the Afghan National Police has not been as 

successful. There is significant momentum, but it will continue to require our highest priority. Police initiatives such as Focused District Development and plans to 

field over 2,000 additional military personnel in a training role show promise. 

Another cornerstone of a comprehensive COIN strategy is the necessity to protect 

the population. To this end, we should look closely at options for deploying additional brigade combat teams to Afghanistan, with a particular focus on the turbulent southern part of the country. The focus should be on traditional COIN operations, safeguarding key populations centers, securing roads and infrastructure, 

pursuing insurgents in their traditional sanctuaries and defeating them. 

Finally, we must continue to focus on refining the strategy to ensure it is comprehensive, fully coordinated and understood by all the allied partners. ISAF, International Community and, most importantly, Afghan success will rely on development and good governance as well as security. 

NATO ISAF CAPABILITIES

Question. Do you believe that the current level of ISAF troops and equipment in 

Afghanistan is sufficient to carry out the mission? If not, what are the current 

shortfalls in troops and/or equipment required for the ISAF mission? 

42

Answer. ISAF certainly needs what was already stated as the CJSOR requirements and the forces need to have critical caveats removed. The underresourced 

condition of ISAF affects its ability to control battle-space, maintain enduring effects 

and accelerate Afghan National Security Force development. Additionally, the ability to support the Government of Afghanistan in other than purely military lines 

of operation is limited. Among the specific shortfalls identified by the current ISAF 

commander are the unfilled requirement for three maneuver battalions, strategic 

Reserves, fixed and rotary wing aviation, Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams 

(OMLTs) and Embedded Training Teams (ETTs), Afghan Security Force trainers, 

Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance assets and Provincial Reconstruction 

Team assets. 

Question. Do you believe our NATO allies should do more to eliminate the shortfalls in resources for the ISAF mission? 

Answer. Yes, but the ability to do more is limited by the willingness of the populations of some countries. We need to better make the case in these nations that 

this mission is important to their own strategic interests and the right thing to do 

for the people of Afghanistan. 

Question. What is your assessment of the military capabilities of the NATO member states participating in ISAF, and of NATO ISAF as a whole? In what specific 

areas is more improvement needed? In what areas has there been the most 

progress? 

Answer. Capabilities vary widely by nation. I cannot yet give a complete personal 

observation or assessment as to either ISAF’s current capabilities or its effectiveness 

until I have been on the ground for a while. However, I have seen that ISAF forces 

have conducted themselves very well in the most contested portions of the south and 

east. I am extremely impressed by ISAF performance and fully respect the sacrifices 

made and burdens borne by all throughout Afghanistan. As Commander of U.S. 

Army Europe, I have assisted the training and preparation of many of the forces 

that make up ISAF and have seen great commitment and progress in the understanding of Counterinsurgency Operations and the importance of Afghan National 

Security Force development. Let me be clear, however, in stating that these training 

and readiness efforts must continue and strengthen in the future. 

NATIONAL CAVEATS

Question. To what extent have national caveats limited the ISAF Commander’s 

ability to deploy effectively the forces under his command in Afghanistan? 

Answer. I believe that COMISAF is definitely hampered by caveats. NATO forces 

possess superior mobility, sustainability and firepower. Caveats tend to negate some 

of those advantages and cause a level of command friction that makes planning and 

execution of flexible operations either very difficult or prone to enemy exploitation. 

Again, I can better assess the operational effects of caveats once I am on the ground. 

Question. What do you believe should be done to encourage our NATO allies to 

remove national caveats? 

Answer. At the most fundamental level, the argument has to be made and accepted by the leadership and citizenry of each member nation that ISAF and Afghanistan are important; that the sacrifices required to defeat extremists, build a better 

life for the Afghans and safeguard our own security are worth it. Also, and very fundamental to this issue, national caveats usually increase the risk to ISAF 

servicemembers and to mission success. 

NATO COHESION

Question.Secretary Gates has expressed concern that NATO could become a ‘‘twotiered alliance’’ composed of some countries who are willing to fight and others who 

are not. A recent independent report warns that if NATO is unable to produce the 

forces required to fight in the southern region of Afghanistan, NATO’s credibility 

and cohesion will be harmed. 

Do you believe that NATO’s credibility and cohesion are at stake in the conduct 

of the ISAF mission? 

Answer. NATO’s credibility and cohesion in the 21st century could certainly be 

affected. 

Question. How confident are you that NATO will be able to sustain its commitment to ISAF given the challenging security situation in Afghanistan? 

Answer. I am optimistic, despite the challenges. Several heads of state have confirmed commitment to NATO, ISAF and Afghanistan. The military leaders I talk 

to in Europe recognize the importance of the campaign. There have been recent reductions in the number and severity of caveats, certain new troop commitments are 

likely to be made and the results of the NATO summit in Bucharest could signal 

43

increased support. Effective strategic communications that inform our respective 

populations and political leadership on the stakes and value of the campaign in Afghanistan will also help. Credible success will also add to popular support. 

DECOUPLING IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

Question. Secretary Gates reportedly indicated that among some European 

publics, opposition to the war in Iraq has contributed to a loss of support for the 

conflict in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Study Group recommended the administration ‘‘de-couple’’ Afghanistan and Iraq, in terms of funding and diplomacy, to enable 

more coherence and focus on Afghanistan. 

Do you believe that opposition to the war in Iraq has led to a loss of support 

among some European publics for the effort in Afghanistan? 

Answer. Yes, I believe that to be true in a number of European countries. 

Question. Would you support de-coupling Afghanistan and Iraq to improve the 

focus on Afghanistan? 

Answer. Yes, internationally that would be helpful. 

I believe that our efforts in Afghanistan would not stand to gain by ‘‘decoupling’’ 

it from Iraq in the U.S. defense budget process. Requirements for funding Operation 

Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan are developed and approved independent 

of those funding requirements for OEF, and the Department has consistently received the levels of funding it has requested for the mission in Afghanistan. 

I also believe that our force capabilities and the process to provide trained and 

ready joint forces to both Operation Iraqi Freedom and OEF (and other requirements) ‘‘couple’’ our commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

COUNTERNARCOTICS STRATEGY

Question. A recent report from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 

finds that Afghanistan provides over 90 percent of the world’s illicit opium and that 

poppy cultivation levels for the coming spring are expected to remain at or near last 

year’s levels. 

Should ISAF have a drug interdiction mission in Afghanistan, including capturing 

drug lords and dismantling drug laboratories? 

Answer. No, I believe the responsibility should remain with Afghan and international law enforcement organizations. However, supporting Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) counternarcotics programs is a validated 

ISAF task. ISAF should not conduct direct military action against narcotics producers, except for self defense or force protection reasons. I support General 

McNeil’s recent commitment to support the GIRoA’s counter-narcotics efforts within 

the means and capabilities of ISAF, specifically by helping to coordinate and synchronize the efforts of the Poppy Eradication Force, enabling support to Afghan Government and international law enforcement interdiction operations and employing 

a holistic provincial engagement approach in the context of counterinsurgency operations. (mirroring the U.S. efforts in Nangahar as a model for success). 

TRAINING MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN

Question. Current plans call for training and equipping the Afghan National Army 

to a level of 80,000 and building the Afghan National Police to a level of 82,000 in 

the next few years. A recent independent report by the Afghanistan Study Group 

recommended that NATO could take over the mission of training the Afghan National Army, currently led by the United States, once NATO members have committed enough resources for this purpose. 

Do you believe that NATO should do more to assist in building the capacity of 

the Afghan Security Forces? Should NATO take over the training mission for the 

Afghan National Army? 

Answer. NATO is contributing to the training mission through the contribution 

of Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams and personnel assigned to the CSTC–

A staff, but more could be done. I would not be opposed to NATO taking over the 

training mission in the future and suspect that the U.S. would need to pledge continued resourcing of the program in order to gain NATO consensus and support for 

addition of this task. The key principle is unity of effort and there is a clear advantage to greater consolidation of the related missions of the current ISAF and CSTC–

A. 

Question. Should NATO allies play a greater role in providing these embedded 

training teams? If so, what should be done to encourage NATO allies to provide 

more of these teams? 

Answer. The U.S. Secretary of Defense and NATO civilian and military leadership 

have recently been very clear about desiring increased Allied contributions to the 

44

development of the Afghan National Security Forces in the form of Operational 

Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs). OMLTs must, however, be totally trained and 

capable when they assume their mission. Until those requirements are sourced, I 

think NATO’s primary focus should be on partnering forces with the ANA units in 

the field and working with these units in that way to improve their capabilities. 

Question. What is your assessment of the Afghan National Police? What more can 

NATO do to improve the effectiveness of the police? 

Answer. Progress is being made in the development of the Afghan National Police, 

but police development is more problematic than military reform at this point. Current initiatives in rank and pay reform are promising as are the already mentioned 

approaches to Focused District Development. NATO countries could certainly assist 

by contributing more law enforcement expertise and training/sustainment resources. 

Ultimately, the Afghan National Police effect will only be as good as their credibility 

with the Afghan population. 

RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS AND PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

Question. What is your role as Commander, ISAF, in reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan? 

Answer. The ISAF commander’s most important contribution to reconstruction is 

security. Besides personal engagement and coordination with Afghan and international agencies whose primary mission is reconstruction, the ISAF commander cochairs, along with the Minister of Interior, the ambassador—minister-level Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Executive Steering Committee. PRT support for elements of security sector reform, reconstruction and development are a major focus 

for ISAF. PRTs report to the ISAF Commander through the Regional Commands. 

Question. What is your assessment of the performance of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan? 

Answer. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan are an essential part of 

our development efforts in Afghanistan, and the primary means by which the ISAF 

acts to improve the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan to govern itself and 

develop essential quality of life services at the subnational level. From what I have 

seen, I think they have been exceptionally effective overall. 

Question. What improvements, if any, do you believe need to be made in the operations or coordination of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan? 

Answer. Each PRT is established and run by a Lead Nation, often with the assistance of one or more Partner Nations. So coherency will continue to be a challenge. 

The PRTs have only been under the command of COMISAF since the completion 

of NATO’s four-stage geographic expansion in October 2006. Since that time, NATO 

has identified and initiated actions to maintain a positive momentum of change for 

PRTs in Afghanistan. Better integration between the PRTs and the ISAF maneuver 

unit commanders in the Province, and more importantly the Regional Commands, 

could produce the same coherence and success of the PRTs that is currently experienced by those in Regional Command East. Funding mechanisms should also be reviewed. Instead of National Capitols financing the development, governance and security sector reform efforts of only ‘‘their PRTs,’’ the funds for PRTs, or a portion 

thereof, could be pooled at the regional level so the Regional Commander’s could allocate the funds in support of better-coordinated, regional counterinsurgency goals 

and objectives. 

LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAM

Question. A key component of the Afghan Government’s development strategy is 

to strengthen local governance capacity. One program that contributes to enhancing 

development and empowering governance at the local level is the National Solidarity Program (NSP). This program, within the Afghanistan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, provides block grants directly to locally-elected Community Development Councils, which are responsible for identifying, planning and 

managing their own development projects. Funding for the NSP comes from the 

World Bank/International Development Association, bilateral donors, and through 

the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. According to its website, the NSP has 

provided $400 million in payments to 16,000 Community Development Councils, 

which have financed more than 30,600 subprojects to improve access to infrastructure, markets, and services. 

What is your understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the NSP in Afghanistan? 

Answer. My understanding of the NSP is that it reflects the right intent from the 

bottom-up perspective to develop Afghan capacity. An important feature of the program is that it is Afghan-led. The rural development projects including irrigation, 

45

transportation, education, water supply and sanitation are all very important and 

consistent with ISAF objectives at the local level. Anything that contributes to Afghan government effectiveness, credibility and governance is positive. The NSP 

demonstrates clear advantages of the Afghan government in contrast to the destructive activity of the insurgency. 

Question. Would you support expanding the NSP as a means of building local governance and strengthening development? 

Answer. I see potential to an expansion of the program at this point so long as 

it retains the current principles, is nested in the overall strategy to develop Afghan 

capacity and does not become a program of inefficiency or corruption. 

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

Question. Recent United Nations reports have found that there were over 1,500 

civilian casualties in Afghanistan in 2007 and that almost half of the non-combatant 

casualties recorded by the United National Assistance Mission in Afghanistan were 

attributed to combat operations by Afghan national and international security 

forces. 

What measures have been taken to reduce the levels of civilian casualties resulting from combat operations by Afghan national and ISAF security forces? 

Answer. Avoiding civilian casualties is a priority within the Alliance, because of 

the moral and legal imperatives, but also because civilian casualties are counter to 

the principles of a successful counter-insurgency campaign. 

Question. What more needs to be done to address the level of civilian casualties 

in Afghanistan? 

Answer. The U.S. and all Allies clearly consider minimizing civilian casualties an 

imperative. Any civilian casualties are a cause for concern, particularly in a COIN 

campaign where one of our preeminent tasks is to protect the population and engender their support for the Government. NATO needs to continue to take measures, 

in concert with the Afghan Government and Afghan Security Forces, to prevent any 

unnecessary casualties. Continued adherence to the law of armed conflict and strict 

application of proper procedures for attack aviation are also critical. We must continuously adapt operating procedures in accordance with changing conditions and 

enemy tactics to prevent unnecessary casualties. When tragic casualties do occur, 

we must conduct deliberate reviews and learn from them. Unfortunately, our foes 

do not share our moral values and have made it a general practice to occupy positions adjacent to or inside civilian structures, in an attempt to shield themselves 

from our forces and cause more civilian casualties. This makes the task more difficult, but no less important. 

SAFE HAVENS IN PAKISTAN

Question. The Intelligence Community assesses that Pakistan’s Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs) along the border with Afghanistan provide a safe 

haven for al Qaeda and other extremists supporting the Taliban-led insurgency in 

Afghanistan. 

What can be done to prevent cross-border incursions by al Qaeda and the Taliban 

from Pakistan into Afghanistan? 

Answer. Preventing cross-border incursions from Pakistan into Afghanistan requires close cooperation between Afghan, Pakistan and ISAF security forces so that 

we can interdict enemy elements as a team. Another imperative is improvement of 

Pakistan military and paramilitary force capability. U.S. support to Pakistan’s border area strategy including training and equipping Pakistan’s Frontier Corps will 

help. Economic assistance to the people in the FATA and a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign on the Pakistan side would also help. 

Question. What role, if any, should ISAF forces play in countering this threat? 

Answer. ISAF should play a significant role in the tri-partite program. ISAF could 

also act to facilitate and support effective Afghan border security management within the guidance of the NATO OPLAN. 

Question. In your view, should the Pakistan Government be doing more to prevent 

these incursions? 

Answer. Yes, but they need the help of the others in the region and the international community to help work on the causes of instability in the FATA. In other 

words, incursions are only a part of the larger security challenges inside Pakistan. 

REGIONAL DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

Question. Recent independent reports by the Atlantic Council and the Afghanistan 

Study Group call for adopting a regional approach to promoting stability in Afghanistan by bringing Afghanistan’s neighbors together to discuss common issues. 

46

What is your understanding of NATO ISAF’s position regarding establishing a regional process for engaging Afghanistan’s neighbors on promoting security in Afghanistan? 

Answer. NATO, ISAF, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 

have an established process and strategy for engaging Afghanistan’s neighbors to 

promote security in Afghanistan. This process and strategy, through constructive, 

cooperative, and productive dialogue, is designed to improve bilateral political and 

economic relations, enhance border security, and seek bilateral and multilateral solutions to combating the narcotics trade. There are numerous mechanisms through 

which this strategy, which is reviewed every 6 months by NATO, is executed:

• ISAF and NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) in Afghanistan 

engaging representatives from neighboring countries in Kabul; 

• NATO’s SCR visiting select embassies of neighboring states; 

• ISAF Participation in the Tripartite Commission, comprised of senior Afghan, Pakistani, and Afghanistan/Pakistan border, and 

• NATO-Afghan consultations with NATO’s Central Asian Partners to discuss regional issues.

• If confirmed, would you support including Iran in such a position? 

Answer. Yes, from a purely military perspective, I would support including Iran 

in ISAF’s regional process for engaging Afghanistan’s neighbors on promoting security in Afghanistan. While it would be inappropriate for me to try to give an assessment on the current situation, I support any approved way for NATO to leverage 

the international community with the Government of Afghanistan to find more effective means to integrate Afghanistan’s neighbors into the development and stabilization of Afghanistan. However, the decision regarding the extent and means 

through which NATO and ISAF will engage Iran is a political one that NATO’s NAC 

must make with input provided from NATO’s military authorities. That said, I can 

tell you that currently, NATO and ISAF may engage Iranian officials in Kabul for 

tactical military coordination of border issues. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those 

views differ from the administration in power? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, ISAF? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

[The nomination reference of GEN David D. McKiernan, USA, 

follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

January 22, 2008. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

The following named officer for appointment in the United States Army to the 

grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under 

title 10, U.S.C., section 601: 

47

To be General. 

GEN David D. McKiernan, 0000. 

[The biographical sketch of GEN David D. McKiernan, which was 

transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GEN DAVID D. MCKIERNAN, USA 

Source of commissioned service: ROTC.

Military schools attended: 

Infantry Officer Basic Course 

Armor Officer Advanced Course 

United States Army Command and General Staff College 

United States Army War College

Educational degrees: 

College of William and Mary - BA - History 

Shippensburg University - MPA - Public Administration

Foreign languages: None recorded.

Promotions:

Promotions Dates of Appointment 

2LT 28 Aug 72

1LT 28 Aug 74

CPT 28 Aug 76

MAJ 1 Dec 81

LTC 1 Feb 88

COL 1 Aug 93

BG 1 Oct 96

MG 1 Feb 00

LTG 6 Nov 01

GEN 14 Dec 05

Major duty assignments:

From To Assignment

Jan 73 .... Jul 75 Scout Platoon Leader, Combat Support Company, later Executive Officer, B Company, 4th Battalion, 

63d Armor, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, KS 

Jul 75 ..... Sep 76 Executive Officer, B Troop, later C Troop, 4th Squadron, 7th Cavalry, 2d Infantry Division, Eighth 

United States Army, Korea 

Jan 77 .... Jul 77 Student, Armor Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Armor School, Fort Knox, KY 

Jul 77 ..... Oct 79 Motor Officer, later Commander, B Company, 2d Battalion, 33d Armor, 3d Armored Division, United 

States Army Europe, Germany 

Oct 79 .... May 80 Assistant S–3 (Air), 1st Brigade, 3d Armored Division, United States Army Europe, Germany 

May 80 ... May 81 S–3 (Operations), 2d Battalion, 33d Armor, 3d Armored Division, United States Army Europe, Germany 

May 81 ... Jun 82 Student, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 

Jun 82 .... May 84 Operations Training Staff Officer, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, 

VA 

May 84 ... Sep 85 S–3, 1st Brigade, 3d Armored Division, United States Army Europe, Germany 

Sep 85 .... May 86 Executive Officer, 2d Battalion, 32d Armor, 3d Armored Division, United States Army Europe, Germany 

May 86 ... Dec 86 Assistant G–3 (Training), 3d Armored Division, United States Army Europe, Germany 

Jan 87 .... Jun 88 Assignment Officer, Colonel’s Division, United States Total Army Personnel Command, Alexandria, VA 

Jun 88 .... Jul 90 Commander, 1st Battalion, 35th Armor, 1st Armored Division, United States Army Europe, Germany 

Jul 90 ..... Dec 90 Senior Task Force Observer/Controller, Combat Maneuver Training Center, 7th Army Training Center, 

United States Army, Germany 

Dec 90 .... Apr 91 Assistant G–3 (Operations), VII Corps, Operations Desert Shield/Storm, Saudi Arabia 

Apr 91 .... Jun 91 Senior Task Force Observer/Controller, Combat Maneuver Training Center, 7th Army Training Center, 

United States Army, Germany 

Jun 91 .... Jun 92 Student, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 

Jun 92 .... May 93 G–3, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX 

May 93 ... Jun 95 Commander, 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX 

48

From To Assignment 

Jun 95 .... Aug 96 Executive Officer to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, 

GA 

Aug 96 ... Nov 97 Deputy Chief of Staff, G–2/G–3, Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps, Germany and Sarajevo 

Nov 97 .... Aug 98 Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver), 1st Infantry Division, United States Army Europe and 

Seventh Army, Germany 

Aug 98 ... Oct 99 Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany 

Oct 99 .... Oct 01 Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX 

Oct 01 .... Sep 02 Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3, United States Army, Washington, DC 

Sep 02 .... Sep 04 Commanding General, Third United, States Army/Commander, United States, Army Forces Central 

Command, Fort McPherson, GA, to include duty as Commanding General, Coalition Forces Land 

Component Command, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Kuwait 

Oct 04 .... Nov 05 Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, 

GA 

Summary of joint assignments:

Dates Rank 

Deputy Chief of Staff, G–2/G–3, Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps, 

Germany and Sarajevo.

Aug 96–Nov 97 ..... Brigadier General 

Commanding General, Third United, States Army/Commander, United States, 

Army Forces Central Command, Fort McPherson, GA, to include duty as Commanding General, Coalition Forces Land Component Command, Operation 

Iraqi Freedom, Kuwait (No Joint Credit).

Nov 02–Sep 04 ..... Lieutenant General 

Commanding General, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Commander, Allied Land Component Command Heidelberg, North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization, Germany.

Dec 05–Present ..... General 

U.S. decorations and badges: 

Defense Distinguished Service Medal 

Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster) 

Defense Superior Service Medal 

Legion of Merit (with two Oak Leaf Clusters) 

Bronze Star Medal 

Defense Meritorious Service Medal 

Meritorious Service Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters) 

Army Commendation Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters) 

Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster) 

Parachutist Badge 

Ranger Tab 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by GEN David D. McKiernan, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]

49

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228

Washington, DC 20510–6050

(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

David D. McKiernan.

2. Position to which nominated: 

Commander, International Security Assistance Force.

3. Date of nomination: 

January 22, 2008.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.]

5. Date and place of birth: 

December 11, 1950; Atlanta, GA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Carmen Dittrich.

7. Names and ages of children: 

Michelle, 30; Michael, 29; Stephanie, 19.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive 

branch. 

N/A

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution. 

N/A.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA).

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch. 

Honorary Doctorate (College of William and Mary), Public Service. 

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee 

of the Senate? 

Yes.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the 

administration in power? 

50

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–

E are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

DAVID D. MCKIERNAN. 

This 18th day of January, 2008.

[The nomination of GEN David D. McKiernan, USA, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on April 24, 2008, with 

the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on April 29, 2008.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to LTG Raymond T. Odierno, 

USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of 

command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly 

improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant commanders in the 

strategic planning process, in the development of requirements, in joint training and 

education, and in the execution of military operations. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. Goldwater-Nichols has significantly improved our ability to conduct joint 

operations. I believe it is important to review and update based on the changing environment. There should be a requirement to constantly review and adjust to ensure 

it continues to meet the desired intent. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. There is good reason to consider the development of Goldwater-Nichols 

Act-like legislation to delineate roles and responsibilities of Federal agencies in support of contingency operations. 

DUTIES

Question. Section 3034 of title 10, U.S.C., states that the Vice Chief of Staff of 

the Army has such authority and duties with respect to the Department of the 

Army as the Chief of Staff, with the approval of the Secretary of the Army, may 

delegate to or prescribe for him. 

Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and powers do you expect to be assigned? 

Answer. Oversee day-to-day operations of the Army involving a wide variety of activities from serving as a principal advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Army on recommendations and plans of the Army Staff, to ensuring the care of soldiers and 

their families and ensuring the Army continues to be sensitive to their needs. Maintain our relevance to future contingencies and ensure we incorporate lessons learned 

throughout the institution. Establish priorities to meet demands and synchronize 

and focus the Army Staff to ensure strategic relevance. 

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties? 

51

Answer. During my nearly 32 years of commissioned service, I have served the 

Army and the Nation from the tactical thru the strategic level. I have been assigned 

in tactical and operational units for 22 years and have commanded soldiers from 

company to Corps level while participating in numerous training and operational 

deployments. I have served in a variety of command and staff positions to include 

joint and multinational staffs, where I gained experience in strategic and combined 

operations, including a tour as a Military Advisor for Arms Control in the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense (OSD), a tour of duty as the Director of Force Management 

in the Headquarters, Department of the Army. I also served as the Chief of Staff 

of V Corps during Bosnia operations and served as Deputy Commander Task Force 

Hawk in Albania during the Kosovo Conflict. I also commanded the 4th Infantry Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom I, then served as the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which entailed being an advisor to the Secretary 

of State, and most recently as Commander of III Corps/Multi-National Corps-Iraq 

for the last 23 months. My professional military education, deployment experience, 

and assignment history have provided me broad knowledge, experience, and insight 

into the business of running the Army in support of the requirements of the national security strategy. In particular, my tours of duty in Iraq have provided me 

with unique insights into the leadership, training, manning and equipping requirements that will make our Army successful on the battlefields of today and tomorrow. 

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your 

ability to perform the duties of the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army? 

Answer. If confirmed for this position, I intend to:

• Stay connected to the field commands, 

• Stay attuned to the ever changing needs of our soldiers and their families, 

• Ensure we incorporate the lessons learned over the last 5 years, 

• Maintain focus on the warrior ethos, 

• Demand high moral and ethical behavior, 

• Be aggressive—tackle challenges as they arise. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. If confirmed, what would your working relationship be with: 

The Secretary of the Army. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would assist the Secretary of the Army in his duties to 

communicate the Army Staff’s plans to the Secretary of the Army and to supervise 

the implementation of the Secretary and Chief’s decisions through the Army Staff 

and Army commands and agencies. In this capacity, my actions would be subject 

to the authority, direction, and control of the Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of 

the Army. In my capacity as a member of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

(JROC), I would also be responsible for appropriately informing the Secretary of the 

Army about conclusions reached by the JROC about significant requirements. I anticipate that I would at all times work closely and in concert with the Chief of Staff 

and the Secretary of the Army to establish the best policies for the Army in light 

of national interests. 

Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army 

Answer. The Chief of Staff performs his duties under the authority, direction, and 

control of the Secretary of the Army and is directly responsible to the Secretary. The 

Chief of Staff of the Army presides over the Army Staff, transmits the plans and 

recommendations of the Army Staff to the Secretary, advises the Secretary with regard to such plans and recommendations; and acts as the agent of the Secretary 

in executing them. The Chief of Staff shall also perform the duties prescribed for 

him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I enjoy a close working relationship 

with the Chief of Staff of the Army and if confirmed, I will assist him as required 

in the execution of his duties. 

Question. The Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Answer. If confirmed, it would be my duty, as a member of the JROC, to review 

and validate all Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System documents 

for Acquisition Category I and IA programs, and other high-interest programs. I 

look forward to a collaborative and frank relationship with the other Service Vice 

Chiefs in this role, and on all actions of national interest. 

Question. The Under Secretary of the Army. 

Answer. The Under Secretary of the Army is the Secretary’s principal civilian assistant and performs such duties and exercises such powers as the Secretary of the 

Army prescribes. His responsibilities require him, from time to time, to issue guidance and direction to the Army Staff. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the SecVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
52

retary of the Army, and to the Under Secretary through the Secretary of the Army 

and Chief of Staff of the Army, for the operation of the Army in accordance with 

such directives. I will cooperate fully with the Under Secretary of the Army to ensure that the policies established by the Office of the Secretary of the Army are 

properly implemented. I will communicate openly and directly with the Under Secretary of the Army in articulating the views of the Army Staff, Army commands, 

and Army agencies. 

Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army. 

Answer. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army have functional responsibilities 

that, from time to time, require the issuance of guidance to the Army Staff and to 

the Army as a whole. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain close, professional 

relationships with each of the Assistant Secretaries to foster an environment of cooperative teamwork between the Army Staff and the Army Secretariat as we deal 

together with the day-to-day management and long-range planning requirements 

facing the Army. 

Question. The General Counsel of the Army. 

Answer. The General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the Department of the 

Army and serves as counsel to the Secretary and other Secretariat officials. His duties include coordinating legal and policy advice to all members of the Army regarding matters of interest to the Secretariat, as well as determining the position of the 

Army on any legal questions or procedures. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the General Counsel. 

Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Army. 

Answer. The Judge Advocate General is the legal advisor of the Chief of Staff of 

the Army, member of the Army Staff, and members of the Army generally. In coordination with the Army General Counsel, The Judge Advocate General serves as 

military legal advisor to the Secretary of the Army. The Judge Advocate General 

also directs the members of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps in the performance 

of their duties and, by law, is primarily responsible for providing legal advice and 

services regarding the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the administration of 

military discipline. Therefore, I will establish and maintain a professional and inclusive relationship with The Judge Advocate General and always welcome his expression of independent views about any legal matter under consideration. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will face the Vice 

Chief of Staff of the Army? 

Answer. We must maintain a balance between our ability to meet our requirements and the resources available. Soldiers and units in the Active and Reserve 

components have been hard at work serving the Nation in the war on terror. Despite our Army’s remarkable performance, this has had an undeniable effect on 

equipment, training, and overall preparedness—not to mention the impact on families and the men and women of the All-Volunteer Force themselves. Maintaining a 

high-quality force able to excel in the current campaigns is a tough, multi-faceted 

challenge made more formidable by the imperative to be ready for other contingencies or conflicts the Army may undertake in support of our national security. 

This tension between meeting the priorities of the present while preparing for the 

future—in light of existing and emerging threats along a broad spectrum of conflict; 

the extent to which we do one at the expense of the other; and managing the associated costs and risks are fundamental to the decisions the Nation’s military and civilian leaders will shape and make. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will assist the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of 

Staff of the Army to restore balance through the Army’s four imperatives. I will 

work to sustain our soldiers and their families to insure that they have the quality 

of life they deserve and that we recruit and sustain a high quality force. To prepare 

our solders, units, and equipment we must maintain a high level of readiness for 

the current operational environments, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. To reset 

our force we must prepare our soldiers, units, and equipment for future deployments 

and other contingencies. Finally, to transform our force, we must continuously improve our ability to meet the needs of the combatant commanders in a changing security environment. I intend to work closely with the Secretary of the Army and 

Chief of Staff of the Army, and appropriate agencies in both executive and legislative branches to develop and execute these plans. 

53

ARMY BUDGET SHARE

Question. Last year’s Army Posture Statement points out that the defense budget 

allocation by Service has changed little over time with the Air Force and Navy 

around 30 percent and the Army around 25 percent. Moreover, since the Army is 

manpower intensive, and personnel costs eat up a large part of its budget, only 25 

percent of the Army’s budget goes toward research, development, and acquisition, 

as compared to 38 percent in the Navy and 43 percent in the Air Force. Further, 

the Army’s overall share of the DOD investment dollars is only 17 percent, as compared to 33 percent for the Navy and 35 percent for the Air Force. The result, according to the posture statement, is that ‘‘the Army has been unable to invest in 

the capabilities needed to sustain a rising operational tempo and to prepare for 

emerging threats.’’

What is your understanding of the effects of this funding discrepancy on the 

Army? 

Answer. The effect is the Army is out of balance as demand has out paced our 

ability to provide trained and ready soldiers to the combatant commanders. Through 

supplemental funding for the global war on terror, we’ve been able to meet the immediate demands, but our soldiers are stressed and our equipment has been used 

hard. We must restore the necessary breadth and depth of Army capabilities to support and sustain essential capacity for the future demands on our Expeditionary 

Force. The solution lies not just in the Army’s share of the defense budget but, more 

importantly, in the size of the overall defense budget. 

Question. What is your understanding about what, if anything, the Secretary of 

the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Secretary of Defense intend to 

do to address this discrepancy? 

Answer. I saw first hand the results of the hard work and personal commitment 

of the Army and DOD leadership as well as Congress to immediately address any 

shortfall. We received the equipment we needed along with trained, ready and capable soldiers in Iraq. They’ve taken a step toward correcting this discrepancy by increasing the strength of the Army funded from the base budget in the fiscal year 

2009 President’s budget rather than relying on supplemental appropriations. I understand the Secretary of Defense is working with the Army to achieve readiness 

requirements and to ensure the Army has the resources necessary to support the 

National Military Strategy. 

POSTURE FOR THE FUTURE

Question. Do you believe that current Army initiatives such as Grow the Force, 

Modularity, and Transformation to the Future Combat Systems (FCSs) adequately 

posture the Army to meet the most likely threats of the next 2 or 3 decades? 

Answer. The Army’s future threats are defined in the National Defense Strategy 

and the National Military Strategy. Grow the Force, Modularity, and Transformation to the FCSs will help posture the Army to meet those threats. As we cannot predict threats with any certainty, we must build readiness and strategic depth 

that can respond to a broad range of possible situations. Our goal must be to build 

an Army versatile and agile enough to be employed in the range of military operations, across the major operational environments, in support of our National Security Strategy. The Army Initiatives are designed to give the Army required capabilities and adequate capacity providing maximum flexibility to respond to continual 

and asymmetrical threats over the next 30 years. 

Question. What other initiatives would you recommend the Army pursue in this 

regard if confirmed as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army? 

Answer. As our Nation’s Army, we must always stay focused on our soldiers and 

their families. They are the centerpiece of our capacity to meet our future requirements. 

LESSONS LEARNED

Question. What do you believe are the major lessons learned from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), in particular concerning 

manning, training, and equipping the Army, which you intend to address if confirmed? 

Answer. First, the importance of environmental analysis which encompasses the 

entire geo-political, socio-economic, and global communications spectrums as they 

relate to the current conflict. Next, we must remember that it takes a network to 

defeat a network. Integration of conventional forces and special operations forces 

must continue to improve. We must also continue to integrate asymmetric warfare 

capabilities into our full spectrum operations. Finally, our leader training programs 

54

must emphasize the key tenets of adaptability, ingenuity, warrior ethos, and moralethical conduct. 

IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN DEPLOYMENTS

Question. Many soldiers are on their third or fourth major deployment to Iraq or 

Afghanistan. Last year, unit deployments were extended to 15 months and dwell 

time in some cases is less than 12 months. 

What is your assessment of the impact multiple deployments of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq is having on retention, particularly among young enlisted and officer 

personnel after their initial obligated service has been completed? 

Answer. The pace of deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq has not had an adverse 

impact on retention to date. Fiscal year 2007 retention of officers was slightly better 

than the overall 10-year average. The recently instituted Captains’ retention program, which offers a number of incentives, to include attendance at graduate school 

or a retention bonus, has enhanced retention of officers at historic rates through fiscal year 2010. 

The retention rates of initial term and mid-career soldiers in deploying units has 

remained between 120–140 percent since fiscal year 2005. For example, nearly 600 

troops reenlisted in Baghdad on Independence Day this past year. In addition, more 

than 100 Army Reserve soldiers gathered at the Al Faw palace at Camp Victory, 

Iraq, on January 18, 2008, to reenlist during a ceremony marking the 100th Anniversary of the Army Reserve. Recently deployed units and units currently deployed 

to Afghanistan and Iraq have reenlistment rates averaging 110–120 percent of their 

yearly goals. This is a significant indicator of the quality of leadership within our 

ranks, the fact that soldiers believe in what they are doing, and the fact that soldiers value the tradition of service to the Nation. 

Question. What are the key indicators of stress on the force, and what do these 

indicators tell you about that level of stress currently? 

Answer. Our soldiers and families are strained and stretched, but they are also 

remarkably resilient. The Army monitors key indicators of individual behaviors and 

aggressively pursues policy or program changes to address negative trends. As an 

example, rates of substantiated spouse abuse have declined steadily since fiscal year 

2001 and child abuse since fiscal year 2004. In addition to programs like ‘‘Strong 

Bonds,’’ the Army is committed to providing programs and services that support soldiers and their families. The overall health of the Force reflects a resilient Army, 

strained by persistent conflict, but still maintaining a solid foundation. 

Question. In addition to any other stress indicators that you address, please discuss suicide and divorce rates, drug and alcohol abuse, AWOLs, and rates of indiscipline. 

Answer. Our soldiers and families are strained and stretched, but they are also 

remarkably resilient. The Army monitors key indicators of individual behaviors and 

aggressively pursues policy or program changes to address negative trends. 

We see the following trends: 

The suicide rates are trending upward. Applying a multi-disciplinary approach, 

we are continuously reviewing and adapting our awareness, intervention, and treatment resources in support of soldiers and commanders. 

Overall officer divorce rates are declining. Enlisted divorce rates trended upward 

from fiscal years 2006 to 2007, but remain below or equal to rates since 2004. Divorce rates have increased among enlisted female soldiers, and deployed soldiers divorce at a higher rate than those who have not deployed. The Army offers a robust 

chaplain-sponsored ‘‘Strong Bonds’’ training program to help soldiers and families 

build and maintain stronger relationships. 

Drug abuse rates overall show a slight increase, but rates in deployed areas are 

declining. The Army has continued its aggressive drug education, awareness, and 

testing programs. 

Enrollments for alcohol abuse treatment are continuing in an upward trend. The 

Army provides comprehensive education packages directed at the reduction of alcohol abuse, to include post deployment training. Alcohol abuse rates are monitored 

continuously via the Army’s Risk Reduction Program. We are also developing and 

implementing preventative intervention programs for soldiers at the first sign of 

trouble. ‘‘Prevention of Alcohol Abuse’’ messages are incorporated in Army-wide prevention of substance abuse campaigns like ‘‘Warrior Pride.’’

Rates for absence without leave (AWOL) show an upward trend. Rates are monitored closely and commanders adjudicate each instance of AWOL based on the facts 

and circumstances of the soldier’s individual case. 

In fiscal year 2007, the number of General and Special Courts-Martial increased, 

but rates remain below the highest post-fiscal year 2001 rates. 

55

Substantiated rates of spouse and child abuse have declined steadily since fiscal 

year 2001. In addition to programs like ‘‘Strong Bonds,’’ the Army continues to focus 

resources on programs and services that support soldiers and their families. 

The overall health of the force reflects a resilient Army, strained by persistent 

conflict, but still maintaining a solid foundation. 

Question. For how long do you believe these levels of commitments, in particular 

the 15 month deployments for combat units, can continue before there will be significant adverse consequences for the Army? 

Answer. Over the past few years we have seen definitive indications that the force 

is strained. Stress on soldiers and units resulting from increased time deployed and 

decreased time at home are visible in several different areas including training, 

readiness and recruitment. However, we have a plan that will, with congressional 

assistance, restore balance to our force. We have identified four imperatives that we 

must accomplish to place ourselves back into balance: sustain, prepare, reset, and 

transform. 

We have and will continue to make significant progress in these areas to bring 

the Army back into balance. We assess that we will continue to recruit and retain 

enough soldiers to meet our end strength requirements. We also have received authorization to accelerate our growth plan to 2011, which will assist the Army in restoring balance to preserve our All-Volunteer Force, restoring the necessary strategic depth and capacity for the future while sustaining a provision of forces to combatant commanders at pre-surge levels. 

While the Army is continually working to reduce the deployment times of its soldiers, it is capable of meeting the current level of global commitments as long as 

they remain at or below pre-surge levels for the foreseeable future. In doing so, we 

will continue to deploy only the best led, manned, equipped, and trained soldiers 

into combat to meet the national strategy. 

POST-DEPLOYMENT HEALTH CONCERNS

Question. The health-related problems experienced after Operations Desert Shield 

and Desert Storm led to the undertaking of extensive efforts to establish a comprehensive health database on deployed forces based on pre- and post-deployment 

health surveys. 

If confirmed, what actions would you expect to take to ensure that the Army uses 

available data—and generates additional data—on the health of returning soldiers 

to ensure that appropriate treatment is available and that all signs of deploymentrelated illnesses or potential illnesses are identified? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that soldiers are referred to appropriate care when their survey responses indicate that additional evaluation and 

treatment are needed. This will require improving the process to track referrals and 

treatment plans. 

The addition of the Post-Deployment Health Reassessment and the new annual 

Periodic Health Assessment provides us with the ability to monitor the ongoing 

health, readiness, and wellness of our soldiers after initial redeployment, and long 

before they start preparing for their next deployment. 

The Army has recognized that building soldier and family resiliency is key to 

maintaining their health and welfare. We developed ‘‘Battlemind’’ training products 

to increase this resiliency and have several different training programs available for 

pre, during and post-deployment. 

Last summer the Army initiated a leader chain teaching program to educate all 

soldiers and leaders about post-traumatic stress and signs and symptoms of concussive brain injury. This was intended to help us all recognize symptoms and encourage seeking treatment for these conditions. We are now institutionalizing this training within our Army education and training system to share the information with 

our new soldiers and leaders and to continue to emphasize that these signs and 

symptoms are normal reactions to stressful situations and it is absolutely acceptable 

to seek assistance to cope with these issues. 

MENTAL HEALTH ADVISORY TEAM V

Question. The Army’s mental health assessment studies in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters have been valuable in identifying the extent of mental health conditions and resource and training challenges being experienced in OIF and OEF. 

Based on the findings of the Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) V that soldiers experience increased stress due to multiple and lengthened deployments, what 

actions would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that appropriate kinds and amounts 

of mental health resources are available to soldiers in theater, as well as upon their 

return? 

56

Answer. If confirmed, I fully support continuation of MHAT assessments in theater to ensure that the correct ratio and distribution of deployed behavioral health 

providers are maintained to meet the psychological needs of the deployed force. Last 

summer the Army Medical Command initiated action to hire 275 behavioral health 

providers to care for soldiers and families in the United States. To date, we have 

hired 162 providers who are already making a difference in our military communities. If confirmed, it is my plan to ensure the Army Medical Command has the 

resources and flexibility required to fill all of our behavioral health care requirements. 

Question. What do you think have been the most valuable findings of the Army’s 

mental health advisory teams, and what are the lessons which can be applied to 

future deployments? 

Answer. MHAT findings have been used as the basis to reshape existing Combat 

and Operational Stress Control units to create more flexible and capable units. 

MHAT information has also been used to predict better the quantity of behavioral 

health assets required for current and future conflicts. Finally, MHAT information 

has been utilized to create a training program known as ‘‘Battlemind,’’ which 

changes the way the Army prepares soldiers, leaders, and families for high stress 

deployments. 

TRICARE FEE INCREASES FOR MILITARY RETIREES

Question. In its fiscal year 2009 budget request, the Department of Defense as- sumed $1.2 billion in cost savings based on its proposal to implement increases in 

TRICARE costs for certain beneficiaries, including higher enrollment fees for military retirees and their families. 

If these fee increases are implemented, what do you see as the likely impact of 

these changes on the Department of the Army? 

Answer. The proposed plan would charge both higher enrollment fees and civilian 

visit co-payments for TRICARE Prime and initiate enrollment fees and higher 

deductibles for TRICARE Standard ‘‘working age’’ retirees under 65 and their families. For these beneficiaries, some cost increases would be based on a three-tiered 

system of annual military retired pay. Last, the proposed budget would raise co-payments for all beneficiaries on prescriptions filled at retail pharmacies. While the 

budgetary impacts of these changes would be recognized in OSD accounts, reductions in expense for medical benefits for retirees would lessen pressure on the total 

Defense budget and begin to address benefit inequities between military retirees 

and other Federal retirees. 

Question. What is your personal view of the DOD justification provided for increases in TRICARE enrollment fees for retirees and are there alternatives to such 

increases you would recommend if confirmed? 

Answer. We must maintain world-class medical support for our retirees, but must 

be realistic in establishing costs and planning for the future. 

STOP LOSS AUTHORITY

Question. How many soldiers do you expect to be on active duty, retained under 

stop loss authority at the end of fiscal year 2008? 

Answer. The Army expects to have 8,046 Active component soldiers retained 

under Stop Loss authority serving in the Army at the end of fiscal year 2008. The 

Stop Loss forecast for the Reserve components for September 2008 is approximately 

6,000. 

Question. What is the Army’s plan for reducing stop loss as it increases its end 

strength through 2012? 

Answer. Department of Defense guidance directs the Services to discontinue Stop 

Loss policies as soon as operationally feasible. The plan to reduce, and eventually 

eliminate, Stop Loss will be based on a reduction in demand and a return to a cycle 

of ‘‘1 year deployed with 2 years at home.’’ The growth of Army end strength supports the growth of additional Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), which supports a return to a cycle of ‘‘1 year deployed with 2 years at home.’’

RESERVE DEPLOYMENT AND MOBILIZATION

Question. In recent years, Reserve Force management policies and systems have 

been characterized as ‘‘inefficient and rigid,’’ and readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment stay behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies. 

What are your views about the optimal role for the Reserve component forces in 

meeting combat missions? 

Answer. To respond to Joint Staff and combatant commanders’ requests for forces 

and capabilities, the Army considers all three components (Active, Guard, and ReVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
57

serve) in developing sourcing solutions. Each component plays a critical role in 

meeting our operational requirements. Transformation continues from a strategic to 

an Operational Reserve. It is an operational, expeditionary and domestic force that 

is an essential piece of our Army. The Army will continue to select the best units, 

capable of meeting Joint Staff and combatant command requirements, with full confidence in each unit’s ability to carry out its assigned mission. 

Question. What is your opinion about the sufficiency of current Reserve Force 

management policies? 

Answer. The Army has made considerable progress in ‘‘total force’’ management 

in the last few years. Our Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process will, as it 

matures, enable us to balance the demands of known operations across all three 

components (Active, Guard, and Reserve) and reduce the stress on the force. Our 

Secretary and our Chief of Staff continue the practice set by their predecessors of 

fully engaging Reserve component leaders and staffs in programming, equipping and 

readiness decisions. Over the past few years, the Army has made considerable funding commitments to the Reserve components for re-set and re-equipping actions, and 

our Chief’s initiatives and imperatives include the Total Army. Together, these efforts will set the stage for effectively transforming, manning, training, equipping, 

and sustaining America’s Army, while fully meeting our commitments at home and 

overseas. 

Question. Do you support assigning any combat, combat support, or combat service support missions exclusively to the Reserve? 

Answer. Both the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard are organized and 

arrayed to perform missions across the full spectrum of combat, combat support, 

and combat service support operations. In today’s operational environment, it is prudent to assign missions and capabilities across all components of the Army. There 

are opportunities to balance our force to meet current contingencies and to prepare 

for future operations, and the Secretary and Chief of Staff are fully engaged in such 

an effort with the aim of arraying capabilities across the Army so that operational 

demands are fully met. 

Question. What is the appropriate role for the Army Reserve and National Guard 

in homeland defense and homeland security missions? 

Answer. The National Guard forces respond to a natural disaster or provide assistance to civil authorities under control of the Governor in title 32 status or under 

Federal control in a title 10 status. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) supports the 

channel of communications between the State and Federal forces. 

The Army Reserve plays a unique role since it commands a highly-skilled, flexible 

force that provides 50–100 percent of the entire Army’s force structure for 21 specialized capabilities such as water supply, medical, transportation, signal, and chemical units. 

When a domestic emergency occurs, including chemical, biological, or nuclear attack, the affected Governor(s) shall first employ their Air and or Army National 

Guard with State authority, as the State response forces, if required. In the event 

of a catastrophic event, the States will likely request Federal military assistance. 

The Army will provide the majority of that assistance with capabilities allocated to 

Northern Command from Active, Guard, and Reserve components in a title 10 status, both to support Homeland Defense, and provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities. 

INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE RECALL POLICY

Question. A July 2006 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recommended that the Army revitalize its Individual Ready Reserve 

(IRR) program by culling existing IRR databases and ensuring that the Army has 

valid contact information on IRR members who may be recalled to serve. 

What has the Army done to clarify the mobilization policy that applies to both 

officer and enlisted members of the IRR? 

Answer. The Army has programmed for and has developed plans to optimize the 

operational and strategic value of the IRR by improving individual deployment readiness levels to ensure timely availability; maintaining a reliable database of mobilization assets; and promoting continuum of service by managing expectations 

throughout a soldier’s career life-cycle. Human Resource Command (HRC) is accomplishing by implementing the following: 

Select soldiers attend Readiness and Personnel Accountability Musters at local 

Reserve Centers and execute personnel updates, medical readiness evaluations, and 

training briefings. Executing musters each year will ensure that individual expectations are being established, soldiers are aware of their annual requirements and potential for mobilization, as well as educated on how to build upon a military career 

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while assigned to the IRR. In fiscal year 2007 over 8,400 IRR soldiers were mustered and over 720 IRR soldiers transferred to the Selected Reserves (SELRES). 

HRC is planning on mustering 10,000 IRR soldiers in fiscal year 2008 and anticipates similar number of transfers to the SELRES. 

Educate and raise awareness at time of transition. Soldiers are counseled and provided information regarding their assignment to the IRR. The IRR Orientation 

Handbook has been developed and is provided to newly assigned IRR soldiers in 

order to establish expectations, provide key information regarding their assignment 

and annual requirements, promotions, training opportunities, as well as continued 

service in the Selective Reserves. 

Question. What has the Army done to update its IRR mobilization database? 

Answer. In the last 3 years the IRR has decreased in size by 33 percent. HRC 

has conducted a systematic screening of the IRR database to reconcile existing 

records (blank and erroneous data fields, obsolete military occupational skills, bad 

addresses); identify non-mobilization assets (passed over for promotion, security violation, physically disqualified, determined hardship, adverse character of service); 

and separated those soldiers who no longer have further potential for useful military 

service if mobilized. Incorrect IRR addresses have been the single largest mobilization exclusion, but are at a 10-year low overall. Approximately 9 percent of those 

ineligible for mobilization are excluded for an incorrect address. 

DOD established a policy in July 2005 mandating the discharge of officers in the 

IRR who are beyond their Military Service Obligation (MSO) unless the officer specifically requests retention in the IRR. Officers who have fulfilled their MSO and 

have not taken action to elect to remain in the IRR shall be transferred to the 

Standby Reserve and discharged within 2 years of transfer. To date approximately 

14,000 IRR officers have been affected by this policy: 2,800 officers elected to transfer to the Standby Reserve and 2,900 have been honorably discharged. 

HRC has developed the Individual Warrior Virtual Screening Portal (IW–VSP) for 

IRR soldiers to update their contact information and verify their readiness level 

without having to report to a physical location. HRC screens all information submitted through the website, reconciles deficiencies, and contacts soldiers that require additional assistance. 

Question. What is your assessment of the value of the IRR to the All-Volunteer 

Total Force, and what is your opinion about the role the IRR should play in the future? 

Answer. Retaining required skills and maintaining the population in the IRR is 

important to managing our operational and strategic capability. The Army recognizes the value of keeping trained and motivated members in the service and we 

continue to offer opportunities for continued service. The IRR is an important and 

critical source of personnel resources to fill deploying units and individual requirements. 

OFFICER SHORTAGES

Question. A report issued by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in July 

2006 concluded that the Army projected an officer shortage of nearly 3,000 in fiscal 

year 2007, with the most acute shortfalls in the grades of captain and major with 

11 to 17 years of service. Unless corrective action is taken, CRS found that shortages will persist through 2013 unless accessions are increased and retention improves. 

What is your understanding of the reasons for the shortfall, and what steps is the 

Army taking to meet this mid-career officer shortfall? 

Answer. Our current officer shortages are not caused by increased attrition. Attrition rates are at or below the 10-year average rates. The officer shortfalls are due 

to the growth of officer requirements of 10,000 ACC officers from fiscal year 2004 

to fiscal year 2012. Nearly 6,200 of these requirements are in the grades of Captain 

and Major. To address this shortfall, we have increased accessions and will have 

produced nearly 5,000 additional officers by fiscal year 2009. 

The Army instituted a precommissioning retention incentives program that is projected to increase by nearly 30 percent our retention of high performing USMA and 

ROTC scholarship officers by offering them graduate school, branch choice, or assignment choice in exchange for additional active duty service. The Army has sought 

officers aggressively from outside the Active Army and has accessed nearly 1,500 

officers from the inactive Reserve and from the other services through the ‘‘Blue to 

Green Program.’’

The Army’s biggest success has been the institution of an unprecedented Captains’ retention program that offers a number of incentives, including attendance at 

graduate school or a retention bonus, to encourage our best and brightest officers 

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to remain on active duty. This program has guaranteed the retention, already within a few hundred officers of historic rates, of our valuable force of heavily combatexperienced officers through fiscal year 2010 and beyond. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure adequate numbers 

of highly qualified captains and majors are serving on active duty over the next 10 

years? 

Answer. The Army has developed policies to retain our ‘‘best and brightest,’’ combat-experienced officers and NCO’s. We will not allow the Army to drift into a postconflict setting or mindset. This will require refocusing the Army and a commitment 

to leveraging combat-experienced soldiers in key and critical assignments, such as 

in the schools and battlelabs of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. 

The Army will continue to monitor and analyze officer attrition and develop additional measures to retain our highly performing officers. To aid our retention efforts 

we also must continue resourcing programs to support Families in an expeditionary 

Army during a period of persistent conflict. 

OFFICER RETENTION FOLLOWING REDEPLOYMENT

Question. After the Vietnam War there was a large reduction in force which some 

believed masked a voluntary departure of some of the best and brightest junior officers from active duty who, after serving in very responsible positions at a relatively 

young age in combat, had difficulty adjusting to a peacetime Army. The nature of 

the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—small unit actions where junior officers are not 

only military leaders, but also diplomats and city managers, and where they have 

even greater authority to act on their own initiatives—may produce similar behavior 

and consequent difficulty in retaining highly-trained and experienced junior officers. 

Do you fear a similar syndrome once the current deployment cycle slows? If so, 

what do you believe should be done to preclude that from happening? 

Answer. It is something that we must constantly monitor. We have established 

several programs to retain our combat experienced NCOs and officers and allow for 

their continued growth. 

MEDICAL PERSONNEL RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. The Army is facing significant shortages in critically needed medical 

personnel in both Active and Reserve components. Growing medical support requirements, caused by the stand-up of BCTs, growth Army end strength, surge requirements in theater, and other factors may compound the already serious challenges 

faced in recruitment and retention of medical, dental, nurse, and behavioral health 

personnel. 

Do you think a comprehensive review of the medical support requirements for the 

Army is needed? 

Answer. Yes, I believe it is important to review medical support requirements on 

a regular, recurring basis; the Army already reviews medical support requirements 

as a part of its ongoing internal processes. For example, in Total Army Analysis 

(TAA), the Army validated over 3,000 new military medical requirements for the 

operational force. In the Institutional Army TAA, the Army identified over 2,500 

new military medical requirements and over 2,400 new civilian medical requirements for the institutional Army. There are other reviews looking at important specific issues like military to civilian conversion, behavioral health, and traumatic 

brain injury, to name just a few. 

Question. Does the Army have sufficient mental health resources to handle the 

redeployment of large combat units? 

Answer. The Army is committed to ensuring all redeploying soldiers receive the 

behavioral health care they need. We anticipate that repeated and extended deployments will lead to increased distress and anxiety, and a higher demand for behavioral health services, and are planning to respond to that demand. An extensive 

array of behavioral health services has long been available to address the strain on 

our soldiers and families who have experienced multiple deployments. However, especially at our larger power projection platforms, the mental health resources are 

strained. The TRICARE purchased care network is also variable in its ability to support the mental health needs of our soldiers and their families. Currently we are 

focused on the needs at Fort Drum and Fort Bragg, but all installations with large 

numbers of returning soldiers will need resources. 

We have a variety of initiatives in place to garner additional behavioral health 

resources. Most significantly, last year we identified a gap between behavioral 

health staffing and the increased needs of our patient population. As a result, we 

initiated an effort to hire 265 behavioral health providers to meet this gap in the 

U.S. The number of requirements has increased to about 330 providers, both in the 

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U.S. and at our overseas locations. As of March 28, 2008, we have 162 new behavioral health contract providers working in our treatment facilities. 

Question. What plans does the Army have in place to ensure that a surge capability of mental health professionals is available to returning soldiers and their families? 

Answer. Through our Regional Medical Commands we shift our assets to fill 

needs. For example, the North Atlantic Regional Medical Command has been providing behavioral health staff from Walter Reed to support needs at Fort Drum and 

Fort Bragg. However, our behavioral health resources are strained across the Army, 

so we have only limited flexibility to shift resources. Our strategy is to enhance our 

behavioral health infrastructure throughout the system rather than providing surge 

teams, which can be inefficient and cumbersome. We also use tele-psychiatry to augment our outreach capacity. Walter Reed has long supported the Northeast with 

tele-psychiatry and recently has begun to support Fort Hood. Madigan Army Medical Center is currently supporting Fort Irwin and Alaska through tele-psychiatry. 

Finally, in coordination with the TRICARE Management Activity, we are encouraging civilian providers to join the TRICARE network. 

Question. What policy and/or legislative initiatives do you think are necessary in 

order to ensure that the Army can continue to fulfill medical support requirements 

as its mission and end strength grow? 

Answer. Given the policy initiatives currently underway and the changes implemented by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, we are optimistic that further policy and legislative changes will not be needed. We will monitor these important resources closely to ensure our goals are realized. 

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. The Department of the Army has implemented changes in policy and 

procedures aimed at preventing and responding appropriately to incidents of sexual 

assault. 

What is your view of the appropriate role for senior military and civilian leaders 

in the Department of the Army in overseeing the effectiveness of implementation 

of new policies relating to sexual assault? 

Answer. Sexual assault is a crime that has no place in our ranks. The role of senior Army leadership is to ensure an organizational climate where such behavior is 

not tolerated, and where victims feel free to report incidents without fear of reprisal. 

The Secretariat and Army Staff oversee and implement the Army’s Sexual Assault 

Prevention and Response Program, which is now more than 3 years old. The Secretary, in fact, has taken a personal interest in this issue and has directed the expansion and implementation of new strategies to increase emphasis on sexual assault prevention measures. If confirmed, I will assist him in this vitally important 

effort. 

As part of senior leader involvement, senior Army leaders review the Army Sexual 

Assault Report quarterly and submit statistical data to DOD on both a quarterly 

and an annual basis. Senior leaders also submit an annual Army report and program assessment to the Secretary of Defense in accordance with statutory requirements and Department of Defense policy. Finally, Senior Army leaders require their 

Inspector Generals periodically to assess the program for compliance with statutory 

and regulatory requirements. 

MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE (SES)

Question. The transformation of the Armed Forces has brought with it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and forward thinking management of 

senior executives. 

What is your vision for the management and development of the Army senior executive workforce, especially in the critically important areas of acquisition, financial management, and the scientific and technical fields? 

Answer. The Department of the Army has taken a very deliberate and direct approach to SES management. If confirmed, I intend to continue this initiative. The 

Army looks to its SES Corps as a replacement for military leaders in critically important areas, such as acquisition, financial management, science, engineering, and 

human resource management. As the Army has sent its flag officers into joint billets 

to support the war, it has replaced them with SES members. The Army is reallocating positions to ensure senior executives are aligned with evolving business strategy. My vision for the management and development of senior executives is a senior 

civilian workforce that possesses a broad background of experiences to prepare them 

to move between positions in order to meet the continually changing mission needs 

of the Army. I am committed to providing for the professional development and 

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management of our civilian executives in ways consistent with what the Army has 

done for its General Officer Corps for many years. As the Army moves forward with 

its transformation, if confirmed, I will be committed to reinforcing and institutionalizing the value that each senior executive brings to the leadership team and to promoting and sustaining high morale and esprit de corps. 

ARMY FAMILY ACTION PLAN

Question. The Army Family Action Plan has been successful in identifying and 

promoting quality of life issues for Army families. 

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues in the 

Army, and, if confirmed, what role would you play to ensure that family readiness 

needs are addressed and adequately resourced? 

Answer. The pace of operations has placed great stress on Army families. Secretary Geren and General Casey have responded to that challenge by making the 

commitments set forth in the Army Family Covenant, a promise to provide soldiers 

and families a quality of life commensurate with their voluntary service and daily 

sacrifices. The Army Family Covenant is focused on five areas: Family programs 

and services; health care; soldier and family housing; excellent schools, youth services and child care; and expanded employment and education opportunities for Family members. I will also work to help further standardize the support being provided 

to soldiers and families and to obtain predictable funding to these important programs. One area of particular concern that has already been addressed is the fatigue and burnout of Family Readiness Group leaders and support staff as they support our families in a time of persistent conflict. We are improving our ability to 

address soldier-family reintegration and reunion issues. The Family Readiness Support Assistant (FRSA) program supports Army spouses who volunteer as Family 

Readiness Group Leaders, Unit Commanders, and Rear Detachment Commanders. 

The FRSA helps mitigate volunteer stress and ensures an effective interface between families and support programs. 

Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global 

rebasing, BRAC, extended deployment lengths, and the planned growth of the 

Army? 

Answer. The Installation Management Command works extensively with garrisons to develop individual plans to meet staffing, funding, and programming requirements. Our BRAC plans address the needs of families as their numbers change 

on our installations. Our global rebasing plans include maintaining support to our 

soldiers and families throughout the process. At the installations that are expected 

to grow, we have programmed new child development centers, youth centers, and 

fitness facilities. Likewise, we have plans to support our soldiers and families in isolated locations. If confirmed, I will closely monitor these efforts to ensure that our 

families’ needs are met as the Army undergoes this dramatic era of growth, restationing, realignment, deployment. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support of Reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment, and family readiness? 

Answer. The Army Integrated Family Support Network (AIFSN) will provide a 

comprehensive, multi-agency approach for community support and services to meet 

the needs of the Army’s geographically dispersed population. This effort is crucial 

in supporting Army National Guard and Army Reserve Families. The baseline services are: information, referral, and follow-up services; child care services; youth services; school transition services; employer support to the Guard and Reserve services; 

wounded warrior program services; survivor support services; transition assistance 

services; employment; home and family life management services; financial services; 

medical care services; and legal services. AIFSN provides additional manning for 

249 Army National Guard Family Assistance Centers spread across the country. 

AIFSN will provide a network consisting of virtual programs, brick-and-mortar facilities, and access to public and private programs and services. AIFSN will ensure 

services and support are available throughout the full spectrum of the mobilization 

process. Additionally, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 requires the OSD to establish 

a reintegration program for the Army National Guard. This program, called the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program, is a key aspect of AIFSN and provides programs 

and services that specifically address the needs of our Guardsmen and their Families. If confirmed I will work to ensure that these programs are implemented fully 

and assessed properly to insure we attain expected outcomes. 

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MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are critical to enhancement of military life for members and their families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments. 

What are the challenges in sustaining Army MWR programs that you foresee, 

and, if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to achieve? 

Answer. Army MWR programs contribute immensely to the quality of life of our 

military families. Their continued vitality depends on consistent appropriated and 

non-appropriated funding to support all of our MWR activities. The Army increased 

funding for family and MWR programs by $739 million with supplemental funds in 

fiscal year 2008 and is moving a significant amount of base funding to the care of 

soldiers and families. The Army’s MWR funds are currently in sound financial condition. All MWR activities report a high degree of solvency through the use of best 

business practices and enterprise purchasing. This allows us to increase the value 

of our programs by eliminating inefficiencies, which would otherwise have to be 

passed on in the form of higher prices. 

The road ahead is challenging. The Army is fighting a war while transforming to 

a more consolidated, expeditionary, and joint force. However, the needs of individual 

servicemembers and their families must still be met, particularly as soldiers return 

from combat. We are developing programs like Adventure Quest, which allows a 

means of adjusting from the adrenalin rush prevalent in the combat environment 

and redirecting that energy into recreational pursuits. The Army will continue to 

explore the most effective means of supporting MWR programs to ensure we are 

meeting the needs of soldiers and families and contributing positively to recruiting, 

retention, and readiness. We will also use the efficiencies in our MWR business activities as the basis for investment capital development to fund an $85 million Capital Program annually for the next 10 years to build Travel Camps, Bowling Centers, Water Parks, Youth Centers, Single Soldier Entertainment Centers, and other 

facilities for our highly deserving soldiers and families. We will begin privatizing 

our lodging programs this summer by transferring our lodging facilities on 11 U.S. 

installations to a highly successful national hotel operating company, which will invest $450 million to upgrade and modernize these facilities. This will insure the 

quality of the lodging we provide our soldiers and families is equal to the quality 

available in the communities from which we recruit America’s sons and daughters. 

We appreciate your support of these important programs, and will continue to consult with you as we implement these far-reaching and enduring changes. 

RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD SERVICE

Question. Heavy demand on the Army National Guard and Army Reserve since 

the attacks of September 11 have significantly changed the expectation of Reserve 

and Guard soldiers about their participation in an operational Army Reserve. The 

Commission on the National Guard and Reserve recently submitted its final report 

calling for formal recognition of this new and developing role for the Reserve components and recommending changes in career patterns to facilitate development of the 

Operational Reserve. 

In your view, how should the Army’s Reserve component forces best be managed 

to provide essential support for operational deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq? 

Answer. The Army endeavors to respond to Joint Staff and Combatant Commanders’ requests for forces and capabilities by considering all three components 

(Active, Guard, and Reserve) in our sourcing solution. The Guard and the Reserve 

have combat arms units (e.g., Infantry, Armor, Artillery, and Aviation) which are 

regarded as fully capable for combat service, and have demonstrated their abilities 

in a superb manner over the past few years. The same applies to the broad spectrum of Combat Support and Combat Service Support units and soldiers in our Reserve components. The Army will continue to select the best units capable of meeting Joint Staff and combatant command requirements, with full confidence in each 

unit’s ability to carry out its assigned mission. 

Question. What is your understanding of the Army’s plans to avoid excessive demands on personnel and units in low density, high demand specialties whose skills 

are found primarily in the Reserve, such as civil affairs, military police, and logistics? 

Answer. The Army is meeting the demands of persistent conflict by taking initiatives in force structure growth and by rebalancing capabilities across all three components to minimize excessive demand on low density, high demand specialties. The 

Grow the Army Plan approved in fiscal year 2007 increases the Army end strength 

by 74,200, a growth of 65,000 in the Active component (AC), 8,200 in the Army National Guard (ARNG), and 1,000 in the United States Army Reserve (USAR). With 

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associated redistribution of Reserve component (RC) Generating Force structure to 

build Operating Force capabilities, the Plan will increase Army Operating Force capabilities by over 80,000. Since fiscal year 2003, the Army has undertaken rebalance 

initiatives to achieve the proper mix of capabilities across all three components, 

eliminate involuntary mobilization of the RC, eliminate manning shortfalls in the 

AC, eliminate over-structure in the RC and minimize high demand/low density 

shortfalls. By the close of fiscal year 2007, the Army had completed rebalance of 

53,600 structure spaces and will rebalance an additional 88,700 spaces by fiscal year 

2013, bringing the Army rebalance total, since fiscal year 2003, to 142,300 spaces. 

The combination of the Grow the Army Plan and ongoing rebalance initiatives has 

addressed persistent shortfall capabilities increasing logistics by 24,700; Military 

Police by 16,700, Engineers by 11,400, Military Intelligence by 9,100, and adds 

11,200 of structure to SOF (to include growth in PSYOP by 2,200, Special Forces 

by 1,600 and Civil Affairs by 400). The combined impact of rebalance and growth 

will build strategic and operational depth across all three components to meet Combatant Commander requirements, mitigate high demand, low density persistent 

shortfalls, and enable strategy. 

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. What is your assessment of the Army’s ability to reach its recruiting 

goals for the Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard in fiscal year 2008 

and fiscal year 2009? 

Answer. Recruiting America’s All-Volunteer Force will continue to be a challenge 

because of the growing percentage of youth ineligible for military services (disqualified for medical, fitness, aptitude, etc,), the increased competition with private industry and other governmental agencies, and the decreasing propensity to serve the 

Nation through military service. Despite these challenges, we remain confident that 

all Army components will attain the accession targets necessary to sustain or grow 

end strength. 

Question. What is your assessment of the impact multiple deployments of troops 

to Afghanistan and Iraq is having on retention, particularly among young enlisted 

and officer personnel after their initial obligated service has been completed? 

Answer. The pace of deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq has not had an adverse 

impact on retention to date. As mentioned above, fiscal year 2007 retention of officers was slightly better than the overall 10-year average. 

The retention rates of initial term and mid-career soldiers in deploying units has 

remained between 120–140 percent since fiscal year 2005. Recently deployed units 

or units currently deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq have reenlistment rates at 110–

120 percent of their yearly goals. This is a significant indicator of the quality of 

leadership within our ranks, the fact that soldiers believe in what they are doing, 

and the fact that soldiers value the tradition of service to the Nation. 

Question. The administration has requested that Congress authorize an activeduty end strength of 532,400 for fiscal year 2009 and intends to grow the activeduty Army to 547,400 soldiers over the next several years. 

Has the Army increased its recruiting goal from fiscal year 2008? 

Answer. The Army has not increased its recruiting goals from fiscal year 2008. 

Based on current analysis, an increase in recruiting goals is not necessary to meet 

our planned growth in Army end-strength. 

Question. If not, how does the Army plan to grow the force an additional 7,000 

soldiers with no increase in recruiting? 

Answer. In addition to recruiting, the Army uses retention and loss management 

tools as levers to manage end-strength. Throughout fiscal year 2007 and the first 

half of fiscal year 2008, the Army has focused on retaining more initial term soldiers 

and has seen attrition drop to record lows. The combination of these tools has enabled the Army to grow strength without increasing recruiting goals. 

Question. When will the Army achieve an active end strength of 547,400, and once 

it does, do you foresee requesting additional end strength increases based on current 

and anticipated operational requirements? 

Answer. The Army will achieve a strength of 547,400 by 30 September 2010. 

While we grow the Army, we will continue to work the transformation, move soldiers into high demand specialties, and examine how effectively we can 

operationalize the Guard and Reserve. Then we will make a decision regarding 

whether the Army can meet the needs of the future. 

Question. According to Army data, retention of U.S. Military Academy graduates 

is lower than historical norms. The West Point class of 2000, for example, saw 34.2 

percent leave the Service as soon as they were able, and according to press accounts, 

54 percent of that class had left Active Service by the 5 year point. The Class of 

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2001 saw 35.3 percent of its graduates leave Active Service as soon as they reached 

their 5 year point, and within the next year, a total of 46 percent of that class had 

left the Service. 

How can the Army reverse this trend? 

Answer. The West Point Class of 2000 saw 35.5 percent leave the Service by the 

5 year point. The Class of 2001 saw 38.3 percent leave by the 5 year point. A year 

later (the 6 year point) 48.9 percent of Class of 2000 and 49.5 percent of Class of 

2001 had separated. These trends are not statistically different than previous Classes 1991–1999. In fact, there is not currently a statistically significant difference in 

the Army Competitive Category (ACC) Company Grade loss rates for any source of 

commission. The losses through the first 5 months of fiscal year 2008 are lower than 

previous years except for 2003, where losses were lower than normal due to the 

start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In fact, the success of recent captain and pre-commissioning retention incentives has already guaranteed the retention above historic 

rates of our valuable force of heavily combat-experienced junior officers through fiscal year 2010 and beyond. 

Question. What resources, if any, does the Army need to better manage the earlyand mid-career officer population? 

Answer. The Army has been given the authority through September 2009 to conduct an unprecedented Captains’ retention program that offers a number of incentives, including attendance at graduate school or a retention bonus, to encourage 

our best and brightest officers to remain on active duty. Though it may be too early 

to directly tie the program to recent retention trends, the Army has recently experienced increased retention among our captains over past years, with loss rates over 

the first 5 months of fiscal year 2008 lower than all but 1 of the previous 9 years 

for the same time period. Analysis of our initial phase of execution of the retention 

program compared to recent Defense Military Data Center surveys indicates that 

our incentive program has made a significant impact on the retention behavior of 

our captains. Prior surveys indicated that 52 percent of captains polled intended to 

separate or were undecided about continuing in a military career. Of those officers, 

54 percent took a menu incentive and will now retain to fiscal year 2011. The Army 

will continue to monitor and analyze officer attrition and develop additional measures to retain our highly performing officers. 

Question. Army data also shows a large increase over the past 4 years of new recruits lacking a high school diploma. In fiscal year 2003, 94 percent of all new recruits graduated from high school; in fiscal year 2007, that number dropped to 79 

percent. 

In your opinion, has the Army sacrificed quality for quantity? 

Answer. No, the Army has not lowered recruiting standards, but they have become more difficult to meet because of declining high school graduation rates and 

the toughest recruiting environment in the 34+ year history of the All-Volunteer 

Force. We remain focused on attaining Department of Defense Quality Benchmarks 

as our recruiting standards. Without exception, soldiers who enlist into the Army 

are qualified for their skill/job. 

Question. How does the Army intend to reverse this trend? 

Answer. The Army has and will continue to implement measures to reduce this 

challenge through programs and policies that increase the potential market. The 

Army is also utilizing enlistment bonuses and other incentives, such as the Army 

College Fund, Loan Repayment, and Army Advantage Fund to attract quality recruits. However, the Army will only enlist soldiers who are qualified and volunteer 

to serve this Nation. 

Question. How many Category IV soldiers did the Army recruit for the ActiveDuty Force and Army Reserve in fiscal year 2007, and what percentage of the total 

number of 2008 recruits is made up of Category IV soldiers? 

Answer. In fiscal year 2007 the Active component accessed 2,738 (3.97 percent) 

Category IV soldiers. The Army Reserve accessed 782 (3.94 percent) Category IV 

soldiers. Year-to-date fiscal year 2008 (thru February 2008) the Active component 

has accessed 1,953 Category IV soldiers (5.5 percent) and the Army Reserve has 

accessed 431 Category IV soldiers (4.61 percent). Quality Marks are measured on 

an annual basis. The number of Category IV recruits is closely monitored throughout the year. As Non-Prior Service volume increases, the Category IV percent will 

decrease. The Active Army and the Army Reserve will be within the Category IV 

benchmark of 4 percent by the end of fiscal year 2008. 

Question. According to the Army Times, a new Army assessment has concluded 

that recruits who receive moral, medical, or other waivers are less likely to drop out 

of basic training, have lower rates of personality disorder, and re-enlist in higher 

numbers than other recruits. The assessment also noted, however, that recruits who 

receive waivers are more likely to desert, experience more drug and alcohol issues, 

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and have higher rates of misconduct, including an increased likelihood of receiving 

a bad conduct discharge. 

Please describe the Army’s current use of waivers, and how these rates compare 

historically. 

Answer. The Army utilizes the recruit waiver process to extend the opportunity 

to serve the Nation to applicants who fall outside the medical, conduct, drug/alcohol, 

or administrative screening parameters established for Army recruits. Army leaders 

and physicians review the files of disqualified applicants to determine if an applicant’s previous medical, conduct, or drug/alcohol history will adversely affect his/her 

likelihood of serving successfully as a soldier. This comprehensive process allows the 

Army (and the other military services) to expand the pool of applicants willing to 

answer the Nation’s call to service. The percentage of recruits enlisting with waivers 

has increased over the past several years. Year-to-date fiscal year 2008 (thru February 2008) overall percentage of personnel who enlisted with a waiver for the Regular Army (RA) and Army Reserve (AR) combined is 19.8 percent. In fiscal year 

2007, the overall percentage of personnel who enlisted with a waiver for the RA and 

AR combined is 18.8 percent. In fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2004, the overall 

percentage of personnel who enlisted with a waiver for the RA and AR combined 

was 13.7 percent and 11.2 percent respectively. The Army will only enlist soldiers 

who are qualified and volunteer to serve this Nation. 

Question. What changes, if any, have been made in tracking and documenting the 

performance and impact, positive or negative, of recruiting more individuals requiring waivers for enlistment? 

Answer. The Army—through the Center for Accessions Research, the RAND Corporation and the Army G–1—is conducting ongoing longitudinal analyses of recent 

Fiscal Year Recruiting Cohorts to determine any significant trends and differences 

of those soldiers accessed with a waiver (i.e., medical, conduct, etc.) and those soldiers accessed not requiring a waiver. To date, results indicate soldiers with waivers 

perform comparable or better in most areas observed (e.g., promotions, awards, reenlistment). These studies, the comments of leaders in the field, and the overall performance of young soldiers during this protracted conflict indicate that the Army 

waiver process is functioning properly in its role of screening in willing applicants 

to join America’s All-Volunteer Force. 

Question. Have the increased use of waivers for criminal offenses had any impact 

to date on the good order and discipline in the units to which these soldiers have 

been assigned? 

Answer. The number of recruits requiring enlistment waivers has increased over 

the last few years, in an era of persistent conflict and growth of the Army. However, 

commanders consistently tell us how proud they are of the young volunteer, combat 

proven soldiers who are serving under them. Army mechanisms for screening these 

individuals are designed to mitigate risk and have proven very effective in the past 

and today. A recent study comparing trends of waivered soldiers and non-waivered 

soldiers who entered the Army from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2006 indicates that they perform comparably in most areas. At this time there is no indication to suggest that waivered soldiers are a detriment to the force. We will continue 

to conduct studies and analyze the trends. 

SUPPORT FOR ARMY FAMILIES IN THE REBASING INITIATIVE

Question. Plans for the relocation of numerous Army units under the Department’s rebasing initiative will present significant challenges to the continental 

United States (CONUS) installations and their surrounding local communities in 

order to ensure adequate resources, including housing and schools, are made available. 

What is your understanding of the steps being taken by the Army to ensure the 

successful implementation of rebasing for both soldiers and receiving communities? 

Answer. The Army is partnering with local communities to deal with increased 

community needs, such as schools, housing, and community activities, associated 

with Army stationing and growth. Garrison commanders and staff regularly engage 

with community leaders and have school liaison officers who facilitate communication with local education agencies to help communities deal with stationing and 

growth. Although Impact Aid is a Department of Education responsibility, the Army 

provides quarterly updates to the Department of Education on projected school-age 

dependent growth. 

The Army will rely on local communities as its primary supplier of family housing 

and will privatize or build family housing at U.S. locations only where necessary. 

To support Army Growth, Congress approved $266 million in fiscal year 2008 for 

government equity contributions for additional housing at Forts Bliss, Bragg, CarVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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son, and Lewis. Additionally, the Army is requesting $334 million in fiscal year 

2009 for government equity contributions for additional housing at Forts Bliss, Carson, and Stewart. We will program additional funds in fiscal year 2010 after updated Housing Market Analyses are completed at other gaining installations. 

Question. What actions will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the challenges 

associated with rebasing are met? 

Answer. The Army has an aggressive, carefully synchronized stationing plan that 

links Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005, Global Defense Posture Realignment, Army Modular Force Transformation, and Grow the Force. The Army’s BRAC 

plan supports these major stationing initiatives, while supporting ongoing missions 

and national security priorities, and is designed to meet the September 2011 statutory BRAC implementation deadline. 

The Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2008 contained a significant 

decrease in BRAC funding, of which $560 million was reduced from the Army’s 

BRAC budget. I cannot overstate the difficulties that cuts or delays in BRAC funding pose to the Army as we implement BRAC and restationing plans. If the $560 

million decrement is not restored, the Army will find it very difficult to comply with 

all aspects of the BRAC Law. 

If confirmed, I will ensure Army stationing requirements are fully vetted and 

work with Congress to garner the resources to implement our BRAC and stationing 

requirements in a timely and efficient manner. 

SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED SOLDIERS

Question. Wounded soldiers from Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom deserve the highest priority from the Army for support services, healing and 

recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from 

active duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. 

What is your assessment of the effectiveness of Army programs now in place to 

care for the wounded, including the Wounded Warrior Program, and programs for 

soldiers in Warrior Transition Units (WTUs)? 

Answer. The Army has made and continues to make significant improvements in 

the areas of infrastructure, leadership, and processes as part of our Army Medical 

Action Plan (AMAP). Over the past 12 months, execution of the AMAP has seen the 

creation of 35 WTUs at installations across the Army. These WTUs are staffed by 

2,655 personnel who provide care and support to over 9,339 soldiers and their families. Although I believe these programs are a significant improvement over past 

practices, we need to continue tracking and monitoring the programs through a variety of internal and external feedback mechanisms. If confirmed, I will continue 

this transformational effort to care for and support our wounded, ill, and injured 

soldiers and their families. 

Question. How does the Army provide follow-on assistance to wounded personnel 

who have separated from active service? 

Answer. The Army has a number of programs to assist wounded personnel who 

have separated from active service. In close coordination with the Department of 

Veterans Affairs, the Army has added 16 Veterans Affairs advisors at major medical 

treatment facilities to facilitate the process of applying for benefits and finalizing 

arrangements for follow-on care and services, all with the view to ensuring that everything is in place when soldiers transition to civilian status. 

The Army recently created the Wounded Warrior Education Initiative, which will 

allow participants to complete an advanced degree and then return to the Army to 

work in assignments in the Institutional Army where their education and personal 

experiences can be put to the best use. In addition, the Army is currently piloting 

the Warrior Transition Employment Reintegration and Training Program at Fort 

Bragg, NC. This program enables Wounded Warriors, working with the staff of the 

Soldier Family Assistance Centers—which support WTUs and are operated by the 

Army Installation Management Command—to receive education and training in the 

development of a resume, networking, and job seeking skills. Through this program, 

Warriors in Transition are assisted by counselors from the Army Wounded Warrior 

Program, Veterans Affairs advisors, and the staff of the Army Career and Alumni 

Program to develop a winning approach to obtaining employment when they leave 

the Army. 

I also want to highlight the U.S. Army Wounded Warrior Program (AW2) which 

assists and advocates for severely wounded, ill, or injured soldiers and their families 

throughout their lifetimes, wherever they are located. AW2 currently serves more 

than 2,300 soldiers, 600 on active duty and 1,700 veterans. AW2 Program caseworkers work with soldiers and their families to address and mitigate proactively 

any issues they may encounter in their recovery. If confirmed, it will be my honor 

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to do all I can to ensure that those who have given so much for their country know 

that the Army will always be there for them. 

Question. How is the Army seeking to measure and ensure the effectiveness of 

these programs? 

Answer. Tracking performance is critical to managing, adjusting, and resourcing 

WTU operations. The Army is using Unit Status Reports and other measures to 

track short-, near-, and long-term objectives. These measures show specific details, 

to include day-to-day operations, but also provide aggregate trending information to 

ensure the organization is on the correct path to success. If confirmed, I would continue to use this dashboard approach to monitoring performance on all standards. 

Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you 

would pursue to increase the Army’s support for wounded soldiers, and to monitor 

their progress in returning to civilian life? 

Answer. I think we have some terrific programs in place to support our wounded, 

ill, and injured soldiers, including some recent pilot programs. If confirmed, I intend 

to monitor the success of these pilot programs to assess their potential for expansion. I would like to continue to partner with academic institutions, industry, and 

Congress to find innovative ways to return all of our Warriors to productive civilian 

lives as proud veterans. 

JOINT ACQUISITION PROGRAMS

Question. What are your views regarding joint acquisition programs, such as the 

Joint Tactical Radio System? 

Answer. There are great efficiencies to be gained by joint programs as opposed 

to individual Service procurements. Joint programs have the advantages of economies of scale, reduction in Service spares inventories, and Service sharing of training costs. However, the critical start-point for a joint program is a ‘‘joint’’ requirement. Without a solid joint requirement, it is doubtful that a joint acquisition program will be cost effective. 

Question. Do you see utility in encouraging the Services to conduct more joint development, especially in the area of helicopters and unmanned systems? 

Answer. Yes, a joint development approach has utility in this area. Key national 

strategic guidance and well defined joint capability voids provide incentives for the 

Services to collaborate to define and produce weapon systems that best meet our national security needs. At the same time, it is very important for the Services to 

maintain separate resourcing and the ability to manage to Service priorities within 

a jointly-enabled construct without adversely constraining or increasing program 

costs. 

Question. If so, what enforcement mechanisms would you recommend to implement more joint program acquisition? 

Answer. DOD has an established process for the development and approval of 

joint capability documents. This process includes oversight at the Joint Service level 

through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). As these capabilities are 

evaluated, a joint service designation is assigned. In response to these capabilities 

documents, DOD Initiative 5000.2 stipulates that joint service programs must be approved, and any changes therein must be approved, by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)). Further, as the Services 

and DOD prepare their budget submissions, resourcing decisions can be made by 

the Service or OSD. Lastly, with the creation of Capability Portfolio Managers 

(CPMs) at the OSD level, a CPM can recommend a host of possible decisions to the 

OSD leadership. 

REQUIREMENTS AND PLANNING PROCESSES

Question. As rising personnel and operation and maintenance costs expend an increasing portion of the Army’s budget authority, and as competing demands for Federal dollars increase in the future years, it is likely that the Army will have to address the challenges of reset, modernization, and transformation with fewer and 

fewer resources. 

What changes, if any, would you recommend to the way the Army prioritizes resources to maintain the momentum of Army transformation? 

Answer. Army personnel and operations and maintenance costs are accounting for 

a larger proportion of our base budget and will continue to do so in the foreseeable 

future. This growth naturally increases the tension between these costs and our investments, which we use to transform the Army. Since 2002, the strategic environment has changed dramatically, requiring our Nation’s Army to reorganize, grow, 

restation, and transform while fighting the war on terrorism. These demands have 

caused the Army to become more dependent on supplementals. While increases in 

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our base budget provide for growth of the Army, they have not kept pace with operational demands that the Army must respond to and request support for, largely 

through requests for supplemental appropriations. 

I believe the Army has, and will continue to implement, a sound resourcing 

scheme that produces a force that meets the needs of the Nation. However, without 

a reduction in expected missions or increased resources to match increased missions, 

the Army will eventually lose the ability to modernize and sustain current capabilities. We have experienced this situation in the past. During the 1990s, Army investment was reduced sharply, which created significant equipment shortages in our 

forces that we have been scrambling to correct with new procurement, just-in-time 

fieldings and retention of theater-provided equipment. Another approach to sustaining transformation would be to concentrate our modernization efforts on a reduced force structure, but that would be inconsistent with current demand. Using 

the lessons from today’s fight, we are transforming to a future force with even more 

robust protection capabilities. The Army is committed to providing the best protection to our soldiers today and in the future. 

BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS

Question. The military Services are in the process of developing business plans 

for the implementation of the 2005 Defense Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 

decisions. 

What do you see as the responsibilities of the Department of the Army in implementing BRAC decisions? 

Answer. The Army is responsible for executing both the Army’s BRAC recommendations and a portion of the joint cross service group recommendations, as 

assigned by the USD(AT&L). The Army has developed business plans and budget 

justification materials, and is executing the program in accordance with those plans 

and the BRAC appropriations. 

Question. What do you see as the priorities of the Department of the Army in implementing BRAC decisions? 

Answer. The Army’s priority is to complete the construction projects required to 

enable unit and organizational moves from closing and realigning installations to 

meet the timeframe directed by the law. The bulk of construction funds ($13 billion) 

will be used in fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010. This is a carefully integrated plan. 

If the Army program is not fully funded in a timely manner each year, we will be 

significantly challenged to execute BRAC as intended. 

Question. The DOD installation closure process resulting from BRAC decisions 

has historically included close cooperation with the affected local community in 

order to allow these communities an active role in the reuse of property. In rare 

cases, the goals of the local community may not be compatible with proposals considered by the Department of Defense. For example, the recent closure of the Walter 

Reed Medical Center in Washington, DC, will present opportunities for both the 

local community and the Federal Government to re-use the land based on potentially competing plans. 

If confirmed, what goals and policies would you propose to assist affected communities with economic development, revitalization, and re-use planning of property received as a result of the BRAC process? 

Answer. If confirmed, and with the guidance of the Secretary, I will work closely 

with the Office of Economic Adjustment, Local Redevelopment Authorities, the Governors, and other appropriate State and local officials to accelerate the property disposal process whenever possible. The Army has completed the Federal screening 

and has made the determination of surplus for all of the closure installations except 

for the Chemical Demilitarization facilities. The Local Redevelopment Authorities 

are submitting their redevelopment plans, and they will be integrated into the Army 

property disposal process. 

Question. What lessons did the Army learn during the BRAC process that you 

would recommend be included in future BRAC legislation? 

Answer. I believe the Army is generally satisfied with the current BRAC authorities, and, if confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to execute BRAC 

2005. 

TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION

Question. The Department’s efforts to quickly transition technologies to the 

warfighter have yielded important results in the last few years. Challenges remain 

in institutionalizing the transition of new technologies into existing programs of 

record and major weapons systems and platforms. 

What challenges to transition do you see within the Army? 

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Answer. The Army carefully coordinates between acquisition programs of record 

and the laboratories and Research, Development and Engineering Centers (RDECs) 

which are developing and evaluating technology options for these programs. The 

Army’s key advanced technology demonstration efforts are required to have a technology transition agreement with the receiving acquisition program. However, because of the demands of the ongoing global war on terror, the Army has not been 

able to fund some acquisition programs to receive the technology that has been matured. 

The Army also fields technologies rapidly through the Rapid Equipping Force and 

the Rapid Fielding Initiative. Technologies transitioned to the field via these programs typically have not been through a formal acquisition development, and the 

Army must deal with the challenges of ensuring that this equipment is safe, effective, and logistically supportable in the operational environment. Further, even for 

those technologies that have been effective in the theatres of operation, the Army 

has procedures to assess the military utility of those technologies for full spectrum 

Army-wide applications. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that technologies are rapidly 

transitioned from the laboratory into the hands of the warfighter? 

Answer. The Army laboratories and RDECs work closely with industry, academia, 

and the other Services and Defense Agencies to explore technology options for the 

soldier. As discussed above, the Army’s key advanced technology demonstration efforts are required to have a technology transition agreement with the receiving acquisition program. These agreements document what products the Science and 

Technology (S&T) program will deliver, at what time, and with what level of performance and maturity, as well as the transition path forward for that technology. 

The Army will continue to focus on obtaining validated needs and continue to synchronize work between S&T and program evaluation offices and program managers. 

We must guard against pressures for technology solutions from the non-technical 

community that reads the popular press and thinks that they are ‘‘discovering’’ technology opportunities. This may lead to unrealistic expectations about technology capabilities and the temptation to redirect disciplined technology development and 

technology maturity assessments towards work of less technical merit which is typically unable to withstand rigorous evaluation. 

Question. What steps would you take to enhance the effectiveness of technology 

transition efforts? 

Answer. The Army is rapidly fielding the best new equipment to the current force 

through several initiatives, including the Rapid Equipping Force and the Rapid 

Fielding Initiative. The Army’s number one priority is force protection of our soldiers with individual weapons and protective equipment. I would plan to upgrade 

and modernize existing systems to ensure all soldiers have the equipment they 

need. I would incorporate new technologies derived from the Army Science and 

Technology program, and from Future Combat System (FCS) development. I would 

field the FCS Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). FCS is the core of the Army’s modernization effort and will provide our soldiers an unparalleled understanding of 

their operational environment, increased precision and lethality, and enhanced survivability. My objective will be to have our soldiers equipped with world-class weapon systems and equipment, keeping the Army the most dominant land power in the 

world with full-spectrum capabilities. 

ARMY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ENGINEERING CENTERS AND LABORATORIES

Question. Among the roles the Army’s Research, Development, and Engineering 

Centers and Laboratories are supposed to play is the development of innovative systems and technologies, supporting their transition to the warfighter, and supporting 

the Army in making technically sound acquisition decisions. 

In your opinion, are the Army’s Research, Development, and Engineering Centers 

and Laboratories sufficiently resourced in funding, personnel and equipment to perform these missions? 

Answer. Despite the demands of the ongoing global war on terrorism the Army 

has been able to maintain its Science and Technology (S&T) investment at over $1.7 

billion for each of the past three budget requests and has actually increased its proposed fiscal year 2009 S&T investment to $1.8 billion. We believe this level of investment is sufficient to support our S&T personnel, projects, and equipment consistent with our broad resource demands. 

Question. In your view, do the Army’s Research, Development, and Engineering 

Centers and Laboratories have the appropriate personnel systems and authorities 

to support the recruiting and retaining of their needed highly qualified technical 

workforce? 

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Answer. Under congressionally authorized laboratory demonstration program authorities, the Army has the appropriate personnel systems and authorities to support the recruiting and retaining of their highly qualified technical workforce. The 

laboratories and centers have already taken significant advantage of the authorities 

provided by Congress for recruiting bonuses, laboratory pay banding, pay-for-performance, incentive awards, and employee advanced education and development 

programs. Our vital laboratory infrastructure is fundamental to exploit the knowledge of our people and to attract and retain the most talented scientists and engineers to work for the Army. 

Question. Do the Army’s Research, Development and Engineering Centers and 

Laboratories have the appropriate flexibility for technology transfer and authority 

to support in-house laboratory research in order to help them best support their 

missions? 

Answer. Yes the Army has sufficient authority for the technology transfer and authority to support in-house laboratory research. What in your view are the biggest 

deficiencies in the performance of the Army’s Research, Development, and Engineering Centers and Laboratories? 

Answer. The biggest deficiency in the performance of the Army’s Research, Development and Engineering Centers and Laboratories is their inability to effectively 

modernize their laboratory infrastructure. 

Question. If confirmed, what would you plan to do to address those deficiencies? 

Answer. To the maximum extent possible, the Army’s Research, Development and 

Engineering Centers and Laboratories will utilize the flexibility provided in title 10, 

U.S.C., section 2805, to recapitalize critical mission infrastructure. We are also seeking to reauthorize the Laboratory Revitalization Demonstration Program and increase the associated minor construction limit to $2.5 million, with a $3 million 

limit for unspecified minor construction. The renewal will provide laboratory/center 

directors the ability to recapitalize critical mission infrastructure and reduce reliance on military construction to meet critical mission needs and corrects construction approval limits to account for major increase in the cost of laboratory construction over more common forms of construction. 

COMMISSION ON ARMY ACQUISITION AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT IN EXPEDITIONARY

OPERATIONS

Question. The Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations concluded that ‘‘the Army sent a skeleton contracting force 

into theater without the tools or resources necessary to adequately support our 

warfighters.’’ According to the Commission, ‘‘Contracting, from requirements definition to contract management, is not an Army Core Competence. The Army has excellent, dedicated people; but they are understaffed, overworked, undertrained, 

undersupported and, most important, undervalued.’’

Do you agree with the conclusions reached by the Commission? 

Answer. The Army greatly appreciates the work of the Commission and is in full 

agreement with the Commission’s general recommendations for improvement. Many 

of the Commission’s recommendations are consistent with the issues identified by 

the Army Contracting Study completed in 2005 and the Army Contracting Task 

Force, which was Co-Chaired by Kathryn Condon and LTG Ross Thompson, U.S. 

Army. The Army is currently addressing structural weaknesses and shortcomings 

identified in the reports with a view to improving both current and future expeditionary contracting operations. The Army is conducting in-depth analysis of all 

areas. Significant action has already been taken against most of the 22 findings of 

the Gansler Commission recommendations specific to the Army. The Army is aggressively addressing the structural weaknesses and shortcomings identified to improve current and future Army contracting activities. Our actions stretch across the 

Army and include an ongoing, comprehensive review of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel, and facilities 

Question. If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in addressing these 

concerns? 

Answer. Secretary of the Army Geren recently announced the establishment of 

the Army Contracting Campaign Plan, which is a focused commitment to implement 

changes across the Army to ensure that our doctrine, manning, training, and support structure for contracting are comprehensive, consistent and fully implemented. 

Secretary Geren directed Under Secretary of the Army, Hon. Ford, to implement 

specific recommendations of both the Gansler Commission and the Army Contracting Task Force as expeditiously as possible. The Army is committed to finishing 

the development and then implementing an Army-wide contracting campaign plan 

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cilities. Achieving this objective will require resources, time, and sustained leadership focus. The contracting campaign plan will continue the initiatives already underway in the Army. The VCSA is the conduit for ensuring the consistency in coordination necessary to implement and institutionalize changes across the Army as 

related to doctrine, manning, training and support structure changes. 

Question. The Commission report states that ‘‘The Army’s difficulty in adjusting 

to the singular problems of Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan is in large part due to 

the fact that there are no Generals assigned to contracting responsibilities.’’ The 

commission recommends that Congress authorize ‘‘a core set of ten additional General Officers for contracting positions.’’

Do you support the recommendation of the Commission? 

Answer. I support the Army’s plans to continue to grow additional military contracting structure in the Active Force and civilian contracting workforce in line with 

the Gansler Commission recommendations. Specifically, Secretary Geren directed 

the realignment of the U.S. Army Contracting Agency (ACA) to the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) and the establishment of the U.S. Army Contracting Command (ACC) (Provisional) under AMC. The ACC (Provisional) stand-up ceremony on 

March 13, 2008 is in keeping with the Gansler Commission’s second recommendation—to restructure Army contracting organizations and restore responsibility to 

better facilitate contracting and contract management in expeditionary and U.S.-

based operations. The ACC is a two-star level command with two one-star level subordinate commands—an Expeditionary Contracting Command and an Installation 

Contracting Command. The Army is seeking five additional general officer authorizations to lead these commands and to fill additional contracting leadership needs 

outside of AMC. This recommendation will restore Uniformed Contracting General 

Officer positions cut as part of Acquisition drawdowns in the 1990s. 

Question. In your view, is legislation required to implement this recommendation, 

or can the Army assign new General Officers to contracting functions without legislation? 

Answer. There is flexibility to assign General Officers to contracting functions 

within the Army’s current General Officer allocations. Given the current optempo 

and the stress on Army leadership, both military and civilian, the Army’s current 

allotment of General Officers cannot support the new contracting requirements. 

Therefore, the Army is working closely with OSD to obtain authority for five additional Army General Officer billets for contracting. 

Question. The Commission report states that ‘‘The number and expertise of the 

military contracting professionals must be significantly increased’’ to address the 

problems we have experienced in theater. The Commission recommends that the 

Army hire 2,000 new contracting personnel. 

Do you support the recommendation of the Commission? 

Answer. The acquisition workforce has declined significantly in the last decade 

(25 percent cut mandated by Congress in National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 1996) while the number of dollars we are executing in the Army has 

increased more than 4-fold ($23.3 billion–1992 vs. $100.6 billion–2006). The Army 

has never fought an extended conflict that required such reliance on contractor support. We are currently addressing the need to expand, train, structure, and empower 

our contracting personnel to support the full range of military operations. To date, 

the Army has identified the need to increase Army contracting and support personnel by 906 military positions and 1,327 civilian positions. These numbers are organizational assessments and may go up or down as our Army Contracting Campaign Planning analysis continues. 

Question. What is your understanding of the steps being taken to implement this 

recommendation? 

Answer. Contingency Contracting force structure increases were being incorporated in the Army’s modular force design even prior to the establishment of the 

Army Contracting Task Force. While the Army did not have the force structure necessary to support expeditionary operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have now 

established a contingency contracting structure that consists of Contracting Support 

Brigades (commanded by a Colonel), Contingency Contracting Battalions, and Contingency Contracting Teams. Recommended increases of 906 military and 1,327 civilians are now under review as part of Army Contracting Campaign Plan process 

to fill the new Army contracting structure. 

Question. The Commission report states that most civilians working on contracting issues in Iraq were ‘‘volunteers, often with inadequate or wrong skill sets 

for the job at hand, and often getting their required contracting experience on-thejob as part of their deployment.’’ The Commission recommends that qualified civilians who agree to deploy be provided enhanced career and job incentives. These inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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clude the elimination of an existing pay cap, tax free status, and long-term medical 

care for injuries incurred in-theater. 

Do you support the recommendations of the Commission? 

Answer. The Army agrees with the Commission that civilians who agree to deploy 

deserve the benefits and professional opportunities commensurate with their skills, 

hardships and contributions. We are working with OSD to examine the entitlements, compensation, and benefits currently afforded to deployed civilian employees. 

As we identify areas in need of improvement or enhancement, we will work with 

the OSD and the administration to seek legislative changes. 

Question. What is your understanding of the steps that the Army has taken, or 

plans to take, to implement these recommendations? 

Answer. The Army has conducted a review of the pay and benefits that are afforded to deployed civilians. We have also partnered with a team led by OSD. Several legislative and regulatory reforms have been identified to improve the benefits 

for deployed civilians and we have initiated the staffing process in these areas. To 

enhance incentives for civilian contracting personnel to ‘‘pre-volunteer’’ for expeditionary operations, OSD has taken the lead to request a legislative change to waive 

the annual limitation on premium pay and the aggregate limitation on pay for Federal civilian employees. In addition, OSD is working with the U.S. Department of 

Labor to ensure there are no conflicts with Workers’ Compensation Laws. The Office 

of Management and Budget disapproved a proposal to provide combat zone tax benefits for civilian employees; OSD is considering an appeal of this decision. 

Question. The Commission report states that some DOD and Army policies actively discourage the deployment of civilians. For example, the report states that 

volunteers are required to be sent on ‘detail’ so that the providing office has to pay 

salary and expenses of deploying civilians out of their existing budgets without any 

reimbursement or backfilling. As a result, the Commission reports, managers in the 

U.S. have actively discouraged civilians from volunteering. 

Do you agree with the Commission’s findings on this issue? 

Answer. The Army does not have evidence suggesting that employees have been 

discouraged from deploying. In some instances, however, organizations have been 

required to continue paying salary and other expenses of deployed employees. With 

the current tight budget situation, commands are often unable to backfill a deployed 

civilian. We are working with OSD to clarify the policy in this area to reduce the 

organizational disruptions caused by deployment of civilian personnel. The Army 

Contracting Campaign Plan Task Force is also studying options to assist CONUS 

organizations that lose deployed civilian volunteers, by activating Reserve component soldiers, enabling them to get much needed contracting experience prior to an 

overseas deployment. 

Question. What is your understanding of the steps that the Army has taken, or 

plans to take, to address this problem? 

Answer. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) 

issued a memo on February 12, 2008, with the subject ‘‘Building Increased Civilian 

Deployment Capacity.’’ In the memo and attached policy guidance, Dr. Chu reiterated the need to support the deployment of DOD civilians for contingency contracting operations. The Department of the Army fully supports the requirement to 

deploy civilians and lift the burden from losing organizations, and will continue to 

review recommendations for resolving the issue. 

Question. The report states that Contracting Officer’s Representatives (CORs) are 

an ‘‘essential part of contract management’’, because they are responsible for ensuring contract performance. According to the report, however, ‘‘CORs are assigned as 

an ‘extra duty,’ requiring no experience the COR assignment is often used to send 

a young soldier to the other side of the base when a commander does not want to 

have to deal with the person. Additionally, little, if any training is provided despite 

this, there are still too few CORs. Moreover, COR turnover is high, frequently leaving many gaps in contract coverage.’’

Do you agree with the Commission’s assessment of the CORs assigned in Iraq and 

Afghanistan? 

Answer. Yes, a Contracting Officer Representative (COR) town hall in Kuwait led 

by ACTF leadership in October 2007 identified both individual COR training and 

execution shortcomings. CORs stated that they lacked the appropriate level of training and expertise to oversee complex theater contracts. While CORs are not contracting personnel, they are the ‘‘eyes and ears’’ of the contracting officer and the 

customer, and must be viewed with the appropriate level of authority across the 

Army. The customer in most cases is also a Commander. The COR is also the ‘‘eyes 

and ears’’ of the Commander. Today’s commanders get much of their warfighting 

support from contractors. As we train and educate our leaders to understand the 

implications of predominantly contracted-support to operations vs. traditional miliVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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tary support they will fully understand and acknowledge the importance of the 

COR. 

Question. What is your understanding of the steps that the Army has taken, or 

plans to take, to address this problem? 

Answer. A standard, minimum training requirement has already been established 

for Army CORs. CORs must complete the Defense Acquisition University on-line 

continuous learning module, ‘‘COR with a Mission Focus,’’ prior to appointment. As 

of November 1, 2007, over 4500 Army personnel have completed this course. Since 

October 1, 2007, 190 CORs have been trained in Kuwait. All contracts awarded now 

by the Kuwait Contracting Office have a trained COR performing surveillance. 

MILITARY ROLE IN DOMESTIC EMERGENCIES

Question. Shortfalls in the Nation’s ability to respond to national and manmade 

disasters, including terrorist attacks, as discussed in the final report of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, have resulted in debate about the appropriate role of the Department of Defense and the Armed Forces in responding to 

domestic emergencies. 

In your view, should the Army have a larger role in responding to domestic emergencies that require military support? 

Answer. Our Nation has been at war for over 6 years. Our Army—Active, Guard, 

and Reserve—has been a leader in this war and has been fully engaged in Iraq, Afghanistan, and defending the homeland. The Army has always supported requests 

for military assistance and will continue to do so. However, the ‘‘role’’ of the Army 

in domestic emergencies should continue to remain within prescribed law and in 

support of the Department of Homeland Security or other lead Federal agency. 

Question. What do you believe the Army’s role should be in supporting U.S. 

Northern Command in homeland defense and civil support missions, including consequence management of a domestic WMD attack? 

Answer. The Department of Defense and United States Northern Command have 

worked in concert with the Department of Homeland Security to plan and prepare 

for response to domestic emergencies. United States Army North is the dedicated 

Army Service Component Command to the United States Northern Command for 

Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities for the CONUS and 

Alaska. 

Northern Command is the Department of Defense’s conduit to each Federal Emergency Management Agency Region for Defense Support to Civil Authorities. The 

Command collocates within the Federal Emergency Management Agency Headquarters and builds synergy and habitual relationships with Federal Emergency 

Management Agency staff, other government agencies, State emergency responders, 

State Adjutant Generals, and potential base support installations. 

When a domestic emergency occurs, including chemical, biological, or nuclear attack, the affected Governor or Governors shall first employ their Air and/or Army 

National Guard with state authority, if required. Each State and Territory has its 

own Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team (for detection and identification). Moreover, 17 States have created federally-funded National Guard Chemical, 

Biological, Nuclear and high yield Explosive Enhanced Response Force Packages 

(commonly known as CERFP) for search and rescue, decontamination, emergency 

medical care, and force protection. These force packages are designed to support all 

States within their FEMA region and also may deploy throughout the country. 

In an event of a catastrophic impact, the States will likely request Federal military assistance. The Army provides the majority of assets to Northern Command for 

the Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and high yield Explosive Consequence Management Response Force (commonly known as CCMRF). This force provides assessment 

teams and enhances the civil authority’s ability to provide command and control, 

medical, logistics, extraction and decontamination, transportation, security, public 

affairs and mortuary affairs. 

Question. What is your assessment of the Army National Guard’s ability to meet 

its state contingency and homeland defense missions, given its operational commitments overseas and current personnel and equipment shortfalls? 

Answer. The Army National Guard continues to demonstrate its ability to respond 

to state contingency and homeland missions as well as to its operational commitments. 

The States use their Army National Guard assets cooperatively through participation in the Emergency Management Assistance Compact. As you know, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact is a congressionally ratified organization 

that provides form and structure to interstate mutual aid. Through the Compact, 

a disaster impacted state can request and receive assistance from other member 

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states quickly and efficiently; the Compact resolves two key issues upfront: liability 

and reimbursement. 

Current Army planning, programming, and budgeting process has been effective 

in examining, assessing, prioritizing and allocating resources to the Total Army—

the Active component and the Reserve components. The Army is currently executing 

and programming unprecedented resource levels to the Reserve components. The Director of the Army National Guard and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau are 

fully represented in Army planning and programming deliberations. Their respective staffs have been integrated directly into the HQDA staff so that we fully understand Reserve component requirements resulting in an improved total force. 

Since September 11, 2001, the Army has resourced over $49 billion in Army National Guard procurement (for fiscal years 2001–2013). Funding and equipment distributions are firewalled: promises made are promises kept. For fiscal years 2001–

2007, the Army resourced $15.3 billion in Army National Guard procurement. Over 

the next 24 months, the Army will distribute over 400,000 items of equipment to 

the Army National Guard, valued at $17.5 billion—36 percent of Total Army distributions. This includes 16,000 trucks, 31,000 radios, 74,000 night vision devices, 

and 86,000 weapons. 

TRANSITION OF THAAD TO THE ARMY

Question. The Army currently produces and operates the Patriot air and missile 

defense system, including the PAC–3 system. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is being developed and initially fielded by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), with the plan that it will be transitioned and transferred to the Army 

at some point. 

What is your view of the best approach to transitioning the THAAD system to 

the Army? 

Answer. The Army and MDA have been working plans to transition and transfer 

those Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) elements including the Theater High 

Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system for which the Army is the lead Service. We 

have collaborated on the past two annual Transition and Transfer Plans and participate in Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) for each element to work the specific details associated with transition and transfer. Transition and transfer was the main 

topic of a recent Army/MDA Board of Directors meeting where it was decided that 

the best approach for transitioning the THAAD system was to develop and sign an 

overarching memorandum of agreement (MOA) that incorporates individual, eventdriven element annexes to further guide the transition and transfer process. 

Question. When do you believe it should happen, and where should the initial 

funding come from? 

Answer. The Army and MDA will be collaborating on defining a series of event 

driven milestones which are designed to minimize cost and reduce risk, while 

transitioning an operational capability to the Army. This operational capability will 

be verified through participation in Force Development Experimentation (FDE) and 

Limited User Test (LUT). At that point I believe an informed decision to transition 

can be made. 

Initial funding should come from a Defense Wide account. The funding would stay 

within the DOD agency. MDA would use the account to fund R&D, Procurement 

and sustainment activities. The services will program for military pay, and specific 

O&M costs. Detailed funding responsibilities will be specified in the MOA and the 

annexes. 

Question. Do you have any concerns, including resource concerns, about 

transitioning THAAD to the Army? 

Answer. Our primary concern with the transition and transfer of BMDS elements 

to the Army is long term affordability. Element transitions must only occur when 

full funding is secured. The procurement and operations and support costs anticipated at transfer are beyond the Army’s ability to program and fund without a total 

obligation authority (TOA) increase. 

FORCE PROTECTION PROGRAMS

Question. Over the past several years, the Army, with the support of Congress, 

has concentrated on the procurement of force protection measures (e.g., Interceptor 

Body Armor, uparmored high mobility multipurpose vehicles, counterimprovised explosive device measures) primarily relying on supplemental appropriations. 

If confirmed, what problems do you foresee and what priority would you place on 

continuing to expand and fund force protection programs, even in the absence of 

supplemental appropriations legislation? 

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Answer. I appreciate the assistance of Congress in protecting our soldiers by supporting Army critical Force Protection programs. I can assure you that equipment 

necessary to protect the lives of soldiers will always be my highest priority for funding. The Army has become increasingly dependent upon supplemental funds to meet 

war-related requirements and many programs funded through supplemental appropriations, like force protection, have persisted—a symptom of finding ourselves in 

an era of persistent conflict. As your question implies, we must continue critical enduring programs even if supplemental appropriations go away. Finally, the Army 

must be prepared for full spectrum operations globally in an era of persistent conflict. While doing so it is important to balance current force needs against modernizing so our soldiers are never in a fair fight. 

EQUIPMENT RESET

Question. The ongoing requirements of the global war on terror have significantly 

increased usage rates on the Army’s equipment. As a result, we know there will be 

a requirement to ‘‘reset’’ the force not only as the current operations continue but 

also for some time after they conclude. Given the ongoing nature of both the war 

in Iraq and the larger war on terror, we need to ensure that our force remains ready 

to respond to whatever contingencies arise. 

Do you think that the Army’s equipment reset program meets the requirements 

of the global war on terror, as well as the requirements for transition to a modular 

force? 

Answer. The Army’s reset program has kept pace with the requirements for deployed forces by maintaining equipment readiness with rates at more than 90 percent for ground equipment and more than 75 percent for aviation equipment. As you 

know, our reset efforts are a significant element of our efforts to maintain readiness 

across the force. Timely and predictable funding is key to ensuring that these reset 

requirements are met. 

Question. In your view, what is the greatest source of risk in the Army reset program and, if confirmed, how would you eliminate or mitigate that risk? 

Answer. Timely and accurate funding is the greatest source of risk to the Army’s 

reset program. Full funding received at the beginning of the fiscal year allows for 

the early purchase of long lead parts which reduce reset timelines, minimizes delays 

in replacing battle losses, and ensures the retention of the skilled labor force at the 

depots. To mitigate this risk, it is imperative for the Army to maintain constant and 

open communication to ensure that our requirements and the reasoning behind 

them are understood. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that sufficient resources are programmed and requested in the Army’s budget to meet reset requirements and provide trained and ready forces across the spectrum of military operations? 

Answer. The development of the Army’s reset requirements is driven by current 

wartime commitments: size of force structure; operational tempo; equipment stress; 

battle losses; lessons learned; and the need to reconstitute equipment readiness for 

the next contingency, which could be any mission across the full spectrum of conflict 

from low intensity to full spectrum operations. Current operations have greatly increased the wear and tear on our equipment and the associated reset requirements 

must be funded to ensure Army readiness. 

Question. What is your understanding regarding the capacity at which our repair 

depots are operating to meet recapitalization, modernization, rebuild, and repair requirements for reset? 

Answer. Depots are not operating at full/maximum capacity but are operating at 

a level that theater equipment retrograde will support. In peace time our depots expend approximately 12 million direct labor hours annually. They are currently executing 27 million and have the capacity to expand up to 40 million. Each depot’s 

production capacity is being optimized by equipment type/commodity. Our depots 

have enabled deployed forces to maintain equipment readiness for the last 5 years 

at 90 percent or better for ground equipment and 75 percent or better for aviation 

and are repairing enough equipment to meet the requirements of the next deploying 

force. Should Army requirements change, depots could do more and increase their 

capacity with predictable funding, available spare parts, increased work force and 

more retrograded equipment. 

Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe could be taken to increase 

the Army’s capacity to fix its equipment and make it available for operations and 

training? 

Answer. Timely and adequate funding is essential. It enables depots to procure 

long lead time parts, maintain a skilled workforce, replace and repair maintenance 

equipment and set the conditions for resetting our redeploying forces. In addition, 

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we are putting in place several logistic initiatives that will speed retrograde, improve asset visibility, reduce transportation time and target certain equipment for 

direct return to depots. These initiatives are being tested in the CSA Reset Pilot 

Program and are already beginning to show results. Depots are implementing Lean 

Six Sigma programs and are showing tremendous success in improving production 

rates and reducing turn around times. 

ARMY PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT

Question. The Army has long included as a critical element of its strategic readiness sufficient prepositioned equipment and stocks around the world and afloat to 

accelerate the deployment and employment of forces in response to crises. However, 

Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) are nearly completely committed in support of operations in Iraq leaving the Army and the Nation little strategic flexibility or options. 

What changes, if any, to policies regarding use of prepositioned equipment stocks 

would you recommend if confirmed? 

Answer. No changes are recommended to the current policy for the use of APS 

at this time. The last 4 years demonstrated that the APS program was flexible, responsive, and critical to the Army’s ability to deploy forces in support of COCOM 

requirements and adapt to changing strategic requirements. The Army carefully 

monitors the use of APS assets and closely coordinates their use with the Combatant Commanders. Whenever use of APS equipment is required, the Army evaluates 

the strategic risk and implements mitigation factors. We must continue to replenish 

our APS with ‘‘modernized’’ equipment that meets the needs of the modular force. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the current plan for reconstituting Army prepositioned equipment to re-establish this strategic capability? 

Answer. APS capabilities will be reconstituted to provide the maximum level of 

strategic flexibility and operational agility. The Army has an APS Strategy 2015 

which articulates the afloat and ashore equipment required to meet the future responsiveness needs of the combatant commanders. Reconstitution of APS is already 

underway and the Army has an executable timeline to reset its APS sets according 

to the APS Strategy 2015, contingent on available resources and operational requirements. 

EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY

Question. Do you believe that the Army has enough equipment to fully support 

the pre-deployment training and operations for the next rotation to OIF/OEF? 

Answer. The Army has enough equipment to ensure forces are adequately prepared for and can successfully conduct operations in OIF/OEF. No soldier will go 

into combat without the proper training and equipment. There are, however, some 

equipment shortages in CONUS that require sharing equipment among pre-deployed units to ensure they are fully trained before deploying. Equipment sharing 

is generally managed at the brigade or division-level by transferring equipment 

among units to support specific training events. The Army works diligently to schedule forces for deployment as early as possible and to project the mission they must 

perform when deployed. As part of each synchronization cycle, a Department-level 

Force Validation Committee works to ensure that deploying forces are provided all 

the personnel and equipment required for their mission. Additionally, a Training 

Support and Resources Conference meets to ensure deploying forces have all the 

training support tools they need to train for their mission and are scheduled for a 

mission rehearsal exercise. 

Question. What do you see as the critical equipment shortfalls for training and 

operations? 

Answer. All soldiers receive the required training and equipment before going into 

combat. Active, Guard, and Reserve must be certified as ready before they are put 

in harms way. Achieving the necessary unit readiness involves consolidating training sets at our installations to compensate for equipment shortfalls among non-deployed units. The most common Active and Reserve component high-demand predeployment training equipment shortfalls occur with some types of mission-specific 

organizational equipment, where equipping solutions are developed to meet specific 

theater requirements. Most of the production of these items goes straight into theater to meet the force protection demand. These items include up armored light, medium, and heavy tactical trucks; special route clearance vehicles (to include the RG–

31, Buffalo, Husky, and Cougar); and counter remote-controlled improvised explosive device warfare (CREW) devices. We retain a limited number of these systems 

for home station training and at our Combat Training Centers so soldiers will gain 

experience with these systems before they deploy. Additionally, a large number of 

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our soldiers already have one or more rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan and have 

direct experience with these systems. 

Other items of equipment with limited availability for home station training include kits designed to increase the survivability of standard Army equipment, including the Bradley and Tank Urban Survivability Kits, and uparmored highly-mobile multipurpose wheeled vehicle fragmentation kits. These kits are provided in 

theater. Finally, there are some additional training equipment gaps in specific areas 

which are driven by the Army’s desire to get the most modern and capable systems 

immediately into the hands of our soldiers in combat operations. These items include the most recent version of the Army Battle Command System, the Command 

Post of the Future, some advanced intelligence 12 systems, and biometric systems. 

The Army is working to get appropriate levels of systems to support training the 

force into the training base and at unit home stations, as well as in our Combat 

Training Centers. 

Significant quantities of Army equipment remain in Iraq and Afghanistan to minimize the time lost, and the associated costs, in transporting equipment to and from 

these missions. The result is that units at home station have less than full sets of 

authorized equipment. Although rotating equipment between training units allows 

us to achieve the training requirements before deployment, these units are limited 

in their ability to support other contingencies around the world should the need 

arise. 

Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address these shortfalls and 

ensure that units have what they need in time to train before deploying and as well 

as for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Answer. The Army is prioritizing and tracking the use of inventory and procurement dollars to repair equipment used and damaged in the global war on terrorism, 

and to replace critical equipment destroyed in battle. The Army is also prioritizing 

and managing procurements and distributions to fill other critical shortages to ensure our forces are organized and equipped for required capabilities, with standard 

quantities and qualities of equipment across all components. While the use of training sets, theater provided equipment and cross-leveling of equipment to meet training and operational requirements are not the optimal solution, units have and will 

continue to meet all required training and readiness standards prior to commitment 

into combat. 

MINE-RESISTANT, AMBUSH-PROTECTED (MRAP) VEHICLES

Question. In September 2007, JROC capped MRAP procurement at 15,374 vehicles, with about 3,700 going to the Marine Corps and approximately 10,000 to the 

Army. In November 2007, the Marines decreased their requirement from 3,700 to 

approximately 2,300 vehicles—citing, in part, an improved security situation in Iraq 

and the MRAP’s unsuitability in some off-road and urban situations. Reports suggest that the Army may follow suit and reduce its overall MRAP requirement. 

Are you aware of a revised Army requirement for MRAPs? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. If the Army has decreased its requirement for MRAPs, is this the 

Army’s final requirement or can we expect the requirement to change again? 

Answer. The new JROC approved interim requirement to support Army units is 

12,000. In January 2007, the Army requirement, based on requests from U.S. Central Command commanders was identified to be 17,770. To ensure this assessment 

met our emerging requirements, the Army worked closely with the Joint Staff and 

OSD to continuously re-assess and raise the procurement quantity in a stair-step 

fashion to ensure a continuous and rapid flow of vehicles to Theater while remaining good stewards of our Nation’s resources. Recently, based on input from Theater, 

the Army was able to reduce its estimate from 17,770 down to a range of between 

15,500 and 11,500, a reduction of nearly 2,000 to 5,000 vehicles. To ensure we do 

not overstate our requirement, we raised our interim requirement from 10,000 to 

almost 12,000 and are actively working with OSD, the Joint Staff and the Joint Program Office to place appropriate production orders that meet warfighters needs for 

protected mobility; preserve options for commanders in the field to make adjustments as force levels and situations change; and to manage fiscal resources appropriately. 

Question. Do you see a role for MRAPs beyond the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts? 

Answer. The MRAP has addressed the Army’s most critical current battlefield deficiency (force protection of our forces against improvised explosive devices) with a 

capable, survivable and sustainable vehicle for the current Theater of Operation. 

However, with the exception of a limited number of vehicles going to Route Clearance and EOD teams, it is premature to describe where MRAP may fit into tomorVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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row’s force structure. Training and Doctrine Command is conducting a tactical 

wheeled vehicle analysis of mission, roles, profiles, threats, and capabilities of the 

various fleets. This analysis includes the MRAP, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, and 

the HMMWV. The initial results will influence POM decisions, the Force Mix Brief 

to Congress, and the Combat and Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy due to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in July 2008. The Army’s Tactical Wheeled Vehicle strategy is an ongoing effort to ensure our soldiers receive the best capabilities available 

in ground wheeled vehicles to meet current and emerging threats. 

SPECIAL UNITS FOR STABILIZATION AND TRAINING/ADVISORY MISSIONS

Question. On October 10, 2007, the Secretary of Defense emphasized the role that 

‘‘unconventional warfare’’ will play in the Army’s future as well as the need to organize and prepare for a training and advisory role. Some, both inside and outside of 

the Army, have suggested that special units or organizations should be established 

to address these mission areas, while others maintain that these missions are best 

handled by the Army’s full-spectum BCTs and their supporting forces. 

Do you believe special units—such as a Training and Advisory Corps—should be 

established? Please explain. 

Answer. No, I believe future requirements to train and advise foreign security 

forces should be addressed with a combination of special operations forces, small 

scale specialized forces, embassy military groups, and Army full spectrum modular 

forces. Pre-conflict security cooperation activities will emphasize Special Operations 

Forces, small scale specialized forces, and small deployments of full spectrum modular forces working under U.S. embassy control, while post conflict efforts will rely 

heavily on full spectrum modular forces. 

The key consideration for training and advising is expertise in your core function. 

For example, U.S. Army infantry, medical, or engineer companies are experts at 

conducting their wartime function and can therefore train and advise foreign infantry, medical, or engineer companies. With some additional training and minor task 

organization changes, Army modular forces can be ideally suited to train and advise. 

U.S. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Question. The U.S. Special Operations Command, pursuant to QDR guidelines, is 

currently expanding the size of its Army component. It is also working to raise the 

language proficiency of its Army special operators. 

If confirmed, how would you support U.S. Army Special Operations Command’s 

(USASOC) end strength growth? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will support USASOC’s end strength growth as currently 

planned. QDR 2006 directed that Special Forces battalions be increased by one-third 

and that Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations be increased by 33 percent. The 

Army has already programmed and is executing these important decisions. By fiscal 

year 2013, the Army will have completed this growth. If confirmed, I will monitor 

this growth and ensure it meets operational requirements. 

Special Operations Forces are performing extremely demanding and specialized 

tasks in combating terrorism. This increase in end strength will mitigate the extremely high operational tempo now experienced by these specially selected and 

trained forces. Growth of Special Operations Forces is within programmed 

endstrengh of 547,400 (Active), 358,200 (National Guard), and 206,000 (Reserve). 

The growth in Special Operations Forces will greatly contribute to the Army’s ability to confront irregular challenges and to conduct stability operations. 

Question. What do you see as the best way to enhance language skills among 

Army special operators? 

Answer. The Army supports the Defense Language Program goal to increase language capability across the force, to include Special Operations. The Army trains 

our language cadre to the minimum Interagency Language Roundtable level of 2 for 

language proficiency, with a goal to reach a proficiency of 3. Currently Active component and Reserve component soldiers may earn up to $400 per month per language depending on their level of proficiency, up to a maximum rate of $1000 per 

month. Soldiers who are in language dependent military operation specialties, such 

as special operators, are paid the highest rate based on their proficiency for their 

primary language. This is true even for languages such as Spanish, which has been 

identified as ‘‘dominant in the force’’ and is not usually authorized for language pay 

for other Army soldiers. This will provide an added incentive to soldiers to maintain 

their proficiency. 

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FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS

Question. FCS is the largest modernization program in the Army. Total cost of the program is expected to be $162 billion. The Army’s FCS includes both manned 

and robot-controlled weapons linked together by a communications network. Army 

leaders have strongly advocated for continued funding and support for FCS, but, in 

February 2008, Secretary of Defense Gates told this committee: ‘‘It is hard for me 

to see how that program can be completed in its entirety. I think that in light of 

what are inevitably going to be pressures on the defense budget in the future, I 

think that that one is one we will have to look at carefully.’’

How would you respond to those who question the feasibility and affordability of 

FCS, and who call it ill-defined and technologically risky? 

Answer. FCS’s precursor technologies have already made a difference today in 

combat. FCS precursor Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) and robotics show the promise of these emerging capabilities in vital IED defeat and route clearance missions. 

The Army currently is fielding FCS Spin-out 1 to the Army Evaluation Task Force 

(AETF) at Fort Bliss, TX. The Army established the AETF so that combat-tested 

soldiers can test and evaluate FCS technologies. Through rigorous testing and 

phased software development the Army is mitigating risk to this ambitious plan to 

deliver needed capabilities. 

FCS is currently less than 3 percent of the Army’s base budget. At its peak (fiscal 

year 2015) FCS is projected to be less than a third of the Army’s investment (RDA) 

account. That would be less than 8 percent of the overall Army budget, assuming 

that budget stays constant. 

The FCS BCT is designed to be an integrated combat formation that delivers the 

full spectrum. As an adaptive force, we will rigorously apply the lessons of combat 

to the development of the FCS BCT. 

Risk is being carefully managed. The standup of the AETF at a cost of 900 soldiers during a time of war is an example of the Army’s commitment to bring FCS 

technologies to soldiers for rigorous evaluation prior to program decisions. 

Question. Can you explain how FCS addresses the imbalance in the Army to 

which Army leaders have spoken in defending the requirement for the capabilities 

the FCS offers? 

Answer. The current imbalance in the Army is caused by our inability to meet 

the demands placed on the Army to generate the ready forces we need to meet global demand. 

The Army is addressing the imbalance by completing its capabilities transformation into modular formations, while simultaneously growing the size of 

deployable formations. These actions will increase the global force pool, enable sustainable periods of dwell for training, and reduce stress on the current operational 

force. 

In parallel with these efforts, FCS is our core effort to complete the transformation of the Army by providing modular formations vastly increased capabilities 

to meet the needs of the 21st century. FCS achieves these goals by providing the 

Army increased abilities to project our forces, connect soldiers to the network, and 

protect soldiers in this century’s complex operating environments. Spin outs ensure 

that we speed these improvements to the Army to meet the needs of warfighters 

who can’t wait for needed capabilities. 

JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT

Question. In June 2006, the Army and Air Force signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) regarding merging two separate small cargo aircraft programs into 

the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA). 

In your opinion, is there a roles-and-missions redundancy between the Army and 

the Air Force in the JCA program? 

Answer. No. The primary mission of the Army JCA is to transport Army timesensitive mission-critical (TSMC) cargo and personnel to forward deployed units, 

often in remote and austere locations, commonly referred to as ‘‘the last tactical 

mile’’. Because of the critical nature of this cargo to the success of the tactical 

ground commander’s mission and the short-notice of its need (usually less than 24 

hours), lift assets must be in a direct support relationship to provide the necessary 

responsiveness. 

For sustainment operations, Army fixed wing aviation performs those missions 

which lie between the strategic and intra-theater missions performed by the USAF 

and the tactical maneuver and movement performed by Army rotary wing or ground 

assets. The JCA will provide point to point distribution where effectiveness vice efficiency is critical to meeting the ground tactical mission needs, while simultaneously 

continuing to push the majority of supplies forward, maintaining the potential synVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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ergistic affect between efficiency and effectiveness. The JCA, Army and Air Force, 

is meant to be a complimentary asset. 

The Chief of Staff of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Air Force have agreed 

to examine Intra-theater Air Lift Roles and Missions as part of the QDR. In the 

most recent Air Force-Army Warfighter talks, we recommitted our Services to the 

success of the C–27 program in its current format, on the current fielding timeline, 

and in accordance with the current beddown plan. Together, both services will work 

any roles and missions issues that may arise. 

MEDIUM AND HIGH ALTITUDE UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

Question. In a March 5, 2007, memorandum, the Air Force Chief of Staff spelled 

out the case for the Air Force to become the Executive Agent (EA) for all medium 

and high altitude UAVs. General Moseley stated his desire to follow up with a comprehensive plan to optimize the Nation’s Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets. 

What is your understanding of the Army’s position regarding the Air Force proposal that it be assigned as the EA for medium and high altitude UAVs? 

Answer. The Army does not support a single Service as executive agent for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). The Army supports the Joint Staff’s 2005 and 2007 

decisions to not establish an executive agent for UAS (JROC memorandums 043–

08 and 136–05), as well as, the Deputy Secretary of Defense 13 September 2007 decision that, in lieu of a single Service designation as executive agent for UAS, directs a UAS Task Force (TF) led by the OSD for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) to coordinate critical UAS interoperability issues and develop a common 

acquisition path forward. 

ARMY MEDICAL ACTION PLAN

Question. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008 

(Public Law 110–181) requires the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress biannually on implementation of the Army Medical Action Plan to correct deficiencies 

identified in the condition of facilities and patient administration for wounded and 

ill soldiers. 

If confirmed, what would be your responsibilities with respect to the implementation of the Army Medical Action Plan and compliance with the requirements included in the (NDAA)? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the smooth transition of the highly effective 

Army Medical Action Plan Cell to the new Warrior Care and Transition Office under 

the supervision of the Director of the Army Staff. The Warrior Care and Transition 

Office will provide Headquarters, Department of the Army oversight, policy, and direction to synchronize and integrate the array of Army warrior care initiatives and 

related programs dedicated to the support, care, and healing of wounded, injured, 

and ill soldiers and their families. Through numerous monitoring and oversight 

mechanisms, including the Medical Strategic Review Group, I will ensure Army 

complies with all requirements of the NDAA. The Army has prepared an initial report to Congress, which details the extraordinary effort and accomplishments made 

in the first year of the Army Medical Action Plan. I look forward to continuing to 

work with Congress on behalf of our wounded, ill, and injured warriors. 

Question. In September 2007 the GAO reported that over half of the Warrior 

Transition Units (WTUs) had significant personnel/staffing shortfalls. 

If confirmed, how would you ensure that WTUs are adequately resourced to meet 

the medical and mental health needs of wounded and ill soldiers returning from deployments now and in the coming years? 

Answer. In follow-up testimony, February 2008, GAO reported on the significant 

progress the Army has made staffing the 35 WTUs established as part of the Army 

Medical Action Plan (AMAP). Currently 2,655 WTU staff members are caring for 

9,339 Warriors in Transition and their families. If confirmed, I will continue to demand the right level of support for our brave men and women whose sacrifice demands no less. I also look forward to working with Congress to fund the rapid construction, furnishing, and ongoing support of Warrior Transition complexes. These 

healing complexes will co-locate fully accessible housing, administrative facilities, 

and Soldier Family Assistance Centers near our Military Treatment Facilities to 

provide better support for our Warriors in Transition and their families. 

RISE IN SUICIDE RATES IN THE ARMY

Question. In your view, what are the strengths and weaknesses of the Army’s current suicide prevention program? 

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Answer. We are continuously strengthening and revitalizing our suicide prevention efforts. This has never been more important, given the higher than normal suicide rates we are experiencing. While engaged leadership is key to our efforts, just 

as important is informing soldiers and family members about the risk factors associated with suicide, how to identify suicidal behavior, and what actions are needed 

to help at-risk soldiers. 

Our multifaceted approach includes increasing awareness about suicide, reducing 

the stigma associated with seeking care, and providing leaders with relevant information they can use to improve their suicide prevention efforts at the unit level. 

We recently formed a suicide prevention steering committee composed of general 

officers from across the Army that includes those with expertise in the personnel, 

health care, spiritual, and legal communities to provide senior-level oversight of our 

suicide prevention efforts. This group will ensure we have a program that provides 

robust, evidence and research-based resources, programs, and services for all aspects of the program. 

The bottom-line is that we must constantly renew our focus on leadership and 

battle buddy involvement both in prevention and intervention. It is crucial for all 

leaders to have access to lessons learned from suicide cases (both completions and 

attempts) to effect new programs, services, and policies. We are in the process of 

creating an analysis cell to collect suicide data, analyze trends, develop lessons 

learned, and provide that information up and down the chain on a continuous basis. 

We are keenly aware that, despite our efforts, the suicide rate has continued to 

climb. We know that we have to change the culture in the Army to reshape attitudes toward those with behavioral health issues. 

Question. If confirmed, what additional steps would you take to reduce the incidence of suicide in the Army? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will fully support the newly-formed suicide prevention flag 

officer panel. The first priority of this multidisciplinary group is to reduce the perceived stigma of soldiers seeking help for mental health issues. It is also focused 

on building in our leaders at every level the understanding of the need to carefully 

monitor the welfare of their soldiers and then ensure they have the necessary skills 

to knowledgeably question and intervene when they see a soldier who may be atrisk. This involves training that begins when soldiers enter the Army and continues 

through every leadership course. Leaders know that it is within their responsibility 

to check on a soldier’s living conditions, ask about his/her family, and, when he 

senses that something is not right, to professionally, but caringly determine what 

is going on. I would reemphasize the importance of leadership involvement. 

We must also increase our research into the factors that will reduce suicide risk 

in the Army. I’m not convinced that what we know about civilian suicides can be 

translated directly into an actionable plan for our population and research in the 

Army on this issue is incomplete. I would task the General Officer Steering Committee to do a bottom-up study of the factors related to suicide to ensure that our 

strategy is complete and sufficient. 

We must also help our soldiers and their families to build great lives. I am told 

that four out of five soldiers who commit suicide do so because of relationship issues 

or because of a poor personal decision that led to legal problems in his or her life. 

We must expand life skills and relationship training so that soldiers make good decisions and avoid the cascade of negative events that is so often the precursor to 

suicide. It is also important to enforce the battle buddy in the total Army, emphasizing in interpersonal relationships, mentorship, and counseling at first line leader 

level. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you seek to ensure that senior Army leaders 

take steps to eliminate the stigma associated by soldiers with seeking mental health 

care? 

Answer. We must continue to change our culture that does not place a shame on 

those soldiers who seek mental health assistance. If confirmed, I would look at a 

number of ways in which to continue to address this issue. Again, it starts with informed and engaged leadership. Leaders who are aware of the impact of uninformed, judgmental attitudes on those at risk for suicide are in the best position of 

shifting the culture toward one that better supports those in crisis. 

We must increase the number of health care professionals to ensure they are 

present and available to soldiers in units. This includes behavioral health professionals and chaplains. 

We have to do better at ensuring that soldiers are completely aware of the process, risks, and limits when they access behavioral health care. I’m convinced that 

soldiers don’t really understand how low their risk is when they seek help and we 

need to change that paradigm. 

82

FULL RESOURCING OF WALTER REED ARMY MEDICAL CENTER

Question. Under the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110–181) adequate 

funding must be provided for the operation and sustainment of the current Walter 

Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) until new facilities are completed and operational at both National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, MD, and Fort Belvoir in 

Northern Virginia. 

If confirmed, how would you ensure that all support requirements are identified 

and supported, to include facilities, personnel, installation support and medical operations and maintenance? 

Answer. The Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) has a very effective budgeting 

system that allocates resources based on workload and population health. The 

MEDCOM will continue to resource WRAMC as a fully operational medical center 

until the fiscal year of closure. The budget will not be decremented for any closurerelated actions. In addition, through the Army Medical Action Plan, we have identified and remedied the circumstances that led to problems highlighted at WRAMC 

last year. All support requirements are routinely monitored by the MEDCOM, the 

Army’s Installation Management Command, and the Office of Warrior Care and 

Transition. 

ARMY FAMILY COVENANT

Question. In the fall of 2007, senior military and civilian leaders and installation 

commanders throughout the Army agreed to the Army Family Covenant, a pledge 

to provide soldiers and their families with the level of support that they need and 

which their level of service deserves. The Chief of Staff of the Army has stated that 

the covenant represents a $1.4 billion commitment in 2008 and that Army leadership is working to include a similar level in the budget for the next 5 years. 

What do you view as the most essential quality of life needs addressed by the 

Army Family Covenant? 

Answer. The most essential aspect of the Army Family Covenant is its unprecedented level of commitment. Last year, Secretary Geren and General Casey asked 

our soldiers and families to tell us how well the Army’s systems were supporting 

them. Soldiers and their families asked for more consistent standards and better access throughout the Army to Family programs and services, physical and mental 

healthcare, better housing, education, child and youth services, and employment opportunities for spouses. The needs addressed in the Army Family Covenant represent the voices of soldiers and their families. Each facet of the Covenant is interwoven in our Army communities and that is what creates a supportive environment 

in which soldiers and their families can live and thrive. We will continue to ask our 

soldiers and families to identify their needs. 

Question. What are the greatest challenges which the Army faces in making good 

on the promises made by the Army Family Covenant, and what would you do, if 

confirmed, to overcome them? 

Answer. The greatest challenges associated with fulfilling the promises made in 

the Army Family Covenant are maintaining a predictable level of funding after the 

next 4 years and at the same time, managing the expectations created by our commitment to address the needs of Army families. To preserve the All-Volunteer Force, 

the Army is committed to providing soldiers and families a full range of essential 

services to support readiness and retention and enhance family resiliency. The Family Covenant is our promise to provide a strong supportive environment and our 

families want to trust and believe in the Family Covenant and Army Leadership’s 

commitment. As we enter year seven of the war, we must also maintain our ability 

to respond to the unpredictable family requirements the changing environment will 

present. To overcome these challenges, we will balance our requirements within the 

Army to provide for our soldiers and their families and we will continue to focus 

on their specific needs. Taking care of our soldiers and their families is essential 

if we are to sustain our Army throughout this era of persistent conflict. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ 

from the administration in power? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this 

committee and other appropriate committees of Congress and provide information, 

83

subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[The nomination reference of LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, 

follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

February 5, 2008. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

The following named officer for appointment as the Vice Chief of Staff, United 

States Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and 

responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., sections 601 and 3034: 

To be General. 

LTG Raymond T. Odierno, 0000. 

[The biographical sketch of LTG Raymond T. Odierno, which was 

transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA 

Source of commissioned service: USMA.

Military schools attended: 

Field Artillery Officer Basic and Advanced Courses 

United States Naval Command and Staff College 

United States Army War College

Educational degrees: 

United States Military Academy - BS - No Major 

North Carolina State University - MS - Engineering, Nuclear Effects 

United States Naval War College - MA - National Security and Strategy

Foreign language(s): None recorded.

Promotions:

Promotions Dates of appointment 

2LT 2 Jun 76

1LT 2 Jun 78

CPT 1 Aug 80

MAJ 1 Dec 86

LTC 1 Feb 92

COL 1 Sep 95

BG 1 Jul 99

MG 1 Nov 02

LTG 1 Jan 05

Major duty assignments:

84

From To Assignment 

Oct 76 ......... Jan 78 ..... Support Platoon Leader, later Firing Platoon Leader, C Battery, 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery, 56th Field Artillery Brigade, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany 

Jan 78 ......... Aug 78 .... Survey Officer, 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery, 56th Field Artillery Brigade, United States 

Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany 

Aug 78 ........ Oct 79 ..... Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General, 56th Field Artillery Brigade, United States Army 

Europe and Seventh Army, Germany 

Nov 79 ........ Jul 80 ...... Student, Field Artillery Advanced Course, Fort Sill, OK 

Aug 80 ........ Dec 80 .... Liaison Officer, 1st Battalion, 73d Field Artillery, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC 

Dec 80 ........ Dec 82 .... Commander, Service Battery, later A Battery, 1st Battalion, 73d Field Artillery, XVIII Airborne 

Corps, Fort Bragg, NC 

Dec 82 ........ May 83 .... Assistant S–3 (Operations), 1st Battalion, 73d Field Artillery, XVLII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, 

NC 

Jun 83 ......... May 84 .... S–3 (Operations), 3d Battalion, 8th Field Artillery, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC 

Jun 84 ......... Aug 86 .... Student, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 

Sep 86 ........ Jun 89 ..... Nuclear Research Officer, later Chief, Acquisition Support Division, Defense Nuclear Agency, Alexandria, VA, later detailed as Military Advisor for Arms Control, Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, Washington, DC 

Jun 89 ......... Jun 90 ..... Student, United States Naval Command and Staff Course, Newport, RI 

Jul 90 .......... Dec 90 .... Executive Officer, 2d Battalion, 3d Field Artillery, 3d Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany 

Dec 90 ........ Jun 91 ..... Executive Officer, Division Artillery, 3d Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany and Operations Desert Shield/Storm, Saudi Arabia 

Jun 91 ......... May 92 .... Executive Officer, 42d Field Artillery Brigade, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh 

Army, Germany 

Jun 92 ......... Jun 94 ..... Commander, 2d Battalion, 8th Field Artillery, 7th Infantry Division (Light), Fort Ord, CA, (relocated to Fort Lewis, WA) 

Jun 94 ......... Jun 95 ..... Student, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 

Jun 95 ......... Jun 97 ..... Commander, Division Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX 

Jun 97 ......... Aug 98 .... Chief of Staff, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany 

Aug 98 ........ Jul 99 ...... Assistant Division Commander (Support), 1st Armored Division, United States Army Europe and 

Seventh Army, Germany to include duty as Deputy Commanding General for Ground Operations, Task Force Hawk, Operation Allied Force, Albania 

Jul 99 .......... Jul 01 ...... Director, Force Management, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, 

United States Army, Washington, DC 

Oct 01 ......... Aug 04 .... Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood, TX, and Operation Iraqi 

Freedom, Iraq 

Aug 04 ........ Oct 04 ..... Special Assistant to Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, DC 

Oct 04 ......... May 06 .... Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Washington, DC 

May 06 ........ Feb 08 ..... Commanding General, III Corps/Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq 

Feb 08 ........ Present .... Commanding General, III Corps and Fort Hood, Fort Hood, TX 

Summary of joint assignments:

Dates Rank 

Nuclear Research Officer, later Chief, Acquisition Support Division, Defense Nuclear Agency, Alexandria, VA, later detailed as Military’ Advisor for Arms Control, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC.

Sep 86–Jun 89 ...... Captain/Major 

Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, Washington, DC.

Oct 04–May 06 ..... Lieutenant General 

U.S. decorations and badges: 

Defense Distinguished Service Medal 

Distinguished Service Medal 

Defense Superior Service Medal 

Legion of Merit (with five Oak Leaf Clusters) 

Bronze Star Medal 

Defense Meritorious Service Medal 

Meritorious Service Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters) 

Army Commendation Medal 

Army Achievement Medal 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge 

Army Staff Identification Badge 

85

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228

Washington, DC 20510–6050

(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Raymond T. Odierno.

2. Position to which nominated: 

Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army.

3. Date of nomination: 

February 5, 2008.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.]

5. Date and place of birth: 

September 8, 1954; Dover, NJ.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Linda Marie Odierno (Maiden Name: Burkarth).

7. Names and ages of children: 

Anthony, 29; Kathrin, 27; Michael, 21.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

None.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

American Legion (Member), Association of the United States Army (Member), 4th 

Infantry Division Association (Member), 8th Field Artillery Regimental Affiliation 

(Member), the 9th Infantry Regiment Association (Member), and the 1st Cavalry Division Association (Member).

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achieveVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
86

ments other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch. 

None. 

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee 

of the Senate? 

Yes, I do.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the 

administration in power? 

Yes, I do. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–

E are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO. 

This 4th day of February, 2008.

[The nomination of LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, was withdrawn by the President on April 30, 2008.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA, by 

Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of 

command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms 

have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution 

of military operations. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. The current transformation of DOD—the largest since World War II, as 

prescribed in our national defense and military strategies and quadrennial defense 

reviews since 2001, was in many ways enabled through Goldwater-Nichols reorganization act of 1986—in this regard I would assess that the provisions continue to 

remain relevant and effective. If confirmed, I will continue to assess the conduct of 

our joint operations and make recommendations as required. It is imperative, however, to apply similar reform to interagency authorities and relationships we must 

apply and integrate effectively all elements of our national power to the challenges 

that face the Nation today and tomorrow. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. The emerging strategic environment presents more complex asymmetrical challenges, regionally and globally, that demand broader and more integrated 

cooperation of agencies within our own government, and with those of our partners 

around the world. The employment of all elements of our national power, and that 

of our partners, must be applied in an integrated fashion. We should seek to continue efforts such as Beyond Goldwater Nichols, the Project for National Security 

Reform, and Project Horizon, so we can codify a framework of interagency authorities, relationships, and capabilities that more effectively bring to bare all elements 

of national power to strategic challenges facing us now and in the future. 

87

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States 

Forces Korea? 

Answer. The Commander, United Nations Command (CDRUNC), serves as commander of an international command and is responsible for maintaining the Armistice Agreement on the Korean Peninsula. The CDRUNC acts in accordance with 

U.N. Security Council resolutions and directives. The CDRUNC also acts in accordance with directives from the U.S. Government that are transmitted by the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman, keeping CDRUSPACOM informed. The 

CDRUNC is responsible for the strategic direction, guidance, operational control of 

forces, conduct of combat operations and acceptance and integration of UNC member nations’ forces during contingencies. This includes enabling access to the seven 

UNC bases in Japan. 

The Commander, Combined Forces Command (CDRCFC), as commander of a binational command, supports Armistice Agreement compliance, deters hostile acts of 

external aggression against the Republic of Korea, and, should deterrence fail, defeat an external armed attack. In this position, he is responsible for receiving strategic direction and missions from the ROK-U.S. Military Committee, which acts as 

the strategic coordinating interface for ROK and U.S. national authorities. The missions and functions for the CDRCFC are prescribed in the Terms of Reference for 

the Military Committee and in the US/ROK Military Committee Strategic Directive 

No. 2. 

The Commander, United States Forces Korea (COMUSKOREA), as a sub-unified 

commander of the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), is responsible for all duties 

and functions associated with title 10, U.S.C., the Unified Command Plan, and 

CJCSI 5130. This role provides the U.S. with the means to provide forces to CDR 

UNC/CFC as required, and to support these forces with the required logistics, administration, and policy initiatives necessary to maintain readiness. 

Question. What background and experience, including joint duty assignments, do 

you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties? 

Answer. The situation in Korea reflects all aspects of both the asymmetrical challenges of the new strategic environment, and our need to transform plans, posture, 

capabilities and relationships with our partners and allies to better meet those challenges. Our alliance in Korea is one that is transforming into a broad strategic relationship that has peninsular, regional, and global components to better meet each 

of those challenges. I have served in Korea at times when we focused predominately 

on the traditional and symmetrical threat of North Korea, and I am very familiar 

with that aspect of the threat that remains on the peninsula. I have also served in 

a number of Peacekeeping and Multinational assignments that would be beneficial 

in my role as UNC Commander, and would also allow me to develop further our 

global partnership with the ROK—a steadfast and significant contributor to stability and security operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most recently, my positions 

on the Joint Staff provide me the background and expertise on the transformation 

of our military to meet traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges 

that face us today and tomorrow—and North Korea is a prime example of a threat 

that has evolved asymmetrically over the last few decades. This experience positions 

me well to continue assessment, integration, and implementation of plans to transform the alliance with South Korea and maximize the strategic relevance and value 

of that alliance. If confirmed, I will effectively apply U.S. policies and strategies 

with our ROK Ally, and will provide valuable assessments and recommendations to 

our defense and national leadership to better shape those policies and strategies. 

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command, United States Forces Korea? 

Question. If confirmed, I intend to conduct in-depth discussions and assessments 

with key personnel and analysts from relevant ROK and U.S. Government agencies 

as well as non-governmental specialists. Throughout my time in command, I will 

continue this dialogue with ROK and U.S. leaders to improve my understanding of 

all aspects of the evolving situation within the Korean theater. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the chain of command 

runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of 

command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the ComVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00093 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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mander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States 

Forces Korea with the following officials: 

The Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Department of Defense is composed of the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(JCS), the Combatant Commands, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DOD Field Activities, and such other offices, agencies, activities, and commands established or designated by law, or by the President 

or by the Secretary of Defense. The functions of the heads of these offices are assigned by the Secretary of Defense according to existing law. CDR UNC reports to 

the Secretary of Defense, and through him to the President, while at the same time 

keeping the Commander, USPACOM, informed of any communications with U.S. 

national authorities. A validated binational ROK–U.S. document provides further 

guidance on CDR CFC’s unique relationship with the ROK National Command and 

Military Authorities and the U.S. Secretary of Defense. 

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. Under existing directives, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has been delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense on any matters 

upon which the Secretary is authorized to act. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., and current directives establish the Under Secretaries 

of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisors to the Secretary regarding 

matters related to their functional areas. Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions within their areas, and may issue instructions and directive type 

memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. 

Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., and current directives establish the Under Secretaries 

of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisors to the Secretary regarding 

matters related to their functional areas. Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions within their areas, and may issue instructions and directive type 

memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. 

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to 

the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. CDR 

UNC communicates through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary 

of Defense. 

Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments. 

Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., provides that, subject to authority, direction, and control 

of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the combatant commanders, the Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces that are assigned to unique and specified commands. 

Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services. 

Answer. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services are responsible for the organization, 

training, and equipping of the Services, under Title 10, U.S.C. Their support is critical to meet readiness needs. They also provide military advice to the Chairman of 

the Joint Chief’s of Staff and the Secretary of Defense as members of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. 

Question. The other combatant commanders, especially the Commander, United 

States Pacific Command 

Answer. COMUSKOREA, as commander of a sub-unified command of USPACOM, 

reports directly to the Commander, USPACOM, on matters directly pertaining to 

U.S. Forces Korea areas of responsibility. CDR UNC and CDR CFC keeps the Commander, USPACOM, informed of any communications with U.S. national authorities. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next 

Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States 

Forces Korea? 

Answer. The major challenges include maintaining readiness and deterrence, 

while implementing the transformation of U.S. forces in Korea and implementation 

of the plan to transfer wartime operational control to the ROK. Readiness of U.S. 

forces will be my primary near-term focus if confirmed for this position. The ROK–

U.S. Alliance must be ‘‘ready to fight tonight’’ due to the proximity and lethality of 

the threat. A highly trained and ready force provides stability and mitigates risk. 

Sustaining readiness requires tough, realistic training; appropriate levels of manning and modern equipment; training infrastructure; and a quality of life which supVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00094 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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ports and sustains our people. I am personally committed to ensuring that the combat readiness of our forces in Korea. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges and problems? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that our forces remain vigilant and well-prepared, by maintaining readiness and rigorous training and exercises. If confirmed 

I will immediately review these elements to ensure that we are as strong and as 

ready as we can possibly be. I will devote myself to maintaining the strong Alliance 

between the United States and the Republic of Korea. A strong, healthy, and capable Alliance is necessary to meet the challenges we face on the Korean Peninsula. 

Should deterrence fail, combined forces must be, and will be, ready to defeat North 

Korean aggression. 

NORTH KOREA

Question. North Korea represents one of the greatest near term threats to U.S. 

national security interests in Asia. 

What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula and the diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to verifiably dismantle its 

nuclear weapons program? 

Answer. North Korea remains the primary threat to security in Northeast Asia. 

Notwithstanding progress in the ongoing Six-Party Talks and the ongoing disablement of North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear reactor facility, North Korea’s historical 

opposition to meaningful reform and its long-term pattern of provocative behavior 

and proliferation present significant challenges to achieving lasting regional and 

global stability. In addition to North Korea’s nuclear threat, its missile program, 

coupled with its aging but still lethal and forward positioned conventional force, continues to present significant challenges. All elements of U.S. and partner national 

power must be applied to achieve our combating WMD objectives. Nonproliferation 

diplomatic efforts, such as the Six-Party Talks negotiations, in addition to Counterproliferation, and Consequence Management plans, capabilities, and posture, are 

part of a comprehensive strategy to combat WMD. We must maintain readiness 

across this spectrum and employ our capabilities consistently and appropriately. 

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed to South Korea, Japan, and 

the United States by North Korea’s ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction capabilities and the export of those capabilities? 

Answer. The October 2006 nuclear test at the Punggye facility supported previous 

assessments that North Korea had produced nuclear weapons. Prior to the test, it 

is assessed that North Korea produced enough plutonium jars for at least a half 

dozen nuclear weapons. According to recent assessments, North Korea pursued a 

Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) capability at least in the past, and the Intelligence 

Community (IC) judges with at least moderate confidence that the effort continues 

today. If fully developed, an HEU capability could provide an alternative method of 

nuclear weapons development independent of its plutonium production facility at 

Yongbyon. The IC remains uncertain about Kim Jong-Il’s commitment to full 

denuclearization, as he promised in the October 2007 Six-Party Agreement. 

North Korea continues to build missiles of increasing range, lethality, and accuracy, bolstering its current stockpile of 800 missiles for its defense and external 

sales. With its test of an intercontinental ballistic missile that can possibly reach 

the western United States, conducted in July 2006, and preparations underway to 

field a new intermediate range missile capable of striking Okinawa, Guam and Alaska, North Korea’s missile development program presents a threat which cannot be 

ignored. 

Question. What is your assessment of North Korea’s conventional capabilities and 

readiness? 

Answer. Despite economic hardship, North Korea retains the fourth largest armed 

Force in the world with 1.2 million active duty and 5 million Reserves, devoting up 

to one third of its available resources to sustain its conventional and asymmetric 

military capabilities. Though aging and unsophisticated by U.S. and ROK standards, its military arsenal, which includes 1,700 aircraft, 800 naval vessels, and over 

13,000 artillery systems, still constitutes a substantial threat. Seventy percent of 

North Korea’s ground forces are located within 90 miles of the Demilitarized Zone, 

with up to 250 long range artillery systems capable of striking the Greater Seoul 

Metropolitan Area, a thriving urban area of over 20 million inhabitants. North 

Korea still has the capacity to inflict major destruction and significant military and 

civilian casualties in South Korea, with little to no warning. 

Question. What, if anything, should be done to strengthen deterrence on the Korean peninsula? 

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Answer. If confirmed, I would encourage both the U.S. and ROK to sustain the 

ongoing transformation initiatives and capabilities enhancement programs. This includes implementation of the Strategic Transition Plan, signed by General Bell and 

the ROK CJCS in June 2007, which establishes a roadmap to achieve OPCON transition in 2012, while maintaining an effective deterrent and warfighting capability. 

Our transformation and realignment initiatives ongoing throughout the Pacific, enhance deterrence on the peninsula, in the region, and align us more effectively globally—we must continue these efforts. 

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PRIORITIES

Question. The current Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, recently testified that 

there is a current need for additional PAC–3 missile defense systems to counter 

North Korea’s missile inventory. 

What is your assessment of the missile defense priorities of U.S. Forces Korea and 

Combined Forces Command? 

Answer. PAC–3 Patriot Missile System upgrades and improved munitions have 

significantly enhanced our ability to protect critical United States facilities in the 

Republic of Korea. However, there is a significant shortage of PAC–3 missiles currently available on the peninsula to counter the North Korean missile threat. 

The Republic of Korea does not currently possess a Ballistic Missile Defense 

(BMD) capability that can fully integrate with U.S. BMD systems. The ROK recently announced plans to purchase eight Configuration-2 Patriot firing units. When 

fielded, these firing units will possess a localized theater ballistic missile defensive 

capability for key sites. 

In the near term, the Republic of Korea must develop a systematic missile defense 

solution to protect its critical civilian and military command capabilities, critical infrastructure and population centers. South Korean military and civilian facilities are 

currently highly vulnerable to North Korean missile attacks. 

Question. What missile defense systems and capabilities do you believe are needed 

in the near term to meet the operational needs of these commands? 

Answer. Continued production of PAC–3 missiles and development of the Theater 

High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD), Airborne Laser, and AEGIS Ballistic Missile 

Defense are needed to provide the layered, systematic missile defense capability to 

required protect critical United States facilities in the Republic of Korea. The ROK 

has announced plans to purchase much needed Configuration-2 Patriot firing units 

and will begin the process of integration with U.S. BMD systems. 

NORTH KOREA-POW-MIA RECOVERY EFFORTS

Question. From 1996–2005, the United States worked with the North Korean military to recover and repatriate the remains of American servicemembers who perished on the Korean peninsula. However, in the spring of 2005, the United States 

unilaterally halted the program. 

In your opinion, should the United States work with North Korea to repatriate 

the remains of American servicemembers found in North Korea? If so, when, or 

under what conditions, should the United States resume such cooperation? 

Answer. The Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) has responsibility for strategy and policy regarding the recovery of Korean War remains 

and provides DOD oversight over the entire personnel accounting process. The 

United Nations Command (UNC) assists DPMO and the USPACOM Joint POW/

MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) in arranging operational and logistics support to 

remains recovery operations in North Korea. Also, the UNC conducts repatriation 

ceremonies after remains are transferred to UNC control at the joint security area 

at the end of each operation. 

Once national policymakers determine that conditions permit reengagement with 

North Korea, DPMO will lead the U.S. negotiating team. If U.S. and North Korean 

representatives can reach a mutually agreeable arrangement that provides the necessary process and procedures to conduct operations, it would seem possible to resume this humanitarian effort. The arrangement must address the safety and security of U.S. personnel executing remains recovery in North Korea. When U.S. commanders are satisfied that an acceptable level of risk to U.S. personnel exists, remains recovery operations can resume in North Korea. 

Question. If confirmed, what, if anything, would you do to restart cooperation with 

North Korea on the POW–MIA remains recovery program? 

Answer. National policymakers will decide when to restart remains recovery operations in North Korea. This is a bilateral U.S.-North Korea policy issue. However, 

when the decision is made, the United Nations Command will continue to play a 

key role in supporting remains recovery operations in North Korea. 

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MILITARY-TO-MILITARY RELATIONS

Question. In your view, what is the value of military-to-military relations, in general? 

Answer. Military-to-military relations are an essential part of establishing and 

maintaining overall relationships with our partners. They help to develop mutual 

respect and facilitate security cooperation amongst partner nations to better meet 

challenges that impact our common national interests and values. Additionally, 

often from our military relationships emerge stronger socio-political and economic 

ones—as recently symbolized by our U.S.–ROK Free Trade Agreement, signed on 

June 30, 2007. 

Military-to-military relationships with countries that present significant security 

and stability challenges, as in the case of North Korea, are mandatory and critical 

to crisis management and tension reduction. 

Question. What is your assessment of the current climate in military-to-military 

professional relationships and interoperability at all levels between U.S. and ROK 

forces? 

Answer. The current military relationship is one of mutual respect and trust, bolstered by the very professional nature of both of our militaries. ROK officers regularly attend our professional development schools and U.S. officers do the same in 

ROK schools. U.S. doctrine not only forms the basis of our combined defense system, 

epitomized by the Combined Forces Command, but it is also the basis for much of 

the ROK’s military doctrine. Our doctrine also allows us to operate effectively with 

partners through independent parallel command structures, as we will achieve with 

the Republic of Korea in 2012, and in multinational command structures as what 

currently exists under United Nations Command or in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. In large part, this is of great credit to the professionalism, training, expertise, 

and experience of the ROK military. ROK and U.S. forces have exercised and operated together for over 50 years, providing a foundation of shared experience that 

solidifies a professional bond that only continues to grow and will flourish under any 

command relationship. This has been proven time and again in our relationship on 

the peninsula, and in our relationship with the ROK military as strategic partners 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Operationally, while interoperability between U.S. and ROK forces has improved, 

there are issues that must be resolved. For instance, advanced U.S. warfighting capability has resulted in greater employment of precision-guided munitions. The 

ROK military needs to invest to balance its ability to put airborne weapons on target to provide more effective use of these assets. Many similar interoperability 

issues have been identified and the ROK military endeavors to resolve these matters. If confirmed, I will assess interoperability further and seek to reduce, if not 

eliminate, any interoperability shortfalls. 

Question. What would be the value, in your opinion, of military-to-military relations with North Korea? 

Answer. The United States and North Korea currently maintain limited relations 

through representatives of the United Nations Command side of the Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) and the (north) Korean People’s Army at Panmunjom. 

This channel gives the U.S., through the U.N. Command, an opportunity to discuss 

any issue of relevance, but is limited by North Korea’s intransigence toward meetings on substantive issues. These relations are vital to maintaining the 1953 Armistice Agreement. Issues of an administrative and operational nature must be 

worked out through the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission 

at Panmunjom. This is a consistent and proven channel with which the two countries can and do maintain military communications. 

Question. If confirmed, what, if any, action would you take to increase the quality 

and quantity of military contacts between the United States and North Korea? 

Answer. The starting point for improvement in U.S. and North Korean mil-to-mil 

contacts is North Korea’s return to active participation in Military Armistice Commission (MAC) General Officer Talks, as called for by the 1953 Armistice Agreement. In 1991 North Korea unilaterally stopped participating in these talks. General Officer Talks between the UNCMAC, which includes a U.S. General Officer, 

and the Korean People’s Army at Panmunjom can provide an opportunity and appropriate level for discussing matters of mutual military concern. 

REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)—U.S. ALLIANCE

Question. Since the end of World War II, the U.S.-ROK alliance has been a key 

pillar of security in the Asia Pacific region. This relationship has gone through periods of inevitable change. 

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What is your understanding of the current U.S. security relationship with the 

ROK? 

Answer. The current U.S. security relationship with the ROK is governed by the 

Mutual Defense Treaty as entered into force from November 1954. In particular, the 

treaty’s requirement that both the U.S. and ROK maintain and develop appropriate 

means to deter and, if deterrence should fail, defeat an armed external attack continues to serve as the cornerstone of the relationship. Both the U.S. and the ROK 

remain fully committed to the treaty’s provisions and the mutual defense of both 

nations. We are also an alliance that is currently evolving into a broader strategic 

partnership based on common interests in the peninsula, region, and world. 

Question. If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to improve the 

U.S.-ROK security relationship? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that I maintain the strong U.S.-ROK security 

relationship that has preserved stability, promoted democracy, and deterred external aggression for the past 55 years. I will also continue to help develop our alliance 

into a broader strategic partnership that is reflective of our two nations’ common 

interests and concerns in the region and globally. 

Question. What is your assessment of ROK warfighting capability trends with regard to the modernization and capability improvements in ROK equipment and 

training of their personnel? 

Answer. Answer is combined with the response to the question below. 

Question. What is your assessment of ROK current and projected military capabilities and the ability of ROK forces to assume a greater role in the defense of their 

homeland including responsibility for commanding and controlling the warfighting, 

readiness, and operations of their own forces in wartime (‘‘OPCON Transfer’’)? 

Answer. The ROK military is fully capable, highly professional and competent. 

The ROK currently exercises daily command and control of all of its 677,000-man 

armed forces, and is working to assume primary responsibility for the lead role in 

its defense in 2012. 

ROK Defense Reform 2020 plan will create a more modern and agile fighting 

force. The ROK military modernization goal is to develop a self-reliant, technologyoriented, qualitative defense force. As a result of its emphasis on technology under 

this plan, the ROK plans to reduce its total (Active and Reserve) Army ground 

forces by approximately 45 percent over the next 12 years leading up to its target 

date of 2020. The overall Active and Reserve Forces will be reduced from about 3.7 

million to about 2 million. 

In September 2006, the Presidents of the United States and the Republic of Korea 

agreed that South Korea should assume the lead for its own defense. In early 2007, 

the U.S. Secretary of Defense and ROK Minister of National Defense determined 

that South Korea will assume wartime operational control of its forces on April 17, 

2012. The ROK military will assume responsibility/or commanding and controlling 

the warfighting readiness and operations of their own forces in wartime/or the first 

time since the end of the Korean War. The ROK will form a national warfighting 

headquarters provisionally described as the ROK Joint Forces Command (JFC). U.S. 

Forces Korea will transform into a new joint warfighting command provisionally described as Korea Command (KORCOM). KORCOM will be a fully capable and 

resourced complementary U.S. joint warfighting command in a doctrinally supporting role to the ROK JFC. The current U.S.-led combined warfighting command, 

Combined Forces Command, will be disestablished. If confirmed, I will ensure that 

U.S. and ROK combined capabilities continue to maintain a strong and credible deterrent, and remain highly capable, should deterrence fail, of defeating a North Korean attack quickly and decisively during the transition period. 

DOMESTIC POLITICS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)

Question. In the last decade, domestic opinion in the ROK with regard to the 

American presence and relations with the North Korea has increasingly split along 

generational lines, with younger Koreans being more skeptical of relations with the 

United States while the older generation is much more content with the status quo. 

If confirmed, how would you see your role and responsibility in the light of these 

changes in the ROK body politic? 

Answer. If confirmed, my role and duties as Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea will remain as described by appropriate governing U.S., ROK–U.S., and U.N. documents. My requirement to maintain the Armistice; deter or, should deterrence fail, defeat external aggression; and discharge all title 10 and Unified Command Plan duties and responsibilities will remain the same throughout my tenure, despite any changes to the 

ROK body politic. I would also add that an enduring, but transformed U.S. presence 

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in and alliance with South Korea is recognized by both nations as essential to our 

common interests—the transformation of our alliance keeps it a relevant and valuable enabler, not obstacle, to maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula and 

in the region. President Lee in recent speeches supports enduring U.S. presence on 

the peninsula, and has stated a desire to expand our relationship into a broader alliance reflective of our common interests on the peninsula, in the region, and globally. 

REGIONAL POSTURE

Question. In your opinion, how should the U.S. employ its forces in Korea to provide for regional presence and engagement, and to best respond to military threats, 

provide support for out-of-area contingencies, and maintain readiness? 

Answer. Transformation and realignment of forces in Korea is not something that 

has occurred outside of DOD transformation and global defense posture initiatives, 

but a highly successful example of our strategy. Our ongoing bilateral transformation and realignment efforts in Korea and Japan—and the rest of the Pacific, 

ensure we maintain the right balance and integration of command and control, and 

capabilities in the region to meet bilateral defense obligations, enhance regional security cooperation, and better meet global challenges. U.S. Forces in Korea should 

possess the capability to meet our mutual defense treaty commitments to the Republic of Korea, while maintaining sufficient flexibility to deploy forces to meet regional and global contingency requirements. The Commander, U.S. Forces Korea 

(COMUSKOREA) continually assesses force requirements on the Korean peninsula 

through CDRUSPACOM to the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will ensure that 

I gain a full understanding of the security environment on the peninsula so that 

I can provide my assessment and recommendations to continue proper shaping of 

our ongoing transformation and realignment efforts. 

CONSOLIDATION OF U.S. FORCES

Question. The Land Partnership Plan (LPP) is consolidating the combat brigade 

and supporting elements of the 2nd Infantry Division in and around Camp Humphrey, South of Seoul. New construction of facilities and infrastructure required to 

support the consolidation is being carried out using funds from both the Host Nation 

and United States military construction accounts. The Yongsan Relocation Plan proposes to move most of the U.S. forces currently stationed at Yongsan compound in 

Seoul to Camp Humphrey, Korea, as well. This relocation is to be largely funded 

by the Korean Government. 

What is your assessment of the current status of the two consolidation plans and 

the timeline for completion? 

Answer. Both the LPP and YRP are being executed simultaneously and are proceeding ahead. To consolidate 2nd Infantry Division, the U.S. goal is to close a total 

of 63 facilities and areas, comprising two thirds of all land granted under the SOFA, 

and totaling more than 38,000 acres. To date, the U.S. has closed 37 installations 

encompassing over 17,208 acres with a tax assessed value of over $500 million and 

returned 35 installations to the Republic of Korea. Both sides are working together 

to develop the land and construct the facilities under our internationally agreed 

plans to relocate U.S. forces in support of both U.S. and ROK national objectives. 

Question. What do you anticipate to be the total costs to be incurred by the U.S. 

Government to carry out the two consolidations’? 

Answer. As part of the YRP signed by the U.S. and the ROK in 2004, the Republic 

of Korea agreed to provide at their expense the majority of the required buildings 

and infrastructure at a cost of billions of dollars. The ROK is aggressively pursuing 

their agreed to requirements, already spending nearly $2 billion in pursuit of project 

goals. For our part, the United States agreed to provide the majority of required 

family housing and unaccompanied senior leader quarters for our force, at a cost 

we estimate to be between $1 and $2 billion. Regarding the relocation of the 2ID 

under the LPP, the United States intends to fund the requirements using both appropriated funds and host nation provided burden sharing funds. The U.S. share of 

the total cost to carry out the two consolidations will be approximately $2.4 billion. 

HOST NATION BURDEN-SHARING PROGRAMS

Question. Two programs supported by the Republic of Korea, the Combined Defense Improvement Program and the Korea Host Nation Funded Construction Program, provide cash and in-kind projects to satisfy U.S. military facility and infrastructure requirements. 

What is your assessment of the current level and quality of the burden-sharing 

arrangement? 

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Answer. In principle, both the U.S. and the Republic of Korea agree to the goal 

of reaching an equitable level of commitment to allied burden sharing. The U.S. Department of Defense position is that to achieve equitability, South Korea should 

share approximately 50 percent of U.S. costs of stationing forces on the peninsula 

excluding military pay. This year the ROK provided the United States with $787 

million in burden sharing funds, which is expected to offset approximately 43 percent of U.S. non-personnel stationing costs. While this year’s contribution did not 

meet DOD’s goal, the ROK and the U.S. continue to negotiate toward a more equitable level of burden sharing. 

Question. What priorities would you establish for U.S. forces in Korea to make 

the best use of these programs? 

Answer. The next allied burden sharing agreement must be negotiated for a 

longer term than the 2-year agreements of the recent past to provide stability and 

predictability for both sides. In that agreement, it is vital to the Alliance to achieve 

an equitable level of cost sharing as well as the ability for the command to apportion host nation funds into the agreed categories to meet command priorities. Over 

the next several years, as U.S. forces in Korea transform and consolidate south of 

Seoul, if confirmed, I will have to balance my construction priorities with labor and 

logistics requirements. Our highest priority will be to apply burden sharing funds 

against the requirement to move 2ID south of Seoul under the Land Partnership 

Plan. 

TRAINING OF U.S. FORCES IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Question. In the past few years as U.S. forces in Korea have drawn down and consolidated, home station training of both U.S. Army and Air Force units based on 

the peninsula has emerged as a significant concern. 

Do you believe there is sufficient availability and access to training ranges for 

large ground unit maneuver and fires, and for close air support missions and other 

Air Force operations? 

Answer. The ground training requirements for U.S. forces in Korea are currently 

being met. Current access to air-to-ground training ranges in the Republic of Korea 

has improved significantly in the past 2 years. Additional arrangements must still 

be made with the South Korean Government to further improve access; however, 

I understand USFK is pleased with the progress being made. If confirmed, I will 

continue to work closely with our ROK ally to facilitate access that provides the 

training opportunities necessary to maintain the combat readiness of our entire 

force. 

Question. In your view, are the ranges in Korea adequate to meet the training 

requirements of U.S. forces? 

Answer. The current inventory and facility replacement plan for ground maneuver 

training ranges is sufficient to meet U.S. ground forces training requirements. We 

are working closely with the Republic of Korea to improve the quality and availability of training ranges for our air component. If confirmed, I will continue to work 

with our ally to improve and modernize all available training facilities to ensure 

force readiness requirements are met. 

FAMILY HOUSING IN KOREA

Question. The Commander of United States Forces in Korea has proposed to increase the number of U.S. military personnel in Korea on accompanied tours, thereby increasing the number of families in Korea. This would require the construction 

of additional housing and community support facilities at U.S. installations in 

Korea. 

To what extent, if any, do you believe the percentage of personnel sent to Korea 

on accompanied tours should be increased? 

Answer. In 55 years, the Republic of Korea has transformed from a war ravaged 

country to one of the most modern, progressive, and democratic countries in the 

world. Unfortunately. the U.S. still rotates servicemembers on 1 year unaccompanied assignments as though South Korea remains an active combat zone. While 

supporting other long-term contingency operations, the U.S. needlessly contributes 

to family separations with the current 1 year unaccompanied rotation policy in 

Korea. Additionally, the ROK–U.S. Alliance is emerging into a broader strategic 

partnership and it is in our mutual interests to maintain enduring, but transformed 

presence on the peninsula—more reflective of that partnership. Normalized tours 

offer many benefits and contribute greatly to enhancing our broad strategic alliance 

with Korea. We should maximize the number of accompanied tours and normalize 

U.S. servicemember tour lengths in Korea to 3-year family accompanied tours and 

2-year unaccompanied tours for our married and single servicemembers, similar to 

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our policies in Japan and Europe. This new policy can be implemented with an infrastructure expansion plan over 10 to 15 years, with costs being supported by burden sharing contributions from the Republic of Korea. 

The benefits of normalizing tours are many and include improved continuity, stability, readiness and retention of regional, institutional, and cultural knowledge. 

The end-state will result in reduced entitlement costs and an overall savings as we 

decrease the number of servicemember moves and lower the need for entitlements 

resulting from family separations. 

QUALITY OF LIFE

Question. Through recent investment in quality of life amenities, to include housing, health care and recreation, the Department has worked to achieve the goal of 

making Korea an ‘‘assignment of choice’’ for U.S. Forces. 

What do you consider to be the most essential quality of life programs for soldiers 

and their families stationed in Korea and, if confirmed, what would be your goals 

in this regard’? 

Answer. I believe the three most essential elements supporting military life in any 

assignment are quality living and working conditions and facilities, quality health 

care, and quality educational opportunities for dependent family members. General 

Bell made tremendous efforts to make improvements in these areas for our 

servicemembers. If confirmed, I will continue to advocate, as my predecessors have, 

for the best possible conditions for all three so that our men and women have the 

quality of life that they deserve while serving so far from home. 

KOREA ASSIGNMENT INCENTIVE PAY

Question. Assignment incentive pay was approved in 2003 for soldiers who agreed 

to extend their tours of duty in Korea. Since that time, payment of an overseas costof-living allowance was also approved. 

In your opinion, is eligibility for assignment incentive pay for duty in Korea still 

necessary and cost-effective? 

Answer. With the authorization of a cost-of-living allowance (COLA) and Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) in Korea, pay disparity for our servicemembers in the 

ROK has been greatly improved. By extending tours through AIP, we improve readiness and increase stability. From a fiscal standpoint, the incentive pay a 

servicemember receives for extending his or her tour is less than the costs borne 

by the government to move two servicemembers (one to Korea, one from Korea). The 

combined effect of reduced PCS costs, increased readiness and greater stability in 

Korea is a win/win situation. AIP has been a huge success with over 19,000 soldiers 

and airmen signing up for incentive pay with an estimated net savings of $112 million in reduced PCS costs. However, while AIP has been a major success from a fiscal perspective, for our unaccompanied servicemembers—over 80 percent of our authorized force in Korea-accepting AIP means longer separations from family back in 

the States. Rather than providing incentives to unaccompanied personnel to stay 

longer in Korea, we should focus on enabling servicemembers to bring their families 

to Korea and establish a more family oriented environment. With tour length normalization in Korea, in accordance with DOD overseas basing policies such as those 

in Europe and Japan, we could end the Assignment Incentive Pay program. 

MEDICAL CARE FOR U.S. FORCES IN KOREA

Question. One of the most important quality of life issues in Korea is ensuring 

access to high quality medical care for servicemembers of all military branches and 

their families. Separate medical chains of command responsible for providing health 

care, and the presence of non-command-sponsored family members who need health 

services, among other factors, have presented challenges. Reforms proposed have included: (1) establishment of a joint military medical command for Korea to streamline command and control of health care delivery for all personnel, (2) development 

of a managed care support contract for Korea, and (3) offering a TRICARE-like benefit to all family members and DOD employees, regardless of command sponsorship. 

If confirmed, how would you assess the need for improvement in the management 

and delivery of health care services in Korea? 

Answer. Quality health care is essential for all servicemembers, regardless of 

where they serve. However, this is even more important for our servicemembers 

who serve in Korea—thousands of miles from home. If confirmed, I will conduct a 

careful and thorough review of the availability of quality health care for our 

servicemembers and their families. 

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Question. What is your view on whether or not the policy regarding support to 

non-command sponsored family members should be reconsidered and revised by the 

Department of Defense? 

Answer. General Bell has made extraordinary strides for non-command sponsored 

family members by ensuring access and availability of the full range of services, entitlements and privileges for all dependent family members who reside with their 

military, DOD civilian employee, or invited contractor sponsor in Korea. If confirmed, I will continue General Bell’s efforts by placing special emphasis on critical 

areas of support for servicemember families such as TRICARE medical and dental 

programs as well as tuition assistance for dependent children. This may require addressing current DOD policies on non-command sponsored dependents. 

SEXUAL ASSAULT

Question. What is your assessment of the progress that the Army has made in 

the last 2 years in the promulgation of policy on sexual assault, and what do you 

think will be your biggest challenge in achieving the changes in programs, training 

and implementation if confirmed as Commander of the U.S. Forces in Korea? 

Answer. I believe that the Army has made great strides in ensuring the promulgation of its policy on sexual assault. General Bell has made preventing sexual assault 

a priority, as well as his policy which is to eliminate any occurrence of this crime 

within United States Forces Korea. If confirmed I will maintain General Bell’s command focus upon awareness and prevention of sexual assault. 

PREVENTION OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Question. Following media reports connecting prostitution and human trafficking 

in Korea to U.S. military forces, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, in 2004 instituted 

a zero tolerance policy regarding the illegal activities of prostitution and human 

trafficking. Under this policy, all USFK personnel, military and civilian, as well as 

contractors and their employees, are expected to comply with prohibitions, including 

observance of curfews and laws regarding off-limits areas and establishments, 

aimed at curtailing these practices. 

What effects on the incidence of prostitution and human trafficking have changes 

in U.S. policy, as well as new criminal laws implemented by the ROK, had on the 

incidence of prostitution and human trafficking in Korea? 

Answer. Changes in U.S. policy have decreased the incidents of prostitution and 

human trafficking in Korea. General Bell has instituted a zero tolerance policy regarding prostitution and human trafficking within United States Forces Korea. The 

current USFK strategy of awareness, identification, reduction, and enforcement has 

been a success, and, if confirmed, I will continue this approach. 

Question. What further changes, if any, to the Uniform Code of Military Justice 

and military regulations are needed in your judgment to ensure maximum effectiveness of the zero tolerance policy? 

Answer. I believe that the Uniform Code of Military Justice and extant military 

regulations are sufficient to ensure the efficacy of the zero tolerance policy. I would 

be willing to offer any recommendations to this committee should I see the need to 

do so in the future. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to further enhance the effectiveness of the zero tolerance policy? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue General Bell’s zero tolerance policy and 

strategy of awareness, identification, reduction and enforcement. I will maintain 

command focus to further enhance the policy’s effectiveness. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those 

views differ from the administration in power? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States 

Forces Korea? 

97

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

[The nomination reference of LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA, follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

February 14, 2008. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

The following named officer for appointment in the United States Army to the 

grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under 

title 10, U.S.C., section 601: 

To be General 

LTG Walter L. Sharp, 0000. 

[The biographical sketch of LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA, which 

was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was 

referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF LTG WALTER L. SHARP, USA 

Source of commissioned service: USMA.

Military schools attended: 

Armor Officer Basic Course 

Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course 

United States Army Command and General Staff College 

United States Army War College

Educational degrees: 

United States Military Academy - BS - No Major 

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute - MS - Operations Analysis/Engineering

Foreign language(s): None recorded.

Promotions:

Promotions Dates of Appointment 

2LT 5 Jun 74 

1LT 5 Jun 76 

CPT 8 Aug 78 

MAJ 1 Jan 85 

LTC 1 Apr 90

COL 1 Sep 93

BG 1 Oct 97

MG 1 Jan 01

LTG 10 Mar 03

Major duty assignments:

From To Assigment

Apr 75 ........ May 77 ... Platoon Leader, A Company, later Executive Officer, B Company, 1st Battalion, 67th Armor, 2d 

Armored Division, Fort Hood, TX 

May 77 ....... Jul 77 ..... S–3 (Air), 1st Battalion, 67th Armor, 2d Armored Division, Fort Hood, TX 

Jul 77 ......... Aug 78 .... Assistant G–3 (Operations), 2d .Armored Division, Fort Hood, TX 

Aug 78 ....... Apr 80 .... Commander, A Company, 1st Battalion, 67th Armor, 2d Armored Division, Fort Hood, TX 

Apr 80 ........ Aug 81 .... Student, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, New York 

98

From To Assigment

Aug 81 ....... Jun 84 .... Combat Development Analysis Officer, Office of the Director for Combat Developments, United 

States Army Armor School, Fort Knox, KY 

Jun 84 ........ May 85 ... Combat Development Analysis Officer, Deep Attack Programs Office. Office of the Deputy Chief 

of Staff for Operations and Plans, Washington, DC 

May 85 ....... Jun 86 .... Student, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 

Jul 86 ......... Jun 88 .... Executive Officer, 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, United States Army Europe 

and Seventh Army, Germany 

Jun 88 ........ Jun 89 .... Combat Development Analysis Officer, A3 Task Force, Office of the Chief of Staff, Army, Washington, DC 

Jun 89 ........ Jul 90 ..... Director of Analysis, Force Developments Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Washington, DC 

Jul 90 ......... Jul 93 ..... Commander, 7th Cavalry Squadron, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX and Operations Desert 

Shield/Storm, Saudi Arabia 

Jul 93 ......... Jul 94 ..... Director, Models and Simulations Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Command, 

National Simulations Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS 

Jul 94 ......... Jun 96 .... Commander, 2d Armored Cavalry Zone V, United Nations Mission in Haiti, Operation Uphold Democracy, Haiti 

Jun 96 ........ Mar 97 .... Executive Officer to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea, Korea 

Mar 97 ....... Oct 98 .... Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver), 2d Infantry Division, Eighth United States Army, 

Korea 

Oct 98 ........ Nov 99 .... Deputy Director for Global/Multilateral Washington, DC 

Dec 99 ........ Nov 01 .... Commanding General, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) and Fort Stewart, GA, to include duty 

as Commander, Multinational Division (North), Operation Joint Forge, Bosnia-Herzegovina 

Nov 01 ........ Mar 03 .... Vice Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, J–8, The Joint Staff, Washington, 

DC 

Mar 03 ....... Aug 05 .... Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, J–5. The Joint Staff, Washington, DC 

Aug 05 ....... Present ... Director, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC 

Summary of joint assignments:

Assignments Dates Rank

Executive Officer to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command/

Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea, Korea.

Jun 96–Mar 97 ......... Colonel 

Deputy Director for Global/Multilateral Issues/International-American Affairs, 

J–5, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC.

Oct 98–Nov 99 ......... Brigadier General 

Vice Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, J–8, The Joint 

Staff, Washington, DC.

Nov 01–Mar 03 ......... Major General 

Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, J–5, The Joint Staff,Washington, DC Mar 03–Aug 05 ........ Lieutenant General 

Director, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC ........................................................ Aug 05-Present ......... Lieutenant General 

U.S. decorations and badges: 

Distinguished Service Medal 

Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster) 

Legion of Merit (with Oak Leaf Cluster) 

Bronze Star Medal 

Meritorious Service Medal (with five Oak Leaf Clusters) 

Army Commendation Medal 

Army Achievement Medal 

Parachutist Badge 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge 

Army Staff Identification Badge 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA, in connection 

with his nomination follows:]

99

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228

Washington, DC 20510–6050

(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Walter L. Sharp.

2. Position to which nominated: 

Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States 

Forces Korea.

3. Date of nomination: 

February 14, 2008.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.]

5. Date and place of birth: 

27/09/52, Morgantown, WV.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Joanne Sharp (Caporaso).

7. Names and ages of children: 

Elizabeth Weyrach, 32; Steven Sharp, 26; Kevin Sharp, 23.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive 

branch. 

None.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution. 

None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

2nd Armored Cavalry Association, Member. 

1st Cavalry Division Association, Member. 

Association of the United States Army, Member.

11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch. 

None. 

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee 

of the Senate? 

Yes.

100

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the 

administration in power? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–

E are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

WALTER L. SHARP. 

This 19th day of February, 2008.

[The nomination of LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA, was reported to 

the Senate by Chairman Levin on April 24, 2008, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on April 29, 2008.] 

(101)

NOMINATIONS OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, 

USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE 

OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, 

UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND; AND 

LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL 

AND TO BE COMMANDER, MULTI-NATIONAL 

FORCE-IRAQ 

THURSDAY, MAY 22, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room SD–

106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, 

Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Clinton, Pryor, Webb, 

Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, Graham, Dole, Cornyn, Thune, 

Martinez, and Wicker. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and Breon 

N. Wells, receptionist. 

Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, 

counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. 

Noblet, professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican 

staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; 

David G. Collins, research assistant; Gregory T. Kiley, professional 

staff member; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional 

staff member; Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff member; 

Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel; and Dana W. White, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Ali Z. Pasha. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Jay Maroney, assistant 

to Senator Kennedy; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; 

Bonni Berge, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple and 

Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R. 

102

Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Andrew Shapiro, 

assistant to Senator Clinton; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Anthony 

J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and 

Todd Stiefler, assistants to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Kevin Bishop and Andrew King, assistants to Senator Graham; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; 

David Hanke, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Andi Fouberg, assistant 

to Senator Thune; David Brown and Brian W. Walsh, assistants to 

Senator Martinez; and Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator 

Wicker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. The committee 

meets today to consider the nomination of General David Petraeus 

for reappointment to the grade of general and to be Commander, 

United States Central Command (CENTCOM); and the nomination 

of Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno for appointment to the 

grade of general and to be Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq 

(MNF–I). 

If confirmed, these two officers will continue to lead our military 

operations in Iraq, where we have 160,000 American troops deployed in the middle of a protracted and bloody sectarian battle. 

As CENTCOM Commander, General Petraeus will also assume 

responsibility for operations in Afghanistan, where an increasing 

level of violence poses new hazards to the Afghan Government and 

the American troops who help support it. 

Every member of this committee recognizes that the long hours 

and hard work put in by our senior military officials at the Department of Defense (DOD) require commitment and sacrifice, not only 

from our nominees, but also from their family members. The sacrifice is particularly striking in the case of General Petraeus and 

General Odierno. Not only has each of these officers served more 

than 30 years in the military, each has already served multiple 

tours of duty in Iraq, and is volunteering to return. 

Over the last 5 years, General Petraeus has served three tours 

of duty in Iraq, spending almost 4 years there, first as Commander 

of the 101st Airborne Division, then as Commander of the MultiNational Security Transition Command-Iraq, and most recently as 

Commander of the MNF–I. 

Similarly, General Odierno has served two tours of duty and 

more than 2 years in Iraq, first as Commanding General of the 4th 

Infantry Division, and more recently as Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq. 

Over the last year and a half, General Petraeus has been the 

leading architect of a new tactical approach in Iraq which has 

brought about some stability in a situation that, a year ago, was 

far more violent and unstable. General Odierno has been his able 

partner in executing that new approach. If confirmed, these two officers will bring in an unprecedented continuity of senior military 

leadership to a military operation, providing unparalleled knowledge of the situation on the ground and fully utilizing the working 

relationships that they’ve developed with Iraqi political and military leaders over the years. 

103

Regardless of one’s view of the wisdom of the policy that took us 

to Iraq in the first place and has kept us there over 5 years, we 

owe General Petraeus and General Odierno a debt of gratitude for 

the commitment, determination, and strength that they’ve brought 

to their areas of responsibility (AORs). Regardless how long the administration may choose to remain engaged in the strife in that 

country, our troops are better off for the leadership that these two 

distinguished soldiers provide. 

We appreciate the sacrifices that you and your families have already made in the service of our Nation. We thank you in advance 

for your willingness to bear the burden of continued service. 

The committee has a long tradition of recognizing the families of 

our nominees. I know that General Petraeus’s family was unable 

to make it here today. General Odierno does have a number of family members present. 

General Odierno, we’d very much like for you to introduce your 

family to the committee. 

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity 

to do that. 

First, as are many soldiers, airmen, sailors, and marines, we’re 

indebted to our families and all that they’ve sacrificed, as you’ve 

mentioned. First, I’d like to introduce my wife, Linda, we’ve known 

each other since high school, went through 4 years of West Point, 

32 years in the military, where she has volunteered for countless 

hours for our soldiers and families, and led family readiness groups 

at the company, battalion, brigade, division, and the corps level. I 

am indebted to her for not only taking care of our family, but taking care of our soldiers and their families, as well. 

I’d also like to introduce my son, Anthony, and his fiance, 

Daniella. Tony’s a 2001 graduate of West Point, served in Iraq. 

He’s an Airborne Ranger infantryman who earned the Combat Infantry Badge, the Purple Heart, and the Bronze Star Medal for 

Valor for his service in Iraq. He currently is attending New York 

University to get his MBA. 

I’d also like to introduce my daughter, Katie, and her husband, 

Nick. Katie lives in Baltimore. She’s an interior architect. Nick is 

a construction engineer, and they’re, just, great young people. 

I’m very proud of all of them. Thank you, sir. 

My son, Michael, who’s not here today, attends Texas Tech University, and I also appreciate all his support. 

Thank you, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could ask General Odierno where his son’s fiance ́ lives. [Laughter.] 

General ODIERNO. She is from Greenwich, CT. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. [Laughter.] 

Chairman LEVIN. I had a hunch we knew the answer to that one. 

[Laughter.] 

We thank you and your families, both, whether they are here in 

person—we’re grateful to them—or whether they’re not able to be 

here in person—we’re very grateful, and we hope you’ll extend, 

General Petraeus, our gratitude to your family. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you. 

104

Chairman LEVIN. Now, Senator Warner, I know, is stuck in traffic. Senator Inhofe, would you like to make an opening statement? 

Senator INHOFE. Mr. Chairman, I do not have an opening statement. I would only say that we’ve been real pleased, recently, to 

even get from some of the generally unfriendly press the successes 

that are going on. I think the two of you have a lot to do with that. 

We are very proud of you. 

I don’t have a formal statement, sir. I would submit the opening 

statement of my colleague, Senator Warner. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Thank you, Senator Levin. 

I join you in welcoming General Petraeus and General Odierno and congratulating them on their nominations. I thank each of them for their service and their 

commitment to continue serving in these key positions. 

General Petraeus, I recall well your nomination hearing on January 23, 2007, for 

your current assignment, and the stark situation that you, General Odierno, the 

Multi-National Corps Commander, and, of course, the men and women of your magnificent force, confronted at that time. You returned to testify about conditions in 

Iraq on September 11, 2007, and again on April 8, 2008. 

No military officer understands the challenges we face in Iraq better than you, 

and no officer has a better foundation to take on the complex responsibilities you 

will have as Commander, United States Central Command (CENTCOM). 

In your responses to the committee’s advance questions, you acknowledge the 

many challenges that you will face throughout the CENTCOM AOR if you are confirmed, but I believe that despite the problems in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in Pakistan, Lebanon, Somalia, Iran, and elsewhere—there are opportunities for us to engage and make this a better, more secure region. 

In his testimony to this committee on March 4, 2008, Admiral Fallon testified 

positively about the security situation in Iraq noting it was on an ‘‘upward vector.’’ 

Similarly, with respect to Afghanistan, the Admiral praised the Afghan Security 

Forces’ leadership, determination, and willingness to go out and engage, and cited 

the broad support that the Government of Afghanistan enjoys. 

If confirmed, this will be your fourth assignment in Southwest Asia since March 

2003. You led the 101st Airborne Division with great distinction in northern Iraq 

in 2003, and you were later recognized for making significant improvements from 

June 2004 through September 2005 in the training of the Iraqi security forces as 

Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq. 

After commanding the Army’s Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, 

where you led the development of the Army’s doctrine for military operations in a 

counterinsurgency environment, you returned to Iraq to Command the Multi-National Force, and you achieved levels of stability that while fragile, are nonetheless 

real. 

I believe you are the best qualified officer in the Armed Forces for this critically 

important position, and I thank you and your family for the sacrifices they and you 

have made during your outstanding service. 

General Odierno, just last month you came before this committee in connection 

with your nomination to be the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. I noted then that 

your career of service has won the hearts and minds of the soldiers and families 

that you have associated with over these many years. You testified on April 3 that 

when you found yourself becoming discouraged, the first thing you would do is go 

visit soldiers or marines and that would build you back up because of their dedication and loyalty. Well, I believe this probably works equally well on the morale of 

those whom you come in contact with, and I know it will continue. 

Army leaders have come before us and testified about a ‘‘resilient’’ Army, but one 

that is stressed to the maximum and lacking shock absorbency and the capability 

to respond to emergent crises or additional demands. I urge you to keep these considerations in mind as you fulfill your new responsibilities. 

General Odierno, in the foreword to the new field manual on counterinsurgency, 

General Petraeus wrote that ‘‘conducting a successful counterinsurgency campaign 

requires a flexible, adaptive force led by agile, well-informed, culturally astute leaders.’’ As Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq from May 2006 through February 

2008, you proved that you possess these qualities and that you will continue to build 

upon your success in putting al Qaeda forces on the defensive, providing protection 

105

to the civilian population, engaging the Sunni population in Anbar province, and 

significantly lowering the rates of violence. You formed a remarkable working relationship over the last 2 years. I’m sure that it will continue. 

I thank you and your families again for the sacrifices you have made. I look forward to your testimony today. 

Senator Levin.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

Now we have standard questions that we ask of our nominees, 

and you can answer together: 

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing 

conflicts of interest? [Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.] 

Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which 

would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

[Both witnesses answered in the negative.] 

Will you ensure that your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the 

record in hearings? [Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.] 

Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? [Both witnesses answered in the 

affirmative.] 

Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? [Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.] 

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify, upon request, 

before this committee? [Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.] 

Do you agree to give your personal views, when asked before this 

committee to do so, even if those views differ from the administration in power? [Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.] 

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic 

forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a 

duly-constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or denial in providing 

such documents? [Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.] 

Thank you. 

General Petraeus? 

STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE 

COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, 

members of the committee. Thank you for your swift scheduling of 

this hearing. 

I’m honored to have been nominated to command CENTCOM 

and to have an opportunity, if confirmed, to continue to serve our 

Nation in a critical region. 

Beyond that, I’m delighted that Lieutenant General Ray Odierno 

has been nominated to command the MNF–I, and I’m grateful to 

him for his willingness to take on this position, and to his family 

for their sacrifice, as well. 

As has been noted already in recent days, one of this committee’s 

senior members has just had a big rock added to his rucksack, and 

I want to take this opportunity to applaud Senator Kennedy’s inspirational spirit as he embarks on a course of treatment that we 

all hope will lead to a quick return to full duty. 

106

As the members of this committee know, CENTCOM is in its 7th 

consecutive year of combat operations, and the CENTCOM AOR 

contains numerous challenges. The AOR includes 27 states and 

some 650 million people from at least 18 major ethnic groups. Stability in the region is threatened by a variety of religious, ethnic, 

and tribal tensions, not to mention transnational terrorist organizations, insurgent elements, piracy, and inadequate economic development. The region is rich in oil reserves, but poor in fresh 

water. Economic conditions vary enormously, with annual per-capital incomes ranging from a low of $200 to a high of over $70,000. 

In 22 of 27 states in the AOR, young people aged 15 to 29 constitute over 40 percent of the population, and economic opportunities are often insufficient to meet their expectations. 

Although the region is diverse, several transnational concerns affect many of its states, and I’d like to quickly review these, and 

then discuss specific challenges and opportunities within the subregions, concluding by outlining concepts I’ll use, if confirmed, to 

guide the refinement of CENTCOM’s regional security strategy. 

A survey of the CENTCOM AOR reveals four primary 

transnational concerns. The first is violent extremism. Al Qaeda is, 

of course, the highest-priority terrorist threat to many states in the 

region, as well as to the United States and many of our allies 

around the world. However, other extremist groups also threaten 

security in the CENTCOM region. In addition, Tehran and Damascus support militant groups and proxies that challenge the stability 

and sovereignty of several states in the AOR. 

The second transnational concern is the proliferation of weapons 

of mass destruction (WMD) and of WMD-related components and 

technical expertise. The lack of transparency and efforts by countries such as Iran and Syria to develop their nuclear programs is 

a major concern to states in the region, and could spark a destabilizing regional arms race. Nuclear proliferation also, of course, 

creates fears about the acquisition of nuclear devices by 

transnational terrorist groups. 

A third concern is the lack of sustainable economic development 

in a number of the region’s countries. This is not just a domestic 

social or humanitarian issue, it is a serious security concern, as 

well; for, without economic opportunity, poor and disenfranchised 

communities can serve as hotbeds for the spread of violent extremism. We have seen this in a number of areas in the region in recent years. 

A fourth transnational concern encompasses narcotics and arms 

trafficking, piracy, and smuggling. These damage societies, threaten legitimate commerce and the flow of strategic resources, and 

often benefit terrorist networks. These activities must be addressed 

if international efforts to combat terrorist financing are to succeed. 

These transnational concerns are interrelated and have different 

manifestations across the subregions of the CENTCOM AOR. 

While they constitute far from an exhaustive list of the challenges 

in the AOR, they do provide perspective as we turn to the subregions and their challenges. 

The CENTCOM region can, in fact, be described as a region of 

regions, consisting of the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf states, Central and South Asia, the Levant, and the Horn of Africa. 

107

The Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf states comprise a region of 

vast complexity and strategic importance. In Iraq, Iraqi and coalition forces continue to build on the security gains of the past 15 

months, as we also continue to reduce U.S. forces and transition responsibility to Iraqi security forces (ISF), strive to maintain the 

conditions necessary for political progress, help build governmental 

capacity, and seek to foster economic development. 

I should note here that the number of security incidents in Iraq 

last week was the lowest in over 4 years, and it appears that the 

week that ends tomorrow will see an even lower number of incidents. This has been achieved despite having now withdrawn three 

of the five brigade combat teams (BCTs) scheduled to redeploy 

without replacement by the end of the July, and also with the reduction of the two marine battalions and marine expeditionary 

unit. 

Recent operations in Basrah, Mosul, and now Sadr City, have 

contributed significantly to the reduction in violence, and Prime 

Minister Maliki, his government, the ISFs, and the Iraqi people, in 

addition to our troopers, deserve considerable credit for the positive 

developments since Ambassador Ryan Crocker and I testified, a 

month and a half ago. 

In the months ahead, coalition forces will continue to work closely with the ISFs in pursuing al Qaeda-Iraq and their extremist 

partners and the militia elements that threaten security in Iraq. As 

always, tough fights and hard work lie ahead. Nonetheless, I believe that the path we are on will best help achieve the objective 

of an Iraq that is at peace with itself and its neighbors, that is an 

ally in the war on terror, that has a government that serves all 

Iraqis and that is an increasingly prosperous and important member of the global economy and community of nations. 

Iran continues to be a destabilizing influence in the region. It 

persists in its nontransparent pursuit of nuclear technology, and 

continues to fund, train, and arm dangerous militia organizations. 

Iran’s activities have been particularly harmful in Iraq, Lebanon, 

the Palestinian Territories, and Afghanistan. In each location, 

Tehran has, to varying degrees, fueled proxy wars in an effort to 

increase its influence and pursue its regional ambitions. [Audience 

interruption.] 

Chairman LEVIN. Excuse me. Excuse me, ma’am. We’re going to 

have to ask you to—we’re going to have to ask you to—we’re going 

to have to ask you to take your seat. Please take your seat. We’re 

going to—I’m sorry that we’re going to have to ask that you leave 

the room now. Please leave the room. Thank you. Please—please—

we’re going to have to ask you to now please—the room. Please. 

Thank you. Please leave the room. We’re going to have—you’ll have 

to be removed if you demonstrate that way we’ve just heard. [Momentary pause while Capitol Police removed protester.] 

General, please continue 

General PETRAEUS. Even as we work with leaders in the region 

to help protect our partners from Iranian intimidation or coercion, 

however, we must also explore policies that, over the long term, 

offer the possibility of more constructive relations, if that is possible. Together with regional and global partners, we need to seek 

ways to encourage Iran to respect the integrity of other states, to 

108

embrace nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and to contribute to 

regional stability rather than regional instability. 

Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Yemen, and the 

United Arab Emirates are important partners in efforts to promote 

regional stability and improve regional economic and military cooperation. Our relationships with these states present many opportunities for advancing common economic and security interests, 

such as engagement via the Gulf security dialogue. We need to continue our strong, productive relationships with each of them as we 

strive to deal with the challenges that confront them and the Gulf 

region. 

The countries of Central and South Asia face a variety of economic and security challenges, but they, too, offer abundant engagement and partnership opportunities. In Afghanistan, our focus 

is on helping the elected government expand governance, security, 

and economic opportunity, while defeating insurgent and terrorist 

threats. 

In assessing the situation in Afghanistan, it is important to recognize that we and our coalition partners are helping that country 

build, not merely rebuild, for, even before its 30 years of war, Afghanistan was one of the poorest countries in the world. Exploiting 

the security provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO)-led International Security Assistance Force, many coalition 

countries are striving to help Afghanistan achieve sustainable economic development in assisting with the provision of basic services, 

the development of infrastructure, and the creation of legitimate alternatives to poppy farming. Due to the scale of the challenges involved, and the difficulties in the security arena in particular, we 

should expect Afghanistan to require substantial international commitment and support for many years to come. 

Afghanistan’s neighbor, Pakistan, has been an important partner 

in efforts to combat terrorism. However, the newly-elected government faces serious economic difficulties and energy shortages, and 

it is still solidifying its coalition and coming to grips with how to 

respond to internal threats that have global implications. 

We have seen, for example, growth in Taliban and al Qaeda capability and control in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 

(FATA) in the Northwest Frontier Province. Foreign fighters continue to flow from Pakistan into Afghanistan, where they’re a violent and destabilizing influence. One of our challenges will be to increase the capability of Pakistani security forces, which are not 

adequately trained or equipped, to secure their border or to deal 

with the growth of terrorist elements and the insurgency in the 

FATA. It is clear that we and other countries supporting Pakistan 

should support Islamabad as Pakistani leaders develop a comprehensive approach to countering extremist and insurgent activity. 

In Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and 

Kazakhstan, abundant opportunities exist for building security, political, and economic partnerships, and for pursuing common interests. To varying degrees, we have, in fact, partnered in security efforts in encountering terrorism with these countries in the past, 

and we will have similar opportunities in the future. 

109

U.S. partnerships can also help these countries’ efforts to build 

governmental capacity and continue economic growth, while also 

reducing the prospects that extremism will gain influence and be 

exported. 

In the Levant, we see continuing challenges of instability and 

terrorist activity and facilitation in Lebanon and Syria, even as we 

enjoy robust security partnerships with Jordan and Egypt. 

In Lebanon, the government is grappling with the political and 

militia activities of Lebanese Hezbollah. Recently, Hezbollah attempted to break the political deadlock through violent action, forcing Sunni Arabs from some neighborhoods in Beirut, and intimidating the government and Lebanese armed forces. Yesterday’s 

agreement between the Lebanese government and the Hezbollahled opposition needs to be seen in that context, as it highlights the 

need to support regional efforts to help Lebanon as it seeks to deal 

with destabilizing Syrian and Iranian influences. 

Syria presents another set of challenges. Of particular concern to 

Iraq, the Syrian government has taken inadequate measures to 

stem the flow of foreign fighters through Syria to join al Qaeda elements in northern Iraq. Damascus also continues to undermine 

stability in Lebanon by encouraging and enabling violent opposition to the elected government. Finally, Syria’s apparent effort to 

develop secret nuclear facilities is also very troubling. The region 

obviously would be more secure were Syria to realize that neither 

harboring terrorist facilitators nor sparking a regional arms race is 

in Syria’s best interest. 

As with Iran, the challenge with Syria will be to find approaches 

that can convince Syrian leaders that they should be part of the solution in the region rather than a continuing part of the problem. 

Hopefully, yesterday’s announcement of renewed peace talks between Syria and Israel marks a first step toward that end. 

Jordan and Egypt are important partners in U.S. counterterrorist efforts, and they help to promote regional stability by encouraging neighboring states to participate constructively in the 

Middle East peace process. In addition, Jordan plays an influential 

role in helping inform attitudes in the Arab world on the situation 

in Iraq. Maintaining our robust partnerships with these countries 

can enable us to sustain mutually beneficial security and economic 

ties. 

As it currently stands, the Horn of Africa is another subregion 

in the CENTCOM AOR. With responsibility for this region which 

includes Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, and 

the Seychelles scheduled for transfer to the U.S. Africa Command 

(AFRICOM) this fall, CENTCOM’s challenge will be to provide a 

seamless transition of responsibilities, and to establish effective coordination and liaison with AFRICOM to ensure unity of effort in 

the conduct of various counterterrorist and counterpiracy missions. 

Having quickly addressed transnational challenges and the challenges in the regions of the AOR, I’d like to briefly discuss some 

broad principles that will guide our efforts if I’m confirmed. These 

approaches are consistent with those pursued by CENTCOM under 

the leadership of Admiral William ‘‘Fox’’ Fallon and now General 

Martin Dempsey. 

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First, we’ll seek to strengthen international partnerships. We 

will continue to pursue strong bilateral and multilateral partnerships and to identify, further develop, and pursue mutual interests. 

Regional partnerships and consensus can create leverage and deter 

destabilizing actors. Of course, the pursuit of common interests requires robust, two-way engagement, understanding, and accommodating the concerns of others even as we understandably seek to 

pursue our own. Engagement will be a central aspect of my responsibilities as the CENTCOM Commander, if confirmed. 

Second, in most, if not all, of our activities, we will partner with 

other departments and agencies within the U.S. Government, taking a whole-of-government approach to the challenges and opportunities of the CENTCOM AOR. In most of the issues we’ll address, 

a purely military approach is unlikely to succeed, and our strategy 

must recognize that. Indeed, many of you will recall that the campaign plan in Iraq is a joint U.S. Embassy-Iraq and MNF–I product, not merely a military one. A combined approach should also 

be a central feature of our efforts in the CENTCOM AOR. 

Third, and related to that, if I’m confirmed we will pursue comprehensive efforts and solutions in the region. Attempting to address, with our partners, not just the symptoms of current conflicts, 

but also their underlying causes. 

Last month in my testimony, I explained the strategy we have 

adopted in pursuing al Qaeda-Iraq, acting along multiple lines of 

operation and employing a variety of kinetic and nonkinetic approaches. We’ll seek to apply a similar strategy, writ large, in the 

CENTCOM AOR, recognizing that enduring security and stability 

require comprehensive economic, political, social, and diplomatic efforts, as well as military means. 

Finally, we should both support the ongoing operations in Iraq 

and Afghanistan and ensure readiness for possible contingency operations in order to be prepared to assist in the event of natural 

disasters, to ensure sufficient deterrence of actions that might 

threaten regional partners, and, if necessary, to be ready to defeat 

aggressors that threaten our vital interests in the region. 

If I’m confirmed, these concepts will guide our approach at 

CENTCOM and inform the refinement of the strategy employed to 

address the challenges and opportunities in the CENTCOM region. 

In closing, I want to thank each of you, once again, for the tremendous support you continue to provide to our men and women 

in uniform and to their families. Nothing means more to the wonderful Americans serving in harm’s way or waiting for a loved one 

at home than knowing that their service and sacrifices are appreciated by their fellow citizens. 

I also want to assure you that, if confirmed, I will work tirelessly 

to meet my responsibilities as a combatant commander to partner 

with you, the Service chiefs and secretaries, the Chairman and the 

Secretary, to help ensure that those serving our Nation in uniform 

have the best equipment available, the best care possible for those 

wounded or injured, and the best preparation for the challenging 

tasks we ask our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen to perform in combat. This is a sacred obligation that 

I take very seriously. 

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This committee knows well the extraordinary performance of our 

troopers downrange. Their selfless commitment to duty has, in fact, 

been foremost in my mind as I have considered the responsibilities 

of the CENTCOM Commander. Command of CENTCOM would 

likely mean carrying the heaviest rucksack I’ve ever shouldered; 

but, given our servicemembers’ repeated willingness to shoulder 

their own heavy rucksacks in the toughest, most complex situations 

imaginable, there can be no alternative but to soldier on with 

them, drawing strength from them, striving to give energy to them, 

and pressing on together with them to accomplish our assigned 

missions. If confirmed, it will be an honor to do that with them. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, General Petraeus. 

General Odierno? 

STATEMENT OF LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ 

General ODIERNO. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

I want to, first, personally pass along my best wishes to Senator 

Kennedy and his family. We’re all rooting and praying for him, his 

quick return back here to the Senate. 

Chairman LEVIN. Let me interrupt you for just a moment. 

Thank you and General Petraeus for your reference to Senator 

Kennedy. This is a Senate family, which is a very strong, cohesive 

family, and he is a very important part of that cohesion. We’re 

never a tighter family than when something like this happens to 

somebody that has such huge respect as Senator Kennedy. That’s 

true on both sides of the aisle. We very much appreciate your reference to him. As we note the seat next to us, which is empty, we 

are all praying and hoping and believing that that seat will be occupied by Senator Kennedy in the near future. 

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, could I associate myself with 

those remarks and thank the generals. I’ve had the wonderful opportunity to know Senator Kennedy for over 40 years. His older 

brother, Bobby Kennedy, and I were in law school together, back 

in the late 1940s, and I got to know him at that time, and we’ve 

been close working partners and good friends ever since. We thank 

you for that acknowledgment. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much. 

General Odierno? 

General ODIERNO. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, distinguished members of the Armed Services Committee, I appreciate 

the opportunity to be here this morning. 

Most recently, as the Commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq, 

I had the honor of speaking with many of you during a number of 

congressional visits to the Iraqi theater of operations. I want to 

thank you for your dedicated support to our forces serving there, 

your faith in their outstanding abilities, and your understanding of 

the many sacrifices they and their families endure for the sake of 

country, comrades, and their loved ones. For all of this, I thank the 

members of the committee. 

As I reflect on my nomination to be appointed the next MNF–

I Commander, I’m both humbled and honored. I understand the 

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great cost that our Nation has endured in Iraq. I also understand 

the importance of our mission there and the responsibility that 

comes with this position. I am inspired, and I feel a tremendous 

sense of awe for the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines and 

their families for their demonstrated resilience and accomplishments and commitment to the tasks at hand. I consider myself 

blessed that I’ve had a chance to continue to serve in their ranks. 

If confirmed, I will do so with integrity, commitment, and drive 

that such a special position of trust and responsibility demands. 

With that, I’d look forward to answering your questions. Thank 

you, Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Excuse this slight delay here. We’re trying to 

schedule a vote of the committee on nominations. If we can get a 

quorum, we will interrupt our questions in order to act on those 

nominations this morning. 

We’re going to have to limit our question period to a 6-minute 

round, because I understand we have up to four votes, starting at 

11:30. Whether we can function through that or not, we will have 

to determine as we proceed, but, at least, we’re going to try to get 

one round each before that time. So, we’re going to, in order to do 

that, have to have a 6-minute round. 

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, if I could just say, we’ve discussed—those are the nominations of General McChrystal and Admiral McRaven to——

Chairman LEVIN. There’s a number of other nominations. They’re 

included with that list. 

Senator WARNER. Right. 

Chairman LEVIN. General Petraeus, when you appeared before 

the committee, on April 8, you said that your recommendation at 

that time was that, after the drawdown of the five brigades of 

surge troops that would be finished in July, that you would first 

undertake a 45-day period of evaluation, and that would take us 

through August, and that then, following that, you would commence a process of assessment to examine the conditions on the 

ground and, over time, determine when you could make recommendations for further reductions. In response to my questions 

at the time, you said that you could not say how long that period 

of assessment would take, whether it would be 1 month, 2 months, 

3 months, or more. Is it now your intention to make a recommendation, relative to further troop reductions, before you 

change command, presumably in September? 

General PETRAEUS. It is, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Can you tell us what has caused that change? 

General PETRAEUS. Mr. Chairman, what I was trying to explain, 

last month, was that the period of consolidation and evaluation 

would include assessments, and that, at the end of that time, if 

conditions allowed, that there would be recommendations at that 

time. My sense is that I will be able to make a recommendation 

at that time for some further reductions. I don’t want to imply that 

that means a BCT or major combat formation, although it could. 

But, I do believe that there will be certain assets that, as we are 

already looking at the picture right now, we’ll be able to recommend, can be either redeployed or not deployed to the theater 

in the fall. 

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Chairman LEVIN. All right. That, I think, is good news to most 

of us. 

What role are U.S. forces playing in the operations in Sadr City? 

General PETRAEUS. We are providing a variety of enabler support 

for the operations. Now we’re really talking about that portion of 

Sadr City in which we do not have forces right now. We have, as 

you may know, Mr. Chairman, up to a certain line in Sadr City, 

about one-fifth of the way from the southwest toward the northeast, forces together with Iraqi elements. In the remaining portion 

of Sadr City, which the Iraqi forces just entered a couple of days 

ago, we do not have forces on the ground, although we do provide 

a variety of enablers, in terms of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance assets, attack helicopter teams, and, again, other assets. 

Although those have not been required to be actively engaged in 

that other part of Sadr City. 

Chairman LEVIN. General Petraeus, at the present time, only 9 

of 18 provinces have been turned over to Iraqi control. It’s been 157 

days since the last province, Basrah, was turned over to Iraqi control, and 157 days is the longest stretch between the turnover of 

a province to Iraqi control since the first province was turned over 

in July 2006. The December 2007 DOD report, titled ‘‘Measuring 

Stability and Security in Iraq,’’ stated that, ‘‘The current projection 

is that all provinces could transition to provincial Iraqi control as 

early as July 2008.’’ Three months later, the December 2007 Defense Department report stated that, ‘‘All remaining provinces are 

expected to transition in 2008.’’ Is that still the Department’s expectation, that all provinces now are expected to transition in this 

year, of 2008? 

General PETRAEUS. It is not, Mr. Chairman. There are several 

additional provinces already scheduled for transition in the next 

few months. Interestingly, Anbar Province, once the most violent 

province in Iraq, and now one of the most peaceful provinces, will 

be transitioning, mostly likely, in June. The final approval has not 

yet been given by the Ministerial Committee on National Security, 

but I believe that that will be dealt with, perhaps later this week 

or next week. 

I expect Qadisiyah Province, which has Diwaniyah as its capital, 

to go through a similar process later this summer, and then there 

are others racked up behind it for which we have projections, and 

we reassess those projections about every month. Frankly, the developments of the last month and a half are causing us to look, perhaps, for earlier transition, in some cases, with some provinces, 

while still others will be, undoubtedly, in the 2009 timeframe. 

Chairman LEVIN. What happened since December 2007, when 

the Department said that all remaining provinces are expected to 

transition in 2008, and now, when apparently a number of provinces will not be transitioned? What has changed? There seems to 

be greater stability on the ground and progress on the ground. 

General PETRAEUS. There is now, Mr. Chairman, but, again, you 

have to go back to that timeframe. We were still, in some cases, 

extending the benefits of the security progress that resulted from 

the additional coalition and Iraqi forces, still trying to determine 

how that was going to go, and, in some cases, grappling with some 

tough issues. Ninawa Province, for example, the only province actuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00119 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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ally of the 18 in Iraq that did not see violence go down, had to be 

slid further to the right in that regard. Now all of a sudden there 

is a major operation there in Mosul and in western Ninawa Province, that appears to be improving the security there substantially. 

We’ll be doing assessments during the course of this year, but I 

don’t think that all of them will be done, by any means, by the end 

of the year. 

Chairman LEVIN. Just a brief final question. Is it your expectation that the October 1, 2008, date for holding provincial elections 

will be met? 

General PETRAEUS. I do not believe that they will be in October, 

sir, based on the very latest. However, the provincial elections law 

has had its second reading, which is the step just before the conduct of a vote in the Council of Representatives. That could take 

place as early as this next week. If all of that goes—they’ve transferred the money to the higher electoral committee, they’re doing 

the security assessments, and a variety of other actions to prepare 

for the voter registration and then the conduct of the elections—

Ambassador Crocker’s assessment most recently is that probably 

November is a more accurate prediction. But, again, there’s every 

intention to have elections in the fall, and that is our expectation, 

still. 

Chairman LEVIN. Yes. That delay is not good news, obviously, to 

us, or most of us, I think, but thank you for your answer. 

Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I welcome both of you and thank you and your families for your 

service to the country. 

Both of you represent not only two of the citizens of this country, 

but you represent our military, two career patterns which, I think, 

incentivize the generations behind you to stay and try and achieve 

some of the successes that each of you have had. That’s important 

at this time. 

On the question of Iraq, this morning’s paper carried a very interesting article on operations in Sadr City, and it indicated that, 

where operations are being conducted now, there’s very few, if any, 

U.S. forces; and that’s, in a way, helping the Iraqi forces to perform 

their mission, because there’s less retaliation from the insurgents 

over there. Can you comment on that? Is that a new development? 

It looks like a very encouraging one. 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, it is an encouraging one, but it is 

one that has been brought about by, very much, joint action by coalition, as well as ISFs. It was that joint action, and also, frankly, 

political dialogue, discussion, negotiation, deals, and compromises, 

that led to the point where the major ‘‘special group’’ leaders, these 

elements that are funded, trained, equipped, and supported by the 

Iranian Quds Force, largely left Sadr City. Some of them were 

killed, by the way. A number of the major other militia leaders also 

departed, and there was an order for the militia essentially to 

stand down. That is an important development. The fact that it is 

Iraqi forces that then can patrol the streets of Sadr City—and they 

have found some significant weapons caches already, including a 

very large one in a hospital, I might add, in Sadr City—again, this 

is encouraging. 

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It is not a model for everywhere. In Basrah, for example, we 

have no ground combat elements with the forces there. We do have 

transition teams, and we do, again, provide enablers. In Mosul, 

we’re very much partnered with them, but they outnumber us 

greatly. 

Senator WARNER. General Odierno, do you have a comment on 

that? Because it seems to me that’s one of the most encouraging 

signs that I’ve seen, that the Iraqis are able to handle these operations, and has left combat as a consequence of the absence of what 

they view us, as occupiers. 

General ODIERNO. I think, obviously, Senator, that each place of 

Iraq has different solutions. In Sadr City and in Basrah, I would 

argue, it’s important for the Iraqis to lead in those areas, and take 

on the majority of the responsibility. In my mind, it is very important that that’s occurring. But the other thing is, we help them significantly, behind the scenes, continue to plan. I see that as a 

model for the future on how we want to do things. What we want 

to do is provide them——

Senator WARNER. I hope you could encourage it in every way possible, because the goal is to have the Iraqi forces take over the responsibility of this sovereign nation, such that we can return home. 

The Strategic Framework Agreement and the other Status of 

Forces Agreement, are you being consulted on that, General 

Petraeus? 

General PETRAEUS. I am, Senator. We provided input to that. 

The lead for that is the Department of State, and, in fact, Ambassador Crocker, with a good deal of support from State. But, I have 

been consulted. We did provide input. 

Senator WARNER. General Odierno, will you, likewise, be consulted, or are you getting up to speed on those two agreements 

now? Because we don’t want to see them put in place as an impediment for the U.S. military from carrying out what it believes is the 

best operational situation to get ourselves out of there. 

General ODIERNO. Senator, obviously it’s very important to us. 

We will continue to provide input. We will watch it very closely to 

make sure that it’s crafted in such a way which allows us to continue to meet the goals of our mission. 

Senator WARNER. Right now you’re being consulted, and, once 

you take command, I would hope that you would be further consulted, to the extent that those agreements have not been concluded. There’s some optimism they could be concluded before you 

move on up to CENTCOM. Is that right? 

General PETRAEUS. I think that is certainly possible, Senator. 

Again, I’m always cautious about events in Iraq. 

Senator WARNER. All right. Back to Afghanistan, one of the 

major concerns that I’ve had is this drug trade. The dollars flowing 

from that drug trade, which, incidentally, I think they are now the 

largest provider, worldwide, of these types of drugs—the dollars 

that are coming from that are being used to purchase weapons, and 

those weapons are being used against our forces and other partners 

in the NATO Alliance. What do you hope to do to try and end that, 

General? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, a country’s economy can’t be built 

on illegal activity, obviously. 

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Senator WARNER. But, in this country it’s over half of their economy. 

General PETRAEUS. No question about it. There is clear recognition of it. Obviously, over time there has to be an alternative provided to those who are currently farming the poppy, and it’s as 

simple as that. But, it is also, as you very well know, extraordinarily difficult and complex to make that transition. 

Senator WARNER. I realize that, but it seems to me you can have 

a very strong voice—I think Admiral Fallon did his best, but we 

cannot just leave this to the Afghan Government and turn our 

backs on it, because our people are on the other end of those weapons systems. 

General PETRAEUS. I agree. 

Senator WARNER. On the question of NATO—while that operation in Afghanistan is largely under the command of NATO—we, 

of course, have a U.S. commander there—NATO survivability depends on a measure of success in that country. What can you do 

to further facilitate NATO’s ability to carry out that success and to 

deal with these really difficult situations, where some of the countries in those forces will not allow their forces, their troops on the 

ground, to participate in combat? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, first of all, of course, what we are 

doing already, and likely will do a bit more of, which is our contribution of forces to that mission—you rightly point out that the 

Commander of the International Security Assistance Force is 

American, but he is a NATO commander. 

Senator WARNER. That’s correct. 

General PETRAEUS. He is not a commander in that billet. Knowing General David McKiernan very well, though, obviously I’ll partner with him as closely as possible, and with NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, and also knowing many of the coalition-country 

leaders, who also contribute troops in Iraq, to work with them to 

do what has been done, and that recently resulted in the pledges 

of some increases of forces. Additionally, we can help with the lessons that we have learned and, I think, have institutionalized effectively in our military services in the United States, in terms of the 

doctrine, the education of our leaders, the training and preparation 

of our forces, and even the equipping of them. We can help with 

that, as well. 

Senator WARNER. But, the national caveats of some of those 

countries to prohibit their forces from engaging in risk-taking operations that ours and others are performing, to me, is a dichotomy 

that you just can’t tolerate. 

Thank you. My time is up. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, and thank you, General Odierno and General 

Petraeus, for your service. Thanks for agreeing to take on these additional assignments, which are not the easiest for you, personally, 

or for your families. We thank them, as well. 

I appreciate that you responded that your future daughter-in-law 

is from Greenwich, CT, because it shows that your son has her 

good judgment. I would also say that he carries on a family tradiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00122 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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tion of heroic service to our country and is characteristic of the tens 

of thousands of Americans who have served under your command. 

Both of you have acknowledged that. 

I think the two of you and those who have served in Iraq wearing 

the uniform of our country have really represented the best of our 

country, and really, if we look at the record here, ought to give the 

whole country tremendous pride, no matter what one thought 

about the original reasons we went into Iraq. You have been a force 

that has been principled, understanding America’s values, you’ve 

been personally strong, you’ve been resilient, in the sense that 

when something wasn’t working, in characteristic American fashion 

you figured out a way to make it work. I personally believe that, 

in doing so, you have greatly brightened the future for the Iraqi 

people, increased the prospects of stability in the Middle East, and 

protected the security and values of the American people. I can’t 

thank you enough for that. 

The military historians and analysts Fred and Kim Kagan recently wrote, ‘‘Great commanders often come in pairs: Eisenhower 

and Patton, Grant and Sherman. Generals David Petraeus and 

Raymond Odierno can now be added to that list.’’ That’s heavy 

stuff, but it happens to be true, in my opinion. I think the two of 

you have now earned your place into the ranks of the most impressive military commanders in American history, and I thank you for 

it. 

General Petraeus, I continue to be very angry about the role that 

Iran is playing in training and equipping Shiite extremists who are 

coming into Iraq and are responsible for the murder of hundreds 

of American soldiers and thousands of Iraqi soldiers and citizens. 

I wanted to ask you—and I know you share that view, of course—

I wanted to ask you what the current state, to the best of your 

knowledge, is, of Iranian support of these special groups and others 

in Iraq. 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, first of all, we know that support 

has continued well after Iran’s most senior leaders made promises 

to Iraq’s most senior leaders that they would stop the training, 

funding, arming, and directing of the so-called ‘‘special group’’ leaders and elements, and also support for the militia. We know that, 

because we have detained individuals who were recipients of that 

training, funding, and arming. They have explained, in great detail, the process for that. We had previously captured the deputy 

commander of Lebanese Hezbollah Department 2800, which was 

created to support this effort and to use the lessons that they had 

learned with Lebanese Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. 

We know, from having captured, and from Iraqi troops having 

captured, massive weapons caches in Basrah, some of which bear 

markings that denote that they were made in January or February 

of 2008, some which contain fuses made only in Iran, others which 

followed a chain to get to Iran and then into the hands of other 

special groups from Syria through Lebanese Hezbollah, in the case 

of RPG–29s. This is all very clear. It’s evidence; it’s not supposition. 

We have laid this out for Iraqi leaders in the past. We’re going 

to do it with an update again with their intelligence agencies, as 

well. Their leaders have laid it out for the public in Iraq. Frankly, 

it has galvanized a degree of opposition, resentment, and so forth, 

118

by a government that views that it’s a sovereign government of a 

sovereign country that is being interfered with by its neighbor to 

the east, a neighbor that should, by rights, want to see it succeed, 

to see a Shiite-led government in Iraq succeed, given that Iran is 

also Shiite, given the common interests they have, the commercial 

interests, economic interests, religious tourism, with Najaf and 

Karbala being in Iraq, and so forth. 

Delegations have recently gone to Iran and shared the concerns 

of the Iraqi Government. It is our hope that this will lead to some 

change in the activities, that there will be a recognition that this 

has been very destabilizing, that it has challenged, again, a sovereign nation and the government of Prime Minister Maliki. We 

are looking for signs of that, frankly. We know, though, that a 

number of the ‘‘special group’’ leaders have gone back to Iran. 

That’s where they are seeking refuge as they have been put under 

pressure in, first, Basrah, then other areas in southern provinces, 

and now in Sadr City. Over time, again, it is our hope that those 

two countries, which will always be neighbors of each other can 

reach an understanding that the kind of lethal activities that have 

been undertaken in recent years are not in the interest of either 

country. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate your answer. I think the most 

significant part of it—I mean, the most disappointing part, of 

course, is the Iranians are still doing what they’ve been doing, resulting in deaths of Americans in Iraq, but the most significant 

part is that Prime Minister Maliki is now, from what you’ve said, 

recognizing that this is not only an attack on us, it’s an attack on 

the sovereignty of Iraq and is asserting that with the Iranians, and 

we can only hope that it draws a response. 

In the time I have left, I want to ask you something else about 

Prime Minister Maliki. When you were here before the committee 

6 weeks ago, the offensive the Prime Minister initiated and ordered 

in Basrah had just begun, and there was a sense then, widely 

shared here in Congress and in the public, that the offensive had 

failed, that it was further proof of the inadequacy of ISFs, that 

Sadr was the winner, that Maliki was the loser. Obviously it looks 

a lot different, 6 weeks later. Give us your own sense of what the 

status on the ground is in Basrah now and what it says about the 

ISF, Maliki, and the extremists in the south of Iraq. 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, you are correct that the operation in 

Basrah did have a shaky start. But, it has since seen enormous 

progress that has produced very positive tactical and strategic results. The tactical results are the return of control to legitimate security forces in Basrah, something for which the Basrawis, the people of that city and province, are quite grateful and they’re pleased 

about. 

The ISFs, again, after that shaky start, very much stiffened. 

They were reinforced by two additional brigades brought down 

from Anbar Province. By the way, our support here has been nothing more than transition teams, the so-called advisor teams, with 

their conventional and Special Operations Forces and the provision 

of enablers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, attack 

helicopter teams on occasion, and so forth. They have continued to 

expand their areas of control. They conducted operations this past 

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week, some 50 or 60 kilometers north of Basrah City, in Al 

Kerna—where the two rivers come together—and the parent site of 

the Garden of Eden, according to some historians—and then even 

turned left and have now gone 20 or so kilometers in another direction. This is moving up towards Maysan Province in the marshes 

and in the city of Amarah, where there have also been some operations by Iraqi forces after quite a long absence there, as well. 

On the strategic side, this has all been important, because there 

has been a degree of support for Prime Minister Maliki in this subsequent period that is unparalleled during the time that Ambassador Crocker and I have been in Iraq. It appears that the Sunni 

coalition will return to government. Touch wood on that, but that 

does look likely. The level of Kurdish support from the two senior 

Kurdish leaders is much solidified. Prime Minister Maliki then 

demonstrated that he’s willing to go after al Qaeda, as well, with 

Iraqi forces, in a very substantial offensive launched in Mosul, 

which is one that took place after about 3 months of very careful 

condition-setting, of the establishment of the infrastructure—combat outposts, joint security stations, the intelligence baseline, and 

all the rest of that logistical stockpiling. That operation is also off 

to a good start, tactically. We’ll have to see, over time, because al 

Qaeda will try to come back and try to regenerate. But, they have 

also launched operations on the so-called ‘‘rat lines’’ along which 

foreign fighters enter Iraq from Syria, and that’s a very important 

development, as well. 

The result is, as I mentioned in my opening statement, that last 

week’s level of incidence was the lowest in over 4 years, and this 

week’s is even significantly lower, and it’s a result of these different operations, plus now Sadr City. 

Meanwhile, in the Council of Representatives, the focus on the 

provincial elections law has been good, and, as I mentioned, we 

hope to see a vote on that in the next week or so, it having had 

its second reading. Then they can start to focus, we believe, on the 

hydrocarbon law package on which there has been much greater coordination between the different factions, as well, already; and 

there are new prospects for progress there that were not at all seen 

prior to the operation in Basrah. So, it’s had a political impact that 

is very significant, in addition to the tactical military progress that 

has been made there. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you for that very encouraging report, 

which I find nothing short of thrilling. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In my brief opening comment, I made reference to an article, 

‘‘Success in Iraq: A Media Blackout,’’ 2 days ago in the New York 

Post, and I’d like to ask that this be entered into the record at this 

point. 

Chairman LEVIN. It will become part of the record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

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Senator INHOFE. In there they talk about how the Iraq and the 

coalition forces are piling up one success after another, the media 

is not giving you a fair shake on this, which is something not too 

surprising. But, we’re now seeing the lowest violence indicators 

since April 2004, and the Iraqi Government is asserting more control. 

I was honored to be right outside of Basrah when that took place, 

and, in fact, I talked to you at that time, and there is kind of a 

mixed feeling as to how the performance was of the ISFs. It was 


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interesting that our forces that I talked to personally were very 

complimentary—we’ve talked about how they are now expanding 

into areas, and we’re real pleased with that. That’s more of a functional thing. 

I’d like to ask each one of you how you’re seeing, since you’ve 

been there a long time, the progress in the training, in the performance of the Iraqis as soldiers. 

General PETRAEUS. There has been a significant increase in the 

capacity, as well as the capability, of the Iraqi forces. Even though, 

for example, the operation in Basrah got off to a shaky start, what 

preceded it was unprecedented, and that is the deployment, really 

throughout that week, of over a division’s worth of Iraqi forces. 

That’s a very substantial movement, and something that would 

have been thought impossible a year ago. 

Senator INHOFE. Which they really did on their own, too. 

General PETRAEUS. They did do it on their own, and they then 

had their C–130s turning several times a day (each of the two of 

their three) typically, that were operating on a given day. Again, 

not all smooth, not all the way we might do it, but it all got done, 

and the result, over time, after the initial, again, slow start, was 

that the units performed quite well. 

Indeed, some of the units that did not do well—among them were 

a brigade that had just literally come out of the unit set fielding, 

the whole process of basic training and so forth; that unit has actually been provided additional replacements, it has gone through a 

retraining process, and its elements are starting to reenter the operations in Basrah, and, so far, have done well. 

Again, there’s been considerable progress in this regard, and you 

see it also in a variety of the other southern provinces, in Mosul 

now, in Diyala Province, Anbar, and also, of course, in Baghdad. 

Senator INHOFE. Good. 

General Odierno? 

General ODIERNO. Senator, if I could just——

Chairman LEVIN. Excuse me for interrupting you, General. We 

have a quorum here, and we have to take advantage of it, as I indicated. [Recessed.] 

General Odierno, you were about to say something. Thank you 

for your patience. 

Senator WARNER. May I say thank you, though, Mr. Chairman, 

for that expedited process. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator INHOFE. General? 

General ODIERNO. Sir, I would just add, to what General 

Petraeus said, what we’ve seen consistently over the last 12 to 14 

months is an improvement in the command and control, the ability 

of the Iraqi forces—the learning. They’re starting to understand 

the command-and-control at brigade, battalion, company level. 

We’ve seen significant improvements in that, in their ability to do 

some planning. 

Of course, the issue always becomes capacity, and we still have 

to work on their full capacity to do this across the entire force. But, 

we are seeing consistent improvement in these areas, and that’s 

where we have to continue—why it’s so important for us to continue to have transition teams, continue to be partnered with them, 

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continue to liaise with them, and we’ll continue to see this improvement. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. That’s why I wanted to mention it. Quite 

frankly, I’ve been over there quite a few times, and what I always 

try to do is get the reports of our troops that are over there participating and training and working with these guys. It’s been favorable. They’re a different standard from us, but dramatic improvements are taking place. 

I’ve long supported the idea of the independent AFRICOM, and 

I’ve had a lot of conversations with General William Ward and his 

predecessor. I really think it’s going to come along fine. I am concerned, however, because, when you think about right now 

AFRICOM is parts of Pacific Command, European Command, 

CENTCOM, but the most aggressive part comes out of CENTCOM. 

Now, you have that whole corner up there. You have Somalia, you 

have Ethiopia, which has been very good in supporting our efforts 

in Somalia; then you have Eritrea, just right down there on the 

water, and the Sudan. That’s where, really, things are very active, 

and a smooth transition is going to be necessary. 

I recognize that they’re talking about standing that up on October 1st, but I also realize, or suspect, and would like to have your 

comments, that there’s going to be a transitional period. If it’s 

going to be seamless, it’s going to take quite a bit of effort beyond 

the October 1st date. What do you think? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, I agree. There is a conference ongoing right now—in fact, in Tampa—between the CENTCOM and 

AFRICOM staff, to work out—there are a host of different tasks 

and functions, dozens and dozens of these identified, that will be 

transitioned, and they are working out that process of transition in 

ensuring that AFRICOM will have, for example, the command-andcontrol operational center capabilities, and those types of capabilities to take over the missions that CENTCOM is performing in the 

Horn of Africa, in particular. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, and we’d like to have——

General PETRAEUS. They——

Senator INHOFE. Please go ahead. 

General PETRAEUS. They may make a recommendation on how to 

phase that over time as this process continues. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. I would hope, also, we look at the resources 

that they have, and that they need, that General Ward will have 

to have, particularly if he stays up in Frankfurt and tries to run 

the thing from there. 

Finally, I always bring up, the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP), it’s been working real well, although 

every time I get used to one thing, they change the name, so now 

it’s CCIF—I guess, Combatant Commander Initiative Fund. But, as 

far as in the areas of Iraq and Afghanistan, it’s my understanding 

that the Iraqi Government recently allocated $300 million for that 

program, and I’d like to get a response from both of you as to how 

well that program’s going and your feelings about the future of the 

CERP. 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, the CERP is of enormous importance to 

our commanders and troopers on the ground in Iraq. It’s hugely important that it continue. It saves lives. It enables commanders—

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when you reach that point where money becomes the most important ammunition because of security progress, it enables them to 

achieve small, but quick and important, wins on the ground in 

small reconstruction projects where we have enormous capacity. In 

fact, it was in recognition of that capacity that the Iraqi Government did provide that to us, although they’re also doing that with 

their own ministries, provinces, and elements, as well. 

Senator INHOFE. Good. Good. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator. 

General ODIERNO. Senator, I would just add that it gives us flexibility, leverage, and influence at the lowest levels, at the company, 

battalion, and brigade level. It’s an extremely important program, 

and that needs to continue. We publish a manual that says, 

‘‘Money is a weapon that we give to all of our young leaders.’’ It 

has significant impacts, and I hope that we’ll be able to continue 

that in the future. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. [Recess for brief 

continuation of the business meeting.] 

Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Petraeus, let me add my welcome to you to the panel. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator AKAKA. General Odierno, welcome, to you and your lovely family here. 

General Odierno, I’ve always thought of culture as important to 

people. Cultural awareness of our soldiers has become a strategic 

center of gravity in the Iraq conflict. The daily interaction of American service men and women with both their Iraqi counterparts and 

civilian population has really expanded the skills required of our 

military personnel far beyond which existed just a few years ago. 

Given the importance of these skills, what cultural or language 

training do units arriving in theater undergo that helps them to 

conduct these nontraditional aspects of the operations? Do you believe this training is adequate? 

General ODIERNO. It’s a very important part, sir, of all the training that we conduct today, and it’s done at the individual level, it’s 

done at the collective level. We do it at all our schools now. It’s 

been incorporated into all of our warrior leader courses, our basic 

noncommissioned-officer courses. It is incorporated in our unit 

training at home station. We’ve incorporated a large portion of this 

at our National Training Centers, Joint Readiness Training Centers. It is critical to continue to do this as we move forward. But, 

we have to continue to adjust, because we continue to learn more, 

we continue to understand it better, and we have to continue to 

change and continue to expand this program. It is one that is extremely important, it’s one that we have to continue, it’s one that 

we must continue to learn from, adjust, so we can continue to give 

our soldiers the best tools possible to be successful. 

Senator AKAKA. General Odierno, your position with respect to 

Iraq’s neighbors is that they are an important element of achieving 

ultimate stability on the ground. I agree that the ability to get 

other nations in the region to actively support political compromise, 

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reconciliation, and stability in Iraq, will be even more important for 

the coalition effort in the months to come. General, what are the 

best approaches to use in achieving cooperation with Iraq’s neighboring countries? Should these approaches be any different when 

dealing with Iran? 

General ODIERNO. I would just say, sir, that, of course, we want 

to continue to have dialogue with many of the countries. General 

Petraeus, I think, could tell you that we have tried to have dialogue with the Ambassador in Iraq three different times, with Iran, 

reaching out to them at that level. So far, it, unfortunately, has not 

yielded the results we want. However, I would suggest that as we 

move forward, if we believe it could yield results, we’d like to, at 

the ambassador level, continue to have those discussions, if we 

think it’ll be fruitful. 

We also should obviously reach out to many of the other countries—Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt—and I’ll work with General 

Petraeus on that, if confirmed, to make sure we work together with 

those countries, to make sure they are helping us to solve the problems, and to help us with reconciliation, which, in my mind, is an 

extremely important piece as we continue to move forward, is getting many of these elements to reconcile. We’ve seen a good beginning in that, Senator, and we want to continue that. 

Senator AKAKA. General Odierno, you have identified the communal struggle for powers as the number-one threat to Iraq, and 

asserted that sectarian conflicts fueled from both within and outside Iraq’s borders poses the greatest challenge to lasting security. 

The membership of the Sons of Iraq, which has been a significant 

part of recent security gains on the ground, stems from local militia 

groups, many of whom were former insurgents and are now being 

integrated into the ISFs. Given the tentative nature of the alliance 

between these groups and coalition forces, is there a plan to continue transitioning the Sons of Iraq into government-controlled 

units so that they don’t serve as a base for future sectarian conflict? 

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Senator. That’s a very important 

question as we move forward. Obviously, we are going to try to integrate them as much as possible. What we’ve found is, we believe 

somewhere between 25 and 30 percent are capable and want to be 

integrated sometime into the ISFs, are either physically/mentally 

capable, or will have the desire to do that. With the other portion, 

we have to develop other programs to ensure that they can be employed. We are working with the Iraqis to do that. We were doing 

that several months ago. That policy has continued, where we’re 

trying to develop work programs, we’re trying to have public works 

units that help, not only to then employ them, but to continue to 

rebuild the infrastructure, as well as deliver basic services. We 

think this is a key, as we move forward, and we must continue to 

work with the Government of Iraq to fund this program, as well 

as helping us to get that instituted. We will work that extremely 

hard, sir. 

Senator AKAKA. Do you feel this is an essential element of longterm stability that would help legitimize the Iraqi national government? 

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General ODIERNO. I do. Many of these individuals, as we’ve 

talked with them and dealt with them, what they’re really looking 

for is legitimacy, and they want to be part of the government—future of Iraq. So, this is their way of reaching out, volunteering to 

first provide security in these areas, and then become a permanent 

part of the government and part of the Nation as it moves forward. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. My time is expired, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Akaka. 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’d like to associate myself with a statement you made earlier, 

at least in part—I thought it was a very eloquent statement that 

these two gentlemen represent continuity at a time when America 

needs it the most. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator GRAHAM. To both of you, I just can’t tell you how proud 

we are of the job that you and those under your command have 

done. It was a enormous challenge that you both took on. A year 

and a half ago, this thing looked very bleak. Your personal dedication, and those under your command, I think will go down in history, quite frankly, as one of the most successful counterinsurgency 

operations ever. 

But, we’re not here to talk about just the good news, we’re here 

to talk about where we go. I want to congratulate the President for 

nominating you both, and, to Senator Levin, for holding these hearings as quickly as possible. 

General Petraeus, as you go into your new job, it seems to me 

that one of the biggest problems we face in Afghanistan is, we have 

many forces over there from different areas of the world, NATO 

has assumed this fight; to me, this is a test of NATO. Are you concerned about the rules of engagement that some countries have imposed on NATO forces? What do you intend to do about that, if it 

is a concern? 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, Senator, this is, indeed, a test of 

NATO, and the caveats that are put on the uses of various national 

forces are a challenge for the NATO commander there. I think General Dan McNeill, the current commander about to hand off to General David McKiernan, has been very clear about that. It’s not unprecedented. I was the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations for 

the Stabilization Force mission in Bosnia, and had a matrix on my 

desk of which forces were allowed to do which nonstandard tasks, 

if you will, or different tasks, and that was challenging. It is the 

same situation in Afghanistan, except more difficult, because, of 

course, they’re in tough combat operations, not just peacekeeping 

or peace enforcement. 

I think that continued dialogue with NATO authorities, with the 

Supreme NATO Commander, General John Craddock, and the 

other authorities with the coalition countries, many of whom also 

contribute forces to Iraq and, therefore, have been able to get to 

know them and so forth, is going to be part of the answer. I think, 

also, some additional provision of U.S. forces, and of those forces 

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ducting counterinsurgency operations in the way that is required, 

will also be important in the months and years ahead. 

Senator GRAHAM. As you hand off command here, in a few short 

months, in Iraq, is it fair to say, from the America public’s point 

of view, that we can expect, in the future, the Iraqis to fight more 

and to pay more for the cost of operations? 

General PETRAEUS. It is, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. What would you attribute to the turnaround? 

I think all of us have met Prime Minister Maliki and some of the 

key players over in Iraq and have come away a bit frustrated at 

times. Last year, I think I visited with him in July—I had very little hope that anything was going to happen over there in a positive 

way. I’m quite astonished at the amount of reconciliation that’s 

happened in the last 90 to 100 days in the operations in Basrah 

and Sadr City. If you could give us some insight, what happened? 

What changed? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, first of all, very significant, of 

course, was the decision that he made to take on the militia in 

Basrah. This is a Shiite-led government taking on a Shiite militia. 

It made an enormous statement about his willingness to serve all 

Iraqis. The result was increased support from those who had criticized him for a long time for turning a blind eye to the militia or 

not taking action against them in the way that he did in Basrah. 

He’s followed that up, of course, courageously, inside Baghdad 

itself. Then also, to show all he’s willing to go after all parties that 

are threatening the security and stability of Iraq, he has, of course, 

launched the operation in Mosul and Ninawa Province to go after 

al Qaeda and its Sunni extremist partners. There has been success 

in a number of these different areas. It’s not solidified yet. As always, Ambassador Crocker and I are cautious in our assessments. 

But, there is significant progress, and, at the end of the day, nothing succeeds like a little bit of significant progress. 

Senator GRAHAM. Conversely, how is Sadr’s standing among the 

Iraqi people? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, Muqtada al Sadr is still certainly 

seen as the embodiment of a very important movement in that 

country. The Sadr movement, which was founded on the martyr 

Sadr, his father, is a very important political element in Iraqi society. It is one that was founded on serving those most disadvantaged in the society. It stayed in Iraq during the Saddam era. It 

suffered enormously under it. So, it still has enormous influence. 

However, Sadr himself has recognized—in fact, by issuing the 

cease-fire order last fall in the wake of the violence precipitated by 

the militia in the holy city of Karbala, and after the militia elements and ‘‘special group’’ elements were linked to the assassination of two southern governors and police chiefs—that the armed 

elements associated with the movement were creating problems. In 

fact, it is that kind of assessment, we believe, that has prompted, 

over time, this directive to cease fire, to take a knee and so forth, 

because the people in Basrah were rejoicing at being freed from the 

grip of the militia. In fact, a man in Basrah told me that now he’d 

been liberated twice in recent years; once by the coalition forces, 

from Saddam; and now by the ISFs, from the militia. 

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Senator GRAHAM. My time is expired. One very brief question. 

General Odierno, thank you for what you’ve done and what you’re 

about to do. The force structure that we have in place and the 

drawdowns that we’re planning to implement over the summer, are 

you comfortable with what we’re about to do and how we’re going 

to do it? 

General ODIERNO. I am, Senator. I provided recommendations to 

General Petraeus as the Multi-National Corps-Iraq Commander. I 

stand behind those recommendations, which is what is going on 

right now. So, I feel extremely comfortable with what I continue to 

see as the progress we’re making over there, that we’ll be able to 

continue with those reductions, as planned, through the summer. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you both, and your families. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham. 

Senator Ben Nelson. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General Odierno and General Petraeus and your 

families, for your continued willingness to serve and the excellence 

of your service in the past. We’ve come to expect that from you, but 

I want you to know we don’t take it for granted, and we truly appreciate that. I know the American people do, as well. 

In terms of finding options, General Petraeus—I can talk in football analogies, because Nebraska football may be on its way back—

you remind me of an options quarterback who has to figure out all 

the options that are available and adjust to conditions on the 

ground before you make a determination. 

Senator Collins and I have been pushing, for some time, the idea, 

which seems to have gained favor, to transition the mission for the 

combat troops, the coalition combat troops, but particularly the 

U.S. forces, in Iraq—in Baghdad to fighting counterterrorism activities, which I think is what they’ve been doing, so that the Iraqi 

forces could take more responsibility for their own security. Apparently, that’s part of what the plan is right now. Is it because we’ve 

come to understand that that’s necessary, and/or is it because 

Prime Minister al Maliki seems poised and prepared to do that 

now? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, again, to continue the analogy, you 

have to make the read at the line when you have the ball in each 

particular play, in each particular case, in each particular area. As 

you recall, when I last testified before the committee, I laid out the 

so-called Anaconda approach or strategy that we have employed to 

focus on al Qaeda-Iraq, and it employs much, much more than just 

what we have traditionally known as counterterrorist forces, our 

special mission units, the high-end Special Operations Forces. Critical to it has been conventional forces that have cleared and then 

been able to help hold cities like Baqubah, large neighborhoods in 

Baghdad, Ramadi, and so forth, and are now, in fact, doing the 

same to lesser degrees, slightly different approach—in Mosul. 

That has enabled us, if you will, when the level of violence is reduced, to have ISFs shoulder more of the burden, and allowed us 

to focus a bit more discretely on some of the, again, al Qaeda or 

Sunni extremist elements that try to come back into those areas 

and try to re-establish roots in them, while Iraqi soldiers and police 

can handle some of the more day-to-day activity in those areas. 

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That’s really what is going on, that this transition, if you will, has 

been the product of some tremendously tough, hard work and fighting by coalition and Iraqi forces, much of it, I might add, during 

the time that Lieutenant General Odierno was the operational architect of the so-called ‘‘surge’’ of coalition and Iraqi forces. 

Senator BEN NELSON. If Senator Graham’s right, that the goal 

is to get Iraq to pay more and to fight more, we may be succeeding 

in that. Of course, Senator Bayh, Senator Collins, and I have 

worked to get Iraq in a position to pay more of the costs for the 

costs of the war; many of them being our costs, which we have been 

underwriting for these several years—do you believe that that will 

put them more in charge, not only of their own destiny, but feel 

more committed to their destiny, not only in charge, but stronger 

commitment? 

General PETRAEUS. Again, Senator, I think that transition—some 

of that is very much well underway. You’ll recall Ambassador 

Crocker, here, saying the days of the big reconstruction effort are 

over. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Yes. 

General PETRAEUS. We’re still finishing them and all the rest of 

that, but that is largely over. 

Senator BEN NELSON. I knew that was his position, but we——

General PETRAEUS. In fact, this past week alone, Prime Minister Maliki announced a $5-billion reconstruction effort, and also they 

are working on a supplemental that will provide additional funds 

to all of their provinces, ministries, and other activities. They have 

long since reached the point where they are paying a good bit more 

for their Iraqi forces development than we are, and that will just 

continue. Our line goes down, and theirs goes up very dramatically. 

When it comes to them fighting, their casualties continue to be 

well over, right now, three times our losses, and that does not include the Sons of Iraq, who are really a different category, who are 

also targeted continually by, in particular, Sunni extremists, because they represent the communities turning against these extremists. That’s a very difficult situation for those extremists. 

Senator BEN NELSON. The query I would leave you with, in 

terms of Iraq and its future, is the question of, what if Muqtada 

al Sadr ends up with the majority in the next elections? But, we 

don’t need to go into that; that’s purely speculative. We certainly 

hope that that’s not the case. 

I’d like to turn to Afghanistan for just a moment. I’m leading a 

congressional delegation there next week, as we spoke the other 

day. Given the challenges that there are in Afghanistan today, do 

we have any idea, or any vision, of what victory in Afghanistan will 

consist of? I’m not talking about when, but can we describe what 

would be victory in Afghanistan? 

General PETRAEUS. Certainly it would be a situation where security is much improved, it does not have these pockets in which reconstruction is challenged, and, of course, where the economy is 

gradually starting to get to a self-sustaining stage. The differences 

between Iraq and Afghanistan could not be starker. You have one 

country which has what now may be the largest oil reserves in the 

world—it certainly is number two or number three—and pumping 

oil at substantial rates, and another country that generates, I beVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00135 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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lieve it’s about $700 million in a year toward its own budget. So, 

Afghanistan clearly is going to require very substantial assistance 

from the international community for a number of years, and very 

important that we continue it, remembering what it was that took 

place on that soil and the reason that we went there. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Sort of reminds us of a war on poverty, but 

it’s a war getting over poverty, to be able to sustain their own government and their own future. That’s not going to be very easy to 

solve simply with guns or butter. 

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely, Senator, that’s, again, why I went 

to some length—and I appreciate your allowing me to provide an 

opening statement of that length—but to describe the comprehensive approach that’s needed, the whole-of-government effort, and 

the effort of very much partnering with all like-minded countries 

around the world, because that’s what it’s going to take. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you both, and good luck to both of 

you. 

Thank you very much. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

I just would quickly note that, while we welcome the $5-billion 

announcement, by the Iraqi Government, of reconstruction funds, 

they’ve announced before reconstruction funding, they’ve budgeted 

reconstruction funding, but, when it comes to spending it, their 

budgeted amount, it’s been very slow. So we assume you’ll keep on 

top of that. 

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely. It has improved, Senator, from 

year to year, but there’s no question but that it has to improve a 

great deal more. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Dole. 

Senator DOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Petraeus and General Odierno, I want to just underscore 

what Senator Graham had to say about both of you, and to express 

my heartfelt thanks for your service to our country. It’s really impossible to adequately express how much we appreciate the service 

that both of you are giving. 

General Petraeus, you’ve probably learned as much or more 

about the need for improving interagency cooperation over the past 

16 months as anyone, and I hope, if confirmed, that you will speak 

on the need for improving interagency cooperation, and to stress 

the consequences if we fail to heed the lessons learned from our efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. This is a topic that we simply 

cannot just pass along to the next administration. 

With those thoughts in mind, would you share with us some examples of where improvements must be made and what, in your 

professional opinion, are the potential consequences of merely 

maintaining the status quo? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, I think you know that a number of 

us in uniform and Secretary Gates are among the biggest champions for providing additional resources for the State Department, 

for U.S. Agency for International Development, and for some of our 

other interagency partners, so that they can, in fact, do just what 

you were talking about. We have learned an enormous amount 

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about this over time, and the increase in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the embedded PRTs has been a hugely important development, and a very significant part of the progress 

that has been made, not just in the security front, but, again, then, 

in the establishment of local governments, revival of local economies and markets, and reconstruction efforts, again, that were possible because of the improved security situation. 

I mentioned, during my opening statement, that the campaign 

plan that we are executing in Iraq is not just a military campaign 

plan, it is the joint product of the U.S. Mission-Iraq, the Embassy, 

and the MNF–I, and it is signed by both the Ambassador and myself. By the way, the main effort—and you always identify a main 

effort in any such campaign plan—is actually the political line of 

operation, not the security line. While the security line is a crucial 

enabler to it, the ultimate solution, as we all recognize, has to come 

in the political arena. 

Now, recognizing that is of enormous significance, and I think it’s 

very important. In the answers to the advance policy questions, I 

discussed a bit about steps that are being taken, and further steps 

should be taken, to improve, in terms of developing doctrine—just 

as we have in the military—to develop doctrine for kind of interagency cooperation and efforts that are required in the endeavors 

such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere in the theater, that there then has to be an education process for those; you 

actually have to practice it, try it somewhere. Ideally, we would 

welcome interagency partners joining us, for example, as our BCTs, 

division, and corps headquarters undergo the mission rehearsal exercises that we conduct for several weeks for each of these deploying units. Those are great opportunities, in fact, to get ready to 

perform the missions that are performed, again, in places like Iraq 

and Afghanistan. Then you need a feedback mechanism, a lessonslearned center. 

A fair amount of this is actually now being done. It’s led by the 

State Department. It is at the Foreign Service Institute. That’s the 

right place for it. I think that developments in that area will be 

very important in helping the interagency do better what it is we 

have learned they must do to enable military forces to be successful 

in these very complex contingency operations. 

Senator DOLE. Thank you. 

General Odierno, earlier this year General Petraeus answered 

questions concerning a reassessment phase following the drawdown 

in U.S. forces to the pre-surge end strength in July. That assessment will, I presume, now become your responsibility. How long do 

you anticipate that security assessment will take to complete before 

you decide if you should hold at the pre-surge level or, at some 

point, resume redeployment? 

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Senator. 

General Petraeus and I have talked about this. If I’m confirmed 

for the position, I think General Petraeus will make an assessment 

prior to his leaving, and we will have some discussion about that 

as he does it. We’ll confer about that. We’ll agree to that, that he 

will make some sort of an assessment as he leaves, and I will then 

execute that assessment, and then continue to assess and identify 

and make further decisions. 

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Senator DOLE. Okay. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Dole. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your service to the Nation and to the 

Army, your extraordinary service, and thank you for your families’ 

support. 

I want to particularly recognize Captain Odierno, because his 

service is emblematic of the service of so many young Americans 

whose courage, many times, compensates for some lack of wisdom. 

Thank you for your service. 

General Petraeus, you now have responsibility for a whole theater of operations. It’s interesting, the last Director of National Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment suggested that al Qaeda has 

reconstituted itself in the FATA, in Pakistan. In fact, Admiral 

Mullen has stated, ‘‘If we were going to pick the next attack to the 

United States, it would come out of the FATA.’’ Do you agree with 

these intelligence assessments? 

General PETRAEUS. I do, Senator. Clearly, al Qaeda senior leadership has been strengthened in the FATA, even though their main 

effort still is assessed to be in Iraq, by them, as well as by us. But, 

the organization of an attack, if you will, would likely come from 

the FATA. 

Senator REED. What does that say about our strategy? We have 

focused extraordinary resources in Iraq, and, in the intervening 

years since we began our operations there, al Qaeda, by our own 

intelligence estimates, have re-established themselves, strengthened themselves, they have higher operational capacity today. We 

have under-resourced Afghanistan, which is the closest theater of 

our operations to Pakistan. We’ve been failing to engage the Pakistan military in effective counterinsurgency operations. Recently, 

the Government of Pakistan has entered into another stand-down 

agreement with the tribal leaders there. It seems to me that if 

that’s the existential threat, we haven’t made it the main effort in 

our campaign plan for your theater of operations. What’s your 

thought? 

General PETRAEUS. As I mentioned in my opening statement, 

Senator, clearly we have to provide additional assistance to the 

new Pakistani Government, which, as you mentioned, is still solidifying its coalition, is developing essentially, a counterinsurgency 

strategy, what approach it is going to take for dealing with the 

FATA, a significant problem that they have inherited and that was 

causing extraordinary violence in their country before they were 

elected. We have very substantial programs in that area. I had a 

very long conversation with Ambassador Anne Patterson, with the 

station chief, with others, who are working that issue, about 2 

weeks ago in Qatar. There are very substantial programs, but I 

think that the key need is to assess whether the overall concept 

that is guiding those—on the Pakistani side, in particular, of 

course—is adequate or not. 

One of the first trips that I would make, if confirmed as the 

CENTCOM Commander, would be to Pakistan to sit down with a 

fellow U.S. Army Command and General Staff College graduate, 

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General Ashfag Parvez Kayani, to talk, at some length, about that, 

and obviously to do the same with the leaders of the Pakistani Government. That is a problem that has to be addressed. As I mentioned, it is a problem that has global implications, not just local 

extremist implications for Pakistan. 

Senator REED. If your conclusion is, you need further resources 

in Afghanistan and further resources in support of the Pakistani 

forces within their own country, where are you going to get them, 

except from further reductions in Iraq? 

General PETRAEUS. Again, that would be, if confirmed, something 

I would have to discuss with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 

with the Service Chiefs, and so forth, and perhaps with the current 

MNF–I Commander. 

Senator REED. I appreciate what you’re going to bring to this 

task, which is incredible skill and insight as to what’s going on in 

the AOR, but I think it’s a serious, serious comment, if our own intelligence agencies are suggesting that, in the intervening several 

years of our great effort in Iraq, our existential enemies have become stronger and perhaps even more capable. 

Let me switch gears briefly to an issue within Iraq, for both you 

and General Odierno. The status of the Sunni Concerned Local Citizen group, the Sons of Iraq—I know you responded to Senator 

Akaka that approximately 25 to 30 percent will be integrated. My 

guess is that the easy part of the integration has already taken 

place. 

I mean, I was out in Anbar with the Iraqi Highway Patrol, which 

probably, a year ago, were Iraqi insurgents. The harder part is the 

remaining 70-plus percent. It doesn’t seem that the administration 

of Maliki has come to grips with this issue. Is that a fair assessment? We’re still paying them, they haven’t paid them. I know the 

response is, ‘‘we have to get them all to employment,’’ but they’re 

still on our payroll. 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, actually there has been a transition 

of, again, well over 20,000 to a variety of different ISFs or other 

governmental employment, and that has been supported by Prime 

Minister Maliki. 

There will be additional ones that do get integrated. But, as General Odierno pointed out, one challenge is that not by any means 

do all of them want to go into the security forces; many of them 

want to have jobs in their own communities; they just want to help 

with security until that’s possible. Then, substantial numbers do 

not qualify, because they don’t meet the literacy or physical requirements. That’s why we’ve generally said between 20 and 30 

percent might ultimately end up in some form of ISFs. 

There are numerous other efforts that are now being, in some 

cases, piloted, in other cases starting to really gain traction, in 

terms of job programs for them, funded by, in some cases dual by 

the U.S. and the Iraqi Government, and in some cases by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs of the Iraqi Government solely. 

These are starting to take off. They’re something that we have to 

push very aggressively, so that there are opportunities provided for 

these individuals who have stood up and helped to protect their 

communities when they were really needed. 

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Senator REED. My time is expired, but if I could make a comment and then, perhaps in subsequent discussions informally, you 

might respond. But, my impression—in brief encounter with the 

Prime Minister—is that he viewed these Sunni Armed Forces as 

just as much a threat as the Shiite armed militias, and he may 

very well choose to deal with them, as he’s dealt in the last few 

weeks with the Shiite, which is a military response which prompts 

some type of political reaction. That could be a serious challenge, 

General Odierno, to your tenure and your stability. 

I don’t want to monopolize the time, but I will look forward to 

discussing this issue in detail with both of you. 

Again, thank you for your extraordinary service. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to join with my colleagues in expressing my appreciation for your magnificent service. 

Captain Odierno, thank you, and for so many of your brothers 

and sisters in arms who have served our country under difficult circumstances. But, you two generals represent the leadership that 

has proven itself under most difficult circumstances, have helped 

position us in a way that I think, today, we can believe, with confidence, that we have a realistic opportunity to establish a very decent good government in Iraq, which will be so important for our 

strategic interests and the people of Iraq. I can’t tell you how appreciative we are and how much admiration we have for both of 

you. 

General Odierno, you were there at the critical point of developing this new surge strategy. General Petraeus, your leadership 

and planning were just superb. 

General Odierno, I asked General Petraeus, when he took command in Iraq, before he left, did he believe our forces could be successful in that country and achieve our essential national goals. He 

said that he did, he wouldn’t have taken the job if he did not. How 

do you feel? Just tell the American people honestly how you feel 

about our opportunity for a successful result. 

General ODIERNO. First, as General Petraeus, sir, I would not 

take this job if I didn’t think that we could be successful. Senator, 

I believe that we have made significant progress, specifically over 

the last 18 months or so, and I do believe that we are headed in 

the right direction. 

I will not say that we are out of the woods yet, but I would say 

that we are clearly headed in the right direction. I believe a selfreliant Government of Iraq that is stable, one that is committed to 

governance and protecting its own people and serving all its people, 

a place that’s denied as a safe haven for terrorists and extremists, 

and one that is integrated into the international community and a 

partner on the war on terror, is absolutely possible in Iraq. I think 

it’s closer today than it has been. 

Senator SESSIONS. Maybe you would tell those who don’t know 

your involvement in our effort there, and how long you’ve been 

there—why don’t you give just a brief summary of what you’ve seen 

and how you’ve come to reach that conclusion. 

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General ODIERNO. I would just say—having been there two separate tours and then several times in between, asked to conduct assessments both as an advisor to the Secretary of State, but also as 

Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I’ve spent 

close to 31 months in Iraq. What’s been encouraging is, we understand the dynamics better than we did, we understand the environment, but the progression of the Iraqis is really now starting to 

show. It started by, first, enabling them, by providing additional security in some key areas, and then allowing the fact that they’ve 

decided to reject al Qaeda initially, starting in Anbar, where they 

understood that they did not want to live under the control of al 

Qaeda, and that they chose to work with the coalition and the Iraqi 

Government to expel al Qaeda and defeat al Qaeda. I think that 

was significant. 

As other Iraqis saw what happened in Anbar, they realized that 

the bright future for them is to reject these extremist groups, and 

that they did not want to be controlled by militias. I think we’re 

starting to see that play out now with operations in Basrah and 

Sadr City. 

The most important thing to me over the last few months has 

been the evenhandedness of going after all of the enemies of Iraq, 

those militias, as well as al Qaeda. But, again, I would say we still 

have quite a bit of work to do, and they will do everything they can 

to try to re-establish their influence inside of Iraq, and it’s important for us that we’re able to build up the ISFs and the governmental capacity so that they can, themselves, not allow them to rebuild any influence at all inside of Iraq. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you very much. 

General Petraeus, you made brief reference to the fact that we’ve 

now seen, this past week, the lowest incidence of violence in Iraq 

in 4 years, and that maybe this week would be even lower. I know 

you don’t want to be overconfident, but tell us what that means to 

you and what’s been happening there. 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, what it means, of course, is that 

other activities can proceed. The whole idea has been to achieve a 

security environment in which individuals can go about their daily 

lives with much less fear than they had previously. This is not to 

say there are not still violent activities taking place in Iraq, there 

aren’t still people trying to blow up other Iraqis, and so forth. But, 

it does say that again, the incidence of violence is significantly reduced, and to a level, again, that has not been seen in over 4 years, 

back to 23 April 2004. 

When you think about where we were, again, in November, December, January, February, and well into, really, the spring and 

early summer of 2007—2006 into 2007—that is a very significant 

development. 

Senator SESSIONS. It went from almost 1,600 incidents, a little 

over a year ago, to under 400, so that’s a 75-percent reduction, 

really, a transformative event, I think. We are proud of that. 

General Petraeus, my time is about up, but I know that the Senate Armed Services Committee reported out our full authorization 

bill. It contains language that would ensure private security contractors are not authorized to perform inherently government functions in a combat area. It’s my understanding that departments 

136

rely on these contractors for many things. Can you tell us what 

kind of impact this might have and if we should reconsider that 

language? 

General PETRAEUS. It would have a very significant impact, Senator, because these private security contractors—do perform very 

important missions. They are securing a variety of different activities in Iraq, and those are so important that we would likely have 

to use U.S. or other forces to secure them. 

The reason we have them there is that we don’t have the forces 

to perform some of those missions, and so, this would be a significant drain on our combat power if it were carried out. 

If I could add that, in the wake of the incident last year, there 

has been significant progress also in the coordination and cooperation between private security contractors and those forces that—if 

you will, own the terrain—are responsible for the areas. There are 

much closer efforts between the contractual units and our forces; 

and, in fact, a lot of this was on General Odierno’s watch, and the 

incidence of escalation of force from private security contractors 

has been reduced very dramatically. 

There are also new authorities that you provided to DOD, which 

were subsequently delegated to me, where I have Uniform Code of 

Military Justice authority over those DOD private security contractors, and there are other provisions for those who are under contract for the Department of State. So, I think that the unfortunate 

incident last year has actually led to a very considerable and good 

focus in this area that has helped enormously to improve the way 

these missions are conducted. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, if I may add my personal thanks to Captain Odierno 

for your service, and tell you how much I personally value it. 

You’re getting a lot of comments today, but you’re here symbolically 

on behalf of a lot of people, I think, and I have very strong feelings 

about people like yourself, like my son, like Senator McCain’s son, 

who stepped forward, moved into harm’s way at a time when the 

country needed you, and I think we’re going to be wanting to benefit from the counsel and the experiences of people like you in the 

long future. I just wanted to personally add my own thanks. 

I would also like to expand a little bit on something that Senator 

Warner said earlier when he was asking you two gentlemen about 

this Strategic Framework Agreement that is being negotiated. It’s 

a very important agreement, and he had asked if you were being 

consulted. I would like to emphasize again for the record, I’d like 

to see the Senate consulted on this matter. We had meetings, at 

a staff level, on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday, 

and our staff did not receive any of the specific information in this 

agreement. I think that it’s an agreement that’s going to have a potentially long-term impact, presently constructed as an executive 

agreement. I’m going to be among those who are going to be attempting to insist that we have the right kind of participation in 

accordance with the Constitution on that. 

137

General Odierno, if I may, my view, having spent a lot of time 

in my life thinking about military issues, strategic issues, and policy issues, is that one of the most essential components of laying 

down a strategy is the need to be able to articulate clearly what 

the endpoint of that strategy is. I believe that the failure of the administration to be able to do that, or to be required to do that, is 

one of the reasons we’ve had so much confusion and debate after 

the initial invasion. In that vein, I would like to hear from you as 

to, in military terms, what do you see as the endpoint in our strategic direction here with respect to our involvement in Iraq? 

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Senator. 

First, I believe one of the most important pieces is to be a selfreliant government that is stable, a government that will contribute inside of the regional context and the international context. 

Obviously that means we need a professionalized ISF, one that 

could handle those missions, which I think we’re moving forward 

toward; obviously, we need a place where we do not allow safe 

haven for terrorists or extremists that can affect the security, not 

only of the region, but also of the United States; and then, obviously one that is integrated, politically and economically, and is an 

economic engine for continued improvement for its people. I think 

those are the things that I think we look forward to. 

From a military perspective, it’s their ability to secure themselves, it’s their ability to do it in such a way where their government is allowed to continue to grow. We will do that by providing 

less and less assistance to them. 

Senator WEBB. If I may, General, because I have a very short period of time here, all that being said, and those political goals for 

the Iraqis, what does the United States military in Iraq look like 

when that happens? 

General ODIERNO. Over time, I think it’ll adjust. We will have 

less and less responsibility for direct combat, more for assisting 

them in conducting their missions. Over time, that would change 

into an advisory mission, as we felt more and more comfortable 

with them being able to do that on their own. 

Senator WEBB. How long do you think we should be there, if 

those conditions are met? 

General ODIERNO. It is unknown how long we would be there 

once all those conditions are met. 

Senator WEBB. Right. 

General ODIERNO. I think that would be a policy decision on how 

long we would want to have some sort of contact with the Iraqi 

Government in the future, and so, I think we’d have to have some 

discussions on that. 

Senator WEBB. What is the endpoint of the United States involvement in Iraq? Let’s say that Iraq meets the conditions you just 

talked about. Should there be a United States military presence in 

Iraq? 

General ODIERNO. I think that’s a discussion we would have 

along several levels, not only from the MNF–I, Commander of the 

CENTCOM level, and obviously our civilian leadership, to decide 

what their policy would be in the future towards Iraq. 

Senator WEBB. Do you believe that, if those conditions are met, 

there would be a need for United States military in Iraq? 

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General ODIERNO. I do not. I believe what we would want, 

though, is to maintain, obviously, military contacts, as we do with 

many countries around the world, over time. 

Senator WEBB. Right. Thank you for that. That’s a very important clarification. 

General Petraeus, there’s some language in response to questions 

that were submitted to you for the record that go to Iran that I 

would like to get some clarification, or give you the opportunity to 

clarify. You used the word ‘‘malign’’ as an adjective. As someone 

who’s written nine books, I’m trying to struggle with how this fits 

into what you’re saying here. 

You say, ‘‘We will continue to expose the extent of Iran’s malign 

activities in Iraq,’’ and then you say, on the next page, ‘‘Our efforts 

in regard to Iran must involve generating international cooperation 

in building consensus to counter malign Iranian influence.’’ You 

then speak about, ‘‘There are consequences for its illegitimate influence in the region.’’ Can you clarify for us how you’re using those 

words? 

General PETRAEUS. I can, Senator. What I’m talking about there, 

I am characterizing that influence. It is malign, and it is lethal, 

and it is illegitimate. The arming, training, funding, and directing 

of militia extremists who have killed our soldiers, have killed Iraqi 

forces, and have killed Iraqi civilians——

Senator WEBB. I’ve heard all of that. 

General PETRAEUS. It is very malign, indeed. It’s the same situation with what they’re doing in——

Senator WEBB. In the interest of time, here, because you’ve given 

those answers, would you agree that, historically, one of the realities that we have to deal with is the notion that there will be some 

sort of Iranian influence in the region? I’m not talking about the 

specific military incidents, I’m talking about the reality of dealing 

with the region. 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, I’m not——

Senator WEBB. We cannot discount Iran. 

General PETRAEUS. I have always——

Senator WEBB. Would you agree with that? 

General PETRAEUS. I have always stated, in fact, that there will 

be Iranian influence, and that the hope is that that Iranian influence is constructive influence—commercial influence, economic influence, perhaps political influence, and cultural influence, religious, and so forth—but not this kind of contribution to lethal activities. That’s exactly——

Senator WEBB. All right, there would be no disagreement from 

me on the last part of what you just said. The difficulty that a lot 

of people in this country, including myself, have is that we would 

hope that we would be able to see some creative leadership, in 

terms of how to bring a different set of diplomatic circumstances 

into play. Probably the best example of that, that I would just encourage you to consider while you’re going through this, is the way 

that we were dealing with China in the early 1970s. China was a 

rogue nation with nukes, with an American war on its borders. We 

had no contact with this country for more than 20 years, after the 

communists took over in 1949. When we aggressively moved forward diplomacy with China, we took nothing off the table—and, by 

139

the way, the Chinese were directly involved in Vietnam at the 

time. They were providing military hardware, the same as you’re 

talking about with Iran. They had military activities in Vietnam. 

We took nothing off the table. We didn’t abandon any of our alliances. But, we, through diplomatic process, tried to reach something that also embraced the historic realities of that region. 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, I think, if you’ll read my statement, 

that you will see that kind of spirit in it. If you want to use the 

international relations theorist concept that what you would want 

to do is to try, through every means possible, help Iran evolve from 

a revolutionary state—i.e., one that is not satisfied with the general status quo—to one that is more of a status quo regional power. 

In fact, as I have testified before this body before, Ambassador 

Crocker and I supported the conduct of the three rounds of negotiations that have taken place, the trilateral talks between Iraq, the 

United States, and Iran. Regrettably, it does not appear that there 

was progress as a result of those. That doesn’t mean that you 

should necessarily stop them, but I certainly think that what Secretary Gates said the other day about determining how we can 

gather more leverage, again, more whatever kinds of support that 

we can, because right now, I think, as he said it, it’s an open question as to whether, with the current circumstances, additional 

rounds of negotiations would be productive. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. My time is up, but I’m glad we were 

able to get that on the record. Thank you. 

General PETRAEUS. I am, too, Senator. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Webb. 

By the way, Senator Webb, Secretary Gates has committed to 

consult with us on those agreements that you talked about, and I 

just want to reinforce your point, Senator Warner’s point, on that, 

that commitment is out there, it’s public, and it’s important. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Martinez. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Gentlemen, I want to extend my word of thanks to both of you 

for your service, and to make that extend to your families, as well. 

I also want to commend you both for the undeniable success that 

you have achieved militarily in Iraq, and the benefits that it has 

had to what we hope will be a more stable region, and certainly 

to make our country more secure. 

General Petraeus, when you were speaking, earlier, of the incidents, I wonder if you have the chart that shows—this chart, here. 

General PETRAEUS. I don’t think we brought any of the big 

boards this time, Senator. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Okay. 

I love your charts. But when you look at the pattern, it clearly 

shows a steep decline, which I would say corresponds to the new 

initiative and the offensive that we went on in February 2007. 

Would you agree that has had the kind of effect that we see now 

in the lessened violence? 

General PETRAEUS. It is certainly exactly what has happened. 

We had to have the surge of offensives to take away—with our 

Iraqi partners—some of the sanctuaries and safe havens that al 

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Qaeda and its Sunni extremist partners had, and, in some cases, 

also that militia extremists were employing. That has enabled, over 

time, the increase of control by legitimate security forces of areas 

that were at one time beyond their control, and has brought down 

the level of security incidents. It is a very significant reduction, as 

you note. 

Senator MARTINEZ. First of all, as you undertake your new command, I want to welcome you to Florida, to MacDill, and to Tampa. 

We’re awfully proud that you’re going to be one of our residents, 

and we will welcome you there. It will be an honor to have you as 

a resident of Florida. But, in this broader responsibility, we know 

that there are problems in Lebanon and continue to see Syria’s activities in the region, including their own very obvious, now, nuclear ambitions, which would be hugely destabilizing to the region. 

In the broader Middle Eastern situation, it does appear that the 

arm of Iran is ever-present in all of these situations, and I know 

you discuss our diplomatic initiatives who have really borne no 

fruit. How do you anticipate that we will deal with the continuing 

challenges that Iran poses to peace and security in the Middle 

Eastern region? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, starting inside Iraq, we will certainly continue what we have done now, increasingly, in support of 

our Iraqi partners. As I mentioned, one of the results of the operation in Basrah is, they have seen these massive caches of weapons—for example, over 2,000 rounds of artillery and mortar rounds, 

hundreds and hundreds of rockets, thousands of pounds of explosives, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), and all the rest—is to realize that their neighbor to the east has been undermining their security, and they have, indeed, generated enormous concerns as a 

result, sent their delegation, had other talks, and so forth. 

More broadly, we have to assist the government in Lebanon as 

it comes to grips with what to do with a similar militia issue there. 

We have just seen Lebanese Hezbollah, as I mention in my statement, carrying out a very intimidating activity in West Beirut and 

challenging, again, the sovereignty of that government. 

We need to do the same with respect to Syria, which partners 

with Iran in some of these activities. We believe, for example, that 

RPG–29s, that were originally sold to Syria back in 1999, eventually made their way to Lebanese Hezbollah, to Iran, and then into 

the hands of the Iranian-supported ‘‘special groups’’ and were used 

in Iraq. Combating that trafficking is also very important. 

Ultimately, it will take unified action. Ideally, you would like to 

do it, as Senator Webb rightly is encouraging, with a variety of different engagements and so forth, if that is possible. As I said, I 

would agree, right now, with the Secretary of Defense, when he 

said that it’s an open question as to the value of negotiations in 

the current circumstances. But, that’s not to say that you can’t try 

to change those current circumstances, try to develop some additional leverage—and it’s about leverage—with the community of 

nations, many of whom share concerns about the issues of nuclear 

proliferation and the possibility of a regional arms race with respect to Iran, that, again, you can galvanize action that could encourage Iran, again, to be a more responsible partner of the NaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00146 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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tions in the region and cease some of this activity that has been 

so damaging and destabilizing in various countries in the region. 

Senator MARTINEZ. I believe you mentioned that you also had incredible finds of caches in the Sadr City area as the Iraqi forces, 

as well as ours, have moved through that area. Did I hear you say 

that earlier? 

General PETRAEUS. If I could clarify, Senator. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Please. 

General PETRAEUS. There are significant finds. They are not yet 

of the scale of Basrah, but, of course, they’ve only been going at it 

for a couple of days. Now, there have also been significant caches 

in other areas in which militia elements were located, in and 

around Baghdad, and in other southern provinces, as well. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Did I hear you mention, earlier, that one of 

these caches had been found in Sadr City in a hospital? 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, it was, Senator. That was used as a location where quite a substantial amount of weaponry, explosives, and 

other devices was stored by the militia. 

Senator MARTINEZ. General Odierno, one last question. My time 

is about to expire. I know that General Petraeus testified before 

the committee in answer to one of my questions, he indicated that 

107-millimeter rockets that the Sadrists and Shiites ‘‘special 

groups’’ were firing into the International Zone, and now I’m told 

that prior to this most recent cease-fire, these have been as large, 

now, as 240 millimeters. I wonder what your plan, as you take over 

this command, is, in terms of protecting the border with Iran better, to enable the Iraqi forces, as well as ours, to impede the flow 

of weaponry from Iran directly? 

General ODIERNO. Senator, I would just say we’ve been working 

very diligently over the last several months to improve the ports 

of entry along the Iranian border by adding a significant amount 

of transition teams and our individuals to help train and provide 

oversight to the Iraqis. 

First what we want to do is close these ports of entry, make it 

very difficult for anybody to get through—illegal weapons and other 

things through these ports. We’ve done that by a series of other 

measures, collecting biometrics and other things on individuals 

who come through there. In addition, we’ll work with the Iraqis in 

order, then, to also secure the areas in between these ports of 

entry, and assist them with intelligence capacity, and allow them, 

then, to help to shut down, hopefully, these networks that are longstanding networks, very complex, and very difficult. Many of these 

networks have been established for many years and have used to 

transit other goods besides weapons. So, it will take a lot of hard 

work for us to get inside of those. But, we are working with the 

Iraqis on that, and I believe that is one of our major tasks as we 

continue to move forward. 

General Petraeus mentioned earlier that there’s been a significant amount of work done along the Syrian border here in the last 

month or so, going after the ‘‘rat lines’’ there, and we’ve learned 

some good lessons there that I think we’ll be able to also utilize on 

the Iranian border, as well, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Martinez. I’m afraid we’re 

going to have to end it there. 

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Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. This will give Senator Pryor a 

chance to have his turn, and then, Senator Pryor, would you recess 

us until my return? 

My return will be sometime between this vote and the second 

vote. 

Senator PRYOR. I’ll be glad to. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator PRYOR [presiding]. Thank you. 

Thank you both for being here, and thank you for your service 

and all the things that you do. It’s good to see both of you again. 

General Petraeus, let me start with you, if I may. I have some 

questions, not about Iraq, but about Afghanistan. Not to get into 

all the background and all the details, because we do have a vote, 

so I’ll try to keep my questions short, but Admiral Fallon said that 

we have a need for 2,000 additional soldiers and marines to conduct training and security missions inside Afghanistan. I know 

that General James T. Conway has stated that he has enough to 

go in and clear, but not enough to hold certain areas in Afghanistan. My first question to you is, do you think we need 2,000 additional troops inside Afghanistan? 

General PETRAEUS. I do. I think that General McNeill may assess the requirement even larger. However, I would point out that, 

actually, there are over 2,000 additional forces that have been provided, I believe, since Admiral Fallon made that statement, and 

they’re on the ground, the marines. In fact, the withdrawal of the 

Marine Expeditionary Unit from Iraq helped reduce some of the 

pressure and allowed that. 

Senator PRYOR. Just to clarify that, I know that at one point 

there were 3,400 additional that were sent. 

General PETRAEUS. That’s actually the number that’s on the 

ground right now. 

Senator PRYOR. Okay. 

General PETRAEUS. It’s a good bit larger than just the 2,000. 

Senator PRYOR. Okay. Now, my understanding is, the request or 

the statements were in the context of 2,000 additional, on top of 

that 3,400. Do you know? 

General PETRAEUS. I do not know that for a fact. I would agree, 

however, that there is a requirement for additional forces, that 

NATO is providing some additional forces, and that we likely will 

have to come to grips if and when additional U.S. forces are provided, as well. 

Senator PRYOR. Do we have those forces available today to do 

that? 

General PETRAEUS. It depends on the level of risk that we would 

assign. It would be an enormous challenge for our Services. They 

would have to come out of cycle, in most cases, because, as the 

Service Chiefs and Vice Chief of the Army have forthrightly reported, there is little strategic flexibility until this recocking process, if you will, following the drawdown of the surge, is complete. 

Senator PRYOR. Right now, there are 3,500 marines that went in 

March into Afghanistan, and they’re going to be there for 7 

months, if I’m not mistaken. You would know more about the details than I do. So, that would put them in until October 2008. Do 

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we have the forces to replace those 3,500 and then do the additional on top of that? 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, I have to get a good bit better 

into the details of those kinds of specific deployments, but, in general, the campaign season starts to end around that time. As the 

snow sets in, the tactical activity in the winter is dramatically reduced. I think that there would be a degree of comfort with not replacing them at that time, although there clearly would need to be 

a replacement when the springs comes, either by NATO or U.S. or 

a combination of both. 

Senator PRYOR. You understand the concern, though, that if we 

don’t have the adequate forces there—maybe, for example, we can 

go in and clear, but not hold——

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely. 

Senator PRYOR. Yes. That’s a big concern that I know the Senate 

will have. 

General PETRAEUS. It’s why they’re trying to build the Afghan 

national security forces, as well. 

Senator PRYOR. Right. 

Let me change gears here a little bit. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 had a provision in there—we 

call it section 1206—that has to do with our ability to help foreign 

military forces conduct counterterrorism operations and support 

the growth of those capabilities for other militaries. However, there 

was a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report that said 

that DOD and the Multi-National Force in Iraq cannot fully account for the Iraqi forces’ receipt of U.S.-funded equipment. Do you 

have any comments on that? Do you know anything about that? 

General PETRAEUS. We’ve had GAO, and we’ve also invited the 

DOD Inspector General in to look at the specific case of accountability of weapons, especially those that were issued to the forces 

during some pretty tough days in the 2004 and early 2005 timeframe. Over time, actually, the Multi-National Security Transition 

Command-Iraq, which has worked hard over the past year to do 

this, has actually re-established accountability, if you will, for a 

substantial portion of the weapons that initially were reported as 

not being accounted for. They continue that effort. 

Beyond that, there have been substantial changes made over 

time, but really started in the spring of 2005, as we were able to 

build the logistics and property accountability teams that were 

needed in the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, 

but not available early on, to enable the Iraqis to track their property, their most important property, in a manner that is closer to 

the way that we track ours. Now we actually even use biometrics 

with the issue of the M–16s and M–4 rifles that have been purchased—U.S. weapons that have been purchased for them—with 

their money, I might add, through Foreign Military Sales. 

Senator PRYOR. I think what I’m hearing you say is, the accountability is very important, to make sure that we know where the 

weapons are going. 

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely, and also that there have been significant changes to improve the accountability process over time 

during our time in Iraq. 

Senator PRYOR. Right. 

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With that, I’m going to have to end my questioning because I 

need to get over for this vote. Again, I want to thank you, and I 

know that Senator Levin will be back here in just a few moments. 

Thank you for your service and all that you do and your testimony 

today. 

With that, what I’ll do is, I’ll recess this hearing, subject to the 

call of the chair, which I understand will be in just a few minutes. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. [Recessed.] 

Chairman LEVIN [presiding]. The committee will come back to 

order. 

Senator Clinton. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank both General Petraeus and General Odierno for 

their service, which has now extended in Iraq over a number of 

years. When I was in Iraq in 2003, I was hosted by General 

Odierno, and here we are in 2008, talking about the way forward 

and trying to determine how best to resolve the difficulties we face. 

I congratulate both of you on the work that you’ve done and the 

incredible leadership you’ve provided. 

I want to turn, General Petraeus, to your broader AOR, should 

you be confirmed to head CENTCOM. I know that you’ve had some 

questions, during the course of the morning, about Afghanistan, 

but I want to just focus on that for a minute. 

I have been increasingly concerned that we have lost the initiative, both militarily and diplomatically. The recent announcement 

by the new Pakistani Government with respect to the agreement 

reached with the Taliban is concerning to me. Obviously, we have 

to have as much of a focus as we can bring to Afghanistan. 

I would ask you, General Petraeus, based on your assessment at 

this moment in time, do we have enough troops to achieve success, 

however ‘‘success’’ is defined, in Afghanistan? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, I think that General McNeill has 

been on the record, and so has Admiral Fallon, about the requirement for additional forces in Afghanistan. Some have been provided by the United States, in the form of the marines that have 

gone on the ground. Then there are also pledges from NATO nations, as a result of the recent meetings, for some additional forces. 

I am not sure that will be all that is required, and one of the 

early efforts that I have to undertake will be, in fact, a trip to the 

Afghan-Pakistan region to spend some time on the ground. I’ve recently, actually, met with our U.S. commanders who are in Afghanistan, also the Ambassador and others. I think that, in the areas 

of the U.S. forces, that we generally have the initiative, but it’s in 

some of the other areas, particularly in the southern part of the 

country, where, in fact, we may need to regain that initiative, and 

that may, indeed, take additional forces, and that’s something that 

I have to look very hard at. 

Also, you alluded to Pakistan and the situation in the FATAs in 

the Northwestern Frontier Province. Clearly, concerns are there as 

well. That is, of course, where al Qaeda senior leadership is resident. Their ability and the ability of the Taliban to send fighters 

from those areas into Afghanistan is very destabilizing. Clearly 

there has to be a good deal of provision of assistance to the PakiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00150 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
145

stani Government by the United States and other coalition partners throughout the world to help this new government as it solidifies its coalition and comes to grips with how to deal with those 

problems in the FATA and in the Northwestern Frontier Province. 

Senator CLINTON. I certainly urge a much greater amount of attention, because I agree with Central Intelligence Agency Director 

Michael V. Hayden that if the U.S. is going to suffer another attack 

on our own soil, it will most certainly originate from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. In your advance policy question responses, you talked about al Qaeda and associated groups being 

the greatest terrorist threats we face, and clearly that’s not confined to Afghanistan or Pakistan, but also Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and other places that will now be in your AOR. 

If we accept that, which I do, that there is a greater threat coming from there than anywhere else, what are you going to do to 

help elevate the attention that is paid to that area? It has been the 

forgotten front lines in the war against terrorism, and we have allowed what was an initial success to, if not deteriorate, certainly 

stagnate, and I’m concerned that we need to engage the country 

again in this effort against al Qaeda. How large a priority do you 

believe tracking down Osama bin Laden should be? 

General PETRAEUS. It should be a very high priority. Having met 

with Director Hayden, actually, recently, about 2 weeks ago in 

Qatar, together with the U.S. Ambassadors to Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) Commander, and the current CENTCOM Commander, Lieutenant General Marty Dempsey, it is very clear that there is a very considerable focus on that. 

Again, having said that, I think there clearly is more that can 

and should be done in helping the new government in Pakistan, because this is a Pakistani problem that has both repercussions and 

does create enormous violence inside Pakistan, but, as you point 

out, has global implications, as well. 

You mentioned the other areas in the region. I am actually fairly 

well acquainted, because of the location of Lieutenant General 

McChrystal in my current AOR of a number of the activities that 

are ongoing in these other areas that you mentioned, all of which 

are, indeed, concerning. 

I would also, though, point out that al Qaeda has been quite 

open about the fact that it sees its main effort to be in Iraq, and 

that, of course, it is appropriate, again, to do everything that we 

can there to pursue al Qaeda-Iraq. That is, in fact, what is ongoing. 

There has been substantial progress against al Qaeda in Iraq, and 

that is an effort that we also do want to continue very much, and, 

in fact, has benefited considerably from the recent offensive directed by Prime Minister Maliki in Mosul and in the greater province of Ninawa. 

Senator CLINTON. I know that we may not agree about what the 

principal emphasis should be with respect to our efforts against al 

Qaeda, because certainly the ongoing threat to the United States 

on our soil emanates from outside of Iraq, in my opinion, and I 

think that we have to raise the visibility of our efforts with respect 

to al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly 

along the border, its efforts to set up subsidiaries in Somalia, 

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Yemen, and elsewhere, because, from the perspective of a Senator 

from New York now 61⁄2 years after September 11, it is deeply troubling that we have not captured or killed or essentially decapitated 

the capacity of al Qaeda under the leadership it had in 2001, which 

is still the leadership it has today. 

I just wanted to ask one question, if I could, of General Odierno, 

because obviously the cycle of repeated and extended deployments 

are ones that we hear a lot about—the use of National Guard, and 

the Reserves. The last time I was there, with Senator Bayh, we 

saw a lot of people, who were born approximately the same time 

I was, who had been called back up in the Individual Ready Reserve pool. How many troops, General Odierno, do you plan to have 

in Iraq for the provincial elections in October? Will you request a 

temporary increase in troops? 

General ODIERNO. Senator, I will never say ‘‘never,’’ but my assessment now is, with the progress we’re making, the progress 

we’re seeing in the ISFs, and what I’m seeing as the security environment on the ground, currently, I do not believe we will need an 

increase. I think we’ll be able to do it with the forces that are on 

the ground there now, or what we’ll get to in July. 

Now, I feel fairly comfortable with that. Obviously, the environment and the enemy has a vote. But, currently, I believe we should 

not need an increase. 

Senator CLINTON. Finally, General, if there were a decision by 

the President, in your professional estimation, how long would a responsible withdrawal from Iraq take? 

General ODIERNO. Senator, it’s a very difficult question. The reason is because there’s a number of assumptions and factors that I 

would have to understand first, based on how do we want to leave 

the environmental issues within Iraq, what would be the final end 

state, what is the affect on the ground, what is the security mission 

on the ground. I don’t think I can give you an answer now, but I 

certainly, at the time, if asked, we would do—and we do planning—

we do a significant amount of planning to make sure that an appropriate answer is given, and we would lay out a timeline in order 

to do that. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, thank you to the witnesses and their families. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Clinton. 

Let me thank our witnesses. 

Just one quick question of General Petraeus. You were asked 

about the security contractors. These are complicated provisions 

that are very carefully laid out, in terms of discretionary action 

that could affect the international relations of the United States. 

I’m wondering whether you’ve read all those particular provisions. 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I have not. All I was responding to was 

the question, as I understood it here today. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Well, I’m wondering if you could take 

a look at them—it takes up 2 pages of our bill—and then give us 

your comment, for the record, because I think you would find these 

to be very carefully set forth. Would that be okay? 

General PETRAEUS. I’ll do that, Senator. 

[The information referred to follows:]

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Statutory language that defines the functions of private security contractors (PSC) 

as inherently governmental and thus precludes using PSCs for security-related 

tasks would have a negative impact on our operations. The use of PSCs to perform 

perimeter security, convoy security, and personnel security is important to our mission accomplishment. If we were unable to use contractors for these tasks, we would 

be required to use U.S. military personnel. The primary missions of the U.S. military in Iraq are to help the Iraqi security forces (ISF) secure the population and 

develop the ISF to take on security missions for themselves. Diverting U.S. military 

forces from these primary missions would adversely affect our operations. Today in 

Iraq there are nearly 7,300 PSCs protecting individuals and property. The removal 

of these PSCs would initially require an equal number of U.S. military personnel 

(boots on the ground). Based on force deployment models, sustaining our force over 

time would increase this number by a factor of three. I assume the draft statutory 

guidance would also generate additional force requirements in Afghanistan. These 

numbers would grow further if U.S. military personnel were also required to replace 

the approximately 1,500 PSCs who provide security for State Department personnel 

in Iraq alone. 

As I noted in my recent confirmation hearing, there have been significant improvements in the operation of PSCs in Iraq over the past 6–8 months. Strengthened oversight and increased authority provided to military commanders has enabled us to use PSCs to fulfill more effectively their security roles in a fully accountable manner that supports mission accomplishment. Last December, the Departments of Defense and State signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) which 

standardized PSC operations in Iraq. Since implementing the MOA’s provisions, we 

have observed a greater than 60 percent reduction in escalation of force incidents 

involving PSC contractors. This oversight is being further strengthened through the 

development of an umbrella regulation as required by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008. This regulation is in final coordination 

now, and will further codify and extend the oversight and management policies of 

the MOA to all U.S. Government PSCs operating in a designated area of combat 

operations. Moreover, since the publication of the Secretary of Defense’s March 10, 

2008, memorandum on Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) jurisdiction over 

Department of Defense (DOD) contractor personnel, commanders in Iraq have begun 

to use the authority provided by Congress in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007 to subject contractor personnel to the UCMJ. 

I understand that DOD is currently assessing the interpretation of relevant regulations and the proposed legislative language. I recommend that DOD be given the 

opportunity to make a recommendation based on their work. I believe it would be 

wise for there to be dialogue on the definition of what constitutes an ‘‘inherently 

governmental’’ function and on the impact of that definition on our operations and 

our force.

Chairman LEVIN. Also, we have been in touch with you about the 

situation with the Christian communities in Iraq. We thank you for 

your awareness of that problem, their security issues, and we 

would ask you, particularly, I guess, General Odierno, to pick up 

that sensitivity and keep that concern very much in your mind. 

General ODIERNO. Yes, Senator, I understand. 

Chairman LEVIN. We thank you both. We hope that we’ll bring 

your nominations to the floor as promptly as possible. 

We will now stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to GEN David H. Petraeus, USA, 

by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization 

Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting 

readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain 

of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and 

authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms 

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have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution 

of military operations. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. The integration of joint capabilities under the Goldwater-Nichols Act has 

been a success. Our military forces are more interoperable today than they ever 

have been in our Nation’s history. This achievement has been remarkable. The next 

step is to ensure the ability of military and civilian departments to work closely together. Some progress has been made in this regard. The State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, who has been given the lead by National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD44), ‘‘Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,’’ has developed the Interagency 

Management System and a draft U.S. Government Planning Framework. These 

tools provide a viable process, within existing authorities, to enhance and align military and civilian engagement in reconstruction and stabilization scenarios. They 

have also designed and begun to stand up the Civilian Response Corps system to 

provide increased civilian expeditionary capacity to complex operations. This system 

holds impressive potential. DOD has developed a working plan to support the implementation of NSPD44. The U.S. will be well-served by having available the various 

tools to promote unity of effort across the U.S. Government. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. One of the most pressing needs is for the creation of interagency doctrine 

for the prosecution of counterinsurgency and stability operations. Counterinsurgency 

requires the commitment of both military and civilian agencies, and unity of effort 

is crucial to success. NSPD44 represents a good overall start, and new military doctrine helps as well. The State Department Bureau of Political-Military Affairs has 

taken initial steps toward this end. In addition, the Consortium for Complex Operations has been stood up to serve as an intellectual clearinghouse for ideas and best 

practices on the many facets of irregular warfare. This appears to be a low-cost, 

high-payoff initiative. 

Question. Do you believe that the role of the combatant commanders under the 

Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled? 

Answer. Yes, although, as mentioned above, further development of interagency 

capacity and doctrine is required. 

Question. Do you see a need for any change in those roles, with regard to the resource allocation process or otherwise? 

Answer. Combatant commanders have increasingly focused on addressing the root 

causes of conflict in their regions in order to prevent the outbreak of violence and 

to mitigate the conditions that allow extremism to take hold. If confirmed, I anticipate maintaining this important focus. This focus requires investment in long-term 

economic and political development, makes whole-of-government approaches more 

important than ever, and requires even more coordination with civilian activities in 

combatant commands’ AORs. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the chain of command 

runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, 

however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, Central Command 

(CENTCOM), to the following officials: 

The Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. Subject to direction from the President, the Commander, CENTCOM performs duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. 

In addition, the Commander, CENTCOM is responsible to the Secretary of Defense 

for the preparedness of the command to carry out its missions. 

Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense. 

Answer. Commander, CENTCOM coordinates and exchanges information with the 

Under Secretaries of Defense as needed to set and meet CENTCOM priorities and 

requirements for support. 

Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense. 

Answer. Commander, CENTCOM coordinates and exchanges information with the 

Assistant Secretaries of Defense as needed to set and meet CENTCOM priorities 

and requirements for support. 

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

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Answer. The Chairman is the principal military advisor to the President, National 

Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. Section 163 of title 10, U.S.C., allows 

communication between the President or the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders to flow through the Chairman. As is custom and traditional practice, and as instructed by the Unified Command Plan, I would communicate with 

the Secretary through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. I would communicate and coordinate with the Vice Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff as required and in the absence of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. 

Question. The Director of the Joint Staff. 

Answer. I would also communicate and coordinate with the Director as necessary 

and expect the Deputy Commander, CENTCOM or Chief of Staff, CENTCOM would 

communicate regularly with the Director of the Joint Staff. 

Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments. 

Answer. The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for the administration and support of forces assigned to the combatant commands. Commander, CENTCOM coordinates closely with the Secretaries to ensure that requirements to organize, train, and equip forces for CENTCOM are met. 

Question. The Service Chiefs. 

Answer. Commander, CENTCOM communicates and exchanges information with 

the Service Chiefs to support their responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping forces. Successful execution of the CENTCOM mission responsibilities requires 

close coordination with the Service Chiefs. If confirmed, I intend to work closely 

with the Service Chiefs to understand the capabilities of their Services and to ensure effective employment of those capabilities in the execution of the CENTCOM 

mission. 

Question. The other combatant commanders. 

Answer. Commander, CENTCOM maintains close relationships with the other 

combatant commanders. These relationships are critical to the execution of our National Military Strategy, and are characterized by mutual support, frequent contact, 

and productive exchanges of information on key issues. 

Question. The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq. 

Answer. I would necessarily have a relationship with the U.S. Ambassador to 

Iraq, in close coordination with the commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF–

I), in order to ensure unity of effort between U.S. military and other U.S. Government activities in Iraq and in the CENTCOM region. 

Question. The U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan. 

Answer. I would necessarily have a close working relationship with the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, in close coordination with the U.S. commander there, in 

order to ensure unity of effort between U.S. military and other U.S. Government activities in Afghanistan and in the CENTCOM region. 

Question. Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq. 

Answer. Commander, CENTCOM requires close cooperation with the Commander, 

MNF–I to support and resource the effort in Iraq to meet national policy goals. It 

is critical that the relationship between the Commander, CENTCOM and the Commander, MNF–I be close, candid, and productive to meet this end. 

Question. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International 

Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan. 

Answer. Commander, CENTCOM requires close cooperation with Commander, 

NATO–ISAF to support and resource the effort to achieve the goals of the NATO 

mandate in Afghanistan. There is no formal command relationship (though there 

are such relationships with the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC–A) and the Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) in Afghanistan). However, robust communications and coordination are necessary to ensure the achievement of strategic goals. 

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. If confirmed, you will be entering this important position at a critical 

time for CENTCOM. 

What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for 

this position? 

Answer. First, I have extensive combat and command experience in the 

CENTCOM AOR. Having served in Iraq for over 31⁄2 years (as a division commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC–I)/NATO 

Training Mission-Iraq (NTM–I) commander, and, now, MNF–I commander), I have 

a good understanding of the country’s culture, its leaders, and its challenges. My 

150

current position as MNF–I Commander, in particular, has provided me with extensive knowledge about our operations in Iraq, ideas on best-practices that would be 

useful elsewhere, and relationships with leaders throughout the Middle East and 

with leaders of Coalition countries. Though I have not served in Afghanistan, I did 

conduct a 5-day assessment there in September 2005 at the request of the Secretary 

of Defense, and my experience with counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations would, I hope, be useful in supporting General McKiernan and coalition 

forces operating there. 

Second, I have had a number of relatively high-level joint assignments, including 

serving as a TDY Special Assistant to CINCSOUTH, as Military Assistant to the 

SACEUR, as Operations Chief of the U.N. Force in Haiti, as Executive Assistant 

to the CJCS, as the temporary duty commander of Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC)-Forward in Kuwait, as ACOS OPS of SFOR in Bosnia, as 

commander of MNSTC–I/NTM–I, and, now, as commander of MNF–I. 

Third, I believe I have an academic background that has intellectually prepared 

me for the challenges of high-level command and complex environments, as I have 

studied—as well as served in—major combat operations, counterinsurgency operations, peacekeeping operations, and peace enforcement operations. My doctoral dissertation at Princeton University was titled, ‘‘The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam.’’ Most recently, while at Fort Leavenworth, I oversaw the development of the Army/Marine Corps manual on counterinsurgency and also changes to 

other Army doctrinal manuals, branch school curricula, leader development programs, combat training center rotations, the ‘‘Road to Deployment’’ concept, and 

other activities that support the preparation of our leaders and units for deployment 

to the CENTCOM AOR. 

Fourth, I have in the past year, as part of my MNF–I duties, met with leaders 

in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Turkey, the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain, as well as 

with many of the leaders of the countries contributing forces in Iraq, many of whom 

also contribute forces in Afghanistan and the Gulf. 

Finally, I believe that I have a solid understanding of the requirements of strategic-level leadership. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Commander, CENTCOM? 

Answer. Although there are numerous country-specific challenges in the region, 

a survey of the CENTCOM AOR as a whole reveals several transnational concerns 

that affect many or all of the region’s countries. These concerns are interrelated and 

create significant challenges for regional stability and for U.S. interests in the region. 

First is the violent extremism that poses a significant threat throughout the region. Though al Qaeda is the highest visibility and priority terrorist organization, 

there are also many other extremist groups in the region. 

Another concern in the region is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 

including related components and technical expertise. Iran’s and Syria’s nontransparent efforts to develop nuclear facilities could destabilize the region and spark a 

regional arms race. The need to secure existing nuclear material is a related and 

critical concern. 

A lack of economic development in many of the region’s countries is another 

transnational concern. This is both a humanitarian issue and a security issue, as 

poverty and lack of opportunity are often enablers of successful terrorist recruiting. 

Another concern is the prevalence of piracy, narcotics trafficking, and arms smuggling in the CENTCOM AOR. In addition to being criminal and destructive activities, these practices threaten strategic resources and are often lucrative sources of 

funding for terrorists. 

Because of the region’s importance to the global economy, another concern is the 

free flow of strategic resources and international commerce through the region. 

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges? 

Answer. Although it is premature to have specific and comprehensive plans, there 

are several concepts that would guide my approach to the region’s challenges, if I 

am confirmed. 

First, we would seek to build partnerships in the region, pursuing bilateral and 

multilateral cooperation in identifying and working toward mutual interests. This 

involves extensive engagement with leaders in the region, and I would see this as 

one of my primary responsibilities as CENTCOM commander. 

Second, we would aim for a whole-of-government approach in addressing the region’s challenges. This approach recognizes that solutions for the region’s challenges 

151

should be as multifaceted as the challenges themselves. Rather than engaging in 

purely military solutions, we would seek to leverage the insight and capabilities 

resident in the whole of government. 

Third, and related, we would pursue comprehensive approaches and solutions, addressing the roots of issues and not just their manifestations. This entails efforts 

varying from spurring economic development and educational opportunity to 

strengthening governments’ abilities to combat terrorism and extremism. 

Fourth, we would posture our forces and maintain focus on readiness to conduct 

contingency operations, whether crisis response, deterrent action, or defeating aggressors. 

These concepts can be applied to each of the transnational threats listed in the 

answers to the previous question, and they are also important in addressing and 

preventing the spread of inter- and intra-state conflicts in the CENTCOM AOR. 

Signaling U.S. resolve to address the region’s challenges is one of the important 

roles of any combatant commander, and active pursuit of these concepts would also 

serve that purpose. 

MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of Commander, CENTCOM? What management actions and 

timelines would you establish to address these problems? 

Answer. Having not yet performed those functions, I cannot say at this time what 

the most serious problems are. Until I have been confirmed and made an assessment, it would be premature to establish management actions or timelines. 

READINESS OF FORCES

Question. What is your assessment of the readiness of U.S. forces that have been 

deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom? 

Answer. Units arrive in theater well prepared for the operations in Iraq. Indeed, 

I continue to believe that our current force is the best trained, best equipped force 

in America’s history. Leaders at every level, many of whom are on their second or 

third combat deployments, are using their experience from previous deployments to 

prepare and train their units well, and U.S. forces in Iraq remain disciplined, spirited, and adaptable in the face of challenging, ever-changing battlefield conditions. 

Question. Have you observed any significant trends in apparent gaps with respect 

to personnel, equipment, or training readiness in units’ upon arrival in theater? 

Answer. There are not currently any significant gaps in the readiness of units as 

they arrive in Iraq. The equipment and training they receive in preparation for deployment are excellent. As in all counterinsurgency operations, though, tactics—

both those of the enemy and our own—constantly change, and the winning side is 

generally that which learns faster. We have strived to be a learning organization 

and have adapted well in the past; with Congress’s support, for example, we have 

effectively employed increasing ISR capability and fielded MRAPs to protect our 

forces from increasingly lethal IEDs. We have also worked to push lessons learned 

back to units so they can integrate them into their training. As enemy tactics evolve 

and new equipment and training requirements arise, I would see it as my responsibility to address those needs, if I am confirmed. 

Question. What are your views on the growing debate over whether the Army is 

putting too much emphasis on preparing for counterinsurgency operations or too little emphasis on preparing for high intensity force-on-force conflict? 

Answer. Although I understand the concern, I believe that the distinction between 

the requirements of counterinsurgency and those of high intensity combat can be 

overstated. Indeed, Army doctrine explains that all operations (including 

counterinsurgency) are a mix of offensive, defensive, and stability and support operations. Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have performed—and continue to perform—

very well in intense combat, gaining new sophistication in the use of fires (increasingly precise) and air-weapons teams, the integration of counterfire radar and unmanned aerial vehicles, the teamwork between conventional and Special Operations 

Forces, the fusion of intelligence, and the command and control of complex operations. The past year, for example, included significant combat operations to clear 

Ramadi, Baqubah, various Baghdad neighborhoods, and now Mosul. Beyond that, 

leaders are explicitly trained and educated in our branch schools in how to think 

rather than what to think, and they are more adaptive as a result. The Army is 

now full of experienced leaders (as are all our Services), and it has shown that it 

is a learning organization, rapidly institutionalizing lessons learned. Finally, it has 

a more robustly equipped force, including vehicles that offer better protection, which 

would serve well in a variety of high intensity conflicts. 

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IRAQ

Question. What is your assessment of the current situation facing the United 

States in Iraq? 

Answer. I believe we are in a significantly better position in Iraq now than we 

were in late 2006 and early 2007. The security situation is much improved, with 

overall attacks, civilian deaths, and ethno-sectarian violence all down substantially. 

The week ending 16 May 2008 had the lowest level of security incidents since the 

week that ended 23 April 2004. Having noted that, progress is uneven and difficult 

challenges remain, including Iran’s malign involvement in Iraq and the fact that 

AQI and other Sunni extremists and illegal Shiite militias retain the ability in some 

areas to carry out lethal attacks and regenerate. Iraqi security forces continue to 

improve and are increasingly taking the lead. Nonetheless, the gains of the past 15 

months remain fragile, and much tough work remains on the security front. 

The Iraqi Government has begun to make progress on some very difficult issues 

and has passed some critical legislation. We have seen more unity across sectarian 

lines at the national level, and this presents opportunities for further political 

progress. Iraq’s governmental capacity is still insufficient in many areas but is improving. Overall, Iraq is moving in the right direction and making progress. However, it will take continued U.S. involvement and commitment to ensure that the 

gains are not reversed. 

Question. From your perspective, what are the top lessons learned from our experience in Iraq? 

Answer. Recent experience in Iraq has shown us the value of pursuing a comprehensive approach in response to complex challenges and of focusing on key 

counterinsurgency concepts. In Iraq, we operate along multiple lines of operation. 

Our strategy recognizes that enduring security and stability rest on economic, political, social, and diplomatic, as well as military, efforts and thus require simultaneous pursuit of a variety of kinetic and non-kinetic operations. Our application of 

a joint USM–I/MNF–I campaign plan has required an immense amount of coordination among governmental departments and agencies and reinforced the lesson that 

the military cannot accomplish its mission on its own. As an example, we have 

begun to address the foreign fighter problem in Iraq through a series of video teleconferences in which more than 25 organizations from the interagency, Intelligence 

Community, and DOD participate; this forum has allowed key leaders across all 

agencies and departments to share current assessments and activities and to discuss future plans. 

Because of the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, we have already seen some 

progress in interagency cooperation. After September 11, every regional combatant 

commander stood up a new doctrinal Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) 

that was originally focused on counterterrorism operations. Over the past few years, 

these JIACGs have begun to evolve into interagency enablers for full-spectrum operations. Just this month, CENTCOM formally announced the evolution of its JIACG 

into an Interagency Task Force for Irregular Warfare to confront the complex challenges of its region. If I am confirmed, I would seek to build on these initiatives 

as CENTCOM commander. 

Question. What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes the U.S. has 

made to date in Iraq? 

Answer. First, there were a number of assumptions and assessments that did not 

bear out. Prominent among them was the assumption that Iraqis would remain in 

their barracks and ministry facilities and resume their functions as soon as interim 

governmental structures were in place; that obviously did not transpire. The assessment of the Iraqi infrastructure did not capture how fragile and abysmally maintained it was (a challenge compounded, of course, by looting). Additionally, although 

most Iraqis did, in fact, greet us as liberators (and that was true even in most Sunni 

Arab areas), there was an underestimation of the degree of resistance that would 

develop as a Shiite majority government began to emerge and the Sunni Arabs, especially the ‘‘Saddamists,’’ realized that the days of their dominating Iraq were over. 

Sunni Arab resistance was also fueled by other actions noted below. 

A number of other situations did not develop as envisioned, including:

- There was a feeling that elections would enhance the Iraqi sense of nationalism. Instead, the elections hardened sectarian positions, as Iraqis who 

did vote did so largely based on ethnic and sectarian group identity; major 

sections of the population boycotted the political process and thus have 

been underrepresented ever since. 

- There was an underestimation over time of the security challenges in 

Iraq, particularly in the wake of the 2006 bombing of the mosque in 

Samarra, coupled with an overestimation of our ability to create new secuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00158 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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rity institutions, in the midst of an insurgency, following the disbandment 

of the Iraqi security forces. 

- It repeatedly took us too much time to recognize changes in the security 

environment and to react to them. What began as an insurgency, gradually 

evolved into a conflict that included insurgent attacks, terrorism, sectarian 

violence, and violent crime. Our actions had to evolve in response to these 

changes, and that was not always easy.

A number of other mistakes were made during the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom, including:

- The very slow execution of the reconciliation components of deBaathification by the Iraqi de-Baathification Committee left tens of thousands of former Baath Party members (many of them Sunni Arabs, but also 

some Shiite) feeling that they had no future opportunities in, or reason to 

support, the new Iraq. To be fair to the Coalition Provisional Authority, 

Ambassador Bremer intended to execute reconciliation (or exceptions to the 

de-Ba’athification order) and, for example, gave me permission to do so on 

a trial basis in Ninewa Province; however, when we submitted the results 

of the reconciliation commission conducted for Mosul University and subsequent requests for exception issued by Iraqi processes with judicial oversight, no action was taken on them by the Iraqi de-Ba’athification Committee in Baghdad. As realization set in among those affected that there 

was to be no reconciliation, we could feel support for the new Iraq ebbing 

in Sunni Arab majority areas. 

- Disbanding the Iraqi Army without simultaneously announcing a stipend 

and pension program, a plan for Iraq’s future security forces, and ways to 

join those future forces left hundreds of thousands of Iraqi men angry, feeling disrespected, and worried about how they would feed their families. The 

stipend plan eventually announced did help, but it did not cover senior officers, who then remained influential critics of the new Iraq. This action likely helped fuel the early growth of anti-coalition sentiment and of the insurgency. 

- We took too long to develop the concepts and structures needed to build 

effective Iraqi security forces to assist in providing security for the Iraqi 

people. 

- Misconduct at Abu Ghraib and in other less sensational, but still damaging, cases inflamed the insurgency and damaged the credibility of Coalition Forces in Iraq, in the region, and around the world. 

- We had, for the first 15 months or more in Iraq, an inadequate military 

headquarters structure. In hindsight, it is clear that it took too long to 

transform V Corps Headquarters into CJTF–7 Headquarters and that even 

after that transformation the headquarters was not capable of looking both 

up and down (e.g., performing both political-military and strategic functions 

and also serving as the senior operational headquarters for counterinsurgency and stability operations). The result was the eventual creation 

of the MNF–I headquarters. Moreover, it is clear that we should have built 

what eventually became MNSTC–I headquarters and TF134 headquarters 

(which oversees detainee/interrogation operations) and other organizations 

(e.g., the Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division Headquarters) 

much sooner. 

- Although it was not a problem in the 101st Airborne Division AOR during 

my time as the 101st Cdr, it is clear that in certain AORs there were more 

tasks than troops—especially in Anbar Province during at least the first 

year of operations. 

- Finally, the effort in the wake of the al-Askariya Mosque bombing in 

Samarra in February 2006, was unable to stem the spiraling ethno-sectarian violence. Repeated operations in Baghdad in the summer and fall of 

2006, in particular, did not prove durable due to a lack of sufficient Iraqi 

and coalition forces for the hold phase of clear-hold-build operations.

Question. Which of these do you believe are still having an impact? 

Answer. Although it is difficult after 5 years of developments in Iraq to attribute 

specific current challenges to particular past activities, it is likely that we are still 

feeling the effects of many of these activities. For instance, groups that chose not 

to participate in Iraq’s 2005 elections are still underrepresented in government at 

the provincial and national levels. For this reason, free and fair provincial elections 

this year will be very important in pulling an increasing proportion of Iraqi society 

into the political process. 

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Question. What do you believe are the most important steps that the United 

States needs to take in Iraq? 

Answer. As U.S. forces in theater draw down, our most important steps are those 

that protect the Iraqi people while continuing to build Iraqi capability and capacity. 

Even as we assist in providing security, we must also enable Iraqi security forces 

increasingly to assume the lead in securing their country. We must work to help 

the Iraqis expand their governmental capability and capacity. We must encourage 

and support political accommodation and reconciliation at both the local and national level. Finally, we must recognize that the challenges associated with internal 

and external stability and security in Iraq cannot be solved solely in Iraq. We must 

thus continue to engage with Iraq’s neighbors and seek to get these neighbors to 

support political compromise and stability in Iraq. 

Question. How has the threat and conduct of intercommunal violence changed the 

fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq? 

Answer. Since liberation in 2003, the conflict in Iraq has been a competition 

among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. While the fundamental nature of this struggle has not changed, it has played out differently over 

time. Over the past year, we have seen a significant decrease in ethno-sectarian violence. However, as overall violence levels have decreased, continuing challenges in 

the area of intra-sectarian conflict have risen to the fore. Iraq continues to face a 

complex array of destabilizing forces, including terrorism and regional interference; 

however, as noted earlier, the level of security incidents in the past week was the 

lowest in over 4 years. 

Question. How would you recommend that military strategy adapt to this change 

in the nature of the conflict? 

Answer. I believe our strategy in Iraq is well-suited to address this conflict over 

power and resources. As commander of MNF–I, I participated in the development 

of the Joint Campaign Plan with the U.S. Ambassador in Baghdad. This plan lays 

out a comprehensive approach, along security, economic, diplomatic, and political 

lines of operation, to achieve the aim of an independent, stable, and secure Iraq. 

Although there is a long way to go, our strategy to address the conflict in Iraq is 

achieving progress. 

Question. What is the appropriate role of coalition forces in response to the threat 

and conduct of intercommunal violence among militant groups vying for control, 

particularly in southern Iraq? 

Answer. Coalition forces support the elected government and help that government enforce its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Iraqi leaders have largely 

united around the aim of disarming all militias, and we seek to support them in 

that effort. 

Question. What role, if any, did you play in the development of the new Iraq strategy announced by the President in January 2007? 

Answer. The day after Secretary Gates took office, immediately before his first 

trip to Iraq, I met with him to discuss the situation in Iraq. We talked again subsequent to his trip. I also talked to the CJCS several times during that period, noting 

that an emphasis on population security, particularly in Baghdad, was necessary to 

help the Iraqis gain the time and space for the tough decisions they faced and also 

contributing my input on the general force levels likely to be required. As the strategy was refined, I talked on several occasions to LTG Ray Odierno to confirm that 

his troop-to-task analysis required the force levels called for by the new strategy; 

I relayed my support for those levels to the CJCS and the Secretary. I also supported the strategy’s additional emphasis on the advisory effort and additional resources for the reconstruction effort (both in terms of funding and personnel for Provincial Reconstruction Teams and governmental ministry capacity development). 

Question. Do you believe that there is a purely military solution in Iraq, or must 

the solution be primarily a political one? 

Answer. There is no purely military or purely political solution in Iraq. All four 

lines of operation—security, economic, diplomatic, and political—are mutually reinforcing and thus must be pursued to achieve a long-term solution in Iraq. Though 

the pursuit of political reconciliation and good governance along the political line of 

operation is the main effort, success in this area depends on security conditions that 

enable and foster compromise. Enduring domestic political progress will also rest on 

supporting economic and diplomatic developments. 

Question. Do you believe that political compromise among Iraqi political leaders 

is a necessary condition for a political solution? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. What do you believe will induce Iraqi political leaders to make the political compromises necessary for a political solution? 

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Answer. Iraq leaders have put themselves under enormous personal pressure and 

are also under the collective pressure of various political elements in Iraq to create 

stability and long-term solutions for Iraq. Indeed, they have already worked together and compromised on a number of difficult issues in order to pass important 

pieces of legislation earlier this year. They recognize that in order to succeed in a 

political process, they will need to produce results, and producing results requires 

compromise. With regard to expectations about the pace of progress, it is important 

to recognize that Iraq’s political leaders are still struggling with fundamental questions such as the degree of devolution to the provinces of various authorities and 

powers in Iraq. Iraq’s political leaders have already begun to make progress in these 

areas, and they are continuing to move forward on issues such as the provincial 

elections scheduled for later this year. 

Question. What leverage does the U.S. have in this regard? 

Answer. Although U.S. forces and reconstruction funding are being reduced, the 

U.S. still has considerable leverage and influence in the form of U.S. forces, the 

large U.S. diplomatic presence, and the comprehensive effort to increase governmental capacity. Having said that, Iraq is a sovereign country and, understandably, 

its leaders seek to exercise that sovereignty—and we seek to encourage that. Beyond 

that, supporting political solutions in Iraq is not purely a matter of leverage and 

convincing Iraqi leaders of the importance of compromise. It is also a matter of helping Iraqi leaders to set conditions that enable progress. There again, our leverage 

lies in our robust engagement, working with the Government of Iraq, and helping 

its leaders to make and implement the hard decisions that are in the best interests 

of all the Iraqi people. 

Question. To your knowledge, aren’t conditions on the ground in Iraq being continuously assessed? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. If so, why is it necessary, in your view, to wait 45 days to assess the 

conditions on the ground and determine when to make recommendations? 

Answer. The withdrawal of over one-quarter of our combat power from Iraq will 

significantly reshape the battlefield. Our goal is to thin out our presence, not simply 

withdraw from areas, to ensure we help the ISF hold the security gains we have 

achieved together and set the conditions for additional progress. A period of 45 days 

will enable us to reposture our forces, if needed, evaluate the effect of required adjustments, and avoid premature judgments about the impact of these changes. After 

this period of consolidation and evaluation, we can then complete an informed assessment and make appropriate recommendations. 

Question. In your view, what conditions on the ground in Iraq would allow for a 

recommendation that further reductions be made in U.S. forces? 

Answer. There is no simple metric or equation that can be used to determine the 

appropriate pace of force reductions. A number of variables are examined as we conduct assessments. Reductions are not merely a question of battlefield geometry; they 

involve complex political and military calculus. We look primarily at security and 

local governance conditions—at the enemy situation and the capability of Iraqi security forces, at the capacity of local officials, and at a host of other factors. Though 

we have metrics to assist in assessing the situation in various locations, in many 

cases it is the commander on the ground who has the best feel for the situation; 

it is as much art as it is science. 

Question. In the fiscal year 2008 defense authorization and appropriation acts 

Congress prohibited the use of funds to seek permanent bases in Iraq or to control 

the oil resources of Iraq. 

Do you agree that it is not and should not be the policy of the United States to 

seek permanent basing of U.S. forces in Iraq or to exercise control over Iraq’s oil 

resources? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. If you agree, what are your views on the construction of any additional 

facilities inside Iraq for use by our military forces? 

Answer. As is currently the case in Iraq, construction efforts should be focused 

on supporting the counterinsurgency concept of living among the people rather than 

on the expansion of large operating bases. Toward this end, we continue to complete 

some Joint Security Station and Combat Outpost facilities that are necessary for 

current missions—though the vast majority of these facilities have already been 

completed. Over time, a few headquarters may be shifted as well, and this may require a few facility changes. Much of our future effort will, however, be focused on 

reducing the size of our facilities. As we continue to withdraw forces, we will follow 

a ‘‘shrink and share’’ strategy that reduces base perimeters and maximizes opportunities to share bases with ISF and Government of Iraq users. Eventually, these facilities will either be transferred to the Government of Iraq or closed. 

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Question. What are your views on the responsibility and ability of the Iraqi Government to assume greater responsibility for paying the costs of reconstruction and 

security activities throughout Iraq, including paying for all large-scale infrastructure projects; the costs of combined operations between Iraqi and MNF–I forces; the 

costs of training and equipping of the Iraqi security forces; and the costs associated 

with the Sons of Iraq? 

Answer. The Government of Iraq has an increasing responsibility and an increasing ability to fund reconstruction and security operations in Iraq, and it is making 

progress in picking up a greater share of the load. As Ambassador Crocker recently 

stated before Congress, ‘‘The era of U.S.-funded major infrastructure projects is 

over.’’ Instead, we are focusing our efforts on helping build Iraqi governmental capacity so that Iraqis can better leverage their own resources. For example, Iraq’s 

2008 budget contains $13 billion for reconstruction; beyond that, we anticipate Iraq 

will spend over $8 billion on security this year and $11 billion next year, and a supplemental Iraqi budget is in the works. An important limiting factor is Iraqi governmental capacity, but this is gradually improving as well, as evidenced by a solid increase in budget execution last year. 

Question. What are your views on the concept circulated over the last year that 

would make Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan a Marine Corps mission 

and end the rotation of Marine units in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom? 

Answer. In my current position in Iraq, I have not been a part of the discussions 

surrounding this issue (other than those related to its impact in Iraq). If I am confirmed, it is an issue I will discuss with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders in Afghanistan. 

CONFRONTING THE MILITIAS

Question. Based on your knowledge, is the Iraqi Government taking the steps it 

must to confront and control the militias? What role would you expect to play on 

this issue, if confirmed? 

Answer. The Iraqi Government has taken some critical steps in recent months to 

confront criminal militias. Prime Minister Maliki made the decision in March to 

confront militia elements in Basra that were carrying out violent crimes and mafialike activities. That operation is still ongoing, but Iraqi security forces have made 

impressive progress in improving security conditions in Basra’s neighborhoods as 

well as in the strategic Port of Umm Qasr and in other areas in Basra Province. 

The government’s success in Basra has also led to a greater degree of unity among 

Iraqi leaders regarding the issue of armed militias. Prime Minister Maliki has become vocal in his stance that the Government of Iraq must have a monopoly on the 

legitimate use of force (an issue on which a public statement of backing was issued 

by Grand Ayatollah Sistani), and the government and ISF have worked to enforce 

this point in Baghdad, particularly in Sadr City. In general, the government has 

been more willing to use its forces to confront militia elements, but it also realizes 

that the militia issue cannot be addressed with a purely military solution. In an effort to win popular support, Iraqi leaders have actively pursued humanitarian assistance efforts in areas affected by militia violence and have reached out to tribal 

and political leaders as well. 

There is obviously a long way to go in reducing militia violence, but there does 

seem to be positive momentum toward addressing these difficult issues and drawing 

dissident factions into the political process. If confirmed, I would continue to support 

the MNF–I Commander’s efforts to partner with the Iraqi Government to combat 

these militias. In addition, I would seek to assist with regional engagement efforts 

to dissuade Iran and Syria from fostering violence and instability in Iraq and seek 

to encourage Iraq’s Arab neighbors to play a more constructive role. 

Question. What has been the role of American troops with respect to operations 

in and around Sadr City and in Basra? 

Answer. U.S. support for the Sadr City and Basra operations has been generally 

in line with the support Coalition Forces regularly provide to Iraqi operations. 

In Basra, working in coordination with the U.K. contingent in Multi-National Division—Southeast, we continue to support Iraqi-led operations with planning, logistics, close air support, intelligence, and embedded transition teams. These efforts 

are typical of our role in provinces transitioned to Iraqi control, where Iraqi forces 

plan and execute operations and are supported by specific Coalition enablers. 

Because Baghdad is not yet transitioned to Provincial Iraqi Control, U.S. forces 

are playing a more robust role in planning and executing operations in the Baghdad 

Security Districts than they are in Basra. We are conducting extensive surveillance 

operations in Sadr City and partnering with Iraqi units on the ground. Using intelligence elements, ground forces, and air weapons teams, U.S. forces also conducted 

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very targeted operations in response to attacks originating in Sadr City. As is typical in the ‘‘partner’’ phase of the lead-partner-overwatch transition to ISF control, 

Coalition forces operate alongside and in coordination with Iraqi Army, special operations, and police units. 

Question. What is your assessment of the Iraqi Government and security forces’ 

strategic and operational planning and preparation for the operation in Basra? 

Answer. Iraqi operations in Basra were launched more quickly than was originally planned and were hampered initially by incomplete planning and conditionssetting. As operations have continued, we have seen steady growth in ISF planning 

capability, and recent operations have been impressive. 

Once the hasty initial planning issues were resolved, Iraq security forces demonstrated impressive growth in operational capability, and it is notable that, on 

short notice, they were able to deploy over a division’s worth of personnel and equipment to Basra from across the country and to quickly employ them upon arrival—

a feat which certainly would not have been possible 1 year ago. 

Question. What is your assessment of Iraqi security forces’ tactical performance 

during operations in Basra? 

Answer. As operations in Basra began, performance of the ISF was uneven, with 

some units performing quite well and others performing poorly. However, the Iraqi 

Government reacted aggressively to shortcomings identified in early operations and 

quickly removed underperforming leaders and troopers and flew in replacements. 

Many of the units—such as a brigade of the 14th Iraqi Army Division—that originally performed poorly have already been retrained and are back in the fight as operations in Basra continue, though progress with reconstituting police elements that 

performed inadequately has been slower. 

As I noted above, performance of the ISF has improved over the course of the ongoing operation in Basra. The ISF have, for several weeks now, been conducting orderly clear-hold-build operations incrementally through the city and outside the city 

with sound tactical planning and execution. They have, for example, captured weapons caches that total over 2800 mortar and artillery rounds, nearly 700 rockets, 

1,300 rocket propelled grenades, 21 surface-to-air missiles, and over 500 mines, 

bombs, and improvised explosive devices. 

Question. In your view, did this operation accomplish the Iraqi Government’s strategic and the Iraqi security forces’ operational objectives? 

Answer. Operations in Basra City and Province are still ongoing; however, they 

do appear to have achieved the Iraqi Government’s military objectives, strategically 

as well as operationally. The accomplishments to date have been impressive and 

have bolstered Prime Minister Maliki’s standing with various political elements. 

The ISF have made significant progress in eliminating the militia’s grip on Basra’s 

neighborhoods, and they have cleared numerous huge caches throughout the city. 

The operation seems to be garnering support from Basrawi citizens and has already 

had positive effects on Iraqi political unity. Also, the ISF have successfully detained 

several militia leaders who returned to Basra after fleeing in the early days of the 

operation. 

ACCOUNTING FOR ISF WEAPONS

Question. A July 2007 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that 

the Multi-National Security Transition Command Iraq (MNSTC–I) could not fully 

account for the receipt by the Iraqi security forces (ISF) of over 190,000 weapons 

provided by the United States. One of the report’s findings is that the lapse in accounting for weapons provided by the United States to the ISF was due to the failure of MNSTC–I to maintain a central record of all equipment distributed from 

June 2004 to December 2005, including during the period you commanded MNSTC–

I. 

Have you reviewed the July 2007 GAO report on accounting for weapons provided 

by the United States to the ISF? If so, what is your assessment of the report’s findings? 

Answer. Yes, I have reviewed the report. Taking into account the caveats listed 

in the GAO report (including the fact that the GAO review utilized an incomplete 

sample), I found the findings to be as accurate as they could have been. The security 

situation in Iraq in 2004–2005 was very challenging, and the priority was to provide 

arms to ISF who were preparing to enter the fight. Indeed, Members of Congress, 

DOD, and the administration repeatedly emphasized the need to accelerate the arming and training of the ISF. On several occasions, we had to provide arms to the 

ISF in the middle of ongoing major combat operations (e.g., Fallujah, Najaf, and 

Mosul in the fall of 2004). Many of our challenges stemmed from an insufficient 

number of logistical personnel in the train and equip effort and in the newly formed 

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Iraqi units, and also from the lack of a fully operational distribution networks and 

property accountability systems across Iraq. Accountability has since been achieved 

by MNSTC–I for a portion of the weapons assessed as unaccounted for in the GAO 

report, and the effort to achieve further accountability continues. 

Question. What has been done to address the accountability for weapons provided 

by the United States in the course of training and equipping the ISF? What additional steps, if any, are needed to improve accountability for these weapons? 

Answer. Accountability procedures have been significantly improved. We have 

worked to establish an unbroken chain of custody for the accountability and control 

of munitions under U.S. control from entry into Iraq to issuance to the ISF. We have 

increased the number of logistics and property accountability specialists in country 

(in MNSTC–I, in particular) and increased security procedures throughout the chain 

of custody. We have also worked with the ISF to build their property accountability 

systems and structures. In July 2007, we partnered with the ISF to establish an 

M–16 Biometrics Program that links individual soldiers to the particular weapons 

they are issued. Prior to weapons issue, each soldier is required to provide biometric 

data in the form of a retinal scan, a voice scan, and fingerprints. In addition, soldiers’ personnel and payroll data are verified before a weapon is issued. The final 

step in the process is to take a picture of each soldier holding his new weapon with 

the serial number visible. Similar biometric procedures have been implemented for 

Iraqi police badge and weapon issue, as well. The fidelity of data and level of detail 

captured in these accountability procedures are significant. Even as we continue 

these important initiatives, we must plan for future transitions by ensuring that the 

ISF can adequately provide security and accountability at key logistics hubs as they 

assume responsibility for these facilities. 

SUSTAINMENT OF U.S. COMMITMENT

Question. Based on your knowledge of the Army and its state of readiness, how 

long do you believe the Army can sustain U.S. troop levels in Iraq of approximately 

140,000 troops at their current operational tempo? 

Answer. There is clearly a strain on the Active and Reserve components. Many 

soldiers have completed or are in the midst of second or third deployments. This 

is obviously difficult for them and their families. My own family is well acquainted 

with this challenge, as I have now been deployed for more than 41⁄2 years since 

2001. Reset of equipment also remains a challenge. Having said that, it is more appropriate for the Joint Staff and the Services to determine how long we can sustain 

given troop levels, though the Army Chief of Staff has said the Army can maintain 

a 15-Brigade Combat Team level in Iraq and Afghanistan—i.e., the post-surge level. 

As CENTCOM commander, it would be beyond my brief to determine the overall 

health of the Army and Marine Corps, though it would be something about which 

I would be very concerned and on which I would have dialogue with the Service 

Chiefs. These concerns are somewhat allayed by the ongoing effort to increase the 

end strength of the Army and Marine Corps and by the ongoing reduction of forces 

in Iraq. Clearly, the conflict in Iraq (and Afghanistan) has been hard on our ground 

forces, and I am grateful for Secretary Gates’ efforts and Congress’ support to ensure we have the forces we need for what are very frequently people-intensive operations. 

COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE

Question. According to Field Manual 3–24, the new counterinsurgency manual, 

‘‘20 [soldiers or police forces] per 1,000 residents is often considered the minimum 

troop density required for effective counterinsurgency operations.’’ Baghdad alone, 

according to doctrine, requires a force of 120,000–130,000 personnel to meet the 

minimum requirement. However, the planned increase in U.S. and Iraqi forces for 

Baghdad only provided for about 80,000 security forces. 

Do you believe that 80,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops has been and remains sufficient 

and if so, why? 

Answer. First, the recommended force ratio is a ‘‘rule of thumb’’ distilled for 

simplicity’s sake from numerous complex cases of counterinsurgency operations. 

These cases may differ significantly in terms of geography, urbanization, or enemy 

strength. As with many aspects of counterinsurgency, this is an art, not a science. 

Having said that, troop levels in Baghdad have been sufficient. Counterinsurgency 

doctrine clearly states that host nation police and army forces are a key part of the 

equation, as are special operating forces and other security elements. Added to 

those, the thousands of ministry security forces and similarly large numbers of civilian (often third party) contracted guard forces protecting key sites in Baghdad contribute to security in the capital city. In addition, nearly 30,000 Sons of Iraq are 

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currently contracted to help provide security in the Baghdad area. Taking into account these additional security forces in Baghdad, the force ratio is sufficient; significantly increased security in Baghdad over the last year bears out this analysis. 

Question. What is your understanding of the status and adequacy of the risk assessment and mitigation plan associated with this deviation from doctrine? 

Answer. Risk assessment and planning to mitigate risk occur on a continuous 

basis in Iraq. As operations in Iraq are considered and undertaken, commanders 

consider the risk to our own forces as well as Iraqi forces, as well as the risk of 

thinning our lines in areas that we currently hold. 

AFGHANISTAN

Question. What is your assessment of the security situation in Afghanistan and 

the nature, size, and scope of the anti-government insurgency? 

Answer. I have not had the opportunity to personally assess the security situation 

in Afghanistan since 2005. However, the Afghan Government and the Coalition 

clearly face a resilient enemy that seeks to force withdrawal of the international coalition, to overthrow the country’s legitimate government, and to turn Afghanistan 

into a safe haven for terrorists once again. 

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, has repeatedly called our military operations in Afghanistan an ‘‘economy of force’’ operation 

and said that there are requirements in Afghanistan that cannot be filled and likely 

won’t be filled until conditions improve in Iraq. 

Do you agree with Admiral Mullen that requirements in Afghanistan are going 

unfilled? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree that these requirements are unlikely to be met until conditions improve in Iraq? 

Answer. There are several ways to meet the requirements in Afghanistan, including increasing NATO contributions and increasing the capability and capacity of the 

Afghan National Security Forces. But clearly a reduction of U.S. and coalition forces 

in Iraq will make available forces that could help meet the need in Afghanistan. 

Question. If confirmed as Commander, CENTCOM, how would you intend to balance the requirements of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Answer. In consultation with the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense, I 

would, if confirmed, work to ensure that CENTCOM’s force posture remains consistent with national priorities, with force levels, and resources reflecting those priorities. It would be my responsibility to make clear the resources necessary to 

achieve the national policy goals and objectives; I would also intend to make clear 

how and to what extent shortfalls in resources produce risk to the force or mission 

objectives. 

Question. If additional troops and equipment are withdrawn from Iraq, do you believe that some of those resources should go to enhance military operations in Afghanistan? 

Answer. Yes; in fact, that has already been the case, with additional Marine 

forces being provided to Afghanistan some months after the Marine Expeditionary 

Unit was withdrawn from Iraq. 

Question. In your view, what additional military or other assistance is required 

to ensure the transition of Afghanistan to a stable, democratic, and economically 

viable nation? 

Answer. I would rely on the commanders on the ground in Afghanistan to determine their requirements; we would then analyze and determine how best to resource those requirements. Ultimately, resolution of Afghanistan’s complex and diverse challenges will require more than just a military solution, though security activities provide an essential foundation for enduring economic and political solutions. Coalition forces in Afghanistan already work alongside civilians on issues 

such as counternarcotics, economic development, border enforcement, and training 

of the Afghan Police. More such whole-of-government efforts are likely to be essential in the future. 

Question. What is your assessment of efforts to train and equip the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police? What changes, if any, would you recommend for this mission? 

Answer. I have not had the opportunity to assess our progress in training and 

equipping the Afghan National Security Forces since 2005. If confirmed, I will work 

with Major General Robert W. Cone and the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan to evaluate our efforts in this critical area and to determine what 

changes to the mission, if any, are required. 

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Question. What needs to be done to address concerns voiced by President Karzai 

and others regarding the number of civilian casualties in Afghanistan? 

Answer. The death of innocent civilians in wartime is a tragedy. The welfare of 

the civilian population is a critical concern, not only from a humanitarian perspective but also from a mission perspective. Indeed, counterinsurgency doctrine highlights the importance of protecting the population as part of the key effort to win 

over the people, convince them of the government’s legitimacy, and provide for their 

welfare. Based on conversations with General McNeill, it is clear that Coalition 

forces in Afghanistan take this concern very seriously and employ all possible means 

to limit the effect of violence on the civilian population. Efforts to minimize civilian 

casualties clearly must continue to be given high priority in Afghanistan and our 

other operational areas. 

Question. Are there additional steps that need to be taken? 

Answer. I am not sufficiently familiar with the systems and procedures in place 

in Afghanistan to be able to recommend at this time specific steps to be taken. Our 

near-term responsibility includes protecting the civilian population from insurgents 

and terrorists and also limiting the adverse effects of our military operations on the 

civilian population. It is important to keep sight of the fact that minimizing civilian 

casualties can be a very difficult endeavor, as we face an enemy who deliberately 

places innocents in harm’s way. But it is an endeavor we must emphasize. 

Question. Afghanistan is in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR). U.S. European Command, however, oversees the NATO International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. 

In your view, does this ‘‘seam’’ present any problems for the coordination and effectiveness of the NATO ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom missions in Afghanistan? 

Answer. All seams present challenges for commanders, and I am sure this seam 

presents coordination challenges in a variety of areas such as security operations, 

reconstruction, economic development, and counternarcotics efforts. If I am confirmed, one of my priorities would be to enhance coordination and cooperation between CENTCOM, EUCOM, and ISAF in order to ensure the greatest possible unity 

of effort on the ground in Afghanistan. 

AL QAEDA AND ASSOCIATED GROUPS

Question. Within the CENTCOM AOR, where do you consider the greatest terrorist threats from al Qaeda and associated groups to be located? 

Answer. The greatest threats from al Qaeda (AQ) in the CENTCOM AOR are in 

Iraq and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan. The AQ 

threat in Iraq is important because Iraq is where AQ has chosen to achieve its fundamental objective of establishing an Islamic state in the heart of the Arab world. 

AQ in the FATA is a critical concern because AQ’s senior leadership is located there, 

exerts malign influence against our operations in Afghanistan from there, and prepares for future global attacks from there. Another area of growing concern is the 

Levant, where AQ is attempting to increase its presence, particularly as Iraq and 

Saudi Arabia have proven increasingly inhospitable to AQ activities. There are additional such efforts in Yemen and the Horn of Africa. 

Question. Which of these threats do you believe constitute the highest priority for 

efforts to counter al Qaeda’s influence and eliminate safe havens for al Qaeda and 

affiliated groups? 

Answer. Defeat of al Qaeda is a priority for the United States. Because AQ is a 

global, distributed terrorist network that is interlinked, we cannot attempt to address individual portions of the network and expect to have a major operational or 

strategic impact against it. This requires a comprehensive approach that is appropriately balanced and tailored to address specific threats. Clearly, however, the 

threats posed by the AQ leadership and elements in the FATA and by those in Iraq 

must rank at the top of the list. 

PAKISTAN

Question. What is your assessment of the current status of U.S.-Pakistan military 

cooperation? 

Answer. My understanding is that military cooperation between the U.S. and 

Pakistan has been robust since September 11. This cooperation includes Foreign 

Military Sales, military-to-military assistance in training and advising, and border 

enforcement efforts. The new Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Kayani (a U.S. 

Army CGSC graduate) has instituted several positive military reforms and sought 

constructive engagement with the U.S. military. These are all initiatives I would 

seek to support and further if I am confirmed. 

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Question. Press reports indicate that incursions across the Afghanistan-Pakistan 

border have increased in recent weeks as the Government of Pakistan seeks to negotiate a peace agreement with militants in the border region. 

What is your assessment of the level of cooperation the United States has received 

from Pakistan in the war on terrorism? 

Answer. On the issue of terrorism, the U.S. and Pakistan have mutual concerns 

and goals. Recognizing the threat posed by terrorism, the Government of Pakistan 

strongly supported U.S. activities in the region following the attacks of September 

11. Pakistan supported, and continues to support, our mission in Afghanistan by allowing the flow of logistical support through Pakistan into Afghanistan. The government has also in the past demonstrated a willingness to pursue wanted terrorists 

within its borders. 

Recent events in Pakistan seem to indicate a modification of the government’s approach to combating terrorism. The newly elected government, seeking to address 

the ongoing problem of extremism and terrorism in its borderlands, recently negotiated with extremists in the FATA and subsequently began thinning out its forces 

in the region. This appears to be a change in methodology rather than in cooperation. The new Pakistani Government is trying to determine the best way to address 

the longstanding problem of control over its western areas and is trying to develop 

a political solution. While it is true that a purely military approach would likely not 

be successful, it is also unlikely that a purely political approach would have the desired effect—as demonstrated by what is generally assessed to be the failure of the 

negotiated ‘permanent peace’ in Waziristan in 2006. 

Question. What more can be done to prevent cross border incursions by the 

Taliban and al Qaeda from Pakistan into Afghanistan? 

Answer. This is a complicated problem that likely requires a comprehensive solution. Aspects of that solution might include: strengthening the ANSF to assist Afghanistan in securing its borders; working with Pakistan to further increase coordination of border enforcement efforts; and strengthening the capacity of the Pakistani Army and the Frontier Corps—and willingness of the Pakistani Government—

to control and disarm militants in the borderlands. Any long-term solution must 

also address the root causes of terrorism’s growth in Pakistan and must include initiatives to increase economic and educational opportunity in the generally poor and 

isolated communities of the region. 

Question. In your view, should the Government of Pakistan be doing more to prevent these cross-border incursions? 

Answer. Certainly increased and more effective efforts by the Pakistani Government to control the border would be helpful to our interests and coalition activities 

in Afghanistan, and we are working with Islamabad to strengthen its capability to 

do so. The danger posed by extremists in the FATA, though, is not limited to the 

threat to our troops and interests in Afghanistan. FATA extremists also pose a serious threat to Pakistan itself. Beyond that, an even more serious and enduring problem is that AQ leadership will continue to use the safe haven provided by Pakistan’s 

borderlands to plan and prepare global terrorist attacks. Our assistance to Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts must also address this important issue and, as mentioned above, be comprehensive. 

Question. What more can be done to eliminate safe havens for violent extremists 

in the FATAs and the North West Frontier Province? 

Answer. The U.S. Government needs to develop a comprehensive approach, in coordination with other countries, to support Government of Pakistan efforts to eliminate extremist sanctuaries in the FATA and Northwest Frontier Province. Based on 

our experiences in Iraq, it seems clear that resolution of the challenges emanating 

from these areas cannot be achieved by application of military force alone—though 

the security component is critical. Rather, resolution demands a strategy grounded 

in proven counterinsurgency practices that is adequately resourced, tailored to the 

Pakistani operating environment, and focused on producing an enduring political solution. At the end of the day, however, the challenges posed by the FATA can only 

be resolved by Pakistani initiatives, albeit with support from the U.S. and other 

partners. 

Question. What role do you believe U.S. forces should play? 

Answer. The role of U.S. military forces in the FATA will undoubtedly be a topic 

of discussion between the U.S. and Pakistan. Before speculating on what roles U.S. 

forces should play, I would want to discuss the situation with Pakistani and U.S. 

leaders. My understanding at this point is that Pakistani leaders understandably 

are reluctant to see non-Pakistani military elements employed in the FATA. 

Question. What is your assessment of the current situation with regard to Pakistani-Indian relations? 

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Answer. Lingering tensions between Pakistan and India provide cause for concern. At various times since the establishment of Pakistan, open war, insurgency, 

and terrorism have marked their relations. The unresolved dispute over Kashmir, 

regional terrorism, the possibility of crisis escalation, and preparations by the armed 

forces on each side for major war have all fueled mistrust and suspicion. Naturally, 

the situation has often precluded Pakistani leaders from focusing more attention on 

the challenge in the FATA and the Northwest Frontier Province. Recently, however, 

we have seen some indications of improved political and economic relations between 

the two countries, as they have been cooperating on cross-border commerce and 

transportation, border control safeguards, and governmental procedures to ease 

cross-border friction. In addition, shortages of a viable electrical energy supply in 

the region have led to several conferences and meetings among regional leaders to 

discuss solutions to a looming energy crisis. 

IRAN

Question. What in your assessment are Iran’s goals with respect to Iraq’s stability 

and security? 

Answer. Based on Iranian interference in Iraq, it appears that Iran seeks a Shiite 

Iraqi Government that is not only friendly to Iran but is subject to the Iranian influence that derives not just from political, economic, and social ties, but also from the 

presence in Iraq of Iranian trained, funded, equipped, and directed militia forces. 

Iranian activities also seem aimed at producing just enough instability to keep the 

Government of Iraq weak. Ambassador Crocker has assessed that Iran has sought 

to ‘‘Lebanonize’’ Iraq, and there are many indicators that support that assessment. 

Question. What options are available to the United States and its allies for influencing Iran’s activities towards Iraq? 

Answer. There are a number of diplomatic, economic, and military options available to the U.S. and its allies. On the diplomatic front, we will continue to expose 

the extent of Iran’s malign activities in Iraq in order to build regional and international consensus against Iran’s actions. We also seek to fully inform Iraqis of the 

nature and extent of the Iranian threat to Iraqi national interests, as official Iraqi 

condemnation of malign Iranian activities in Iraq sends a powerful signal to Tehran 

and encourages normal statecraft and relations between the two countries. In addition, we will continue to encourage a substantive show of support for Iraq by regional states, which would be an important counterbalance to Iranian influence in 

Iraq. This support could include further debt relief for Iraq and the reestablishment 

of normal diplomatic relations through an exchange of ambassadors with Baghdad. 

On the economic front, we could seek international support for sanctions, to include 

travel restrictions, against the Iranian regime for the malign activities of the Quds 

Force and Iranian intelligence services. On the military front, we will continue to 

target and expose Iranian malign actors and extremist surrogates operating in Iraq 

and taking actions—often lethal—against Iraqi and Coalition interests. 

Question. What in your view are Iran’s goals in the region? 

Answer. Iran seeks to guarantee the survival of its regime and, it appears, to establish a degree of Iranian hegemony over the northern Gulf and also Iranian influence in various states in the region through the use of surrogate militias. The presence of U.S. and Coalition forces in the Gulf, Iraq, and Afghanistan provides a significant counter to Iranian aspirations. To pursue its strategic objectives, Iran is enhancing its ability to project its military power, primarily with ballistic missiles and 

naval power, with the goal of intimidating the Gulf states and deterring any potential attack on the Iranian regime. In addition to employment of such conventional 

means, Iran also appears to want to exert its influence throughout the broader region by pursuing a nuclear capability and by supporting terrorist proxies and surrogates in the Palestinian territories, southern Lebanon, Iraq, and western Afghanistan. 

Question. What options do you believe are available to the United States to 

counter Iran’s growing influence in the region? 

Answer. Our efforts in regard to Iran must involve generating international cooperation and building regional consensus to counter malign Iranian influence and 

destabilizing activities, while also striving to promote more constructive engagement, if that is possible. We have strong alliances and partnerships in the Gulf and 

throughout the broader region upon which we can build a common cause that may 

help dissuade Iran from its subversive activities and encourage legitimate statecraft 

and economic interchange. At the same time, we should continue to work with the 

international community to demonstrate to Iran that there are consequences for its 

illegitimate influence in the region, especially for the destabilizing actions of the 

Quds Force and Iranian intelligence services. 

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In addressing these issues, we should make every effort to engage by use of the 

whole of government, developing further leverage rather than simply targeting discrete threats. As noted earlier, one particular lever may be the ongoing international diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran to end its nuclear program; such 

pressure seems to be affecting the Iranian energy market and may convince Tehran 

to focus on longer-term, less malign interests. A destabilized Iraq, rampant terrorism in the region, and a nuclear armed Middle East are not in any nation’s longterm interest, including Iran’s. Along these lines, the international community can 

reach out to help moderate, pragmatic elements that might influence the internal 

Iranian debate over Iran’s foreign policy and long-term security interests. At the 

same time, we should retain, as a last resort, the possibility of a range of military 

actions to counter Iran’s activities. As Admiral Mullen has noted, our approach 

should consist of ‘‘using all elements of national power, whether it’s economic or financial, international, diplomatic, and not taking any military options off the table.’’ 

Question. Could a protracted deployment of U.S. troops in Iraq strengthen Iran’s 

influence in the region? 

Answer. On the contrary, one impact of the U.S. effort in Iraq has been to bring 

into focus Iran’s destabilizing regional impact. The presence of U.S. troops in Iraq 

and elsewhere in the region has the potential to counter malign Iranian influence 

against the Government of Iraq, build common cause in the region, and expose the 

extent of malign Iranian activities to the world. 

Question. Iran is clearly going to remain a significant factor in the CENTCOM 

AOR. One of the critical objectives for the U.S. in this region is to determine how 

to achieve a more manageable and stable situation with respect to Iran for the future. 

How do you believe we could best encourage or achieve a more manageable relationship with Iran in the future? 

Answer. The consensus-building, comprehensive approaches described above (two 

questions previous) are constructive ways to improve relations with Iran. Such approaches would seek to create leverage and make possible constructive engagement 

in the region. 

FORMER SOVIET UNION STATES

Question. Several former Soviet states have played roles in supporting the U.S. 

and coalition forces in the global war on terrorism. 

What is your assessment of current U.S. military relationships with these nations, 

including Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan? 

Answer. The military relationship with most of our Central Asian counterparts is 

good and improving. Soon after the September 11 attacks, Uzbekistan offered basing 

access and overflight rights to the U.S. for operations in Afghanistan. While this 

particular access ended late in 2005 after the Andijon events, recently there have 

been modest signs of improvement in the relationship. Since the U.S. left KharshiKhanabad Airbase in Uzbekistan, Manas Airbase in Kyrgyzstan has become more 

important as the remaining northern Central Asia base. The Kyrgyz have been willing to expand and solidify that relationship, and improvements to the infrastructure 

and capabilities of Manas Airbase continue. Kazakhstan has aggressively pursued 

strengthening of the bilateral relationship with the U.S., recently signing a 5-year 

plan of military cooperation with the U.S. Turkmenistan’s new President 

Berdimukhammedov continues to allow U.S. humanitarian overflights and refueling 

operations. Recent gestures toward improving the international investment climate 

suggest positive development toward possible future bilateral military relationships 

with Turkmenistan. Tajikistan remains a solid partner, steadfast in its support for 

coalition operations and willing to expand the relationship. 

Question. What security challenges do you see in this portion of the CENTCOM 

AOR? 

Answer. Central Asian States share our concerns about religious extremism and 

consider it a threat to regional stability. We are working with partners in the region 

to improve the collective ability to interdict the movement of WMD, their delivery 

systems, and related materials, and also to exercise control of national borders to 

counter terrorism and illegal trafficking. 

The Central Asia region is relatively stable; however, potential migration of militants from Afghanistan and Pakistan presents a latent threat. Political and economic challenges in some areas provide a potential atmosphere for extremism exploitable by foreign and domestic extremist organizations. Also, the region has become a transit route for human and drug trafficking and is becoming vulnerable to 

the domestic consumption of narcotics. Contentious borders fuel tension between 

Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in the Fergana Valley. The Caspian Sea littoral dispute 

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and resultant access to energy fields and fisheries remains unresolved. Finally, 

water management, which is linked to hydro-electric power, is an ongoing area of 

contention, as a diminishing Aral Sea, pollution, and irrigation programs threaten 

shared river resources. 

IRAQI REFUGEES

Question. The United Nations estimates that over two million Iraqis have been 

displaced; 1.8 million have fled to surrounding countries, while some 500,000 have 

vacated their homes for safer areas within Iraq. 

What is your assessment of the refugee problems in Iraq? Are more Iraqis returning home? 

Answer. Refugee and displacement issues remain a serious concern. There are, 

however, indicators that the situation has begun to improve. According to U.S. 

Agency for International Development reporting, the rate of displacement of Iraqi 

citizens has been slowing considerably for at least the last 4 months, and some 

Iraqis (in significant numbers in some areas) are returning to their homes. These 

returns are motivated by a variety of factors, including: improved security in places 

of origin, deteriorating conditions in places of displacement, increased restrictions 

in neighboring countries, and tribal reconciliation. It is encouraging that the Iraqi 

Government has begun to give more attention to the problem of Iraqi refugees 

through the drafting of a national policy on internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 

a Basic Law for the Ministry of Displacement and Migration. 

Question. What should be the role of the U.S. military in your view, with respect 

to those Iraqis who are returning to find their homes occupied by others? 

Answer. The U.S. military can assist with key leader engagement on this issue 

and help partner with Iraqis to assist in their development of the governmental capacity needed to handle refugee and IDP returns. 

Question. Beyond working to improve the security environment in Iraq, do you believe that the U.S. military should play a role in addressing this issue? 

Answer. While protecting the population and assisting Iraq security forces should 

be the military’s primary roles, the military can also play a role in addressing other 

concerns associated with IDPs and refugee return. Key tasks the military can perform that may help to address this issue include coordinating or executing humanitarian assistance when asked to do so by the Iraqi Government (at local as well as 

national levels) and partnering with provincial reconstruction teams to monitor and 

track the status of displaced persons and related issues. 

Question. Recent months have seen an increase in kidnappings and murders of 

non-Muslim religious leaders. 

In your opinion, are non-Muslim religious minorities in Iraq at significant risk of 

being the victims of violence as a result of their religious status? Are there any of 

these groups that are particularly vulnerable? 

Answer. There are a number of ethno-sectarian fault lines throughout Iraq, including in Baghdad and some other areas of mixed population. In some of these 

areas, groups within the population may be local minorities. When tensions are 

high, these groups (Muslim or non-Muslim) may be at greater risk. In addition, 

there are a number of smaller minority communities of Christians, Turkmen, 

Yezedis, etc., throughout Iraq that either are—or perceive themselves to be—in environments in which power and resources are controlled along sectarian lines and 

where their security is threatened. Attacks on a number of these communities bear 

out the threats. It is encouraging, however, that the government has devoted greater attention to security in such areas. For example, the murderer of the Chaldean 

Archbishop Rahho was detained by Iraqi and Coalition forces on 5 March and sentenced to death in an Iraqi trial on 18 May. 

Question. If so, what is the appropriate role for the U.S. military in addressing 

their vulnerability? 

Answer. MNF–I partners with Iraqi Government and security force officials, ensuring constant communication and close cooperation on security concerns. This 

same cooperative approach is important in dealing with all population security concerns. 

HORN OF AFRICA

Question. One of CENTCOM’s significant subregions is the Horn of Africa. Until 

a new U.S. African Command is stood up later this year, CENTCOM will continue 

to be responsible for this region, which will likely experience continued instability 

and humanitarian crises as demonstrated by recent events in Somalia. 

What is the strategic importance of this region to the United States? 

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Answer. U.S. interests in the Horn of Africa include: denying terrorists a sanctuary in which to train, plan, and prepare for attacks; maintaining unimpeded commerce and freedom of the seas as part of a viable global economy; and alleviating 

humanitarian crises and suffering. 

In addition to terrorist activity and simmering humanitarian crises in Somalia 

and Sudan, there are several challenges to our interests in the region. These include 

lack of economic development, poorly governed and ungoverned areas, ethnic tensions, and vulnerable strategic maritime choke points. 

Question. Over the last few weeks, the U.S. military has had a very public presence in Somalia. 

What is your assessment of the situation in Somalia? 

Answer. Somalia continues to be a weak and fragile state fraught with violence. 

Political and security conditions remain precarious as Islamic militants, clan militias, and al Qaeda-associated factions conduct insurgent activities against Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces and the Ethiopian and African Union contingents supporting them. The TFG has made little headway in establishing effective ministries and, barring unforeseen circumstances, is unlikely to transition 

power to a permanent government in the near future. In addition, U.N.-led reconciliation talks are not expected to lower the level of violence in Somalia. 

Question. What is your understanding of the U.S. Government’s policy for Somalia 

and how U.S. military action there supports that policy? 

Answer. Current U.S. policy is to support the internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government and its efforts to establish capable ministries and move 

toward democratic elections. Militarily, our strategy is to contain threats that may 

emanate from Somalia. As I understand the current national policy, Combined Joint 

Task Force-Horn of Africa engagement within Somalia is not permitted. Presumably, the U.S. retains the right to strike terrorists wherever they operate and deny 

them sanctuary. 

Question. In your view, where does a stable Somalia fall in our national security 

priorities and how does the limited availability of ground forces due to competing 

requirements affect our strategy? 

Answer. A stable Somalia would be in the interest of the U.S. and its regional 

allies. Our current strategy in the Horn of Africa is not limited by the availability 

of ground forces. We have adopted a low-profile approach focused on working with 

partners in the region to build their capacity to deal with ungoverned spaces, even 

as we conduct precision operations against terrorist groups in the region. 

U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

Question. Over the last year or so, the U.S. Government has mobilized more of 

its resources to focus on the strategic importance of Africa. DOD has played an important role through two combatant commands—EUCOM via the Trans Sahara 

Counter Terrorism Program and CENTCOM via the creation of the Combined Joint 

Task Force-Horn of Africa. 

What impact will the transfer of responsibility for operations in the Horn of Africa 

have on the conduct of anti-terrorism and other operations in that region? 

Answer. It is my understanding that CENTCOM has been working closely with 

AFRICOM, as well as with the Joint Staff, to ensure that the transfer of responsibility for the Horn of Africa is as seamless as possible and causes minimal impact 

on operations. 

Question. If confirmed, what would you do to ensure a smooth transition and to 

manage the seams between CENTCOM and the new African Command? 

Answer. Extensive coordination for this transition is currently underway. Staffs 

are currently working several issues, including responsibility for maritime security 

off the coast of Africa, coordination for activities in Egypt and in Yemen, and provision of uninterrupted intelligence collection and command and control during the 

transition. AFRICOM and CENTCOM will continue to work together closely following official transfer. As AFRICOM builds capacity, CENTCOM and its components will continue to support AFRICOM and its requirements as necessary. 

SYRIA

Question. In recent weeks, the United States and Israel have publicly disclosed 

information relating to the September 6, 2007, bombing in northern Syria, and asserted North Korean and Syrian cooperation on nuclear technology. Recent weeks 

have also seen reporting on ongoing negotiations between Israel and Syria on a 

peace agreement, similar to those Israel has signed with Egypt and Jordan. 

In your assessment, what should be our military posture vis-a ́-vis Syria? 

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Answer. Our military posture should be an integrated part of a comprehensive 

strategy. If confirmed, I anticipate that we will conduct a strategy review at 

CENTCOM, and the posture of our forces will obviously be an important element 

of that review. 

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by Syria to U.S. national 

security interests in the Middle East? 

Answer. Syria has tended to take positive steps when it suits Syrian interests. 

Syrian activities have generally had a destabilizing effect on security in the region, 

particularly its continued hosting of groups committed to armed opposition to the 

legitimate governments of several of its neighbors. As the Syrian regime seeks to 

maintain its hold on power, it also aims to counter U.S. influence in Lebanon, limit 

U.S. support of Israel, and increase its influence in the region. Syria’s damaging activities include the failure to adequately address foreign fighter flow through Syria 

into Iraq, the sponsorship of terrorist activities in Lebanon and Israel, and the potential pursuit of a clandestine nuclear program. 

Question. Are there actions the United States could take to encourage a SyrianIsraeli peace agreement? If so, what are they? 

Answer. The United States has taken recent steps to encourage a Syrian-Israeli 

peace agreement, including hosting the Annapolis Conference in late 2007. U.S. 

leaders have also made recent diplomatic visits to key Arab states to encourage forward movement in the peace process. Unfortunately, Syria’s method has been to create leverage in pursuit of its aims by taking actions that destabilize some of its 

neighbors, including Lebanon and Iraq. Defeating the extremist groups that Syria 

supports would help create better conditions for the peace process to move forward, 

as would countering the Syrian regime’s anti-U.S. propaganda in the region. 

ISRAEL

Question. While Israel is not part of the CENTCOM AOR, it does play an important role in the AOR. 

In your assessment, what are the most significant threats facing Israel in the 

Middle East? 

Answer. The most significant threats currently facing Israel are a combination of 

Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Palestinian rejectionists and the proliferation of weapons, technology, and tactics among those elements. Over the past several years, military and political cooperation between Iran and Syria has strengthened. Iran, and to a lesser degree Syria, continue to provide increasingly sophisticated weaponry, equipment, and training to Lebanese Hezbollah, which has likely 

reconstituted and expanded its weapons stockpiles and capabilities since its summer 

2006 conflict with Israel. Additionally, Iran provides training to Palestinian 

rejectionist groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Damascus 

continues to harbor the leadership of Hamas, PIJ, and other affiliated organizations. 

Question. The Iraq Study Group report suggested the most significant hurdle to 

broader peace in the Middle East was a final status agreement between the Israeli 

and Palestinian governments. 

Do you agree with this conclusion of the Iraq Study Group? If not, why not? 

Answer. A just and fair agreement that offers peace and security to the Palestinians and Israel would certainly aid the achievement of broader peace in the Middle 

East and negate the perception of inequity in the Arab world. However, the effort 

to secure broader peace in the region also must address the challenge of interstate 

conflicts and extremist movements that are not directly connected to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 

EGYPT

Question. Egypt has been criticized for its perceived failure to act along the EgyptGaza border to counter the smuggling threat posed by cross-border tunnels. Egypt 

has also played an important role, however, in ensuring peace on the southern border of Israel. 

What is your assessment of the role Egypt plays with respect to regional stability? 

Answer. Egypt is a key leader in regional stability. Their decision 3 decades ago 

to break from the Arab bloc that opposed Israel’s existence and sign a peace treaty 

was courageous but unpopular, and it cost them politically and financially for years. 

Despite being initially ostracized, Egypt stood firm on its peace agreement with 

Israel and continues to lead the way in seeking regional stability. Egypt is one of 

the major contributors of peacekeepers to the United Nations African Mission in 

Darfur and on numerous occasions has provided humanitarian and military assistance to neighboring countries during times of crisis. Egyptian leaders have been and 

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continue to be key mediators between Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, and Israel, 

and they provide valuable leadership within the Arab League. 

Question. What is your assessment of the U.S.-Egyptian military relationship? 

Answer. The U.S.-Egyptian military relationship is very strong. Egyptian forces 

have long participated in regional combined military exercises, and Egypt is a coalition member of Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan). Since July 2003, it has 

supplied a field hospital in Bagram, which has treated thousands of patients and 

provided training to dozens of Afghan doctors. They have also provided tons of humanitarian supplies, ammunition, and weapons to the Afghan National Army. Although Egypt does not directly participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom, it has supported U.S. operations by granting overflight rights and expediting Suez Canal transits. It has also provided training for Iraqi security personnel in Egypt. Additionally, 

Egypt receives Foreign Military Financing, totaling $1.3 billion annually; this military assistance has helped Egypt modernize its armed forces and strengthen regional security and stability. 

LEBANON

Question. The United States has played an active role vis-a ́-vis Lebanon over the 

last few years, particularly following the war between Israel and Hezbollah. More 

recently, a U.S. aircraft carrier was ordered to maintain a position off the coast of 

Lebanon. 

What are the U.S. national security interests in Lebanon? 

Answer. U.S. interests lie in a strong, sovereign, and democratic Lebanese Government that has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force inside Lebanon’s borders. Such a government would increase stability along its borders and therefore improve regional stability. We also have an interest in supporting the Lebanese Government’s efforts to reduce extremist activity, counter malign influence by external 

actors, and reduce the flow of foreign fighters in the region. 

Question. Given Lebanon’s strategic geographic position in the Middle East, in 

your opinion, what is the appropriate role for CENTCOM in Lebanon? 

Answer. As with so many of the region’s challenges, the situation in Lebanon is 

best approached comprehensively, through regional partnership and varied methods. 

Political and diplomatic methods are already being pursued at the U.S. national 

level to isolate Syria diplomatically and economically for its actions in Lebanon; 

Congress passed multiple laws toward this end, and national leaders continue to 

support U.N. Security Council Resolutions and other international efforts to influence Syria’s actions. The U.S. has provided military training and assistance to the 

Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in an effort to bolster the government’s ability to control violence inside its borders; the LAF is a potential unifying force in the country, 

given the broad support it enjoys from the population and its multi-ethnic, crosssectional makeup. Though the relative inaction of the LAF during Lebanon’s recent 

spike in violence raises concerns, these military assistance efforts will likely remain 

an important part of a comprehensive strategy. The struggle in Lebanon is essentially a competition for power and resources, and progress may lie in political incorporation of disenfranchised elements of the population. If confirmed, I would seek 

opportunities for CENTCOM to support all of these efforts. 

SAUDI ARABIA

Question. In your assessment what threat does a more regionally assertive Iran, 

including the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran, pose to Saudi Arabia, and what 

do you believe to be Saudi Arabia’s options should Iran gain a nuclear weapon? 

Answer. The interests of Saudi Arabia are certainly threatened by Iranian activities. There is a long history of animosity between these two states; since 1979, Iran 

has consistently attacked the legitimacy of the Saudi Government’s custodianship 

of the Two Holy Mosques. Although the Kingdom maintains diplomatic relations 

with Iran, a variety of events and activities have convinced the Saudis to be wary 

of Iran’s intentions, including: Iran’s military expansion, its nuclear program, and 

its destabilizing activities throughout the region. Saudi Arabia has expressed an interest in acquiring a peaceful nuclear power program, and there is inevitably the 

possibility that Saudi Arabia, like other countries in the region, could reevaluate its 

non-nuclear weapons policy in response to Iran’s efforts to acquire a nuclear capability. 

Question. What is your assessment of the U.S.-Saudi military-to-military relationship? What are the pluses and minuses of this relationship? 

Answer. The U.S. enjoys a strong military-to-military relationship with Saudi 

Arabia. Cooperation has led to greater interoperability, and a training exchange program results in officers and senior NCOs who have been exposed to U.S. military 

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values, are well trained, and are well-versed in the rule of law. The Kingdom gains 

increased internal and external security capability through U.S. training, equipment, and information sharing. Finally, U.S. industry and military departments 

benefit from a robust Foreign Military Sales Program. We understand that there are 

constraints on this relationship due to regional sensitivities, and we will continue 

to work through them. 

ETHIOPIA/ERITREA

Question. Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki recently forced the United Nations 

Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea out of Eritrea by cutting off all supplies to the mission. In response to the departure of this mission, both Eritrea and Ethiopia have 

repositioned their respective militaries in a manner that would seem to indicate 

that these two countries may reengage one another in military conflict. 

In your assessment, what threat does a war between Eritrea and Ethiopia pose 

to the security of the broader Horn of Africa region? 

Answer. A war between Ethiopia and Eritrea would likely have a destabilizing effect in the region. If these two nations were to return to war, Ethiopia would divert 

leadership focus and key assets away from their forces in Somalia. This action could 

further undermine Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government, which is heavily dependent upon Ethiopian military support. Ethiopia would also likely pull out of its 

pending commitment to provide peacekeeping troops to the Sudan AU/U.N. Mission 

in Darfur. Djibouti could also be affected by a return to hostilities in the form of 

refugees, mostly from Eritrea, who could present local security and humanitarian 

concerns. 

MARITIME SECURITY

Question. In the past 2 years, there have been a growing number of pirate attacks 

off the coast of Somalia—some ending in death and others ending in the payment 

of ransom. The shipping lanes off the coast of Somalia are some of the most economically and strategically important in the world. 

In your opinion, what is the most appropriate maritime strategy in this region of 

the world, given the threats of weapons trafficking, human trafficking, and piracy? 

Answer. Piracy off the coast of Africa is a critical issue in the region, in particular 

because extremist groups often directly participate in and financially benefit from 

these activities. As with most strategies for this region, the strategy to counter piracy must be comprehensive. This includes the legal efforts already underway to 

pass a U.N. Security Council Resolution to allow international vessels to counter pirates operating within Somalia’s territorial waters and to adjust international maritime standards to prevent the registration of ‘‘phantom ships.’’ This strategy may 

also include economic development assistance in nations like Somalia to reduce the 

draw of illegal activities. Of course, it involves military maritime cooperation with 

countries of the region. 

IRAQI STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the status of DOD efforts to help restart Iraqi state-owned enterprises to increase employment in Iraq? 

Answer. Prior to 1991, Iraq was the most industrialized of the Arab States, with 

a significant base of industrial operations across a wide range of sectors and a highly skilled civilian workforce. From 1991–2003, industry in Iraq was strictly focused 

on internal production to meet domestic demand as United Nations sanctions prevented export of goods or international economic engagement. Many of these factories shut down immediately after liberation. Coalition efforts to help Iraq revitalize its State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are led by the OSD Task Force to Improve Business and Stability Operations in Iraq (TF BSO). TF BSO has assisted 

Iraqi leaders in restoring operations and/or materially increasing production at 56 

factories across Iraq. Funded projects, specifically targeted to restart or increase 

production, range from procurement of raw materials and spare parts to replacement of damaged or obsolete production equipment. Initiatives to revitalize SOEs 

have resulted in the re-employment of over 100,000 idled or underemployed workers. 

In coordination with Iraqi leaders, TF BSO continues its efforts to restart production at Iraqi factories, with specific focus on agriculture and food processing operations and factories in Southern Iraq that had been inaccessible prior to recent military operations. To ensure sustainable results, TF BSO is assisting with the application of standard business investment management practices to the process of allocating new funds to idled or low-production-rate factories. Coalition personnel also 

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instruct factory managers in business plan preparation, marketing strategies, and 

capital investment plans. 

The Iraqi Government announced in January the first private investment awards 

to international consortiums—for three cement factories. Two of these deals, which 

average over $100 million each, were finalized in April, and another is still in negotiation. Under the private joint venture arrangement, investors will manage the facility and increase current production levels six-fold, thus creating employment for 

5,000 Iraqi workers. These deals represent a modern, profitable business model for 

investors and for Iraq. In combination with other initiatives focused on private sector development, banking, budget execution, and facilitation of foreign direct investment, these are small but positive steps toward market economy development in 

Iraq. 

The jobs created by the revitalization of SOEs are an important support to Coalition and Iraqi efforts to reduce underemployment; this has a direct impact on security in that it decreases the pool of economically-driven potential recruits for insurgent and extremist elements in Iraq. Revitalization efforts are also an important 

first step toward future privatization of Iraqi industries. 

DETAINEE TREATMENT STANDARDS

Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006 memorandum 

issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions? 

Answer. Yes. The standards outlined in Common Article 3 should be the standard 

for U.S. and Coalition forces to adhere to in regard to the handling of detainees at 

all levels. In fact, as commander of the 101st Airborne Division, I directed that detainees would be handled in accordance with the Geneva Convention, as those were 

the standards our soldiers understood at the time. Since then, FM 2–22.3 has been 

published and we adhere to its standards. 

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, 

and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the DOD Detainee Program, dated September 5, 

2006? 

Answer. Yes. I believe having one interrogation standard outlined in one document adds clarity. The FM clearly articulates what is and what is not authorized 

and effectively identifies methods to ensure accountability. 

Question. Do you share the view of the Judge Advocates General that standards 

for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that 

we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat our own 

detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, 

airmen or marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 

of the Geneva Conventions? 

Answer. Yes. We can conduct effective interrogation and detention in wartime in 

a counterinsurgency environment and comply with the requirements outlined in 

Common Article 3. In fact, in drafting the current Army/Marine counterinsurgency 

manual, we ensured human rights organizations participated in discussions and 

provided input on this issue. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that U.S. forces in the CENTCOM 

AOR comply with the standards in the Army Field Manual, the DOD Directive, and 

applicable requirements of U.S. and international law regarding detention and interrogation operations? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would place my personal and command emphasis on ensuring that forces in the CENTCOM AOR fully comply with the letter and spirit 

of these important standards. 

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

Question. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) have proved to be an extremely 

deadly threat to U.S. troops in Iraq. 

In your assessment, what threat do IEDs pose to the broader CENTCOM AOR, 

and what is the most effective way to prevent the spread of these deadly devices? 

Answer. Over the past few years, we have witnessed the spread of IED technology 

throughout the CENTCOM AOR. Though not as prolific as in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

the IED has become the low cost, weapon of choice of militants and extremist groups 

in many countries. The most disturbing trend has been the material support and 

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training in the employment of advanced IEDs, known as Explosively Formed 

Penetrators (EFPs), provided by Iran. We can expect militant groups to continue to 

use this technology to advance their goals and to intimidate government forces and 

local populaces. 

Countering this threat requires comprehensive action to defeat the networks that 

produce and employ IEDs, technology and training to detect and render IEDs ineffective, and advanced armor systems to protect our troops. 

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

Question. CENTCOM has articulated an increasing requirement for additional 

aircraft with imaging and signals intelligence capabilities. Although recently the Air 

Force has ‘‘surged’’ a large number of Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to 

CENTCOM, this surge and other activities will not close the gap between available 

and required resources. The main problem appears to be that there are bottlenecks 

in fielding more UAVs in the near future, coupled with a reluctance to seek alternative aircraft to the UAV programs-of-record. 

Do you believe that small manned aircraft acquired immediately from the commercial sector could provide a practical near-term solution to CENTCOM’s intelligence platform shortage? 

Answer. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms are essential to our operations. Persistent surveillance is required to identify, track, target, 

and kill or capture insurgents and minimize civilian casualties. 

Small manned aircraft acquired from the commercial sector are, in fact, being employed to help fill the ISR platform shortage, and we will continue to take advantage of such options where they make sense. They are not, however, the complete 

answer to our ISR shortfalls. Comprehensive solutions are required, and these must 

take into account the platform’s support infrastructure; sensor capabilities; communications bandwidth; and processing, exploitation, and dissemination architectures. 

Question. Are you satisfied that this potential solution has been adequately considered? 

Answer. On 18 April, Secretary Gates created an Operational ISR Task Force to 

tackle the challenge of delivering more ISR to the CENTCOM Theaters of Operations. Secretary Gates has been a staunch supporter of our ISR requirements, and 

I am pleased he has taken this step to help meet our ISR needs. 

SPECIAL IMMIGRANT VISA PROGRAM

Question. Section 1059 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006 and section 1241 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 authorized a special immigrant visa program for Iraqi translators and interpreters. This program 

has enabled the Department to aid those Iraqis who have assisted the United States 

in Iraq. 

What is your view of the utility of this program? 

Answer. While there is a clear need for the Special Immigration Visa Program, 

we have encountered obstacles in utilizing the program. Our understanding is that 

the quota under Section 1059 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is 

nearly filled for fiscal year 2008 and USCIS has stopped scheduling Visa interviews. 

Furthermore, while Section 1241 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 broadened the 

scope to other Iraqis who are U.S. Government employees or contractors, there is 

not yet implementing guidance, and USCIS is not currently accepting applications. 

In order to overcome these challenges, we would benefit from Congress affirming the 

technical instructions agreed upon by the Department of State and Department of 

Homeland Security so that USCIS can begin accepting applications. 

Question. Is it beneficial for the military to have the ability to recommend certain 

Iraqis who have worked with us for special immigrant visas? 

Answer. Yes, our Iraqi interpreters provide valuable support to coalition operations on a daily basis and often at great risk to themselves and their families. 

Many interpreters have to relocate their families due to harassment, threats, and 

even the possibility of death at the hands of extremists because they provide help 

to the U.S. and our coalition partners. For those trusted interpreters who are eligible, the special immigrant visa is a useful tool to reward these courageous individuals who risk so much to assist Coalition efforts. 

REGIONAL BALLISTIC MISSILE THREATS AND RESPONSE

Question. Iran has hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles today 

that are capable of reaching forward-deployed U.S. forces, allies, and other friendly 

nations in the CENTCOM AOR. Syria also has an inventory of ballistic missiles that 

pose a threat to the region. A joint capabilities mix study conducted by the Joint 

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Staff for U.S. Strategic Command concluded that the U.S. military needs about 

twice the number of Standard Missile-3 (SM–3) and Terminal High Altitude Area 

Defense (THAAD) interceptors as are currently planned to provide even the minimum capability needed by our regional combatant commanders to defend against 

such existing threats. 

Do you agree with the conclusion of the joint capabilities mix study that we need 

to acquire more of these near-term systems to provide our regional combatant commanders with the capability to defend our forward-deployed forces and allies against 

existing missile threats? 

Answer. Yes. These systems are important to counter both the existing threat and 

that of 2015, upon which the joint capabilities mix study was based. 

Question. Do you agree there is a high priority need in CENTCOM for additional 

SM–3 and THAAD interceptors to defend against existing short- and medium-range 

missiles within the AOR? 

Answer. Yes. However, THAAD interceptors are not yet fielded, and SM–3-capable platforms (i.e., Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense ships) are limited by the number 

of available interceptors. Effectively defending our forward-deployed forces and allies against the existing missile threat in the CENTCOM AOR will also require a 

greater number of Patriot PAC3 interceptors, SM–2 BLK IVs, and SM–3s. 

SEXUAL ASSAULT

Question. If confirmed, you will be responsible for ensuring compliance with DOD 

policies on prevention of and response to sexual assaults against military personnel 

and civilians throughout the CENTCOM AOR. 

What lessons have Army leaders in Iraq learned regarding sexual assault prevention, response, and reporting protocols that can be applied across the entire 

CENTCOM? 

Answer. The prevention of sexual assault is a critical command issue. It is important to have a program that incorporates an awareness campaign that reaches every 

servicemember and that provides integrated response services, including medical 

care, counseling, victim advocacy, chaplain programs, law enforcement (investigation, detainment, etc.), legal measures (prosecution, legal assistance, and victim/witness liaison), reporting processes (assault reporting and data collection), and program assessment. It is widely recognized in today’s Services that such a program 

must receive command emphasis to be effective, and I would continue to give it that 

emphasis if confirmed as the commander of CENTCOM. 

Question. What are the unique issues that you believe need to be addressed to 

ensure that prevention, reporting, medical treatment (including mental health care), 

and victim support are available for military personnel and civilians in the operational environments of Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Answer. Some of the most important challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan include 

combat stress, battlefield dispersion, and a mixed, joint service and civilian population. With regard to the last of these challenges, civilians constitute a considerable 

percentage of force on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan and are critical contributors to mission success. The availability of response services for DOD civilian and 

contractor personnel should be similar to the services available to servicemembers. 

There are jurisdictional, legal, contractual, and resource challenges associated with 

extending program response provisions to DOD civilian or contractor personnel 

which should be addressed. 

With regard to sexual harassment and mental health, it is important to continually reinforce the responsibility of all individuals in the CENTCOM AOR to remain 

cognizant of the welfare of their fellow servicemembers and co-workers and to encourage those exhibiting signs of difficulty to receive help. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you assess the adequacy of such resources in 

the CENTCOM AOR? 

Answer. If I am confirmed, I would consult with commanders in the field, who 

are directly responsible for these programs and most familiar with their requirements. I would also welcome external and internal audits of our programs and resources. The Sexual Assault and Prevention Program is critical for the well-being 

of our troopers, and I would support it in every way possible. 

DEPLOYED CIVILIANS IN THE CENTCOM AOR

Question. The President has called on all agencies of the executive branch to encourage the assignment of highly qualified Federal civilian employees in support of 

CENTCOM operations. 

If confirmed, what would be your objectives for improving and sustaining the support of Federal civilians in the CENTCOM AOR? 

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Answer. I am fully committed to the DOD policy for building increased civilian 

deployment capacity. Our civilian employees who deploy in support of missions in 

the CENTCOM AOR are capable and committed to supporting the Department’s 

highest mission priorities. In Iraq, I have witnessed first-hand the capabilities and 

dedication our civilian employees bring to bear. 

We must take advantage of the synergistic effect that the wide range of skill sets 

and talents resident in our civilian force can achieve. If I am confirmed, we would 

continue to review our global force employment planning to expand those opportunities. 

We must execute the intent of Congress and the DOD in ensuring our civilian employees receive appropriate benefits and recognition when they volunteer to serve 

overseas and especially in war zones. We should also make every effort to assist civilian deployees in the same manner we do our deploying military personnel—from 

pre-deployment through deployment, as well as redeployment. 

As outlined in counterinsurgency doctrine and by the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, unity of effort is essential to winning the wars in which our Nation is engaged—and fully utilizing and caring for deploying civilian employees within the 

CENTCOM AOR is absolutely essential. 

MENTAL HEALTH IN THEATER

Question. The Army’s Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) has made five separate assessments over the past several years detailing the immediate effects of combat on mental health conditions of U.S. soldiers deployed to Iraq. The most recent 

study, MHAT V, found that stress and mental health problems increased with each 

subsequent month of deployment, and that ‘‘soldiers on their third or fourth deployment were at significantly higher risk’’ for mental health problems. These types of 

reports lend support to the fact that increasing numbers of troops are returning 

from duty in Iraq with post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and other mental 

health problems. 

What is your understanding of the key findings of this and previous MHAT assessments, actions taken by the Army to address key findings, and the effect of such 

actions? 

Answer. The MHAT process has provided an objective assessment on what is 

transpiring with servicemembers’ psychological health and also valuable recommendations for future action on this issue. MHAT V produced 43 separate recommendations. Some, such as the recommendation to cross-train Army medics in 

behavioral health concepts, are already being implemented at the DA level; others, 

such as the recommendation to authorize assignment of a mental health professional to every Combat Aviation Brigade, are under review at the DA level. If I am 

confirmed, I would seek to implement recommendations which are independently actionable at the CENTCOM level and engage with the Services on those in their purview. 

Question. If confirmed, what measures would you support to ensure ongoing mental health assessments of all U.S. forces in Iraq? 

Answer. I would encourage and fully support future MHAT assessments if confirmed. This would include (but not be limited to) providing full access to information and staff input and feedback as appropriate. 

Question. Do you have any views on how to best address the mental health needs 

of our troops, in terms of both prevention and treatment? 

Answer. My views are shaped by the recommendations of mental health professionals and by tools such as MHAT assessments. 

Generally speaking, prevention begins with supporting servicemembers and their 

families before servicemembers deploy; this includes tough training at home station 

that builds camaraderie in units and gives troopers confidence that they can accomplish their tasks. Predictability of deployments and time at home in between deployments for troopers to ‘reset’ with their families are also important. 

Many important preventive steps are already being taken in theater. Medics in 

theater are being trained on behavioral health topics so they can assist in identifying troopers who need help, and Suicide Risk Management Teams have been created to ensure troopers having difficulties get the help they need. Perhaps most 

critically, commanders are pushing the message that seeking help is a sign of 

strength, not weakness, and that it is essential to look out for battle buddies’ mental 

health. 

Question. Do you believe that mental health support and resources in theater are 

adequate to handle the needs of our deployed servicemembers and at home for their 

families? 

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Answer. If confirmed, I would conduct an assessment of mental health requirements and resources in theater. The extensive work completed by the MHAT will 

provide a good starting point for this assessment. 

Question. If confirmed, would you request additional behavioral health resources 

from the services, if needed, to meet the needs of current and future units deployed 

to Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Answer. If a specific need was validated, I would absolutely request additional 

support. Our troopers serve bravely and selflessly, and we owe it to them to understand their needs and then act with all due haste to provide for those needs. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those 

views differ from the administration in power? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, CENTCOM? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

INTERCOMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN IRAQ

1. Senator LEVIN. General Petraeus, each of you have noted in different places 

and times that the conflict in Iraq has evolved and that, although there is still terrorism and insurgency, the current threat is the intercommunal fight over power. 

What do you mean by the communal fight over power? 

General PETRAEUS. I have long described the nature of the conflict in Iraq as a 

competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This 

has been the case since Iraq’s liberation in 2003 and remains the case today. Many 

groups in Iraq vie to determine who will have a voice in, and whose voice will most 

influence, the future of Iraq, and the competition is often heavily tied to concerns 

over economic opportunity. 

The competition between communities for resources and power is something that 

happens in every nation. In our Nation, this competition takes place in the political 

arena, in legal structures, via the media, and through democratic processes; the 

fault lines in the debate are often economic and ideological. In Iraq, the competition 

has taken place through violence and intimidation on the streets, and the fault lines 

have often been ethnic or sectarian. Iraq’s competition used to be primarily intersectarian, with Shiite and Sunni elements vying with each other for power and economic opportunity; Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) violence sparked widespread sectarian 

violence throughout Iraq. As coalition and Iraqi forces stemmed the violence and increased security, the fault lines within Shiite and Sunni communities came to the 

fore; AQI turned its violence on its Sunni brethren, and Shiite militias—particularly 

Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and its splinter Special Groups (SG)—waged violence on the 

Shiite-led government in an effort to increase its power. 

One of the most important trends in Iraq has been the increasing rejection of violence by the Iraqi people—first with Sunnis refusing to accept the indiscriminate 

violence, oppressive practices, and extremist ideology of AQI and then with Shiite 

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communities tiring of the mafia-like violence and activities of JAM/SG criminals. 

There is still an intercommunal struggle over power and resources, but Sunnis and 

Shiite alike are increasingly opting to make their voice heard through the political 

process rather than through violence.

2. Senator LEVIN. General Petraeus, how has this changed the fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq? 

General PETRAEUS. While the fundamental nature of this competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources has not changed, it has 

played out differently over time. Over the past year, we have seen a significant decrease in ethno-sectarian violence. However, as overall violence levels have decreased, continuing challenges in the area of intra-sectarian conflict have periodically surfaced. Iraq continues to face a complex array of destabilizing forces, including terrorism and regional interference; however, security incidents are now at the 

lowest level we have seen since March 2004.

3. Senator LEVIN. General Petraeus, what is the appropriate role of coalition 

forces in response to the threat and conduct of intercommunal violence among militant groups vying for control? 

General PETRAEUS. Coalition forces support the elected government and help that 

government enforce its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Iraqi leaders have 

largely united around the aim of defeating extremists and disarming all militias, 

and we seek to support them in that effort.

PAKISTAN

4. Senator LEVIN. General Petraeus, the newly-elected Pakistani Government has 

limited offensive military operations in the tribal areas, choosing instead to negotiate a peace agreement with the tribal leader accused by the Pakistani Government 

of being responsible for the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. It’s been reported that 

the Pakistani Government is not seeking an end to cross-border attacks into Afghanistan as a condition of the accord. Officials report that cross-border incursions 

increased in April as the peace agreement was being negotiated. Are you troubled 

at the prospect of a peace agreement that doesn’t seek to stop cross-border attacks 

into Afghanistan? 

General PETRAEUS. Recent events in Pakistan seem to indicate a modification of 

the government’s approach to combating terrorism. The newly-elected government, 

seeking to address the ongoing problem of extremism and terrorism in its borderlands, recently negotiated with tribal leaders in the Federally Administered Tribal 

Areas (FATA) and subsequently began thinning out its forces in the region. This appears to reflect an effort by the new Pakistani Government to determine the best 

way to address the longstanding problem of control over its western areas and 

shows that the government is trying to develop a political solution. While it is true 

that a purely military approach would likely not be successful, it is also unlikely 

that a purely political approach would have the desired effect—as demonstrated by 

what is generally assessed to be the failure of the negotiated ‘‘permanent peace’’ in 

Waziristan in 2006—and thus we must closely monitor this situation as we work 

with the new Pakistani Government and seek ways to help it deal with the challenge of the FATA to it and to Afghanistan. 

The cross-border terrorism issue is complex and likely requires a comprehensive 

solution. We should continue working with Pakistan to further increase coordination 

of border enforcement efforts, and we should also seek to strengthen the capacity 

of the Pakistani Army and the Frontier Corps—and the willingness of the Pakistani 

Government—to control and disarm militants in the borderlands. Any long-term solution must also address the root causes of terrorism’s growth in Pakistan and must 

include initiatives to increase economic and educational opportunity in the generally 

poor and isolated communities of the region.

5. Senator LEVIN. General Petraeus, are we seeing a decrease in the level of cooperation the United States is receiving from the Government of Pakistan in the 

conflict with al Qaeda and other extremists? 

General PETRAEUS. The newly-elected Government in Pakistan seems to have 

modified its approach to combating terrorism in the Pakistani borderlands, as the 

government recently negotiated with tribal groups and began thinning out its forces 

in the FATA. The United States and Pakistan continue to have mutual concerns 

and goals where terrorism is concerned, and the change appears to be one of methodology rather than of a decrease in cooperation with the United States. NevertheVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00180 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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less, it is incumbent upon us as Pakistan’s partners to help Islamabad adopt a realistic approach to terrorism, and one of my first trips, if confirmed, will be to Pakistan in order to assess the situation there and to talk to the Pakistani leaders and 

our personnel on the ground. 

At the same time, opportunities exist to deepen U.S.-Pakistani cooperation 

against al Qaeda and other extremists, such as through our efforts to build the capabilities of the Pakistani military and the Frontier Corps. These efforts, in concert 

with other programs to promote development in the frontier areas, can place further 

pressure on the al Qaeda network in Pakistan.

6. Senator LEVIN. General Petraeus, what more can be done to eliminate these 

safe havens for violent extremists? 

General PETRAEUS. The problem of safe havens in the Pakistani borderlands is 

a complicated one that demands a comprehensive solution. The Government of Pakistan faces a difficult situation in which multiple actors in its borderlands benefit 

from illicit cross-border trade, while traditional tribal laws and customs in the border region foster a spirit of fierce independence and provide for a great deal of autonomy from the central government. As a result, the government is often seen more 

as outside force to be resisted than as a force to be embraced. In some areas, these 

same tribal laws and customs offer protection and respect to extremist elements. 

Given these circumstances, we should work with Pakistan to further increase coordination of border enforcement efforts, both internal to Pakistan and with the Afghan National Security Forces, while strengthening the capacity of the Pakistani 

Army and the Frontier Corps—and willingness of the Pakistani Government—to 

control and disarm militants in the borderlands. 

We should also help the Government of Pakistan address the root causes of terrorism in Pakistan, which include conditions of poverty, illiteracy, and alienation 

from the government. We should support Government of Pakistan initiatives to increase economic and educational opportunity in at-risk regions of the country, to include supporting the new FATA Development Plan and other initiatives aimed at 

education reform and rural development. 

Meanwhile, our own whole-of-government approach to assisting Pakistan should 

include the fostering of foreign direct investment, targeted economic aid, and debt 

forgiveness. We must recognize that a good lot of the heavy lifting for this problem 

lies in the economic and political spheres, and our efforts there need to move more 

rapidly.

7. Senator LEVIN. General Petraeus, what role should U.S. military forces play 

with respect to the tribal areas? 

General PETRAEUS. The role of U.S. military forces in the FATA will undoubtedly 

be a topic of discussion between the United States and Pakistan. Before speculating 

on what roles U.S. forces should play, I would want to discuss the situation with 

Pakistani and U.S. leaders. My understanding at this point is that Pakistani leaders 

are understandably reluctant to see non-Pakistani military elements employed in 

the FATA.

PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS

8. Senator LEVIN. General Petraeus, in response to a question from Senator Sessions, you expressed concern about section 841 of S. 3001, which addresses the performance of inherently governmental functions by private security contractors 

(PSCs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. The language of section 841 is modeled on paragraph E2.1.4.1.4 of Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction 1100.22, which defines 

certain functions to be performed in uncontrolled or unpredictable high threat areas 

outside the United States as inherently governmental and designated for military 

performance. You promised to review the provision and get back to us with your 

detailed views. I would appreciate your response to some specific questions. Do you 

support the standard in paragraph E2.1.4.1.4 of DOD Instruction 1100.22 for determining which functions to be performed in uncontrolled or unpredictable high threat 

areas outside the United States are inherently governmental and designated for 

military performance? 

General PETRAEUS. I will respond collectively to questions 8–12 since they all relate to the same subject and the responses are clearly interrelated. 

I support the standards set forth in DOD Instruction 1100.22, including paragraph E2.1.4.1.4, and do not believe that this paragraph prohibits the use of private 

security contractors in high threat areas outside the United States. My reading of 

this DOD Instruction suggests that paragraph E2.1.4.1.4 should not be interpreted 

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1Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF–I) complies with these standards identified in paragraph 

E2.1.4.1.5. The command has established strict, comprehensive rules on the conditions under 

which PSC operations can be conducted, obviously delimiting their mission to defensive operations. These and other rules are defined in the MNF–I Fragmentary Order 07–428, ‘‘Overarching Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) for Requirements, Procedures, Responsibilities for Control 

Coordination and Management and Oversight of Armed Contractors, DOD civilians, and PSCs.’’ 

In addition, all DOD contract solicitations and contracts implemented in Iraq properly describe 

the environment in which contractors will be operating. The Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/

Afghanistan ensures that both the description of environmental conditions and the requirement 

for compliance with FRAGO 07–428 are incorporated into all contracts being implemented in 

Iraq. 

In short, DOD PSCs in Iraq are not allowed to perform inherently governmental functions. 

All contract solicitations and awards are conducted under Defense Federal Acquisition Supplement (DFARS) rules. These DFARS rules prohibit DOD contractors from participating in offensive operations and from using the combat-oriented Rules of Engagement. Instead, the DFARS 

requires that contractors use the more restrictive defensive/self-protection oriented Rules on the 

Use of Force. I am advised that the Comptroller General noted in a decision in 2006, that ‘‘the 

Services sought under the solicitations appear to comport with the DOD policies and regulations 

that state that security contractors are not allowed to conduct direct combat activities or offensive operations.’’ 

in isolation. The section’s opening paragraph (E2.1.4.1) cites it only as an example, 

not as a statement of DOD policy prohibiting PSC operations in uncontrolled or unpredictable high threat areas. Immediately following paragraph E2.1.4.1.4, the next 

paragraph (E2.1.4.1.5) affirms that ‘‘a defense contractor may be authorized to provide security services, provided its services do not involve substantial discretion,’’ 

and defines the conditions under which contractors providing security services are 

not considered to be performing inherently governmental functions.1

I take seriously the responsibility for limiting PSC roles and missions to those 

permitted in the DFARS and DOD policies, including DOD Instruction 1100.22. 

PSCs are not permitted to operate in areas where active combat operations are contemplated or underway. Moreover, policies and procedures are in place to divert 

PSC movements away from areas in which combat operations may potentially be 

launched or in which a high risk exists of hostile action or an encounter with civilian activities that could represent a threat to a PSC movement or operation. Based 

upon the above, it is my view that paragraph E2.1.4.1.4 does not prohibit the use 

of private security contractors in uncontrolled or unpredictable high threat areas 

outside the United States provided that the requirements and conditions of paragraph E2.1.4.1.5 are implemented and the conduct of PSCs is subject to regular 

oversight by military commanders. 

You also asked about significant differences between the wording of Section 841 

of the Senate Bill and paragraph E2.1.4.1.4. The most significant difference is the 

one I identified above—paragraph E2.1.4.1.4. is only an illustrative example of a potentially inherently governmental function, further clarified by the succeeding paragraph, which defines the conditions under which PSC operations would not be considered inherently governmental. Section 841 would create a new statutory standard, redefining the boundaries of permissible activity for PSC operations. Section 

841 also changes the term of ‘‘substantial discretion’’ to ‘‘immediate discretionary decisions,’’ the significance of which is to eliminate all armed PSC operations almost 

anywhere, because the nature of defensive/self protection responses to emerging 

threats requires immediate discretionary decisions, even within a very constrained 

set of rules. Draft section 841, paragraph (b)(1)(A), also modifies the phrase from 

the DOD Instruction, ‘‘could require deadly force that is more likely to be initiated 

by U.S. forces than occur in self defense,’’ to ‘‘could reasonably be expected to require deadly force that is more likely to be initiated by personnel performing such 

security operations than by others.’’ This modification essentially expands the standard to include any use of force—even that which occurs in self-defense. In application, this modification would bar security contractors from any hostile area regardless of actual function. 

With regard to standards for other Federal agencies operating with PSCs in a contingency operation area, I believe the policies, standards, procedures, and oversight 

should be closely aligned, presenting a common perception among host country nationals of U.S. Government PSC operations. Having said that, there could be occasions in which other U.S. Government departments and agencies may need to operate under different policies on the use of PSCs. For example, various contractors, 

including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), involved in reconstruction and 

development programs may feel strongly about the need not to be associated with 

PSC operations, particularly those provided by DOD contractors, and more specifically those provided by U.S. military forces. In such cases they may adopt more restrictive conditions for the deployment of civilian personnel or the movement of reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00182 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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construction materials and equipment than those currently implemented under 

DOD Instruction 1100.22. 

While I cannot speak to every scenario that may involve other Federal agencies, 

the Departments of Defense and Department of State signed a Memorandum of 

Agreement which improved interagency transparency and established common 

standards and procedures for security contractor performance in Iraq. As such, the 

functions of security contractors for those two agencies in Iraq are essentially identical. This effort has produced significant improvements in the management and 

oversight of PSC operations in Iraq. With the implementation of Section 862 of the 

2008 National Defense Authorization Act, we will achieve even broader and more 

effective oversight of all U.S. Government PSCs. 

In responding to your question, I also need to provide you with an assessment of 

the impact of the proposed language of Section 841 on military operations in Iraq. 

My reading of the language of Section 841, confirmed by my Staff Judge Advocate, 

is that Section 841 would effectively forbid the use of U.S. Government armed private security contractors in Iraq, and presumably also in Afghanistan. Replacing 

DOD contractors with military personnel would significantly delay the drawdown of 

U.S. forces in Iraq, requiring approximately 7,300 additional military personnel to 

be trained and deployed to Iraq, plus additional forces to provide the expanded 

logistical support required. These figures do not include the requirements for the 

dedication and training of additional military personnel to support rotational requirements, nor the addition of equipment and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 

(MRAP) vehicles needed by our combat forces to replace armored tactical vehicles 

used by contractors. By adding significantly to the military forces required in Iraq, 

Section 841 could also delay the ability of the Army to reduce combat tours from 

15 months to 12 months. It would also require a special training and certification 

program to be developed and implemented, which would take up to a year to execute. 

For the reasons stated above, the requirements proposed under Section 841 of the 

Senate Bill would be counterproductive to the work we already have underway, and 

would be enormously disruptive to our efforts to achieve U.S. goals in Iraq.

9. Senator LEVIN. General Petraeus, in your view, does paragraph E2.1.4.1.4 of 

DOD Instruction 1100.22 prohibit the use of private security contractors in uncontrolled or unpredictable high threat areas outside the United States? 

General PETRAEUS. See response to qfr #8.

10. Senator LEVIN. General Petraeus, are you aware of any significant differences 

between section 841 of S. 3001 and paragraph E2.1.4.1.4 of DOD Instruction 

1100.22? If so, what are the differences and why do you believe that they are significant? 

General PETRAEUS. See response to qfr #8.

11. Senator LEVIN. General Petraeus, are you aware of any reason why private 

security contractors employed by Federal agencies other than DOD should operate 

under a standard different from that provided in paragraph E2.1.4.1.4 of DOD Instruction 1100.22? 

General PETRAEUS. See response to qfr #8.

12. Senator LEVIN. General Petraeus, are there functions that are inappropriate 

for performance by DOD contractors in an uncontrolled or unpredictable high threat 

area outside the United States, but are appropriate for performance by contractors 

of other Federal agencies in the same area? If so, why? 

General PETRAEUS. See response to qfr #8. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

CENTRAL COMMAND

13. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, you have highlighted the lack of economic 

development in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) as 

one of the biggest challenges facing the region’s security and stability. You have, in 

my opinion, correctly identified the link between poverty and potential for violent 

activities—an area in which you are a recognized expert. If confirmed as commander, what ideas do you have for using CENTCOM’s authority to facilitate a government-wide approach to stimulating economic development in the region? 

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General PETRAEUS. There are a number of successful programs CENTCOM can 

use as models throughout its AOR to facilitate a government-wide approach to stimulating economic development. A good example is CENTCOM’s support to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that are playing a critical role in stimulating 

development, improving governance, and increasing government capacity at the 

local level in Iraq and Afghanistan. CENTCOM’s role in supporting the PRTs has 

been to help provide security, to synchronize the efforts of PRTs and local U.S. military organizations, and to contribute skilled military personnel to fill PRT positions 

when necessary. It may be possible for the PRT model to be applied in other areas 

in the CENTCOM AOR that are in need of development assistance, based on local 

conditions. 

CENTCOM and its subordinate commands have also played a role in helping 

partner nations increase government capacity at the ministerial level. In both Iraq 

and Afghanistan, CENTCOM organizations have undertaken large-scale efforts to 

increase the capacity of the host nations’ security ministries and to assist in security 

sector reform. These efforts can help stimulate economic development and improved 

governance by enabling host nations to establish secure environments in which government agencies, NGOs, and private businesses can more easily operate. 

CENTCOM organizations have also assisted in extensive efforts to build capacity in 

non-security ministries. Where desired by U.S. policymakers, CENTCOM and other 

governmental agencies could expand such capacity-building efforts elsewhere in the 

AOR to bolster security, economic, and good governance growth in the region. 

Finally, commanders throughout CENTCOM have learned over the past several 

years that money—along with economic development—is an essential weapon in 

counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns. Our commanders in Iraq in 

particular have learned to very skillfully use such resources as Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds to address urgent economic and governance 

needs at the local level, thereby helping to alleviate some of the grievances and conditions of poverty that give rise to violence. We should consider applying the successful CERP model in other areas of the CENTCOM AOR when necessary.

14. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, the CENTCOM commander’s responsibilities are necessarily broader and more strategic in nature than those required in 

your current position. One of the main challenges with respect to resource allocation 

in the AOR is the balance between Iraq and Afghanistan. This committee has heard 

from military and civilian leaders, as well as independent experts, who identify the 

United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) efforts in Afghanistan as an under-resourced conflict. Given the importance of combating a resurgent al Qaeda and its leadership in the FATA of neighboring Pakistan, how do 

you plan to address these shortfalls should security conditions in Iraq warrant the 

maintaining of current troop levels for a longer period? 

General PETRAEUS. I would, if confirmed, work in consultation with the Joint 

Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that CENTCOM’s force posture remains consistent with national priorities. It would be my responsibility to make 

clear the resources necessary to achieve national policy goals and objectives in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere in the CENTCOM AOR. I would also intend 

to make clear how and to what extent shortfalls in resources produce risk to the 

force or mission objectives. 

I would also work with the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense to encourage 

that all feasible means of meeting the requirements in Afghanistan were pursued, 

including increasing NATO and, if needed, U.S. contributions and increasing the capability and capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces. Over the long term, 

the latter will be the most important means of fulfilling Afghanistan’s security requirements.

15. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, you have advocated a ‘‘whole of government’’ approach for CENTCOM that would include effective and improved coordination between various civilian diplomatic and relief agencies with the military component of the U.S. presence. What role does CENTCOM need to take with regards to 

working with these civilian diplomatic and relief agencies, and what specifically 

would you do as its commander to actively promote these efforts? 

General PETRAEUS. CENTCOM and its subordinate commands already promote 

some important efforts to improve coordination among civilian diplomatic agencies, 

relief agencies, and the militant component of U.S. presence. Most notably in the 

CENTCOM AOR, numerous Joint Interagency Task Forces and PRTs have put the 

‘‘whole of government’’ approach into practice in order to promote development in 

all areas—political, social, and economic. In addition, CENTCOM headquarters has 

long employed a Joint Interagency Coordination Group with representatives from 

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numerous agencies. If confirmed, I would seek to sustain, empower, and expand 

such efforts. If confirmed, I would also seek to further integrate CENTCOM’s efforts 

with those of other government agencies by working closely with our ambassadors 

in the region who supervise U.S. activities in each country. I would also work closely 

with the State Department Bureau Chiefs and other corresponding government officials to ensure that our activities are coherent, integrated, and responsive to the 

changing needs of the AOR.

16. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, is improvement in coordination between 

these various agencies a pre-condition for achieving security in Iraq and elsewhere 

in the AOR? 

General PETRAEUS. Effective coordination among government agencies is an absolutely essential condition for achieving sustainable security in Iraq and in other 

areas in the CENTCOM AOR. I have mentioned before that the Goldwater-Nichols 

Act has succeeded in making our military forces more interoperable today than they 

ever have been, and this interoperability has been a critical element of our progress 

in establishing security. The next step, however, is to ensure the ability of military 

and civilian departments to work closely together. In Iraq, Ambassador Crocker and 

I have partnered closely to ensure unity of effort within the U.S. effort and, to the 

extent possible, with the efforts of our coalition partners, through the development 

of a Joint Campaign Plan and through regular joint assessments to evaluate our 

progress. 

The State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization has been 

given the lead by National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD44) in developing the Interagency Management System and a draft U.S. Government Planning 

Framework. These will provide a viable process and framework within which we can 

enhance and align military and civilian engagement in reconstruction and stabilization scenarios. The State Department has also begun to stand up the Civilian Response Corps system to provide increased civilian expeditionary capacity to complex 

operations. 

The United States will be well served by having available various tools like these 

to promote unity of effort across the U.S. Government, and by the development of 

interagency doctrine for the use of these tools in the conduct of counterinsurgency 

and stability operations. If confirmed, I will continue to stress the importance of 

such coordination to promote unity of effort in the application of our ‘‘whole of government’’ approach to the security issues in the CENTCOM AOR.

17. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, you have made it clear that actively engaging with Iraq’s neighbors is essential to achieving long-term internal and external 

stability in the country. You and others have also mentioned Iran’s malign influence 

in covertly supporting elements of the insurgency. As one of Iraq’s influential neighbors, it would appear that diplomatic engagement with Iran is a precondition to any 

long-lasting security gains. However, Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear technologies complicates the diplomatic equation. What recommendations would you make, if confirmed as commander of CENTCOM, concerning how the U.S. Government should 

navigate its dealings with Iran? 

General PETRAEUS. I embrace Secretary of Defense Gates’ view that we should 

seek leverage in our relations with Iran in order to have a constructive basis for 

engagement. If confirmed, my recommendations would be built upon the idea that 

our efforts in regard to Iran must involve generating international cooperation and 

building regional consensus to counter malign Iranian influence and destabilizing 

activities, while also striving to promote more productive engagement, if that is possible. We have strong alliances and partnerships in the Gulf and throughout the 

broader region upon which we can build a common cause that may help dissuade 

Iran from its subversive activities and encourage legitimate statecraft and economic 

interchange. At the same time, we should continue to work with the international 

community to demonstrate to Iran that there are consequences for its illegitimate 

influence in the region, especially for the destabilizing actions of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force and Iranian intelligence services. 

In addressing these issues, we should make every effort to engage by use of the 

‘‘whole of government,’’ developing further leverage rather than simply targeting 

discrete threats. One particular lever may be the ongoing international diplomatic 

and economic pressure on Iran to end its nuclear program; such pressure seems to 

be affecting the Iranian energy market and may convince Tehran to focus on longerterm, less malign interests. A destabilized Iraq, rampant terrorism in the region, 

and a nuclear armed Middle East are not in any nation’s long-term interest, including Iran’s. Along these lines, the international community can reach out to help 

moderate, pragmatic elements that might influence the internal Iranian debate over 

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Iran’s foreign policy and long-term security interests. As Admiral Mullen has noted, 

furthermore, our approach should consist of ‘‘using all elements of national power, 

whether it’s economic or financial, international, diplomatic, and not taking any 

military options off the table.’’ We should retain, as a last resort, a range of military 

options to counter Iran’s activities. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK PRYOR

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLES

18. Senator PRYOR. General Petraeus, improvised explosive device casualties are 

on the rise in Afghanistan. As a result, units in support of Operation Enduring 

Freedom are receiving operation orders with a fragmentary order for mandated 

MRAP fielding. Our forces are therefore required to allocate appropriate combat 

power to employ these vehicles even though they cannot be used throughout the 

AOR because of their inability to maneuver or traverse incompatible and difficult 

terrain. How do you plan to employ this ‘‘political’’ mandate but still keep you soldiers safe? 

General PETRAEUS. The improved protection provided by MRAPs has saved lives 

in Iraq, and certainly has the potential to do so in many areas in Afghanistan. However, it is true that MRAPS cannot be used everywhere in Afghanistan because, despite road improvements and routine maintenance, certain areas remain inaccessible for some larger vehicles. In response to these conditions, the plan as I understand it is to replace approximately two-thirds of the Up-Armored HMMWVs with 

MRAPs, retaining the balance of Up-Armored HMMWVs to allow access to areas not 

reachable by MRAPs. I also understand that units deployed to Operation Enduring 

Freedom have recently requested additional MRAPs for the Afghanistan Theater of 

Operations. If confirmed as the Commander, CENTCOM, I would continue to consult closely with the Commander of the International Security Assistance Command-Afghanistan to assess requirements and resource the needs of units operating 

in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

19. Senator PRYOR. General Petraeus, how many MRAPs are needed in the region? 

General PETRAEUS. I have not had the opportunity to conduct a detailed assessment of the need for MRAPs throughout the CENTCOM AOR. If confirmed, I would 

consult closely with the Commander, MNF–I and the Commander, International Security Force-Afghanistan to assess requirements and resource established needs. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

20. Senator COLLINS. General Petraeus, I am particularly interested in the Iraqis 

shouldering greater responsibility for the costs of the war, including paying, training, and equipping their own security forces, the salaries of the Sons of Iraq, and 

helping the United States pay for the costs of fuel used by U.S. troops operating 

in Iraq. Asking the Iraqis to take more responsibility for their own security and the 

rebuilding of their country will give them a sense of ownership and only makes 

sense given Iraq’s growing budget surplus. Senators Nelson, Bayh, and I authored 

language that would: prohibit American tax dollars from being spent on major reconstruction projects in Iraq; direct the administration to ensure that the Iraqi Government pays the costs of the salaries, training, equipping of ISF, and for the salaries of the Sons of Iraq; and direct the administration to negotiate an agreement 

with the Iraqi Government for reimbursement of some of the costs of joint operations between U.S. and Iraqi troops. The Senate Armed Services Committee unanimously approved our proposal, which represents possibly the first significant bipartisan change in direction in Iraq. This language is also included in the Senate supplemental bill. In addition, I have met with the Iraqi Ambassador who stated the 

commitment of the Government of Iraq to take on more of these costs. In fact, Prime 

Minister Maliki recently stated in Brussels that Iraq is a rich country and is not 

asking for direct assistance to fund its reconstruction. What are your thoughts on 

this important topic? 

General PETRAEUS. The Government of Iraq has a responsibility and an increasing ability to fund reconstruction and security operations in Iraq, and it is making 

progress in picking up a greater share of this fiscal load. As Ambassador Crocker 

recently stated before Congress, ‘‘The era of U.S.-funded major infrastructure 

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projects is over.’’ As Iraq continues to spend more and the United States spends 

less, a period of transition is needed because Iraqi capacity is still limited. However, 

Iraqi capacity is gradually improving as well, as evidenced by a solid increase in 

budget execution last year. In the meantime, we are looking for additional ways to 

help Iraq to leverage our capacity to spend its own funds. A good example of this 

is the Iraqi Commander’s Emergency Response Program, which we call ‘‘I–CERP.’’ 

The Iraqis have already allocated $300 million for this fund, of which $270 million 

has been deposited in an account on which coalition forces can draw. Coalition 

forces have already made substantial progress in using this money to deliver 

schools, health clinics, community centers, and other projects on behalf of the Iraqi 

Government to the Iraqi people.

21. Senator COLLINS. General Petraeus, are you committed to shifting some of 

these costs to the Government of Iraq—costs that the Iraqis themselves say they 

would like to undertake? 

General PETRAEUS. Yes. Long-term sustainability of Iraqi security and economic 

development ultimately depends on the Iraqi Government’s ability to provide, and 

we are committed to helping Iraqi leaders build the governmental capacity to do so. 

The Government of Iraq is already assuming more responsibility for reconstruction 

and security efforts. For example, Iraq’s 2008 budget contains $13 billion for reconstruction, with an additional multi-billion dollar reconstruction spending package in 

the works. In terms of security spending, we anticipate Iraq will spend over $8 billion on security this year and $11 billion next year, and a 2008 supplemental of $4.3 

billion for security spending has been proposed. As Iraqi spending on reconstruction 

and Iraqi security forces (ISFs) continues to increase, U.S. spending will continue 

to decrease. As an example, increased Iraqi spending on the ISFs has enabled us 

to decrease our budget request for the ISFs fund for fiscal year 2009 from $5.1 billion to $2.8 billion. This trend will continue over time, and it is one that I support.

AFGHANISTAN

22. Senator COLLINS. General Petraeus, at a hearing before this committee on 

April 10, I asked Secretary of Defense Robert Gates about the situation in Afghanistan. During his opening statement that day, he stated that the United States cannot repeat the mistakes of the past from the Unites States policy regarding that 

country. That comment reminded me of a trip that I took to Afghanistan with some 

of my colleagues in 2003, including Senator Levin. When we met President Karzai 

at Bagram Air Base, he had a message for us, even back then. It was ‘‘don’t abandon us; don’t make the same mistakes that were made decades ago.’’ On subsequent 

visits to his country, President Karzai has repeated his plea. That is why I’m concerned about the reports from the Afghanistan Study Group and the Atlantic Council that warned, very bluntly, that we are under-resourcing Afghanistan, as well as 

NATO. The Atlantic Council’s report goes so far as to say, ‘‘Make no mistake. NATO 

is not winning in Afghanistan.’’ I am very concerned about having to send more 

American troops; that it will make it impossible for us to, in the long-term, sustain 

the 12-month deployments that all of us are desperate to see us return to. Could 

you give me your best assessment of whether you expect other NATO countries to 

step up to the plate and provide the troops that are necessary? 

General PETRAEUS. As the Commander of MNF–I, I have not been in a position 

to assess the likelihood of NATO countries providing additional troops to support 

the NATO mission in Afghanistan. However, I am concerned about the existence of 

requirements in Afghanistan that have not been fully sourced. If confirmed as the 

Commander of CENTCOM, I would work in consultation with the Supreme Allied 

Commander, Europe, the Commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force, the U.S. Joint Chiefs, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense to assess the 

force protection and mission risks produced by shortfalls in resources in Afghanistan, and to pursue ways of addressing those shortfalls. Generally speaking, it appears clear that the Afghanistan mission would benefit from greater contributions 

from participating nations, with fewer national caveats, as well as from continuedand expanded-efforts to build the strength and capabilities of the Afghan National 

Security Forces.

SOUTHWEST ASIA

23. Senator COLLINS. General Petraeus, while a considerable amount of time has 

been spent discussing Iraq and the subject of troop levels, we may be missing the 

big picture. We can’t lose sight of what we are ultimately trying to accomplish in 

182

Iraq and how our future force structure supports these goals. We need to focus the 

discussion on coming up with a constructive solution and way ahead. I believe that 

the entire region of southwest Asia is of vital strategic importance to the United 

States. Beyond the situation in Iraq, we have a resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan, a tenuous political situation at best in Pakistan, and Iranian nuclear ambitions. Can you tell us what you believe the United States’ geopolitical strategic priorities in this region should be and why? 

General PETRAEUS. A survey of the CENTCOM AOR reveals a wide array of challenges. An important priority, as recently emphasized by the Secretary of Defense, 

must be to win the wars in which we are currently engaged. The United States 

must continue to focus on the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq to ensure 

U.S. national policy objectives are met. In addition to these conflicts, several 

transnational concerns affect many or all of the countries within the CENTCOM 

AOR. These concerns are interrelated and create significant challenges for regional 

stability and for U.S. policy and interests in the region. Our strategic priorities include five areas. Deterring state-based aggression. The destabilizing effects of the 

Iranian regime’s attempts to increase its influence in the region, Syrian efforts to 

influence Lebanese politics, and Eritrean antagonism aimed toward Ethiopia are all 

significant concerns. Defeating violent extremist networks. Though al Qaeda is the 

highest visibility and priority terrorist organization, there are many other extremist 

groups throughout the region. They constitute threats to their home governments 

as well as to people across the globe. Countering the proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction, including related components and technical expertise, in the region. Iran’s and Syria’s non-transparent efforts to develop nuclear facilities could destabilize the region and spark a regional arms race. The need to secure existing nuclear material is a related and critical concern. Promoting economic development in 

many of the region’s countries. This is both a humanitarian issue and a security 

issue, as poverty and lack of opportunity are often enablers to successful terrorist 

recruiting. Countering transnational piracy and narcotics and arms smuggling. In 

addition to being criminal and destructive activities, these practices threaten strategic resources and are often lucrative sources of funding for terrorists.

24. Senator COLLINS. General Petraeus, what is the best way to achieve these 

strategic priorities? 

General PETRAEUS. Although it is premature to have specific and comprehensive 

plans, there are several concepts that would guide my approach to the region’s challenges, if I am confirmed. First, we would seek to build partnerships in the region, 

pursuing bilateral and multilateral cooperation in identifying and working together 

toward mutual interests. This involves extensive engagement with leaders in the region, and I would see this as one of my primary responsibilities as the CENTCOM 

commander. Second, we would aim for a whole-of-government approach in addressing the region’s challenges. This approach recognizes that solutions for the region’s 

challenges should be as multifaceted as the challenges themselves. Rather than engaging in purely military solutions, we would seek to leverage the insight and capabilities resident in the whole of government. Third, we would pursue comprehensive 

approaches and solutions, addressing the roots of issues and not just their manifestations. This entails efforts varying from spurring economic development and 

educational opportunities to strengthening governments’ ability to combat terrorism 

and extremism. Fourth, we would maintain focus on readiness to conduct contingency operations, whether crisis response, deterrent action, or defeating aggressors.

TROOPS LEVELS IN IRAQ

25. Senator COLLINS. General Petraeus, I continue to be concerned about the negative effects of repeated and extended deployments to Iraq on our soldiers and marines. The surge in U.S. forces during the last year increased the Army’s presence 

in Iraq to 20 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) instead of the pre-surge level of 15. 

The Chief of Staff of the Army, General George Casey, has said, ‘‘Today’s Army is 

out of balance. The current demand for our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan exceeds 

the sustainable supply and limits our ability to provide ready forces for other contingencies.’’ When do you foresee the ISF will be ready to step up in significant numbers so that you will be able to reduce your force level requirements to fewer than 

15 BCTs? 

General PETRAEUS. The ISF is already stepping up in significant numbers and enabling us to reduce our force level requirements. We have recently made significant 

security progress in Iraq, as the level of security incidents for the past month is the 

lowest it has been for more than 4 years. We have sustained our security gains even 

183

as three BCTs, a Marine Expeditionary Unit, and two Marine battalions have left 

without replacement. A fourth BCT has already given up its battle space and will 

withdraw this month, and the final surge brigade will leave by the end of July 2008. 

We have also reduced the detainee population in coalition facilities by over 3,500 

detainees, and a continuing decline will allow me to recommend reductions in units 

programmed for the detainee mission. Our ability to achieve and sustain gains even 

as we have drawn down is in large part due to increasing capability in the ISFs, 

as well as the Iraqi Government’s determination in meeting security challenges 

throughout Iraq. 

Over the last 18 months, the ISF have grown substantially in size and capability. 

In the last year alone, the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior have generated 

51 new combat battalions, an increase of over 30 percent. This intensive effort to 

increase ISF numbers involved recruiting, hiring, and training over 132,000 new police and soldiers. Over 540,000 personnel now serve in the ISF. The ISF will grow 

even further in the next year, providing for the eventual strength in numbers necessary to provide a security presence throughout Iraq. 

As important as the ISF’s growth in size is its growth in capability. The number 

of combat battalions capable of taking the lead in operations, albeit with some coalition support, has grown to well over 100—a 15 percent increase since January 2007. 

Ongoing ISF operations in Basra, Mosul, Sadr City, Anbar, and Maysan have demonstrated increased planning capability, mobility, and tactical competence, as well 

as an ability to conduct simultaneous major operations throughout the country. The 

enablers that coalition forces provide are in line with expectations and generally involve capabilities that take more time to build (i.e. close air support capability). The 

performance of many units has been solid, and some formations and specialist organizations are proving to be extremely capable. Thanks to improved security and ISF 

capability, eight of sixteen Iraqi provinces are under Provincial Iraqi Control, with 

two more provinces due to transition by the end of June 2008. 

Growth in the size and capability of the ISF will be one of the major conditions 

that will allow us to continue to reduce coalition forces in Iraq while sustaining our 

security gains. My sense is that after a brief period of consolidation and evaluation 

this summer, conditions on the ground will be such that I will be able to make a 

recommendation for some further reductions. My recommendation may not be for 

a BCT or major combat formation, though it could. But I do believe that there will 

be assets that we will be able to recommend can be either redeployed or not deployed to the theater. Beyond the initial decision on post-surge force levels, we will 

continually assess security conditions in Iraq and seek to identify further possible 

force withdrawals.

REALIGNMENT IN IRAQ

26. Senator COLLINS. General Petraeus, you testified in March that the security

situation in Iraq has improved since the implementation of the surge and that there 

has been substantial progress in training and equipping the ISF. You also testified 

that the operation against Shiite militias in southern Iraq indicates the growing capability of the ISF. The report issued by the Independent Commission on the ISFs, 

chaired by retired Marine Corps General and former Commandant of the Marine 

Corps, James Jones, suggests that coalition forces could begin to be adjusted, realigned, and retasked as the ISF become increasingly capable. General Jones’ report 

stated that U.S. forces could soon be retasked to better ensure territorial defense 

of the state by concentrating on the eastern and western borders and the active defense of critical infrastructures essential to Iraq. This is very similar in many ways 

to the transition of mission proposed by the Iraq Study Group, and also proposed 

in legislation by Senator Ben Nelson and myself. We have suggested that our troops 

transition their mission and focus on border security, counterterrorism operations, 

training and equipment of Iraqi troops, and protecting Americans and American infrastructure. Under what conditions should the U.S. military begin a realignment 

of the mission in Iraq? 

General PETRAEUS. As the Commander, MNF–I, or if confirmed, as the Commander, CENTCOM, my responsibility is to execute the policy that has been decided 

upon by my chain of command. The current strategic goal of the United States in 

Iraq remains a unified, democratic, and Federal Iraq that can govern, defend, and 

sustain itself, and is an ally in the war on terror. Achieving this goal requires a 

comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign, working along security, economic, diplomatic, and political lines of operation, to help the Iraqi Government secure its citizens, develop capacity, grow its economy, and strengthen its relations with other 

countries in the region. Border security, counterterrorism operations, training and 

184

equipping Iraqi troops, and protecting our troops and infrastructure are all important aspects of our counterinsurgency efforts, but limiting U.S. troops to these actions would not enable us to achieve the United States’ strategic goal in Iraq. 

Accomplishing this goal remains a complex and difficult undertaking, but our 

view is that we are on the right path. Significant security progress has been made, 

as the level of security incidents across Iraq for the past month is the lowest it has 

been for more than 4 years, and we continue to transition additional responsibilities 

to the Iraqi Government and ISFs. This transition is evident in the fact that we 

have sustained our security gains even as three BCTs, a Marine Expeditionary Unit, 

and two Marine battalions have left without replacement. A fourth BCT has already 

given up its battle space and will withdraw this month, and the final surge brigade 

will leave by the end of July 2008. We have also reduced the detainee population 

in coalition facilities by a net of 3,500 detainees and this reduction, as well as our 

continuing detainee releases, will allow me to recommend reductions in units programmed for the detainee mission. We continually assess the conditions on the 

ground, and after a period of consolidation and evaluation this summer, we will seek 

to identify further possible force withdrawals. 

It is possible that the U.S. strategy and policy for Iraq could change. If that were 

to happen, I would work with other U.S. Government agencies to develop the comprehensive plans, including risk management, required to implement that strategy.

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN

27. Senator COLLINS. General Petraeus, the work of Special Inspector General for

Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Stuart Bowen, has revealed an extraordinary litany of 

contracting waste, fraud, and abuse coming out of that country. His 336 investigations related to Iraq contracting have resulted in 5 convictions; 14 indictments pending trial; 14 arrests; 52 debarments or suspensions; $17 million in court ordered 

fines, forfeitures, and restitutions; and nearly $58 million saved through audits. In 

addition, the SIGIR is currently conducting audits of companies such as 

Halliburton’s former subsidiary, Kellogg Brown and Root. Last year’s National Defense Authorization Act created a new position, the Inspector General for Afghanistan, called the SIGAR. If confirmed as Commander of CENTCOM, what support 

will you provide to the SIGAR to ensure that office can provide adequate oversight 

to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse in contracting practices in Afghanistan? 

General PETRAEUS. If confirmed as the Commander, CENTCOM, I would provide 

my full support to the efforts of the SIGAR. Today’s military operations require significant financial and contractor support, and audit and oversight agencies serve a 

critical role in ensuring that taxpayer money is well spent. As the Commander of 

MNF–I, I have fully supported and encouraged special reviews as I rely on oversight 

and audit processes to provide me essential information on the health of the organization. During my tenure, MNF–I has welcomed the Special Inspector General for 

Iraq Reconstruction as well as personnel from the Government Accountability Office, the DOD Inspector General, the Army Audit Agency, and the Army Criminal 

Investigation Command. As the Commander of CENTCOM, I would continue to provide my full support for oversight and review processes. 

[The nomination reference of GEN David H. Petraeus, USA, follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

April 30, 2008. 

Ordered, that the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

The following named officer for appointment in the United States Army to the 

grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under 

title 10, U.S.C., section 601: 

To be General. 

GEN David H. Petraeus, 0000. 

185

[The biographical sketch of GEN David H. Petraeus, USA, which 

was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was 

referred, follows:]

RE ́SUME ́ OF SERVICE CAREER OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA 

Source of commissioned service: USMA.

Military schools attended: 

Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, 

Armor Officer Advanced Course, 

United States Army Command and General Staff College, 

Senior Service College Fellowship—Georgetown University.

Educational degrees:

United States Military Academy—BS—No Major. 

Princeton University—MPA—International Relations. 

Princeton University—PHD—International Relations.

Foreign language(s): None recorded.

Promotions:

Dates of appointment 

2LT ............................................................................................ 5 Jun 74 

1LT ............................................................................................ 5 Jun 76

CPT ............................................................................................ 8 Aug 78

MAJ ............................................................................................ 1 Aug 85

LTC ............................................................................................ 1 Apr 91

COL ........................................................................................... 1 Sep 95

BG ............................................................................................. 1 Jan 00

MG ............................................................................................. 1 Jan 03

LTG ............................................................................................ 18 May 04

GEN ........................................................................................... 10 Feb 07

Major duty assignments:

From To Assignment

May 75 Jan 79 Platoon Leader, C Company, later S–4 (Logistics), later S–1 (Personnel), 509th Airborne Battalion 

Combat Team, Vicenza, Italy. 

Jan 79 Jul 79 Assistant S–3 (Operations), 2d Brigade, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, GA. 

Jul 79 May 81 Commander, A Company, later S–3 (Operations), 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, 24th Infantry Division 

(Mechanized), Fort Stewart, GA. 

May 81 May 82 Aide-de-Camp to the Division Commander, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, GA. 

May 82 Jun 83 Student, Command and General Staff Officer Course, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

Jun 83 Jun 85 Student, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ. 

Jul 85 Jun 87 Instructor, later Assistant Professor, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy, 

West Point, NY. 

Jun 87 Jun 88 Military Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers 

Europe, Belgium. 

Jun 88 Aug 89 S–3 (Operations), 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, later 1st Brigade, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), 

United States Army Europe, Germany. 

Aug 89 Aug 91 Aide/Assistant Executive Officer to the Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, DC. 

Aug 91 Jul 93 Commander, 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, KY. 

Jul 93 Jul 94 G–3 (Operations)/Director of Plans, Training, and Mobilization, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 

Fort Campbell, KY. 

Aug 94 Jan 95 Senior Service College Fellow, Georgetown University, Washington, DC. 

Jan 95 Jun 95 Chief Operations Officer, U.N. Mission in Haiti, Operation Uphold Democracy, Haiti. 

Jun 95 Jun 97 Commander, 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC. 

Jun 97 Sep 97 Executive Assistant to the Director of the Joint Staff, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC. 

Oct 97 Aug 99 Executive Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC. 

Aug 99 Jul 00 Assistant Division Commander (Operations), 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina and 

Commanding General, Combined Joint Task Force-Kuwait, Operation Desert Spring, Kuwait. 

Jul 00 Aug 00 Acting Commanding General, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC. 

Aug 00 Jun 01 Chief of Staff, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC. 

Jun 01 Jun 02 Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, SFOR and Deputy Commander, United States Joint Interagency 

Counterterrorism Task Force, Operation Joint Forge, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina. 

186

From To Assignment 

Jul 02 May 04 Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and Fort Campbell, Fort Campbell, KY, 

and Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq. 

May 04 Sep 05 Commander, Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq/Commander, NATO Training MissionIraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq. 

Oct 05 Feb 07 Commanding General, United States Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

Feb 07 Present Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq. 

Summary of joint assignments:

Dates Rank 

Military Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe, Belgium (Cumulative Joint Credit).Jun 87–Jun 88 Major 

Chief Operations Officer, U.N. Mission in Haiti, Operation Uphold Democracy, 

Haiti (No Joint Credit).

Jan 95–Jun 95 Lieutenant Colonel 

Executive Assistant to the Director, The Joint Staff, later Executive Assistant to 

the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.

Jun 97–Aug 99 Colonel 

Commanding General, Combined Joint Task Force-Kuwait, Operation Desert 

Spring, Kuwait (No Joint Credit).

Aug 99–Sep 99 Colonel 

Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, SFOR and Deputy Commander, United 

States Joint Interagency Counter-Terrorism Task Force, Operation Joint Forge, 

Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina (No joint credit).

Jun 01–Jun 02 Brigadier General 

Commander, Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq/Commander, NATO 

Training Mission-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.

May 04–Sep 05 Lieutenant General 

Commander, Multinational Force-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq .................... Feb 07–Present General 

U.S. decorations and badges: 

Defense Distinguished Service Medal 

Distinguished Service Medal 

Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster) 

Legion of Merit (with three Oak Leaf Clusters) 

Bronze Star Medal with ‘‘V’’ Device 

Defense Meritorious Service Medal 

Meritorious Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters) 

Joint Service Commendation Medal 

Army Commendation Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters) 

Joint Service Achievement Medal 

Army Achievement Medal 

Combat Action Badge 

Expert Infantryman Badge 

Master Parachutist Badge 

Air Assault Badge 

Ranger Tab 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge 

Army Staff Identification Badge 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by GEN David H. Petraeus, USA, in connection 

with his nomination follows:]

187

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228

Washington, DC 20510–6050

(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

David H. Petraeus.

2. Position to which nominated: 

Commander, United States Central Command.

3. Date of nomination: 

30 April 2008.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.]

5. Date and place of birth: 

7 November 1952; Cornwall on Hudson, NY.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Hollister Knowlton Petraeus.

7. Names and ages of children: 

Anne, 25; Stephen, 21.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive 

branch. 

None.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

Council on Foreign Relations. 

Association of the United States Army. 

Association of Graduates, United States Military Academy. 

82d Airborne Division Assosciation. 

101st Airborne Division Association. 

504th Parachute Infantry Regiment Association. 

Static Line Association. 

555th Parachute Infantry Regiment Association. 

187th Infantry Regiment Association. 

SHAPE Alumni Association. 

7th Armored Division Association. 

Princeton Alumni Association. 

United States Parachute Association. 

Command and General Staff Foundation.

188

11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

None. 

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate? 

Yes.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the 

administration in power? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–

E are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

DAVID H. PETRAEUS.

[The nomination of GEN David H. Petraeus, USA, was reported 

to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2008, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on July 10, 2008.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to LTG Raymond T. Odierno, 

USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

Please provide any updates or modifications to the answers to advance policy 

questions that you submitted in connection with your recent nomination to the position of Vice Chief of Staff of the Army that you believe to be necessary to ensure 

that your views are fully and accurately reflected. 

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF–I)? 

Answer. The Commanding General of MNF–I commands forces within Iraq and 

is the senior military representative to the U.S. Chief of Mission. MNF–I is a Combined Joint Task Force under Operational Control (OPCON) to the Commander of 

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). MNF–I conducts operations in support of the 

Government of Iraq, U.S. Mission, and other international organizations. The CG 

exercises Tactical Control of non-U.S. coalition forces and OPCON of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC–I). MNF–I is a strategic level command. 

Question. What are the differences between the duties and functions of the Commander, MNF–I and the Commander, MNC–I? 

Answer. The Commanding General of MNC–I is the senior operational level commander in Iraq. He directly commands forces conducting operations to restore order 

and security in Iraq. 

The Commanding General of MNF–I has a wider responsibility. He is responsible 

for all strategic issues and the political-military interface, working with the U.S. 

Ambassador and Government of Iraq to integrate all aspects of the campaign to include security, governance, economic development, communication, and transition. 

Question. What background and experience, including joint duty assignments, do 

you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties? 

Answer. During my nearly 32 years of commissioned service, I have served the 

Army and the Nation from the tactical through the strategic level. I have been asVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00194 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
189

signed in tactical and operational units for 22 years and have commanded soldiers 

from company to Corps level while participating in numerous training and operational deployments. I have served in a variety of command and staff positions to 

include joint and multinational staffs, where I gained experience in strategic and 

combined operations, including a tour as a Military Advisor for Arms Control in the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, a tour of duty as the Director of Force Management in the Headquarters, Department of the Army. I also served as the Chief of 

Staff of V Corps during Bosnia operations and served as Deputy Commander Task 

Force Hawk in Albania during the Kosovo Conflict. I also commanded the 4th Infantry Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom I, then served as the Assistant to the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which entailed being an advisor to the Secretary of State, and most recently as Commander of III Corps/Multinational Corps 

Iraq for the last 24 months. My professional military education, deployment experience, and assignment history have provided me broad knowledge, experience, and 

insight into what is needed to command coalition forces in support of the strategic 

goals outlined by the U.S. Mission Iraq. In particular, my recent tours of duty in 

Iraq have provided me with unique insights into the complicated situation and requirements needed to be successful in our mission in Iraq. 

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Commander, MNF–I? 

Answer. If confirmed for this position, I intend to:

• Continually update my military and civilian chain of command of our 

analysis and assessment 

• Stay connected with my subordinate commanders and higher headquarters 

• Lead and challenge all of MNF–I to continue to learn, change, and adjust 

to the environment, in order to attain our end state as quickly as possible 

• Continually assess the progress of our campaign and make adjustments 

when necessary to ensure success 

• Establish mechanisms to incorporate the lessons learned over the last 5 

years 

• Maintain focus on the warrior ethos—Always place the mission first; 

never accept defeat; never quit; never leave a fallen comrade 

• Demand high moral and ethical behavior by all U.S. forces 

• Be aggressive—tackle challenges as they arise and mitigate the risk involved 

IRAQ

Question. What is your assessment of the current situation facing the United 

States in Iraq? 

Answer. I believe we are in a significantly better position to achieve success in 

Iraq than we were in late 2006 and early 2007. The security situation is improved, 

with overall attacks, civilian deaths, and ethno-sectarian violence all down. Progress 

remains uneven and difficult challenges remain, specifically the continued presence 

of militias and Iran’s malign involvement in training, equipping, and funding these 

militias. Second, AQI maintains the capability to conduct high profile attacks in 

some areas, although their capability is diminished. They will continue to attempt 

to de-legitimize the Government of Iraq. Iraqi security forces continue to improve 

and are increasingly taking the lead. However, all of this progress is still fragile. 

To achieve long-term sustainable security tough work still remains. The gap between needs of the Iraqi people and the capacity of the government has been reduced, but is not yet self-sustainable by the Government of Iraq. The Iraqi Government has begun to make progress on some very difficult issues and has passed some 

critical legislation, but implementation of this legislation is what is needed. There 

appears to be better cooperation among many political parties which has provided 

some unified positions across sectarian lines. However, Iraq’s governmental capacity 

is still insufficient in many areas. Overall, we are moving in the right direction and 

progressing toward a stable and representative state in Iraq. However, for it to be 

sustainable we must continue U.S. involvement across all US Governmental agencies and continue to pressure the Iraqi Leaders to move forward economically, politically, and diplomatically. 

Question. What do you believe are the most important steps that the United 

States needs to take in Iraq? 

Answer. As U.S. forces in theater drawdown, we must ensure that malign influences are unable to reestablish themselves through violence. ISF and Coalition 

forces must continue to protect the Iraqi people while continuing to build Iraqi capability and capacity. Even as we assist in providing security, we must enable Iraqi 

190

security forces to increasingly assume the lead in securing their country. They must 

expand their governmental capability and capacity. We must encourage and support 

political accommodation and reconciliation at both the local and national level. Finally, we must recognize that the challenges associated with internal and external 

stability and security in Iraq cannot be solved solely in Iraq. We must continue to 

engage with Iraq’s neighbors and seek to get these neighbors to support political 

compromise and stability in Iraq. 

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next 

Commander, MNF–I? 

Answer. In my opinion, the number one threat to Iraq is the communal struggle 

for power. The struggle between Shia-Sunni, inter-Shia, inter-Sunni, Kurds, (et al.) 

with malign outside influences (predominately Iran and to a less degree AQI) trying 

to effect the outcome. Iran, through the support of illegal militias, AQI and other 

Sunni extremists (particularly in Northern and Central Iraq), poses the greatest 

threat to a lasting security. We must enable Iraqi security forces to increasingly 

take the lead against these challenges without creating significant risks to shortand long-sustainable security. 

There continue to be major challenges in the economic, political, and diplomatic 

realms. Gains made in security will be easier to preserve in an environment in 

which people have ready access to essential services and opportunities for employment. In addition, local and national political reconciliation efforts must continue to 

move forward. The provincial elections slated to occur later this year and the national elections scheduled to take place in 2009 will be important milestones in this 

process. The Iraqi Government must not only be representative, but also must continue to grow in capability and capacity. Finally, the Iraqi people continue to face 

challenges from countries in the region, as Iran provides lethal assistance to surrogates in Iraq and as Syria continues to take inadequate measures to stem the flow 

of foreign fighters into Iraq through its territory. Iraq’s Arab neighbors must do 

more to reach out and engage Iraq in a positive fashion through concrete steps including debt relief and the establishments of embassies in Baghdad. I would seek 

to partner with the Ambassador and fully support his efforts to address these diplomatic and political challenges. 

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish and what actions would you initially take as Commander, MNF–I? 

Answer. The gap between the Iraqi individual needs and desires and the ability 

of the Government of Iraq to provide for those needs and desires still exists. The 

role of coalition forces is to support the Government of Iraq in building capacity to 

meet the basic needs of the Iraqi citizens. We will assist the Government of Iraq 

by working to make the communal struggle for power less violent, helping them to 

develop legitimate Iraqi institutions and mitigate the negative effects created by 

those trying to exploit the gap. MNF–I basic objectives will be:

• Provide security for the local populace 

• ISF is professionalized and self-sustaining and is able

• to move towards police primacy 

• to protect its borders 

• to maintain security with less and less reliance on coalition forces

• Assist the Government of Iraq in providing a more legitimate and capable 

central, provincial, and local government that has:

• Credible and effective control with provincial and local civil institutions 

• is accountable to the people of Iraq 

• has established the rule of law 

• delivers adequate services 

• increases employment through economic development 

LESSONS LEARNED

Question. How would you characterize the effectiveness of the military tactics employed by the division under your command in Tikrit in 2003? What were the results of those tactics and what lessons did you, the theater command, and the Army 

learn from that experience? 

Answer. As is the case now, all areas in Iraq in 2003 faced significantly different 

challenges. In 2003 and the beginning of 2004, the 4th ID area of operations was 

the heart of the Sunni-Triangle and the Baathist Regime itself. This area of operations was probably most affected by the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and potentially lost more than any other group in Iraq. They were the privileged—therefore, 

the regime change followed by the dissolution of the Iraqi Army, as well as the implementation of debathification measures by the interim Iraqi Government, put 

191

thousands upon thousands of military, education, medical and local government employees out of work. This created an extremely tense environment and a corresponding increase in reaction and violence to these decisions. In the fall of 2003 

this was the most violent area within Iraq. From November to March of 2004, we 

were able to significantly reduce the level of violence through a combination of lethal and non-lethal means and re-establish stability throughout the region. During 

this time, the division captured nearly 20 of the top 55 high value targets to include 

Saddam Hussein in December of 2003. Additionally, we established standing provincial governments in Salah-ah-Din, At Tamim, and Diyala provinces and started several job programs as well as began numerous reconstruction efforts. In the beginning of 2004 through our transition of authority on 15 March 2004, we reduced the 

level of violence in the region to its lowest levels that have yet to be re-achieved. 

However we learned many lessons. It took us much too long to recognize the true 

nature of the insurgency. We did not have the capacity or expertise to fully understand the underlying cultural or tribal underpinnings of the region. We were unable 

to establish longstanding relationships and trust with the local tribal and religious 

leaders. We underestimated the relevance of justice and honor to the Iraqis and the 

necessity of creating honorable work not just jobs. Lastly, reconciliation had not yet 

become a viable concept. It took us 4 more years to see this take hold. 

Question. What were the major lessons you learned from your more recent experience as Commander, MNC–I, that are most applicable to the duties you are about 

to assume?

• Securing the population comes first 

• Understand the complexity of the conflict—‘‘COIN-plus’’

• Fundamental concepts

• Secure the people where they sleep 

• Give the people justice and honor 

• Make the people choose

• Integrate civilian and military efforts to ‘‘mass effects’’. It is the combination 

of interagency and combined arms

• Embedded PRTs with the BCTs better leverages the appropriate expertise and allows for increase integration and synchronization 

• Total integration SOF and conventional forces across the battlespace 

• Improved significantly our overall intel capacity and our ability to synchronize the ‘‘INTs’’ at the lowest level—ISR integration is more critical 

than ever

• Knowing the threat isn’t enough . . . understand the environment holistically 

• ‘‘Aggressive pursuit’’ continues even after the threat recedes

• Pushing the ISF as they grow in capacity and take on responsibility 

• Pushing governance and economic development as security improves

• Building ISF capacity—there is no substitute for partnership 

• Empowering ground-owning commanders (decentralization of efforts) 

• Importance of headquarters elements 

• Importance of enablers as force multipliers and ‘‘risk mitigators’’

• What leaders do makes a critical difference . . . everyday, at every level 

• Be first with the truth 

• ‘‘Supporting the troops’’ involves funding OGAs—CERP is not enough

Question. What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes the U.S. has 

made to date in Iraq? 

Answer.

1. Inadequate post-war planning to exploit the military success of the initial invasion. We underestimated/misunderstood the environment. 

2. Disbanding of the Iraqi Army and further de-Baathification efforts 

threw thousands upon thousands of Iraqis out of work. 

3. It took us too long to recognize the insurgency and all of its 

underpinnings, which allowed extremist groups to establish themselves and 

gain passive support of the population. 

4. We attempted to turn complete control over to the Iraqis too early 

when they did not yet have the capacity to govern or secure the population. 

This resulted in a significant increase in ethno-sectarian violence on that 

was exploited by Sunni/Shia extremist groups.

Question. Which of these mistakes, if any, still impact U.S. operations? 

Answer. They all to some extent still effect our operations, but we have made adjustments at the strategic, operational, and tactical level which is the beginning to 

have an effect. 

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Question. What corrective action, if any, will you take if confirmed? 

Answer. I will ensure that we are a learning organization that is able to adjust 

its operations in order to meet the Nation’s stated objectives. We will push the 

Iraqis to assume more control across the security, diplomatic, and governance lines 

of operation to include the investment of their wealth into their own country. We 

will continue to assess and analyze the strategic and operational environment and 

make adjustments. 

Question. During your prior combat tours of duty in Iraq, were there any incidents 

of which you were aware within your command of alleged detainee abuse or abuse 

of civilians? 

If so, please explain the circumstances and describe the actions that you took in 

response to these incidents. 

Answer. Unfortunately, due to the nature of our operations, allegations of detainee or civilian abuse occur frequently against both coalition forces and Iraqi security forces (ISF). For alleged abuse by U.S. forces, I require that all allegations be 

reported through the chain of command to me. I also require that each allegation 

be thoroughly and impartially investigated, evidence gathered and evaluated. Each 

case of confirmed abuse is treated as misconduct under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, adverse administrative procedures, or both. Each case is handled on 

its own merits at the appropriate level after due process is afforded to any soldier 

accused of such conduct. Known victims of confirmed abuse are compensated as part 

of our counter-insurgency strategy and our moral obligation to do right by our host 

country’s citizens. We take our lessons learned from such incidents and refine our 

tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as retrain our soldiers in the importance 

of following the Law of Armed Conflict, respecting Iraqi civilians, and treating detainees humanely. 

For allegations of abuse by ISF, I require that reports be made by U.S. inspectors 

of Iraqi military, police, and detention facilities, as well as anyone in my command 

who has information of this type of alleged conduct. The reports are forwarded to 

the appropriate liaison authority who can engage the right Iraqi leaders in order 

for them to address the allegations of Iraqi-on-Iraqi abuse. 

ROLE IN DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW IRAQ STRATEGY

Question. What role, if any, did you play in the development of the new Iraq strategy announced by the President in January 2007? 

Answer. After my arrival in Iraq in December 2006 as the MNC–I Commander, 

General Casey challenged me to take a look at different ways to break the cycle of 

sectarian violence in Baghdad. As a result of the assessment, we confirmed that 

Baghdad was the most important piece of terrain and ethno-sectarian violence, 

fueled by extremist elements was the primary cause of the problem. We conducted 

crisis action planning and through our assessment and analysis determined that we 

must first and foremost protect the population first in Baghdad and then the other 

ten cities. We also determined that there was an opportunity in Anbar to exploit 

some initial success that was created by the reconciliation efforts with the tribes. 

We developed tactics, techniques, and procedures to push coalition and ISF forces 

out into the neighborhoods in small Joint Security Stations (JSS) and combat outpost (COP). In the past we would clear areas but would not be able to hold these 

areas. We knew we must secure the population; we must deny the enemy sanctuaries and eliminate the support zones in the so called Baghdad Belts. We then 

developed the operational plan and requested the surge forces. This plan was 

briefed to General Casey and the Secretary of Defense for approval, and later to 

General Petraeus upon his arrival. 

U.S. FORCE REDUCTIONS IN IRAQ

Question. The President has said that following the withdrawal of the last surge 

brigade combat team in July there will be a 45-day consolidation and evaluation period, after which an assessment of conditions on the ground would begin to determine when recommendations for further reductions in U.S. forces in Iraq could be 

made. 

To your knowledge, aren’t conditions on the ground in Iraq being continuously assessed? 

Answer. Commanders at all levels continually assess, both formally and informally, conditions in Iraq. 

Question. If so, why is it necessary, in your view, to wait 45 days to assess the 

conditions on the ground and determine when to make recommendations? 

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Answer. The recommendation to reduce our forces by five combat Brigades and 

two Marine Battalions, back down to pre-surge levels was made based on our best 

judgment and analysis of many factors. 

The environment in Iraq is complex and constantly changing across security, economic, and diplomatic lines. One of our key considerations is to ensure that we do 

not give back gains we have made. We learned the lesson the hard way in 2006. 

In order to make informed decisions it is important to understand the risk involved 

and how you can best mitigate this risk. This 45 day period following a 25 percent 

reduction in combat brigades allows us to adequately and more accurately evaluate 

the risk and ensure that tactical, operational, and strategic risk mitigation techniques are sufficient. 

Question. Do you believe that there is a purely military solution in Iraq, or must 

the solution be primarily a political one? 

Answer. There is no purely military or purely political solution in Iraq. All four 

lines of operation—security, economic, diplomatic, and political—are mutually reinforcing and thus must be an important part of any long-term solution in Iraq. While 

the political line of operation, the effort to create political accommodation and good 

governance, is the main effort, it cannot be pursued to the exclusion of reinforcing 

efforts. We have seen in the past year that Iraqi leaders are more likely to make 

the type of compromise seen in February’s legislative package when they and their 

communities are feeling more secure rather than less. 

Question. Do you believe that compromise among Iraqi political leaders is a necessary condition for a political solution? 

Answer. Compromise among Iraqi Political leaders is a necessary condition for 

any successful solution in Iraq. 

Question. What do you believe will induce Iraqi political leaders to make the compromises necessary for a political solution? 

Answer. We must continue to apply the right amount of pressure in order to ensure constant and consistent progress. I also believe constant communications between leaders in MNF–I and the Embassy with all Iraqi political leaders is essential. Iraqi leaders are under enormous pressure from internal and external sources 

and they have begun to make some progress with legislation as well as other areas. 

However, the importance of implementation will be the underpinning of long-term 

sustainable success, and we must continue to coach, teach, mentor, and pressure the 

Iraqi leadership along the way. 

Question. What leverage does the U.S. have in this regard? 

Answer. We must throw all means available; push, pull and convince Iraqi leaders 

that political solutions must be found by helping them find those solutions, coaching 

them, and urging them throughout the process. We must sustain our robust engagement, working with the Government of Iraq to identify mutual interests amongst 

Iraqi leaders and convincing them to make the hard decisions that are in the best 

interests of security and stability in Iraq. 

Question. In your view, what conditions on the ground in Iraq would allow for a 

recommendation to make further reductions in U.S. forces? 

Answer. There is no simple metric or calculation that can give us a green or red 

light on further reductions. However, if confirmed as Commander of MNF–I, I will 

focus on a number of variables such as the level of security, level of threat, capacity 

of the ISF, capacity of the ministries, capacity of the provincial and local governments, economic development, and improvement of basic services. We will use a variety of objective and subjective systems. However, I will rely most heavily on my 

subordinate commanders’ recommendations and my own independent judgment. 

INTERCOMMUNAL CONFLICT

Question. You have noted that the conflict in Iraq has evolved and that, although 

there is still terrorism and insurgency, the current threat is the intercommunal 

fight over power. 

How has this changed the fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq? 

Answer. Since liberation in 2003, the conflict in Iraq has been a competition 

among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This has played 

out differently over time, with inter- and later intra-sectarian violence, and it is accompanied by a complex mixture of destabilizing forces such as terrorism, regional 

interference, and foreign-fueled proxy war. As Iraq progresses forward it will continue to be a complex problem set. 

Question. How would you recommend that military strategy adapt to this change 

in the nature of the conflict? 

Answer. I believe our strategy in Iraq is well-suited to address this conflict over 

power and resources. As commander of MNC–I, I had a hand in the development 

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of the Joint Campaign Plan. It addresses not just the manifestation of this conflict 

(security) but its roots (economic, political) and a comprehensive approach to address it (security, economic, diplomatic, and political). The strategy also involves directly addressing sectarian division, engaging with dissonant factions and individuals to bring reconcilable enemies to the realization that the best means of change 

is the political process and not armed conflict. We have also worked to bring together rivaling religious and political leaders to work together for their communities. Our efforts have been reinforced by the general population’s increasing rejection of violence and those who would cause it. Although there is a long way to go, 

our strategy to address the conflict in Iraq is helping to enable progress by the Iraqi 

Government. 

Question. What is the appropriate role of coalition forces in response to the threat 

and conduct of intercommunal violence among militant groups vying for control, 

particularly in southern Iraq? 

Answer. The role of coalition forces is to support the elected government and help 

that government enforce its monopoly on the legitimate use of arms. It is my sense 

that Iraqi leaders have largely begun to unite around the issue of disarming all militias, and we seek to support them in that effort. 

Question. Recent months have seen an increase in kidnappings and murders of 

non-Muslim religious leaders. 

In your opinion, are non-Muslim religious minorities in Iraq at greater risk? 

Answer. I believe the non-Muslim religious minorities are not at greater risk from 

the majority of Iraqis. However, there are extremist elements that target several 

groups to include non-Muslim religious minorities in order to maintain their own 

legitimacy. 

Question. Are there any groups that are particularly vulnerable? 

Answer. Recent events in Basra and Sadr City indicate that low level Iraqi Government officials and Iraqi security forces are at the greatest risk when traveling 

outside established safe zones. 

Question. If so, what is the appropriate role for the U.S. military in addressing 

their vulnerability? 

Answer. The U.S. must ensure that threat reporting and information is shared 

with Iraqi counterparts to ensure widest possible dissemination; this allows individuals (of all religions and sects) who are at risk to take property security measures. 

CONFRONTING THE MILITIAS

Question. Based on your knowledge, is the Iraqi Government taking the steps it 

must to confront and control the militias? 

Answer. The Iraqi Government has taken some critical steps in recent months toward confronting criminal militias. Prime Minister Maliki made the courageous decision in March to confront militia elements in Basra that were carrying out acts 

of intimidation and murder, threatening peace and the rule of law. Reports state 

that Prime Minister Maliki has become vocal in his stance that the Government of 

Iraq must have a monopoly on the legitimate use of arms, and the government and 

ISF are attempting to enforce this point in Baghdad, particularly Sadr City. It appears the government is more willing to use its forces to confront militia elements. 

This must be followed by diplomatic and humanitarian efforts. However, this is only 

the first step in reducing militia influence. It will take a concerted effort over time 

to have long-term success. 

Question. What role would you expect to play on this issue, if confirmed? 

Answer. I will continue to work with the Iraqi Government to assist them in confronting militias by using all the tools available to them (military, diplomatic, and 

humanitarian.) Coalition forces will continue to support and enable Iraqi forces in 

their kinetic and non-kinetic operations against militias through partnership and 

the use of coalition advisors. 

Question. What has been the role of American troops with respect to recent operations in and around Sadr City and in Basra? 

Answer. It is my understanding that U.S. support for the Sadr City and Basra 

operations has been generally in line with the support coalition forces regularly provide to Iraqi operations. 

In Basra, working in coordination with the U.K. contingent in Multi-National Division—Southeast, the coalition has continued to support Iraqi-led operations with 

planning, some logistic enablers, close air support, and ISR. U.S. and U.K. Military 

Transition Teams embedded with Iraqi units on the ground play an integral role 

in these support efforts. 

It is my understanding that U.S. forces in Baghdad are playing a more robust role 

in planning and executing operations in the Baghdad Security Districts than in 

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Basra. They are conducting extensive surveillance operations in Sadr City and 

partnering with Iraqi units on the ground, using ISR and Air Weapons Team assets 

to conduct targeted operations in response to attacks originating in Sadr City. As 

typical in the ‘‘partner’’ phase of the lead-partner-overwatch transition to ISF control, coalition forces operate alongside and in coordination with Iraqi Army, Special 

Operations, and Police units. 

PERFORMANCE OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

Question. As part of the new strategy in Iraq, the Iraqi Government agreed to 

send three additional Iraqi Army brigades to Baghdad. 

How many additional Iraqi Army brigades have been deployed and participated 

in operations in Baghdad since January 2007? 

Answer. In January 2007, the Government of Iraq committed to providing sufficient forces to conduct operations in support of the Baghdad Security Plan (Benchmark #9—Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq). In February 2007, the Government of Iraq established an Iraqi Army (IA) battalion rotation plan in support 

of Fardh al Qanoon to provide three additional brigades (9 additional battalions) of 

combat power to Baghdad. On 1 December 2007, the 2nd and 3rd Brigades of the 

11th IA Division completed force generation and assumed responsibility for 

battlespace within the Baghdad Province, allowing six of the rotational battalions 

to return home. The 4th Brigade of the 11th Division is scheduled to complete the 

force generation process in November 2008, which will allow the 4th Brigade, 1st 

IA Division and its battalions to return home to Anbar Province. 4/11 IA will fulfill 

the requirement to have three additional IA brigades permanently stationed in 

Baghdad (in accordance with Benchmark #9). Over the past year and a half, there 

have been as many as six additional battalions—above and beyond the requirement 

for three brigades—temporarily deployed to Baghdad in support of ongoing operations. 

Question. How many additional Iraqi Army brigades are there now? 

Answer. The 4th Brigade, 1st IA Division will remain deployed to Baghdad until 

completion of the force generation of 4th Brigade, 11th IA Division, thus fulfilling 

the requirements of the Baghdad Security Plan. Currently, there are six additional 

battalions deployed to Baghdad in support of ongoing operations in Sadr City. 

Question. How would you characterize the performance of Iraqi forces in the conduct of recent security operations in and around Baghdad? 

Answer. It is difficult for me to comment on recent security operations since I 

have not been in theater for about 90 days. But when I was there, we were seeing 

steady progress in planning and execution at battalion and brigade level by the ISF. 

Progress is still not uniform, and there are still some significant NCO and officer 

shortages, as well as some small pockets of sectarian behavior. 

Question. As U.S. surge forces are withdrawn, are Iraqi Army brigades assuming 

the areas and missions of these units? 

Answer. As local conditions vary, so does Iraqi force capability on the ground. In 

general, our intent is to thin out U.S. presence rather than withdraw it from a given 

area. In many cases, we are spreading out our presence as troops leave and continuing to partner with ISF. In other cases, ISF units on the ground—to include 

Iraqi Police, National Police, and Iraqi Army elements—are assuming a greater role. 

Several provinces are scheduled to transfer to Provincial Iraqi Control in the coming 

months. The specific arrangement varies not only province to province, but city to 

city and in some cases neighborhood to neighborhood. 

Question. If so, are gains in reduced violence and increased stability achieved by 

U.S. forces being effectively maintained in the areas for which Iraqi Army forces 

have assumed responsibility? 

Answer. It is imperative that we preserve hard won gains. We must take an approach that allows us to preserve these gains by ensuring that Iraqi forces are capable and supported so they not only take responsibility, but are successful. In general, our intent is to thin out U.S. presence over time rather than completely withdraw from a given area. 

Question. In March 2008, the Iraqi Army launched a major offensive aimed at 

forcing the Mahdi Army out of Basra. 

What is your assessment of the Iraqi Government and security forces’ strategic 

and operational planning and preparation for the operation in Basra? 

Answer. It is very difficult to make an assessment from afar. From reporting, it 

appears Iraqi operations in Basra began much more quickly than originally planned 

and thus suffered initially from a lack of sufficient strategic and operational planning and conditions setting. But as operations have continued, with our coaching 

and assistance, Iraqi planning has seen growth in capability. 

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What is encouraging is that Iraq Security Forces demonstrated they have the ability to deploy over a division’s worth of personnel and equipment across the country 

and then employ them upon arrival—a feat which was not possible in 2006. 

Question. What is your assessment of Iraqi security forces’ tactical performance 

during operations in Basra? 

Answer. I have not personally observed these operations and can not make an accurate assessment. 

Question. In your view, did this operation accomplish the Iraqi Government’s strategic and the Iraqi security forces’ operational objectives? 

Answer. Through reporting, it is my view that it is too early to talk about operational or strategic success. However, it appears the militia’s grip on Basra’s neighborhoods has been affected, and significant caches have been found throughout the 

city. The operation appears to be garnering support from citizens of Basra, but any 

conclusions at this time about the operation’s overall tactical and strategic accomplishments would be premature. 

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Question. What is the command and control relationship between American and 

Iraqi forces in the new Baghdad security plan? 

Answer. Iraqi security forces in the Baghdad area receive all orders through national command channels, and U.S. forces operate under the command and control 

of Multi-National Corps Iraq. The relationship between these two chains of command is one of constant coordination and cooperation. 

Question. What concerns, if any, have you had about command and control relationships with Iraqi forces, and what have been the lessons learned in this regard 

over the last year of combined operations? 

Answer. The issue of command and control relationships is an important one, and 

the most critical imperative has been to ensure unity of effort. Over the past year, 

we have gained a great deal of experience as a result of our partnership between 

transition teams and Iraqi units and our close cooperation at the tactical level. The 

operations of the last year particularly have reaffirmed the value of our training and 

transition teams. These elements have been critical in providing coalition forces 

with situational awareness and in helping the coalition to support Iraqi operations 

with enablers such as logistics, intelligence, and close air support. 

COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE

Question. According to Field Manual 3–24, the new counterinsurgency manual, 

‘‘20 [soldiers or police forces] per 1,000 residents is often considered the minimum 

troop density required for effective counterinsurgency operations.’’ Baghdad alone, 

according to doctrine, requires a force of 120,000–130,000 personnel to meet the 

minimum requirement. However, the planned increase in U.S. and Iraqi forces for 

Baghdad only provided for about 80,000 security forces. 

Do you believe that 80,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops has been and remains sufficient 

and if so, why? 

Answer. While every commander would like additional resources, the 80,000 

troops that were in or moved to Baghdad were sufficient given the political-military 

situation and phased conduct of operations. Counterinsurgency requires local security forces and not just soldiers. At the same time, the Baghdad police were expanded and now have an authorization of over 39,000. In addition, it is important 

to recognize the security contribution of 30,000 Sons of Iraq assisting U.S. forces in 

Baghdad alone. As the Baghdad security plan has progressed, these forces proved 

to be sufficient to allow gradual but steady progress in efforts to clear and hold 

Baghdad’s neighborhoods. I would also add that the critical increase in the enablers 

such as ISR platforms, intelligence teams, and aviation, as well as many other 

enablers, has a significant impact. 

Question. What is your understanding of the status and adequacy of the risk assessment and mitigation plan associated with this deviation from doctrine? 

Answer. As the former commander of MNC–I, I can attest that risk assessment 

and planning to mitigate risk occur on a continuous process in Iraq. As operations 

in Iraq are considered and undertaken, commanders consider the risk to our own 

as well as Iraqi forces, as well as the risk of thinning our lines in areas which we 

currently hold. If confirmed, I would continue to ensure that risk assessment occurs 

on a continuous basis. 

LENGTH OF IRAQI INSURGENCY

Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Casey, has said that 20th century counterinsurgency efforts typically lasted 9 years. 

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How long do you believe the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq could last? Do 

you have reason to believe that this campaign will be shorter than the typical effort 

cited by General Casey? 

Answer. I agree with General Casey that the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq 

will continue for some time, but its duration will depend on a variety of factors 

about which it is very difficult to make judgments. While the support of the United 

States will be important for some time to come, ultimately the Government of Iraq 

must win this fight. Therefore, while the counterinsurgency campaign could last 9 

years, it is not necessarily the case that U.S. forces would be involved in substantial 

numbers for the duration of that period. 

SUSTAINMENT OF U.S. COMMITMENT

Question. Based on your knowledge of the Army and its state of readiness, how 

long do you believe the Army can sustain U.S. troop levels in Iraq of approximately 

140,000 troops at their current operational tempo? 

Answer. Over the past few years, we have seen definitive indications that the 

force is strained. Stress on soldiers and units resulting from increased time deployed 

and decreased time at home are visible in several different areas including training, 

readiness, and recruitment. However, the Army has a plan that will, with congressional assistance, restore balance to our force. The Army has identified four imperatives that we must accomplish to place ourselves back into balance: sustain, prepare, reset, and transform. 

We have and will continue to make significant progress in these areas to bring 

the Army back into balance. We assess that we will continue to recruit and retain 

enough soldiers to meet our end strength requirements. The Army also has received 

authorization to accelerate our growth plan to 2011, which will assist in restoring 

balance to preserve our All-Volunteer Force, restoring the necessary strategic depth 

and capacity for the future while sustaining a provision of forces to combatant commanders at pre-surge levels. 

While the Army is continually working to reduce the deployment times of its soldiers, it is capable of meeting the current level of global commitments as long as 

they remain at or below pre-surge levels for the foreseeable future. In doing so, we 

will continue to deploy only the best led, manned, equipped, and trained soldiers 

into combat to meet the national strategy. 

STATE OF TRAINING AND EQUIPPING OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

Question. What is your understanding of the state of training and equipping of 

Iraqi security forces? 

Answer. Over two-thirds of Iraqi Army units are leading security operations 

throughout Iraq, and over half of the police units of the Ministry of Interior are capable of planning and executing counterinsurgency operations. However, numerous 

challenges remain in logistics and other enablers. The single most important area 

that still needs improvement relates to shortages in the officer and noncommissioned officer corps. 

Question. What is your assessment of Iraqi security forces progress toward assumption of full responsibility for internal security? 

Answer. Iraqi security forces have made important progress, but are not yet ready 

to assume full responsibility throughout Iraq on their own. Over the past 16 

months, an increasingly robust Iraqi-run training base enabled Iraqi security forces 

to grow by over 133,000 soldiers and police, and this still-expanding training base 

is expected to generate an additional 73,000 soldiers and police through the rest of 

2008. Additionally, Iraq’s security ministries are steadily improving their ability to 

execute their budgets. Despite these gains, however, recent operations have underscored the considerable work that remains to be done in the areas of expeditionary 

logistics, force enablers, staff development, and command and control. 

BURDEN SHARING

Question. What are your views on the responsibility and ability of the Iraqi Government to assume the cost of training, equipping, and operations for its security 

forces? 

Answer. The Government of Iraq has a responsibility, and also the increasing capability, to assume the training, equipping, and operations costs for the Iraqi security forces. In 2006 and 2007, Iraq’s security ministries spent more on their forces 

than the United States provided through the Iraqi security forces fund. Iraq is expected to spend over $8 billion on security this year and $11 billion next year. The 

trend of Iraq spending more for its own defense and the United States paying less 

will continue over time. However, it is important that this occur in a somewhat 

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gradual manner rather than all at once to avoid major disruptions and delays in 

the development of more capable Iraqi security forces. 

Question. What are your views on the responsibility and ability of the Iraqi Government to share the cost of combined operations with Multi-National Force-Iraq 

forces and stability programs throughout Iraq? 

Answer. The Government of Iraq is responsible for sharing the cost of security operations and stability programs throughout Iraq, and it is increasingly doing so. As 

an encouraging example, the Iraqi Government recently allocated $300 million for 

the coalition forces to manage as Commanders’ Emergency Response Program funds. 

This initiative has enabled coalition forces to execute projects for the Iraqi people 

while the Iraqi Government continues to build its own capacity to do so. 

PERMANENT BASING

Question. In the National Defense Authorization and Appropriation Acts for Fiscal 

Year 2008, Congress prohibited the use of funds to seek permanent bases in Iraq 

or to control the oil resources of Iraq. 

Do you agree that it is not and should not be the policy of the United States to 

seek permanent basing of U.S. forces in Iraq or to exercise control over Iraq’s oil 

resources? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree that it is important for the Government of Iraq to assume 

greater responsibility for paying the costs of reconstruction throughout Iraq, including paying for all large-scale infrastructure projects? 

Answer. Yes. 

FORCE PROTECTION

Question. The Baghdad security plan distributed American units with Iraqi units 

over approximately 30 mini-bases throughout Baghdad. 

What is the status of American forces’ distribution to small local bases throughout 

Baghdad? 

Answer. Coalition forces have nearly completed the establishment of planned stations and outposts in Baghdad. 53 of 55 Joint Security Stations (JSS) and 22 Combat Outposts (COPs) are established. 

Question. If confirmed as Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, how would you 

ensure the protection of those forces and the forces which would have to resupply 

them on a daily basis? 

Answer. Force protection and sustainment of JSS and COPs is always a major 

concern. If confirmed, I will ensure constant assessments are made of our current 

force protection measures and constant adjustments are made to improve our operational, tactical, and technical measures of force protection; ensuring we do all possible for the protection of all U.S. and coalition forces. 

AIRBORNE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

Question. CENTCOM issued a Joint Urgent Operational Need Statement 

(JUONS) in December of 2006, for a large number of additional aircraft with imaging and signals intelligence capabilities. Since that JUONS was issued, even larger 

requirements for such intelligence platforms have been articulated by commanders 

in the theater. It appears that the Department of Defense (DOD) has been slow to 

respond to these requirements, although recently the Air Force has ‘‘surged’’ a large 

number of Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to CENTCOM. However, this 

surge and other activities will not close the gap between available and required resources. The main problem appears to be that there are bottlenecks in fielding more 

UAVs in the near future, coupled with a reluctance to seek alternative aircraft to 

the UAV programs-of-record. 

Do you believe that small manned aircraft acquired from the commercial sector 

could provide a practical near-term solution to CENTCOM’s intelligence platform 

shortage? 

Answer. As we develop our requirements we normally do not focus on specific 

platforms. We try to identify the operational and strategic needs and define shortfalls in capability and capacity. Then we seek needed capabilities and practical solutions rather than specific platforms and technologies. 

Question. Are you satisfied that this potential solution has been adequately considered? 

Answer. Yes. I believe that MNF–I and CENTCOM, in coordination with the DOD 

Task Force on ISR, are considering all possible solutions to ISR shortfalls. 

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INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR GROUND FORCES

Question. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, Special Operations Command 

(SOCOM) and the national intelligence agencies have developed effective equipment, 

tactics, and intelligence dissemination practices to target al Qaeda personnel and 

personnel from other related terrorist networks. The effectiveness of these tools and 

their utility for regular ground forces in battling militias and IED networks are now 

more widely recognized. As a result, some of these tools and capabilities are migrating to Army and Marine Corps ground forces. 

Do you believe that regular Army and Marine Corps ground forces can replicate 

the capabilities developed by Special Forces? 

Answer. Special Operations Forces and conventional Army and Marine Corps 

units do have some overlapping capabilities. However, they also have unique characteristics based on their missions. For example, conventional forces are specifically 

designed to be able to hold terrain—a task for which Special Operations Forces are 

ill-suited. Conversely, Special Operations Forces are organized, trained, and 

equipped to conduct foreign internal defense, strategic reconnaissance, and specific 

counterterrorism missions typically beyond the capabilities of conventional units. 

Both conventional and Special Operations Forces are needed as part of the comprehensive approach necessary to defeat organizations such as the al Qaeda network. One of the positive developments we have seen in Iraq is an increasing sophistication in the ability of our conventional forces to work closely with Special Operations Forces to synchronize efforts and achieve a greater effect. Conventional and 

Special Operation Force capabilities continue to mature; which has created substantially more cooperation and synergy and improved capacity. 

Question. Are MNF–I commanders now attempting to accomplish this? 

Answer. During my time as MNC–I Commander, one of our greatest successes 

was the synchronization and interaction of conventional and Special Operations 

Forces. Conventional force commanders in Iraq continually adapted to accomplish 

their missions in diverse and complex local environments. Some of the tasks that 

they undertook, such as partnering with local Iraqi security forces, resembled missions historically associated with Special Forces. However, these efforts complement 

rather than duplicate the work done by Special Operations Forces. Similarly, Special Operations Force commanders recognize that their missions must complement 

the efforts of conventional force commanders who are responsible for maintaining 

security in the areas in which Special Operations Forces conduct missions. Our 

gains in effectiveness have come not from merging the two different types of units, 

but from increasing the coordination and synchronization of their efforts. 

Question. Has DOD provided the resources to acquire the equipment and intelligence dissemination support to enable Army and Marine Corps ground forces to 

adopt or adapt these tactics, techniques, and procedures? 

Answer. A critical enabler for the success of coalition operations in Iraq, particularly as we have drawn back down from surge force levels, has been a robust intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR) posture. ISR assets have increased 

operational effectiveness and improved force protection capabilities. Platforms such 

as the armed Predator have also enabled precision targeting, which allows the elimination of threats, such as an enemy indirect fire team, while avoiding civilian casualties and damage to property. But this must be a continuous and dynamic process. The enemy will adapt and we must continue to adapt. 

MILITARY TRANSITION TEAMS

Question. Do you believe that the size, structure, number, and operating procedures for U.S. Military and Police Transition Teams embedded with Iraqi security 

forces need to be changed in any way? If so, what would you recommend? 

Answer. The current military transition teams, composed of 10–15 personnel, do 

not require any significant changes, as they have proven to be highly successful during major operations across the battlefield. A team’s composition is the result of battlefield assessments, commander’s recommendations, and feedback from teams 

themselves. Recently, the Iraq Assistance Group, in conjunction with the Multi-National Division Commanders and division-level Transition Team chiefs, reviewed all 

transition team manning and requirements. This allowed Human Resources Command to modify the rank and specialty of selected positions within Transition 

Teams. This provided greater flexibility for the Army to assign team members who 

are qualified to coach, teach, and mentor Iraqi security forces. 

The Iraqi Army will continue to increase in size over the next year and a half; 

however, this does not generate a need to increase the number of external Transition Teams. As Coalition Forces move toward operational overwatch, fewer forces 

will be involved in direct conflict, allowing more focus on the training and preparaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00205 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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tion of Iraqi forces. Coalition Forces will gradually shift to operational overwatch 

as threat levels decrease, more ISF units achieve ORA level one status, and Iraq 

moves towards sustainable security. 

In the short-term, MNC–I remains focused on security and stability operations, 

using a combination of internal and external Transition Teams, in conjunction with 

aggressive coalition partnering, to maintain current gains and continue to build towards Iraqi security autonomy. MNF–I and MNC–I continue to assess the optimal 

size and role of transition teams and the adjustments required to the Coalition Brigade and Division force structure for the future. Teams will likely remain 10–15 

man elements. Coalition units will frequently augment teams based on operational 

need. 

The size, structure, and operating procedures of Police Transition Teams (PTTs) 

are sufficient. PTTs have a core element of 11–16 individuals, though BCT commanders frequently augment the team based on their specific needs. The size of the 

PTTs allows partnering with Coalition units, which fosters continual improvement 

of the Iraqi Police Service. 

The total number of personnel serving on PTTs is not sufficient. Because of manning levels, coalition forces currently have 252 Police Transition Teams in the 9 

Provinces that have not yet transferred to Provincial Iraqi Control. This is only 83 

percent of the 305 total PTTs required to provide coverage to all Police districts and 

stations within those provinces. 

Question. What is your view of the potential transition of this mission to contractors? 

Answer. I support the DOD policy that prohibits contractors from serving in roles 

in which they are an integrated part of a combat force and from direct participation 

in offensive combat operations. In order to be effective in developing ISF capability, 

Transition Teams serve with Iraqi forces in day-to-day operations as advisors and 

trainers. This constant presence with ISF units provides a link to Coalition enablers 

and allows the ISF to learn by observing our fine officers and noncommissioned officers in action on the battlefield everyday. Some contracted personnel play a properly 

limited but valuable role in Iraq by serving as advisors to Transition Team leaders 

on issues such as military doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. 

Question. What is your understanding of how the Army and Marine Corps are ensuring that U.S. troops are properly trained for this duty, to include dissemination 

of ‘‘lessons learned’’ to incoming teams? 

Answer. Prior to serving as advisors to Iraqi security forces, Army and Marine 

Corps teams undergo extensive training regarding cultural awareness, advisor 

skills, ground maneuver tactics, individual and crew served weapons, foreign weapons, fire support, logistics, intelligence, and communications. Externally sourced 

Army teams attend training at Fort Riley, KS and then Camp Beuhring, Kuwait, 

while Marine teams train at Twentynine Palms, CA. Internally sourced Army teams 

conduct training at home station with their Brigade Combat Team and participate 

in training exercises to include Combat Training Center rotations and Mission 

Readiness Exercises. All teams, regardless of sourcing, attend training at the Phoenix Academy in Taji, Iraq, before conducting a 10-day transition with outgoing 

teams. 

The Iraq Assistance Group (IAG), a directorate of MNC–I, Fort Riley, and 

Twentynine Palms, conduct quarterly training conferences to review all training 

programs. Also, if major changes in enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures occur, 

that information is immediately transmitted to Fort Riley for input into training 

plans for deploying teams. Sixty days into their deployment, teams conduct an initial review that is designed to provide direct feedback on the training they received 

and allow immediate adjustments to training at Fort Riley. IAG compiles and posts 

on its website lessons learned and best practices from over 200 teams in the field 

to allow easy access. These lessons learned are discussed during quarterly conferences to ensure the data is incorporated into future training and is easily accessible for all teams. 

The mission to train Transition Teams (TTs) is currently supported by over 25 

major external agencies, including the Center for Army Lessons Learned, the Defense Language Institute, and the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance. Additionally, the IAG runs two very effective programs, the alumni program and the Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS) program. The alumni program 

sends current TT members back to Fort Riley during their mid-tour leave to discuss 

lessons learned and link up with incoming team members. The PDSS program 

brings every team leader undergoing training at Ft. Riley to Iraq to colocate and 

operate with the team they will replace for a 7–10 day period. They gain valuable 

insight into their area of operations and bring lessons learned back to their team’s 

training program at Fort Riley. 

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Question. If confirmed, what would you recommend in this regard? 

Answer. I will support aggressive assessment and adjustment to Transition Team 

training and lessons learned proliferation. It is critical to continue to adjust and improve the critical component of our strategy. 

DETAINEE TREATMENT STANDARDS

Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum 

issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions? 

Answer. Yes. The standards outlined in Common Article 3 must be the standard 

for U.S. and Coalition Forces to adhere to in regards to the handling of detainees 

at all levels. How we treat detainees reflects upon us as a nation. 

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, 

and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the DOD Detainee Program, dated September 5, 

2006? 

Answer. Yes. The FM clearly articulates what is and what is not authorized and 

effectively identifies methods to ensure accountability while at all times ensuring 

humane treatment. Having one interrogation standard outlined in one document 

adds clarity. 

Question. Do you share the view of the Judge Advocates General that standards 

for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that 

we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat our own 

detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, 

airmen, or marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts? 

Answer. Yes. I agree that the way we treat detainees may affect how our captured 

U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are treated. We adhere to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as a baseline for treatment, regardless of whether 

our enemies afford us that treatment. 

Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 

of the Geneva Conventions? 

Answer. Yes. FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency, mandates compliance with Common 

Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Treating detainees in compliance with the Geneva Conventions is an integral part of counterinsurgency operations. 

IRAQI STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the status of DOD efforts to help restart Iraqi state-owned enterprises to increase employment in Iraq? 

Answer. Prior to 1991, Iraq was the most industrialized of the Arab States, with 

a significant base of industrial operations across a wide range of sectors and a highly skilled civilian workforce. From 1991–2003, industry in Iraq was strictly focused 

on internal production to meet domestic demand as United Nations sanctions prevented export of goods or international economic engagement. Many of these factories shut down immediately after liberation. Coalition efforts to help Iraq revitalize its State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are led by the Task Force to Improve 

Business and Stability Operations in Iraq (TF BSO). TF BSO has assisted Iraqi 

leaders in restoring operations and/or materially increasing production at 56 factories across Iraq. Funded projects, which were specifically targeted to restart or increase production, range from procurement of raw materials and spare parts to replacement of damaged or obsolete production equipment. Initiatives to revitalize 

SOEs have directly resulted in the re-employment of over 100,000 idled or underemployed workers. 

In coordination with Iraqi leaders, TF BSO continues its efforts to restart production at Iraqi factories, with specific focus on agriculture and food processing operations and factories in Southern Iraq that had been inaccessible prior to recent military operations. To ensure sustainable results, TF BSO is assisting with the application of standard business investment management practices to the process of allocating new funds to idled or low-production-rate factories. Coalition personnel also 

instruct factory managers in business plan preparation, marketing strategies, and 

capital investment plans. 

The Iraqi Government announced in January the first private investment awards 

to international consortiums—for three cement factories. Two of these deals, which 

average over $100 million each, were finalized in April, and another is still in negotiation. Under the private joint venture arrangement, investors will manage the facility and increase current production levels six-fold, thus creating employment for 

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5,000 Iraqi workers. These deals represent a modern, profitable business model for 

investors and for Iraq. In combination with other initiatives focused on private sector development, banking, budget execution, and facilitation of foreign direct investment, these are small but positive steps toward market economy development in 

Iraq. 

The jobs created by the revitalization of SOEs are an important support to Coalition and Iraqi efforts to reduce underemployment; this has a direct impact on security in that it decreases the pool of economically-driven potential recruits for insurgent and extremist elements in Iraq. Revitalization efforts are also an important 

first step toward future privatization of Iraqi industries. I would seek to encourage 

further development of these initiatives if confirmed. 

IRAQI REFUGEES

Question. The United Nations estimates that over 2 million Iraqis have been displaced, of which 1.8 million have fled to surrounding countries while some 500,000 

have left their homes to find safer areas within Iraq. 

What is your assessment of the refugee problem in Iraq? Are more Iraqis returning home? 

Answer. Although refugee and displacement issues remain a serious concern, 

there are indicators that the situation has begun to improve. According to U.S. 

Agency for International Development reporting, the rate of displacement of Iraqi 

citizens has been slowing for at least the last 4 months. In addition, some Iraqis 

(primarily those from ethnically and religiously homogenous areas) are returning to 

their homes. These returns are motivated by a variety of factors, including: deteriorating conditions in places of displacement, increased restrictions in neighboring 

countries, tribal reconciliation, and reports of improved security in places of origin. 

It is encouraging that the Iraqi Government has begun to take a more proactive approach to the problem of Iraqi refugees through the drafting of a national policy on 

internally displaced persons and a Basic Law for the Ministry of Displacement and 

Migration. 

Question. Beyond working to improve the security environment in Iraq, do you believe that the U.S. military should play a role in addressing this issue? 

Answer. While protecting the population and assisting Iraqi security forces should 

be the military’s primary roles, the military can also play a limited role in addressing other concerns associated with internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugee 

return. 

What the Military Can Do 

- Execute humanitarian assistance when asked to do so by the Iraqi Government. 

- Liaise with USAID for humanitarian assistance coordination. 

- Track IDPs in the AOR in so far as they affect security operations. 

- Utilize PRTs/ePRTs as requested to identify and relay IDP-related issues. 

What the Military Cannot Do 

- Assist IA and ISF with forcibly removing squatters and IDPs. 

- Provide security for IDP camps of movements of IDPs. 

- Move or clear IDPs from government or private property.

Question. What should the role of the U.S. military be, in your view, with respect 

to those Iraqis who are returning to find their homes occupied by others? 

Answer. In addition to the capabilities and limitations discussed above, the U.S. 

military can continue to assist with key leader engagement on this issue and to help 

develop the governmental capacity that will be necessary to handle refugee and IDP 

returns. 

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

Question. The Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR) conducts 

comprehensive audits, inspections, and investigations which are valuable to Congress. 

If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to support the audits, inspections, 

and investigations conducted by the SIGR? 

Answer. The reports of the SIGIR provide valuable insights to the Force Commander, the Ambassador, and officials in Washington. I supported the activities of 

the SIGIR as the MNC–I Commander and, if confirmed, I will support them as the 

commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF–I). 

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MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENTS IN THEATER

Question. The Army’s Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) has made five separate assessments over the past several years detailing the immediate effects of combat on mental health conditions of U.S. soldiers deployed to Iraq. The most recent 

study, MHAT V, found that stress and mental health problems increased with each 

subsequent month of deployment, and that ‘‘soldiers on their third or fourth deployment were at significantly higher risk’’ for mental health problems. These types of 

reports lend support to the fact that increasing numbers of troops are returning 

from duty in Iraq with post traumatic stress disorder, depression, and other mental 

health problems. 

What is your understanding of the key findings of this and previous MHAT assessments, actions taken by the Army to address key findings, and the effect of such 

actions? 

Answer. The MHAT process has provided an objective assessment on what is 

transpiring with servicemembers’ psychological health and valuable recommendations for future action on this issue. MHAT V produced 43 separate recommendations. Some, such as the recommendation to cross-train Army medics in behavioral 

health concepts, are already being implemented at the DA level; others, such as the 

recommendation to authorize assignment of a mental health professional to every 

Combat Aviation Brigade, are under review at the DA level. If I am confirmed, I 

would seek to implement recommendations which are independently actionable at 

the MNF–I level. 

Question. If confirmed, what measures would you support to ensure ongoing mental health assessments of U.S. forces in Iraq? 

Answer. I would strongly encourage and fully support future MHAT assessments 

if confirmed. This would include (but not be limited to) providing full access to information and staff input and feedback as appropriate. 

Question. Do you have any views on how to best address the mental health needs 

of our troops, in terms of both prevention and treatment? 

Answer. My views are shaped by the recommendations of mental health professionals and by tools such as MHAT assessments. We must continue to learn and 

study to ensure the welfare of our soldiers. 

Generally speaking, prevention begins with supporting servicemembers and their 

families before servicemembers deploy; this includes tough training at home station 

that builds camaraderie in units and gives soldiers the confidence that they can accomplish their tasks. Predictability of deployments and time at home in between deployments for troopers to ‘reset’ with their families are also important. 

Many important preventive steps are already being taken in theater. Medics in 

theater are already being trained on behavioral health topics so they can assist in 

identifying soldiers who need help, and Suicide Risk Management Teams have been 

created to ensure servicemen and women having difficulties get the help they need. 

Perhaps most critically, commanders are pushing the message that seeking help is 

a sign of strength, not weakness, and that it is essential to look out for battle buddies’ mental health. 

Question. Do you believe that mental health resources in theater are adequate to 

handle the needs of our deployed servicemembers? 

Answer. My understanding is that MNF–I is currently reassessing the adequacy 

of mental health resources in theater to ensure soldiers’ needs are met. One possibility being considered is requesting 30 additional behavioral health personnel in 

theater, including mental health professionals and behavioral health technicians. 

SEXUAL ASSAULT

Question. If confirmed as Commander, MNF–I, you will be responsible for ensuring compliance with DOD policies on prevention of and response to sexual assaults 

in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. 

What lessons did you learn while implementing sexual assault training, reporting 

protocols, and command awareness while serving as Commander, MNC–I that can 

help improve any of these policies or their implementation in theater? 

Answer. The prevention of sexual assault is a critical command issue. It is important to have a program that incorporates an awareness campaign that reaches every 

servicemember and that provides integrated response services, including medical 

care/counseling, victim advocacy, chaplain, law enforcement (investigation, detainment, etc.), legal (prosecution, legal assistance, and victim/witness liaison), reporting 

(assault reporting and data collection), and program assessment. I know that such 

a program must receive a commander’s emphasis to be effective, and I would continue to seek to give it that emphasis if confirmed as the commander of MNF–I. 

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Question. What are the unique issues that you believe need to be addressed to 

ensure that policies on prevention, reporting, medical treatment (including mental 

health care), and victim support are available in the operational environment of 

Iraq? 

Answer. Some of the most important challenges in Iraq include combat stress, 

battlefield dispersion, and a mixed, joint service and civilian population. With regard to the last of these challenges, civilians constitute approximately 50 percent 

of the force on the ground in Iraq and are critical contributors to mission success. 

The availability of response services for DOD civilian and contractor personnel 

should be similar to the services available to servicemembers. There are jurisdictional, legal, contractual, and resource challenges associated with extending program response provisions to DOD civilian or contractor personnel which should be 

addressed. 

With regard to sexual harassment and mental health, it is important to continually reinforce the responsibility of all individuals in theater to remain cognizant 

of the welfare of their fellow servicemembers and co-workers and to encourage those 

exhibiting signs of difficulty to receive help. 

Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of sexual assault prevention 

and response resources currently available in the CENTCOM area of responsibility? 

Answer. Sexual assault is a serious crime that adversely impacts the physical and 

psychological readiness of our combat fighting force in Iraq. In my experience as the 

MNC–I Commander, I found the sexual assault and response program and 

resourcing to be robust. However, if confirmed as the MNF–I Commander, I would 

continue to assess our efforts in this area to ensure we continue meeting the needs 

of our deployed servicemembers and civilians. It is important for a commander to 

constantly monitor organizational climate and to foster the development of a culture 

that is intolerant of sexual assault. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those 

views differ from the administration in power? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, MNF–I? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

INTERCOMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN IRAQ

1. Senator LEVIN. Lieutenant General Odierno, each of you have noted in different 

places and times that the conflict in Iraq has evolved and that, although there is 

still terrorism and insurgency, the current threat is the intercommunal fight over 

power. What do you mean by the communal fight over power? 

General ODIERNO. In my opinion, the #1 threat to Iraq is the communal struggle 

for power. The struggle between Shia-Sunni, inter-Shia, inter-Sunni, Kurds, (et al.) 

with malign outside influences (predominately Iran and to a less degree AQI) trying 

to effect the outcome. Iran, through the support of illegal militias, AQI and other 

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Sunni extremists (particularly in Northern and Central Iraq), poses the greatest 

threat to a lasting security. We must enable Iraqi security forces (ISF) to increasingly take the lead against these challenges without creating significant risks to 

short and long-sustainable security. 

There continue to be major challenges in the economic, political, and diplomatic 

realms. Gains made in security will be easier to preserve in an environment in 

which people have ready access to essential services and opportunities for employment. In addition, local and national political reconciliation efforts must continue to 

move forward. The provincial elections slated to occur later this year and the national elections scheduled to take place in 2009 will be important milestones in this 

process. The Iraqi Government must not only be representative, but also must continue to grow in capability and capacity. Finally, the Iraqi people continue to face 

challenges from countries in the region, as Iran provides lethal assistance to surrogates in Iraq and as Syria continues to take inadequate measures to stem the flow 

of foreign fighters into Iraq through its territory. Iraq’s Arab neighbors must do 

more to reach out and engage Iraq in a positive fashion through concrete steps including debt relief and the establishments of embassies in Baghdad. I would seek 

to partner with the Ambassador and fully support his efforts to address these diplomatic and political challenges.

2. Senator LEVIN. Lieutenant General Odierno, how has this changed the fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq? 

General ODIERNO. Since liberation in 2003, the conflict in Iraq has been a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This has 

played out differently over time, with inter- and later intra-sectarian violence, and 

it is accompanied by a complex mixture of destabilizing forces such as terrorism, regional interference, and foreign-fueled proxy war. As Iraq progresses forward it will 

continue to be a complex problem set. In May 2008, however, security incidents are 

now at the lowest level we have seen since March 2004.

3. Senator LEVIN. Lieutenant General Odierno, what is the appropriate role of coalition forces in response to the threat and conduct of intercommunal violence 

among militant groups vying for control? 

General ODIERNO. The role of coalition forces is to support the elected government 

and help that government enforce its monopoly on the legitimate use of arms. It is 

my sense that Iraqi leaders have largely begun to unite around the issue of disarming all militias, which must include influence from external entities and we seek 

to support them in that effort. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

CENTRAL COMMAND

4. Senator AKAKA. Lieutenant General Odierno, after frustrations experienced 

with a top-down strategy to reconciliation and security efforts, the policy shifted to 

more of a bottom-up approach, as evidenced by the success of the Sons of Iraq (SOI) 

in Anbar Province and elsewhere. Recently the Maliki Government has asserted its 

influence by lashing out against armed militia groups both in the south and around 

Baghdad, and it is the opinion of some that the ISF are steadily improving their 

capabilities. In your new position, would you be an advocate of shifting once again 

to a more top-down approach, rather than the current bottom-up approach to solving 

power struggle differences, and if so, when should such a shift take place? 

General ODIERNO. The current struggle in Iraq is complex, dynamic, and waged 

by ethno-sectarian groups, extremist elements, and criminal gangs from the local 

level to the national. Any strategy that the coalition would pursue in the context 

of this struggle must therefore include all elements of national power in order to 

be successful, with a particular emphasis applied to reconciliation and security efforts in support of political objectives. Key to future reconciliation and legitimacy 

of the government is the successful conduct of fair and transparent Provincial Election in late 2008. Military leaders at all levels will continue to coach, mentor, and 

dialogue with associated Iraqi counterparts in the ISFs and civilian sectors, in cooperation with civilian members of the interagency community. Civilian personnel, 

either working as member of Provincial Reconstruction Teams or as part of military 

organizations, are an integral part of this strategy. While greater progress has been 

realized at the local and provincial level, MNF–I and the American Embassy-Baghdad (AMEMB-Baghdad) have observed progress within ministerial agencies as well. 

For example, the Iraqi Council of Representatives passed key budget and provincial 

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powers legislation in February 2008, and the Iraqi Government has pledged significant funding to advance reconstruction both nationwide, and to specifically target 

civil capacity for Basra, Sadr City, and Mosul. If confirmed, conditions on the 

ground after I assume my new position will dictate the most prudent approach; and 

this approach will be comprehensive in nature. It would be premature for me to advocate either a top down or bottom up approach uniformly throughout Iraq. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK PRYOR

LENGTH OF COMBAT TOURS

5. Senator PRYOR. Lieutenant General Odierno, what is your opinion of legislation 

dictating the length of combat tours for the Army, Army Reserve, and National 

Guard to 365 days, and 210 days for the Marine Corps and Marine Reserve? 

General ODIERNO. I believe that tours longer than 365 days for the Army and 210 

days for the Marine Corps are difficult for soldiers, marines, and their families. We 

should, whenever possible, ensure tour lengths are not longer. However, flexibility 

is important in order to address emergency situations, and react quickly to problems 

around the world, and I do not believe this should be legislated.

6. Senator PRYOR. Lieutenant General Odierno, what effect does this have on a 

commander’s ability to employ combat power? 

General ODIERNO. Under emergency conditions this could prevent changes to 

strategy or employment of additional forces as conditions on the ground dictate. I 

do not believe it would be prudent to limit the flexibility to react to operational and 

strategic changes on the ground.

7. Senator PRYOR. Lieutenant General Odierno, can you give me an example of 

how such legislation could have an adverse effect on operations? 

General ODIERNO. Had legislation as stated in question 5 been in place in 2007 

we would not have been able to sustain the surge in order to set conditions to curtail the sectarian violence in Iraq, thus allowing the Iraq Government and ISFs to 

grow in capacity and capability while protecting and securing the people of Iraq. 

Once the brigades of the surge were employed we had the flexibility to extend the 

tours to 15 months verse 12 months, which allowed us to establish the conditions 

on the ground to deliberately and successfully sustain progress and then draw back 

down to pre-surge levels. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS

TRAINING

8. Senator COLLINS. Lieutenant General Odierno, recently I was at an event in 

Maine and afterwards a constituent came up to me and said that he was a former 

Marine Corps officer and that it took the Marine Corps only 10 weeks to transform 

him from a Bates College graduate to a 2nd Lieutenant. He asked me why it is taking so long for the Iraqis to become trained. It has now been over 3 years since the 

United States began its full effort to train Iraqi citizens for service in their military 

and police force. Why is it taking so long to get the Iraqis trained to be an effective, 

cohesive force? 

General ODIERNO. The strategic transition from a coalition-led counterinsurgency 

to an Iraqi-led counterinsurgency requires ISFs capable of assuming greater responsibility from coalition forces. No nation or coalition of nations has ever attempted 

to rebuild the entire security apparatus of a sovereign country, on as large a scale, 

in a shorter time, and in more difficult security conditions. Nonetheless, to understand why it takes so long to get the Iraqis trained to be an effective, cohesive force, 

one needs perspective on the magnitude of the problem. In calendar year 2007, the 

United States Army grew by approximately 11,600 soldiers, or 2.3 percent. The Iraqi 

Army grew by over 60,600 soldiers, or 61 percent—while at war and while the government and other institutions that support it were still forming. By comparison, 

the Iraqi-equivalent growth percentage of 61 percent applied to the United States 

Army in 2007 would result in our Army growing by over 310,000 soldiers in 1 year. 

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Such growth would challenge the United States Army’s mature institutional processes and force management systems in peacetime. The fact the Iraqis have rapidly 

grown their security forces while fighting a determined and ruthless enemy—and 

establishing nascent ministerial and institutional capacity to generate and replenish 

those forces—is even more remarkable. As evidenced in Basrah, Sadr City, and 

Mosul, the ISFs are making progress and demonstrating real capability. However, 

much work remains to be done, particularly in the area of providing the ISFs with 

key enabling capabilities such as aviation, intelligence, logistics, and command and 

control.

TROOPS LEVELS IN IRAQ

9. Senator COLLINS. Lieutenant General Odierno, I continue to be concerned about 

the negative effects of repeated and extended deployments to Iraq on our soldiers 

and marines. The surge in U.S. forces during the last year increased the Army’s 

presence in Iraq to 20 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) instead of the pre-surge level 

of 15. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General George Casey, has said, ‘‘Today’s 

Army is out of balance. The current demand for our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan 

exceeds the sustainable supply and limits our ability to provide ready forces for 

other contingencies.’’ When do you foresee the ISF will be ready to step up in significant numbers so that you will be able to reduce your force level requirements to 

fewer than 15 BCTs? 

General ODIERNO. The ISF is already stepping up in significant numbers and enabling us to reduce our force level requirements. We have recently made significant 

security progress in Iraq, as the level of security incidents for the past month is the 

lowest it has been for more than 4 years. We have sustained our security gains even 

as three BCTs, a Marine Expeditionary Unit, and two Marine battalions have left 

without replacement. A fourth BCT has already given up its battle space and will 

withdraw this month, and the final surge brigade will leave by the end of July 2008. 

We have also reduced the detainee population in coalition facilities by over 3,500 

detainees, and a continuing decline will allow me to recommend reductions in units 

programmed for the detainee mission. Our ability to achieve and sustain gains even 

as we have drawn down is in large part due to increasing capability in the ISFs, 

as well as the Iraqi Government’s determination in meeting security challenges 

throughout Iraq. 

Over the last 18 months, the ISF have grown substantially in size and capability. 

In the last year alone, the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior have generated 

51 new combat battalions, an increase of over 30 percent. This intensive effort to 

increase ISF numbers involved recruiting, hiring, and training over 132,000 new poVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00213 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB

522ful3.eps
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lice and soldiers. Over 540,000 personnel now serve in the ISF. The ISF will grow 

even further in the next year, providing for the eventual strength in numbers necessary to provide a security presence throughout Iraq. 

As important as the ISF’s growth in size is its growth in capability. The number 

of combat battalions capable of taking the lead in operations, albeit with some coalition support, has grown to well over 100—a 15-percent increase since January 2007. 

Ongoing ISF operations in Basra, Mosul, Sadr City, Anbar, and Maysan have demonstrated increased planning capability, mobility, and tactical competence, as well 

as an ability to conduct simultaneous major operations throughout the country. The 

enablers that coalition forces provide are in line with expectations and generally involve capabilities that take more time to build (i.e. close air support capability). The 

performance of many units has been solid, and some formations and specialist organizations are proving to be extremely capable. 

Growth in the size and capability of the ISF will be one of the major conditions 

that will allow us to continue to reduce coalition forces in Iraq while sustaining our 

security gains. If confirmed I will evaluate the consolidation this summer, to see if 

conditions on the ground will be such that I will be able to make a recommendation 

for some further reductions. Beyond the initial decision on post-surge force levels, 

we will continually assess security conditions in Iraq and seek to identify further 

possible force withdrawals.

IRAQ SECURITY FORCES

10. Senator COLLINS. Lieutenant General Odierno, there are roughly 90,000 mostly Sunni fighters that are now part of the so-called ‘‘awakening movements,’’ or 

‘‘SOI,’’ that are aligned with the United States and defending their home villages 

against both al Qaeda in Iraq and Shiite militias. This has been a very positive development in improving the security situation in Sunni parts of Iraq. The next step 

is to translate that success into true integration at the national level. According to 

the White House, the Government of Iraq and coalition forces have agreed that 20 

to 30 percent of these forces will be incorporated into the ISF, and the rest will be 

found jobs in the public or private sector. Some reports, however, indicate the Maliki 

Government is resistant to further integration of these forces, fearing that because 

many are veterans of Saddam Hussein’s army and Republican Guard, incorporating 

these fighters will result in a Sunni-led coup. Do you agree with this assessment? 

General ODIERNO. No, I think this is an inaccurate assessment. It is important 

that we work with the GOI to reduce illiteracy and develop job training programs 

to improve workers skills. Therefore we have increase vocational training targeted 

at the requirements for needed skills throughout Iraq. Many training programs do 

evolve into jobs for many of the students as some are immediately hired by contractors or public works projects that they trained on. 

Though the ‘‘Awakening Movement’’ did inspire the anti-al Qaeda movement, of 

which some elements have been formed into formal ‘‘SOI’’ programs, the two are not 

the same. It is an important distinction as we have the formal ‘‘SOI’’ who are working with the coalition forces and in full support of the Government of Iraq—some 

still on U.S. funded contracts and some either already transitioned to formal ISF 

jobs or some on their way to being formally integrated into the security apparatus. 

Then we have many other Sunni and Shia, as noted, who are not formally part of 

the ‘‘SOI’’—funded programs but still are aligned in support of the larger ‘‘Awakening’’ movements who support, in general, the Government of Iraq’s interest in preventing foreign entities—via proxy groups—to engage in terrorism or other criminal 

actions inside of Iraq. This larger ‘anti foreign influence’ movement—which is the 

essence of the ‘‘Awakening’’ movement—has been emanating from all sects of Iraqi 

society. We’re seeing both Sunni and, as of late, Shia elements express interest in 

joining forces with the Government of Iraq in some capacity to assist in taking control of the situation in Iraq’s cities and provinces. So this new phase of the overall 

movement, which is cross-sectarian in composition, is now referred to in Iraq as 

‘‘Isnad’’—or support—to denote the intention of the members of this movement to 

operate totally in support of the Government of Iraq to restore stability. 

Incorporating these ‘‘SOI’’ fighters into the ISFs will not lead to a Sunni-led coup.’’ 

When we approved this program when I was the Commander of Multi-National 

Corps Iraq, there was a concern that some of these ‘‘SOI,’’ who had previously supported and/or participated in armed conflict against the then nascent Government 

of Iraq and coalition forces, might revert back to their prior insurgent identities and 

use their new-found influence with the Government of Iraq Security Forces to attempt some type of armed rebellion. This was a known and calculated risk taken 

by myself, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker when we first decided to purVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00214 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
209

sue this endeavor. One of the key reasons we initially agreed to pursue the ‘‘SOI’’ 

was to fill a void as we eliminated former safe havens and sanctuaries. They assisted in forming neighborhood watch elements that would provide CF and ISF intelligence to help sustain our gains. We soon realized that many wanted to participate once again and be included in the future of Iraq. Some reasons for their state 

of exclusion were due to in part to sectarian bias and a certain level of corruption 

on the part of some Iraqi bureaucrats. Yet another reason for that was self-imposed 

on themselves by their voluntary boycott of the 2005 elections. Since then, the 

Sunni population writ large has come to see their decision to boycott the election—

shaped largely by corrupt religious political parties and intimidation—was a mistake. The reconciliation process and the existence of the ‘‘SOI’’ program is an example of their change in mindset and they have continued to demonstrate their commitment to the Government of Iraq as an institution and to the rule of law. There 

is a highly scrutinized vetting process conducted by CF which includes the collection 

of biometrics and spans all ministries in the Government of Iraq before these ‘‘SOI’’ 

can be accepted into formal Iraqi Government positions. This vetting process was 

approved by Prime Minister Maliki’s and one which has been described as slow, but 

prudent to ensure the integrity of the Iraqi Governmental services and of each member of the ‘‘SOI’’ integrated into Government posts. Most recently, as you may know, 

an 11-member delegation of Iraqi tribal and governmental leaders—to include 

Sheikh Ahmad Albu Risha of the Anbar-based Sahawa al Iraq movement and political party—travelled to Washington recently on their second State Departmentsponsored trip in 7 months. During their trip they held a number of meetings with 

senior U.S. officials to include audience with the President, the National Security 

Council, Senators and Congressmen. The delegation was comprised of both Sunni 

and Shia Iraqi leaders whom reaffirmed their support for improved Iraqi governance, rule of law, and a view toward creating an environment in Iraq focused on 

improved political participation. I believe these signs are encouraging; that the motives and intentions of the ‘‘SOI’’ and all those supporting these Sheikhs and Iraqi 

leaders who are leading the political outreach on behalf of their Iraqi constituencies 

will continue to pursue their political objectives via engagement with Government 

of Iraq leaders. With continued U.S. support both to the Government of Iraq, to the 

‘‘SOI’’ program, and to the overall national reconciliation efforts which is ongoing, 

combined with the demonstrated goodwill on the part of the coalition, Government 

and Iraqi Awakening leaders, there is little evidence to suggest the movement—or 

those former disenfranchised elements of Iraqi society, will attempt to achieve its 

political objectives via the use of force.

11. Senator COLLINS. Lieutenant General Odierno, what happens to those Sunni 

fighters who are not integrated into the ISF, but cannot find jobs? 

General ODIERNO. Only 25 percent of the SOI want to be integrated into the ISF. 

Approximately 50 percent of the SOI do not want to be integrated into the ISF and 

another 25 percent cannot be integrated into the ISF because they are physically 

or mentally unqualified. Therefore, MNC/F in conjunction with the GOI target the 

SOI who do not make it into the ISF for integration into capacity building programs 

that provide the transitioning either vocational training in a discipline/skill of their 

choice or apprentice style, on-the-job training in various disciplines and skills (mostly construction oriented) that meet needs/shortages of the local area with the goal 

being that once the programs are complete that the local area will absorb some or 

all of the newly skilled and transitioned SOI into employment. 

[The nomination reference of LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, 

follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

April 30, 2008. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

The following named officer for appointment in the United States Army to the 

grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under 

title 10, U.S.C., section 601: 

210

To be General. 

LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA. 

[The biographical sketch of LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, 

which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

RESUME ́ OF LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA 

Source of commissioned service: USMA.

Military schools attended:

Field Artillery Officer Basic and Advanced Courses 

United States Naval Command and Staff College 

United States Army War College

Educational degrees:

United States Military Academy - BS - No Major. 

North Carolina State University - MS - Engineering, Nuclear Effects. 

United States Naval War College - MA - National Security and Strategy.

Foreign language(s): None recorded.

Promotions:

Dates of appointment 

2LT .................................................................................................................................................................. 2 Jun 76

1LT .................................................................................................................................................................. 2 Jun 78

CPT ................................................................................................................................................................. 1 Aug 80

MAJ ................................................................................................................................................................. 1 Dec 86

LTC ................................................................................................................................................................. 1 Feb 92

COL ................................................................................................................................................................. 1 Sep 95

BG ................................................................................................................................................................... 1 Jul 99

MG .................................................................................................................................................................. 1 Nov 02

LTG ................................................................................................................................................................. 1 Jan 05

Major duty assignments:

From To Assignment 

Oct 76 ......... Jan 78 ..... Support Platoon Leader, later Firing Platoon Leader, C Battery, 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery, 56th Field Artillery Brigade, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany 

Jan 78 ......... Aug 78 .... Survey Officer, 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery, 56th Field Artillery Brigade, United States 

Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany 

Aug 78 ........ Oct 79 ..... Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General, 56th Field Artillery Brigade, United States Army 

Europe and Seventh Army, Germany 

Nov 79 ........ Jul 80 ...... Student, Field Artillery Advanced Course, Fort Sill, OK 

Aug 80 ........ Dec 80 .... Liaison Officer, 1st Battalion, 73d Field Artillery, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC 

Dec 80 ........ Dec 82 .... Commander, Service Battery, later A Battery, 1st Battalion, 73d Field Artillery, XVIII Airborne 

Corps, Fort Bragg, NC 

Dec 82 ........ May 83 .... Assistant S–3 (Operations), 1st Battalion, 73d Field Artillery, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, 

NC 

Jun 83 ......... May 84 .... S–3 (Operations), 3d Battalion, 8th Field Artillery, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC 

Jun 84 ......... Aug 86 .... Student, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 

Sep 86 ........ Jun 89 ..... Nuclear Research Officer, later Chief, Acquisition Support Division, Defense Nuclear Agency, Alexandria, VA, later detailed as Military Advisor for Anns Control, Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, Washington, DC 

Jun 89 ......... Jun 90 ..... Student, United States Naval Command and Staff Course, Newport, RI 

Jul 90 .......... Dec 90 .... Executive Officer, 2d Battalion, 3d Field Artillery, 3d Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany 

Dec 90 ........ Jun 91 ..... Executive Officer, Division Artillery, 3d Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany and Operations Desert Shield/Storm, Saudi Arabia 

Jun 91 ......... May 92 .... Executive Officer, 42d Field Artillery Brigade, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh 

Army, Germany 

Jun 92 ......... Jun 94 ..... Commander, 2d Battalion, 8th Field Artillery, 7th Infantry Division (Light), Fort Ord, CA (relocated to Fort Lewis, WA) 

Jun 94 ......... Jun 95 ..... Student, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 

Jun 95 ......... Jun 97 ..... Commander, Division Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX 

211

From To Assignment 

Jun 97 ......... Aug 98 .... Chief of Staff, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany 

Aug 98 ........ Jul 99 ...... Assistant Division Commander (Support), 1st Armored Division, United States Army Europe and 

Seventh Army, Germany to include duty as Deputy Commanding General for Ground Operations, Task Force Hawk, Operation Allied Force, Albania 

Jul 99 .......... Jul 01 ...... Director, Force Management, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, 

United States Army, Washington, DC 

Oct 01 ......... Aug 04 .... Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood, TX and Operation Iraqi 

Freedom, Iraq 

Aug 04 ........ Oct 04 ..... Special Assistant to Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, DC 

Oct 04 ......... May 06 .... Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Washington, DC 

May 06 ........ Dec 06 .... Commanding General, III Corps and Fort Hood, Fort Hood, TX 

Dec 06 ........ Feb 08 ..... Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq/Commanding General, III 

Corps 

Feb 08 ........ Present .... Commanding General, III Corps and Fort Hood, Fort Hood, TX 

Summary of joint assignments

Dates Rank 

Nuclear Research Officer, later Chief, Acquisition Support Division, Defense Nuclear Agency, Alexandria, VA, later detailed as Military Advisor for Arms Control, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC.

Sep 86–Jun 89 ...... Captain/Major 

Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, Washington, DC.

Oct 04–May 06 ..... Lieutenant General 

Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq/Commanding General, III Corps.Dec 06–Feb 08 ...... Lieutenant General 

U.S. decorations and badges: 

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster) 

Distinguished Service Medal 

Defense Superior Service Medal 

Legion of Merit (with five Oak Leaf Clusters) 

Bronze Star Medal 

Defense Meritorious Service Medal 

Meritorious Service Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters) 

Army Commendation Medal 

Army Achievement Medal 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge 

Army Staff Identification Badge 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]

212

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228

Washington, DC 20510–6050

(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Raymond T. Odierno.

2. Position to which nominated: 

Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq.

3. Date of nomination: 

April 30, 2008.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.]

5. Date and place of birth: 

8 September 1954; Dover, NJ.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Linda Marie Odierno (Maiden Name is Burkarth).

7. Names and ages of children: 

Anthony, 29; Kathrin, 27; Michael, 21.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed int eh service record extract provided to the committee by the executive 

branch. 

None.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution. 

None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

American Legion (Member) 

Association of the United States Army (Member) 

4th Infantry Division Association (Member) 

8th Field Artillery Regimental Affiliation (Member) 

9th Infantry Regiment Association (Member) 

1st Cavalry Division Association (Member)

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those lited on the service record extract provided to the committee 

by the executive branch. 

None. 

213

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee 

of the Senate? 

Yes, I do.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the 

administration in power? 

Yes, I do.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–

E are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO. 

This 30th day of April, 2008.

[The nomination of LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2008, with 

the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 10, 2008.] 

(215)

TO CONSIDER CERTAIN PENDING MILITARY 

NOMINATIONS 

THURSDAY, MAY 22, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m. in room 

SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, 

Ben Nelson, Pryor, Webb, Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, Thune, 

Martinez, and Wicker. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and Breon 

N. Wells, receptionist. 

Majority staff members present: Michael J. Kuiken, professional 

staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general 

counsel; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; William 

G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican 

staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; 

David G. Collins, research assistant; Gregory T. Kiley, professional 

staff member; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lynn F. Rusten, 

professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel; and Dana W. White, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Ali Z. Pasha. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Jay Maroney, assistant 

to Senator Kennedy; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; 

Bonni Berge, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple and 

Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R. 

Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Andrew Shapiro, 

assistant to Senator Clinton; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Anthony 

J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and 

Todd Stiefler, assistants to Senator Sessions; Andrew King, assistant to Senator Graham; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; 

David Hanke, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Andi Fouberg, assistant 

to Senator Thune; Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez; 

and Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker. 

216

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Since a quorum is now present, I ask the committee to consider a list of 142 pending military nominations. All 

of these nominations have been before the committee the required 

length of time. 

Is there a motion to favorably report these nominations? 

Senator WARNER. I so move. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is there a second? 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Second. 

Chairman LEVIN. All in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.] 

Opposed, nays. [No response.] 

The ayes have it. The motion carries. 

Thank you. [Pause.] 

Let me correct the record. I read 142 pending nominations. The 

correct number is 144 pending nominations, and if there’s no objection, that will be the action of the committee. I think everybody 

who voted here before is still here. 

Senator WARNER. Without objection. 

Chairman LEVIN. Without objection, we will correct the record in 

that way.

MILITARY NOMINATIONS PENDING WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

WHICH ARE PROPOSED FOR THE COMMITTEE’S CONSIDERATION ON MAY 22, 2008. 

1. RADM Harry B. Harris, Jr., USN to be Vice Admiral and Deputy Chief of 

Naval Operations for Communication Networks, N6, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Reference No. 1286). 

2. In the Navy Reserve there are three appointments to the grade of rear admiral 

(list begins with Julius S. Caesar) (Reference No. 1343). 

3. LTG Stanley A. McChrystal, USA, to be Lieutenant General and Director, Joint 

Staff (Reference No. 1352). 

4. RADM William H. McRaven, USN, to be Vice Admiral and Commander, Joint 

Special Operations Command/Commander, Joint Special Operations Command Forward, U.S. Special Operations Command (Reference No. 1354). 

5. RADM Michael C. Vitale, USN, to be Vice Admiral and Commander, Navy Installations Command (Reference No. 1355). 

6. RADM(lh) Raymond E. Berube, USN, to be Rear Admiral (Reference No. 1432). 

7. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of Rear Admiral (list begins with Richard R. Jeffries) (Reference No. 1433). 

8. In the Air Force, there are five appointments to the grade of Colonel (list begins 

with Lonnie B. Barker) (Reference No. 1465). 

9. Col. Kimberly A. Siniscalchi, USAF, to be Major General (Reference No. 1485). 

10. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of Rear Admiral (lower 

half) (list begins with David F. Baucom) (Reference No. 1518). 

11. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of Rear Admiral (lower 

half) (list begins with David C. Johnson) (Reference No. 1519). 

12. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of Rear Admiral (lower 

half) (list begins with Donald E. Gaddis) (Reference No. 1520.) 

13. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of Rear Admiral (lower 

half) (list begins with Michael H. Anderson) (Reference No. 1521). 

14. Capt. Norman R. Hayes, USN, to be Rear Admiral (lower half) (Reference No. 

1522). 

15. Capt. William E. Leigher, USN, to be Rear Admiral (lower half) (Reference 

No. 1524). 

16. MG Mark D. Shackelford, USAF, to be Lieutenant General and Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (Reference No. 

1565). 

17. BG John F. Mulholland, Jr., USA, to be Lieutenant General and Commanding 

General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command (Reference No. 1567). 

18. MG Philip M. Breedlove, USAF, to be Lieutenant General and Commander, 

Third Air Forces in Europe (Reference No. 1590). 

19. MG Charles E. Stenner, Jr., USAFR, to be Lieutenant General and Chief of 

Air Force Reserve (Reference No. 1600). 

217

20. RADM William E. Gortney, USN, to be Vice Admiral and Commander, U.S. 

Naval Forces, Central Command and Commander, Fifth Fleet (Reference No. 1601). 

21. VADM Melvin G. Williams, Jr., USN, to be Vice Admiral and Commander, 

Second Fleet (Reference No. 1602). 

22. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of Major (Cheryl Amyx) 

(Reference No. 1603). 

23. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of Major (Deborah K. 

Sirratt) (Reference No. 1604). 

24. In the Army, there are two appointments to the grade of Major (list begins 

with Mark A. Cannon) (Reference No. 1605). 

25. In the Army, there are two appointments to the grade of Lieutenant Colonel 

(list begins with Gene Kahn) (Reference No. 1606). 

26. In the Army, there are seven appointments to the grade of Lieutenant Colonel 

and below (list begins with Lozay Foots III) (Reference No. 1607). 

27. In the Army, there are five appointments to the grade of Lieutenant Colonel 

and below (list begins with Phillip J. Caravella) (Reference No. 1608). 

28. RADM David J. Dorsett, USN, to be Vice Admiral and Director of Naval Intelligence, N2, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Reference No. 1612). 

29. In the Navy, there are 21 appointments to the grade of Commander and below 

(list begins with Stanley A. Okoro) (Reference No. 1613). 

30. In the Air Force Reserve, there are two appointments to the grade of Colonel 

(list begins with Eric L. Bloomfield) (Reference No. 1615). 

31. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of Colonel (Jimmy 

D. Swanson) (Reference No. 1616). 

32. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of Colonel (Ronald 

J. Sheldon) (Reference No. 1617). 

33. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of Lieutenant Commander 

(Robert S. McMaster) (Reference No. 1618). 

34. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of Lieutenant Commander 

(Christopher S. Kaplafka) (Reference No. 1619). 

35. In the Army Reserve, there are 26 appointments to the grade of Major General and below (first name is Stephen E. Bogle) (Reference No. 1639). 

36. LTG Peter W. Chiarelli, USA, to be General and Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. 

Army (Reference No. 1642). 

37. RADM(lh) Kevin M. McCoy, USN, to be Vice Admiral and Commander, Naval 

Sea Systems Command (Reference No. 1657). 

38. VADM William D. Crowder, USN, to be Vice Admiral and Deputy Chief of 

Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy, N3/N5, Office of the Chief 

of Naval Operations (Reference No. 1658). 

39. RADM Peter H. Daly, USN, to be Vice Admiral and Deputy Commander, U.S. 

Fleet Forces Command (Reference No. 1659). 

40. In the Army, there are 11 appointments to the grade of Major (list begins with 

Brian M. Boldt) (Reference No. 1663). 

41. In the Air Force, there are three appointments to the grade of Major (list begins with Mary J. Bernheim) (Reference No. 1670). 

42. In the Air Force, there are eight appointments to the grade of Colonel and 

below (list begins with James E. Ostrander) (Reference No. 1671). 

43. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of Major (James K. 

McNeely) (Reference No. 1672). 

44. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of Lieutenant Commander 

(David R. Eggleston) (Reference No. 1673). 

45. In the Navy, there are six appointments to the grade of Captain and below 

(list begins with Katherine A. Isgrig) (Reference No. 1674). 

46. In the Navy, there are six appointments to the grade of Captain and below 

(list begins with Robert D. Younger) (Reference No. 1675). 

Total: 144.

[Whereupon, at 10:36 a.m., the committee adjourned.] 

(219)

NOMINATIONS OF HON. NELSON M. FORD TO 

BE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY; JOSEPH A. BENKERT TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL SECURITY AFFAIRS; SEAN J. STACKLEY TO BE 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR 

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION; AND FREDERICK S. CELEC TO BE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

FOR NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS 

THURSDAY, JUNE 26, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m. in room SD–

106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Warner, Thune, 

and Martinez. 

Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations 

and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; 

Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton 

Greene, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional 

staff member; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; William G.P. 

Monahan, counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican 

staff director; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; David 

M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff 

member; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff member; Diana G. 

Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority 

counsel. 

Staff assistants present: Ali Z. Pasha and Benjamin L. Rubin. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator 

Bayh; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Peg Gustafson, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Samuel Zega, assistant to Senator Warner; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Jason 

220

Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; David Brown, John L. 

Goetchius, and Brian W. Walsh, assistants to Senator Martinez; 

and Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. 

Today, the committee considers the nominations of Nelson Ford 

to be Under Secretary of the Army, Joseph Benkert to be Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs, Fred Celec to be 

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical 

and Biological Defense Programs, and Sean Stackley to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition. 

We welcome our nominees and their families to today’s hearing. 

We know the long hours that senior Department of Defense (DOD) 

officials put in every day. We appreciate the sacrifices that our 

nominees are willing to make to serve their country. We also know 

that they will not be alone in making those sacrifices. So, we thank 

in advance the family members of our nominees for the support 

and the assistance that all those family members will be needing 

to provide, and I know will be willingly providing. 

Each of our nominees will be called upon, if confirmed, to make 

important contributions to our national defense. 

If confirmed, Mr. Ford will take over as Under Secretary of the 

Army at a time when our soldiers and equipment are worn out and 

our Army families are stressed by extended and repeated deployments. The next Under Secretary has a critical role to play in restoring the readiness of the force and ensuring that our Army has 

the strategic depth needed to face the challenges of the decade 

ahead. In addition, section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 gives the Under Secretary a new role 

as the Chief Management Officer of the Army. Now, what that 

means is that the next Under Secretary will also be expected to 

play a leading role in addressing longstanding deficiencies in the 

Army’s business systems and management practices. 

If confirmed, Mr. Benkert will be the first person to serve in the 

new position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security 

Affairs. In that capacity, he will be responsible for coalition affairs, 

technology security policy, security cooperation, counternarcotics, 

counterproliferation, and countering global threats, detainee affairs, and prisoner of war/missing-in-action issues. Any one of those 

issues—detainee affairs, for example—would appear to be a fulltime job. Mr. Benkert is currently serving as Acting Assistant Secretary, and we look forward to his assessment of the responsibilities of the new position and how he intends to carry them out. 

The position to which Mr. Celec has been nominated, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, has been vacant for 2 years. This longstanding vacancy was cited by General Larry Welch, in his report 

on Nuclear Weapons Security, as emblematic of the inattention of 

DOD to nuclear security and command-and-control. This neglect, as 

reported earlier this month by Admiral Kirkland Donald, has resulted in inattention to detail, lack of discipline, and a degradation 

of authority, technical competence, and standards of excellence in 

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the handling of our nuclear weapons. We look forward to Mr. 

Celec’s thoughts on how to address these problems, along with the 

other important issues in his portfolio, which will include chemicalweapons destruction and chemical and biological defense programs. 

Finally, Mr. Stackley, if confirmed, will take over as the senior 

acquisition executive with the Department of the Navy at a time 

when the major defense acquisition programs of the DOD are overrunning their budgets by an aggregate total of $295 billion. Less 

than a year ago, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the Navy had experienced a cumulative cost growth of 

almost $5 billion on just 41 ships. According to the GAO, the Navy 

pushed programs forward, ‘‘without a stable design and without realistic cost estimates, resulting in higher costs, schedule delays, 

and quality programs.’’ If anyone is prepared to answer these problems, it should be Mr. Stackley, who has served our committee as 

the principal Republican staffer responsible for overseeing Navy 

and Marine Corps programs for more than 2 years. The Senate 

Armed Services Committee has benefited tremendously from the 

knowledge and the experience that Mr. Stackley brings to bear on 

Navy and Marine Corps programs and on acquisition programs 

generally. Should he be confirmed, our loss will be the Navy’s gain. 

These are extremely important positions. They merit the attention that we will be giving them today. 

Senator Warner. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’ll ask to place my statement in the record. 

You’ve covered, very accurately and carefully, the distinguished 

biological records of each of these nominees. 

I am so pleased to see that they’re joined by a number of members of their family this morning. Even though they have served in 

DOD for some period of time, I have always thought that, at this 

hearing, I would tell the families that their respective spouses 

should be home by 8 o’clock, as every decision made in the Pentagon after 8 o’clock is usually changed the next day. Having spent 

many years in that building myself, I tell you, I look back on it as 

probably one of the most exciting and challenging chapters of my 

life. 

I thank you for the service to, not only the men and women in 

uniform, but directly and indirectly to their families. Today’s military is very much of a family affair, and we should ever be mindful 

of their needs and their concerns, especially when their loved ones 

are sent on missions abroad. 

I will have to leave here shortly, which I rarely do, but, in this 

case, it’s an important meeting for me. I join my colleague from 

Virginia, Senator Jim Webb, and we’re discussing the new GI Bill, 

which, optimistically, will be passed by the United States Senate 

this afternoon and on its way with the House bill to the President 

for signature. 

I was—I say, with great sense of humility—the recipient of two 

GI Bills in my career, for different reasons, and wouldn’t be sitting 

in this chair today had it not been for what our Nation did for me 

and millions of others as they came back from their period in uniVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00227 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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form to regain a place in the civilian community and trying to acquire the education to do their jobs. You’ll hopefully forgive me for 

that. 

But, I wish each of you well. Again, I look back on my period 

there as one of the most exciting in my life. I often tell the story—

there was an old fellow there—this is 1969—who wore a green eyeshade, and he actually came there with Jim Forrestal when he was 

in the comptroller’s office. We all liked him. He used to wander 

around the hall and kibbitz with us about the ‘‘good old days,’’ as 

he said in those days. He said, ‘‘You know, you’d better always remember, you have a front row seat on the greatest and most important show on Earth.’’ That, you have, because it is the men and 

women in uniform, and their families, that are the guardians of the 

freedoms we have today. I know each of you, in your respective responsibilities, will ensure that they can do that as best they can. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Thank you, Senator Levin. 

I join you in welcoming our nominees and their families. I have been advised that 

all of them claim the Commonwealth of Virginia as their home State, and are looking to me to vouch for their qualifications. I am prepared to do that, Mr. Chairman. 

Each of these nominees has served, or is currently serving, with distinction in the 

Department of Defense (DOD). We are fortunate that they are willing to assume the 

duties of these vitally important positions at such a challenging time. 

Mr. Ford, you have worked your way up since 2002 from the position of Deputy 

Assistant Secretary for Health Budgets in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to 

the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller in 

2005, and, since December 2007, as Acting Under Secretary of the Army. Secretary 

Geren has given you his highest recommendation, which counts greatly in your 

favor. 

The Army’s senior leaders have stated that the Army is stressed and out of balance, but not broken. I hope you will be able to provide us today with current information about how the Army is ensuring that its combat units are fully trained, 

manned, and ready for their missions, and that Army families are receiving the support they need and deserve. 

Mr. Celec, you are returning to the office you previously served in as the Deputy 

Assistant for Nuclear Matters from 1996 through 2003. With your experience there, 

and for 21 years before that in the Air Force, I anticipate you will be greatly relied 

on in the Department’s further responses to the report of Admiral Donald and in 

working with Dr. Schlesinger’s task force in identifying the Department’s nuclear 

weapons policies and safeguards. 

Mr. Benkert and Mr. Stackley you have similar backgrounds—both distinguished 

graduates of the U.S. Naval Academy and both having many accomplishments as 

Navy career officers. 

Mr. Benkert, if you are confirmed, you will be the first Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs with a complex portfolio of responsibilities, including building international, interagency, and partner capabilities, overseeing DOD 

policies for coalition and multinational operations, counternarcotics and counterproliferation policies, and detainee affairs—among others. You have been working 

in this arena for several years, and you are clearly well qualified. 

We look forward to hearing your assessment of the challenges we face in this area 

and your views on what our strategy and policy toward them should be. 

Mr. Stackley, it is always a pleasure to see members of the committee’s professional staff selected for nomination to positions of great responsibility in the Department. You joined the committee in 2005 and, in the great tradition of this committee, have worked closely with Creighton Greene, Peter Levine, and other counterparts in a collegial and bipartisan way in order to ensure appropriate oversight, 

support, and when necessary, scrutiny of the Department’s programs. I thank you 

and your family for the excellent service you have given us.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner. 

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Let me now ask the standard questions of each of our nominees. 

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing 

conflicts of interest? [All four witnesses answered in the affirmative.] 

Chairman LEVIN. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken 

any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? [All four witnesses answered in the negative.] 

Chairman LEVIN. Will you ensure that your staff complies with 

deadlines established for requested communications, including 

questions for the record in hearings? [All four witnesses answered 

in the affirmative.] 

Chairman LEVIN. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and 

briefers in response to congressional requests? [All four witnesses 

answered in the affirmative.] 

Chairman LEVIN. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal 

for their testimony or briefings? [All four witnesses answered in the 

affirmative.] 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify, upon request, before this committee? [All four witnesses answered in the affirmative.] 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree to provide documents, including 

copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner 

when requested by a duly-constituted committee, or to consult with 

the committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or denial in providing such documents? [All four witnesses answered in 

the affirmative.] 

Chairman LEVIN. We thank you. 

As I call upon each of you for your opening statement, we’d be 

delighted if you would introduce any members of your family that 

might be with you. 

Secretary Ford? 

STATEMENT OF HON. NELSON M. FORD, TO BE UNDER 

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY 

Mr. FORD. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members 

of the committee, it is both an honor and a privilege to be here this 

morning as the President’s nominee for the Under Secretary of the 

Army. I want to thank Secretary Gates and Secretary Geren for 

their confidence in me, and for the Army’s staff in their help in preparing for this hearing. 

I’d like to introduce my wife, Cecilia, who’s behind me. She has 

been my partner and my number-one supporter during our many 

years together. She recently retired after 35 years as a Federal attorney, mostly with the Department of Health and Human Services. Her service continues as a strong supporter of our two sons 

on Active Duty. Aidan, our oldest, is a doctor in the Air Force, and 

Alex, who will graduate next month from Army Special Forces 

training, spent a year in Afghanistan with the 82nd Airborne. 

Their service is a great inspiration to me. 

I expect that my daughter, Mary, who is a senior at the University of Virginia and interested in medicine and public health, will 

follow them into public service, but I haven’t had any luck, so far, 

convincing her to join the Navy. [Laughter.] 

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The soldiers of our Army are a precious gift to the Nation. I am 

in awe of the soldiers’ commitment and the sacrifice of Army families who demonstrate their resilience in communities across the 

Nation and around the world. It has been humbling to help lead 

such a tremendous organization over the past 3 years, and I look 

forward to continuing my contribution as the Under Secretary of 

the Army. 

In this era of persistent conflict, during the 6th year of deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army is stretching to meet our 

assigned tasks. We are balancing the requirements of today’s deployments with needed investments in new capabilities to ensure 

our future security. 

Our soldiers and our Nation are counting on us to provide the 

direction and resources needed for the Army to succeed in its mission. 

Mr. Chairman, I am honored to be working on the challenges facing the Army today. If confirmed, I will work diligently to serve the 

Nation and the Army to the best of my ability. 

Finally, I would like to thank the committee for all it has done 

for the men and women, the soldiers and families of our Army. 

Your generous support and unwavering commitment to the Army’s 

needs has been instrumental to our success. If confirmed, I look 

forward to working with you and your staff in the months ahead. 

I believe that partnership and collaboration will be crucial to keeping the Army strong. 

I am happy to take your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Secretary Ford. 

Mr. Benkert? 

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH A. BENKERT, TO BE ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL SECURITY AFFAIRS 

Mr. BENKERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members of the Senate Armed 

Services Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today for this confirmation hearing. It is a great privilege and 

an honor to appear before you as the President’s nominee for the 

position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs and, Mr. Chairman, as you noted, the first nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs. 

I’d like to thank the President for nominating me for this position, and Secretary Gates for his confidence and support. I’d also 

like to thank the committee for what you’ve done, and continue to 

do, to support our Armed Forces, and, in particular, the men and 

women of our Armed Forces. 

Finally, I’d like to thank my family for their support as I pursue 

continued public service. With me this morning, seated behind 

me—are my wife, Gail—we’ve been married for 26 years through 

a career in the Navy, as well as public service following that—her 

mother, Jean Deveure, and my son, Stephen. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this committee, the United States Senate, and your colleagues in the House 

of Representatives, to advance the security of the United States. 

The issues within the purview of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs can only be addressed by working 

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closely together with Congress. I hope, if confirmed, to be able to 

work constructively with the committee to meet the many challenges facing us. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Benkert. 

Mr. Stackley? 

STATEMENT OF SEAN J. STACKLEY, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND 

ACQUISITION 

Mr. STACKLEY. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, members of 

the committee, thank you for your time and for the efforts of the 

committee in preparing this hearing today. I’m greatly honored 

that the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of 

the Navy have put forth my nomination, providing this opportunity 

to appear before you today. 

I would like to take a moment to introduce my wife and three 

of my four children who are joining me here today. My wife, Terry, 

has been keeping me out of trouble for the past 28 years. My oldest 

daughter, Erin, joins me—she currently works for Congressman 

‘‘Bob’’ Goodlatte in the House of Representatives; my son, Scott, 

and daughter, Maura. 

It has been my utmost privilege to serve the Senate Armed Services Committee these past few years. During this time, I’ve had the 

opportunity to work with, and learn from, the distinguished members of the committee, as well as my dedicated, very professional 

staff colleagues. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with 

this committee in helping to resolve the challenges before the acquisition community in the Department of the Navy. 

Before coming to the committee, I had the privilege of fulfilling 

a career in the Navy. When I consider the prospects of departing 

the committee to return to the Department, I’m equally humbled 

by, and focused on, this next opportunity to serve our sailors and 

marines, to provide them with the ships and aircraft, the systems 

and equipment that they require to train and deploy, to succeed in 

their missions, and to return home safely. 

If confirmed, I will work, with the best of my ability, to fulfill my 

duties and execute responsible leadership for research, development, and acquisition matters in the Department of the Navy. 

Again, I thank you for your time and look forward to answering 

your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Celec? 

STATEMENT OF FREDERICK S. CELEC, TO BE ASSISTANT TO 

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS 

Mr. CELEC. Thank you, sir. 

Senator Levin, Senator Warner, and members of the committee, 

I am honored to be here today, and appreciate your personal time 

at this critical point in your legislative calendar. I also wish to 

thank the President for having sufficient faith in me to nominate 

me for this important position. 

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I have a few remarks, but, before I make them, I’d like to introduce my family—my wife of 47 years, Irene, who’s behind me here; 

my daughter, Christine Gold, and her husband, Jonathan; their 

children and two of my four grandchildren, Adam and Hannah; and 

my son, Ken. 

Senators, if I am confirmed, I am already aware of several critical issues that I will have to address, simply from following the 

national news. I’m sure there are others that I’m not aware of that 

need resolving. 

Perhaps the most urgent is restoring the culture for nuclear safety and security in the Air Force. That culture was very much a 

part of the Air Force I served in for 21 years, and I will work hard 

to ensure its restoration. 

Another is supporting the congressionally mandated commission 

on our strategic posture, with the expectation that they will make 

recommendations that will help obtain bipartisan support for the 

future of our nuclear enterprise. 

Yet another is ensuring, to the best of our ability, that we destroy our chemical munitions as rapidly as possible and attempt to 

meet the treaty-mandated 2012 date for completion. 

Finally, there are issues surrounding the way ahead for the entire nuclear enterprise as systems continue to age, and many are 

approaching their end of useful service life. 

If confirmed, I will work to get each of these issues on track toward resolution. But, I recognize that I will need the support and 

encouragement from both the administration and Congress in order 

to be successful. If confirmed, I expect to work closely with you and 

your staffs as we seek to resolve these difficult, but strategically 

important, issues of national security. 

This concludes my opening remarks. Thank you, sir. I will be 

happy to answer any questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Again, thanks to all of your family, whether they’re here or 

whether they’re unable to be here. 

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, could I put my questions into 

the record and, thus, let them reply to them that way? 

Again, forgive me. We’re going to announce the GI Bill, which is 

going to help the very men and women, after they leave the service, that you’re working with. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner. The questions will 

be asked, for the record, and our witnesses will be asked to promptly answer the questions of Senator Warner or other Senators who 

may not be here; some cases, those of us who are able to be here. 

Secretary Ford, let me start with you. The Army has three major 

modernization initiatives that are going to shape the force over the 

next several years, and perhaps over the next several generations. 

Those are growing the Army’s end strength, restructuring units to 

the modular design, and transformation to the Future Combat System (FCS). All three have very expensive investment implications 

for the Army’s current and future budget. However, it’s uncertain 

that the Army will be able to afford all three modernization initiatives at the same time. Could you give us your thoughts on that, 

227

as to the affordability of these initiatives within the current and 

projected Army budgets? 

Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We believe that we do have enough financial wherewithal to complete all three initiatives. Of course, the FCS program will not 

reach its full acquisition until after the end of the upcoming budget 

cycle, and so, the out-year fiscal guidance for that system hasn’t yet 

been given. But, over the next 6 years, out through fiscal year 

2015, we think that we’re able to afford all three programs, in balance, to keep the Army a balanced force, going forward. Our budget 

planning will reflect that when it’s submitted to Congress. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, ongoing operations supporting the global 

war on terror put a huge amount of wear and tear on Army equipment throughout the force. So, now there’s going to be a real challenge to reset the force, not only as current operations continue, 

but for as many as 3 to 5 years after they conclude. Could you give 

us your view, Secretary Ford, as to whether the Army’s current 

equipment reset program meets the requirements of the global war 

on terror as well as the requirements for changing to a modular 

force? 

Mr. FORD. The plans that we’ve had over the last several years 

to reset the Army have been largely based on supplemental funding, and it’s been our position that we will require substantial supplemental funding, on the order of $15 to $17 billion a year, for 

several years after the deployments diminish. Of course, we need 

that amount of money every year, with the deployments at the current rate, so it’s about a $17-billion-a-year investment that’s required to sustain the wear and tear on the equipment, based on 

current deployment levels. 

We think that those are appropriate expenses to be included in 

the supplemental, and we look forward to working with Congress 

to help Congress understand why those are valuable and important 

expenses to be appropriated. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is it your understanding that our repair depots 

are operating at full capacity to meet rebuild-and-repair requirements for the reset? 

Mr. FORD. Our depots are running at full capacity, but not at 

maximum capacity. If there was more money, we could run three 

shifts, or two long shifts each day, 6 days a week, with downtime 

on the weekends for equipment maintenance. But, they are running at very full capacity, and they are running commensurate 

with the amount of funds that we have available to support them. 

The labor hours are up almost 100 percent over the predeployment 

period. 

Chairman LEVIN. Would you give us, for the record, what maximum capacity could produce and what its cost would be? 

Mr. FORD. We can certainly do that, yes, sir. 

[The information referred to follows:]

The Army’s maintenance depots have surged to more than double their output 

since 2003 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). They have done this by increasing their workforce (both contract and 

Federal employees), working multiple shifts and increased overtime, and becoming 

more efficient (through numerous efficiencies derived from Lean Six Sigma and 

other management initiatives). We can surge still further if Army requirements so 

dictate—around half of our fiscal year 2008 execution level of 27 million direct labor 

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hours, or a little over 40 million direct labor hours total—with our current physical 

infrastructure. To do so, we would require ample time to hire and train additional 

personnel (6 to 9 months), and to obtain long lead repair parts to support increased 

production (up to 18 months for some systems such as the Bradley and M1 Abrams). 

We currently have personnel plans and long lead items in the supply pipeline to 

continue production at planned levels through fiscal year 2009. As OIF/OEF requirements change beyond fiscal year 2009, our personnel resourcing and long lead item 

planning will adjust accordingly. Because our depots are Army Working Capital 

Fund industrial organizations, they are self-sustaining through the rates they 

charge to customers. Thus, there is no ‘‘cost’’ to surge other than the additional cost 

of the funded reset programs themselves. The cost of additional funded reset programs would vary depending upon the systems being reset—for example, additional 

Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems workload would cost much more than additional 

small arms workload.

Chairman LEVIN. By the way, we’ll have a 10-minute round here 

for the first round, if that’s all right. Does that work for you, Senator Martinez? 

Secretary Ford, the Army’s practice of using supplemental appropriations to fund parts of its annual modernization or routine 

maintenance costs obscures the real growth in the Army base budget. That’s because of supplemental appropriations. We may, in fact, 

be losing sight of what a trained and ready Army will realistically 

cost on an annual basis after the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan draw down. 

Secretary Ford, give us your views on how supplemental appropriations have been used over the years, and its potential impact, 

if any, on our ability to estimate the annual baseline costs of a 

trained and ready Army. 

Mr. FORD. Senator Levin, we are very mindful of the effect of 

supplementals on the training and reset requirements in the Army, 

and we track very carefully what activities have been transferred 

from the base program to the supplemental. They’re mostly in the 

areas of equipment reset and in training costs, where the training 

costs specific to the deployments that we’re entering into have been 

transferred to the supplemental at the direction of the Department. 

But, we are monitoring that very carefully, and we understand that 

as the deployments draw down, we’re going to have a challenge in 

transferring this activity back to the base. We are doing that planning now. We understand. We’re building a base budget that’s 

based on fiscal guidance at historic rates, not at substantiallygreater-than-historic rates, and we are paying very careful attention to that issue. 

Chairman LEVIN. Secretary Ford, if confirmed as Under Secretary, you’ll also become the Chief Management Officer of the 

Army, with responsibility for improving the Army’s outdated business systems and processes. One of the keys to successful business 

transformation is a sound business enterprise architecture and 

transition plan to guide investment decisions. 

Last month GAO reported that the Army has fully satisfied only 

1 of 31 core elements of a sound business enterprise architecture. 

Moreover, the GAO reported that the Army has ‘‘experienced a 29-

percent decrease in those core elements that it had partially satisfied a year ago.’’ In other words, not only has the Army not made 

any discernible progress towards an enterprise architecture, it is 

actually going backward. 

229

What steps would you take to reverse this trend and ensure that 

the Army has a sound foundation for business transformation? 

Mr. FORD. Senator Levin, we’ve been working very diligently, 

since I joined the Department 3 years ago, on improving our business systems. We have three major efforts ongoing. We have the 

General Fund Accounting System, that’s in development, that will 

give us a good realtime view of the financial transactions of the Department, not only the income statement, but the balance sheet. 

It’s in test now, and it’s scheduled to go to full, live operation in 

the next couple of years. We are using our logistics system, and we 

are marrying that with our financial system, so that we will be 

able to track both our equipment and its financial aspects at the 

same time. We are leading the Department’s effort in implementing 

the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System, which 

is the new payroll/personnel system for DOD, and we’re doing a 

test of that late this year, with full implementation scheduled for 

next year. 

I’ve spent a significant part of my career working on information 

systems and information systems implementations. They are complicated, difficult to do, particularly in an enterprise the size of the 

Army, with $150 billion worth of base activity and a million people. 

But, we are working at it—we work at it every day—with great seriousness of purpose. 

Chairman LEVIN. Would you agree that the Army business transformation has not been well served by the existing stovepipe organization and that the Department needs a single office responsible 

for managing the effort to reform business systems and processes? 

Mr. FORD. I would agree with that conclusion. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Martinez. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning. 

Senator MARTINEZ. I wanted to begin by thanking all of you for 

your willingness to serve, and, again, to add my word of congratulations and thanks to your families, as well. 

I particularly wanted to single out Mr. Stackley, who I’ve had the 

privilege of working with in the Seapower Subcommittee. We are, 

again, very proud of your career as a naval officer, and, particularly, we appreciate your service to the United States Senate. As 

was mentioned earlier, the Navy’s gain is certainly our loss, and 

we will miss you greatly, but we wish you the very best and are 

proud of what you have done and what you will continue to do. 

On that vein, I wanted to just follow through and ask Mr. 

Stackley a couple of questions along the lines of the things that 

we’ve been working on having to do with the Navy and our shared 

concern about low rates of production that have been experienced 

lately, and how that relates also to an industrial base that will suffer if we don’t resolve these issues. I wonder if you might address 

that for us. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Thank you, Senator Martinez, and thank you for 

the kind words. 

Let me start in addressing that important question by going back 

to the Navy shipbuilding plan itself. If you look back, a couple of 

years ago, the Navy shipbuilding plan, in fact, was changing annuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00235 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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ally. So, each year, a new 30-year shipbuilding plan would emerge 

which would have a different forecast for the numbers and types 

of ships to support the Navy’s requirements, as well as the industrial base. 

When Admiral Mullen took over as Chief of Naval Operations 

(CNO), he recognized that this churn in planning for shipbuilding 

was harming both the Navy’s ability to meet its requirements, as 

well as the industrial base’s ability to facilitize, to equip their 

workforce, to efficiently meet the Navy’s requirements. Therefore, 

he chartered a group that took a look at the long-term requirements, and included in the plan the Navy’s commitment to stabilize 

that plan. 

I think the committee is well aware of what’s referred to as the 

313-ship Navy. Incorporated in this plan is an attempt to, one, provide stability, and, two, to procure the ships at a rate that balances 

the Navy’s requirements, the Navy’s resources, and the industrial 

base’s needs to be able to stabilize around that plan. 

It continues to be a challenge. The rates at which we’ve been procuring ships over the past 10 to 15 years has been about six, seven, 

eight per year. Taking a metric, where you take the number of 

ships per year that you procure, versus the number of shipyards 

that you have, it’s been just about one ship per year per shipyard. 

The future plan looks at increasing that rate, to get up to a 313-

ship Navy, as well as to improve upon the base for the shipyards. 

The challenge remains to accomplish that affordably within the resources that are available to the Navy. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Do you think that we have a realistic plan 

that can get us to that 313-ship Navy? Do we have a realistic approach to getting that done? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Let me answer that question in terms of historical and then future projections. 

Historically, over the last 10 to 15 years, the Navy’s investment 

in shipbuilding has averaged $10 to $12 billion per year. When you 

look out to the end of the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) and 

beyond, the investment that’s required to meet the 313-ship plan 

is on the order of $18 to $20 billion per year. Right there, you have 

a 50-percent increase in the investment required to meet the plan. 

That challenge is significant, and that investment is going to be 

required at the same time that other bills are coming to the Department. Would I call it realistic? I think it requires significant 

effort, between now and the end of the FYDP, to retire the risk associated with both cost projections and the inherent challenges associated with ship construction. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Finally, let me ask you, in the area of concerns that we share—the DDG–1000 and its future—what do we 

need to do to get that program back on track, as well as the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Let me start with the DDG–1000. The DDG–1000 

program represents a significant investment in research and development in establishing requirements for the capability that the 

ship brings to the fleet. Up to this point in time, the Navy has done 

a credible job, a thorough job, of establishing the requirements, 

identifying the risks, and putting together a development plan to 

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retire those risks through a series of engineering development models for the top-10 technology risks for the program. 

The two lead ships—authorized and appropriated in the 2007 

budget—were awarded design and construction contracts earlier 

this year. By all measures, they are currently on track, at this very 

nascent stage of design and construction, there appears to be a robust plan in place to manage the risk, but the fact remains that 

the capabilities that are brought to that platform are, in fact, leading-edge, and the investment in those 10 engineering development 

models still has in front of it the integration of those technologies 

on the platform. 

I believe that, at this stage, proper planning has gone into the 

lead ships. We are at the front end of execution and need to maintain discipline in managing the risk to the program, discipline in 

managing design and requirements so we don’t introduce disruption. We need to provide the oversight required, not just in the 

shipyard, but in the systems development arena, to ensure that the 

risk management plan holds true to its intentions. 

The LCS program is at a similar stage, but arrived here at a 

much different path. As opposed to the DDG–1000 program, which 

had a lengthy development period, the LCS program placed an emphasis on accelerating design and construction to deliver a capability that is needed in the fleet today. Risk was assumed in the 

design and construction phase. Risk was not retired through the 

development phase. As a result, you had a lot of parallel development/design/construction taking place; and, as soon as disruption 

was introduced into the program, through design change, snowballing effect took place and costs grew significantly. 

Today, the first two lead ships—one is getting ready for trials; 

the second ship, in the water, 6 to 9 months behind the first ship. 

At this stage, we have to push these ships to completion of their 

tests and trials. We have to clean up the design on those ships to 

enable a more orderly construction process for follow-on ships. 

There’s much left to be learned on the programs. The third, fourth, 

and fifth ships have been solicited. Those bids are in the hands of 

the Navy. They’re evaluating those proposals. There’s an understanding of the cost cap that was introduced by Congress. I think, 

at this stage, we complete the evaluation of the proposals and complete the design, test, and trials for those ships. The CNO has been 

emphatic—the past three CNOs have been emphatic—that this is 

an important requirement. They are wrestling with the cost growth 

to ensure that we continue to meet the requirement. But, there’s 

much information to be learned in completing these first ships before building the path for the follow-on ships. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Benkert, I want to just ask you if you might have any comment on the proliferation issue as it relates to the announcement 

this morning on North Korea that the President made—obviously, 

the concern was their potential involvement in Syria and what was 

discovered there just a few weeks ago, and whether you feel that 

this announcement today is significant, in terms of ameliorating or 

decreasing the threat to the world, of proliferation from North 

Korea. 

Mr. BENKERT. Thank you, Senator Martinez. 

232

I would just note, first of all, that our Department, and this job 

to which I’ve been nominated, in particular, have been very much 

in a mode, here, of supporting the lead, when it comes to North 

Korea, of the Secretary of State and Ambassador Christopher Hill. 

We are full participants in this process, and, in particular, in evaluating how one would go about verifying North Korean declarations. I think, as this process has continued, the prospect, obviously, is for a significant reduction in the proliferation threat as we 

go forward. But, again, within the scope of my competence here, I 

am in the business of helping to support this process as it moves 

forward and to help ensure that we can verify what is declared in 

the process. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you. My time’s expired. Thank you all 

very much. I congratulate all of you on your future assignments, 

and look forward to working with you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Martinez. 

Secretary Ford, I’m concerned that the Army is still not investing 

enough in developing next-generation technologies to reduce the 

Army’s fuel-related costs and logistics burdens. The Army is not 

moving aggressively, still, to develop and adopt advanced energy 

technologies and systems, including vehicles, that could increase 

performance, enhance military capabilities, and reduce costs to the 

taxpayer, and reduce the use of fossil fuel. If confirmed, what proposals would you make to put the Army on a more aggressive path 

in developing and adopting advanced energy technologies? 

Mr. FORD. Thank you, Senator Levin. 

Just this past week, Secretary Geren asked to have a meeting on 

this issue, and we addressed several ideas. 

First, the majority of our spending on fuel is for nontactical vehicles and for energy on our posts, camps, and stations. The first efforts, and the efforts where we think we can have some almost immediate impact, are moving to acquisition of hybrid vehicles for the 

nontactical vehicles on posts, camps, and stations, and looking for 

pilot ways to look at solar power, wind power, energy conservation 

in the buildings here in the United States. 

FCS is based on the theory that the common platform will be a 

hybrid vehicle, I believe, diesel/electric vehicle. So, we are investing 

in the technology for the tactical vehicles to reduce our fuel consumption. 

Our current tactical vehicles consume great amounts of fuel, and 

we understand that the logistic tail required to get that fuel to the 

tactical vehicles is a real problem. We are looking at it both in the 

tactical and nontactical areas. 

Chairman LEVIN. We have some laws on the books that require 

the military to look at alternative fuel systems for the nontactical 

vehicles. Instead of doing what we said that the Army and the 

other Services should do throughout the years, there usually is a 

waiver signed that is simply waiving it, because the comparable 

cost isn’t there. Are you going to take a different kind of a view 

of the need to do this now? 

Mr. FORD. I’m not aware of any waivers that have been signed 

in the past. It wasn’t under my purview, I don’t believe. But, in the 

future, with gas at north of $4 a gallon, the economics of energy, 

particularly with regard to nontactical vehicles, has clearly 

233

changed, and we will look at that very carefully. But, our plan is 

to almost immediately take advantage of General Services Administration’s offering of significant numbers of hybrid vehicles. 

Chairman LEVIN. I hope you would not just look at the current 

economies, but also the future. The problem is that when gas was 

cheap, they always said, ‘‘Well, it doesn’t pay.’’ It would have paid. 

We could have kept gas cheap if we had taken the pressure off buying more and more oil. I understand what you’re saying about the 

current cost of gas making it easier to justify economically, but I 

think we have to take a longer view. Even if a miracle happened 

and gas prices came down, the same truth would be there. We’ll 

count on you to take a look at that. 

We also would invite you to come out and take a look at the ways 

in which the Army is working on dual-use technologies, including 

vehicle designs and batteries, but also how that can be increased, 

that dual-use approach. Would you be willing to come out and take 

a look at that? 

Mr. FORD. Very interested in doing that, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Secretary Ford, in the aftermath of the problems with outpatient 

care in facilities at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, the Army 

established Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) to which all injured 

or ill soldiers were assigned. The exclusive mission of these units 

is to heal. While we certainly commend the Army for the work done 

thus far to help improve the quality of care and case management 

of these wounded warriors, high operational tempo and recent redeployments of large combat units have increased the size of many 

of these transition units, to the point where case manager staffing 

no longer meets the ratios of case managers to wounded warriors 

which were established by the Army. Additionally, we’ve heard that 

the Army expects that these WTUs will grow by as much as 900 

soldiers per month for the foreseeable future. 

The most alarming case that we’ve heard about is at Fort Hood, 

where the number of nurse case managers to soldiers is far beyond 

the Army’s established ratio. Are you familiar with that situation 

at Fort Hood? 

Mr. FORD. I am. 

Chairman LEVIN. Can you tell us what is being done to help increase the number of case managers to support the wounded-warrior population? 

Mr. FORD. At the beginning of this year, we expanded the definition of who would be included in WTUs. In January, we had a caseload of about 5,000; our current caseload is almost 13,000. So, in 

a 6-month, almost 7-month period, it’s more than doubled. 

We believe, at this point, that we have identified almost everybody that is going to be included in the WTUs. The key, at this 

point, is to make sure that we are providing the right services to 

each of those folks, as they are needed. Some of those folks have 

never deployed—actually, 40 percent have never deployed. Anyone 

who is in a medical limited-duty status has been, kind of, wrapped 

under the WTU label. What we need to do now is to figure out 

which of our soldiers need simply to be monitored, that they’re 

making their medical appointments, and which need the serious 

physical rehabilitation, mental-health services required so that 

234

they can heal and either get back to their unit or move on with the 

rest of their lives. 

We are looking at this very carefully. The chief of staff intends 

to deliver new guidance, I think, in the next couple of days on this 

issue. Brigadier General Gary Cheek has just taken over as the 

head of the WTU. He’s a very able leader and really, I think, has 

his hands around the administrative—or the management problems that currently have been created by this explosive growth. 

We don’t think that there will be much more growth from current levels. So, really, at this point, it’s about figuring out how to 

take care of the wounded warriors in the best possible way. 

Chairman LEVIN. It’s your continuing goal, as I know it is ours, 

that all wounded and injured soldiers will be assigned to WTU? 

Mr. FORD. Oh, yes. They’ll be assigned to WTUs. 

Chairman LEVIN. Congress authorized, last year at the request 

of the Department, an increase to the maximum monthly amount 

of hardship duty pay from $750 to $1,500. The Army’s proposing 

to use this authority to institute an umbrella pay program, called 

Warrior Pay, that will reward servicemembers for lengthy or repeated deployments to certain high-risk areas. Will any 

servicemember, at the end of the day, receive, under your approach, less money under the Warrior Pay Program than they are 

now, under the various special and incentive pays? 

Mr. FORD. I am not familiar with the details of that program sufficiently so that I could assure you that there is no situation in 

which someone would get paid less. But, clearly the intention is 

that pay for warriors who are deployed in theater would be greater 

than it is today. That is our intention. 

Chairman LEVIN. Can you double check with people who are familiar with the details, so that you can give us the assurance that 

there won’t be any reduction as a result of this new program? 

Mr. FORD. We’ll be happy to look into it further. 

[The information referred to follows:]

No soldier will receive less money under the Warrior Pay concept than they receive with special and incentive pays authorized today. The Army intends to continue paying soldiers the current incentives until Warrior Pay is implemented. No 

soldier will be adversely affected by the implementation of this new program. At 

this time, soldiers are not rewarded for frequent and lengthy tours in a fair and 

equitable manner. Some soldiers who are in units that have been involuntarily extended in theater by the Secretary of Defense are receiving $1,000 per month Assignment Incentive Pay for 1 to 3 months. Under the Warrior Pay concept, soldiers 

would be eligible for the pay once they have served greater than 365 days in a combat zone—or $2,400 in additional compensation for the second tour in a combat 

zone. The proposed pay structure would then increase the monthly amount paid for 

each additional 365 days deployed. We believe Warrior Pay will provide a more equitable and predictable system to compensate for deployments. All components 

would receive the same amount of pay for deploying.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Benkert, you made reference, now, to the announcement this 

morning about North Korea, and I have a number of questions on 

that, but I also want to just announce—staff can carry this back 

to the Senators—that we are going to be having a hearing on this 

announcement today. We’ll have a hearing sometime in July, before 

this committee, going into the issues in detail. But, I just want to 

ask you a few questions this morning. 

235

Do you know what the plan is for the plutonium that has been 

produced in North Korea? What commitment has been made or insisted upon by us? 

Mr. BENKERT. Mr. Chairman, I don’t know. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. 

Mr. Celec, would you know, by any chance? 

Mr. CELEC. No, sir, I do not. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. 

Do you know what role, Mr. Benkert, the Defense Department’s 

going to play in assisting the disablement and dismantlement of 

the nuclear program? 

Mr. BENKERT. The role the Defense Department is going to play 

obviously is constrained, at this point, by the Glenn Amendment. 

The Department has been supportive of the lead that State Department has had. I think that the Department will be involved in the 

verification, and the Department will be involved, as is necessary, 

in other aspects. But, we have not been asked, at this point, to support the dismantlement. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you know what information, if any, was 

provided by North Korea, relative to its alleged enriched uranium 

program? 

Mr. BENKERT. Sir, I do not. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. 

Mr. Celec, would you know? 

Mr. CELEC. No, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. 

Mr. Celec, just on this subject, let me move to you—do you have 

any understanding that’s different from what we heard from Mr. 

Benkert about the actions that DOD may undertake to implement 

the disablement or the dismantlement of North Korean nuclear 

program? 

Mr. CELEC. Historically, the Department has provided the logistics necessary to move things for the Department of Energy and 

the Department of State. I would assume that that’s the role that 

they will continue to provide in this operation. 

Chairman LEVIN. The President said this morning, ‘‘a moment of 

opportunity for North Korea. If North Korea continues to make the 

right choices, it can repair its relationship with the international 

community. If North Korea makes the wrong choices, the United 

States and our partners in the Six-Party Talks will respond accordingly. If they do not fully disclose and end their plutonium, their 

enrichment, and their proliferation efforts and activities, there will 

be further consequences.’’ 

Do you know what the President was referring to, Mr. Benkert? 

Mr. BENKERT. Mr. Chairman, I don’t know. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you know, Mr. Celec? 

Mr. CELEC. No, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. 

Mr. Benkert, you stated, in your responses to the advance policy 

questions, that there’s a need for better coordination between 

DOD’s counternarcotics program and the security assistance program. One area where DOD will encounter, could encounter, a duplication of efforts is in the West Africa region, where the counterVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00241 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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narcotics program has requested expanded authorities, and where 

DOD has utilized, extensively, it’s section 1206 authorities. 

But, on the same issue of coordination, earlier this month I sent 

a letter to Secretary Gates regarding the $75 million in funding for 

the Pakistan Frontier Corps, requesting that it be made conditional 

on the inclusion in any peace deals that are struck between the 

Government of Pakistan and the tribal militants of a commitment 

to stop cross-border incursions into Afghanistan and a strong mechanism to enforce that commitment. 

It’s my understanding that, in addition to that funding, DOD also planned to expend approximately $54 million in funding from 

the counternarcotics program in fiscal year 2008. In your view, 

what should be the status of that $54 million? Should that funding 

be conditioned—indeed, should the $75 million in funding that I 

previously referred to be conditioned—on a peace agreement between the Government of Pakistan and the tribal leaders, including 

a commitment to stop cross-border incursions with strong enforcement mechanisms? 

Mr. BENKERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, I would just note that the $54 million that you had 

mentioned in counternarcotics funding was very closely coordinated 

with the plans for the $75 million so as to avoid duplication of effort and also to stay in the proper lanes. 

I would also note that one of the intents—among the intent of 

the counternarcotics program is to assist in creating border surveillance centers—initially on the Afghan side of the border, but potentially also on the Pakistan side, later on. In addition to our personnel, these border surveillance centers would be staffed with Afghan and Pakistan personnel, as well, precisely to assist in being 

able to monitor what may be going back and forth across the border. 

So, from that point of view, I do not think that it would be necessary—or wise—to make the funding contingent on some sort of 

an agreement with the Pakistanis, since, in part, the purpose of 

this funding is to assist in stopping the cross-border operations. 

Chairman LEVIN. The problem is that there’s some evidence that 

Pakistan doesn’t care about those cross-border operations, and 

could easily be supporting militants crossing into Afghanistan between those posts that you talk about. Unless we have an understanding from the tribal leaders that they’re going to put an end 

to this and that they’re going to give us some metrics that we can 

measure putting that to an end, we would potentially be spending 

$75 million of taxpayer dollars to support a Pakistan Frontier 

Corps, which is the opposite goal that we have. That’s the concern 

that I’ve raised with Secretary Gates. The mere presence of some 

posts along the border—I don’t know how many you’re talking 

about—doesn’t solve the problem, unless there’s an intent, on the 

Pakistan side, to put an end to the militants crossing the border 

into Afghanistan, where they’re attacking our troops. 

Do you have any opinion, then, about the importance of getting 

the commitment of those tribal leaders? Our military people and 

our diplomats have said it’s critically important that we get those 

commitments as part of any peace agreements. I’m just wondering 

what your view is on it. 

237

Mr. BENKERT. Mr. Chairman, I think the concern that you have 

expressed is known, and there is an understanding of this concern. 

This issue—it’s on the Secretary’s agenda, as well as the Chairman’s and the senior military leaders, including the Commander of 

International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. I think I 

would defer to them on the answer of whether some additional restrictions might be necessary based on their discussions with their 

Pakistani counterparts. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Since I’ve stated publicly that we 

sent this letter to Secretary Gates, I’ll state publicly that we are 

anxiously awaiting a response to that letter. 

I understand that you, as Assistant Secretary for Global Secretary Affairs, would be overseeing the Office of Detainee Affairs. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. BENKERT. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. The office that formulates defense policies in 

support of strategic defense affairs objectives, including that office. 

I visited one of those detention operations at Camp Cropper, in 

Baghdad, when I was there in March. It was a very impressive operation, with standards which I consider to be really important 

standards, with a new reintegration effort being made for the detainees, with programs that included family visits, religious discussion, literacy, and vocational training. Are you familiar with that 

approach? 

Mr. BENKERT. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you support it? 

Mr. BENKERT. Very much so. I think one of the very positive developments in detention operations in Iraq over the past year or so, 

under the leadership of Major General Doug Stone, who was the 

commander of the Detainee Task Force, was a shift in focus from 

simply holding detainees off the battlefield, to a focus on what he 

called counterinsurgency within the wire, which is to ensure the 

fact that they had been put into a detainee facility did not make 

jihadis or insurgents out of individuals who were not radical to 

start with, and then to provide a way to reintegrate them into society when they left. I think the track record has been very good. 

The intent now, obviously, is to try to apply what we’ve learned in 

this process elsewhere, such as Afghanistan. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is it your intent that the lessons learned from 

these positive operations would be incorporated into DOD doctrine 

and procedures and training? 

Mr. BENKERT. Absolutely. We need to capture these lessons 

learned. 

Chairman LEVIN. As a Nation, we have a long way to go to 

cleanse the stain of Abu Ghraib, and this is an important part of 

that shift of the perception of us in our dealing and handling of detainees. 

Al Qaeda has a safe haven in Pakistan. What can we do to try 

to eliminate that safe haven, more than what we’re already doing? 

Mr. BENKERT. Mr. Chairman, again, within the competence of 

the position to which I’ve been nominated, I would note that the 

Office of Global Security Affairs is in the position of looking at the 

tools that are available to carry out the intent that is determined 

by the Secretary and the military commanders. I think that, again, 

238

at the level that we support these operations, we are fortunate to 

have a set of tools available to us, that you have given us, that 

allow us to put together a package that addresses the issue of the 

safe haven. 

I would also note that there are issues here, in the world of 

counterterrorism, that I would not be able to talk about in this 

hearing, but I think the principle point is that we have the ability 

to put together the necessary set of support mechanisms that 

would assist the Pakistani military in dealing with this. We also 

have measures that are available to our forces, as well. 

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Benkert, we face a huge number of global 

security challenges. In order to address many of them, we’re going 

to need a sustained cooperation, internationally, and that includes 

cooperation with Russia; Iran just being one example, but one of 

the bigger ones. We have a number of successful areas of cooperation with Russia, but we also have some significant strains in the 

relationship. Can you give us your assessment as to the future of 

cooperation with Russia on a number of international security challenges? Can we improve that security cooperation with Russia? 

Mr. BENKERT. Mr. Chairman, I think we can. I appreciate the 

fact that you’ve noted that we have examples of successful cooperative programs, as well as strains, in the relationship. I think it’s 

unfortunate that attention is sometimes only paid to the strains. I 

think some of those are well known; for example, in the area of 

missile defense. 

Let me just note several areas where I think we have very productive relationships with Russia that continue and on which we 

want to expand. 

First, I think, the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, 

the Nunn-Lugar program, I think, is a real example of a program 

of solid cooperation with Russia that has continued over many 

years, despite whatever ups and downs in the overall relationship 

may take place. I think it’s a very strong program. We continue to 

have very good working relationships with the Russian counterparts in this program. 

Second, there have been some joint initiatives that the U.S. and 

Russia have undertaken. I would note the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, an initiative that Presidents Bush and 

Putin announced a couple of years ago, is a program under which 

any nation that ascribes to the principles of the Global Initiative 

can become a member, and we’re now up over 70 members. In the 

space of the time that this program has existed, it has helped to 

generate a greater focus on combating nuclear terrorism and an opportunity for the U.S. and Russia to work together to promote best 

practices, exercises focused on dealing with this matter, and so 

forth, in the international community. 

I think that those opportunities have continued, despite the challenges in other aspects of the relationship. 

Chairman LEVIN. I want to go back to North Korea just for a moment, Mr. Benkert. In your written response to the advance policy 

questions, you made reference to a letter that I received from Secretary Gates, responding to my question as to when operations in 

North Korea would resume to recover the remains of unaccountedfor American servicemen. The letter that you referred to says that 

239

operations will resume at an ‘‘appropriate time.’’ Is it not now appropriate, given this breakthrough that’s been announced by the 

President today, to resume these operations and to press the North 

Koreans for us to be allowed to look for those remains? 

Mr. BENKERT. Mr. Chairman, I think we have been—and I say 

‘‘we,’’ it’s not just the Department, but in consultation with other 

agencies of the Government as well. We have been looking at the 

circumstances and the progress within the Six-Party Talks and the 

activities related to that; and, I think, now with this announcement 

we will go back and, again, in consultation with our partners in the 

interagency, look at the impact of this and when might be the appropriate time. 

Chairman LEVIN. There’s a lot of interest in this, and I just hope 

that it won’t just be inquiring ‘‘When?’’ but asking, ‘‘Hey, isn’t it 

time now to get this high up on this agenda?’’ 

Mr. BENKERT. Mr. Chairman, I think we are very attuned to the 

desires of the families for a full accounting of those who are missing in North Korea. We talk to the families—and I personally do, 

as well—and their representatives frequently. I’m very much aware 

of the desire and the need to get this process started again at an 

appropriate time. 

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Stackley, we have a situation, which you’re 

very personally familiar with, that the F/A–18 and the AV–8B aircraft are continuing to age. There could be, now, a shortfall of 125 

strike fighter aircraft in the next decade, according to the Navy 

prediction, which would increase the concern about the schedule for 

the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). In response to the pre-hearing questions, you indicated that one of the options available to the Navy 

would be ‘‘extending procurement of the F/A–18 aircraft.’’ Some 

have asserted that the JSF program is threatened by continuing 

procurement of legacy aircraft. I’m wondering if you can give us 

your view as to whether the continued procurement of those legacy 

aircraft to address near-term inventory shortfalls will threaten the 

JSF program. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

First, the timeframe in which we’re discussing, the F/A–18 procurement proceeds out through 2011—correction, aircraft delivers 

from the current multiyear procurement for the F/A–18 goes out 

through 2011, and then there are an additional 3 years, outside of 

the multiyear procurement, 2012 through 2014 where the program 

winds down. That program, today, is in—call it ‘‘hot production,’’ 

stable, delivering at economic rates. 

JSF is at the other end of the spectrum, the front of the program. 

Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for Marine Corps is 2012; IOC 

for the Navy, 2015. There’s this critical period between shutting 

down the F/A–18 production line and ramping up the JSF program. 

Between now and that point in time, we expect risk to be retired 

on the JSF program, we expect to have greater understanding, in 

terms of the service life extension program for the F/A–18 to determine exactly where we will be relative to the magnitude and the 

duration of shortfall for strike fighter aircraft. 

There is opportunity, if there is a need, to continue procurement 

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able resources and what we understand about the JSF program at 

that point in time. 

I would not try to indicate that F/A–18s would be procured instead of JSFs with those resources; but, rather, if we can’t get to 

the procurement rate that’s needed for JSF in that timeframe, then 

an option is to continue procurement of F/A–18s. 

Chairman LEVIN. You don’t have an opinion, at this time, given 

what we now know, as to whether that option should be exercised? 

Mr. STACKLEY. The Department is clearly committed to the JSF 

program. Again, the magnitude and duration of the shortfall will 

depend on what happens with the extension program, with the 

ability to ramp up JSF, and with—call it ‘‘workaround plans’’ for 

the fleet, to ensure they can meet the requirements. I think we 

have to march further down that path to understand if the problem 

will get worse or if it will stay stable at the current projections. 

Chairman LEVIN. You may have partly addressed this question 

before, Mr. Stackley, but let me put it slightly differently. When 

the LCS program was announced by the CNO, he indicated that we 

could afford $220 million per ship. Since that time, the Navy has 

requested, and Congress has approved, an increase in the cost cap 

up to $460 million per ship for the sea frame. What would you propose to do to get better cost estimates for complex construction and 

development programs, since that estimate for the sea frame 

turned out to be so wildly wrong? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

I understand that the basis of the estimate for LCS was centered 

on commercial design. In other words, the two shipbuilders in the 

program have comparable commercial ships that they used for 

their bids, and the Navy’s cost estimates were linked to commercial 

experience. LCS is not a commercial ship. In going from—call it 

‘‘those commercial designs’’ to the current warship design, significant change was introduced in what’s referred to as ‘‘naval vessel 

rules,’’ as well as combatant features and requirements associated 

with reduced manning and other Navy requirements for survivability. There is significant deviation on the LCS program from 

whatever the basis of estimate was and the current platform. 

If you look at major defense programs, and you look at cost 

growth, in most cases cost growth will trace back to poor-quality 

cost estimates. The Navy has a cost estimating group that is working on improving its cost-estimating, modeling techniques, et 

cetera. As well, DOD relies on the cost analysis improvement group 

to provide some outside independent cost estimating. I think we 

need to beef up these efforts. I think we need to take a harder look 

at the cost models that we’re using. The complexity of Navy warships today far exceed what the earlier cost models used for determining cost estimates for Navy programs. 

Step 1, improve the cost modeling. Step 2, ensure that the correlation between the requirements and the estimates are tightly 

coupled. Step 3, ensure discipline in the process, so you don’t see 

growth in requirements, growth in design, outside of the estimates 

that were provided for the program. 

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Stackley, shortcomings in the acquisition 

workforce are faced by all of the military Services. Earlier this 

month the Navy announced the establishment of a new position of 

241

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Acquisition Workforce. 

That would be a deputy who would work for you, if you’re confirmed. Do you agree that the Navy has significant shortcomings 

in its acquisition workforce? Do you support the establishment of 

that new position? 

Mr. STACKLEY. The answer is yes to both questions, Mr. Chairman. The acquisition workforce has seen steady reduction over the 

past 10 or 15 years, and I think it’s inarguable that the pendulum 

has swung too far in that regard. 

In the discussion on cost estimates, I discussed discipline. An important part of discipline in the process is a qualified workforce. 

The appointment of the principal deputy that will have responsibilities for strengthening the acquisition workforce, I think, is a good, 

strong move. There has traditionally been a senior civilian in the 

Navy who has had ad hoc responsibilities in that regard. This goes 

beyond ad hoc; this assigns someone with principal responsibilities, 

and ensures that that individual has the credibility and the experience that’s required to do the job. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Celec, one of the concerns that has arisen from the blue-ribbon report and the other reports coming from the B–52 flight from 

Minot Air Force Base to Barksdale Air Force Base, as well as the 

more recent Donald report, is that the various security and operational inspections of nuclear forces do not find, and are not designed to fix, deficiencies. How are you going to work with the 

Services, the Nuclear Weapons Council, and the National Security 

Administration to improve the quality of these inspections if you 

are confirmed? 

Mr. CELEC. Thank you, Sir. 

The problems in the Air Force, I think, are cultural in nature. 

They didn’t develop overnight, and they obviously won’t be cured 

overnight. It’s going to require leadership attention, not only in the 

Air Force, but in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, where I 

hope to be. I know, for example, that the Air Force is currently reviewing its policies and procedures to ensure that they’re current. 

The real question is, ‘‘will the leadership insist that they be followed to the letter of the law,’’ if you will. In the past, leadership 

focus has just been diverted elsewhere. They’re involved in, obviously, fighting two wars right now. However, it’s going to take the 

focus of the leadership of the Air Force and the Secretary of Defense—and that’s where I hope to participate—to oversee that they 

will make some tremendous strides over the next couple of months, 

but the question is, ‘‘Will this be sustained?’’ It’s going to take oversight and leadership to sustain the return of the culture that we 

knew in the past. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. Mr. Celec, you made reference, in 

your opening remarks, to the Chemical Weapons Convention, 

which requires us to destroy all the chemical weapons no later 

than April 2012. Now, DOD has not notified Congress that the 

United States will not be able to meet that extended treaty deadline. You’ve indicated that we have an obligation to take our treaty 

obligations seriously. We expect other nations to do that. If you’re 

confirmed, will you make mighty efforts to ensure that the Department provides the adequate funding either to meet that deadline 

242

or, if that proves impossible, to come within as close a distance as 

possible to it? 

Mr. CELEC. Absolutely. I think it’s important that we meet our 

treaty obligations, to the best of our ability. I would work very hard 

to make sure we do. 

Chairman LEVIN. In 2003 and 2004, Mr. Celec, Congress debated, at length, whether to fund the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) and the development of small nuclear weapons, 

which were sometimes referred to as ‘‘mini nukes.’’ Before you retired from DOD, in August 2003, you were the Deputy for Nuclear 

Matters, reporting to the then-Assistant to the Secretary, the position for which you’ve now been nominated. 

The Department supported the development and the fielding of 

an RNEP capability, and, in your previous capacity at the Department, according to statements that you made at the time, you, too, 

supported the development of RNEP. Congress eventually declined 

to fund that program. Are you going to resume your advocacy of 

the RNEP program if you’re confirmed? 

Mr. CELEC. My personal view certainly has not changed. Whether or not that view is the administration’s or the Secretary’s prevailing view, I don’t know, and I will find out once I get there. 

I do know that there are a number of underground structures 

that exist in the world today that we cannot attack with conventional weapons, even the weapons that we project out into the far 

future of their capabilities. I know that many of these underground 

structures have multiple entrances, and whether or not we know 

where all of the entrances are or not is a problematical question. 

I know that we could close the entrances that we know of conventionally, although they could be reopened within a matter of a few 

tens of hours. 

Finally, many of these underground structures are commandand-control facilities. By closing the adits—or the entrances—to 

these things, the facility itself will continue to function. In that 

time, an awful lot of people could die. 

So, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator gives the President an 

opportunity to end that issue right now, and I think he—my personal view, not necessarily supported by the Secretary—is that he 

ought to have that capability. 

Chairman LEVIN. In your written responses, Mr. Celec, you state 

that, ‘‘There are serious issues with the Comprehensive Test Ban 

Treaty (CTBT) that need to be resolved.’’ Could you give us just a 

couple of examples of those? 

Mr. CELEC. I’ll be glad to. First off, the treaty was signed some 

15 years ago, and a lot has occurred in the world, particularly with 

the threat, and particularly in the nuclear arena; three nations 

have actually tested nuclear weapons that weren’t nuclear powers 

when that treaty was signed—North Korea, Pakistan, and India. In 

addition, part of our verification system that we had intended to 

use in the CTBT was actually installed in the Threshold Test Ban 

Treaty (TTBT). Those stations have been dismantled; and so, our 

verification problems are going to increase. We can’t change those 

verification technologies without going back and renegotiating, certainly, the TTBT. 

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Perhaps the most critical issue that I have is the issue of, what 

is ‘‘zero yield’’ in the CTBT? The United States tabled the definition 

of ‘‘zero yield’’ during the negotiations in the treaty. The Russians 

said, ‘‘Thank you very much. We understand your position.’’ But, 

they didn’t accept it, and it didn’t enter into the treaty. 

There’s only one treaty that actually defines ‘‘yield,’’ and that’s 

the TTBT. In that treaty, it says ‘‘yield’’ is what comes out of the 

explosive cannister. The explosive cannister is a big container that 

you put the nuclear device in when you detonate it. 

Now, it is possible, with that language, if unchanged, that the 

Russians could put small, low-yield nuclear weapons into very 

large containers, detonate them, and still be in compliance with the 

CTBT. One further thing, the Russians have said that part of their 

weapons development program are these low-level tests. They’ve 

admitted that in public. I believe there’s some serious concern, because of history—that is, the number of years since the treaty was 

negotiated, and some of the technologies—that need to be addressed when we go back. I think we need to go back and do it, 

because I think the treaty is the right thing to do, but we have to 

be careful. 

Chairman LEVIN. Let me ask you both, Mr. Celec and Mr. 

Benkert—each of you have a responsibility for the CTR program. 

Will each of you commit to work cooperatively on the CTR programs? Since you both have some responsibility there, do either of 

you have any thoughts about the need to work cooperatively? Any 

impediments to that? 

Mr. Benkert, why don’t we start with you? 

Mr. BENKERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To the first part of your question, I will absolutely commit to 

working cooperatively on the CTR program. I think the cooperation 

goes in several dimensions. One is, I think we’ve had a very cooperative relationship with your staff and your colleagues on the House 

side as well as we’ve advanced this program, and we greatly appreciate that relationship and the developments—for example, the 

flexibility that you’ve provided us to move the program—to begin 

moving the program outside the former Soviet Union. So, I commit 

that we will continue that cooperative relationship. 

I think, as we move the program forward, I have discussed a bit, 

before the strong level of cooperation we have with the Russians 

in this program. I think we have cooperative relationships, as well 

with the other countries that are in the program. There are problems, but generally we work through them. Again, they help build 

very strong relationships at various levels with these countries. 

The issue we have is, over time, moving the program from one 

that is an assistance program in a lot of ways, to one that is more 

defined by partnership—both partnership with the Russians, partnership with other countries, and particularly partnerships outside 

the former Soviet Union. Over time, I think we want to move in 

that direction. 

I think the second thing that we are trying to do—and, again, in 

cooperation with your staff and the flexibility you’ve given us—is 

find ways to make the program more flexible, nimble, and responsive as we move outside the former Soviet Union, so that we are 

able to seize opportunities for cooperation and partnership, perhaps 

244

more rapidly than was the case in the way we developed the CTR 

program. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Mr. Celec? 

Mr. CELEC. I agree. I have a personal interest in that program, 

because when it was initiated as the Nunn-Lugar program, it was 

sent to the operations directorate of the Defense Nuclear Agency 

for execution. I was the Deputy Director for Operations at the time, 

and so, I helped see that program born, if you will, and I think it’s 

been tremendously successful, and I will continue enthusiastically 

to support that program and to make sure that it continues to 

make the progress that it has. It has destroyed more missiles than 

the Strategic Air Command ever thought about doing. 

Chairman LEVIN. We welcome that enthusiasm. We wish you 

were a little bit less enthusiastic about RNEP. [Laughter.] 

You gave us your honest opinion, and that’s what we ask for. 

We thank you all. We thank your families. 

If I can single out your grandchildren, Mr. Celec, since I’m a 

proud grandfather, you have two of them here. We have Adam and 

Hannah. I just want to let you kids know how important it is to 

a grandpa to have his grandkids standing behind him, and sitting 

behind him so patiently, and looking like you’re following every single thing that you heard. It’s amazing to me how beautifully you 

two did, there. I know it’s important that your grandpa have you 

here. We thank you, particularly, and we thank all of the families. 

We stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:06 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Nelson M. Ford by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of 

command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly 

improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant commanders in the 

strategic planning process, in the development of requirements, in joint training and 

education, and in the execution of military operations. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions 

based on your experience in the Department of Defense (DOD)? 

Answer. The Goldwater-Nichols Act has made a profound and positive change in 

the operation of DOD. While I believe that the framework established by GoldwaterNichols has significantly improved interservice and joint relationships and clarified 

responsibilities, the Department, working with Congress, should continually assess 

the law in light of improving capabilities, evolving threats, and changing organizational dynamics. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. This milestone legislation has served our Nation well for more than 2 

decades. If confirmed, I would certainly work with Congress to determine whether 

the act should be revised to better address the requirements of combatant commanders and the needs and challenges confronting the military departments in today’s security environment. It also may be appropriate to assess whether the law 

might be modified to allocate roles and responsibilities more effectively among the 

Joint Staff, the combatant commanders, the military departments, and the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense (OSD). One particular issue that merits review is accountability for the conduct of deployed forces. 

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DUTIES

Question. Section 3015 of title 10, U.S.C., states the Under Secretary of the Army 

shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary of the Army 

may prescribe. 

Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and powers do you expect to be assigned? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will serve as the principal assistant and senior civilian 

advisor to the Secretary of the Army and will support him in his leadership of the 

Department as he fulfills the duties and responsibilities accorded him by law and 

regulation. I envision the Secretary will also assign to me specific duties and responsibilities that will support his efforts to ensure that the Department of the Army 

successfully accomplishes the many demanding and varied missions with which it 

has been entrusted. Further, pursuant to Section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008, I expect that the Secretary of the 

Army will designate the Under Secretary as the Chief Management Officer of the 

Department with the primary management responsibility for business operations. I 

expect the Secretary to assign me such duties and responsibilities in my role as 

Chief Management Officer as are necessary to organize and administer the business 

operations of the Army effectively and efficiently, in accordance with the policies 

promulgated by the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will carry out my duties 

to the best of my ability, with honor and integrity. 

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties? 

Answer. For most of my career, I have served in a variety of senior management 

positions responsible for financial management, policy development, program evaluation and productivity. I am currently the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller (ASA(FM&C)), having been confirmed by the 

Senate in October 2006 after serving for 2 years as the Principal Deputy to the 

ASA(FM&C). Previously, I served in DOD as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for 

Health Budgets and Financial Policy with responsibility for the financial management, policy development and program evaluation of the Defense Health Program. 

External to government service, I served as Chief Operating Officer for Georgetown 

University Medical Center and was a partner in Coopers & Lybrand. These experiences have afforded me the opportunity to understand how large organizations function, particularly within the parameters of plans, programs and budgets, to face and 

overcome challenges on a continuing basis. My work in financial management for 

the Army has afforded me the privilege of building strong, effective relationships 

with other senior leaders and staff within the Army, the other military departments, 

and DOD. 

My experience with the Defense Health Program is beneficial to the Army, particularly at this point in time when we are working with DOD and the Department 

of Veterans Affairs to provide quality, comprehensive care to Wounded Warriors and 

Warriors in Transition. In fact, most of my career has been in the health care field, 

which has given me a broad base of knowledge that benefits the Army in developing 

processes and policies to support a wide range of health care initiatives. 

Further, I am familiar with the fiduciary responsibilities of Federal officials, particularly those that are applicable to Army personnel, and feel confident that I can 

positively contribute toward establishing and maintaining management controls and 

high fiscal and ethical standards. Much of my experience has been in mission-driven 

organizations, both as a manager and board member, so I understand the challenges 

of matching large and complicated missions in resource constrained environments. 

My experience includes organizational service in times of both growth and cutbacks, 

both of which are relevant for today’s Army. I feel I am very well prepared to continue leading from the strategic level and with the strategic capabilities the position 

of Under Secretary of the Army requires. 

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your 

ability to perform the duties of the Under Secretary of the Army? 

Answer. I expect that there are. Although I am serving as Acting Under Secretary 

of the Army and look forward with confidence to performing the duties of the Under 

Secretary of the Army, any new position presents new challenges and opportunities 

for learning. Should the Senate confirm me, I intend to engage in an ongoing process of consultation with Army leaders, others in DOD, and Congress, to pursue opportunities for improvement. I have to say though, that my experience for the past 

4 years in the Army has significantly strengthened my knowledge of the Army, its 

history, its culture, and its needs to continue to support the Nation in its assigned 

missions. 

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RELATIONSHIPS

Question. If confirmed, what would your working relationship be with: 

The Secretary of the Army. 

Answer. As head of the Department of the Army, Secretary Geren is responsible 

for, and has the authority to conduct, all affairs of the Department. If confirmed, 

my relationship with the Secretary of the Army will be close, direct, and supportive; 

my actions always will be subject to the Secretary’s authority, direction, and control. 

Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army. 

Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Army performs his duties under the authority, 

direction, and control of the Secretary of the Army and is directly responsible to the 

Secretary. The Chief of Staff also performs the duties prescribed for him by law as 

a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is extremely important that all leaders of 

the Department of the Army, civilian and military, work closely together as one 

team as we face the many challenges confronting our institution. I anticipate that 

I will work closely and collaboratively with the Chief of Staff to supervise the implementation of the Secretary’s decisions throughout the Department of the Army. 

Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army. 

Answer. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army set the Department’s strategic direction by formulating and overseeing policies and programs within their functional 

areas of responsibility, consistent with law, regulation, and the objectives of the Secretary of the Army. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional 

relationship with each of the Assistant Secretaries and seek to foster an environment of cooperative teamwork as we work together on the day-to-day management 

and long range planning needs of the Army. 

Question. The General Counsel of the Army. 

Answer. The Army General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the Department 

of the Army and serves as counsel to the Secretary and other Secretariat officials. 

His duties include providing legal and policy advice to all members of the Army as 

well as determining the position of the Army on any legal question or procedure. 

If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close and professional relationship with 

the General Counsel and will actively seek his guidance to ensure that Army policies and practices are in strict accord with the law and the highest principles of ethical conduct. 

Question. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. 

Answer. The Vice Chief of Staff has such authority and duties as the Chief of 

Staff, with the approval of the Secretary of the Army, may delegate to or prescribe 

for him. If confirmed, I will work with the Vice Chief of Staff to further the Secretary of the Army’s policies and to advance the interests of the Army. I will establish and maintain a close and professional relationship with the Vice Chief of Staff 

and communicate directly and openly with him on matters involving the Department of the Army. 

Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Army. 

Answer. The Judge Advocate General of the Army is the legal adviser of the Chief 

of Staff of the Army, members of the Army Staff, and members of the Army generally. In coordination with the Army General Counsel, The Judge Advocate General 

serves as military legal adviser to the Secretary of the Army. The Judge Advocate 

General also directs the members of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps in the performance of their duties and, by law, is primarily responsible for providing legal advice and services regarding the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the administration of military discipline. Therefore, I will establish and maintain a professional 

and inclusive relationship with The Judge Advocate General and always welcome 

his expression of independent views about any legal matter under consideration. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will face the next 

Under Secretary of the Army? 

Answer. As the Secretary of the Army and Army Chief of Staff have stated previously, the Army is out of balance due to current operational demands. Our increased operational tempo and multiple combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan have 

placed a heavy burden on soldiers and their families. Part of regaining that balance 

is reducing the stress on the force caused by repeated, extended-duration deployments in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Another crucial challenge is obtaining predictable and adequate funding. As the Army modernizes to meet the security challenges of the 21st century, 

while continuing the current operational pace as required by the combatant commanders, reestablishing our strategic depth will be a major effort requiring close collaboration with Congress. 

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Answer. The Army is faced with many other challenges, including providing proper support to soldiers and families in time of war, enhancing readiness, providing 

quality housing, modernizing our Cold War-era equipment, and meeting recruiting 

and retention goals, just to name a few. The Army must transform its support infrastructure and integrate Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) decisions. The Army 

must provide a quality of life commensurate with the quality of soldiers’ service and 

provide high quality care for those who have become ill, injured, or wounded, particularly for those suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic 

Brain Injuries. Finally, the Army must transform Army contracting, growing leaders, increasing personnel and providing appropriate training in this critically important area. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will provide my assistance to Secretary Geren and Chief 

of Staff Casey in pursuing several critical initiatives, including growing the Army 

and making necessary readiness improvements; building momentum and continuity 

of our modernization efforts; completing the transition of the Reserve component to 

an operational force; and adapting our institutional processes to support an expeditionary Army that is currently suffering from the cumulative effects of 5 years at 

war. The strength of the soldier is the Family, and in an All-Volunteer Force, we 

must remain committed to supporting our soldiers and their families through Installation and Soldier Readiness, and Soldier and Family Quality of Life. Of special interest to me will be leading the Secretary’s effort to transform Army contracting, 

developing solutions to address the challenges facing the Department in this area. 

If confirmed, I will focus on programs and efforts to reduce the stress on the soldiers and their families. I will work closely with Congress to ensure these programs 

are defined to meet the objectives and requirements in support of our national defense. A major part of addressing these challenges will be to work collaboratively 

with members of this committee, the entire Congress, the President, and the Army 

leadership. I share Secretary Geren’s commitment to maintain the Army as the 

dominant land force in the world, and with your help, I am confident we can succeed. 

ARMY BUDGET SHARE

Question. Last year’s Army Posture Statement points out that the defense budget 

allocation by Service has changed little over time with the Air Force and Navy 

around 30 percent and the Army around 25 percent. Moreover, since the Army is 

manpower intensive, and personnel costs eat up a large part of its budget, only 25 

percent of the Army’s budget goes toward research, development, and acquisition, 

as compared to 38 percent in the Navy and 43 percent in the Air Force. Further, 

the Army’s overall share of DOD investment dollars is only 17 percent, as compared 

to 33 percent for the Navy and 35 percent for the Air Force. The result is that ‘‘the 

Army has been unable to invest in the capabilities needed to sustain a rising operational tempo and to prepare for emerging threats.’’ 

What is your understanding of the effects of this funding discrepancy on the 

Army? 

Answer. Today’s Army is out of balance. Our equipment, procured through Congress’ vigorous support to the Army, has been used hard during this period of prolonged and persistent conflict. This means that we are using up equipment at a 

much faster rate than anticipated, requiring our Army to reset or recapitalize this 

equipment at an accelerated pace. This impacts ammunition stocks, maintenance 

depots, and manufacturing capacities, and is further complicated by America’s 

shrinking industrial base. We must restore the necessary breadth and depth of 

Army capabilities to support and sustain essential capacity for the future demands 

on our Expeditionary Force. 

Question. What do you intend to do if confirmed as the Under Secretary to address this funding discrepancy? 

Answer. Foremost, it is imperative for us to receive supplemental funding in a 

timely manner to prosecute the global war on terror and provide our soldiers with 

the equipment needed to meet current operational demands. If confirmed, I will continue to try to match Army resources to strategic requirements as I did when serving as the ASA(FM&C). During the build of the fiscal year 2009 budget, we worked 

closely with OSD and the Office of Management and Budget to help them better 

understand the Army’s challenges. Additionally, we are examining the relationship 

of activities funded in the base budget and supplemental. We have identified requirements currently funded through the supplemental that would be more appropriately resourced in the base budget. We are looking forward to working within the 

248

administration to ensure an understanding of what activities should migrate back 

from the supplemental to the base program. To ensure we are good stewards of the 

Nation’s resources, I will continue to work closely with Congress and the administration to address the Army’s current readiness issues that have resulted from previous funding shortfalls. 

Question. What is your understanding of what, if anything, the Secretary of the 

Army and the Secretary of Defense intend to do to address this discrepancy? 

Answer. While building the President’s fiscal year 2009 budget, we explored the 

impact of budgetary shortfalls with OSD. I believe we effectively communicated and 

quantified the challenges the Army faces in preparing for current and future conflicts and other emerging requirements. The Secretary of Defense is working with 

the Army to meet readiness requirements and to ensure the Army has the resources 

necessary to support the National Military Strategy. 

POSTURE FOR THE FUTURE

Question. Do you believe that current Army initiatives such as Grow the Force, 

Modularity, and Transformation to the Future Combat Systems (FCSs) adequately 

posture the Army to meet the most likely threats of the next two or three decades? 

Answer. The Army’s future threats are defined in the National Defense Strategy 

and the National Military Strategy. Grow the Force, Modularity, and Transformation to the FCSs will help posture the Army to meet those threats. As we cannot predict threats with any certainty, we must build readiness and strategic depth 

that can respond to a broad range of possible situations. Our goal must be to build 

an Army versatile and agile enough to be employed in the range of military operations, across the major operational environments, in support of our national security strategy. The Army initiatives are designed to give the Army maximum flexibility to respond to continual and asymmetrical threats over the next 30 years. 

Question. Do you believe that these initiatives are affordable within the projected 

Army budget? 

Answer. Yes, Grow the Force and Modularity are affordable within the projected 

Army budget. These requirements reflect what is needed to restore balance in the 

Army. Our budget requests reflect our comprehensive plan to restore balance and 

build the full spectrum capable Army we need in the 21st century. The acquisition 

program anticipated for FCSs extends well beyond current budget planning timeframes but resources roughly in the amounts described in the long-range planning 

documents will be essential to modernizing Army equipment for future fights. 

Question. What other initiatives would you recommend the Army pursue in this 

regard if confirmed as Under Secretary of the Army? 

Answer. As mentioned above, Secretary Geren and Chief of Staff Casey are working to advance a list of initiatives that seek to provide better support to Army families. Of particular interest to me is our disability system, which having been built 

over generations, has become a bureaucratic maze and needlessly complex. It is a 

system that frustrates, and often stymies, the best intentions of dedicated public 

servants and compromises the Army Values we pledge to uphold. A soldier who 

fights battles abroad should not have to fight bureaucracy at home. I look forward 

to working with OSD and the Veteran’s Administration to revamp this antiquated 

disability system. 

Question. The Government Accountability Office reported last year that the cost 

of the Army’s largest acquisition program—the FCS—is expected to grow from the 

$160 billion estimated in 2006 to between $203 billion and $234 billion (an increase 

of as much as 45 percent). Earlier this month, Secretary Gates acknowledged the 

existence of a substantial gap in funding for the Army’s Global Force Initiative and 

testified that ‘‘it is hard to see’’ how DOD can afford to complete the FCS. 

What steps, if any, do you believe the Army needs to take to control costs on the 

FCS and ensure that the system is affordable? 

Answer. The Army can afford FCS. The cost estimates referenced above are the 

total costs for FCS, operating costs and procurement, over its lifecycle, a 27-year period (2003–2030). FCS procurement costs are substantially less and, even during the 

peak procurement period, are projected to be less than a third of the Army’s investment (RDA) account. As the investment account is about a quarter of the total budget, FCS procurement cost is unlikely to exceed 10 percent of the Army’s budget in 

any year. The Army took steps in 2007 to adjust the scope of the program (from 

18 systems to 14), and slowed the pace of procurement. This program adjustment 

was designed to reduce the costs of fielding FCS to a more manageable level. Finally, we believe that FCS brigades will have lower operating costs than the legacy 

brigades they replace and will be more effective when deployed, providing significantly more ‘‘bang for the buck’’ once the program is completed. 

249

LESSONS LEARNED

Question. What do you believe are the major lessons learned from OEF and OIF 

which you would seek to address if confirmed as Under Secretary of the Army? 

Answer. Lessons learned from OEF/OIF have caused the Army to adjust its training and equipment to fight an adaptable, determined enemy. On the homefront, the 

pace of operations has placed great stress on Army families and we have had to 

build programs to better support our families. We have also had to expand language 

skills and enhance cultural awareness to be successful in the operations and missions we are engaged in today and likely will be engaged in the future. The Army 

must continue to modernize and sustain its combat training centers, home station 

training, and institutional training. Detention operations have improved over the 

course of the conflict, but we must continue to look for ways to enhance our capabilities in this area. 

With growth in the Army’s force structure and the challenges this places on training, the Army needs to continue to assess ways to train efficiently, using training 

resources from all Army Components, as appropriate. As the Army develops its 

operational rhythm, Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) will continue to play a 

critical role in synchronizing cyclic training, while placing focus on theater-specific 

training requirements, such as training to defeat Improvised Explosive Devices 

(IEDs). Because of the large load that the Reserve component (Army National 

Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve) is pulling, the Army needs to assess continually 

its mobilization policies, balancing training requirements to meet the appropriate 

level of Reserve component operational readiness with domestic missions and requirements. 

Question. More specifically, what are the lessons learned concerning manning, 

training, and equipping the Army which you intend to address if confirmed? 

Answer. The Army needs to expand the force to its authorized levels as quickly 

as possible without compromising the quality of our recruits, and with the goal of 

reducing the length and frequency of deployments. The Army must build on its distance learning program to enable soldiers in the field to train individually on skills 

not otherwise available when deployed. Further, the Army must take appropriate 

measures to provide adequate Training Support Systems (TSS) at Army installations to support full spectrum training. Units must have greater capabilities at 

home stations to train across the full spectrum of conflict in a training environment 

replicating the Contemporary Operating Environment. One equipping lesson learned 

is that consistent, timely, and adequate funding is required to increase the equipment available for operations and training. We are taking steps to transition the 

Logistics Civil Augmentation Program contract from one to three contractors to increase capabilities and generate the competition necessary to reduce cost and improve service. We must find ways to respond immediately to the stress and demands 

placed on our military families. We need to work to be able to change quickly to 

succeed in this type of conflict, facing a nimble and adaptive enemy. 

Question. What are the Army’s lessons learned from detainee abuse incidents at 

Guantanamo, in Iraq, and in Afghanistan? 

Answer. The primary lessons learned from the detainee abuse incidents are: first, 

we must clearly communicate through the establishment of standards, meaningful 

and realistic training, and constant vigilance, our commitment to ensuring that all 

soldiers live up to our values and the law of war, regardless of the circumstances; 

and second, we must act to ensure that any soldier who engages in detainee abuse 

is held accountable. 

As the executive agent for the administration of DOD detainee operations policy, 

the Army continues to gather detention operations lessons learned for incorporation 

into Army and joint policy and doctrine. Another major lesson learned has been that 

DOD needs more detention operations force structure, particularly in the Military 

Police and Military Intelligence specialties. We continue to work with OSD and the 

other Services to assess and refine force structure needed to support the combatant 

commanders’ detention operations missions with success. 

Although our policies have always prohibited detainee abuse, Army detention operations policy and doctrine required revisions to reflect the current operational situation. Policy and doctrine across the full spectrum of detention operations has been 

revised and published. Some key revisions include the designation of a single commander for detention operations, clear delineation of roles and responsibilities for 

detainee care, custody, and interrogations, and finally, very specific guidance for 

identifying and reporting detainee abuse. New policy also mandates that our forces 

receive additional law of war and cultural awareness training. The Army has enhanced detention operations training for soldiers, units, and civilians, not only as 

an annual requirement, but also institutionally and during pre-deployment. 

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IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN DEPLOYMENTS

Question. Many soldiers are on their third and some their fourth major deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Last year, unit deployments were extended to 15 

months and dwell time in some cases is less than 12 months. 

What is your assessment of the impact of multiple deployments of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq having on retention, particularly among young enlisted and officer personnel after their initial obligated service has been completed? 

Answer. The pace of deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq has not had an adverse 

impact on retention to date. Fiscal year 2007 retention of officers was slightly better 

than the overall 10-year average. The recently instituted captains’ retention program, which offers a number of incentives, to include attendance at graduate school 

or a retention bonus, has guaranteed retention of officers at historic rates through 

fiscal year 2010. 

The retention rates of initial term and mid-career soldiers in deploying units has 

remained between 120–140 percent since fiscal year 2005. For example, nearly 600 

troops reenlisted in Baghdad on Independence Day this past year. In addition, more 

than 100 Army Reserve soldiers gathered at the Al Faw palace at Camp Victory, 

Iraq, on January 18, 2008, to reenlist during a ceremony marking the 100th Anniversary of the Army Reserve. Recently deployed units and units currently deployed 

to Afghanistan and Iraq have reenlistment rates averaging 110–120 percent of their 

yearly goals. This is a significant indicator of the quality of leadership within our 

ranks, the fact that soldiers believe in what they are doing, and the fact that soldiers value the tradition of service to the Nation. 

Question. What are the indicators of stress on the force, and what do these indicators tell you about that level of stress currently? In addition to any other stress indicators that you address, please discuss suicide and divorce rates, drug and alcohol 

abuse, AWOLs, and rates of indiscipline. 

Answer. Our soldiers and families are strained and stretched, but they are also 

remarkably resilient. The Army monitors key indicators of individual behaviors and 

aggressively pursues policy or program changes to address negative trends. 

We see the following trends:

• The suicide rates are trending upward. Applying a multi-disciplinary approach, we are continuously reviewing and adapting our awareness, intervention, and treatment resources in support of soldiers and commanders. 

• Overall officer divorce rates are declining. Enlisted divorce rates trended 

upward from fiscal years 2006 to 2007, but remain below or equal to rates 

since 2004. Divorce rates have increased among enlisted female soldiers, 

and deployed soldiers divorce at a higher rate than those who have not deployed. The Army offers a robust chaplain-sponsored ‘‘Strong Bonds’’ training program to help soldiers and families build and maintain stronger relationships. 

• Drug abuse rates overall show a slight increase, but rates in deployed 

areas are declining. The Army has continued its aggressive drug education, 

awareness, and testing programs. 

• Enrollments for alcohol abuse treatment are continuing in an upward 

trend. The Army provides comprehensive education packages directed at 

the reduction of alcohol abuse, to include post deployment training. Alcohol 

abuse rates are monitored continuously via the Army’s Risk Reduction Program. We are also developing and implementing preventative intervention 

programs for soldiers at the first sign of trouble. ‘‘Prevention of Alcohol 

Abuse’’ messages are incorporated in Army-wide prevention of substance 

abuse campaigns like ‘‘Warrior Pride.’’ 

• Rates for Absence Without Leave (AWOL) show an upward trend. Rates 

are monitored closely and commanders adjudicate each instance of AWOL 

based on the facts and circumstances of the soldier’s individual case. 

• In fiscal year 2007, the number of General and Special Courts-Martial increased, but rates remain below the highest post-fiscal year 2001 rates. 

• Substantiated rates of Spouse and Child Abuse have declined steadily 

since fiscal year 2001. In addition to programs like ‘‘Strong Bonds,’’ the 

Army continues to focus resources on programs and services that support 

soldiers and their families. 

• The overall health of the force reflects a resilient Army, strained by persistent conflict, but still maintaining a solid foundation.

Question. For how long do you believe these levels of commitments can continue 

before there will be significant adverse consequences for the Army? 

Answer. The Army can sustain Iraq and Afghanistan deployments at the presurge levels as long as there is no additional growth in other global requirements. 

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As demands reduce beyond the pre-surge levels, stress on the Army, our soldiers 

and our families will be reduced further, and we will be able to restore strategic 

depth and flexibility. 

Question. General Casey has stated that the Army is ‘‘out of balance.’’ What is 

your understanding of this statement and what do you think can or should be done 

to correct that imbalance? 

Answer. The Army’s balance is the relationship between the demands placed on 

the Army and the ability to generate ready forces in a resource-limited environment, 

with an All-Volunteer Force. To meet current global demands, the Army has assumed risks in readiness and strategic flexibility that are not sustainable indefinitely. This imbalance stresses all of the Army—soldiers, families, and organizations—and impacts our ability to meet future challenges. Ultimately, current global 

operational demands in support of the global war on terrorism exceed the supply 

of forces that the Nation’s strategic guidance requires. The Army is addressing the 

imbalance; but it will take both time and resources. The Army is moving closer to 

completing its capabilities transformation into a modular construct, while simultaneously growing additional end strength. These actions will increase the global force 

pool, enable sustainable periods of dwell for training, and reduce stress on the current operational force. As time between deployments (dwell) continues to increase, 

readiness will improve and the Army can move from primarily a counterinsurgency 

ready force to one ready for the full spectrum of military operations. Increased dwell 

will also reduce some of the stress on soldiers and families and safeguard the volunteer force. Any effort to restore balance, however, is dependent on full, timely, and 

predicable funding. 

SOLDIERS’ POST-DEPLOYMENT HEALTH CONCERNS

Question. The health-related problems experienced after Operations Desert Shield 

and Desert Storm led to the Department, at congressional direction, undertaking extensive efforts to establish a comprehensive health database on deployed forces 

based on pre- and post-deployment health surveys. 

If confirmed, what actions would you expect to take to ensure that the Army uses 

available data on the health of returning soldiers to ensure that appropriate treatment is available and that all signs of deployment-related illnesses or potential illnesses are identified? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that soldiers are referred to appropriate care when their survey responses indicate that additional evaluation and 

treatment are needed. This will require improving the process to track referrals and 

treatment plans. 

The addition of the Post Deployment Health Reassessment and the new annual 

Periodic Health Assessment provides us with the ability to monitor the ongoing 

health, readiness, and wellness of our soldiers after initial redeployment, redeployment, and long before they start preparing for their next deployment. 

The Army has recognized that building soldier and family resiliency is key to 

maintaining their health and welfare. We developed ‘‘Battlemind’’ training products 

to increase this resiliency and have several different training programs available for 

pre, during, and post-deployment. 

Last summer the Army initiated a leader chain teaching program to educate all 

soldiers and leaders about post-traumatic stress and signs and symptoms of concussive brain injury. This was intended to help us all recognize symptoms and encourage seeking treatment for these conditions. We are now institutionalizing this training within our Army education and training system to share the information with 

our new soldiers and leaders and to continue to emphasize that these signs and 

symptoms are normal reactions to stressful situations and it is absolutely acceptable 

to seek assistance to cope with these issues. 

MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENT TEAM IV (MHAT IV)

Question. The Army’s mental health assessment studies in the Iraqi theater have 

been valuable in identifying the extent of mental health conditions and resource and 

training challenges being experienced in OIF. 

Based on the findings of MHAT IV that soldiers experience increased stress due 

to multiple and lengthened deployments, what actions would you take, if confirmed, 

to ensure that appropriate numbers of mental health resources are available to soldiers in theater, as well as upon their return? 

Answer. If confirmed, I fully support continuation of MHAT assessments in theater to ensure that the correct ratio and distribution of deployed behavioral health 

providers are maintained to meet the psychological needs of the deployed force. Last 

summer the Army Medical Command initiated action to hire 275 behavioral health 

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providers to care for soldiers and families in the United States. To date, we have 

hired 147 providers who are already making a difference in our military communities. If confirmed, it is my plan to ensure the Army Medical Command has the 

resources and flexibility required to fill all of our behavioral health care requirements. 

Question. What do you think have been the most valuable findings of the Army’s 

mental health assessment teams, and what are the lessons which can be applied 

to future deployments? 

Answer. MHAT findings have been used as the basis to reshape existing Combat 

and Operational Stress Control units to create more flexible and capable units. 

MHAT information has also been used to predict better the quantity of behavioral 

health assets required for current and future conflicts. Finally, MHAT information 

has been utilized to create a training program known as ‘‘Battlemind,’’ which 

changes the way the Army prepares soldiers, leaders, and families for high stress 

deployments. 

TRICARE FEE INCREASES FOR MILITARY RETIREES

Question. In its fiscal year 2009 budget request, DOD assumed $1.2 billion in cost 

savings based on implementing increases in TRICARE costs for certain beneficiaries, including higher enrollment fees for military retirees and their families. 

What is your understanding of the Department’s proposals for changes in 

TRICARE fees for retired soldiers, and, if they are implemented, what do you see 

as the likely impact of these changes on the Department of the Army? 

Answer. The proposed plan would charge both higher enrollment fees and civilian 

visit copayments for TRICARE Prime and initiate enrollment fees and higher 

deductibles for TRICARE Standard ‘‘working age’’ retirees under 65 and their Families. For these beneficiaries, some cost increases would be based on a three-tiered 

system of annual military retired pay. Last, the proposed budget would raise copayments for all beneficiaries (except Active Duty) on prescriptions filled at retail pharmacies. While the budgetary impacts of these changes would be recognized in OSD 

accounts, reductions in expense for medical benefits for retirees would lessen pressure on the total defense budget and begin to address benefit inequities between 

military retirees and other Federal retirees. 

Question. What is your personal view of the justification for increases in 

TRICARE enrollment fees for retirees and are there alternatives to such increases 

you would recommend if confirmed? 

Answer. I support any reasonable strategy to protect the TRICARE program for 

our beneficiaries without jeopardizing Army readiness or modernization programs. 

Even with reasonable cost increases, TRICARE will continue to be among the most 

affordable and highest quality health plans in the country. 

STOP LOSS AUTHORITY

Question. How many soldiers do you expect the Army to retain under stop loss 

authority at the end of fiscal year 2008? 

Answer. The Army expects to have 8,046 Active component soldiers retained 

under Stop Loss authority serving in the Army at the end of fiscal year 2008. The 

Stop Loss forecast for the Reserve components for September 2008 is approximately 

6,000. 

Question. What is the Army’s plan for reducing stop loss as it increases its end 

strength through the out-years? 

Answer. DOD guidance directs the Services to discontinue Stop Loss policies as 

soon as operationally feasible. The plan to reduce, and eventually eliminate, Stop 

Loss will be based on a reduction in demand and a return to a cycle of ‘‘1 year deployed with 2 years at home.’’ The growth of Army end strength supports the 

growth of additional Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), which supports a return to a 

cycle of ‘‘1 year deployed with 2 years at home.’’ 

RESERVE DEPLOYMENT AND MOBILIZATION

Question. In recent years, Reserve Force management policies and systems have 

been characterized as ‘‘inefficient and rigid’’ and readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment stay-behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies. 

What are your views about the optimal role for the Reserve component forces in 

meeting combat missions? 

Answer. To respond to Joint Staff and combatant commanders’ requests for forces 

and capabilities, the Army considers all three components (Active, Guard, and Reserve) in developing sourcing solutions. The Guard and Reserve have combat arms 

units (e.g., Infantry, Armor, Artillery, and Aviation) that are fully qualified and 

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combat ready. They have demonstrated their abilities in a superb manner over the 

past few years. The same is true for Reserve Component Combat Support and Combat Service Support units. The Army will continue to select the best units, capable 

of meeting Joint Staff and combatant command requirements, with full confidence 

in each unit’s ability to carry out its assigned mission. 

Question. What is your opinion about the sufficiency of current Reserve Force 

management policies? 

Answer. The Army has made considerable progress in ‘‘total force’’ management 

in the last few years. Our Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process will, as it 

matures, enable us to balance the demands of known operations across all three 

components (Active, Guard, and Reserve) and reduce the stress on the force. Our 

Secretary and our Chief of Staff continue the practice set by their predecessors of 

fully engaging Reserve component leaders and staffs in programming, equipping, 

and readiness decisions. 

Over the past few years, the Army has made considerable funding commitments 

to the Reserve components for re-set and re-equipping actions, and our Chief’s initiatives and imperatives include the Total Army. Together, these efforts will set the 

stage for effectively transforming, manning, training, equipping, and sustaining 

America’s Army, while fully meeting our commitments at home and overseas. 

Question. Do you support assigning any support missions exclusively to the Reserve? 

Answer. Both the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard are organized and 

arrayed to perform missions across the full spectrum of combat, combat support, 

and combat service support operations. In today’s operational environment, it is prudent to assign missions and capabilities across all components of the Army. There 

are opportunities to balance our force to meet current contingencies and to prepare 

for future operations, and the Secretary and Chief of Staff are fully engaged in such 

an effort with the aim of arraying capabilities across the Army so that operational 

demands are fully met. 

INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE RECALL POLICY

Question. A July 2006 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recommended that the Army revitalize its Individual Ready Reserve 

(IRR) program by culling existing IRR databases and ensuring that the Army has 

valid contact information on IRR members who may be recalled to serve. 

What has the Army done to clarify the mobilization policy that applies to both 

officer and enlisted members of the IRR? 

Answer. The Army has implemented plans to optimize the operational and strategic value of the IRR. This effort will improve individual deployment readiness levels and ensure timely availability. Additionally, we will maintain a reliable database 

of mobilization assets and promote a continuum of service by managing expectations 

throughout each soldier’s career life-cycle. 

We are conducting annual muster events for IRR soldiers. Select Reserve soldiers 

attend Readiness and Personnel Accountability Musters at local Reserve centers to 

execute personnel updates and medical readiness evaluations and receive training 

briefings. Annual musters ensure that individual expectations are established and 

maintained. Soldiers are aware of their annual requirements and potential for mobilization. They are educated on how to build upon a military career while assigned 

to the IRR. In fiscal year 2007, more than 8,400 IRR soldiers were mustered, and 

over 720 IRR soldiers transferred to the Selected Reserves (SELRES). The current 

plan is to muster 10,000 IRR soldiers in fiscal year 2008 and to transfer roughly 

the same number IRR soldiers to the SELRES as in fiscal year 2007. 

Our intent is to educate and raise awareness at the time soldiers transition from 

active duty. Towards that end, soldiers are counseled and provided information regarding their assignment to the IRR, to include an IRR Orientation Handbook we 

have developed and implemented. We provide this handbook to newly assigned IRR 

soldiers to establish expectations and to provide key information regarding their assignment, annual requirements, promotions, and training opportunities, as well as 

information about continued service in the SELRES. 

Question. What has the Army done to update its IRR mobilization database? 

Answer. The U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) has conducted a systematic screening of the IRR database to reconcile existing records (blank and erroneous data fields, obsolete military occupational skills, bad addresses); identify nonmobilization assets (soldiers passed over for promotion or with security violations, 

physical disqualifications, determined hardships, or adverse characterizations of 

service); and separate those soldiers who no longer have further potential for useful 

military Service if mobilized. These efforts have reduced the number of IRR soldiers 

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by a third and provided the Army with a more reliable database. For example, incorrect IRR addresses were the single largest mobilization exclusion, but are now 

at a 10-year low, with only about 9 percent of those ineligible for mobilization being 

excluded because of an incorrect address. 

A DOD policy established in July 2005 mandated the discharge of officers in the 

IRR who are beyond their Military Service Obligation (MSO), unless the officer specifically requests retention in the IRR. Officers who fulfilled their MSO and have 

not taken action to elect to remain in the IRR are transferred to the Standby Reserve and discharged within 2 years of transfer. To date, approximately 10,000 IRR 

Officers have been transferred to the Standby Reserve; 2,900 of these have been 

honorably discharged. 

HRC developed the Individual Warrior Virtual Screening Portal (IW-VSP) for IRR 

soldiers to update their contact information and verify their readiness level without 

having to report to a physical location. HRC screens all information submitted 

through the website, reconciles discrepancies, and contacts soldiers that require additional assistance. 

Question. What is your assessment of the value of the IRR to the All-Volunteer 

Total Force, and what is your opinion about the role the IRR should play in the future? 

Answer. The IRR is very important to our attempts to restore balance in the AllVolunteer Force. Retaining required skills and maintaining the population in the 

IRR is important to managing our operational and strategic capability. The Army 

recognizes the value of keeping trained and motivated members in the Service, and 

we continue to offer opportunities for continued service. The IRR will continue to 

play a vital role in the Army’s mission in the future. 

OFFICER SHORTAGES

Question. After the Vietnam War there was a large reduction in force which some 

believed masked a voluntary departure of some of the best and brightest junior officers from Active Duty who, after serving in very responsible positions at a relatively 

young age in combat, had difficulty adjusting to a peacetime Army. The nature of 

the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—small unit actions where junior leaders are not 

only military leaders, but also diplomats and city managers, and where they have 

even greater authority to act on their own initiatives—may produce similar behavior 

and consequent difficulty in retaining highly trained and experienced junior officers. 

A report issued by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in July 2006 found 

that the Army projected an officer shortage of nearly 3,000 in fiscal year 2007, with 

the most acute shortfalls in the grades of captain and major with 11 to 17 years 

of service. Unless corrective action is taken, CRS found that shortages will persist 

through 2013 unless accessions are increased and retention improves. 

What is your understanding of the reasons for the shortfall, and what steps is the 

Army taking to meet this mid-career officer shortfall? 

Answer. Our current officer shortages are not caused by increased attrition. Attrition rates are at or below the 10-year average rates. The officer shortfalls are due 

to the growth of officer requirements of 9,000 officers by fiscal year 2012. Nearly 

6,800 of these requirements are in the grades of captain and major. To address this 

shortfall, we have increased accessions and will produce nearly 5,000 additional officers by fiscal year 2009. 

The Army instituted a pre-commissioning retention incentives program that is 

projected to increase by nearly 30 percent our retention of high performing USMA 

and ROTC scholarship officers by offering them graduate school, branch choice, or 

assignment choice in exchange for additional Active-Duty service. The Army has 

sought officers aggressively from outside the active Army and has accessed nearly 

1,500 officers from the inactive Reserve and from the other Services through the 

‘‘Blue to Green Program.’’ 

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure adequate numbers 

of highly-qualified captains and majors are serving on Active Duty over the next 10 

years? 

Answer. The Army has developed policies to retain our ‘‘best and brightest,’’ combat-experienced officers and noncommissioned officers. We must not allow the Army 

to drift into a post-conflict mindset. This will require refocusing the Army and a 

commitment to leveraging combat-experienced soldiers in key and critical assignments, such as in the schools and battle labs of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 

Command. 

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MEDICAL PERSONNEL RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. The Army is facing significant shortages in critically needed medical 

personnel in both Active and Reserve components. Medical support requirements 

caused by the stand-up of BCTs, potential growth of the Army, surge requirements 

in theater, and other factors may compound the already serious challenges faced in 

recruitment and retention of medical, dental, nurse and behavioral health personnel. 

Do you believe that a comprehensive review of the medical support requirements 

for the Army is necessary and should be accomplished this year? 

Answer. Yes, I believe it is important to review medical support requirements on 

a regular, recurring basis; the Army already reviews medical support requirements 

as a part of its ongoing internal processes. For example, in Total Army Analysis 

(TAA), the Army validated over 3,000 new military medical requirements for the 

operational force. In the Institutional Army TAA, the Army identified over 2,500 

new military medical requirements and over 2,400 new civilian medical requirements for the institutional Army. There are other reviews looking at important specific issues like military to civilian conversion, behavioral health, and traumatic 

brain injury, to name just a few. 

Question. What policy and/or legislative initiatives do you think are necessary in 

order to ensure that the Army can continue to fulfill medical support requirements 

as its mission and end strength grow? 

Answer. Policy initiatives implementing the authorities provided by the NDAA for 

Fiscal Year 2008 are required in areas such as the authority to reduce mandatory 

service obligations from 8 to 2 years in critically short health specialties. Further, 

DOD is currently developing and evaluating legislative proposals relating to enhanced direct hire authorities for civilian medical personnel. Finally, section 721 of 

the NDAA, which effectively prohibits the conversion of military medical and dental 

positions to civilian positions, constrains the Department’s ability to meet changing 

requirements with Army civilian employee and contractor employee medical professionals and impacts Army plans to reshape its medical workforce better to meet 

operational medical requirements and the needs of our beneficiaries. We understand 

that this concern is being addressed by a USD(P&R) legislative repeal proposal. 

INTERSERVICE TRANSFERS

Question. At the same time that the Army and Marine Corps are working harder 

than ever to achieve recruiting goals, the Navy and the Air Force are planning for 

significant reductions in military personnel. Section 327 of title 37, U.S.C., authorizes a $10,000 bonus for certain interservice transfers. Additional incentives may be 

necessary, however, to encourage ‘‘blue to green’’ transfers in order to retain sailors 

and airmen with valuable military training, skills, and experience. 

What is your assessment of the adequacy of existing incentives for interservice 

transfers? 

Answer. The existing incentive system is achieving good results. To date, the program has produced over 500 officer interservice transfers for the Army. These experienced professionals have been crucial to meeting our growing need for leaders, 

particularly in our combat units. It continues to be in our national defense interest 

to promote interservice transfers. The military departments must work together to 

make this program a success. 

Interservice transfer financial incentives alone may not be sufficient to make the 

program succeed. Service-specific force shaping tools may need to be redesigned to 

support the effort. The requirement for the Army to recoup from a candidate for 

interservice transfer any voluntary separation incentive the individual has received 

is a disincentive for an officer to transfer to the Army. The voluntary separation incentives, therefore, have had a negative impact on Army recruiting of officers from 

sister Services by creating a greater incentive to leave the Service than to transfer 

between Services. However, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service now follows a policy of not recouping separation pay until the officer concerned qualifies 

for retired pay. This mitigates somewhat the disincentive of forced recoupment. An 

officer who receives separation pay and then transfers to the Army will repay that 

separation pay at the end of his/her active service via a monthly deduction from retired pay. Army G–1 supports this DOD recoupment policy, and will actively recruit 

separating officers from our sister Services to offer them the opportunity to continue 

to serve their country. 

If confirmed, and subject to the direction of Secretary Geren, I will continue to 

work with Department leadership and Congress to identify and establish programs 

to attract quality personnel from the other Services. 

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SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. The Department of the Army has implemented changes in policy and 

procedures aimed at preventing and responding appropriately to incidents of sexual 

assault. 

What is your view of the appropriate role for senior military and civilian leaders 

in the Secretariat and the Army staff in overseeing the effectiveness of implementation of new policies relating to sexual assault? 

Answer. The Secretary and the Chief have clearly stated that sexual assault is 

a crime that has no place in our ranks. The role of senior Army leadership is to 

ensure an organizational climate where such behavior is not tolerated, and where 

victims feel free to report incidents without fear of reprisal. The Secretariat and 

Army Staff oversee and implement the Army’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program, which is now more that 3 years old. The Secretary, in fact, has 

taken a personal interest in this issue and has directed the expansion and implementation of new strategies to increase emphasis on sexual assault prevention 

measures. If confirmed, I will assist him in this vitally important effort. 

As part of senior leader involvement, senior Army leaders review the Army Sexual 

Assault Report quarterly and submit statistical data to DOD on both a quarterly 

and an annual basis. Senior leaders also submit an annual Army report and program assessment to the Secretary of Defense in accordance with statutory requirements and DOD policy. Finally, Senior Army leaders require their Inspector Generals periodically to assess the program for compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements. 

MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE (SES)

Question. The transformation of the Armed Forces has brought with it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and forward thinking management of 

senior executives. 

What is your vision for the management and development of the Army senior executive workforce, especially in the critically important areas of acquisition, financial management, and the scientific and technical fields? 

Answer. The Department of the Army has taken a very deliberate and direct approach to SES management. If confirmed, I intend to continue this initiative. The 

Army looks to its SES Corps as a replacement for military leaders in critically important areas, such as acquisition, financial management, science, engineering, and 

human resource management. As the Army has sent its flag officers into joint billets 

to support the war, it has replaced them with SES members. The Army is reallocating positions to ensure senior executives are aligned with evolving business strategy. My vision for the management and development of senior executives is a senior 

civilian workforce that possesses a broad background of experiences to prepare them 

to move between positions in order to meet the continually changing mission needs 

of the Army. I am committed to providing for the professional development and 

management of our civilian executives in ways consistent with what the Army has 

done for its General Officer Corps for many years. As the Army moves forward with 

its transformation, if confirmed, I will be committed to reinforcing and institutionalizing the value that each senior executive brings to the leadership team and to promoting and sustaining high morale and esprit de corps. 

Question. Over the last 10 years, the Army budget has almost doubled, but the 

number of senior executives in the Department of the Army has remained almost 

unchanged. 

Do you believe that the Army has the number of senior executives it needs, with 

the proper skills to manage the Department into the future? 

Answer. The Department of the Army projects a greater need for executive resource allocations in the near term. The need to convert General Officer billets to 

senior executive billets and the ever expanding mission of the Army has created a 

potential requirement for more senior executives. The Office of Personnel Management, in consultation with the Office of Management and Budget, controls the allocation of senior executive resources to all government agencies. Federal agencies can 

request additional senior executive allocations on a biennial or ad hoc basis, but 

there is no guarantee that such requests will be granted. This year, the Army was 

successful in obtaining additional executive resources for its most pressing requirements. 

The Department is currently undertaking a study of executive resource allocations 

in response to section 1102 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007. Congress mandated 

that the Department develop a strategic plan for shaping and improving the senior 

management, functional, and technical workforce, including an assessment of 

whether current allocations and position types meet all DOD needs. An interim reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00262 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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port was provided by the Department on July 13, 2007. An update is due in April 

2008. 

The Deputy Secretary of Defense promulgated a new policy in October 2007, identifying the new requirements for executives for the 21st century. These new policies 

will be the foundational doctrine to guide and conduct the baseline evaluation of executive resources. The Army supports the Department’s concept to leverage better 

career civilian executive leadership capabilities. The Army recognized this critical 

need several years ago, and set out to create a deliberate executive management 

system that will develop, grow and sustain executives who are prepared for a broader range of leadership, particularly in the joint environment, and who are exerting 

influence and supporting the most substantive national security matters. 

ARMY FAMILY ACTION PLAN

Question. The Army Family Action Plan has been successful in identifying and 

promoting quality of life issues for Army families. 

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues in the 

Army, and, if confirmed, what role would you play to ensure that family readiness 

needs are addressed and adequately resourced? 

Answer. The pace of operations has placed great stress on Army families. Secretary Geren and General Casey have responded to that challenge by making the 

commitments set forth in the Army Family Covenant, a promise to provide soldiers 

and families a quality of life commensurate with their voluntary service and daily 

sacrifices. The Army Family Covenant is focused on five areas: Family programs 

and services; health care; soldier and family housing; excellent schools, youth services and child care; and expanded employment and education opportunities for family members. I will also work to help further standardize the support being provided 

to soldiers and families and to obtain predictable funding to these important programs. One area of particular concern that has already been addressed is the fatigue and burnout of Family Readiness Group leaders and support staff as they support our Families in a time of persistent conflict. We are improving our ability to 

address soldier-family reintegration and reunion issues. The Family Readiness Support Assistant (FRSA) program supports Army spouses who volunteer as Family 

Readiness Group Leaders, Unit Commanders, and Rear Detachment Commanders. 

The FRSA helps mitigate volunteer stress and ensures an effective interface between families and support programs. 

Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global 

rebasing, BRAC, extended deployment lengths, and the planned growth of the 

Army? 

Answer. The Installation Management Command works extensively with garrisons to develop individual plans to meet staffing, funding, and programming requirements. Our BRAC plans address the needs of families as their numbers change 

on our installations. Our global rebasing plans include maintaining support to our 

soldiers and families throughout the process. At the installations that are expected 

to grow, we have programmed new child development centers, youth centers, and 

fitness facilities. Likewise, we have plans to support our soldiers and families in isolated locations. If confirmed, I will closely monitor these efforts to ensure that our 

families’ needs are met as the Army undergoes this dramatic era of growth, restationing, realignment, deployment. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support of Reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment, and family readiness? 

Answer. The Army Integrated Family Support Network (AIFSN) will provide a 

comprehensive, multi-agency approach for community support and services to meet 

the needs of the Army’s geographically dispersed population. This effort is crucial 

in supporting Army National Guard and Army Reserve families. The baseline services are: information, referral, and follow-up services; child care services; youth services; school transition services; employer support to the Guard and Reserve services; 

wounded warrior program services; survivor support services; transition assistance 

services; employment; home and family life management services; financial services; 

medical care services; and legal services. AIFSN provides additional manning for 

249 Army National Guard Family Assistance Centers spread across the country. 

AIFSN will provide a network consisting of virtual programs, brick-and-mortar facilities, and access to public and private programs and services. AIFSN will ensure 

services and support are available throughout the full spectrum of the mobilization 

process. Additionally, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 requires OSD to establish a 

reintegration program for the Army National Guard. This program, called the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program, is a key aspect of AIFSN and provides programs 

and services that specifically address the needs of our guardsmen and their families. 

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If confirmed I will work to ensure that these programs are implemented fully and 

assessed properly to insure we attain expected outcomes. 

MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

Question. Morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) programs are critical to enhancement of military life for members and their families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments. These programs must be relevant and attractive to 

all eligible users, including Active-Duty and Reserve personnel and retirees. 

What challenges do you foresee in sustaining Army MWR programs and, if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to achieve? 

Answer. Army MWR programs contribute immensely to the quality of life of our 

military families. Their continued vitality depends on consistent appropriated and 

non-appropriated funding to support all of our MWR activities. The Army increased 

funding for family and MWR programs by $739 million with supplemental funds in 

fiscal year 2008 and is moving a significant amount of base funding to the care of 

soldiers and families. The Army’s MWR funds are currently in sound financial condition. All MWR activities report a high degree of solvency through the use of best 

business practices and enterprise purchasing. This allows us to increase the value 

of our programs by eliminating inefficiencies, which would otherwise have to be 

passed on in the form of higher prices. 

The road ahead is challenging. The Army is fighting a war while transforming to 

a more consolidated, expeditionary, and joint force. However, the needs of individual 

servicemembers and their families must still be met, particularly as soldiers return 

from combat. We are developing programs like Adventure Quest, which allows a 

means of adjusting from the adrenalin rush prevalent in the combat environment 

and redirecting that energy into recreational pursuits. The Army will continue to 

explore the most effective means of supporting MWR programs to ensure we are 

meeting the needs of soldiers and families and contributing positively to recruiting, 

retention, and readiness. We will also use the efficiencies in our MWR business activities as the basis for investment capital development to fund an $85 million Capital Program annually for the next 10 years to build travel camps, bowling centers, 

water parks, youth centers, single soldier entertainment centers, and other facilities 

for our highly deserving soldiers and families. We will begin privatizing our lodging 

programs this summer by transferring our lodging facilities on 11 U.S. installations 

to a highly successful national hotel operating company, which will invest $450 million to upgrade and modernize these facilities. This will insure the quality of the 

lodging we provide our soldiers and families is equal to the quality available in the 

communities from which we recruit America’s sons and daughters. We appreciate 

your support of these important programs, and will continue to consult with you as 

we implement these far-reaching and enduring changes. 

RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD DEPLOYMENTS

Question. Deployments completed since the attacks of September 11 of the Army 

National Guard and Army Reserve for a time significantly depleted the number of 

soldiers available for involuntary mobilization under the Department’s previous policy limiting involuntary recalls of Reserve personnel to 24 cumulative months. While 

this policy has changed, sensitivity about overuse of the Reserve component continues. 

How should the Army’s Reserve component forces best be managed to provide essential support for operational deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq? 

Answer. The Army endeavors to respond to Joint Staff and combatant commanders’ requests for forces and capabilities by considering all three components 

(Active, Guard, and Reserve) in our sourcing solution. The Guard and the Reserve 

have combat arms units (e.g., Infantry, Armor, Artillery, and Aviation) which are 

regarded as fully capable for combat service, and have demonstrated their abilities 

in a superb manner over the past few years. The same applies to the broad spectrum of Combat Support and Combat Service Support units and soldiers in our Reserve components. The Army will continue to select the best units capable of meeting Joint Staff and combatant command requirements, with full confidence in each 

unit’s ability to carry out its assigned mission. 

Question. What is your understanding of the Army’s plans to avoid excessive demands on personnel and units in low density, high demand specialties whose skills 

are found primarily in the Reserve, such as civil affairs, military policy, and logistics? 

Answer. The Army is meeting the demands of persistent conflict by taking initiatives in force structure growth and by rebalancing capabilities across all three components to minimize excessive demand on low density, high demand specialties. The 

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Grow the Army Plan increases the Army end strength by 74,200, a growth of 65,000 

in the Active component (AC), 8,2000 in the Army National Guard (ARNG), and 

1,000 in the United States Army Reserve. By the close of fiscal year 2007, the Army 

had completed rebalance of 53,600 structure spaces and will rebalance an additional 

88,700 spaces by fiscal year 2013, bringing the Army rebalance total to 142,300 

spaces. The combination of growth and rebalance addresses persistent shortfall capabilities increasing logistics by 47,400; Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and 

Special Operations Forces by 12,700; Military Police by 7,400, Military Intelligence 

by 4,500, and Engineers by 11,800. The combined impact of rebalance and growth 

will build strategic and operational depth across all three components to meet combatant commander requirements, mitigate high demand, low density persistent 

shortfalls, and enable strategy. 

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. What is your assessment of the Army’s ability to reach its recruiting 

goals by component in fiscal year 2008? 

Answer. I believe that the Army will reach its recruiting and accession goals for 

fiscal year 2008. Both the Active component and the National Guard are above their 

recruitment targets to date. The Army Reserve, although short of its year-to-date 

recruiting goal, has met its overall year-to-date accessions goal (which includes IRR 

to Troop Program Unit transfers and Active component to Reserve component missions). The current recruiting environment remains challenging. Not only are we 

competing with industry, but the qualified youth population of High School Diploma 

Graduates is dwindling. In addition, illegal drug use and poor physical fitness is on 

the rise, further limiting the qualified population. We continue to use the resources 

authorized and additional recruiters to assist in meeting our goal. 

Question. What is your assessment of the impact multiple deployments of troops 

to Afghanistan and Iraq is having on retention, particularly among young enlisted 

and officer personnel after their initial obligated service has been completed? 

Answer. The pace of deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq has not had an adverse 

impact on retention to date. As mentioned above, fiscal year 2007 retention of officers was slightly better than the overall 10-year average. 

The retention rates of initial term and mid-career soldiers in deploying units has 

remained between 120–140 percent since fiscal year 2005. Recently deployed units 

or units currently deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq have reenlistment rates at 110–

120 percent of their yearly goals. This is a significant indicator of the quality of 

leadership within our ranks, the fact that soldiers believe in what they are doing, 

and the fact that soldiers value the tradition of service to the Nation. 

SUPPORT FOR ARMY FAMILIES IN THE REBASING INITIATIVE

Question. Plans for the relocation of numerous Army units under the Department’s rebasing initiative will present significant challenges to the continental 

United States (CONUS) installations and their surrounding local communities in 

order to ensure adequate resources, including housing and schools, are made available. 

What is your understanding of the steps being taken by the Army to ensure the 

successful implementation of rebasing for both soldiers and receiving communities? 

Answer. The Army is partnering with local communities to deal with increased 

community needs, such as schools, housing, and community activities, associated 

with Army stationing and growth. Garrison commanders and staff regularly engage 

with community leaders and have school liaison officers who facilitate communication with local education agencies to help communities deal with stationing and 

growth. Although Impact Aid is a Department of Education responsibility, the Army 

provides quarterly updates to the Department of Education on projected school-age 

dependent growth. 

The Army will rely on local communities as its primary supplier of family housing 

and will privatize or build family housing at U.S. locations only where necessary. 

To support Army Growth, Congress approved $266 million in fiscal year 2008 for 

government equity contributions for additional housing at Forts Bliss, Bragg, Carson, and Lewis. Additionally, the Army is requesting $334 million in fiscal year 

2009 for government equity contributions for additional housing at Forts Bliss, Carson, and Stewart. We will program additional funds in fiscal year 2010 after updated Housing Market Analyses are completed at other gaining installations. 

Question. What actions will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the challenges 

associated with rebasing are met? 

Answer. The Army has an aggressive, carefully synchronized stationing plan that 

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formation, and Grow the Force. The Army’s BRAC plan supports these major stationing initiatives, while supporting ongoing missions and national security priorities, and is designed to meet the September 2011 statutory BRAC implementation 

deadline. 

The Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2008 contained a significant 

decrease in BRAC funding, of which $560 million was reduced from the Army’s 

BRAC budget. I cannot overstate the difficulties that cuts or delays in BRAC funding pose to the Army as we implement BRAC and restationing plans. If the $560 

million decrement is not restored, the Army will find it very difficult to comply with 

all aspects of the BRAC Law. 

If confirmed, I will ensure Army stationing requirements are fully vetted and 

work with Congress to garner the resources to implement our BRAC and stationing 

requirements in a timely and efficient manner. 

SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED SOLDIERS

Question. Wounded soldiers from OEF and OIF deserve the highest priority from 

the Army for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation 

for return to duty, successful transition from Active Duty, if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. 

What is your assessment of the effectiveness of Army programs now in place to 

care for the wounded, including the Warrior Transition Brigade? 

Answer. The Army has made and continues to make significant improvements in 

the areas of infrastructure, leadership, and processes as part of our Army Medical 

Action Plan (AMAP). Over the past 12 months, execution of the AMAP has seen the 

creation of 35 Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) at installations across the Army. 

These WTUs are staffed by more than 2,300 personnel who provide care and support to over 13,000 soldiers and their families. Although I believe these programs 

are a significant improvement over past practices, we need to continue tracking and 

monitoring the programs through a variety of internal and external feedback mechanisms. If confirmed, I will continue this transformational effort to care for and support our wounded, ill, and injured soldiers and their families. 

Question. How does the Army provide follow-on assistance to wounded personnel 

who have separated from active service? How effective are those programs? 

Answer. The Army has a number of programs to assist wounded personnel who 

have separated from active service. In close coordination with the Department of 

Veterans Affairs, the Army has added 16 Veterans Affairs advisors at major medical 

treatment facilities to facilitate the process of applying for benefits and finalizing 

arrangements for follow-on care and services, all with the view to ensuring that everything is in place when soldiers transition to civilian status. 

The Army recently created the Wounded Warrior Education Initiative, which will 

allow participants to complete an advanced degree and then return to the Army to 

work in assignments in the Institutional Army where their education and personal 

experiences can be put to the best use. In addition, the Army is currently piloting 

the Warrior Transition Employment Reintegration and Training Program at Fort 

Bragg, NC. This program enables Wounded Warriors, working with the staff of the 

Soldier Family Assistance Centers—which support Warrior Transition Units and 

are operated by the Army Installation Management Command—to receive education 

and training in the development of a resume, networking, and job seeking skills. 

Through this program, Warriors in Transition are assisted by counselors from the 

Army Wounded Warrior Program, Veterans Affairs advisors, and the staff of the 

Army Career and Alumni Program to develop a winning approach to obtaining employment when they leave the Army. 

I also want to highlight the U.S. Army Wounded Warrior (AW2) Program, which 

assists and advocates for severely wounded, ill, or injured soldiers and their families 

throughout their lifetimes, wherever they are located. AW2 currently serves more 

than 2,300 soldiers, 600 on Active Duty and 1,700 veterans. AW2 Program caseworkers work with soldiers and their families to address and mitigate proactively 

any issues they may encounter in their recovery. If confirmed, it will be my honor 

to do all I can to ensure that those who have given so much for their country know 

that the Army will always be there for them. 

Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you 

would pursue to increase the Army’s support for wounded soldiers, and to monitor 

their progress in returning to civilian life? 

Answer. I think we have some terrific programs in place to support our wounded, 

ill, and injured soldiers, including some recent pilot programs. If confirmed, I intend 

to monitor the success of these pilot programs to assess their potential for expansion. I would like to continue to partner with academic institutions, industry, and 

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Congress to find innovative ways to return all of our warriors to productive civilian 

lives as proud veterans. 

Question. What is the Army’s view of the Military Severely Injured Center? 

Answer. I support any program that helps our wounded warriors get back on the 

track to success. If confirmed, my efforts will focus on getting programs and services 

such as the Military Severely Injured Center and the AW2 Program fully integrated 

with each other so as to provide comprehensive, uniform support to all 

servicemembers. To this end, I would work to see that the recently approved Department of the Army Office of Warrior Care and Transition integrates all of our 

Army programs into a streamlined and effective approach to care for soldiers and 

their families. 

RELIABLE REPORTING OF HEALTH CARE COSTS

Question. In June 2007, a congressionally-mandated Task Force on the Future of 

Military Health Care, which was formed to evaluate proposed increases in 

TRICARE fees, found that financial statement information for the medical departments of the Army, Air Force, and Navy are not auditable because of financial and 

information system problems, inadequate business processes, and internal controls. 

The same was true for DOD purchased health care, TRICARE operations, and the 

Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. Together these comprise two 

out of three stand-alone financial statements for the Department’s nearly $40 billion 

a year defense health program. 

During your tenure as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Budgets 

and Programs, and also as Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management, what problems did you identify in the financial management of military 

health care programs, and what actions did you initiate, both for the Department 

as a whole and within the United States Army, to establish more effective internal 

controls on health care costs? 

Answer. While serving as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health Budgets and 

Financial Policy, I implemented performance-based budgeting to tie resource requirements to health care production under a prospective payment system. This system helps align resources to outputs instead of basing resources on costs. It is still 

being used successfully by the Military Health System to align incentives and control costs. Questions regarding the auditability of the defense health program focus 

largely on legacy financial systems that are not Federal Financial Management Improvement Act compliant and do a poor job of tracking program assets and liabilities. The cost of health care for DOD beneficiaries is driven by the entitlement of 

our patients to extensive health care services. We worked with both the TRICARE 

contractors and the military departments to make sure that the amounts paid for 

those services were comparable to the prices paid by the Federal Government’s largest health benefit program, Medicare. 

Question. If confirmed as Under Secretary of the Army, what additional steps 

would you take to ensure and accelerate the reliable reporting of health care costs? 

Answer. The primary responsibility of the Army in reporting health care costs is 

to make sure that the resources provided to the Army by the Defense Health Program (DHP) are managed according to the standards set by the DHP. While I believe that reporting to be both timely and accurate, any future improvements required would be the responsibility of the DHP. 

Question. In your view, is the administration justified in seeking additional fee 

increases for military retirees before it corrects problems in health care cost reporting? 

Answer. Yes. Although the DHP financial statements are not auditable, they do 

represent a reasonably accurate picture of the costs of the current benefit structure. 

I agree with the recommendations of the Task Force on the Future of Military 

Health Care that additional fee increases are appropriate. 

FULLY MANNING THE ARMY’S WARRIOR TRANSITION UNITS

Question. Full resourcing of the Warrior Training Units (WTU) is critical to the 

successful recovery of injured and ill soldiers. 

What is your understanding of the current manpower requirement for the WTUs, 

and what portion of that requirement has been filled? 

Answer. The current manpower requirements are based on U.S. Army Tables of 

Distribution and Allowances (TDA) that were created for 35 Warrior Transition 

Units. There are currently 2,434 positions authorized for the WTUs. There are 2,509 

personnel on hand, for a total of 103 percent of positions filled. This fill rate includes borrowed military manpower. 

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Question. Have reservists and National Guardsmen been mobilized to fill leadership positions? 

Answer. Yes, Army reservists and National Guardsmen have been mobilized to fill 

key leadership positions in the Warrior Transition Units (WTUs). A board was conducted to select Army reservist and National Guardsmen as WTU Battalion Commanders, Company Commanders, Command Sergeants Major and First Sergeants. 

All authorized U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard leadership positions 

are currently filled. 

Question. If confirmed, what level of priority would you accord the WTUs, and 

how would you monitor and resolve any problems in resourcing that occur? 

Answer. Priority of fill is based on the three priorities established in the Army 

Manning Guidance. The WTUs are a priority 1 mission—the highest priority for fill. 

Other than providing units in response to Combatant Commanders’ Requests For 

Forces, caring for our wounded, ill, and injured soldiers is our highest priority. 

Army leadership monitors WTU manning regularly. If confirmed I would resolve 

any problems in resourcing according to the established priorities of the Army. 

HEALTH CARE ACCESS FOR SOLDIERS IN THE WTUS

Question. The Army has established special health care access standards for 

servicemembers assigned to the WTUs, which should reflect the high priority assigned to these soldiers. 

What is your understanding of the standards and how well they are being met 

at this time? 

Answer. The Army has established standards to ensure the WTU soldiers have 

expedited access to medical services. These standards assist in reducing the time 

our soldiers are in a transition status, and help facilitate a quick return to duty or 

separation to active citizenship. The enhanced standards apply to WTU soldiers receiving either primary or specialty care in our Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs). 

Over the past several months, the Army has hired new care providers and adjusted 

additional resources to meet these enhanced standards. We use an automated system to measure and track trends related to these unique access standards. The 

Army currently meets the new standards for approximately 80 percent of WTU appointments. This is below our objective of 90 percent. Additionally, the Army tracks 

access through a WTU satisfaction survey. This survey asks WTU soldiers several 

questions related to their ability to access both doctors and therapists. The most recent survey results indicate that approximately 75 percent of WTU soldiers are satisfied with their ability to access medical care, a satisfaction level that is comparable to civilian benchmarks for access. A number of initiatives are ongoing to ensure processes and resources align to meet the access standards and improve patient satisfaction. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you monitor performance on all standards, including health care, staffing and facility standards, as well as timely medical and 

physical evaluation board processing for soldiers assigned to the Army’s WTUs? 

Answer. Tracking performance is critical to managing, adjusting, and resourcing 

WTU operations. The Army is using Unit Status Reports and other measures to 

track short-, near-, and long-term objectives. These measures show specific details, 

to include day-to-day operations, but also provide aggregate trending information to 

ensure the organization is on the correct path to success. If confirmed, I would continue to use this dashboard approach to monitoring performance on all standards. 

JOINT ACQUISITION PROGRAMS [ASA–ALT]

Question. What are your views regarding joint acquisition programs, such as the 

Joint Tactical Radio System and the Joint Strike Fighter? 

Answer. There are great efficiencies to be gained by joint programs as opposed 

to individual Service procurements. Joint programs have the advantages of economies of scale, reduction in Service spares inventories, and Service sharing of training costs. However, the critical start-point for a joint program is a ‘‘joint’’ requirement. Without a solid joint requirement, it is doubtful that a joint acquisition program will be cost effective. 

Question. Do you see utility in encouraging the Services to conduct more joint development, especially in the area of helicopters and unmanned systems? 

Answer. Yes, a joint development approach has utility in this area. Key national 

strategic guidance and well defined joint capability voids provide incentives for the 

Services to collaborate to define and produce weapon systems that best meet our national security needs. At the same time, it is very important for the Services to 

maintain separate resourcing and the ability to manage to Service priorities within 

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a jointly-enabled construct without adversely constraining or increasing program 

costs. 

Question. If so, what enforcement mechanisms would you recommend to implement more joint program acquisition? 

Answer. DOD has an established process for the development and approval of 

joint capability documents. This process includes oversight at the Joint Service level 

through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). As these capabilities are 

evaluated, a joint service designation is assigned. In response to these capabilities 

documents, DODI 5000.2 stipulates that joint service programs must be approved, 

and any changes therein must be approved, by the USD(AT&L). Further, as the 

Services and DOD prepare their budget submissions, resourcing decisions can be 

made by the Service or OSD. Lastly, with the creation of Capability Portfolio Managers (CPMs) at the OSD level, a CPM can recommend a host of possible decisions 

to the OSD leadership. 

REQUIREMENTS AND PLANNING PROCESSES

Question. As rising personnel and operations and maintenance costs consume an 

increasing portion of the Army’s budget authority, and as competing demands for 

Federal dollars increase in the future years, it is possible that the Army will have 

to address the challenges of modernization and transformation with fewer and fewer 

resources. What changes would you recommend to the way the Army prioritizes resources 

to maintain the momentum of Army transformation while at the same time reducing future force protection shortfalls? 

Answer. Army personnel and operations and maintenance costs are accounting for 

a larger proportion of our base budget and will continue to do so in the foreseeable 

future. This growth naturally increases the tension between these costs and our investments, which we use to transform the Army. Since 2002, the strategic environment has changed dramatically, requiring our Nation’s Army to reorganize, grow, 

restation, and transform while fighting the war on terrorism. These demands have 

caused the Army to become more dependent on supplementals. While increases in 

our base budget provide for growth of the Army, they have not kept pace with operational demands that the Army must respond to and request support for, largely 

through requests for supplemental appropriations. 

I believe the Army has, and will continue to implement, a sound resourcing 

scheme that produces a force that meets the needs of the Nation. However, without 

a reduction in expected missions or increased resources to match increased missions, 

the Army will eventually lose the ability to modernize and sustain current capabilities. We have experienced this situation in the past. During the 1990s, Army investment was reduced sharply, which created significant equipment shortages in our 

forces that we have been scrambling to correct with new procurement, just-in-time 

fieldings and retention of theater-provided equipment. Another approach to sustaining transformation would be to concentrate our modernization efforts on a reduced force structure, but that would be inconsistent with current demand. Using 

the lessons from today’s fight, we are transforming to a future force with even more 

robust protection capabilities. The Army is committed to providing the best protection to our soldiers today and in the future. 

BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS

Question. The military Services are in the process of developing business plans 

for the implementation of the 2005 Defense BRAC decisions. 

What do you see as the responsibilities of the Department of the Army in implementing BRAC decisions? 

Answer. The Army is responsible for executing both the Army’s BRAC recommendations and a portion of the joint cross Service group recommendations, as 

assigned by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). 

The Army has developed business plans and budget justification materials, and is 

executing the program in accordance with those plans and the BRAC appropriations. 

Question. What do you see as the priorities of the Department of the Army in implementing BRAC decisions? 

Answer. The Army’s priority is to complete the construction projects required to 

enable unit and organizational moves from closing and realigning installations to 

meet the timeframe directed by the law. The bulk of construction funds ($13 billion) 

will be used in fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010. This is a carefully integrated plan. 

If the Army program is not fully funded in a timely manner each year, we will be 

significantly challenged to execute BRAC as intended. 

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Question. The DOD installation closure process resulting from BRAC decisions 

has historically included close cooperation with the affected local community in 

order to allow these communities an active role in the reuse of property. In rare 

cases, the goals of the local community may not be compatible with proposals considered by DOD. For example, the recent closure of the Walter Reed Medical Center 

in Washington, DC, will present opportunities for both the local community and the 

Federal Government to re-use the land based on potentially competing plans. 

If confirmed, what goals and policies would you propose to assist affected communities with economic development, revitalization, and re-use planning of property received as a result of the BRAC process? 

Answer. If confirmed, and with the guidance of the Secretary, I will work closely 

with the Office of Economic Adjustment, Local Redevelopment Authorities, the Governors, and other appropriate State and Local officials to accelerate the property disposal process whenever possible. The Army has completed the Federal screening 

and has made the determination of surplus for all of the closure installations except 

for the Chemical Demilitarization facilities. The Local Redevelopment Authorities 

are submitting their redevelopment plans, and they will be integrated into the Army 

property disposal process. 

Question. What lessons did the Army learn during the BRAC process that you 

would recommend be included in future BRAC legislation? 

Answer. I believe the Army is generally satisfied with the current BRAC authorities, and, if confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to execute BRAC 

2005. 

TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION

Question. The Department’s efforts to quickly transition technologies to the 

warfighter have yielded important results in the last few years. Challenges remain 

in institutionalizing the transition of new technologies into existing programs of 

record and major weapons systems and platforms. 

What challenges to transition do you see within the Army? 

Answer. The Army carefully coordinates between acquisition programs of record 

and the laboratories and Research, Development, and Engineering Centers (RDECs) 

which are developing and evaluating technology options for these programs. The 

Army’s key advanced technology demonstration efforts are required to have a technology transition agreement with the receiving acquisition program. However, because of the demands of the ongoing global war on terror, the Army has not been 

able to fund some acquisition programs to receive the technology that has been matured. 

The Army also fields technologies rapidly through the Rapid Equipping Force and 

the Rapid Fielding Initiative. Technologies transitioned to the field via these programs typically have not been through a formal acquisition development, and the 

Army must deal with the challenges of ensuring that this equipment is safe, effective, and logistically supportable in the operational environment. Further, even for 

those technologies that have been effective in the theatres of operation, the Army 

has procedures to assess the military utility of those technologies for full spectrum 

Army-wide applications. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that technologies are rapidly 

transitioned from the laboratory into the hands of the warfighter? 

Answer. The Army laboratories and RDECs work closely with industry, academia, 

and the other Services and Defense Agencies to explore technology options for the 

soldier. As discussed above, the Army’s key advanced technology demonstration efforts are required to have a technology transition agreement with the receiving acquisition program. These agreements document what products the Science and 

Technology (S&T) program will deliver, at what time, and with what level of performance and maturity, as well as the transition path forward for that technology. 

The Army will continue to focus on obtaining validated needs and continue to synchronize work between S&T and program evaluation offices and program managers. 

We must guard against pressures for technology solutions from the nontechnical 

community that reads the popular press and thinks that they are ‘‘discovering’’ technology opportunities. This may lead to unrealistic expectations about technology capabilities and the temptation to redirect disciplined technology development and 

technology maturity assessments towards work of less technical merit which is typically unable to withstand rigorous evaluation. 

Question. What steps would you take to enhance the effectiveness of technology 

transition efforts? 

Answer. The Army is rapidly fielding the best new equipment to the current force 

through several initiatives, including the Rapid Equipping Force and the Rapid 

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Fielding Initiative. The Army’s number one priority is force protection of our soldiers with individual weapons and protective equipment. I would plan to upgrade 

and modernize existing systems to ensure all soldiers have the equipment they 

need. I would incorporate new technologies derived from the Army S&T program, 

and from FCSs development. I would field the FCS BCTs. FCS is the core of the 

Army’s modernization effort and will provide our soldiers an unparalleled understanding of their operational environment, increased precision and lethality, and enhanced survivability. My objective will be to have our soldiers equipped with worldclass weapon systems and equipment, keeping the Army the most dominant land 

power in the world with full-spectrum capabilities. 

ARMY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ENGINEERING CENTERS AND LABORATORIES

Question. Among the roles the Army’s Research, Development, and Engineering 

Centers and Laboratories are supposed to play is the development of innovative systems and technologies supporting their transition to the warfighter, and supporting 

the Army in making technically sound acquisition decisions. 

Do you feel that the Army’s Research, Development, and Engineering Centers and 

Laboratories are sufficiently resourced in funding, personnel, and equipment to perform these missions? 

Answer. Despite the demands of the ongoing global war on terrorism the Army 

has been able to maintain its S&T investment at over $1.7 billion for each of the 

past three budget requests and has actually increased its proposed fiscal year 2009 

S&T investment to $1.8 billion. We believe this level of investment is sufficient to 

support our S&T personnel, projects, and equipment consistent with our broad resource demands. 

Question. What in your view are the biggest deficiencies in the performance of the 

Army’s Research, Development, and Engineering Centers and Laboratories? 

Answer. The biggest deficiency in the performance of the Army’s Research, Development, and Engineering Centers and Laboratories is their inability to effectively 

modernize their laboratory infrastructure. 

Question. What do you plan to do to address those deficiencies? 

Answer. To the maximum extent possible, the Army’s Research, Development, and 

Engineering Centers and Laboratories will utilize the flexibility provided in title 10, 

U.S.C., section 2805, to recapitalize critical mission infrastructure. We are also seeking to reauthorize the Laboratory Revitalization Demonstration Program and increase the associated minor construction limit to $2.5 million, with a $3 million 

limit for unspecified minor construction. The renewal will provide laboratory/center 

directors the ability to recapitalize critical mission infrastructure and reduce reliance on military construction to meet critical mission needs and corrects construction approval limits to account for major increases in the cost of laboratory construction over more common forms of construction. 

Question. Do you feel that the Army’s Research, Development, and Engineering 

Centers and Laboratories have the appropriate personnel systems and authorities 

to support the recruiting and retaining of their highly-qualified technical workforce? 

Answer. Under congressionally authorized laboratory demonstration program authorities, the Army has the appropriate personnel systems and authorities to support the recruiting and retaining of their highly-qualified technical workforce. The 

laboratories and centers have already taken significant advantage of the authorities 

provided by Congress for recruiting bonuses, laboratory pay banding, pay-for-performance, incentive awards, and employee advanced education and development 

programs. Our vital laboratory infrastructure is fundamental to exploit the knowledge of our people and to attract and retain the most talented scientists and engineers to work for the Army. 

CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER

Question. Section 904 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 provides for the Under 

Secretary of each military department to be designated as the Chief Management 

Officer of the department. 

What is your understanding of the authorities and responsibilities that you would 

assume, if confirmed, as Chief Management Officer of the Department of the Army? 

Answer. Section 904 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 designates the Deputy Secretary of Defense as the Chief Management Officer of DOD and designates the Service Under Secretaries as Chief Management Officers of the Military Departments. 

This designation makes sense, and if confirmed to this position, I will discharge my 

duties in providing oversight and leadership across the broad range of the Army’s 

business functions. 

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Question. What priorities would you establish in your capacity as Chief Management Officer, and what would you hope to accomplish in that position? 

Answer. Instituting a cost culture is essential to the success of the Army. Integrating cost as a variable in our decisionmaking process will help us ensure that 

scarce resources are used wisely and efficiently. Working with the Deputy Under 

Secretary of the Army, I would ensure effective execution of our enterprise architecture and modernization efforts across all business domains. I would ensure that 

progress is realized in implementing a comprehensive financial improvement and 

audit readiness plan to guide financial modernization activities. 

Question. If confirmed, would you expect to establish a strategic management plan 

for the Department of the Army? 

Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I would work with the Secretary to develop a strategic 

management plan for the Army that is consistent and aligns with the DOD management plan. The Army’s enterprise architecture aligns with the Department’s federated approach to business system modernization. 

Question. If so, what issues would you expect to address in that plan, and how 

would you go about addressing them? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that progress is realized on the Army’s three 

key financial improvement activities. The first is to complete development and fielding of General Fund Enterprise Business System Increment 2. The second is to complete all testing, fielding, and organizational restructuring in support of the Defense 

Integrated Military Human Resource System. Our third key activity is to implement 

a pilot program supporting electronic payments for the Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Iraq. I would work to ensure that progress is made in developing 

business system transition plans and that systems architecture aligns with the Department’s Enterprise Transition Plan and Business Enterprise Architecture. 

COMMISSION ON ARMY ACQUISITION AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT IN EXPEDITIONARY

OPERATIONS

Question. The Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations concluded that ‘‘the Army sent a skeleton contracting force 

into theater without the tools or resources necessary to adequately support our 

warfighters.’’ According to the Commission, ‘‘Contracting, from requirements definition to contract management, is not an Army Core Competence. The Army has excellent, dedicated people; but they are understaffed, overworked, under-trained, 

under-supported and, most important, under-valued.’’ 

Do you agree with the conclusions reached by the Commission? 

Answer. The Army greatly appreciates the work of the Commission and is in full 

agreement with the Commission’s general recommendations for improvement. Indeed, many of the Commission’s recommendations are consistent with the issues 

identified by the Army Contracting Study completed in 2005 and the Army Contracting Task Force, which was co-chaired by Ms. Kathryn Condon and LTG Ross 

Thompson. To date, the Army has taken action on 21 of the 22 Gansler Commission 

recommendations specific to the Army. The Army is aggressively addressing the 

structural weaknesses and shortcomings identified to improve current and future 

expeditionary contracting activities. Our actions stretch across the Army and include an ongoing, comprehensive review of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, 

leader development, personnel, and facilities. 

Question. If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in addressing these concerns? 

Answer. Secretary of the Army Geren recently announced the Army Contracting 

Campaign Plan, which is a focused commitment to implement changes across the 

Army to ensure that our doctrine, manning, training, and support structure for contracting are comprehensive, consistent and fully implemented. Mr. Geren has directed me to implement specific recommendations of both the Gansler Commission 

and the Army Contracting Task Force as expeditiously as possible. 

Question. The Commission report states that ‘‘The Army’s difficulty in adjusting 

to the singular problems of Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan is in large part due to 

the fact that there are no generals assigned to contracting responsibilities.’’ The 

Commission recommends that Congress authorize ‘‘a core set of 10 additional general officers for contracting positions’’. 

Do you support the recommendation of the Commission? 

Answer. The Army plans to continue to grow additional military contracting structure in the Active Force and civilian contracting workforce in line with the Gansler 

Commission recommendations. To that end the Army has approved and is standing 

up a two-star level Army Contracting Command (ACC) under the AMC, including 

two subordinate commands; a one-star expeditionary contracting command; and a 

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restructured one-star level installation contracting organization. The Army is seeking additional officer authorizations to provide the leadership for those new commands as well as provide career path progression to help retain and promote much 

needed uniformed leadership. 

Question. In your view, is legislation required to implement this recommendation, 

or can the Army assign new general officers to contracting functions without legislation? 

Answer. There is flexibility to assign general officers to contracting functions 

within the Army’s current general officer allocations. The key question is, given the 

current optempo and the stress on Army leadership, both military and civilian, does 

the Army need more general officers to meet the leadership demands for the force? 

The Army is working closely with OSD to assess whether legislation to increase the 

number of general officers to lead DOD’s future contracting workforce is the best 

way to meet the identified requirements in this area. 

Question. The Commission report states that ‘‘The number and expertise of the 

military contracting professionals must be significantly increased’’ to address the 

problems we have experienced in theater. The Commission recommends that the 

Army hire 2,000 new contracting personnel. 

Do you support the recommendation of the Commission? 

Answer. The acquisition workforce has declined significantly in the last decade 

while the number of dollars that we are executing in the Army has increased by 

more than 80 percent. The Army has never fought an extended conflict that required such reliance on contractor support. We are currently addressing the need 

to expand, train, structure, and empower our contracting personnel to support the 

full range of military operations. 

Question. What steps have you taken, if any, in your capacity as Acting Under 

Secretary to address this issue? 

Answer. Contingency contracting force structure increases were being incorporated in the Army’s modular force design even prior to the establishment of the 

Army Contracting Task Force. While the Army did not have the force structure necessary to support expeditionary operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have now 

established a contingency contracting structure that consists of Contracting Support 

Brigades (commanded by a colonel), Contingency Contracting Battalions, and Contingency Contracting Teams. An increase of 295 contingency contracting officers to 

fill this new force structure has already been approved. A further growth of 167 

military and 804 civilians in the institutional Army is still undergoing analysis. 

Question. What additional steps do you expect to take, if confirmed? 

Answer. As the point person for the Army Contracting Campaign plan, I plan to 

examine the entire contracting process in the Army, from requirements definition 

to the final receipt and payment for goods and services received. We will look at 

everything, from how we are identifying what we need to how we raise and train 

our young officers to become our future contracting experts. As best practices 

emerge from these efforts, they will be shared across the entire contracting workforce. 

Question. The Commission report states that most civilians working on contracting issues in Iraq were ‘‘volunteers, often with inadequate or wrong skill sets 

for the job at hand, and often getting their required contracting experience on-thejob as part of their deployment.’’ The Commission recommends that qualified civilians who agree to deploy be provided enhanced career and job incentives. These include the elimination of an existing pay cap, tax free status, and long-term medical 

care for injuries incurred in-theater. 

Do you support the recommendations of the Commission? 

Answer. The Army agrees with the Commission that civilians who agree to deploy 

deserve the benefits and professional opportunities commensurate with their skills, 

hardships, and contributions. We are working with OSD to examine the entitlements, compensation, and benefits currently afforded to deployed civilian employees. 

As we identify areas in need of improvement or enhancement, we will work with 

OSD and the administration to seek legislative changes. 

Question. What is your understanding of the steps that the Army has taken, or 

plans to take, to implement these recommendations? 

Answer. The Army has conducted a review of the pay and benefits that are afforded to deployed civilians. We have also partnered with a team led by OSD. Several legislative and regulatory reforms have been identified to improve the benefits 

for deployed civilians and we have initiated the staffing process in these areas. 

Question. The Commission report states that some DOD and Army policies actively discourage the deployment of civilians. For example, the report states that 

volunteers are required to be sent on ‘detail’, so that the providing office has to pay 

salary and expenses of deploying civilians out of their existing budgets without any 

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reimbursement or backfilling. As a result, the Commission reports, managers in the 

U.S. have actively discouraged civilians from volunteering. 

Do you agree with the Commission’s findings on this issue? 

Answer. The Army does not have evidence suggesting that employees have been 

discouraged from deploying. In some instances, however, organizations have been 

required to continue paying salary and other expenses of deployed employees. With 

the current tight budget situation, commands are often unable to backfill a deployed 

civilian. We are working with OSD to clarify the policy in this area to reduce the 

organizational disruptions caused by deployment of civilian personnel. 

Question. What is your understanding of the steps that the Army has taken, or 

plans to take, to address this problem? 

Answer. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) 

issued a memo on February 12, 2008, with the subject ‘‘Building Increased Civilian 

Deployment Capacity.’’ In the memo and attached policy guidance, Dr. Chu reiterated the need to support the deployment of DOD civilians for contingency contracting operations. The Department of the Army fully supports the requirement to 

deploy civilians and lift the burden from losing organizations, and will continue to 

review recommendations for resolving the issue. 

Question. The report states that Contracting Officer’s Representatives (CORs) are 

an ‘‘essential part of contract management’’, because they are responsible for ensuring contract performance. According to the report, however, ‘‘CORs are assigned as 

. . . an ‘extra duty,’ requiring no experience. . . . The COR assignment is often 

used to send a young soldier to the other side of the base when a commander does 

not want to have to deal with the person. Additionally, little, if any training is provided. . . . Despite this, there are still too few CORs. Moreover, COR turnover is 

high, frequently leaving many gaps in contract coverage.’’ 

Do you agree with the Commission’s assessment of the CORs assigned in Iraq and 

Afghanistan? 

Answer. A Contracting Officer Representative (COR) townhall meeting in Kuwait 

led by Army Constructive Training Federation leadership in October 2007 identified 

both individual COR training and execution shortcomings. CORs stated that they 

lacked the appropriate level of training and expertise to oversee complex theater 

contracts. While CORs are not contracting personnel, they are the ‘‘eyes and ears’’ 

of the contracting officer and the customer and must be viewed with the appropriate 

level of authority across the Army. 

Question. What is your understanding of the steps that the Army has taken, or 

plans to take, to address this problem? 

Answer. A standard, minimum training requirement has been established for 

Army CORs. They must complete the Defense Acquisition University online continuous learning module, ‘‘COR with a Mission Focus,’’ prior to appointment. As of November 1, 2007, over 4,500 Army personnel have completed this course. 

MILITARY ROLE IN DOMESTIC EMERGENCIES

Question. The shortfalls in the emergency response to Hurricane Katrina along 

the Gulf Coast have resulted in debate about the appropriate role of DOD and the 

Armed Forces in responding to domestic emergencies. 

In your view, should the Army have a more expansive role in responding to natural disasters? 

Answer. Our Nation has been at war for over 6 years. Our Army—Active, Guard, 

and Reserve—has been a leader in this war and has been fully engaged in Iraq, Afghanistan, and defending the homeland. The Army has always supported requests 

for military assistance and will continue to do so. However, the ‘‘role’’ of the Army 

in domestic emergencies should continue to remain within prescribed law and in 

support of the Department of Homeland Security or other lead Federal agency. 

Question. In your view, what should the Army’s role be in responding to domestic 

emergencies, including chemical, biological, or nuclear attacks? 

Answer. DOD and United States Northern Command have worked in concert with 

the Department of Homeland Security to plan and prepare for response to domestic 

emergencies. United States Army North is the dedicated Army Service Component 

Command to the United States Northern Command for Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities for the continental United States and Alaska. 

Northern Command is DOD’s conduit to each Federal Emergency Management 

Agency Region for Defense Support to Civil Authorities. The Command collocates 

within the Federal Emergency Management Agency Headquarters and builds synergy and habitual relationships with Federal Emergency Management Agency staff, 

other Government Agencies, state emergency responders, state Adjutant Generals, 

and potential base support installations. 

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When a domestic emergency, including chemical, biological, or nuclear attack, occurs, the affected Governor or Governors shall first employ their Air and/or Army 

National Guard with State authority, if required. Each State and Territory has its 

own Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team (for detection and identification). Moreover, 17 States have created federally funded National Guard Chemical, 

Biological, Nuclear and high yield Explosive Enhanced Response Force Packages 

(commonly known as CERFP) for search and rescue, decontamination, emergency 

medical care, and force protection. These force packages are designed to support all 

States within their FEMA region and also may deploy throughout the country. 

In an event of a catastrophic impact, the States will likely request Federal military assistance. The Army provides the majority of assets to Northern Command for 

the Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and high yield Explosive Consequence Management Response Force (commonly known as CCMRF). This force provides assessment 

teams and enhances the civil authority’s ability to provide command and control, 

medical, logistics, extraction and decontamination, transportation, security, public 

affairs, and mortuary affairs. 

Question. What is your assessment of the Army National Guard’s ability to meet 

its State contingency and homeland defense missions, given its operational commitments overseas and current equipment shortfalls? 

Answer. The Army National Guard continues to demonstrate its ability to respond 

to State contingency and homeland missions as well as to its operational commitments. 

The States use their Army National Guard assets cooperatively through participation in the Emergency Management Assistance Compact. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact is a congressionally ratified organization that provides 

form and structure to interstate mutual aid. Through the Compact, a disaster impacted state can request and receive assistance from other member states quickly 

and efficiently; the Compact resolves two key issues upfront: liability and reimbursement. 

Current Army planning, programming, and budgeting process has been effective 

in examining, assessing, prioritizing and allocating resources to the Total Army—

the Active component and the Reserve components. The Army is currently executing 

and programming unprecedented resource levels to the Reserve components. The Director of the Army National Guard and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau are 

fully represented in Army planning and programming deliberations. Their respective staffs have been integrated directly into the HQDA staff so that we fully understand Reserve component requirements resulting in an improved total force. 

Since September 11, 2001, the Army has resourced over $49 billion in Army National Guard procurement (for fiscal years 2001–2013). Funding and equipment distributions are firewalled: promises made are promises kept. For fiscal years 2001–

2007, the Army resourced $15.3 billion in Army National Guard procurement. Over 

the next 24 months, the Army will distribute over 400,000 items of equipment to 

the Army National Guard, valued at $17.5 billion—36 percent of Total Army distributions. This includes 16,000 trucks, 31,000 radios, 74,000 night vision devices, 

and 86,000 weapons. 

Question. What is your view of the recommendation of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves to provide Governors the authority to direct all military 

forces within their States when responding to domestic emergencies? 

Answer. States have effectively responded to numerous disasters and have done 

well. A catastrophic domestic emergency will likely be a multi-state event overwhelming the ability of the State or States to respond. In that situation, forces from 

outside the disaster area, not burdened by an immediate danger to themselves and 

their families, are the best assets to respond. 

While I understand the need to provide the Governors with access to military 

forces in response to domestic emergencies, I disagree with the means identified in 

the recommendation. A Governor’s perspective is primarily his or her State. After 

use of local and State first responders, each Governor has Army and Air National 

Guard forces under state authority available to respond to State emergencies. Further, most of the States and territories participate in the Emergency Management 

Assistance Compact which enables them to provide additional support to each other. 

When the Governors request Federal assistance, DOD provides the military portion of that support to the designated lead Federal agency. In the event of multiple, 

near simultaneous terrorist attacks, the Federal Government must maintain the 

flexibility and agility to employ forces to manage and sustain an effective response 

force. 

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FORCE PROTECTION PROGRAMS

Question. Over the past several years, the Army, with the assistance of Congress, 

has spent billions of dollars on force protection measures (e.g., Interceptor Body 

Armor, uparmored high mobility multipurpose vehicles, counter-IEDs measures) primarily using supplemental appropriations. 

If confirmed, how would you ensure that the Army continues to support and fund 

force protection programs, even in the absence of supplemental appropriations provisions? 

Answer. I appreciate the assistance of Congress in protecting our soldiers by supporting these critical Force Protection programs. I can assure you that equipment 

necessary to protect the lives of soldiers will always be a high priority for funding. 

The Army has become increasingly dependent upon supplemental funds to meet 

war-related requirements and many programs funded through supplemental appropriations—like force protection—have become enduring. As your question implies, 

we must continue critical enduring programs even if supplemental appropriations 

go away. Funding from supplemental appropriations for enduring programs must 

move to the base program. So in addition to ensuring that Force Protection programs receive a high priority for funding within the Army, I will also advocate 

strongly that the missions assigned to the Army are resourced commensurately. 

EQUIPMENT RESET

Question. The ongoing requirements of the global war on terror have significantly 

increased usage rates on the Services’ equipment. As a result, we know there will 

be a requirement to ‘‘reset’’ the force not only as the current operations continue 

but for some time after they conclude as well. However, given the ongoing nature 

of both the war in Iraq, and the larger war on terror, we need to ensure that our 

force remains ready to respond to whatever contingencies are required. 

Do you think that the Army’s equipment reset program meets the requirements 

of the global war on terror, as well as the requirements for changing to a modular 

force? 

Answer. The Army’s reset program has been meeting the requirements for deployed forces by maintaining equipment readiness with rates at more than 90 percent for ground equipment and more than 75 percent for aviation equipment. The 

Army expects to have its BCTs fully equipped by 2015 and its combat support and 

combat service support units by 2019 provided it receives adequate funding. 

Question. In your view, what is the greatest source of risk in the Army reset program and, if confirmed, how would you eliminate or mitigate that risk? 

Answer. Timely and accurate funding is the greatest source of risk to the Army’s 

reset program. Full funding received at the beginning of the fiscal year allows for 

the early purchase of long lead parts which reduce reset timelines, minimizes delays 

in replacing battle losses, and ensures the retention of the skilled labor force at the 

depots. To mitigate this risk, it is imperative for the Army to maintain constant and 

open communication with OSD, the Office of Management and Budget, and Congress, so that they clearly understand our requirements and the reasoning behind 

them. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that sufficient resources are programmed and requested to meet the Army’s requirements to provide trained and 

ready forces across the spectrum of military operations? 

Answer. The development of the Army’s reset requirements is driven by current 

wartime commitments: size of force structure; operational tempo; equipment stress; 

battle losses; lessons learned; and the need to reconstitute equipment readiness for 

the next contingency, which could be any mission along the spectrum of conflict 

from low intensity to full spectrum operations. Current operations have greatly increased the wear and tear on our equipment and the associated reset requirements 

are a cost of war and should be entirely funded by supplemental dollars. 

Question. Is it your understanding that our repair depots are operating at full capacity to meet rebuild and repair requirements for reset? 

Answer. Depots are not operating at maximum capacity but are operating at a 

level that theater equipment retrograde and funding will support. In peacetime, our 

depots expend approximately 12 million direct labor hours annually. Depots are currently executing 27 million direct labor hours and have the capacity to expand up 

to 40 million. Each depot’s production capacity is being optimized by equipment type 

and commodity. Our depots have enabled deployed forces to maintain equipment 

readiness for the last 5 years at 90 percent or better for ground equipment and 75 

percent or better for aviation, and are repairing enough equipment to meet the requirements of the next deploying force. Should Army requirements change, depots 

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could do more and increase their capacity with predictable funding, available spare 

parts, increased workforce, and more retrograded equipment. 

Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe could be taken to increase 

the Army’s capacity to fix its equipment and make it available for operations and 

training? 

Answer. Timely and adequate funding is essential. It enables depots to procure 

long lead time parts, maintain a skilled workforce, replace and repair maintenance 

equipment, and set the conditions for resetting our redeploying forces. In addition, 

we are putting in place several logistics initiatives that will speed retrograde, improve asset visibility, reduce transportation time, and target certain equipment for 

direct return to depots. These initiatives are being tested in the Reset Pilot Program 

and are already beginning to show results. Depots are implementing Lean Six 

Sigma programs and are showing tremendous success in improving production rates 

and reducing turn around times. 

ARMY PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT

Question. The Army has long included as a critical element of its strategic readiness sufficient prepositioned equipment and stocks around the world and afloat to 

accelerate the deployment and employment of forces in response to crises. However, 

Army prepositioned stocks are nearly completely committed in support of operations 

in Iraq leaving the Army and the Nation little strategic flexibility or options. 

What changes to policies regarding use of prepositioned equipment stocks would 

you recommend if confirmed? 

Answer. No changes are recommended to the current policy for the use of Army 

Prepositioned Stocks (APS) at this time. The last 4 years demonstrated that the 

APS program was flexible, responsive, and critical to the Army’s ability to deploy 

forces in support of combatant command requirements and to adapt to changing 

strategic requirements. The Army carefully monitors the use of APS assets and 

closely coordinates their use with the combatant commanders. Whenever use of APS 

equipment is required, the Army evaluates the strategic risk and implements mitigation factors. We must continue to replenish our APS stocks with ‘‘modernized’’ 

equipment that meets the needs of the modular force. 

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the current plan for reconstituting Army prepositioned equipment to re-establish this strategic capability? 

Answer. APS capabilities will be reconstituted to provide the maximum level of 

strategic flexibility and operational agility. The Army has developed ‘‘APS Strategy 

2015’’ which articulates the afloat and ashore equipment required to meet the future 

responsiveness needs of the combatant commanders. Reconstitution of APS is already underway and contingent on available resources and operational requirements, the Army has an executable timeline within which to reset its APS sets in 

accordance with ‘‘APS Strategy 2015.’’ 

EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY

Question. Do you believe that the Army has enough equipment to fully support 

the predeployment training and operations for the next rotation to OIF/OEF? 

Answer. The Army has enough equipment to ensure forces are adequately prepared for and can successfully conduct operations in OIF/OEF. No soldier will go 

into combat without the proper training and equipment. There are, however, some 

equipment shortages in CONUS that require sharing equipment among pre-deployed units to ensure they are fully trained before deploying. Equipment sharing 

is generally managed at the brigade or division-level by transferring equipment 

among units to support specific training events. The Army works diligently to schedule forces for deployment as early as possible and to project the mission they must 

perform when deployed. As part of each synchronization cycle, a Department-level 

Force Validation Committee works to ensure that deploying forces are provided all 

the personnel and equipment required for their mission. Additionally, a Training 

Support and Resources Conference meets to ensure deploying forces have all the 

training support tools they need to train for their mission and are scheduled for a 

mission rehearsal exercise. 

Question. What do you see as the critical equipment shortfalls for training and 

operations? 

Answer. All soldiers receive the required training and equipment before going into 

combat. Active, Guard, and Reserve must be certified as ready before they are put 

in harms way. Achieving the necessary unit readiness involves consolidating training sets at our installations to compensate for equipment shortfalls among nondeployed units. The most common Active and Reserve component high-demand 

predeployment training equipment shortfalls occur with force protection-related 

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equipment, where equipping solutions are developed to meet specific theater requirements. Most of the production of these items goes straight into theater to meet 

the force protection demand. These items include up armored light, medium, and 

heavy tactical trucks; special route clearance vehicles (to include the RG–31, Buffalo, Husky, and Cougar); and counter remote-controlled improvised explosive device 

warfare (CREW) devices. We retain a limited number of these systems for home station training and at our Combat Training Centers so soldiers will gain experience 

with these systems before they deploy. Additionally, a large number of our soldiers 

already have one or more rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan and have direct experience with these systems. 

Other items of equipment with limited availability for home station training include kits designed to increase the survivability of standard Army equipment, including the Bradley and Tank Urban Survivability Kits, and uparmored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) fragmentation kits. These kits are 

provided in theater. Finally, there are some additional training equipment gaps in 

specific areas which are driven by the Army’s desire to get the most modern and 

capable systems immediately into the hands of our soldiers in combat operations. 

These items include the most recent version of the Army Battle Command System, 

the Command Post of the Future, some advanced intelligence 12 systems, and biometric systems. The Army is working to get appropriate levels of systems to support 

training the force into the training base and at unit home stations, as well as in 

our Combat Training Centers. 

Significant quantities of Army equipment remain in Iraq and Afghanistan to minimize the time lost, and the associated costs, in transporting equipment to and from 

these missions. The result is that units at home station have less than full sets of 

authorized equipment. Although rotating equipment between training units allows 

us to achieve the training requirements before deployment, these units are limited 

in their ability to support other contingencies around the world should the need 

arise. 

Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address these shortfalls and 

ensure that units have what they need in time to train before deploying and as well 

as for operations in Iraq? 

Answer. The Army is prioritizing and tracking the use of inventory and procurement dollars to repair equipment used and damaged in the global war on terrorism, 

and to replace critical equipment destroyed in battle. The Army is also prioritizing 

and managing procurements and distributions to fill other critical shortages to ensure our forces are organized and equipped for required capabilities, with standard 

quantities and qualities of equipment across all components. While the use of training sets, theater provided equipment and cross-leveling of equipment to meet training and operational requirements are not the optimal solution, units have and will 

continue to meet all required training and readiness standards prior to commitment 

into combat. 

MINE-RESISTANT, AMBUSH-PROTECTED VEHICLES

Question. In September 2007, the JROC capped Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) procurement at 15,374 vehicles with about 3,700 going to the Marine 

Corps and approximately 10,000 to the Army. In November 2007, the marines decreased their requirement from 3,700 to approximately 2,300 vehicles—citing, in 

part, an improved security situation in Iraq and the MRAP’s unsuitability in some 

off-road and urban situations. Reports suggest that the Army may follow suit and 

reduce its overall MRAP requirement. 

Are you aware of a revised Army requirement for MRAPs, and if the Army has 

decreased its requirement for MRAPs, is this the Army’s final requirement or can 

we expect the requirement to change again? 

Answer. The new JROC approved interim requirement to support Army units is 

12,000. In January 2007, the Army requirement, based on requests from U.S. Central Command commanders was identified to be 17,770. To ensure this assessment 

met our emerging requirements, the Army worked closely with the Joint Staff and 

OSD to continuously reassess and raise the procurement quantity in a stairstep 

fashion to ensure a continuous and rapid flow of vehicles to theater while remaining 

good stewards of our Nation’s resources. Recently, based on input from theater, the 

Army was able to reduce its estimate from 17,770 down to a range of between 

15,500 and 11,500, a reduction of nearly 2,000 to 5,000 vehicles. To ensure we do 

not overstate our requirement, we raised our interim requirement from 10,000 to 

almost 12,000 and are actively working with OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Joint 

Program Office to place appropriate production orders that meet warfighters needs 

for protected mobility; preserve options for commanders in the field to make adjustVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00278 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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ments as force levels and situations change; and to manage fiscal resources appropriately. 

Do you see a role for MRAPs beyond the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts? 

Answer. The MRAP has addressed the Army’s most critical current battlefield deficiency (force protection of our forces against IEDs) with a capable, survivable and 

sustainable vehicle for the current Theater of Operation. However, with the exception of a limited number of vehicles going to Route Clearance and explosive ordnance disposal teams, it is premature to describe where MRAP may fit into tomorrow’s force structure. 

Training and Doctrine Command is conducting a tactical wheeled vehicle analysis 

of mission, roles, profiles, threats, and capabilities of the various fleets. This analysis includes the MRAP, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, and the HMMWV. The initial 

results will influence program objective memorandum decisions, the Force Mix Brief 

to Congress, and the Combat and Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy due to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in July 2008. The Army’s Tactical Wheeled Vehicle strategy is an ongoing effort to ensure our soldiers receive the best capabilities available 

in ground wheeled vehicles to meet current and emerging threats. 

SPECIAL UNITS FOR STABILIZATION AND TRAINING/ADVISORY MISSIONS

Question. On October 10, 2007, the Secretary of Defense emphasized the role that 

‘‘unconventional warfare’’ will play in the Army’s future as well as the need to organize and prepare for training and advisory role. Some, both inside and outside of 

the Army, have suggested that special units or organizations should be established 

to address these mission areas, while others maintain that these missions are best 

handled by the Army’s full-spectrum BCTs and their supporting forces. 

Do you believe that there is any merit in establishing special units—such as a 

Training and Advisory Corps? 

Answer. Future requirements to train and advise foreign security forces will be 

addressed with a combination of special operations forces, small scale specialized 

forces, embassy military groups, and Army full spectrum modular forces. Pre-conflict 

security cooperation activities will emphasize Special Operations Forces, small scale 

specialized forces, and small deployments of full spectrum modular forces working 

under U.S. embassy control, while post conflict efforts will rely heavily on full spectrum modular forces. 

A new small scale specialized force the Army is studying is the Theater Military 

Advisory and Assistance Group—Future, which would provide three 22-man security cooperation detachments working directly for the Combatant Command and 

conducting preconflict security cooperation training and advising. The Army is considering piloting the Theater Military and Advisory Group—Future in United States 

Army South. 

Army modular forces are ideally suited to train and advise. For all these forces, 

the key consideration is expertise in their core function. For example, U.S. Army 

infantry, medical, or engineer companies are experts at conducting their wartime 

function and can therefore train and advise foreign infantry, medical, or engineer 

companies. However, before Army forces conduct a training or advising mission, 

they must prepare for the unique aspects an advising mission entails. To that end 

the Army is creating an enduring advising institution. This institution will reside 

at Fort Polk and will have the capability to prepare individuals or units to serve 

as trainers and advisors. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Question. The Special Operations Command, pursuant to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) guidelines, is currently expanding the size of its Army component. It is also working to raise the language proficiency of its Army special operators. 

If confirmed, will you support U.S. Army Special Operations Command’s 

(USASOC) end strength growth? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will support USASOC’s end strength growth. QDR 2006 

directed that Special Forces battalions be increased by one-third and that Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations be increased by 33 percent. The Army has already programmed and is executing these important decisions. By fiscal year 2013, 

the Army will have completed this growth. If confirmed, I will monitor this growth 

and ensure it meets operational requirements. 

Special Operations Forces are performing extremely demanding and specialized 

tasks in combating terrorism. This increase in end strength will mitigate the extremely high operational tempo now experienced by these specially selected and 

trained forces. Growth of Special Operations Forces is within programmed end 

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strengh of 547,400 (Active), 358,200 (National Guard), and 206,000 (Reserve). The 

growth in Special Operations Forces will greatly contribute to the Army’s ability to 

confront irregular challenges and to conduct stability operations. 

Question. What steps do you believe the Army should take to ensure that proficiency pays for language create the appropriate incentives to Army special operators to learn, improve, and retain language skills? 

Answer. The Army supports the Defense Language Program goal to increase language capability across the force. The Army goal is to train our language cadre to 

the minimum level of 2 for language proficiency. Currently Active component and 

Reserve component soldiers may earn up to $400 per month per language depending 

on their level of proficiency, up to a maximum rate of $1,000 per month. Soldiers 

who are in language dependent military operation skills, such as special operators, 

are paid the highest rate for their primary language. This is true even for languages 

such as Spanish, which has been identified as ‘‘dominant in the force’’ and is not 

usually authorized for language pay for other Army soldiers. This will provide an 

added incentive to soldiers to maintain their proficiency. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Under 

Secretary of the Army? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes, to the extent of my authority. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

TRANSFORMING THE RESERVES

1. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Ford, one of the challenges you have highlighted for 

the Army is the transitioning of the Reserve component to an operational force rather than a Strategic Reserve. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves 

reached the same conclusion in their last report before the Senate Armed Services 

Committee in February of this year. What elements of this report do you feel are 

the most important for Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) to address 

immediately, and what obstacles do you foresee as being the most problematic in 

beginning the official transformation of our Reserve Forces? 

Mr. FORD. At this time, the Army, as well as the other Services and DOD stakeholders, are participating in a comprehensive review of 95 recommendations in the 

Commission’s final report, including a full evaluation, their relationship to other 

programs and initiatives, their cost (if approved), and how they will be funded (if 

approved). 

The Commission noted that, as the Nation uses its Reserve Forces for current operations to an unprecedented degree, there is ‘‘no reasonable alternative to increased reliance on the Reserve component as an operational force for missions at 

home and abroad.’’

We fully concur. The Commission’s recommendations validate numerous strategic 

initiatives that the Army has been pursuing for several years, to include 

transitioning the Army’s Reserve component from Strategic Reserve to part of the 

sustainable operational force, committing units to providing military support to civil 

authorities and other domestic operations, and providing soldiers with service opVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00280 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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tions under a continuum of service personnel management construct. The Army appreciates continued congressional and department support in these areas. However, 

the degree to which we transition the Army’s Reserve components depends on a 

move towards institutionalizing budget policy and support for making the Reserve 

component part of the operational force.

AVIATION SURVEILLANCE BATTALION

2. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Ford, a recent article in the New York Times described the Army’s new Aviation Surveillance Battalion in Iraq, named Task Force 

Odin. It was reported that the order to stand up this unit was in response to frustration with Army requests for both combat air power and surveillance assets while 

conducting ground operations in Iraq, and the unit has been successful enough that 

there is a plan to stand up a similar battalion in Afghanistan. It was further stated 

that this signals a clear shift for the Army away from joint operations, and toward 

more self-sufficient operations. To what extent do you agree with this statement? 

Mr. FORD. The New York Times opinions about assets and joint support to the 

Army do not reflect the policy or opinions of the United States Army. Task Force 

Odin supports battalion and brigade reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition requirements and provides actionable intelligence directly to the warfighter. 

Experience with Task Force Odin shows having the sensor assets and the engagement assets under the same command provides a dynamic real time ability to persistently view and engage elusive insurgents. Similar reconnaissance, surveillance, 

and target acquisition requirements exist in Afghanistan and the Army plans to 

meet those needs.

3. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Ford, if confirmed, what steps will be taken by the 

Army to address conflicts in roles and missions between Army and Air Force assets 

conducting operations in both areas of responsibility? 

Mr. FORD. The Army and the Air Force will continue recently initiated efforts intended to enhance their joint warfighting capabilities. Several initiatives are underway including a series of warfighter talks convened by both the Chief of Staff of the 

Army and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. These talks resumed in January 2008 

to synchronize Service concepts, roles and missions, and improve joint interoperability and interdependence. As a result of the most recent talks the Army-Air Force 

Board (AAFB) was formed to address bilateral issues of concern. The goal of the 

AAFB is to make recommendations to improve service integration, interdependence, 

and warfighting capabilities as they relate to the current conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as to future warfighting requirements. Issues currently being addressed include concepts, doctrine, joint capabilities, requirements, and programs 

and span a wide range of initiatives relative to current and future operations. 

In addition to the Warfighter Talks, the Services have established the Army-Air 

Force Integration Forum (AAFIF) to identify and recommend prioritized Doctrine, 

Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities solutions to enable complementary and seamless interoperability between the 

two Services. The AAFIF targets issues to be resolved at the Air Combat Command 

and Training and Doctrine Command level. The AAFIF provides recommended solutions to the AAFB and, thereby, to the respective Service Headquarters Staffs, for 

review and implementation.

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS

4. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Ford, the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS), like 

many other DOD programs, is expected to undergo as much as 45 percent cost 

growth, as highlighted by last year’s Government Accountability Office (GAO) report. You have indicated that this may be an overestimation, since the figures take 

into account operating costs over the service life of the system, and that the FCS 

Brigades will cost less to operate than older brigades they replace. What factors are 

you using to calculate lower operating costs, especially considering the degree of 

technical complexity of the elements of FCS once fielded when compared to older 

systems? 

Mr. FORD. There are three factors used in the Program Manager’s (PM) current 

Operations and Support (O&S) cost estimate that drive the projection of lower operating cost. The first is the number of military personnel planned for a FCS Brigade 

Combat Team (FBCT) as compared to a current Heavy Brigade Combat Team 

(HBCT). The second is the anticipated reliability of the FBCT platforms and subsystems. The third is the planned lower training operational tempo that is due to 

276

an embedded training capability. It should be noted that these benefits are somewhat offset by the increased hardware costs of individual subsystems/platforms (as 

compared to currently fielded systems). These hardware costs reflect the higher degree of complexity alluded to in this question. As a final point, it is noted that the 

PM’s estimate does not yet reflect the anticipated benefits of other planned FCS capabilities that are intended to reduce support costs. These include: the FCS support 

concept (i.e., performance based logistics, brigade centric support), logistic support 

software/network products (i.e., Platform Soldier—Mission Readiness System, Logistics Decision Support System), and the reduced brigade ‘‘footprint’’ (which likely has 

second order cost benefits). Once the cost benefits of these other planned capabilities 

are quantified, it is anticipated that the operating cost benefit of FCS will grow larger.

5. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Ford, how will the recent decision to shift the focus 

on fielding FCS program spinout technologies from HBCTs to Infantry BCTs impact 

cost projections both now and in the future? 

Mr. FORD. The Army is reviewing the Programmed Objective Memorandum and 

upcoming decisions to determine the proper spin out of FCS technologies to the current force. The fielding of FCS technologies to the current configurations of the Infantry BCTs in fiscal year 2011 would be less expensive than the previously planned 

HBCTs. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

READINESS OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

6. Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary Ford, if confirmed, you will be principally responsible for oversight of the Army’s comptroller and financial management. The 

equipment goal for the Florida National Guard, indeed all Guard units, is at least 

75 percent. The Florida Guard is far from that goal. If confirmed, what would be 

your plan to reset the Army and provide for the equipment needs of the National 

Guard? 

Mr. FORD. The equipping goal for all Army units is 100 percent but few of our 

units, Active or Reserve component, meet that goal unless deployed. The Florida 

Army National Guard (and for all other units) is either assigned to the unit, being 

repaired or rest, or else not yet in the Army inventory. The Army ensures that deploying units are properly equipped and trained. We must also modernize, grow, 

and rebalance the force to meet current and anticipated missions. In light of these 

initiatives, and our overall equipping posture, we have had to accept lower equipping levels in nondeployed units. The Army fully recognizes the dual mission of the 

Army National Guard to perform Federal and State missions. To this end, the Department of the Army has ensured that the Army National Guard has sufficient 

equipment necessary to meet the demands of those missions. 

As an example, we have made special efforts to ensure hurricane prone States 

have the equipment that they need to be prepared for each hurricane season. No 

Governor or State Adjutant General has identified a capability gap that precludes 

them from being ready to respond to an emergency. If such a gap is identified, we 

would certainly respond appropriately. In the fiscal year 2010–2015 Program Objective Memorandum, we will field most of the equipping requirements in support of 

actions to equip units to modular designs, and to grow and rebalance the Army. In 

fact, through the end of 2009, we are fielding over 400,000 pieces of equipment to 

the Army National Guard, valued at over $17.5 billion. This represents 36 percent 

of all Army equipment distributions. 

As for resetting the Army, we are committed to resetting soldiers and units into 

a deployment ready condition as quickly as practicable after they have redeployed. 

Congressional support for continued and timely reset funding requirements will go 

a long way toward ensuring our ability to do this. Rapid and effective reset efforts 

will provide more equipment, in better condition, to all Army units, including the 

units of the Army National Guard.

7. Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary Ford, how does our presence in Iraq impede 

your ability to reset the force, equip the Guard, and provide for emergencies here 

at home? 

Mr. FORD. With the support of Congress, our presence in Iraq and Afghanistan 

has not significantly impaired our ability to reset equipment, equip the Guard, or 

provide for emergencies here at home. These requirements are considered, 

prioritized, and equipment is distributed to meet requirements of the National MiliVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00282 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
277

tary Strategy. Reset—a cost of war—has been adequately resourced over the last 

few years. Continued and timely support for the reset funding associated with returning equipment goes a long way toward ensuring our ability to accomplish this 

responsibility rapidly and effectively. Reset provides more equipment to all Army 

units, including the Army National Guard. Our equipment fill across the Active and 

Reserve component continues to improve. The Army has appropriate mitigation 

strategies in place to address critical equipment needs to respond to domestic emergencies like disaster relief.

8. Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary Ford, if confirmed, what would be your role 

in planning for the Future Years Defense Plan funding request and how would that 

meet the goal of getting to at least 75 percent of its equipment requirements? 

Mr. FORD. The Future Years Defense Plan is the Department’s, and thus the 

Army’s, projection of resources required to provide trained and ready forces to the 

Nation—sustaining current capabilities while building our future force. My role in 

Army leadership is to ensure a balance in the program to meet current and future 

challenges. The Army National Guard is an essential part of the Army’s warfighting 

mission and has a critically important title 32 mission. This is part of the balance 

consideration. The Army will only deploy forces if they have the equipment they 

need to accomplish their mission. This includes critical civil support equipment requirements. With your continued support the Army can meet its warfighting equipment requirements, and the goal of at least 75 percent of Army National Guard 

equipment requirements.

9. Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary Ford, the Army insists that the Governor and 

local Mayors in the State of Florida sign covenants that support the Guard and 

their families by providing adequate facilities and services for Guard members while 

they’re deployed. However, while Guard personnel are in training at locations 

throughout the Nation, the Army refuses to support these deploying members’ efforts to return home and visit their family members before they depart to Iraq and 

Afghanistan. Oftentimes, there are training flying missions en route to Florida that 

are available to transport Guardsmen, but the Army refuses to let them go. If confirmed, would you support the Army’s ability to allow these Guardsmen to travel 

on training flying missions on a space available basis? 

Mr. FORD. First Army is mobilizing, training, and deploying tens of thousands of 

Reserve component (RC) soldiers every year (88,357 in fiscal year 2008 mobilized 

Reserve component soldiers, 2,105 units) at 9 Active Mobilization Training Centers 

(MTC) throughout the continental United States.

• In accordance with the First Army Standard Operating Procedure, mobilized Reserve component forces are authorized pass or block leave prior to 

deployment based on the number of post-mobilization days at their MTCs. 

• Units that train at an MTC for less than 90-days are authorized up to 

a 4-day pass prior to deployment. 

• Units that train for 90-days or more are authorized either a 4-day pass 

or 5- to 7-day block leave prior to deployment. 

• Units that train over the Christmas holiday period are authorized to take 

leave from December 23 to January 2.

The Reserve component deployment expeditionary force commander determines 

the dates the unit will take some, all, or none of their authorized post-mobilization 

pass or leave. This decision is codified in a memorandum during the unit’s joint assessment in-process review (minimum of 180 days from the unit’s mobilization date) 

in order for First Army to finalize the unit’s post-mobilization deployment training 

plan. In all cases, a unit’s pass and block leave activities must conclude not later 

than 24-hours prior to the unit’s ready-to-load date for personnel. 

First Army has no control over the means (space available travel, Air Guard 

training missions; commercial air, etc.) used by soldiers or units to execute their 

post-mobilization pass or block leave and, as Reserve component soldiers in this situation are in a title 10 (Active Army) status, the individual soldier is responsible 

for all travel costs incurred while on pass or leave.

MODELING AND SIMULATION

10. Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary Ford, what are your views on the use of modeling and simulation technologies to reduce the costs of Army acquisition programs? 

Mr. FORD. The Army Modeling and Simulation (M&S) strategy was developed to 

address issues and complement published Army Strategic Planning Guidance 

(ASPG) 2006–2023. The ASPG states, ‘‘as the Army’s institutional strategy, (ASPG) 

278

represents the Army senior leadership’s vision of how the Army will fulfill its mission to provide necessary forces and capabilities to the combatant commanders in 

support of the National Security and Defense Strategies. It also communicates the 

Army’s priorities for employing available resources.’’ As the Army executes the process of re-examining and challenging basic institutional assumptions, organizational 

structures, policies, and procedures to better serve the Nation, M&S will play an 

increasingly important role in decisionmaking processes, doctrine, and capabilities 

development in the emerging network-enabled environment. Both Army and Joint 

Capstone Concepts provide the strategic context that will drive future M&S efforts 

in development of both materiel and institutional capabilities required to realize full 

spectrum dominance. Expectation of an increasingly resource constrained future requires that the Army leverage M&S more than ever to minimize cost and do more 

with fewer resources to make informed, fact-based decisions and provide more relevant and ready forces and capabilities to the Army and Joint Team.

11. Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary Ford, how will you work to promote the use 

of these types of technologies to reduce Army test, training, and acquisition costs? 

Mr. FORD. I will ensure that the different communities such as Advance Concepts 

and Requirements; Research, Development and Acquisition; and Training Exercises 

and Military Operations are working together and integrating their M&S efforts to 

reduce cost but increase capabilities to support our soldiers in the current fight and 

future. The Army has many examples where M&S is used to reduce Army test, 

training, and acquisition costs. The testing community uses M&S to validate testing 

procedures prior to a test. For example, the testing community will employ live, virtual, and constructive M&S to properly display the capabilities and test the FCSs. 

Today, Army installations, schools, and units use training aids, devices, simulators, 

simulations, and gaming technologies to train soldiers and units for Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom deployments. These M&S tools reduce 

costs and enhance live training events. For the Army acquisition community, it is 

very important to integrate M&S technology into acquisition functions (requirements generation, design, development, test and evaluation, training, manufacturing, and fielding) and programs. The benefits reduce process time, required resources, and risks associated with acquisition functions, as well as increase quality 

and supportability of fielded systems.

UNIVERSITY RESEARCH CENTERS

12. Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary Ford, the Army has established a number of 

university research centers to perform basic research in support of Army missions. 

These centers have some advantages, but they also limit the Army’s ability to invest 

in innovative research in a broad range of university programs across the Nation. 

How will you work to balance the Army’s basic research portfolio so that it is not 

overly focused on a few, select university research centers? 

Mr. FORD. The Army’s current and future basic research portfolio will not be focused on a few select university research centers. In fiscal year 2008, approximately 

15 percent of the Army’s basic research portfolio is executed through university centers. In fiscal year 2009, the percentage of the portfolio executed at university centers is projected to drop to approximately 13.7 percent. The remainder of the Army’s 

basic research portfolio is balanced across a broad range of capability areas important to the Army’s mission and needs and is executed by more than 250 research 

and educational institutions across the Nation. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

WOUNDED WARRIOR CARE

13. Senator WARNER. Secretary Ford, the Army established Warrior Transition 

Units (WTUs) to improve the care, rehabilitation, and disability evaluation of 

wounded and injured soldiers. The increasing number of soldiers in this status has 

caused staffing shortfalls at some locations. What are the challenges facing the 

WTUs at this time? 

Mr. FORD. The rapid growth of soldiers in WTUs has made it difficult to maintain 

appropriate cadre-to-soldier ratios in our WTUs. This growth, a result of the expanded mission of the WTUs to cover more soldiers, has presented the Army with 

a variety of challenges. These include:

• managing the high tempo of deploying and redeploying units and the consequent growth in wounded, ill, or injured soldiers; 

279

• keeping pace with a growing requirement for nurse case managers and 

mental health professionals, especially in locations such as Fort Hood and 

Fort Drum; 

• providing sufficient and appropriate facilities to house, manage, and support the growing population of Warriors in Transition (WTs). 

• executing and sustaining efficient, fair and expeditious processes such as 

Medical and Physical Evaluation Boards (PEBs); 

• developing and expanding capabilities to ensure soldiers and families receive the support they require to either transition back to duty or to prepare for productive civilian careers, to include assisting in arranging for authorized medical care and benefits through the Department of Veterans Affairs.

14. Senator WARNER. Secretary Ford, if confirmed, what actions would you undertake to ensure that apart from the war itself, care for soldiers and families remains 

the Army’s highest priority? 

Mr. FORD. While Army leadership is pleased with how far we have come in a 

short time, we need to continue our efforts to provide world-class care for our 

wounded, ill, and injured soldiers. To accomplish this, Secretary Geren and General 

Casey directed the following enhancements to our Warrior Transition program:

a. To allow immediate care to our wounded and severely ill or injured soldiers who require comprehensive care, senior commanders will ensure that 

WTU cadre levels meet the designated ratios for warrior care. To this end, 

senior commanders have been directed to establish a triad of leadership at 

installations with WTUs that includes the senior commander and command 

sergeant major, along with the commanders and senior noncommissioned 

officers of the installation’s military treatment facility and WTU. This triad 

is empowered and directed to immediately fill all remaining WTU cadre positions by transferring all necessary installation personnel to ensure and 

maintain 100 percent staffing of WTUs at levels that ensure comprehensive 

care and support for all WTs and their families. 

b. Senior commanders are further directed to evaluate the effectiveness of 

installation execution of the Physical Disability Evaluation System and provide their findings in writing to the Warrior Care and Transition Office no 

later than August 29, 2008. From these reports an action plan will be developed to streamline the disability process, establish achievable timeline 

metrics for medical evaluation board and PEB processing, and minimize the 

time required for PEB disposition by aggressively processing orders. 

c. The Army leadership has empowered the triad of leadership with more 

options in management of our wounded, ill, and injured soldiers. This includes more flexible exit criteria and careful use of medically nondeployable 

soldiers in appropriate cadre positions. We will continue efforts to eliminate 

the stigma attached to mental health conditions and will continue to embrace innovations and best practices in the treatment of post-traumatic 

stress disorder and traumatic brain injury. 

[The nomination reference of Hon. Nelson M. Ford follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

January 22, 2008. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

Nelson M. Ford, of Virginia, to be Under Secretary of the Army, vice Preston M. 

Geren. 

[The biographical sketch of Hon. Nelson M. Ford, which was 

transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF HON. NELSON M. FORD

Nelson Ford currently serves as both the Acting Under Secretary of the Army and 

as the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller. 

280

His previous position was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller. From 2002 through 2004, he was Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health Budgets & Financial Policy in the Department of Defense, where he was responsible for financial management, policy development, and 

program evaluation for the Defense Health Program. Prior to returning to Federal 

service, Mr. Ford held senior management positions in academic medicine, medical 

manufacturing, and health insurance. From 1997 to 2000, he was President and 

CEO of Clinipad, a manufacturer of disposable medical products. During the 1990s, 

he was Chief Operating Officer of Georgetown University Medical Center, with responsibility for Georgetown Hospital and financial oversight of faculty practice 

plans, research activities and the medical and nursing schools. Earlier in his career, 

Mr. Ford was a partner with Coopers & Lybrand, providing strategic and financial 

consulting services to a wide range of health care clients. During the 1970s, he was 

the Executive Secretary of the Health Care Financing Administration and worked 

on health policy matters in the Office of Management and Budget. He has served 

on many not-for-profit boards and advisory committees. Mr. Ford holds a bachelor’s 

degree in history from Duke University, a master’s in education from the University 

of Delaware, and has completed additional professional training at the University 

of Pennsylvania. He lives in McLean, VA, with his wife Cecilia. They have three 

grown children. 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Hon. Nelson M. Ford in connection with his 

nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228

Washington, DC 20510–6050

(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Nelson McCain Ford.

2. Position to which nominated: 

Under Secretary of the Army.

3. Date of nomination: 

January 22, 2008.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.]

5. Date and place of birth: 

June 3, 1947; Wilmington, DE.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

281

Married to Cecilia Sparks Ford (Maiden Name: Sparks).

7. Names and ages of children: 

Aven Walker Ford, 29; Alexander Sparks Ford, 26; and Mary Bartlett Ford; 20.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received, and date degree granted. 

Alexis I DuPont HS (9/1959–6/1965) HS Diploma, June 1965 

Duke University (9/1965–6/1969) B.A., June 1969 

University of Delaware (1/1971–6/1972) M.Ed, January 1973 

University of Pennsylvania (9/1975–6/1977) no degree

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

Acting Under Secretary of the Army, 12/2007-present. 

Assistant Secretary of the Army (FM&C), Department of Army, Pentagon 10/

2006-present 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (FM&C), Department of the 

Army, Pentagon, 6/2005-10/2006. 

Director-Senior Products, Humana, Washington, DC, 9/2004-6/2005. 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense-Health Affairs (HB&FP), Falls Church VA, 

1/2002-9/2004. 

Executive Vice President-Finance and Strategy, GMI Networks Inc., Vienna VA, 

9/2000-3/2001. 

President & CEO, Clinipad Corporation, Rocky Hill CT, 10/1997-3/2000.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

None.

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

President, American Society of Military Comptrollers.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

Washington Golf and Country Club, member. 

George Washington University, Adjunct Associate Professor. 

American Society of Military Comptrollers, member. 

AcademyHealth, member.

13. Political affiliations and activities:

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

Republican Party, member. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 

None.

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Civilian Service 

USOE Fellowship 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

Article - ‘‘Transforming Resource Management to Support an Army at War’’ The 

Public Manager LMI Research Institute Winter 2007-2008, Volume 36, Number 4 

(A slightly modified version of this article will appear in Resource Management) 

Article - ‘‘Challenge and Change in Army Financial Management’’ The AUSA 

2007-2008 Green Book Association of the U.S. Army October 2007. 

Article - ‘‘Army Resourcing: Recent Experiences and the Near-Term Future’’ Resource Management U.S. Army Second Quarter 2007. 

I was listed as a co-author on two HEW publications on the cost of educating 

handicapped children in the early 1970s but do not remember their titles.

282

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.]

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–

F are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

NELSON M. FORD. 

This 29th day of January, 2008.

[The nomination of Hon. Nelson M. Ford was reported to the 

Senate by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2008, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on July 23, 2008.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Joseph A. Benkert by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The goals of Congress in enacting the Goldwater-Nichols Department of 

Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms can be summarized as: strengthening civilian control over the military; improving military advice; placing clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; enhancing the effectiveness of military operations; and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense (DOD). 

Do you agree with these goals? 

Answer. Yes, I agree with these goals. 

Question. Do you anticipate that legislative proposals to amend Goldwater-Nichols 

may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these proposals? 

Answer. No, I do not see any need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols Act. 

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs (ASD/GSA)? 

Answer. The ASD/GSA is a new position, created to centralize DOD’s policy apparatus for dealing with global threats and the tools we have to address those threats. 

In this capacity, the ASD/GSA is the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense for development and execution of 

strategies, policies and procedures on the following matters: building partner nations’ capacity to maintain security and stability; overseeing security cooperation 

and foreign military sales programs; countering transnational threats including narcotics and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and related networks 

of contraband; security of U.S. technology; maintenance of coalitions in support of 

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multinational operations; policies for humanitarian and disaster assistance; recovery 

of U.S. personnel and prisoners of war (POW)/missing-in-action (MIA) issues; and 

detainee affairs. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you anticipate that Secretary Gates would prescribe for you? 

Answer. If confirmed, I anticipate that the Secretary would direct me to manage 

the Global Security Affairs (GSA) organization, including the day-to-day tasks associated with the duties noted in my response to the previous question. He would likely ask that I provide him and the Under Secretary for Policy with policy recommendations on issues within my area of responsibility, and that I monitor and 

provide policy advice on operations with these areas. I would also expect the Secretary to ask that I represent him and the Under Secretary for Policy in the interagency policy deliberations and international negotiations dealing with my assigned 

areas of responsibility 

Question. What impact has the reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Policy had on the functions and duties of the ASD/GSA? What challenges has the reorganization created for carrying out those functions and duties, 

and if confirmed, what steps would you take to address those challenges? 

Answer. The reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy created the office of the Assistant Secretary for Global Security Affairs. The 

functions of this new organization were performed previously by disparate elements 

of the Policy Organization. The purpose of creating ASD/GSA was to place under 

a central management structure the policy specialists who address many types of 

global threats—for example, counternarcotics, proliferation and detainees, and the 

policy tools to address those threats. These tools include the security assistance and 

building-partnership capacity programs implemented by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the personnel recovery and accountability activities of the Defense POW/MIA Organization, and the technology security activities of the Defense 

Technology Security Administration. This Defense Agency and two Defense Field 

Activities, respectively, were also realigned under the new ASD/GSA as part of the 

reorganization. 

Centralization of DOD’s policymakers who work on global issues has broken old 

stovepipes of information and permitted better synchronization of DOD policies and 

activities. For example, we are better able to coordinate building partnership activities with the work of counternarcotics and combating WMD programs by having all 

of these activities report to a single Assistant Secretary. The span of responsibilities 

for this new organization is admittedly broad. If confirmed, one step that I will take 

to mitigate this factor is to seek to ensure that all key leadership positions in the 

organization are filled. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. What do you see as the relationship between the ASD/GSA and each 

of the following? 

The Secretary of Defense 

The Deputy Secretary of Defense 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

The Secretaries of the Military Departments 

The Chiefs of Staff of the Services 

The Combatant Commanders 

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs 

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs 

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict 

and Interdependent Capabilities 

The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs 

Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency 

Director, Defense Technology Security Administration 

Answer. If confirmed, I will report to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I will work 

closely with the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I expect 

to develop and maintain close working relationships with the Under Secretaries and 

Assistant Secretaries across the Department, the General Counsel of DOD, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, and with combatant commanders. I would expect to maintain a close 

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relationship on programs related to combating WMD with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs; the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency; the Defense POW/MIA Office; 

and the Director of the Defense Technology Security Administration and with the 

Assistant Secretary for Global Security Affairs. 

The position requires close coordination with the other Assistant Secretaries of 

Defense within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Policy, as appropriate. 

Examples of this coordination would include working with the Assistant Secretaries 

for International Security Affairs, Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, and Homeland 

Defense and Americas Security in their areas of responsibility to synchronize building partnership capacity activities and countering global threats; and working with 

the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities on combating WMD terrorism. 

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies 

you for this position? 

Answer. I believe that I am qualified for this position, if confirmed, by virtue of 

leadership experience in a broad range of organizations responsible for national security policy, program formulation and implementation; and a broad base of substantive knowledge regarding U.S. national security priorities and issues. 

I have served as the Principal Deputy ASD/GSA since December 2006, when the 

organization was established. I managed the establishment of the organization and 

its day-to-day affairs, and in the absence of a duly appointed and confirmed Assistant Secretary, have performed many of the non-statutory duties of the Assistant 

Secretary. I believe that I am well versed in GSA’s issues and in the requirements 

to lead the organization. 

Since 2003, I have served in the Department in several civilian leadership positions. I assisted in establishing the Coalition Provisional Authority’s (CPA) Washington organization and served as its Deputy and Chief of Staff. Upon the CPA’s 

dissolution, I led the standup of a follow-on organization to support the Department’s role in Iraq reconstruction and stabilization programs and activities. Prior 

to my current position, I served as the acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for International Security Affairs. 

In my current and previous positions, I have testified before Congress on issues 

under my responsibility, and have established effective working relationships with 

DOD and interagency counterparts. 

Prior to my civilian service, I was a career Navy officer with leadership experience 

in command at sea and in Washington. As a naval officer, I had over 3 years of 

experience in the OSD Policy organization as a senior military assistant and as the 

Director of European Policy. I also served earlier in my career as a legislative liaison officer for the Department of the Navy, which I believe has facilitated working 

with Congress since then. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the ASD/

GSA? 

Answer. If confirmed, I expect to be confronted with at least four primary challenges during my tenure. First, the office of GSA needs to consolidate and institutionalize the ‘‘toolkit’’ of programmatic and related options available for advancing 

the Department’s strategy of building partner capacity. Second, we will need continued focus on preventing the proliferation of WMD, and in particular the connections 

between the combating WMD and counterterrorism missions. Third, we need to continue to focus on transition paths for current detainee operations at Guantanamo 

Bay, in Iraq, and Afghanistan. Finally, I believe we can drive improvements in our 

understanding of how various networks of transnational threats might intersect or 

converge, and how to address these threats to U.S. national security. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the work I have begun while Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary with respect to rationalizing processes for security cooperation development. Our system is currently not as flexible as it should be for postSeptember 11 challenges and we can use the GSA structure to improve. I also believe we need to continue to develop new processes to ensure better integration 

within DOD of the combating WMD and counterterrorism missions. With respect to 

the challenge of ‘‘networked threats,’’ we are truly in a learning mode. We have been 

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fine this new mission space, and GSA will host a conference along with the National 

Counterproliferation Center and the Monterrey Institute this autumn to broaden 

participation in this effort. 

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

Question. In the past few years, Congress has provided DOD a number of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner nations. These include 

the global train and equip authority (‘‘section 1206’’) and the security and stabilization assistance authority (‘‘section 1207’’). 

What are DOD’s strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations? 

Answer. The Department’s objectives for building partner capacity are tied to our 

broader regional and functional objectives for each of the regional and functional 

combatant commands as prescribed by the National Defense Strategy and the Guidance for Employment of the Force. Our intention is to build a network of like-minded, capable security partners who face mutual security threats and can operate 

alongside, or in lieu of, U.S. forces to combat these threats. Because U.S. forces and 

resources are finite, and given the nature of the threats we face, it is essential that 

we work to build partner capabilities to effectively counter evolving security threats. 

DOD guidance documents, strategies, and operational and contingency planning 

now reflect the reality that providing security must be a cooperative endeavor conducted by, through, and with our partners. As Secretary Gates made clear in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, ‘‘building partner capacity is a 

vital and enduring military requirement—irrespective of the capacity of other departments—and its authorities and funding mechanisms should reflect that reality. 

DOD would no more outsource this substantial and costly security requirement to 

a civilian agency than it would any other key military mission.’’ 

Question. What is your understanding of the purpose of the global train and equip 

authority, and what is your assessment of the implementation of the global train 

and equip program? 

Answer. I believe the global train and equip authority, commonly known as ‘‘section 1206’’ authority, is an important new tool for building partner-nation operational capacity. By law, the purpose of the global train and equip authority is twofold. Any program conducted under this authority must build the capacity of partner 

nation security forces to either: (1) conduct counterterrorist operations, or (2) participate in or support military and stability operations where U.S. forces are a participant. For either purpose, DOD’s focus is the same: build operational capacity 

that meets U.S.-identified partner capability gaps that, if filled, may reduce nearterm stress on U.S. forces and the long-term risk of U.S. military intervention, as 

partners increasingly address threats within their borders and become security exporters. 

My assessment is that ‘‘section 1206’’ has a solid implementation track record. Although the program is only in its second full fiscal year of implementation, it is in 

many ways already a model of interagency cooperation. The program requires both 

State and DOD to formally approve each proposal, both in the field and in Washington, DC. The approach recognizes DOD’s core military requirement for operational partners, while simultaneously recognizing the State Department’s core competency in ensuring that all actions are in accord with U.S. foreign policy, international agreements, human rights vetting, and other legal requirements. There has 

been an enthusiastic response from embassies and combatant commands, culminating in program requests. I thank the committee for extending and expanding this 

authority in its draft National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, and 

will work to ensure our processes and guidance fully reflect congressional intent. 

Question. What is the relationship of the global train and equip authority to other 

security assistance authorities, such as counternarcotics assistance and foreign military financing? What should be done to ensure that the global train and equip authority does not duplicate the efforts of these other assistance programs? 

Answer. The Global Train and Equip authority, as noted previously, fills two very 

specific requirements to build capacity to counter terrorism and instability. These 

purposes can complement other DOD and U.S. Government authorities, but also 

serve discrete needs apart from them. 

DOD counternarcotics authorities allow DOD to support U.S. Government efforts 

to counter the flow of narcotics globally. While some regions of the world—notably 

Latin America and southwest Asia—face significant counternarcotics challenges, the 

threat of terrorism exists there as well, and terrorists seek to exploit many of the 

same gaps used by those who seek to smuggle drugs across our borders. 1206 is deliberately designed to build capacity to meet such transnational threats early, before 

they metastasize into more significant problems. 

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I strongly support congressional desire to keep these programs separate and distinct, using them only for their legislatively-directed purposes. The best way to ensure 1206 programs meet defined counterterrorism or stability operations needs is 

to tie them directly to objectives established in the Department’s planning guidance. 

In my current capacity as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, I have 

tasked my staff to review 1206 and counternarcotics proposals together to identify 

potential overlap in individual programs, and to ensure 1206 guidance reflects that 

projects are only appropriate when the proposal’s primary mission is counterterrorism or stability operations, not to backfill lower priority counternarcotics 

needs. Proposals are deconflicted by individual country teams, which must follow 

1206 guidance that requires deconfliction with foreign military financing (FMF). 

Once submitted, this deconfliction is validated by Department of State. 

Question. What is your understanding of the purpose of the security and stabilization assistance authority (‘‘Section 1207’’)? What is your assessment of how this authority has been utilized? 

Answer. I believe that 1207 fills an urgent gap in the State Department’s ability 

to provide stabilization and reconstruction assistance. Secretary Gates made clear 

in his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee the Department’s view 

of the purpose of ‘‘Section 1207’’ authority: bringing civilian resources to bear in 

complex security environments where their expertise is needed. In his words: ‘‘A 

touchstone for the Defense Department is that 1207 should be for civilian support 

for the military—either by bringing civilians to serve with our military forces or in 

lieu of them.’’ 

In my view, the 1207 authority’s utility has been growing. We have made progress 

in improving the coordination with the State Department and Congress, importing 

several 1206 implementation ‘‘best practices’’ that have proven themselves valuable. 

Program quality and execution have improved. Since its inception, improved DOD 

and State coordination has led to the identification of more programs that met the 

legislation’s intent, and in fiscal year 2007, State and DOD ultimately approved programs totaling virtually all of the authority. It is likely that the full authority will 

again be used in fiscal year 2008. 

Question. What is the process by which DOD reviews requests from the Department of State for security and stabilization assistance funding? 

Answer. Section 1207 projects must originate in the field, and require formal concurrence from both the relevant Chief of Mission and Combatant Commander. Once 

finalized in the field, DOD, State, and U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID) review projects simultaneously. 

Question. Secretary Gates has called for an expansion of the Government’s resources devoted to instruments of non-military ‘‘soft power’’—civilian expertise in reconstruction, development, and governance. 

If confirmed, what actions would you take to expand the Government’s resources 

devoted to the ability of civilian departments and agencies to engage, assist, and 

communicate with partner nations? 

Answer. Advancing Secretary Gates’ efforts to expand ‘‘soft power’’ tools is a key 

element of the ASD/GSA’s mission. If confirmed, I would continue to advance this 

agenda, including: 

(1) Continued focus on the utilization of ‘‘Section 1207’’ security and stabilization assistance authority; 

(2) Continued advocacy for increases to State and USAID’s topline, as 

well as support for State’s Civilian Stabilization Initiative; 

(3) Overseeing the implementation of the congressionally-mandated study 

of the National Security Interagency System, the Interagency elements of 

the Congressionally-Mandated Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review, 

and advising the Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy on additional interagency initiatives or requirements; 

(4) Seeking additional ways that DOD can effectively support U.S. Government initiatives led by civilian agencies, including counternarcotics, public diplomacy, security sector reform, humanitarian assistance and disaster 

response; and 

I would add, however, that only Congress has the authority to significantly expand the Government’s resources devoted to instruments of nonmilitary ‘‘soft power’’ and civilian agency capacity to engage, assist, and 

communicate with our partners. If confirmed, I stand ready to work with 

you on legislative initiatives to address this challenge.

Question. In your view, what should be the role of DOD, vis-a ́-vis other civilian 

departments and agencies of the Government, in the exercise of instruments of soft 

power? 

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Answer. As Secretary Gates said during his Landon Lecture at Kansas State University last November, ‘‘if we are to meet the myriad challenges around the world 

in the coming decades, this country must strengthen other important elements of 

national power both institutionally and financially, and create the capability to integrate and apply all of the elements of national power to problems and challenges 

abroad.’’ The threats we face today require that we strengthen our capacity to use 

‘‘soft’’ power and to better integrate it with ‘‘hard’’ power. 

An essential element of DOD’s role vis-a ́-vis other agencies in the exercise of the 

instruments of soft power is that the department remain supportive of those agencies with appropriate statutory authority and core competencies in foreign policy 

(State), development and humanitarian response (USAID). For example, we are 

working closely with State and other agencies to provide assistance as available and 

appropriate in support of the national security strategy. Such involvement may include providing logistical support and expertise to State/USAID leadership in response to a natural disaster or humanitarian crisis. We are working closely with 

State and other agencies to promote multiagency coordination and cooperation to develop more comprehensive approaches to problems before they become crises. 

Question. In your view, which department should have the lead in setting U.S. 

Government security assistance policy? 

Answer. The State Department has had and should retain the lead in setting U.S. 

Government security assistance policy. In developing processes for new tools like 

section 1206, and reforming processes for traditional tools like FMF, both Departments have taken additional steps to enhance collaboration and jointly formulate 

plans and programs, while fully respecting the State Department’s primacy in security assistance. 

GLOBAL AND EMERGING THREATS

Question. The position of ASD/GSA includes responsibilities for formulating strategy and policy for countering global threats and emerging threats. 

What are the global and emerging threats that you believe pose the most significant challenge to our security, and what approach would you take, if confirmed, to 

address these threats? 

Answer. For the foreseeable future, I believe that our Nation will face an environment defined by a global struggle against a violent extremist ideology that seeks 

to overturn the international state system. Violent extremist movements such as al 

Qaeda and its associates reject the rules and structures of the international system. 

Their adherents reject state sovereignty, ignore borders, and attempt to deny selfdetermination and human dignity wherever they gain power. These extremists 

opportunistically exploit respect for these norms for their own purposes, hiding behind international norms and national laws when it suits them, and attempting to 

subvert them when it does not. 

Armed sub-national groups, including but not limited to violent extremists and 

international criminal networks frequently exploit local geographical, political, or social conditions to establish safe havens from which they can operate with impunity. 

Ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned, and contested areas offer fertile ground 

for such groups to exploit the gaps in governance capacity of local regimes to undermine local stability and regional security. If left unchecked, such instability can 

spread and threaten the stability and legitimacy of key states. 

A particular concern in this environment is the potential for proliferation of WMD 

(chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear). WMD in the possession of hostile 

states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the 

United States. 

Addressing the problem will require effective international partnerships and cooperation, and creative approaches to prevent proliferation and deny armed subnational groups the opportunity to gain footholds in ungoverned spaces. 

Question. How do you believe we can most effectively reduce or minimize proliferation of the technology for WMD and their means of delivery? 

Answer. To reduce or minimize proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, 

overlapping multilateral and national tools are the most effective approach. This is 

not a threat that can be solved by any one country or process alone. The treaties 

on WMD (Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Chemical Weapons Convention 

(CWC), Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)) provide the legal underpinnings of 

preventing the proliferation of WMD. In conjunction with this legal basis, the export 

control regimes (Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group for Chemical Weapons 

and Biological Weapons technologies, and the Missile Technology Control Regime) 

provide a common basis for countries to work together. To stop WMD/missile-related 

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ing together through the Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict such threatening movements of dual-use goods before they get to proliferators. The U.N. Security Council has addressed the problem through resolution 1540, which requires all 

countries to take steps against WMD/missile proliferation, to include export control 

laws in these areas. In addition, to specifically address the Iranian and North Korean threats, the U.N. Security Council has adopted resolutions 1718, 1737, 1747, 

and 1803. To stop the financial aspects of WMD/missile proliferation, the President 

has implemented Executive Order 12938. 

Question. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) have been described by Lieutenant 

General Metz, Director of the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), as a strategic weapon and one that we should expect to see in future wars. The United 

States has already seen IEDs proliferate from Iraq to Afghanistan, and there are 

reports about IEDs being used against Ethiopian forces in Somalia. 

What do you believe the Department should do to counter the spread of IED technology? 

Answer. The Department’s JIEDDO continues to develop new, innovative ways to 

rapidly find, develop, and deliver emerging capabilities to counter IEDs and the 

transnational networks that facilitate the funding and building of IEDs. The Department is also focusing on operational initiatives that disrupt IED networks, including tracking financiers, trainers and the supporting infrastructure. 

I believe that limiting the availability of components, and effective policing action 

to find the terrorist cells before they act, are the most effective measures against 

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Limiting the availability of components, 

through export controls and other means, is however difficult. For example, terrorists can pick and choose from a large variety of fusing mechanisms, which can range 

from very simple such as a hand held switch or a pressure plate switch to more 

sophisticated methods such as cellular telephones or other commercially available 

communications devices. 

COMBATANT COMMANDS AND THE INTERAGENCY

Question. If confirmed, you will play an important role in developing interagency 

coordination with DOD. Two of the Department’s geographic combatant commands—U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Southern Command—are in the process of 

developing and implementing an interagency model that incorporates into their respective command structures personnel from other agencies of government. Both 

commanders have touted this interagency approach as a model for the future. 

What is your opinion of these new interagency models for these two combatant 

commands? 

Answer. Both of these efforts are evolutionary in nature. We are working closely 

with the State Department to develop new structures in an attempt to deal with 

new threats and challenges. The goal is to promote interagency coordination in such 

a way that we can better prevent rather than simply react to problems before crises, 

and crises before they become catastrophes. 

Question. Do you believe the other agencies of government, particularly the U.S. 

Department of State and USAID, will be able to provide adequate support for these 

interagency commands? 

Answer. We continue to work with both State and USAID in meeting the evolving 

staffing requirements. The intent of this approach is to achieve a level of State and 

USAID participation so that the commands can better support State’s lead in foreign policy and USAID’s lead in development. The intended purpose is for improved 

interagency cooperation and coordination that remains supportive of the statutory 

lead roles as well as core competencies of both State and USAID. 

STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT AND STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT WITH IRAQ

Question. What is the role of the ASD/GSA, if any, in the negotiations of a Strategic Framework Agreement and a status of forces agreement with Iraq? 

Answer. The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Global Security Affairs does not 

have a direct role in the negotiations of a Strategic Framework or the status of 

forces agreement with Iraq. We review and provide suggestions regarding specific 

aspects of the negotiations that relate to matters under the authority of the ASD/

GSA. 

Question. What is your understanding of the basic authorities that the United 

States is seeking as part of these agreements, absent which we would not sign the 

agreements? 

Answer. GSA does not have a direct role in the negotiations; nor were we part 

of the interagency discussions developing U.S. negotiating strategies. 

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COALITION SUPPORT FUNDS

Question. Since 2001, DOD has provided billions of dollars in Coalition Support 

Fund payments to reimburse key partner nations for support provided to U.S. military operations in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

What is the role of the ASD/GSA, if any, in overseeing the use of Coalition Support Funds? 

Answer. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the applicable combatant commander have primary responsibility for administering Coalition 

Support Funds activities. The role of ASD/GSA is to assist in resolving issues when 

necessary. 

Question. What is your assessment of the process for reviewing claims presented 

for reimbursement of Coalition Support Funds? What steps, if any, would you recommend for improving this process? 

Answer. My assessment of the process for reviewing claims presented for reimbursement of Coalition Support Funds is that it appears to work reasonably well. 

I understand that timely submission of requests for reimbursement of Coalition 

Support Funds is a factor, but the responsibility of our coalition partners. 

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

Question. Do you support accession by the United States to the United Nations 

Convention on the Law of the Sea? 

Answer. Yes, I support the United States’ accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. 

Question. In your view, would ratification of this convention be in the national security interest of the United States? 

Answer. Joining the Convention will give the United States a seat at the table 

when rights vital to our national interests are debated and interpreted, and will 

serve the national security interests of the United States, including the maritime 

mobility of our Armed Forces worldwide. The navigation and overflight rights and 

high seas freedoms codified in the Convention are essential for the global mobility 

of our Armed Forces and the sustainment of our combat forces overseas. As the 

world’s foremost maritime power, our security interests are intrinsically linked to 

freedom of navigation. America has more to gain from legal certainty and public 

order in the world’s oceans than any other country. By joining the Convention, we 

provide the firmest possible legal foundation for the rights and freedoms needed to 

project power, reassure friends and deter adversaries, respond to crises, sustain 

combat forces in the field, and secure sea and air lines of communication that underpin international trade and our own economic prosperity. 

UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN DARFUR

Question. The United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is suffering from a 

variety of equipment shortfalls, which have essentially made it impossible to deploy 

additional peacekeepers to this region. Some have argued that DOD, despite the demands in Iraq and Afghanistan, ought to provide the helicopters, trucks, and lift 

needed to make this mission a success. 

In your view, what is the appropriate role for DOD in supporting U.N. peacekeeping missions? 

Answer. The U.S. Government is the largest contributor of financial resources to 

U.N. peacekeeping missions in general and to Darfur in particular. DOD has over 

30 U.S. military personnel assigned to multiple peacekeeping missions. In partnership with the State Department, DOD provides training, financial resources and, 

when required, lift to countries contributing troops in Darfur and other U.N. peacekeeping missions. In my view, current DOD involvement in supporting U.N. peacekeeping missions is consonant with U.S. interests in those missions. 

Question. Would you support DOD providing a greater level of support to U.N. 

peacekeeping missions and specifically to the mission in Darfur? 

Answer. DOD recently approved assignment of eight U.S. military personnel to 

serve in Darfur. The Department is in the process of adding DOD staff officers to 

the U.N. Assistance Mission to Iraq and to the mission in Chad and the Central 

African Republic. I would support a comprehensive review of U.S. military personnel 

deployed to U.N. peacekeeping missions to ensure appropriate distribution and representation. 

In partnership with the State Department and other U.S. Government agencies, 

DOD has been actively involved in efforts to identify countries with the capacity to 

fill critical UNAMID shortfalls such as helicopters and other enabling capabilities. 

We are making progress with particular countries such as Jordan, Bangladesh, Sri 

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Lanka, and Ethiopia. We are currently researching the availability of financial resources to assist these and perhaps other countries in their efforts to meet U.N. 

specifications. 

Question. Would you support NATO providing a greater level of support to the 

U.N. mission in Darfur? 

Answer. Secretary Gates has made clear his position that Afghanistan must remain a top NATO priority. There have been substantial challenges meeting operational requirements in Afghanistan. I would not advocate any NATO involvement 

in Darfur that might jeopardize the Alliance’s capacity to fully support operations 

in Afghanistan. Additionally, the U.N. mission in Darfur was conceived as an African Union—United Nations hybrid operation. The Government of Sudan (GoS) 

agreed to the presence of a U.N. mission on its soil with the understanding that 

it would consist primarily of African forces, and has consistently obstructed the involvement of non-African and particularly Western countries. I would support specific UNAMID contributions from NATO and Partnership for Peace countries that 

did not conflict with priorities in Afghanistan. 

GLOBAL FORCE POSTURE AND MANAGEMENT

Relocation of Forces to Guam 

Question. What is your assessment of the implementation to date of the agreement between the United States and the Government of Japan to relocate a substantial portion of our Marine forces from Okinawa to Guam, and what is your assessment of the prospects for the ultimate success or failure of this effort? What do 

you see as the major obstacles to the full implementation of this agreement? 

Answer. The U.S. and the Government of Japan are committed to implementing 

the Realignment Roadmap for force posture changes in the Pacific as negotiated. 

The Roadmap addresses both the realignments from Okinawa to Guam and an 

interconnected set of realignments of U.S. forces within Japan. 

Both sides have done extensive planning for these relocations, including initiation 

of the required environmental impact analysis on Guam. DOD is working with our 

interagency colleagues on ways to improve Guam’s capacity to absorb the volume 

of construction the program envisions. The Realignment Roadmap makes the Guam 

relocation contingent upon the Government of Japan successfully relocating Marine 

Corps Air Station Futenma within Okinawa prefecture to a new facility adjacent to 

Camp Schwab. To that end, the Government of Japan has initiated an environmental impact study for that. 

The Government of Japan is currently building its next budget (April 2009–March 

2010), and we are in discussions with the Government of Japan regarding the Guam 

construction programs that budget would cover as part of Japan’s $6.09 billion total 

commitment for the Guam relocation. Overall, both governments remain committed 

to this complex effort and the prospects for success remain good. 

Headquarters for Africa Command 

Question. It appears that few nations in Africa are eager to see a permanent U.S. 

military presence on their soil. In the near term, the Department is establishing a 

headquarters for the Africa Command in Stuttgart, Germany. 

Do you believe an Africa Command is viable over the long run if we cannot reach 

an agreement with a host nation in Africa to establish a headquarters for that command on the African continent? 

Answer. Viability of the new command is not necessarily determined by location; 

there are examples of unified command headquarters located both within and outside of the regions for which they are responsible. At present DOD has opted to put 

aside the issue of a location for an on-continent HQ while it conducts an analysis 

of the logistical and personnel footprint required to support the new command. 

Control of Special Operations Forces 

Question. There has been disagreement among senior military leaders in recent 

years about whether Special Operations Forces (SOFs) should be a globally managed force that is largely based in the United States under the control of the Special 

Operations Command, or whether some portion of these forces should be stationed 

in, and under the control of, regional combatant commands. 

What are your views on this matter? What do you believe maximizes our military 

capability and builds the best relationships with partner nations? 

Answer. Under DOD’s Global Force Management (GFM) system, SOF are a globally managed force. Under this system, SOCOM manages the deployment of its 

forces around the world, regardless of their source location. SOF units with a particular regional focus are routinely deployed to operate with or train partner nation 

units in theater. Once in theater, they are employed under the command of the uniVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00296 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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fied combatant commander in whose geographic area the activity or mission is to 

be conducted. This system gives DOD the strategic flexibility to use such units for 

other operational assignments outside of their primary area of responsibility—as is 

the case of the situation in Iraq today. 

The majority of SOF units are based in the U.S. SOF units stationed overseas are 

assigned to the Geographic Combatant Commanders, but are also globally available 

under the GFM system. This overall arrangement for managing SOF provides the 

Department with the ability to allocate capability against the full range of demands, 

and sustain the necessary partnerships to conduct special operations globally. 

‘‘Permanent’’ Bases 

Question. In a written response to a question for the record in connection with 

your testimony before the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee last 

year, you provided a definition of ‘‘permanent’’ versus ‘‘enduring’’ bases. 

Would you agree that your response indicates the difference between the two is 

not a function of the length of time that United States forces maintain a presence 

at the installation in question, but rather depends on how robust that United States 

presence is, such as whether forces are permanently stationed or only assigned to 

that location on a rotational basis, or whether such tours are accompanied and the 

installation provides the family support facilities necessary to support accompanied 

tours? 

Answer. ‘‘Enduring’’ is a term often used to describe a location where the U.S. intends to develop and sustain a longstanding host-nation relationship and from 

which DOD expects there to be long-term demand to support critical missions. ‘‘Permanency’’ is generally a function of the nature of the footprint at a location—e.g., 

we tend to describe as ‘‘permanent’’ those locations with permanently assigned 

forces, substantial infrastructure, and dependents and family support facilities. In 

that sense, ‘‘permanent’’ generally would mean a very robust presence. It is often 

the case that locations described as ‘‘permanent’’ are also considered ‘‘enduring’’ in 

terms of host-nation relationship and mission needs. 

Question. Does DOD use the term ‘‘permanent bases’’ in its internal decisionmaking processes? If so, what meaning does that term have inside DOD? 

Answer. DOD uses a three-tiered lexicon for facility types: Main Operating Bases, 

Forward Operating Sites, and Cooperative Security Locations. How specific locations 

are designated using this lexicon is a function of the nature of the host-nation relationship, the activities and missions the location supports, and the physical footprint 

at a location. 

Enduring Presence at Baumholder, Germany 

Question. The Department recently decided to maintain our base at Baumholder, 

Germany, as an ‘‘enduring’’ base in support of our global strategy and of U.S. Army 

forces in Europe. 

What units does the Department envision retaining at Baumholder, and how 

would the training areas at Baumholder be used by such forces or by other U.S. 

forces stationed in, or rotating through, Europe? 

Answer. Support units, or ‘‘enablers’’ (e.g., military police and sustainment units), 

will likely be the predominant force presence at Baumholder over the long-term. 

EUCOM and its Army component are finalizing plans that identify the types of 

units to be stationed there and the nature of training activities to be conducted. 

Question. In your opinion, is the change in the status of the Baumholder indicative of a larger reassessment of the ground force posture in Europe? 

Answer. No. Since 2004 when the initial footprint requirements for a military 

presence in Germany were identified, the Department has determined that it would 

not have enough basing capacity in Germany to meet its needs if Baumholder were 

closed. Estimates of future footprint capacity needs are based upon emerging force 

structure changes (based on the new modular Army brigades), the need for additional support units, and evolved infrastructure requirements tied to supporting 

these other changes. 

Question. Does this change signal a departure from the Integrated Global Posture 

and Basing Strategy announced by the President in August 2004? 

Answer. No. 

Change in Status of U.S. Forces in the Republic of Korea 

Question. The Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea, has advocated for the authorization to increase the number of, and length of accompanied tours for U.S. military 

personnel stationed in Korea in order to provide a more stable U.S. military presence on the peninsula. 

In your view, what are the costs and benefits to this request? 

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Answer. As Secretary Gates stated recently, DOD is interested in pursing the approach of extended, accompanied tours in Korea. The benefits of normalizing tour, 

include improved continuity, stability, and readiness and retention of regional, institutional, and cultural knowledge; as well as reduced costs and an overall savings 

as the number of servicemember moves and lower the need for entitlements resulting from family separations. The military departments are conducting detailed assessments to determine the best way to implement this initiative over the course 

of the next 10 to 15 years. 

Question. In your opinion, would this increase require a renegotiation of the Status of Forces Agreement with the Republic of Korea? 

Answer. DOD must conduct further detailed assessments to determine the full implications of the initiative, to include any possible impacts on agreements provisions. 

However, the initiative to normalize tour lengths in Korea has the broad support 

of the Government of the Republic of Korea. 

HOST NATION BURDENSHARING

Question. How would you assess the current trends in burden-sharing arrangements and residual value recovery with nations currently hosting U.S. forces? 

Answer. Burden-sharing arrangements with host-nation partners should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Key factors affecting these arrangements include the 

context of regional political-military and operational dynamics, the nature of the 

specific host-nation relationship, and related U.S. presence goals. 

Residual value recovery policy is managed by the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L). 

Question. Is the willingness of host nations to share in the costs of basing U.S. 

forces increasing or decreasing? 

Answer. As I indicated earlier, I am reluctant to generalize about host-nation costsharing for the U.S. presence globally. As the Department realigns its defense posture globally, it continues working with host-nation partners to develop suitable arrangements for supporting long-term U.S. presence goals. In many cases host-nation 

consultations and negotiations that determine cost-sharing arrangements are still 

ongoing. 

Question. If confirmed, what would you do to maintain a healthy burden-sharing 

and residual value recovery program? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would work to ensure the Department continues pursing 

global defense posture changes with our allies and partners that strengthen our access relationships and forward capabilities. In pursuit of these two aims, I would 

certainly work to make burden sharing an important element of our negotiations 

with potential host-nation partners. 

COUNTERNARCOTICS

Question. The DOD has been involved extensively in counternarcotics missions for 

many years, involving both Active and Reserve component forces. 

In your view, what is the appropriate role of DOD in interdicting illegal drugs 

bound for the United States, in reducing drug cultivation, and in reducing demand? 

Answer. The counternarcotics (CN) authorities and responsibilities assigned to the 

DOD by law provide useful and flexible ways to support the National Drug Control 

Strategy, as well as achieve national security goals around the world. DOD conducts 

CN activities in support to U.S. local, State, and Federal counternarcotics agencies, 

as well as foreign counternarcotics forces. In many cases, this support is carried out 

by DOD-sponsored Joint Task Forces and Joint Interagency Task Forces, several of 

which have increased their international liaison and operational coordination roles. 

Question. In recent years, the Department has shifted its focus from interdicting 

illegal drugs bound for the United States to interdicting illicit trafficking (including 

trafficking in drugs, weapons, people, and money) bound for the United States. 

What is your opinion of this expanded focus? 

Answer. As it has become increasingly apparent that the global illegal drug trade 

has connections to terrorism, financial crimes, corruption of governmental systems, 

weapons smuggling, human trafficking, major gang networks, insurgency and instability in many places worldwide. As a general premise, illicit trafficking, whatever 

the commodity, undermines partner nations’ authority and government structures; 

and provides transnational criminal organizations and terrorists revenue to purchase weapons and plan operations that threaten U.S. security interests. By widening the Department’s focus to trafficking networks—drugs, weapons, people or 

money—the Department provides critical support to undermine transnational networks that threaten the Nation. 

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Question. In the legislative proposals the committee received from DOD for the 

upcoming fiscal year, the counternarcotics program requested a significant expansion in the number of countries eligible to receive support from the Department, including an expansion to West Africa. 

In your assessment, is the drug trafficking threat from Africa sufficient enough 

to justify a major expansion of the counternarcotics program into West Africa? 

Answer. Africa, especially West Africa, has seen a dramatic increase in drug 

smuggling and associated corruption and intimidation that turns weakly-governed 

areas into nearly ungoverned spaces. Currently, the threat of the expanding illicit 

drug trade threatens Africa’s fragile future. Working with African nations to 

strengthen their domestic capabilities, while partnering with European allies, is one 

way to approach the dilemma. Additionally, profits realized by Colombian 

narcoterrorists in Africa, sustain continued assaults against the Government of Colombia and others in the Western Hemisphere. 

COUNTERNARCOTICS, COUNTER PROLIFERATION, AND GLOBAL THREATS

Question. You have responsibility for counternarcotics, counterproliferation, and 

nonproliferation activities. A growing concern is the connection between narcotics 

trafficking and terrorists. 

What actions do you believe are appropriate to identify, track, and stop funding 

sources that could be used by terrorists to obtain nuclear or other WMD weapons 

or equipment? 

Answer. I agree that there is concern over the possible connection between narcotics trafficking and terrorists, and that undermining an adversary’s ability to finance hostile activities against U.S. interests is a critical priority for the Department. The Department supports counterthreat finance interoperability with other 

government agencies to achieve national security objectives. If confirmed as ASD for 

GSA, I will be responsible for developing the Department’s counterthreat finance 

policy guidance and developing counterthreat finance requirements. It is critical to 

develop and include integrated capabilities designed to exploit financial networks 

that support activities that are hostile towards U.S. interests. The Department will 

work in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies to counter adversaries’ 

funding networks and undermine terrorists’ ability to obtain nuclear or other WMD. 

COUNTERDRUG/COUNTERTERRORISM MISSIONS

Question. SOFs have been deeply involved in training forces in Colombia to conduct unified counterdrug-counterterrorism missions. 

In your view, what has been the success of training missions in Colombia? 

Answer. In my view DOD’s training has been successful. The Colombian military 

and police forces are achieving battlefield superiority over illegal groups that traffic 

in drugs and have terrorized Colombia’s people and threatened its sovereignty. SOF 

counternarcoterrorism training missions have been instrumental in helping the Colombian military and national police gain professional skills, improve combat techniques, and develop tactics and procedures. Equally important, SOF training has resulted in intangible results such as increased respect for human rights, an appreciation for civil-military operations, and professionalization of the force. 

Question. Are these appropriate missions for SOFs? 

Answer. These missions are appropriate and beneficial for SOF. By undertaking 

these training missions, SOF increase their proficiency at working with foreign partners to conduct their core missions of Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal 

Defense. 

Question. What, if any, benefit do unified counterdrug-counterterrorist training 

missions in Colombia and counterdrug-training missions worldwide provide to 

SOFs? 

Answer. These training missions provide a realistic scenario for SOF to hone their 

skills such as: teaching through interpreters; organizing, training, equipping, and 

leading an indigenous force; and operating in austere environments not easily replicated in training locations in the U.S. 

DETAINEE AFFAIRS

Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum 

issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions? 

Answer. Yes. 

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Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, and in DOD Directive 

2310.01E, the DOD Detainee Program? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you share the view of the Judge Advocates General that standards 

for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that 

we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat our own 

detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, 

airmen or marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts? 

Answer. Yes. Humane treatment is the bedrock principle of DOD policy, regulations, and detention operations. By treating all detainees humanely, we hope that 

our adversaries will reciprocate with our servicemembers. It should be noted however that al Qaeda and the Taliban are not bound by international regimes, and 

have demonstrated a profligate disregard for the law of armed conflict. Nonetheless, 

the Department remains steadfastly committed to its obligations under the law of 

armed conflict, and detains members of al Qaeda and the Taliban within its custody 

and control humanely and consistent with international standards of treatment. 

Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 

of the Geneva Conventions? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. In the past year and a half, Task Force 134 in Iraq has made significant 

changes to the way in which detention operations are conducted in a counterinsurgency environment, including through the establishment of reintegration centers at theater internment facilities. 

What do you consider to be the main lessons learned from the changes to detention operations in Iraq over the past year and a half? 

Answer. In order to be successfully integrated into an effective counterinsurgency 

campaign, detention operations in Iraq have moved beyond simply detaining individuals that remain a security threat to coalition forces and Iraqi citizens. Besides removing insurgents from the battlefield, successful detention operations now focus on 

successfully reintegrating and rehabilitating detainees so that when they are released, they will not re-engage in hostilities. 

Task Force 134 has adopted a number of measures, called counterinsurgency inside the wire, which focus on these reintegration and rehabilitation efforts. These 

lessons learned have included more thorough screening of detainees so as to isolate 

the extremists elements from more moderate Iraqis, family involvement and visitations, and voluntary educational and vocational programs, including voluntary exposure to moderate Islamic teaching, so as to better equip detainees to find jobs upon 

release and help them resist extremist influences. 

Question. What should be done to incorporate those lessons learned into the 

DOD’s doctrine, procedures and training for personnel involved in detention and interrogation operations? 

Answer. Each theater of operations will have some unique detention requirements, tailored to the nature and scope of operations. However the Department is 

applying lessons learned from detention-centered counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq 

and incorporating best practices in Afghanistan. For example, the Department is 

planning to implement voluntary educational and vocational training programs at 

Theater Internment Facilities in Afghanistan. The Department is also examining 

ways to incorporate some of these practices at Guantanamo, such as expanding family contact through telephone calls. 

Building on these successes will require a review of DOD’s internal directives and 

policy guidance as it pertains to detention, and issuing or modifying new guidance 

as appropriate. 

DOD COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR) PROGRAM

Question. The CTR program has several key objectives including: (1) reducing 

strategic nuclear weapons; (2) improving the security and accounting of nuclear 

weapons and fissile material; (3) eliminating and preventing biological and chemical 

weapons and capabilities; and (4) encouraging military reductions and reforms to reduce proliferation threats. 

In your view, how has the CTR program benefitted U.S. national security? 

Answer. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has reduced the threat 

of WMD proliferation by securing possible sources of WMD, destroying or deactivating threat systems, and improving the capability to detect and interdict WMD 

or related materials in transit. CTR’s ‘‘scorecard’’ during the 16-year history of the 

program speaks for itself: 7,292 warheads deactivated with CTR support; 1,529 

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Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) eliminated; 796 silos eliminated; 131 mobile ICBM launchers eliminated; 155 strategic bombers eliminated; 906 nuclear Air-to-Surface missiles eliminated; 456 submarine launch tubes eliminated from 30 missile submarines which 

were eliminated by CTR. In addition, a fissile material storage facility was constructed in Russia which we believe is being loaded with plutonium derived from 

dismantled weapons; CTR has provided inventory control and physical security for 

Russian warhead storage sites. The forgoing comprises key elements of the ‘‘scorecard,’’ but do not include CTR’s work in WMD border security and bio-security. 

Many of these activities were initially conducted during a period when cooperating 

governments were unable to provide adequate security for the weapons and related 

systems. Thus, the data reflects not merely specific weapons or delivery systems 

eliminated, but rather elimination of threats which in many cases were vulnerable 

to misappropriation. 

In addition to the ‘‘scorecard’’ data, CTR has also provided a vehicle for cooperation with governments with whom communication with the U.S. was sometimes 

tense in other venues. The value of maintaining areas of cooperation on difficult 

issues is difficult to measure but no less intrinsic. Moreover, CTR specifically and 

U.S. national security interests more broadly have benefited greatly from the willingness of its founders, Senators Nunn and Lugar, to continue being emissaries for 

WMD nonproliferation cooperation. 

Question. What is your view of the CTR program’s chemical and biological weapons elimination efforts? 

Answer. CTR’s chemical weapons elimination efforts marked a milestone in 2007, 

when Albania became the first State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention to 

complete elimination of its declared chemical weapons stockpile. This effort was 

completed with CTR assistance. In 2008/2009, CTR’s chemical weapons elimination 

efforts will mark another milestone with commissioning of the Chemical Weapons 

Destruction Facility at Shchuch’ye, in the Russian Federation. CTR is committed to 

successful completion of this project, which has had a very complex history. CTR 

will remain well-positioned to conduct chemical weapons elimination work, or related activities, over the long term due its ability to draw on expertise of the U.S. 

Army’s Chemical Corps and Chemical Materials Agency. 

CTR’s biological weapons elimination work is based currently on a flexible model 

which incorporates bio-security, dangerous pathogen surveillance, cooperative research, and disease reporting/information sharing. It is titled formally the ‘‘Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP).’’ BTRP can be adapted to meet the needs of 

new partner nations, or to limit the risk DOD chooses to take on. BTRP is the fastest growing area of the CTR program, reflecting the threat posed by weak bio-security worldwide. 

Question. Do you think the CTR program is well coordinated among the U.S. Government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts in Russia, e.g., the State 

Department and the Department of Energy? 

Answer. Yes. Examples of CTR’s coordination can be found in the area of nuclear 

warhead security in Russia and the bio-security area. With respect to nuclear warhead security, CTR and a companion program at the Department of Energy have 

coordinated closely to accelerate U.S. efforts to complete work by the end of calendar 

2008. That work is proceeding on schedule with robust communication between CTR 

and DoE to resolve problems or pursue opportunities. With respect to bio-security, 

CTR staff has participated fully in an interagency effort led by the Department of 

State to develop a global strategy for coordination of U.S. bio-security and related 

assistance. 

For fiscal year 2008, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program received additional funding and new authority to conduct threat reduction activities outside of 

the former Soviet Union. 

Question. What actions have you taken to implement this new authority? 

Answer. The Department appreciates the streamlining of CTR authorities, as well 

as the initial allocation of $10 million for fiscal year 2008 that was provided for activities outside states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). During my April 12, 2008 

testimony to the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, I noted that the program was 

evaluating potential programs in several countries outside the FSU with the goal 

of developing in 2008 CTR activities with those countries that could begin in 2009. 

If confirmed, I would offer to brief the committee on the results of our evaluation 

and the way ahead. 

Expansion of CTR outside the FSU has received much focus, but I should also 

note that 2008 is a year of intense activity for CTR inside the FSU: the complex 

Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility and nuclear warhead security projects in 

Russia will conclude this year; nonproliferation activities in Kazakhstan are being 

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accelerated; and entirely new bio-security engagement activities are beginning in 

Armenia and Turkmenistan. 

Question. Are there any impediments that you have encountered in implementing 

this new authority and if so what are those impediments and what is your plan for 

addressing any such impediments? 

Answer. New initiatives in a program like CTR are inherently labor intensive to 

develop. Therefore, a principal impediment has been prioritizing among CTR activities. We have added additional staff to help with this reprioritization. We also appreciate congressional support for streamlining CTR authorities which will help improve flexibility and efficiency in operation of the program. 

Question. In your view, what are the key opportunities and challenges over the 

next 5 years that the CTR Program should address? 

Answer. Among the specific opportunities or challenges that I see in the next 5 

years for CTR are the following: (1) adapt CTR’s nonproliferation policy goals and 

program business practices to be able to function effectively outside the Former Soviet Union; (2) add a more flexible, rapid mode of operations should circumstances 

warrant, but without overlapping with the State Department’s Nonproliferation/Disarmament Fund; (3) move CTR’s relationship with the cooperating countries from 

an assistance-based model to one of partnership. 

More broadly, since its inception, CTR’s priority has been to address WMD and 

related materials ‘‘at there source.’’ This is the most reliable means of dealing with 

the threat posed by WMD proliferation. In 2004, with the 2001 terrorist attacks in 

mind, CTR added the problem of WMD and related materials ‘‘on the move’’ as a 

goal to be addressed. For CTR, this has meant undertaking new activities in the 

area of WMD border security and expanding its bio-security work. CTR will always 

be ready to address WMD at the source. However, expanding the program’s impact 

on nonproliferation priorities will demand continued creativity with the challenge of 

WMD ‘‘on the move.’’

Question. Clearly the Russian economy has changed since the creation of the CTR 

programs, as has the nature of the U.S.-Russian relationship. 

In your view, how should these changes be reflected in future of U.S.-Russian programs under the CTR program? 

Answer. As I testified on April 2, 2008, I believe it is important to remember that 

CTR in Russia remains in the U.S. interest. However, CTR’s role in Russia is changing as the Russian economy has improved and progress has been made on the initial 

programs of accounting for and securing the vast complex of Soviet-era WMD. CTR’s 

role in Russia is declining today as Russia has new resources to fulfill its legal and 

other responsibilities. In 2008, more CTR funds will be obligated for activities outside Russia than inside Russia. This milestone begins a trend in CTR’s program 

plan which will continue. Our goal is to fulfill promises and contracts that the CTR 

program has made in Russia, but also to shift our relationship to a different footing. 

The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which Russia co-chairs, is an 

example of Russia bringing its own expertise to the worldwide fight against WMD. 

We could envision the relationships built through CTR being leveraged for cooperative Russian-U.S. efforts to combat WMD in other countries. 

Question. What is your view of the advantages of the recently signed U.S-Russia 

civil nuclear cooperation agreement from a nonproliferation perspective? 

Answer. In my view, the recently signed U.S.-Russia civil nuclear cooperation 

agreement may have a benefit in the nonproliferation area, in that it helps codify 

cooperation with agencies of the Russian Federation which also have responsibility 

for security of some nuclear materials. At a time when U.S.-Russian relations are 

complex, new venues for cooperation can be helpful in a mission as broad as nonproliferation. 

ARMS CONTROL

Question. Arms control has been a prominent feature in U.S. security policy in 

the past, but clearly the international security landscape has changed dramatically 

in the past decade. 

What is your view of the current arms control efforts and the proper role of arms 

control in U.S. national security strategy? 

Answer. Arms control remains an effective tool for combating the proliferation of 

WMD. The National Strategy to Combat WMD identifies nonproliferation and arms 

control as one of its three principle pillars, and as such, calls for the enhancement 

of arms control measures to impede proliferant states and terrorist networks. The 

National Strategy also calls for compliance with existing nonproliferation regimes, 

such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Agreements such as 

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these not only call for the complete destruction of certain classes of WMD, but also 

possess the framework for addressing emerging threats. 

Question. What opportunities exist for advancing arms control with respect to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery? 

Answer. The U.S. is currently leading international efforts to agree to a Fissile 

Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) which would ban the production of highly-enriched 

uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes. If ratified by all countries, this treaty could be a major step forward in nonproliferation and arms control. DOD supports current negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament. 

In addition to negotiation of an FMCT, full implementation of the NPT, CWC, and 

BWC, along with efforts at universalization of these treaties, would contribute to security and stability. We are also working with the Department of State to conclude 

a follow-on to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). 

EXPORT CONTROL

Question. Do you believe that a review is necessary of the implications for the 

U.S. satellite industry of retaining or removing satellites from munitions list for export purposes and the range of satellite and satellite components that are controlled 

under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations? 

Answer. The Department of State, which has the statutory authority for administering the International Traffic in Arms Regulation, including items on the U.S. 

Munitions List, would need to determine that such a review is necessary. If a review 

was initiated, DOD would assist in providing technical expertise and programmatic 

insight needed to determine whether the export controls protect U.S. national security. 

Question. If so, what questions should be addressed in such a review? 

Answer. The scope of any review would be determined in coordination with the 

Department of State. 

COUNTERPROLIFERATION AND PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI)

Question. If confirmed, what would be your role, if any, in policy formulation and 

implementation of the PSI? 

Answer. I would be an active participant in the interagency policy formulation for 

PSI. In addition, I would provide guidance and oversight to the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation, Counternarcotics, and Global Threats, 

who leads U.S. Government efforts in PSI’s Operational Experts Group. The PSI 

Operational Experts Group (OEG), a group of military, law enforcement, intelligence, legal, and diplomatic experts from 20 PSI participating states, meets regularly to develop operational concepts, organize the PSI exercise program, share information about national legal authorities, and pursue cooperation with key industry sectors. The OEG works on behalf of all PSI partners and strives to share its 

insights and experiences through bilateral and multilateral outreach efforts. 

Question. In your view, what are the benefits of the PSI? 

Answer. First, PSI channels international commitment to stopping WMD-related 

proliferation by focusing on interdiction as a key component of a global counterproliferation strategy. 

Second, PSI provides participating countries with opportunities to improve national capabilities and strengthen authorities to conduct interdictions. PSI partners 

have developed and sustained one of the only global, interagency, and multinational 

exercise programs, conducting over 30 operational air, maritime, and ground interdiction exercises involving over 70 nations. 

Third, PSI provides a basis for cooperation among partners on specific actions 

when the need arises. Interdictions are information-driven and may involve one or 

several participating states, as geography and circumstances require. By working together, PSI partners combine their capabilities to deter and stop proliferation wherever and whenever it takes place. 

Question. Have the participants in the PSI actually interdicted a shipment of 

items associated with WMD that were being shipped illegally? If so, please provide 

examples of these actions including what nations participated and the legal authorities utilized to interdict the shipment and under which it was determined that the 

shipment was illegal. 

Answer. PSI partners define ‘‘interdiction’’ broadly, as any action, based on sufficient information and consistent with national authorities and international legal 

frameworks, that results in the denial, delay or disruption of a shipment of proliferation concern. Shipments of concern may be transported by air, sea, or land. 

The United States has worked successfully with multiple PSI partners in Europe, 

Asia, and the Middle East to prevent transfers of equipment and materials to WMD 

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and missile programs in countries of proliferation concern. Details of specific successes are classified, and could be provided in a separate briefing. 

Question. How is funding to support PSI efforts, including exercises, determined 

and allocated and to what entities is such funding provided? What is the source of 

the funds and the amount utilized for PSI activities in fiscal year 2007 and planned 

for in fiscal years 2008 and 2009? 

Answer. PSI is not budgeted currently in a traditional, programmatic sense. The 

PSI was conceived as a flexible, adaptive initiative that leverages existing capabilities, activities, authorities and resources rather than creating new ones. For example, PSI-related interdiction scenarios are often injected into existing military exercises, as was the case with SOUTHCOM’s Panamax 2007 exercise. DOD’s PSI activities are funded out of existing budgets, such as Operations and Maintenance 

when a U.S. vessel executes a ‘‘hail-and-query.’’ As a result, we have not previously 

tracked PSI expenditures separately. However, in response to legislative requirements, GSA staff is preparing a more detailed analysis of PSI funding. 

In addition, beginning in 2007, the Department requested funding specifically for 

support to combatant commands for PSI-related activities. The 2008 request is 

$800,000. 

Question. Is funding or in-kind assistance provided to international partners? If 

so please provide a list of countries which have received assistance and the nature 

or amount of the assistance provided on an annual basis? 

Answer. The Department has not provided funding or in-kind support to international partners specifically for PSI. I understand that the Department of State 

has provided financial support to PSI partners under State authorities. 

CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Question. Last month more than 110 countries, including the United Kingdom—

but not the United States—approved the text of an agreement banning the use, production, and sale of cluster munitions. 

What is your view of the treaty on cluster munitions? 

Answer. Cluster munitions are effective weapons, provide distinct advantages 

against a range of targets and can, against some targets, result in less collateral 

damage to civilians and civilian infrastructure than unitary weapons. The Oslo Convention’s ban on cluster munitions, if we were to join it, would result in a capability 

gap for indirect fire of area targets that would require an increase in other resources 

and could put at risk our airmen and ground forces. 

The U.S. shares the concerns about unintended harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure caused by the use of cluster munitions. In July, at the next negotiation 

session of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), the United States will 

work to complete a new cluster munitions protocol. The CCW includes all of the 

major producers and users of cluster munitions, many of which will not sign the 

Oslo Convention; thus, an agreement in the CCW is likely to have a greater practical effect. We have called for completion of a new cluster munitions protocol by 

the end of 2008. 

Question. What impact do you believe U.S. opposition to the cluster munitions 

treaty will have on our relations with other nations who support the treaty and on 

future operations with coalition partners? 

Answer. The Oslo Convention contains specific provisions that would allow parties 

to the Convention to cooperate militarily and to operate with non parties such as 

the United States. Military cooperation and operations includes transit of and storage of cluster munitions on the territory of countries that accede to the Oslo Convention. Without a single, broad interpretation of these provisions, the U.S. ability 

to uphold treaty commitments and for countries to participate with us in international peacekeeping operations could be in jeopardy. We believe that all countries 

that accede to the Oslo Convention can agree on a single, broad interpretation which 

provides for needed interoperability. 

PRISONER OF WAR/MISSING-IN-ACTION PERSONNEL

Question. Recovery of remains operations in North Korea are a humanitarian effort, and arguably should not be tied to the larger political and strategic issues surrounding North Korea. Since its inception in 1996 until its suspension in 2005, this 

program was seen by both parties as humanitarian in nature. The program is critically important to the families of these missing servicemembers. 

What is the status of resumption of recovery operations in North Korea? 

Answer. The Department temporarily suspended remains recovery operations in 

May 2005 due to concern for our personnel during a period of heightened tensions 

between the U.S. and North Korea; however, we are prepared to return once condiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00304 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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tions are appropriate. The Department will ensure that before any personnel conduct future remains recovery operations in North Korea we have taken all possible 

precautions to ensure their safety. These precautions will include access to urgent 

medical care if required, and availability of adequate communications systems. Additionally, the Department will require North Korea to permit our teams access to 

key sites where suspected remains may be recovered. 

Question. Does the Department intend to wait until pending political and nuclear 

issues are resolved before approaching North Korea about the resumption of recovery operations? 

Answer. As the Secretary wrote in his 21 May 2008 letter to Chairman Levin, the 

Department shares the desires of families and veterans to resume remains recovery 

operations in North Korea, and we are prepared to do so at the appropriate time. 

Unfortunately, we cannot predict when conditions will be conducive to resuming discussion on this humanitarian program. We are monitoring the situation closely. As 

soon as we believe it is appropriate to reengage with North Korea on these recovery 

efforts, we will ensure that Congress is informed. The Six-Party Talks are currently 

at an especially sensitive point. Should we deploy U.S. personnel in re-stated recovery operations, their efforts could be put in jeopardy if the talks fail. 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy reported to Congress last year on the 

organization, management, and budgeting of the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC). The report essentially supported the status quo. 

Question. What is your view of the organization, management, and budget structure of JPAC? 

Answer. I believe JPAC’s current organization, management, and budget structure aligned under PACOM and funded by the Department of the Navy meets its 

current needs and requirements. The Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel 

Office (DPMO) has formed a Senior Study Group comprised of principals within the 

POW/MIA personnel accounting community to study continually this and other 

issues within the personnel accounting community. 

Question. Is JPAC sufficiently funded to maximize progress in identifying the remains of missing servicemembers? 

Answer. JPAC is fully funded for its approved missions and its current operations 

tempo, which includes fielding 70 worldwide missions per year. Their biggest challenge has been insufficient workspace. The JPAC commander has taken action to 

increase work space, which will enhance their ability to establish identifications. 

The PACOM commander has ranked the JPAC MILCON in his top requirements; 

design begins in fiscal year 2009, and construction begins in fiscal year 2010. Additionally JPAC is working with the military and civilian human resource offices to 

increase their percentage of assigned personnel. These actions will allow the command to be more effective in accomplishing its mission. 

Although JPAC is sufficiently funded to maintain its current operations tempo, 

if JPAC is able to resume operations in North Korea, the organization will require 

additional funding. JPAC’s latest estimate for fiscal year 2009 is that an additional 

$15.1 million would be required to resume operations. That estimate could change 

depending on market conditions when operations actually resume. We will keep the 

committee apprised of any changes in that assessment. 

Question. Has the Department considered moving JPAC and its forensic capabilities to the mainland United States? If so, what were the results of that consideration? What are the obstacles to such a move? 

Answer. The Department continues to look at a number of options to increase 

JPAC’s forensic remains identification capacity, to include another laboratory on the 

mainland, still under the command of JPAC and focused only on identifying remains. This is only one option under consideration, however. Currently, the JPAC 

commander is evaluating ways to improve the recruitment and retention of anthropologists and archaeologists, to include increasing pay and incentives, but the organization is still collecting data on these matters, and will make recommendations 

after evaluating the data. 

A 2005 Government Accountability Office (GAO) study recommended that the Department undertake a formal needs assessment of the workload of the Defense 

POW/MIA Office to determine both what resources are needed and how they can 

best be allocated among the various mission areas. 

Question. Has the Department performed a formal needs assessment as recommended by the GAO? If not, why not, and if so, what were the results? 

Answer. In August 2007, OUSD Policy contracted with a private organization to 

analyze the current distribution of staff, identify areas for revised manpower distribution, and offer recommendations to improve the capacity of Defense Prisoner 

of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) to meet mission objectives. The analysis 

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included a review of, and recommendations for, the most effective use and distribution of civilian, military, and contract personnel. 

The organizational assessment, which also included a needs assessment, was completed on December 28, 2007. The assessment recommended increased staffing for 

the operational support and personnel recovery mission areas. DPMO documented 

the recommended staffing requirements in developing the Department’s fiscal year 

2010–2015 program. 

Question. What is DOD doing to ensure sufficient outreach to family members to 

collect reference samples and that adequate resources are allocated to family reference sample collection? How will DOD ensure that it has collected as many family 

reference samples as possible? 

Answer. We have 67 percent of family reference samples from Vietnam War families. For the Korean War, we have samples for 61 percent of all losses, but we have 

employed a strategy that prioritizes collection on losses in certain key areas. As a 

result we have 90 percent of the reference samples for those lost in the principal 

areas where JPAC operated in North Korea and between 84–90 percent of samples 

in areas where North Korea unilaterally recovered and repatriated a large number 

of remains that we are still working to identify. For World War II, our approach 

is to collect family reference samples for specific aircraft crews or casualties in individual engagements where we have recovered remains, and there too our methods 

have proven successful. 

One of the major methods DPMO uses to solicit for reference samples is through 

our Family Update program. Annually, DPMO holds eight Family Update meetings 

in cities around the Nation. More than 40 percent of families at these meetings are 

first time attendees. DPMO will continue to explore creative ways to increase family 

reference donation. 

HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Question. Human trafficking is a significant global humanitarian problem. If confirmed, you would serve as the focal point for the Secretary of Defense’s policies of 

interest within OSD. 

What do you believe to be the appropriate role for DOD in supporting U.S. Government policies to prevent human trafficking? 

Answer. Per DOD Instruction 2200.01, it is DOD policy to: oppose prostitution, 

forced labor, and any related activities that may contribute to the phenomenon of 

Trafficking in Persons (TIP) as inherently harmful and dehumanizing; deter activities of DOD servicemembers, civilian employees, indirect hires, contract personnel, 

and command-sponsored dependents that would facilitate or support TIP, domestically and overseas; educate all servicemembers and DOD civilians annually on the 

worldwide trafficking menace, national TIP policy, overseas theater TIP policy, and 

attendant personal responsibilities consistent with DOD core values and ethical 

standards; increase efforts by commanders and military police worldwide, within 

their authorities, to pursue indicators of TIP in commercial establishments patronized by DOD personnel, place offending establishments off-limits, and provide support to host-country authorities involved in the battle against TIP. 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness serves as the DOD 

Combating Trafficking in Persons (CTIP) Principal Staff Assistant to the Secretary 

and Deputy Secretary of Defense and develops overall policy and provides guidance 

for the DOD CTIP program. The Office of the ASD/GSA supports DOD efforts to 

combat TIP by representing the Department in the annual U.S. Government TIP 

sanction review process and working closely with the Office to Monitor and Combat 

TIP at the Department of State. 

PIRACY

Question. Piracy is a major problem that affects U.S. interests. Some of the 

world’s key shipping lanes and offshore oil operations, for instance, off the coast of 

Somalia, in the Gulf of Guinea, and in the Strait of Molacca have seen numerous 

incidents of piracy. The U.S. Navy and our allies in Europe have played an active 

role in protecting the shipping lanes off the coast of Somalia in recent years. 

What do you believe to be the appropriate role for DOD in preventing and responding to the growing problem of piracy? 

Answer. The President’s Piracy policy of June, 2007, provides that ‘‘The United 

States strongly supports efforts to repress piracy and other criminal acts of violence 

against maritime navigation. The physical and economic security of the United 

States—a major global trading nation with interests across the maritime spectrum—relies heavily on the secure navigation of the world’s oceans for unhindered 

legitimate commerce by its citizens and its partners. Piracy and other acts of vioVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00306 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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lence against maritime navigation endanger sea lines of communication, interfere 

with freedom of navigation and the free flow of commerce, and undermine regional 

stability.’’ 

The policy calls for a multifaceted approach to piracy involving the missions and 

capabilities of various U.S. agencies, and the international community, in addition 

to DOD: ‘‘Piracy repression should include diplomatic, military, intelligence, economic, law enforcement, and judicial actions. Effectively responding to piracy and 

criminal activity sends an important deterrent message and requires coordination 

by all departments and agencies of the U.S. Government in order to ensure that 

those responsible are brought to justice in a timely manner.’’ As this policy recognizes, DOD plays an important, but not the sole role in preventing and responding 

to piracy through the combined operational capabilities of our forces, and our coalition allies. 

GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS

Question. One of your responsibilities will be to serve as the focal point for policies 

of interest relating to DOD’s response to international health crises and humanitarian disasters. By all accounts, the world is in the midst of a decline in the availability of food and an increase in the price of food. Should this global food crisis continue, it is likely that DOD will be called upon to assist in a variety of places around 

the world. 

In your view, what is the appropriate role of DOD in providing relief to this crisis 

and other resource crises around the world? 

Answer. DOD has varied capabilities to assist in crises of different kinds, as was 

demonstrated during the December 2004 response to the tsunami in Asia. I would 

expect the Department to respond to any crisis in conjunction with other elements 

of the U.S. Government, but it is difficult to comment on an appropriate role for 

a hypothetical event that has not occurred. 

HUMANITARIAN DISASTER

Question. In international humanitarian crises where the United States provides 

relief, DOD is often called upon to play a major role. 

What do you see as the primary challenges for the Department in providing such 

relief, and what do you believe is the appropriate role for the Department in providing humanitarian relief? 

Answer. Again, I would expect the Department to respond to any crisis in conjunction with other elements of the U.S. Government, but it is difficult to comment on 

challenges for a hypothetical event that has not occurred. 

In general, DOD, through its combatant commands, participates in Foreign Disaster Relief efforts: (1) when directed by the President; (2) with the concurrence of 

the Secretary of State; and (3) in emergency situations in order to save lives. DOD 

plays a key role in disaster situations by offering unique assets for timely and effective response to foreign nations that request assistance. The Department also plays 

a key role in any overseas disaster relief effort when civilian authorities become 

overwhelmed as evident during the Indonesian Tsunami (2005), Pakistan Earthquake (2006), Hurricane Felix-Nicaraguan relief efforts (2007), Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh (2007), and Cyclone Nargis in Burma (2008). 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as ASD/GSA? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

302

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

AFGHAN POLICE FORCE/ARMY

1. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Benkert, given your responsibilities for capacity 

building among partners and allies, what is your role in overseeing training of the 

Afghan police force and the Afghan army? 

Mr. BENKERT. The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Global Security Affairs 

(GSA) in general deals with broad policy for training and equipping partner nation 

forces, and with the authorities used for training and equipping this provides the 

framework through which assistance to specific nations is provided. With respect to 

Afghanistan, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia-Pacific Security Affairs 

(APSA) provides policy oversight for training the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police (ANP). GSA is also responsible for policy oversight of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) support to counternarcotics efforts worldwide and 

manages the counternarcotics Central Transfer Account. In this role, GSA provides 

policy oversight of the training, equipping, and infrastructure support for the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan, as well as overseeing the advanced interdiction 

training of the Afghan Border Police, working closely with APSA, Central Command, Drug Enforcement Agency, and the State Department. In addition, GSA 

helps to identify and recruit coalition partners to provide training and equipment 

to the Afghan Security Forces and provides oversight and policy guidance supporting the efforts of participating coalition partners. This activity is executed in 

close coordination with the Department of State and the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense regional offices.

2. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Benkert, to your knowledge, what are the current 

capabilities of the Afghan police force and the Afghan army? 

Mr. BENKERT. Primary policy oversight and guidance for DOD work with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)—the Afghan Army and police—is developed 

by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for APSA. 

I understand that the capabilities of the Afghan National Army (ANA) have been 

improving and the ANA is currently seen as one of the most trusted and respected 

institutions in Afghanistan. There are currently 63,000 ANA, growing towards an 

end strength of 80,000. The ANA has become increasingly capable and has taken 

the lead in over 30 major operations. 

The ANP is several years behind the ANA but is making progress. There are approximately 75,000 ANP and they are growing to their approved end strength of 

82,000. The current focus in ANP development is on reforming and training the current force. 

Building the capabilities of the ANSF is one of the key priorities of the United 

States. The U.S. has spent over $10.1 billion in the last 2 years towards these efforts. The desired end state is a professional, capable, respected and multi-ethnic 

ANSF with competent ministries and staffs and sustaining institutions capable of 

directing, planning, commanding, controlling, training and supporting the ANSF. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

COUNTERNARCOTICS POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN

3. Senator WARNER. Mr. Benkert, among the issues you would be responsible for, 

if you are confirmed, is that of DOD counterdrug policy in Afghanistan. It is critically important that we not permit the enemy in Afghanistan to fund hostile activities against our forces using drug money. So, I’d like to pose to you the same question I posed to Secretary Gates a few months ago: When it comes to taking responsibility for the counternarcotics mission in Afghanistan, where does the buck stop? 

Mr. BENKERT. President Karzai has primary responsibility for Afghanistan’s narcotics problem, with the support of the international community. The Afghan Compact, agreed at the February 2006 London Conference, passed the lead to the Government of Afghanistan in all areas of reform and development, with international 

commitment to support Afghanistan in these areas. As Secretary Gates testified, at 

the Bucharest North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit the heads of 

government were direct with President Karzai on the narcotics issue.

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4. Senator WARNER. Mr. Benkert, who is responsible for this matter ultimately? 

Who in the U.S. Government is responsible? Who in the NATO/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) structure is responsible? 

Mr. BENKERT. Ultimately, President Karzai and the Government of Afghanistan 

are responsible for the narcotics problem in Afghanistan. The Afghan Government 

must have the political will to counter the narcotics threat. The majority of the 

poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is taking place in the southern region of the country where the government’s authority is weak and the insurgency is strong. 

Within the U.S. Government, the lead agency in dealing with the narcotics problem continues to be the Department of State. In August 2007, all relevant agencies 

of the U.S. Government approved the U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan, which sets forth roles and responsibilities. The Office of National Drug Control 

Policy, Departments of State, Justice, and Defense, along with the United States 

Agency for International Development and the Drug Enforcement Administration 

will continue to implement programs to build Afghan capacity to enable President 

Karzai to succeed against the narcotics problem, in support of the Counternarcotics 

Strategy. 

The ISAF is providing counternarcotics support within the limits of the NATO operations plan. The ISAF commander’s military chain of command ultimately leads 

to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. ISAF has an important supportive role 

in the counternarcotics effort, given that the drug trade is a key destabilizer in Afghanistan, and that the narcotics trade helps fuel the insurgency. 

[The nomination reference of Joseph A. Benkert follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

February 25, 2008. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

Joseph A. Benkert, of Virginia, to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense, vice Peter 

Cyril Wyche Flory, resigned. 

[The biographical sketch of Joseph A. Benkert, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, 

follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH BY JOSEPH A. BENKERT

Joe Benkert became the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs (GSA) in December 2006 upon the establishment of the Office 

of Assistant Secretary of Defense for GSA. Previously, he served as the Principal 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, GSA’s predecessor. The GSA office is responsible for defense-related issues and programs that 

concern building the capability of partners and allies; coalition affairs; technology 

security policy; security cooperation; counternarcotics, counterproliferation, and 

countering global threats; detainee affairs; and prisoner of war/missing-in-action 

issues. 

Mr. Benkert previously served as Deputy Director and Director of the Defense Reconstruction Support Office and its predecessor, the Defense Support Office-Iraq. 

Mr. Benkert was instrumental in establishing these offices to provide a single focus 

within the Office of the Secretary of Defense for coordination of the Defense Department’s support to stabilization and reconstruction activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. Prior to this appointment, he was the Deputy and Chief of Operations for the 

Coalition Provisional Authority’s Washington office. Before that, he was Chief of 

Staff for the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

Mr. Benkert was a career Navy officer with extensive experience both in command 

at sea and in national security policy formulation and implementation in Washington. He commanded two destroyer squadrons; a guided missile cruiser, U.S.S. 

Josephus Daniels; and a frigate, U.S.S. McCloy. He was the Executive Director of 

the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel, an advisory group for the Navy’s 

senior uniformed leader; and served in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy both as a senior military assistant and as the Director of European Policy. 

304

Mr. Benkert graduated with distinction from the United States Naval Academy 

and received the Master of Public Policy degree from the John F. Kennedy School 

of Government, Harvard University. He and his wife Gail have two children and reside in Arlington, VA. 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Joseph A. Benkert in connection with his 

nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228

Washington, DC 20510–6050

(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Joseph Albert Benkert.

2. Position to which nominated: 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Global Security Affairs).

3. Date of nomination: 

February 25, 2008.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.]

5. Date and place of birth: 

January 17, 1951; Frankfort, KY.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Gail (DeVeuve) Benkert.

7. Names and ages of children: 

Suzanne Benkert, 23; Stephen Joseph Benkert, 21.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received, and date degree granted. 

Franklin County High School, Frankfort KY, Diploma, June 1969. 

U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis MD, Bachelor of Science, June 1973. 

John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge MA, 

Master of Public Policy, June 1979.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Global Security Affairs. Office of 

the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Washington, DC. December 2006–Present. 

305

Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security 

Policy. (SES) OSD, Washington, DC. June 2006–December 2006. 

Deputy Director and Director, Defense Reconstruction Support Office/Defense 

Support Office-Iraq. (Limited-term SES) Department of Defense, Washington, DC. 

August 2004–May 2006. 

Deputy and Chief of Operations, Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Washington. (Temporary appointment) Department of Defense, Washington, DC. November 2003–July 2004. 

Chief of Staff/Special Assistant, Office of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary 

of Defense for Policy. (Temporary appointment) Washington, DC. May–October 

2003. 

Executive Director, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Executive Panel. (Captain, 

USN) Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC. February 2001–

April 2003. 

Director, European Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

(Captain, USN) OSD, Washington, DC. March 1999–February 2001. 

Senior Military Assistant to the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy. (Captain, USN) OSD, Washington, DC. August 1997–March 1999. 

Commander, Destroyer Squadron 32 and Commander, Destroyer Squadron 22. 

(Captain, USN) Norfolk, VA, and deployed operations. May 1996–July 1997.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

None.

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

None.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

Member, St. Mary’s Episcopal Church, Arlington. VA 

Member, U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association 

Member, U.S. Naval Institute 

Member, Military Officers Association of America 

Member, Smithsonian Associates

13. Political affiliations and activities:

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

None. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 

None.

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals, and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

Military medals: Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Navy Meritorious Service Medal, Navy Commendation Medal, Coast Guard Commendation 

Medal, Navy Achievement Medal, unit and campaign awards. 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

I authored one article for the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings in 1985.

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

No formal speeches. 

In my current position, I have made informal remarks to government audiences 

on several occasions on combating weapons of mass destruction. While serving with 

the Coalition Provisional Authority, I made informal remarks on several occasions 

at conferences on Iraq reconstruction. 

306

In my current and previous positions, I have testified before Senate and House 

committees on several occasions. Transcripts are available. These appearances include:

Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Readiness and 

Management Support, ‘‘Use of Riot Control Agents,’’ September 2006

Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Readiness and 

Management Support, ‘‘Overseas Basing Plans,’’ April 2007

Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging 

Threats and Capabilities, ‘‘Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,’’ April 

2007

House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Security, ‘‘The Development 

Fund for Iraq,’’ June 2005

House Committee on Appropriations, Defense Subcommittee, ‘‘Guantanamo,’’ May 2007

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate? 

I agree. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–

F are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

JOSEPH A. BENKERT. 

This 25th day of February, 2008.

[The nomination of Joseph A. Benkert reported to the Senate by 

Chairman Levin on June 26, 2008, with the recommendation that 

the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the 

Senate on July 23, 2008.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Sean J. Stackley by Chairman 

Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of 

command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly 

improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant commanders in the 

strategic planning process, in the development of requirements, in joint training and 

education, and in the execution of military operations. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions 

based on your experience in the Department of Defense (DOD)? If so, what areas 

do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications? 

Answer. I do not have recommended modifications to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. 

Civilian and military roles defined by Goldwater-Nichols have been modified by 

Congress since first enactment of this cornerstone legislation commensurate as opportunities to improve the Department’s effectiveness have become apparent. I consider it to be incumbent upon the Service Acquisition Executive to routinely review 

the need for changes to the act and, if confirmed, I would conduct such review and 

bring forward to the Department changes that merit consideration by Congress. 

307

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Assistant 

Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN(RDA))? 

Answer. It is my understanding that, as currently designated by the Secretary of 

the Navy, the ASN(RDA) serves as the Service Acquisition Executive for the Department of the Navy with the authority, responsibility, and accountability for all acquisition functions and programs within the Department of the Navy. As such, the 

ASN(RDA) is responsible for managing the Department of the Navy’s acquisition 

workforce management structure and processes consistent with governing statute, 

DOD policies, and Navy regulations; making recommendations regarding milestone 

decisions for Acquisition Category ID programs; and serving as the decision authority for Acquisition Category IC and II programs. 

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties? 

Answer. A strong technical background and an extensive Navy career have provided me with the opportunity to serve in a series of assignments in ship operations, 

design and construction, maintenance, logistics, system integration, acquisition policy, and Major Program management. Specifically, operational experience gained 

while deployed in a Navy destroyer; and subsequent assignments as project naval 

architect for a first of class frigate, shipyard production manager for a first of class 

destroyer, and director for maintenance and modernization for Atlantic Fleet cruisers and destroyers provided invaluable experience in the operation, design, construction, and life cycle support of complex warships. Later assignments in the Aegis 

Shipbuilding Program Office and the Office of the ASN(RDA) provided in-depth experience in procurement, financial management, policy formulation, and the business end of major defense programs. Subsequently, as the LPD 17 Program Manager, I had the opportunity to lead an organization of research centers, warfare centers, Systems Commands, industry, and the test and evaluation community while 

completing the Lead Ship’s design, software development, weapon system integration, production, test, and delivery. More recently, in the performance of my duties 

on the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I have gained critical insight 

to the role of Congress and the perspective of the committee while working closely 

with the Navy and Marine Corps on the full spectrum of acquisition matters that 

confront the ASN(RDA). 

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your 

ability to perform the duties of the ASN(RDA)? 

Answer. I believe that I am technically and professionally prepared to perform the 

duties of the ASN(RDA). If confirmed, I expect to have a close working relationship 

with the Secretary of the Navy and the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics), and I expect to coordinate on acquisition matters with 

the Secretariat and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) organizations. Ultimately, 

performance of the duties of the ASN(RDA) is measured by the performance of the 

acquisition workforce. There are a number of actions, initiated by the Department 

and with the support of Congress, intended to strengthen this workforce and the 

processes governing the management of major procurements. I believe that one of 

my priorities, if confirmed, will be to further the implementation of these initiatives. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect 

that the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy would prescribe for 

you? 

Answer. If confirmed, I expect the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the 

Navy to assign me duties and functions commensurate with the ASN(RDA) position, 

and any others they may deem appropriate. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the following: 

The Secretary of the Navy/Under Secretary of the Navy. 

Answer. By current instruction, the Secretary of the Navy has designated the 

ASN(RDA) as the Department of the Navy Service Acquisition Executive with responsibility for establishing acquisition policy and procedures, and for managing research, development and acquisition within the Department of the Navy. If confirmed, I will report directly to the Secretary and Under Secretary of the Navy in 

the execution of the duties related to this function. Further, I will perform other 

duties as assigned by the Secretary. 

Question. The Chief of Naval Operations/Commandant of the Marine Corps. 

Answer. The CNO and Commandant of the Marine Corps are the principal advisors to the Secretary of the Navy in the allocation of resources to meet program requirements. If confirmed, I will work closely with the CNO and the Commandant 

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in the planning and execution of acquisition programs to most effectively meet the 

warfighters’ requirements with available resources. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would represent the Department of the Navy to the Under 

Secretary of Defense on all matters relating to Navy acquisition policy and programs. In addition, as the Navy Acquisition Executive, I would provide recommendations on all Navy Acquisition Category ID programs to the Under Secretary of Defense. 

Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army and Air Force for Acquisition. 

Answer. If confirmed, I plan to establish close working relationships with my 

counterparts in the Army and the Air Force to ensure coordination on key acquisition issues. 

Question. The General Counsel of the Navy. 

Answer. If confirmed, I expect to seek advice and counsel from the Navy’s Chief 

Legal Officer on all relevant matters. 

Question. The Director for Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E). 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with DDR&E in the coordination of Research 

and Development (R&D) efforts by the Department of the Navy. 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration (ASD(NII)). 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the ASD(NII) as necessary to ensure Navy/

Marine Corps system design and development meet interoperability exchange, information assurance, and further network requirements established by the ASD(NII). 

Question. The Navy Chief Information Officer. 

Answer. The Department of the Navy (DON) Chief Information Officer (CIO) reports directly to the Secretary for all matters on Information Management (IM) and 

Information Technology (IT). If confirmed, I will work closely with the DON CIO on 

acquisition of IM/IT systems, and IM/IT matters as they affect Navy acquisition. 

Question. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Director in the development, 

approval, and execution of Test and Evaluation Master Plans for Navy acquisition 

programs. 

Question. The Chief of Naval Research. 

Answer. By current instruction, the Chief of Naval Research reports to the 

ASN(RDA). If confirmed, I would oversee the Chief of Naval Research execution and 

management of the Department of the Navy RDT&E appropriation. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that you would confront, 

if confirmed as ASN(RDA)? 

Answer. If confirmed as the ASN(RDA), my overarching challenge will be to oversee and integrate the Department of the Navy’s research, development and procurement functions within the available resources in order to provide the Nation’s Navy 

and Marine Corps with unmatched capability for the performance of their full range 

of missions. I believe some of the more specific challenges I would confront include:

• Meeting the urgent needs of the sailors and Marines in prosecuting the 

global war on terrorism; 

• Ensuring the depth and breadth of skills and experience in the Navy’s 

acquisition workforce matches the requirements for managing the Navy’s 

acquisition programs; 

• Improving performance in controlling cost and requirements in order to 

deliver programs within budget and schedule; 

• Sustaining a robust science and technology program to ensure our technological advantage over future threats; 

• Addressing industrial base challenges in an environment of sustained low 

rate production.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I expect to draw on my previous experiences as well as the 

advice and counsel of the Navy’s acquisition team, the CNO, and the Commandant 

in order to address these challenges. I intend to work closely with the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), industry, and Congress 

to develop and execute plans and initiatives that will advance our efforts on these 

challenges. 

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the ASN(RDA)? 

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Answer. At this time, I am unaware of any serious problems in the performance 

of the functions of the ASN(RDA). 

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will address problems as they arise, establishing a plan 

of action and timeline appropriate to the nature, priority, and urgency of each problem. 

PRIORITIES

Question. What broad priorities would you establish, if confirmed, in terms of 

issues which must be addressed by the ASN(RDA)? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work within the framework of objectives established 

by the Secretary of the Navy for the Department. I believe some of the more specific 

priorities I would need to address include:

• Meeting the urgent needs of the sailors and marines prosecuting the global war on terrorism; 

• Developing, implementing, and executing acquisition plans to affordably 

modernize and procure the ships, aircraft, and related systems required to 

meet the demands of the National Military Strategy; 

• Building and sustaining a highly capable acquisition workforce to manage 

acquisition of Navy/Marine Corps programs. 

ACQUISITION ISSUES

Question. Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) in the Navy and the 

other military Services continue to be subject to funding and requirements instability. 

Do you believe that instability in funding and requirements drives up program 

costs and leads to delays in the fielding of major weapon systems? 

Answer. Yes. Studies by the Department, by third parties, and by oversight organizations, such as the Government Accountability Office (GAO), have consistently 

identified instability in funding and requirements as one of the root causes for cost 

growth and schedule delay on major programs. 

Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Navy should take to address funding and requirements instability? 

Answer. I believe that there is close coupling between the degree of stability in 

funding and requirements, the quality of cost estimates for major weapons systems, 

and the performance by the government and industry as they relate to program cost 

and schedule. As such, I believe that a first step in addressing funding and requirements instability is to ensure the reasonableness of the system requirements and 

to improve the quality of related cost and schedule estimates to ensure that decisionmakers are well informed of their full commitment of resources at the front end 

of major weapon systems programs. A commensurate step would include ensuring 

adherence to the Department’s standards for achieving the appropriate level of technology readiness prior to proceeding to the next acquisition phase to minimize the 

degree of uncertainty that would surround the cost estimate at each program milestone. If the Department properly funds the program, it is then incumbent upon the 

acquisition team to exercise discipline in tracing system design and specifications 

to performance requirements, and to employ the appropriate acquisition strategy to 

deliver the capability within the resources allocated. Throughout this process, it is 

essential that the acquisition organization working closely with the resources and 

requirements organization adheres to Navy acquisition policy governing contract 

changes. If adequate resources are not programmed, I believe it is incumbent upon 

the Acquisition Executive to ensure the Department is fully aware of the effect of 

such funding instability on program execution, including cost impacts to other programs and impact to the industrial base. For mature programs that meet appropriate criteria, multiyear contracting has historically proven effective in maintaining 

funding and requirements stability. 

GAO has reported that the use of insufficiently mature technologies has resulted 

in significant cost and schedule growth in the MDAPs of the Navy and the other 

military departments. Section 2366a of title 10, U.S.C., requires the Milestone Decision Authority for an MDAP to certify that critical technologies have reached an appropriate level of maturity before Milestone B approval. 

Question. Do you believe that the use of insufficiently mature technologies drives 

up program costs and leads to delays in the fielding of major weapon systems? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to make sure that the Navy complies with the requirements of section 2366a? 

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Answer. If confirmed, I will review Navy acquisition policy and practice to ensure 

compliance with the requirements of section 2366a, assess the implementation of 

this policy in the course of reviewing major programs, and ensure adherence 

through continued program review and oversight. Consistent with milestone decision authority designated for the ASN(RDA), I will ensure compliance with the section 2366a certification requirements prior to Milestone B approval and provide notification to the congressional defense committees. If it is necessary to proceed with 

Milestone B approval prior to completing the 2366a requirements in order to meet 

national security objectives, I will submit in writing to the congressional defense 

committees a waiver to section 2366a requirements, my determination that the Department would be unable to meet critical national security objectives without the 

waiver, and the reasons for this determination. 

GAO has reported that the use of unrealistically optimistic cost and schedule estimates by the Navy and the other military departments is a major contributor to cost 

growth and program failure. 

Question. Do you believe that the use of unrealistically optimistic cost and schedule estimates leads to program disruptions that drive up program costs and delay 

the fielding of major weapon systems? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. What steps do you believe the Navy should take to ensure that cost and 

schedule estimates are fair and independent, and provide a sound basis for Navy 

programs? 

Answer. I believe that the quality of cost and schedule estimates relies to a great 

extent on the cost models employed by the various estimating groups; access to data 

required to validate these models; the policies governing the treatment of risk, contract type, escalation, margin, and change management; and the estimating group’s 

degree of independence, experience, and skill at managing these and other factors 

in the formulation of cost and schedule estimates. I believe that steps to ensure that 

cost and schedule estimates are fair and independent include ensuring that the cost 

estimating groups responsible for these efforts are adequately staffed with a workforce skilled and experienced for the task, that their accountability is distinct from 

the program office, and that the governing policies described above reflect the degree of risk that the Department is willing to include in budgeting for the program. 

In formulating estimates for major programs, it is prudent to seek multiple independent estimates, compare the estimates, understand the differences, and ensure 

that the risk highlighted by this approach is either included in the program budget 

or mitigated through the program’s contract strategy and risk management plan. 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics has 

issued a memorandum directing the military departments to institute new ‘‘Configuration Steering Boards’’ to review and approve new requirements that could add significantly to the costs of major systems. 

Do you support this requirement? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Navy complies 

with this new requirement? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that this requirement is addressed by appropriate instructions governing Navy acquisition policy and procedures. I will ensure 

that these instructions have been properly promulgated, review results of the Configuration Steering Boards, and ensure adherence to this requirement in the course 

of overseeing management of major programs. 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics has also 

issued a memorandum directing that the largest DOD acquisition programs undergo 

competitive prototyping to ensure technological maturity, reduce technical risk, validate designs, cost estimates, evaluate manufacturing processes, and refine requirements. 

Question. Do you support this requirement? 

Answer. Yes. As noted, as major weapon systems trend towards increased complexity, competitive prototyping provides an effective means for controlling and reducing technical risk in major defense programs. Additionally, sustaining competition to later stages of development for these weapon systems should provide for increased innovation and affordability in meeting design requirements. 

Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Navy complies 

with this new requirement? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the requirement addressed in this 

USD(AT&L) memorandum is captured by ASN(RDA) instructions governing Navy 

acquisition policy and procedures, I will ensure that these instructions have been 

properly promulgated, and I will assess the implementation of the requirement in 

the course of conducting reviews of major programs. 

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Numerous acquisition reviews over the last decade have identified shortcomings 

and gaps in the acquisition workforce of the DOD. Section 852 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 establishes an Acquisition Workforce 

Development Fund to provide the resources needed to begin rebuilding the Department’s corps of acquisition professionals. 

Question. Do you believe that a properly sized workforce of appropriately trained 

acquisition professionals is essential if the Navy is going to get good value for the 

expenditure of public resources? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. What steps do you expect to take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Navy 

makes appropriate use of the funds made available pursuant to section 852? 

Answer. As noted, the drawdown of the acquisition workforce has occurred over 

a protracted period. Similarly, a sustained campaign will be necessary in order to 

attract, train and retain the skilled professionals required by the Department to 

properly perform its mission, provide appropriate oversight of contractor performance, and provide the best value for the taxpayer’s dollars. If confirmed, I will review current metrics and results of the Department’s most recent billet review in 

order to assess existing gaps in critical skills for the acquisition workforce. I will 

review guidance promulgated by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) for the administration of the Fund, and consult with senior 

Navy civilian and military leadership to assess the implementation of this guidance 

and the current state of planning for use of these funds within the Department. 

Another concern raised about MDAPs is that a number of factors, including promotion and rotation policies are causing the military Services to retain program 

managers for too short a time. 

Question. Do you agree that shortened tours as program managers can lead to difficulties in Acquisition programs? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. If you agree, what steps would you propose to take to provide for stability in program management? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would review current policy and practice for assigning program managers to major programs with senior Navy military and civilian leaders, 

including such considerations as career flow points, tenure agreements, and succession planning for program managers. To the extent that existing policy warrants improvement to support both the function of program management and the career of 

the program manager, I will work within the Department to make these changes; 

and otherwise I will work to ensure that the Department adheres to established policy. 

CONTRACT MANAGEMENT

Question. By some estimates, DOD now spends more money every year for the acquisition of services than it does for the acquisition of products, including major 

weapon systems. Yet, the Department places far less emphasis on staffing, training, 

and managing the acquisition of services than it does on the acquisition of products. 

What steps, if any, do you believe the Navy should take to improve the staffing, 

training and management of its acquisition of services? 

Answer. I understand that the Department of the Navy has implemented a number of initiatives to improve the management of its acquisition of services and, if 

confirmed, I intend to review these initiatives. However, I believe that this issue 

must be addressed within the context and framework of previously noted concerns 

regarding the drawdown of the acquisition workforce. 

Question. Do you agree that the Navy should develop processes and systems to 

provide managers with access to information needed to conduct comprehensive 

spending analyses of services contracts on an ongoing basis? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. The last decade has seen a proliferation of new types of governmentwide contracts and multi-agency contracts. DOD is by far the largest ordering agency under these contracts, accounting for 85 percent of the dollars awarded under one 

of the largest programs. The DOD Inspector General and others have identified a 

long series of problems with interagency contracts, including lack of acquisition 

planning, inadequate competition, excessive use of time and materials contracts, improper use of expired funds, inappropriate expenditures, and failure to monitor contractor performance. 

What steps, if any, do you believe the Navy should take to ensure that its use 

of interagency contracts complies with applicable DOD requirements and is in the 

best interests of the Department? 

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Answer. I understand that the Department of the Navy has promulgated procedures to ensure that the use of interagency contracts is in the best interests of the 

Department. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Department complies with 

these procedures and applicable DOD requirements. 

MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS

Question. Section 811 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2008 amended section 2306b of title 10, U.S.C., to ensure that DOD enters 

multiyear contracts only in cases where stable design and stable requirements reduce risk, and only in cases where substantial savings are expected. The revised 

provision requires that data be provided to Congress in a timely manner to enable 

the congressional defense committees to make informed decisions on such contracts. 

What types of programs do you believe are appropriate for the use of multiyear 

contracts? 

Answer. Multiyear contracts potentially provide substantial savings through improved production processes, optimized employment of workforce and facilities, and 

procurement of material at economic order quantities. I believe that programs that 

are characterized by stable requirements, mature design, and realistic cost estimates, and that are intended to be procured at an economic rate under a fixed price 

type contract should be considered for multiyear procurement. 

Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the Navy and the Marine Corps fully 

comply with the requirements of section 2306b of title 10, U.S.C., as amended by 

section 811 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public 

Law 110–181) with respect to programs that are forwarded for authorization under 

a multiyear procurement contract? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. What is your understanding of the requirement that a multiyear contract result in ‘‘substantial savings’’ compared to the cost of carrying out a program 

through annual contracts? 

Answer. My understanding of the requirement that a multiyear contract result in 

‘‘substantial savings’’ is, as defined by section 2306b, that the use of a multiyear 

contract will result in savings that exceed 10 percent of the total costs of carrying 

out the program through annual contracts. Exception to this criterion would be considered if the Department presents an exceptionally strong case that the proposal 

meets the other requirements of section 2306b. 

Question. What is your understanding of the new requirements regarding the timing of any DOD request for legislative authorization of a multiyear procurement 

contract for a particular program? 

Answer. My understanding of the new requirements regarding the timing of any 

DOD request for authorization of a multiyear procurement contract is that the Secretary of Defense is to certify in writing by no later than March 1 of the year in 

which the Secretary requests the authority, that he has determined that each of the 

requirements of section 2306b(a) will be met by the multiyear procurement. 

ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT

Question. Section 908 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2008 (Public Law 110–181) requires that the service acquisition executive of each 

of the military departments shall have a 3-star principal military deputy. The Senate report states that the purpose of this provision is to strengthen the performance 

of the service acquisition executive; improve the oversight provided military officers 

serving in acquisition commands; and strengthen the acquisition career field in the 

military The provision requires that each principal military deputy be appointed 

from among officers who have significant experience in the areas of acquisition and 

program management, including a requirement that a nominee for this position 

have at least 10 years of direct acquisition experience. 

If confirmed, will you ensure that officers assigned to the principal military deputy position meet the full qualifications of a critical acquisition position? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that officers assigned to the principal military 

deputy position are the best qualified for the position with regard to the requirements for this critical acquisition position. 

Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to improve accountability in acquisition management and will you hold those acquisition officers accountable for 

failing to follow acquisition laws and regulations? 

Answer. If confirmed, the steps I would consider for increasing accountability 

would include an assessment of qualifications required for critical acquisition billets, 

an assessment of succession planning to ensure qualified acquisition professionals 

are being developed for program management positions, and a review of policy and 

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practice to ensure program managers are being expected to commit to tenure agreements that align to the program’s needs for continuity and stability. I would review 

current practice regarding ‘turnover’ letters, and consider the value of using these 

opportunities for the incoming program manager to identify the current status of 

the program and to identify the program objectives for his tenure. Further, I would 

work with the program managers to identify the tools, resources and support they 

require in order to successfully manage their programs and would consider it to be 

my responsibility to ensure that these needs are met. If an acquisition official were 

to violate law or regulations, I would thoroughly review the facts and findings and 

work with counsel to determine appropriate actions in holding the individual accountable. 

Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to improve oversight in the requirements determination, resource allocation or acquisition management processes? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the CNO and the Commandant 

of the Marine Corps are well advised on cost, schedule and risk associated with developing and fielding new capabilities, and that related programs are properly funded through the Program, Planning, Budgeting and Execution system. I will review 

existing Navy acquisition policy and practice governing changes to system requirements to ensure appropriate discipline in the management of contract changes. I understand that the Secretary of the Navy has implemented a series of initiatives, primarily a Gate Review process, to improve oversight and coordination in requirements determination and resource allocation leading to acquisition of major programs. If confirmed, I will take the necessary steps to ensure the effectiveness of 

these processes. 

Question. What is your view of the appropriate use of fixed-price contracts in 

major defense acquisition programs? If confirmed, will you ensure that the Department of the Navy fully implements the requirements of section 818 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007? 

Answer. My view is that fixed-price contracts are appropriate for major defense 

acquisition programs when the system being procured can be described in sufficient 

detail to ensure complete understanding of the requirements and the inherent risks 

of performance by both the government and the contractor. If confirmed, I will review the current status of the Department of the Navy’s implementation of the requirements of section 818 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2007 and, as necessary, take appropriate steps to fulfill the requirements. 

Question. GAO has reported that since the mid-1990s, the acquisition costs for 

major weapons programs has increased almost 120 percent and that current programs are experiencing, on average, nearly a 2-year delay in delivering initial capabilities to the warfighter. 

What steps will you take, if confirmed, to reduce or eliminate cost overruns and 

delays for major weapon programs, such as what the department experienced in the 

Littoral Combat Ship and the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle? 

Answer. Common causes for cost overruns and delays of major programs include 

invalid cost estimates, requirements instability, funding instability, excess technical 

risk, ineffective contract strategies, disruption caused by contract change, and inadequate government oversight. If confirmed, I will review related acquisition policy, 

processes, standards and practices to ensure their effectiveness at addressing these 

issues; I will review major programs to assess their risk for overrun or delay; and 

I will review the current health of the acquisition workforce, including the staffing 

of critical billets for the management of these major programs. To the extent that 

deficiencies, weaknesses, or opportunities for improvement are identified during 

these reviews, I’ll work within the Department to identify and implement appropriate corrective action. 

Question. Recently GAO released a report entitled, ‘‘Defense Contracting, PostGovernment Employment of Former DOD Officials Needs Greater Transparency.’’ 

GAO found that a large number of former DOD officials may have worked on defense contracts related to their former agencies, and some may have worked on the 

same contracts for which they had oversight responsibilities or decisionmaking authorities while at DOD. 

If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that acquisition officials in the 

Department of the Navy do not violate statutes and regulations regarding conflicts 

of interest and post-government employment? 

Answer. I am aware that the Department conducts training and counseling regarding post-government employment for acquisition officials. If confirmed, I would 

consult with the Office of General Counsel regarding the Department’s further responsibilities for ensuring compliance by former DOD officials in post-government 

employment, and determine any necessary further steps. 

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Question. The poor performance of many major defense acquisition programs has 

been attributed to the failure of the military departments to make tough decisions 

as to which programs should be pursued, and more importantly, not pursued, to ensure that requirements are reasonable achievable and programs are executable, and 

to hold senior officials accountable when responsibilities are not fulfilled. 

Would you agree that the existing acquisition culture in DOD leads the military 

Services, including the Department of the Navy, to over-promise on capability and 

underestimate costs in order to buy new programs and capture funding? 

Answer. Yes. Basing program decisions on unrealistic cost and schedule estimates 

is routinely cited as a root cause for poor cost and schedule performance in the procurement of major defense programs. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to change that culture? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will review related acquisition policy, processes, standards, and practices to ensure their effectiveness at addressing these issues; I will 

review major programs to assess their risk for overrun or delay; and I will evaluate 

current tools and practices for ensuring the reasonableness of system requirements 

and place priority on ensuring the quality of related cost and schedule estimates. 

A commensurate step would include ensuring adherence to the Department’s standards for achieving the level of technology appropriate to each major milestone. To 

the extent that deficiencies, weaknesses, or opportunities for improvement are identified during these reviews, I’ll work within the Department to identify and implement appropriate corrective action. Further, I understand that the Secretary of the 

Navy has implemented a series of initiatives, primarily a Gate Review process, to 

improve oversight and coordination in requirements determination and resource allocation leading to acquisition of major programs. If confirmed, I will take the necessary steps to ensure the effectiveness of these processes. 

NAVY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Question. What are the current major strengths and weaknesses of the Navy 

science and technology enterprise in supporting Navy and defense missions? 

Answer. The Navy science and technology enterprise has underpinned the technological superiority of the U.S. Navy. The extensive network of laboratories and institutions comprising this enterprise provide a broad base of expertise and world class 

facilities that succeed in bringing innovation and leading edge technologies to the 

design of today’s U.S. Navy ships, aircraft and weapon systems. 

Question. What metrics would you use to judge the value of Navy science and 

technology investments and the level of resource investment in them? 

Answer. Metrics for judging the value of science and technology investments must 

be careful in defining ‘return on investment.’ By its nature, the development of leading edge technologies requires a higher tolerance for risk and failure. However, 

there should be a measure of correlation between the future naval capabilities envisioned for ‘the Navy after next,’ the projects comprising the science and technology 

portfolio, the dollars invested, and relative measures of risk, payback, priority, and 

potential value to the warfighter. If confirmed, I would consult with the Chief of 

Naval Research regarding the enterprise’s current metrics to determine if further 

measures are warranted. 

Question. What methodology will you use to assess the appropriateness of the current balance between short- and long-term research to meet current and future 

Navy and Marine Corps needs? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will review the current and historical balance between 

short and long term Navy and Marine Corps research with the Chief of Naval Research and other key stakeholders in the science and technology enterprise in the 

context of near and long term requirements to determine whether the current balance and trends best support the warfighter. 

Question. What role do Navy science and technology investments play in reducing 

technical risk for major acquisition programs? 

Answer. Ultimately, these investments are fundamental to the acquisition team’s 

ability to provide the advance technologies that are critical to sustaining naval superiority. Further, as weapon systems tend toward increasing complexity, it is increasingly important that major programs seek to retire technical risk by leveraging 

science and technology efforts in the early acquisition phases. 

Question. How should Navy science and technology investments be planned, programmed, and coordinated with respect to major acquisition efforts to help reduce 

risk and keep programs on budget and on schedule? 

Answer. A well-developed acquisition plan will include a technology roadmap that 

identifies the risk factors, key development efforts, technology readiness levels appropriate to each phase of acquisition, and estimated costs in order to support the 

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program’s budget and schedule. The program plan needs to establish well documented exit criteria at decision points to ensure risk is managed in each of these 

phases, and the management structure must bridge the science and technology, acquisition, and requirements organizations to manage progress and ensure close coordination throughout the process. 

NAVY LABORATORIES AND TECHNICAL CENTERS

Question. In general, what are the greatest current strengths and weaknesses of 

the Navy’s laboratories and technical centers? 

Answer. The technical expertise and facilities comprising the network of Navy laboratories and technical centers are a strategic, national asset. These centers have 

been at the core of every major innovation in naval systems and are well suited for 

the unique demands of naval operations. I believe that the challenges associated 

with sustaining these capabilities and expertise are inherently significant, made 

more so when confronting issues with resource constraints, competition from outside 

industry, and aging workforce issues. 

Question. How would you compare the quality of the Navy’s labs and technical 

centers with respect to other defense laboratories and national laboratories? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would consult with the Chief of Naval Research to determine how the Navy laboratories and technical centers could benefit from 

benchmarking these other defense and national laboratories. 

Question. What initiatives would you consider to improve the ability of Navy laboratories and technical centers to support Navy and defense missions? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will review with the Chief of Naval Research and key 

stakeholders the current state of Navy laboratories and technical centers, as well 

as ongoing and planned initiatives prior to considering further initiatives. 

NAVY TEST AND EVALUATION CAPABILITIES

Question. What are the greatest strengths and weaknesses in the Navy’s Test and 

Evaluation (T&E) to ensure adequate development and operational testing of systems? 

Answer. The Navy’s T&E program has been extremely effective at ensuring major 

weapon systems are operationally effective and suitable when fielded. One of the 

more significant challenges to the T&E program is the completion of development 

of advanced threat-representative weapon targets for live-fire testing. 

Question. Do you feel that the Navy’s test infrastructure, including facilities and 

personnel, are adequate to support current and future Navy needs? 

Answer. Yes. As noted, target development efforts remain a challenge, but I believe that the Navy has employed acceptable methods to continue testing while development proceeds. 

TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION

Question. The Department’s efforts to quickly transition technologies to the 

warfighter have yielded important results in the last few years. Challenges remain 

in institutionalizing the transition of new technologies into existing programs of 

record and major weapons systems and platforms. 

What challenges to transition do you see within the Department of the Navy? 

Answer. There is a natural tension that exists between the desire to field the most 

advanced technologies available for the warfighter and the need to effectively manage risk to ensure that programs meet performance requirements within budget and 

schedule. The USD(AT&L) and the Navy have established policies for balancing 

these competing factors through such approaches as competitive prototyping, such 

policies as the establishment of configuration steering boards and establishment of 

technology readiness level criteria for milestone decisions, and such processes as 

Gate Reviews for major programs. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that technologies rapidly transition 

from the laboratory into the hands of the warfighter? What steps would you take 

to enhance the effectiveness of technology transition efforts? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work within the framework described above for standard acquisition programs. Regarding rapid acquisition programs, or similar efforts 

to meet urgent needs of the warfighter, I will assess the effectiveness of current efforts with the program managers, systems commands, and warfare centers to determine what further support or guidance they need to improve on these transition efforts. 

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TECHNICAL WORKFORCE

Question. What is your current assessment of the quality and sustainability of the 

DOD S&T workforce and the management of the Navy’s laboratory and technical 

center infrastructure? 

Answer. I believe that DOD has historically been successful at attracting an extremely skilled science and technology workforce. However, the drawdown of the Department and acquisition workforce has impacted the Department’s ability to sustain this depth and breadth of skills. This is compounded by increasing demand for 

these skills in private industry. 

Question. If confirmed, what plans would you pursue to ensure an adequate supply of Navy and Marine Corps experts in critical disciplines in the Department’s 

R&D commands? What role will you in play in ensuring that the Navy laboratories 

and technical centers have the proper personnel tools necessary to recruit and retain a world class technical workforce? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will consult with the Chief of Naval Research and the 

leadership of the Navy warfare centers to gain a better assessment of the current 

state of critical skills in the Department’s R&D commands and, in concert with review of the acquisition workforce, determine what further plans are appropriate to 

sustain these critical skills. 

NAVY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS

Question. What steps do you feel the Navy needs to take to ensure the success 

of the Next Generation Enterprise Networks (NGEN) program? 

Answer. I believe that the first and most important step is to ensure the Department has effectively determined a reasonable set of requirements for NGEN, and 

has balanced these requirements with the resources available for the program. The 

Department needs to identify the risks, obstacles, and costs it will incur when 

transitioning from Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) to NGEN, and it will need 

to work closely with industry as it defines its requirements to ensure the solicitation 

process is fair and timely and that performance requirements are well understood. 

Question. How will you work to ensure a seamless transition between the NMCI 

and NGEN programs so that Navy missions are not adversely affected during the 

transition process? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will review the current strategy for transition between 

NMCI and NGEN and ensure appropriate priority is placed on a seamless transition, including contract schedules and incentives, phasing and communication of the 

rollout plan, and an accompanying risk mitigation plan. 

Question. How will you work to ensure that Navy IT investments, in both tactical 

and businesses systems, are coordinated and interoperable with joint efforts and Department-wide enterprise initiatives? 

Answer. The Department of the Navy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

have parallel organizations responsible for these concerns. If confirmed, I will work 

with these organizations to ensure that acquisition of these systems meet their requirements for interoperability. 

NATIONAL SHIPBUILDING RESEARCH PROGRAM—ADVANCED SHIPBUILDING ENTERPRISE

Question. The Advanced Shipbuilding Enterprise of the National Shipbuilding Research Program (NSRP–ASE) is a collaborative effort between the Navy and shipbuilding industry to improve processes with the objective of reducing the costs to 

build ships. Modest funding from both partners is projected to more than pay for 

itself. With the current criticism of increasing costs for Navy ships, it does not seem 

prudent for the Navy to cease supporting this program, but funding for the program 

was not requested in the fiscal year 2009 budget request. 

If confirmed, what steps would you propose in working with the shipyards to reduce the costs of Navy shipbuilding? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure shipbuilding requirements are welldefined, reasonable, and stable; that contracts are appropriately structured to 

incentivize cost performance; and that appropriate measures are in place to ensure 

discipline in managing contract changes. I will work within the Department to 

maintain stable funding for shipbuilding programs and look for opportunities to stabilize shipyard workload, including use of multiyear contracts when conditions are 

met for substantial savings. Beyond shipbuilder costs, I will work with Integrated 

Warfare Systems to improve understanding of the cost drivers in naval weapons 

systems development, integration and testing in order to identify opportunities to 

improve on costs in these areas. I will seek to leverage competition where possible, 

and employ fixed type contracts where appropriate. 

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SHIPBUILDING

Question. The committee has repeatedly heard testimony from the Navy and industry leadership that stability in the shipbuilding program is essential if costs are 

to be controlled. Although there has been some progress on this front lately, the 

Navy has changed the acquisition profiles and strategies for shipbuilding programs 

numerous times in recent years. 

Do you agree that stability of acquisition profiles and strategies are essential to 

shipbuilding cost control? 

Answer. Yes 

Question. If confirmed, how would you attempt to ensure this stability? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the shipbuilding program is built 

upon realistic cost estimates and reasonable, efficient procurement profiles; that 

platform requirements are well understood and the development of key technologies 

is on a path to support these requirements; that competition plans and contract 

types, terms, and conditions appropriately incentivize performance within budget; 

that appropriate policy is in place to ensure discipline in the management of contract changes; and that multiyear contracts are employed when conditions are met 

to achieve substantial savings. Further, I will advocate this stability throughout the 

Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution process to ensure that the Department, in evaluating changes to the shipbuilding program, is well informed of related 

impacts to cost, schedules, and the industrial base. 

ALTERNATIVE FUNDING FOR SHIPBUILDING

Question. On numerous occasions, Navy leaders have testified that identifying an 

acceptable alternative to the full funding policy for shipbuilding is necessary to 

avoid increases in the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy account brought about by 

the purchase of large ships. Methods such as split funding and incremental funding 

have been used on certain ships. Another method that has been discussed is advance appropriations. 

In your opinion, what is the best way to fund Navy ships? 

Answer. I believe that the current full-funding policy for Navy ships, with noted 

exceptions for funding of large ships, has proven sufficiently effective in meeting 

Navy acquisition objectives. 

Question. If confirmed, what alternative methods, if any, for shipbuilding funding, 

that would still allow congressional oversight, would you recommend? 

Answer. I have no recommendations at this time for alternative funding methods 

for shipbuilding. 

Question. What is your view of the long-term impact of split funding or incremental funding on the availability of funds for Navy shipbuilding accounts? 

Answer. In my view, when properly planned, programmed and executed, I believe 

that incremental funding for high cost ships, such as aircraft carriers and large-deck 

amphibious ships, serves to improve stability in the shipbuilding account by reducing associated spikes to the shipbuilding budget. 

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP

Question. The committee has great concerns about cost problems in the shipbuilding arena, most notably with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. Last 

year, the Navy canceled the contract for the second ship at both of the two LCS contractors. 

Changing requirements, poor cost estimates, inexperienced program managers, 

and poor supervision of the contractors’ performance were among the causes of the 

overrun. For many years, numerous studies have recommended against changing requirements after signing a contract because that will inevitably lead to cost and 

schedule problems. The committee does not understand why the Department of the 

Navy has not taken this lesson to heart. 

What, in your opinion, are the reasons for poor cost and schedule performance of 

the LCS program? 

Answer. In my opinion, the Navy incurred significant cost and schedule risk in 

the LCS program by placing priority on accelerating the design and construction of 

the first of class LCSs, and by placing inadequate emphasis on cost realism and cost 

control in the award and execution of the design and construction contracts. As a 

result, immature cost estimates were locked into the budget before the Navy had 

developed the ship specifications, contracts were awarded before the contractors had 

incorporated newly developed Naval Vessel Rules into their respective designs, and 

program execution compromised on cost performance in the effort to meet the first 

ships’ critical path schedules. These factors led to significant disruption at the front 

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end of this new ship program, caused significant impact to production planning and 

construction of the first of class ships, and ultimately drove poor cost and schedule 

performance. 

Question. Are there other reasons for cost and schedule performance issues on 

Navy shipbuilding contracts? 

Answer. Cost and schedule performance issues on Navy shipbuilding contracts 

often refer to performance on first of class ships. Many, varied factors contribute to 

these issues, and while each lead ship confronts a unique set of issues, I believe 

common factors include:

• Challenges associated with properly estimating cost for completing design, development of related technologies, software development, system integration, and construction of complex first of class warships. 

• Technological challenges inherent to a first of class ship generally result 

in employment of cost-plus contracts which place cost risk on the government. 

• Competitively awarded first of class ships are very aggressively priced. • The increasing complexity of Navy warships and the limited ability to retire risk through prototyping results in cost growth and schedule delay 

through ‘‘discovery’’ in the course of completing lead ship design, first of 

class production planning, development and integration of ship systems, 

construction, and testing of the lead ship. 

• The long duration required to complete detail design, construction, and 

test for a first of class ship—typically 5 to 7 years—inherently increases 

cost risk. 

• Government-responsible changes emerge through the course of the lead 

ship as specification deficiencies are identified and as new requirements are 

incorporated into the design; 

• Low rate production for shipbuilding has resulted in sub-optimal utilization of shipbuilding facilities, and changes to the shipbuilding program 

cause significant impacts to overhead costs.

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that the Navy 

avoids making these same mistakes on current and future shipbuilding contracts? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure policy and practice on shipbuilding contracts 

emphasize cost realism and cost control by way of program estimates, contract 

award criteria, and contract type, incentives, terms and conditions. I will review 

execution of current shipbuilding programs to ensure that program budgets support 

current estimates; that programs are executing effective risk management plans to 

retire technical risk and contain cost; and that contracts appropriately incentivize 

cost performance. I will review the acquisition organization to ensure that shipbuilding programs are properly staffed, and I will review acquisition policy to ensure 

implementation of USD(AT&L) policy regarding Configuration Steering Boards and 

related discipline in the management of contract changes. 

TACTICAL AVIATION PROGRAMS

Question. As Navy and the Marine Corps F/A–18 and Marine Corps AV–8B aircraft continue to age, the Navy is now predicting that there may be a shortfall of 

125 strike fighter aircraft in the next decade, which only increases the concern 

about the schedule for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). 

What are your views regarding the current risk to the JSF program schedule during its System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase? 

Answer. The technical risks inherent to any new aviation program during its SDD 

phase are compounded on the JSF program by the complexity of the system and the 

multi-service/multi-nation requirements the JSF variants must meet. Appropriate to 

the investment in this capability, I believe the program has received the highest priority within DOD to ensure effective management of this risk and, if confirmed, I 

will review the program in detail to gain a current assessment by the Navy program 

office. 

Question. If there were to be new schedule difficulties with the JSF program, 

what course of action would you recommend to maintain sufficient strike assets 

within our Carrier Strike Groups? 

Answer. If there are new schedule difficulties with the JSF program, the alternatives for maintaining sufficient strike assets would potentially include continuing 

efforts to extend the service life for current strike/fighter aircraft, extending procurement of F/A–18 aircraft, or otherwise evaluating operating cycles for inventory 

aircraft to determine potential interim measures to mitigate the shortfall to strike 

requirements. If confirmed, I would work with the CNO and Commandant of the 

Marine Corps and the Naval Air Systems Command to evaluate these and other poVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00324 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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tential alternatives and make recommendations based on the balance of requirements, risk, and resources. 

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLES

Question. Secretary Gates has said ‘‘There is no failsafe measure that can prevent 

all loss of life and limb on this or any other battlefield. That is the brutal reality 

of war. But vehicles like mine-resistant ambush-protected, combined with the right 

tactics, techniques, and procedures, provide the best protection available against 

these attacks.’’ 

In your view, what steps must the Department take to stay ahead of the involving 

insurgent threat in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Answer. In my view, the Department needs to ensure that it is responsive to Urgent Needs Statements and pro-active in translating threat assessments to requirements, and the acquisition organization needs to be innovative and in close coordination with the user in the development of technologies to defeat the threat—and 

equally innovative and agile in mobilizing the defense industrial base to produce 

these new capabilities to the rate needed to meet rapid fielding requirements. 

ARMY AND MARINE CORPS CAPABILITIES AND ACQUISITION PROGRAMS

Question. Although the Army and Marine Corps have different missions and capabilities, their equipment, should have some degree of commonality. Throughout Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, the Army and Marine Corps have 

worked together on acquiring equipment for Army and Marine Corps forces. However, for equipment such as helicopters and heavy wheeled vehicles, the Army and 

the Marine Corps have pursued divergent acquisition paths. 

What are your views regarding the joint development and acquisition of Army and 

Marine Corps equipment? 

Answer. In general, Joint development of equipment reduces acquisition costs and 

provides for significant benefits associated with commonality throughout the system’s life cycle. To the extent that there is alignment between respective requirements, then Army and Marine Corps equipment should be jointly developed. 

Question. What role should the ASN(RDA) and the Secretary of the Navy play in 

synchronizing Army and Marine Corps requirements and synchronizing service programs? 

Answer. In my view, the Department of the Navy should evaluate opportunities 

to jointly develop new systems in conjunction with reviewing material solutions for 

warfighting requirements. I envision that the ASN(RDA) would coordinate with the 

Army Service Acquisition Executive to evaluate the technical suitability for joint development of a system to fulfill the Service requirements. For those programs designated for joint development, the program management, milestone decision authority, and roles of the respective Service Acquisition Executives should be outlined by 

memorandum of understanding. 

JOINT PROGRAMS

Question. In the last few years, the Navy and the Air Force have both withdrawn 

from joint weapons programs. The Air Force withdrew from the Joint Standoff 

Weapon system, and the Navy withdrew from the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile system. 

In your opinion, what are the key reasons that joint programs are initiated, but 

one or more of the partners withdraws? 

Answer. I cannot comment on the specific programs cited, but in my opinion the 

requirements, budgeting, and acquisition processes pose inherent challenges to the 

successful fielding of a new capability, and this is more true when adding the dimension of jointness. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you recommend changing the system so that 

the Navy and Marine Corps would participate in only those programs in which it 

would follow through? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will review current Department acquisition policy and 

practice regarding participation in joint programs and consult with key stakeholders 

in the requirements, budgeting, and acquisition processes to determine the history, 

lessons learned, and potential changes to policy that need to be implemented to improve results in joint programs. 

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CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the 

ASN(RDA)? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION

1. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Stackley, the newly directed Configuration Steering Boards 

(CSBs), along with competitive prototyping, are two of the ways in which the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) hopes to 

achieve more realistic program cost estimates and ensure a more stable acquisition 

process. Requirement changes and immature technologies, however, still pose problems to these goals even once a program has made it past the prototyping stage. 

What steps would you take, if confirmed, to improve the processes the Navy uses 

both to minimize the use of immature technologies and help freeze program requirements? 

Mr. STACKLEY. The Department of the Navy (DON) has implemented a Gate Review process for major programs with the specific intent of ensuring that system requirements are well-defined, applied program technologies are mature, program 

costs are properly estimated, and contract type, terms, and conditions incentivize 

desired performance. Gate Reviews are conducted in conjunction with major milestones and key decision points throughout the life of major programs. The review 

process encompasses the CSBs in its scope, and includes participation by stakeholders in the requirements, budget, and acquisition organizations. In conjunction 

with my leadership role in the Gate Review process, I will work closely with the 

Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps to ensure operational requirements are defined, stable, and fully funded; and will be deliberate in 

meeting my responsibility for ensuring adherence to these requirements in the 

course of overseeing management of major programs. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

MODELING AND SIMULATION

2. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Stackley, the Navy and Marine Corps Modeling and 

Simulation (M&S) Offices serve as the single points of contact for M&S for the Navy 

and Marine Corps. There are two naval activities in Orlando, FL: (1) the Navy Air 

Warfare Center Training Systems Division; and (2) the Marine Corps Program Manager for Training Systems. There is a great hub of technology in Orlando that provides great synergies between Government, academic, and industry to develop cutting edge training systems using M&S technology. What aspects of the Navy and 

Marine Corps’ efforts in research and development are currently utilizing Orlando’s 

M&S expertise? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Orlando’s M&S expertise are used in many aspects of the Navy 

and Marine Corps’ research and development efforts. Both of these naval activities 

work in partnership with the other resources in Orlando to design, develop, and acquire training systems throughout the Navy and the Marine Corps. Both activities 

perform research and development to improve future simulation-based training systems.

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3. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Stackley, if confirmed, what are your plans to utilize 

the expertise that exists in Orlando’s Technology Corridor to enhance the Navy’s 

mission? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Team Orlando consists of the combined resources from all four Department of Defense (DOD) Services, academia, and industry. I plan on utilizing the 

naval activities to research, develop, and acquire training solutions for our naval 

forces in a joint environment. I will promote continued cooperation between these 

naval activities and the other Orlando resources to ensure that the desired 

synergies are realized to the fullest practical extent. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EVAN BAYH

SUPPLY CHAIN RISK

4. Senator BAYH. Mr. Stackley, what kind of strategies or approaches would you 

implement to reduce the supply chain related risk associated with the measured decline in the electronics industrial base? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Supply chain related risks are a significant issue and will continue 

to increase as our weapon systems incorporate more commercial off-the-shelf microelectronics and assemblies. To mitigate these risks, the DON has a robust Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages (DMSMS) policy that requires each program to forecast and plan preventive measures. I will promote the 

various organic and commercially available forecasting tools, and collection of 

metrics to support policy and budget decisions. To assess risk, the DON applies its 

Independent Logistics Assessment (ILA) process, which provides an independent assessment of supportability design and planning (such as supply chain, DMSMS, etc.) 

at key program milestones. The ILA is a critical input to ensuring supportability 

risk is understood and mitigated. I intend to continue leveraging these policies and 

processes in managing supply chain management risks.

5. Senator BAYH. Mr. Stackley, do these strategies include methods to address related electronic technology issues, such as foreign dependency on electronic circuit 

boards, the move to prohibit lead in solder, as well as more recent Restriction of 

Hazardous Substances (RoHS) expansion efforts in the European Union? 

Mr. STACKLEY. The DON’s approach to mitigating supply chain management risk 

addresses the prohibition of leaded solder and components, as governed by the European Union’s RoHS legislation. While there are many efforts studying the impacts 

of RoHS legislation, the DOD has joined with industry to form the Executive Lead 

Free (ELF) Integrated Product Team (IPT). I have personnel on this IPT to determine the most viable solution in addressing RoHS issues. This IPT is comprised of 

management from the large DOD suppliers, as well as each of the Services and 

DOD agencies. The IPT has already developed a RoHS training course, which has 

been provided to Defense Acquisition University for implementation, as well as draft 

guidance/policy for USD(AT&L) approval. While RoHS may impact the reliability of 

our systems, there is currently a lack of adequate statistical data (e.g. fleet failure 

data resulting from lead free restrictions) to effectively assess the risks. I will support data gathering and analysis concerning these risks. 

While there is a potential for reliability impacts, RoHS also presents DMSMS-related issues as globally the electronics industry moves toward adopting EU restrictions. Currently, DOD’s electronics requirements equate to approximately 1 percent 

of industry sales so it is critical that ASN RD&A work in concert with other DOD 

activities to ensure an adequate supplier base is maintained. Finally, industry is 

telling us that counterfeiting of electronics and electronic components is becoming 

an area of concern. The IPT is exploring the potential impact of this threat. Accordingly, I intend to continue to support the efforts of the joint DOD/Industry IPTs, 

such as the ELF IPT, to determine the best solution, and support those decisions.

6. Senator BAYH. Mr. Stackley, would you take the lead with the Office of Secretary of Defense for AT&L and the other Service Acquisition Executives to make 

sure that DOD has a uniform policy to address these extremely high risk issues? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes. I have a voting member on the Office of the Secretary of Defense-chartered DMSMS and ELF IPTs and the goal of both IPTs is to standardize 

RoHS and DMSMS guidance and policy as applicable across DOD.

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NUCLEAR POWER

7. Senator BAYH. Mr. Stackley, as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, will you support the development of the next 

class of cruisers, CG(X), with nuclear power? 

Mr. STACKLEY. The Navy’s analysis of alternatives (AoA) for the Maritime Air and 

Missile Defense of Joint Forces capability, which includes an assessment of CG(X) 

alternatives, examines both fuel efficient conventional power plants and nuclear 

power alternatives. I will work closely with the Chief of Naval Operations to ensure 

that the decision as to whether or not nuclear power propulsion will be incorporated 

in future surface combatants is based on a thorough examination of both requirements and acquisition considerations as they pertain to ‘national interest’, in compliance with statute.

8. Senator BAYH. Mr. Stackley, do you believe nuclear power is the best way to 

accommodate the high energy demands of future weapon systems? 

Mr. STACKLEY. I believe it is critical that future ships be designed with the ability 

to accommodate higher electric energy demands associated with future weapon and 

sensor systems. The ability to accommodate these higher demands is a function of 

electrical generation capacity, which can be introduced into either nuclear or fossil 

fuel propulsion plant designs. The Navy’s recent study on Alternative Propulsion 

Methods for Surface Combatants and Amphibious Warfare Ships concluded that 

ships with high demands for energy benefit from the operational advantages provided by nuclear propulsion. However, a design decision for a particular class should 

be based on a thorough examination of alternatives to satisfy specific mission requirements, in compliance with statute.

313-SHIP NAVY

9. Senator BAYH. Mr. Stackley, should Congress be exploring different ways to 

budget funding for ship procurement to ensure the 313-ship Navy is achievable in 

the near future? 

Mr. STACKLEY. The Navy’s budget policy for ship procurement requires that ships 

be fully funded in the first year of procurement. In view of the long duration required for detail design and construction of complex warships (5 years on average), 

this policy has proven effective in ensuring that DOD and Congress understand and 

budget for the full ship construction costs at the front end of this procurement process. 

There are three notable exceptions to the full funding policy which, with the support of Congress, have proven to be extremely helpful to the Navy’s ability to mitigate budget spikes and perturbations in the shipbuilding program. The Navy has 

utilized incremental funding to finance the significant costs related to construction 

of large, complex warships, such as nuclear aircraft carriers and large deck amphibious assault ships, across multiple years. The Navy has utilized advance procurement where it proves beneficial to the government as a tool to reduce the impact 

of long lead times for critical shipbuilder materials, or otherwise to provide stability 

for the industrial base. For those programs that are stable in design and requirements, and are to be procured at efficient rates over an extended period, the Navy 

has employed multiyear procurement contracts when substantial savings can be 

achieved. 

As the Navy Acquisition Executive, I will continue to work with the Department 

and with Congress to employ these funding mechanisms to improve the affordability 

of the 313 ship Navy. As well, I will consider alternative funding mechanisms, and 

those that offer significant benefit to the government will be brought forward to the 

Department for further consideration. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

NAVY’S ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

10. Senator WARNER. Mr. Stackley, the Navy has been criticized for its management of acquisition and its ability to successfully manage shipbuilding and acquisition programs. What is your assessment of the Navy’s acquisition workforce? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Along with a capable workforce, successful acquisition programs 

depend upon support from basic research, disciplined requirements, clear responsibilities, sufficient resources including financial reserves and incremental budgeting 

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to milestones, accepting prudent risks, controlling cost and appropriate business and 

technical strategies. 

My assessment of the Navy’s acquisition workforce is that the drawdown of the 

workforce has occurred over a protracted period without a corresponding reduction 

in acquisition workload. We must balance the workforce with the acquisition workload and attract, train and retain the skilled professionals required by the Department to properly perform its mission, provide appropriate oversight of contractor 

performance, and provide the best value for the taxpayer’s dollars. The Department 

must also rebuild its in-house Systems Engineering capability. It is important that 

we have an organic ability to perform requisite engineering tradeoffs to ensure we 

are pursing the right balance of requirements and risks, before we request proposals 

for a ship or system.

11. Senator WARNER. Mr. Stackley, is sufficient emphasis being placed on developing the skills and experience needed to successfully manage shipbuilding programs? 

Mr. STACKLEY. As you are aware, the drawdown of the acquisition workforce has 

left the Department with a smaller aging workforce. In support of recent initiatives 

to reenergize this professional corps, the Secretary of the Navy has approved establishment of a senior executive position, Principal Civilian Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (PCDASN), responsible to ASN(RDA) for professional development and community management of the Navy’s acquisition workforce. The 

PCDASN is in the process of assessing the acquisition workforce billet structure, 

qualifications, and career paths to determine strengths and weaknesses of the acquisition workforce. 

This baseline assessment will provide important insight for the Department’s 

strategy to implement the Acquisition Workforce Development Fund. The Fund provides a mechanism to reenergize the workforce and develop an effective transition 

strategy as those eligible for retirement choose to leave Federal service. Planned use 

of the Fund includes hiring of highly-qualified experts to serve as senior mentors 

as well as journeyman and interns to bring in new and fresh ideas; recruiting and 

retention incentives; and training and development. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

NAVY/MARINE CORPS WEAPONS SYSTEMS

12. Senator CHAMBLISS. Mr. Stackley, I’ve appreciated your service on the Senate 

Armed Services Committee and we are going to miss you. I wanted to ask you about 

an issue that is not completely within your proposed portfolio but one that I know 

you will need to deal with, and that is the issue of how we plan for logistics and 

sustainment in the process of acquiring new weapons systems. Unfortunately, the 

Services have often approached acquisition and sustainment separately when they 

should be approached together. It is a fact that, for most weapons systems, the cost 

of sustaining them over the life of the system is larger than the cost of acquiring 

the system in the first place. I am concerned that, in some cases, the Services rely 

too much on maintenance and sustainment by the contractor who builds the system 

which in the end often costs more and is not in the best interests of the Government. Can you explain your vision of how this should work, how you will ensure 

that the Navy plans jointly for acquisition and sustainment of new weapons systems, and can I have your assurances that, if confirmed, you’ll work to ensure that 

the Navy and Marine Corps look first to develop an organic, in-house capability for 

sustaining military weapons systems rather than relying on the private sector to 

provide this capability for the Government? 

Mr. STACKLEY. I will work to ensure that the DON requirements for new or upgraded weapon systems will emphasize design traits of being logistically sustainable 

to high and affordable degrees of fleet readiness. DON has begun treating maintenance and sustainment as critical performance design characteristics; and ones that 

are not secondary to, or separated from, the process of acquiring major defense systems. The DON has several tools, by which to ensure that this design priority is 

established and maintained throughout the Acquisition process. They include: 1) 

Two Pass/ Six Gate Reviews; 2) Independent Logistics Assessments (ILA); and 3) the 

Naval Logistics Integration (NLI) initiative. 

The DON recently implemented its Two Pass/Six Gate Review process in an effort 

to improve governance and insight into the development, establishment, and execution of acquisition programs. Ensuring alignment between Service-generated capability requirement and acquisition, as well as improving senior leadership decisionVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00329 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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making through better understanding of risks and costs throughout the program’s 

entire life cycle is central to this significant process reform. Additionally, the DON 

implemented a standardized ILA process in 2004 in an effort to provide independent 

evaluation of a program’s logistics supportability planning at key acquisition milestones (B, C, and FRP). Fundamental to this review is the assessment of risks associated with the chosen logistics strategy which would also include organic versus 

contractor support. Since its implementation, the ILA process has been instrumental 

in revealing opportunities to enhance supportability prior to system deployment. Finally, the DON is leveraging its NLI initiative to integrate processes, policy, doctrine, resources, information, technologies and people (organizational) construct in 

support of enhanced naval logistics capability both afloat and ashore. 

These three processes, along with adherence to 10 U.S.C. 2466(a) (i.e. the ‘‘50/50 

Rule’’), will be tools I will leverage to ensure the Department applies the proper mix 

of organic and contractor support to achieve effective and affordable logistics support for our programs. 

[The nomination reference of Sean J. Stackley follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

May 1, 2008. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

Sean Joseph Stackley, of Virginia, to be an Assistant Secretary of the Navy, vice 

Delores M. Etter, resigned. 

[The biographical sketch of Sean J. Stackley, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, 

follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF SEAN J. STACKLEY

Sean J. Stackley is a professional staff member on the Senate Armed Services 

Committee. He is responsible for overseeing Navy and Marine Corps programs, 

Strategic Lift, and related policy for the Seapower Subcommittee. As Republican 

staff lead for the subcommittee, he has drafted and coordinated the committee position on Department of the Navy and United States Transportation Command matters for the National Defense Authorization Act. Additionally, he supports the 

Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee and the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee; advising on Navy and Marine Corps operations and 

maintenance, science and technology, and acquisition policy. Mr. Stackley joined the 

committee in December 2005. 

Mr. Stackley began his career as a Surface Warfare Officer in the United States 

Navy, serving in engineering and combat systems assignments onboard the destroyer, U.S.S. John Young (DD 973). Upon completing his warfare qualifications, 

he was designated as an engineering duty officer and served in a series of industry, 

fleet, program office, and headquarters assignments in ship design and construction, 

maintenance, logistics, system integration, and acquisition policy, leading to major 

program management. 

Prior to joining the committee, Mr. Stackley served as LPD 17 Program Manager 

from 2001 to 2005, with responsibility for all aspects of procurement for this major 

ship program. His first duties in this position included restructuring the program 

in the wake of a Nunn-McCurdy breach, settling a series of outstanding industry 

claims, and brokering a realignment of industry teaming agreements to provide a 

path forward for the program. Through the course of his tour, he led the completion 

of ship design, software development, weapon system integration, production, test, 

trials, and delivery of the lead ship; start of construction for four follow ships; and 

planning and programming for the remaining ships of the Class. 

Having served earlier in his career as Production Officer for the U.S.S. Arleigh 

Burke (DDG 51) and Project Naval Architect overseeing design standards for the 

Canadian Patrol Frigate, H.M.C.S. Halifax (FFH 330), Mr. Stackley has the distinction of having performed a central role in the design, construction, test, and delivery 

of three first-of-class warships. 

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Mr. Stackley was commissioned and graduated with distinction from the U.S. 

Naval Academy in 1979, with a Bachelor of Science, Mechanical Engineering. He 

holds the degrees of Ocean Engineer and Master of Science, Mechanical Engineering 

from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Mr. Stackley earned certification as 

Professional Engineer, Commonwealth of Virginia, in 1994. His military awards include the Legion of Merit with Gold Star. 

Mr. Stackley is married to Teresa Mullin Stackley, and has four children. 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Sean J. Stackley in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228

Washington, DC 20510–6050

(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Sean Gerard Joseph Stackley.

2. Position to which nominated: 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition).

3. Date of nomination: 

May 1, 2008.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.]

5. Date and place of birth: 

August 7, 1957; Baltimore, MD.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Teresa Mullin Stackley.

7. Names and ages of children: 

Erin Stackley, 24; Tess Stackley, 22; Scott Stackley, 19; Maura Stackley, 16.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received, and date degree granted. 

1972–1975, Towson Senior High School. 

1975–1979, U.S. Naval Academy, Bachelor of Science, Mechanical Engineering, 

1979. 

1983–1986, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Master of Science, Mechanical 

Engineering, 1986, Ocean Engineer, 1986.

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9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

2005–2008, Professional Staff Member, U.S. Senate. 

1979–2005, Naval Officer. 

2001–2005, LPD–17 Program Manager, U.S. Navy. 

1998–2001, Chief of Staff, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Ships). 

1995–1998, DDG–51 Production Officer, Aegis Shipbuilding Program.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

None.

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

None.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

Board of Professional Engineers, Commonwealth of Virginia. 

American Society of Naval Engineers. 

Action in Community Through Service (ACTS). 

Naval Academy Alumni Association. 

Military Officers Association of America.

13. Political affiliations and activities:

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

None. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 

None.

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

Military Awards: Legion of Merit (two awards). 

Meritorious Service Medal (two awards). 

Navy Commendation Medal. 

Navy Achievement Medal. 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

‘‘Managing Defense Resources’’, American Society of Military Comptrollers Journal, Fall 2007.

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

None.

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–

F are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

327

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

SEAN J. STACKLEY. 

This 20th day of May, 2008.

[The nomination of Sean J. Stackley was reported to the Senate 

by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2008, with the recommendation 

that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed 

by the Senate on July 23, 2008.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Frederick S. Celec by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the war fighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of 

command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms 

have also vastly improved cooperation between the services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution 

of military operations. 

Do you see a need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. At this point I do not. However, if confirmed I will remain sensitive to 

the goals that Goldwater-Nichols set forth to facilitate jointness in operations, command and control, and acquisition. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. If confirmed I will work with the Secretary, the Chairman, and their 

staffs to periodically review the implementation policies to insure they remain current and are being implemented. 

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Assistant 

to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs? 

Answer. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ATSD(NCB)) has several key duties and functions. First 

and foremost is to insure that our nuclear stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable. If confirmed, I will work with the Service chiefs and responsible commanders 

to ensure that the high standards of safety and security are maintained. I will work 

with the Administrator of National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to insure that the stockpile remains reliable. The ATSD oversees Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. In addition, the ATSD is responsible for the Chemical Weapons Demilitarization Program, 

serves as the Executive Director of the Nuclear Weapons Council and treaty management 

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your 

ability to perform the duties of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear 

and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs? 

Answer. I am aware of several independent studies by organizations like the Defense Science Board that have made recommendations designed to enhance the ability of the ATSD to meet his responsibilities. If confirmed, I will review these recommendations, and working with the Secretary and the Nuclear Weapons Council, 

make the appropriate recommendations. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect 

that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you? 

Answer. If confirmed I expect the Secretary to charge me with assisting the Air 

Force in returning the culture and attention to detail that was the hallmark of that 

service in maintaining nuclear weapons. In addition, he will expect the ATSD to 

328

oversee the CTR and Counterproliferation Programs, the Chemical Weapons Demilitarization Program, and the Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. If confirmed, how will you work with the following officials in carrying 

out your duties: 

The Secretary of Defense, The Deputy Secretary of Defense, The Under Secretaries of Defense. 

Answer. If confirmed, I expect to report to USD(AT&L), and through him and the 

Deputy Secretary, to the Secretary himself. On matters directly affecting my technical responsibilities (safety, security, reliability, etc.), I expect to have direct access 

to the Secretary if needed. 

I expect to work closely with USD(P) to insure our nuclear policies, both home 

and abroad, are understood and implemented. I expect to work closely with the 

USD(C) to insure nuclear weapons programs are adequately funded and with PA&E 

to insure that sufficient follow-on weapons are in the pipeline as current weapons 

systems approach end of life. 

Question. The Service Secretaries. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Service secretaries to insure that nuclear programs are provided sufficient priority to be funded at a level and in time 

to maintain safety, security, system reliability, and end of life issues. 

Question. The commanders of the combatant commands, particularly U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and U.S. Northern Command. 

Answer. If confirmed, I expect to work closely with each combat commander with 

nuclear responsibilities to insure that he has the systems he needs in the numbers 

and with the capability he needs to execute his mission. 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. 

Answer. If confirmed I would expect to insure that DTRA programs support 

ASD(HD) requirements. 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SOLIC)) and Independent Capabilities. 

Answer. The ASD(SOLIC) and the ATSD both have policy responsibilities for our 

Nations nuclear weapons. If confirmed, I will work closely with ASD(SOLIC) to insure our nuclear policies are consistent, understood by our forces and allies, and are 

being properly implemented. 

Question. The Director of the DTRA. 

Answer. If confirmed, I expect to have daily contact with the Director DTRA in 

assisting him in executing his responsibilities in Combat Support, CTR, 

counterproliferation, on-site inspection, research and development, USSTRATCOM 

Center for Combating (SCC) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Chemical 

and Biological defense programs. 

Question. The Secretary of Energy. 

Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to work with the Secretary of Energy 

through the Administrator of NNSA. 

Question. The Administrator and Deputy Administrators of the NNSA. 

Answer. As partners in the nuclear weapons program, if confirmed, I would expect 

to work closely and personally with both the Administrator and Deputy Administrator to ensure that we have sufficient reliable, safe, and secure weapons to support our combat commanders, and that we have the capability to maintain them. 

Question. Officials in the Department of Homeland Security with responsibilities 

for nuclear, chemical, and biological homeland defense matters. 

Answer. DTRA and Homeland Security are partners in a number of areas such 

as nuclear detection, nuclear forensics, and counterproliferation. DTRA focuses on 

the DOD mission, which often means overseas, while the DHS focus is more on domestic issues. If confirmed, I will work with both organizations to insure their programs are not duplicated, but mutually supportive, and are funded and prioritized 

at the required level. 

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies 

you for this position? 

Answer. I spent 39 years in the Federal service, all in nuclear and chemical weapons. Twenty-one of those years were in the Air Force where I performed nuclear survivability tests on nuclear delivery systems to include underground nuclear testing. 

I spent several Air Force assignments developing the simulation tools needed to be 

able to check the survivability of those systems without nuclear tests. I developed 

nuclear weapons requirements and assigned specific weapons to specific targets. I 

329

had an assignment to the State Department where I worked both nuclear and 

Chemical Weapons issues, writing a paper (with others) widely distributed throughout the world by the State Department on Soviet Chemical Warfare in Afghanistan 

and Southeast Asia. I completed my Air Force career in OSD Policy working on 

NATO nuclear issues. 

I then joined the Defense Nuclear Agency (now renamed DTRA) where I became 

Deputy Director for Operations with oversight responsibilities for nuclear accident 

response, the CTR Program, and NATO nuclear weapons security. I then joined the 

ATSD office as the Deputy for Nuclear Matters. I completed my Federal Service as 

the ATSD Deputy for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. I then joined The 

Institute for Defense Analysis as an Adjunct Research Associate working nuclear 

issues, where I remain today. Thus I have spent 44 years working nuclear and 

chemical weapons issues. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense 

Programs? 

Answer. There are several. First, restoring the pride, interest, and attention to 

detail to maintaining Air Force nuclear weapons in a safe and secure manner. Second, supporting the congressionally-mandated Commission on our Strategic Posture 

and Secretary Gates Task Force on WMD in order to gain bipartisan support for 

the future of our nuclear stockpile in national security. Third, insuring the quick 

and safe demilitarization of our chemical weapons stockpile. Fourth, continuing and 

expanding the CTR program beyond the Former Soviet Union to help prevent proliferation. Fifth, strengthen the Nuclear Weapons Council. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. To meet the first challenge I intend to focus on meeting with the appropriate Air Force officials to review the actions they have taken to date, review the 

DTRA conducted inspection reports to insure the actions are effective and work with 

the Air Force wherever necessary to insure the proper focus on nuclear policies and 

procedures at every level in the command structure. For the second priority, I intend to meet regularly and frequently with members of the two commissions to insure that they are getting useful, timely, and accurate information. For the third 

priority, I intend to insure that the schedule, funding, and priority within the Department are all consistent and if changes or additions are necessary, to make the 

appropriate recommendation. For the fourth priority I intend to work with OSD Policy and DTRA to insure that appropriate objectives are defined for CTR support beyond the Former Soviet Union and that funding is available to support those objectives. For the fifth priority I will personally review and insure that information and 

presentations provided to the NWC are timely and sufficiently informative so as to 

warrant the members time. 

Question. What do you anticipate will be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear 

and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs? 

Answer. Gaining bipartisan support for the role of nuclear weapons in our National Security Strategy and then developing the institutional structure and obtaining the funding to support that role. 

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems? 

Answer. Particular attention to the findings of the Congressional Commission on 

the Strategic Posture of the United States will hopefully begin the process to resolve 

the issue. Their timelines are established by Congress. 

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of 

issues which must be addressed by the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs? 

Answer. First, restoring the pride, interest, and attention to detail to maintaining 

Air Force nuclear weapons in a safe and secure manner. Second, supporting the congressionally-mandated Commission on our Strategic Posture and Secretary Gates 

Task Force on WMD in order to gain bipartisan support for the future of our nuclear 

stockpile in national security. Third, insuring the quick and safe demilitarization of 

our chemical weapons stockpile. Fourth, continuing and expanding the CTR program beyond the Former Soviet Union to help prevent proliferation. Fifth, strengthen the Nuclear Weapons Council. 

330

REPORTING CHAIN

Question. Section 142 of title 10, U.S.C., requires that the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs ‘‘advise the Secretary of Defense on nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and chemical and 

biological defense.’’ The responsibilities for chemical and biological defense were 

added to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and 

Biological Defense Programs in 1996. The position was originally created as the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense to ensure direct access to the Secretary of Defense in the event that any matter implicating the safety, security, or reliability of 

the nuclear weapons stockpile needed to be immediately provided to the Secretary. 

What is your understanding of to whom you would report, if confirmed, within the 

Department of Defense (DOD), and who would report to you? 

Answer. If confirmed, I expect to report to USD(AT&L), and through him and the 

Deputy Secretary, to the Secretary himself. 

Question. If confirmed, would you expect to have direct access to the Secretary of 

Defense for matters pertaining to the safety, security, and reliability of nuclear 

weapons? 

Answer. Yes. 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS COUNCIL

Question. Section 179 of title 10, U.S.C., designates the Assistant to the Secretary 

of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs as the Executive Director of the Nuclear Weapons Council. The chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council is the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 

Would it be your expectation, if confirmed, to have direct responsibility, authority, 

direction, and control of all the assets, resources, and personnel needed to fulfill the 

responsibilities of Executive Director of the Nuclear Weapons Council? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. If confirmed as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and 

Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, how frequently would you expect the 

Nuclear Weapons Council to meet and, in your view, would that be sufficient to 

meet the obligations of the Council? 

Answer. I would expect to meet as necessary, and as Executive Secretary, it will 

be my responsibility to insure that the agenda, presentations, and issues for those 

meetings warrant the time that the members need to devote in order to attend. 

Question. If confirmed as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and 

Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, how would you ensure that the Nuclear 

Weapons Council carries out its statutorily mandated duties? 

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to work personally with each of the members to 

insure that the NWC carries out its statutorily mandated duties. 

Question. Are there any changes that you would recommend to the membership, 

organization, or structure of the Nuclear Weapons Council? 

Answer. It would be premature to make any such recommendations. 

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY

Question. What is your understanding of the organizational structure of the office 

of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological 

Defense Programs? 

Answer. My understanding is that there is a Principal Deputy who is also responsible for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Treaty Management, a Nuclear Matters 

Deputy, a Chemical and Biological Defense Programs and Chem Demil Deputy, and 

the Director of DTRA, who reports to the ATSD. In addition, there are supporting 

staff to enable the functions of those deputies. 

Question. Do you believe this structure is adequate or would you make any 

changes if confirmed? 

Answer. At this time it would be premature to recommend any changes. 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM

Question. Do you believe that there are any technical reasons to resume nuclear 

weapons testing at the present time or at any foreseeable time in the future? 

Answer. No. 

Question. Do you believe that the Stockpile Stewardship Program is capable for 

the foreseeable future of supporting the nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear 

weapons testing? 

Answer. Yes. 

331

Question. Do you support the Stockpile Stewardship Program? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. What are your views on the current moratorium on nuclear weapons 

testing? 

Answer. I support the moratorium. 

Question. What are your views on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)? 

Answer. The CTBT can be an effective treaty to prevent proliferation. That said, 

there are serious issues with the treaty that need to be addressed and resolved. 

Question. In your view, are there any additional capabilities that the Stockpile 

Stewardship program should develop? 

Answer. The production complex is aging considerably and needs attention. 

Question. What are your views on the feasibility and certifiability (without nuclear testing) of the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW)? 

Answer. My understanding is that a cornerstone of the RRW program is that it 

be developed and certified without the need for testing. 

Question. If confirmed, how quickly and under what circumstances would you inform Congress in the event there is ever any problem with any nuclear warhead? 

Answer. As quickly as possible consistent with national security requirements. 

Question. If confirmed, what role, if any, do you anticipate you will plan in reviewing the size and makeup of the nuclear weapons stockpile? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to be a major voice in recommending to the 

Secretary and the President the size and makeup of the nuclear weapons stockpile. 

SECURITY OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE

Question. If you are confirmed, what role would you have and do you believe the 

Nuclear Weapons Council should have in developing, implementing, and overseeing 

implementation of nuclear security orders and regulations? 

Answer. Both the ATSD and the NWC have responsibilities to insure that our nuclear weapons are secure. Monitoring security operations and implementation policies, reviewing inspection reports, and insuring sufficient funding for Service security programs are some of those responsibilities. 

Question. If confirmed what role would you play in nuclear security and nuclear 

operational inspections? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to review all DTRA conducted inspections. 

I would expect the Service Secretary’s to review Service conducted inspections and 

inform me of any issues that they find. Finally, I would expect the unit commanders 

to inform me personally, of the results of the Mighty Guardian Force on Force exercises. 

DEGRADATION IN NUCLEAR EXPERTISE, TECHNICAL RIGOR AND COMPLIANCE WITH

REGULATIONS, RULES, AND ORDERS

Question. Over the course of the last 12 months there have been a number of instances within DOD of inattention, sloppiness, and intentional disregard for nuclear 

rules, orders and regulations. The reviews that have been conducted as a result of 

these incidents have identified degradation in the attention to nuclear matters as 

one of the root causes of the many incidents. 

If confirmed, what role would you anticipate you would play and the Nuclear 

Weapons Council would play in restoring discipline and credibility in the nuclear 

enterprise within DOD and the military Services? 

Answer. Since the end of the Cold War the role of nuclear weapons in our National Security Strategy has not been clearly defined. Absent that clearly defined 

role, the Air Force in particular, allowed itself to lose focus on the policies, procedures, and attention to detail demanded of the stewards of nuclear weapons. Congress has recognized this problem and has established the Strategic Posture Commission and challenged it to define the role of nuclear weapons in our post Cold War 

National Security Strategy. The Commissions findings will hopefully lead to bipartisan support for the way ahead. If confirmed, I expect to support the Commission 

with regular briefings and meetings with the Commission and individual members 

to ensure that they have the most complete and credible information available to 

prepare their report. 

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ADMIRAL DONALD REPORT

Question. If confirmed, what role, if any, would you expect to play in implementing corrective actions recommended by Admiral Donald in his recently submitted report on the security of nuclear weapons in the Air Force? 

Answer. I have not seen the Admiral Donald Report, and it would not be appropriate to comment on it. 

332

STRATEGIC COMMISSION

Question. The Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States was established in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. If confirmed, would you fully cooperate with and support the work of the Commission in 

preparing its report? 

Answer. Yes. 

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM

Question. Section 142 of title 10, U.S.C., states that the Assistant to the Secretary 

of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs shall advise 

the Secretary of Defense on chemical and biological defense, as well as on nuclear 

matters. Your background is primarily in nuclear technology and related issues. 

If confirmed, how would you plan to become familiar with the issues and technology associated with chemical and biological defense matters? 

Answer. While I have some familiarity with chemical and biological defense matters having served for a short period of time as the Deputy ATSD for Chemical and 

Biological Defense Programs, I will certainly become much more familiar with the 

current program through briefings from the Deputy ATSD, the Director of DTRA, 

the Director of the JPEO for Chemical Biological Defense, and actual visits to many 

of the program sites. 

VACCINE DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION

Question. What role would you expect to play, if confirmed, in ensuring that vaccines needed to ensure medical treatment and protection of deployed U.S. 

servicemembers are developed and acquired? 

Answer. If confirmed I would expect to work closely with the ASD for Health Affairs to ensure medical treatment and protection of deployed U.S. servicemembers 

are developed and acquired. 

Question. What are the urgent vaccine needs for U.S. forces? 

Answer. My understanding is that the anthrax is the most urgent. 

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE MATTERS

Question. If you are confirmed, what do you expect your roles and responsibilities 

would be with respect to chemical and biological defense matters? 

Answer. The ATSD is the principal staff advisor to the Secretary on Chemical and 

Biological Defense matters. The ATSD is responsible for oversight, coordination, and 

integration of the joint Chemical and Biological Defense Program. If confirmed, I 

would expect to work closely with the Services, JPEO, and DTRA to meet those responsibilities. 

Question. If confirmed, would you review the chemical and biological defense program and make any needed recommendations to Congress for improving the program? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. What are your general priorities with respect to the Chemical and Biological Defense Program? 

Answer. The general priorities for the Chemical and Biological Defense Program 

are: contamination avoidance, protection, and restoration. 

INTERACTION WITH OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES ON CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MATTERS

Question. The Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Health 

and Human Services play important roles in planning and implementing U.S. policy 

and programs for protecting the United States against biological and chemical 

threats, including the development and stockpiling of vaccines and therapeutic products. 

If confirmed, how would you work with these agencies to ensure the effective coordination and collaboration of efforts to improve U.S. security against chemical and 

biological threats? 

Answer. If confirmed I would work with each of these agencies to ensure that programs are mutually supportive, avoid duplication, and share results. 

CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION ISSUES

Question. Since 2001, responsibility and oversight for the chemical demilitarization program within DOD have been under the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 

for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. 

333

If confirmed, would responsibility for and oversight of the chemical demilitarization program remain within your office? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. The United States is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention 

(CWC) and is obligated to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile by no later than 

the extended deadline of April 2012. 

Do you agree that the United States should take all necessary steps to meet its 

obligations under the CWC? 

Answer. Consistent with safety and security, yes. 

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure adequate funding 

is requested to permit the most expeditious destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile, consistent with the legal requirement to protect public health, safety, 

and the environment? 

Answer. If confirmed I will review the current program to insure that priorities, 

funding, and operations are consistent within the program. If additional funding is 

needed, I will ensure that it is requested. 

Question. On April 10, 2006, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld notified Congress that 

the United States would not meet the extended deadline under the CWC for destruction of the United States chemical weapons stockpile, but would ‘‘continue 

working diligently to minimize the time to complete destruction without sacrificing 

safety and security,’’ and would also ‘‘continue requesting resources needed to complete destruction as close to April 2012 as practicable.’’

If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure the full implementation of 

those commitments? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will review the program against those commitments and 

make any necessary changes or recommendations needed to ensure full implementation. 

Question. What is your understanding of the timeline for the destruction that the 

Department expects to meet under the current projections and the currently 

planned expenditures for this program? 

Answer. I am not familiar with the current details of the program in terms of 

schedule and funding, so it would not be appropriate for me to comment. 

CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT OF CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, OR

HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIVE INCIDENTS

Question. DOD has the mission of providing support to civil authorities for consequence management of domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or 

high-yield explosive (CBRNE) incidents, if requested. Since 2002, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and the Commander of U.S. Northern Command have had responsibilities for planning and executing that mission. 

If confirmed, how would you expect to work with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and the Commander of U.S. Northern Command on 

issues related to the Department’s capabilities to provide support to civil authorities 

for CBRNE consequence management, as well their homeland defense missions related to nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or materials? 

Answer. DTRA has a number of programs designed to provide CBRNE responders 

world wide with equipment, training, command and control support, logistical planning, and technical support. If confirmed I will insure that the DTRA program is 

responsive to the needs of ASD (HD) and CONCOM. 

Question. The Department of Homeland Security is the lead Federal agency for 

planning, coordinating, and implementing consequence management of CBRNE incidents in the United States, in conjunction with the States and territories. 

If confirmed, what relationship would you expect to have with the Department of 

Homeland Security and its component entities? 

Answer. If confirmed I would expect to oversee the coordination of DTRA programs with DHS for planning, coordinating, and implementing consequence management of CBRNE incidents. 

Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role for DOD in providing support to civil authorities for CBRNE consequence management? 

Answer. A CBRNE event would constitute a national emergency. DOD’s role 

should be to provide whatever support and assets that the President requested in 

order to save lives, minimize damage, and facilitate recovery. 

Question. What are your views on the adequacy of the numbers of WMD-civil support teams, and do you believe that the training and equipping of these teams is 

appropriate? 

Answer. I am not aware of the details, and so it would not be appropriate for me 

to comment. 

334

COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS (NUNN-LUGAR PROGRAMS)

Question. Do you support the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. If confirmed, would you support joint research programs between Russia 

and the United States in the areas of chemical or biological weapons defense? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. What is your understanding as to your responsibilities with respect to 

the CTR programs? 

Answer. The ATSD has oversight responsibility for the implementation of the 

CTR program. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense 

Programs? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

THE DONALD REPORT

1. Senator WARNER. Mr. Celec, the Secretary of Defense cited leadership failures 

associated with the control of nuclear weapons and equipment as the proximate 

cause for his decision to request the resignations of the Secretary of the Air Force 

and the Air Force Chief of Staff. In your view, were these security lapses mainly 

a failure of leadership within the Air Force, or would you view complacency on nuclear matters within the senior Department of Defense (DOD) leadership as a contributing factor? 

Mr. CELEC. While I have not seen the Donald Report, I am aware of its existence, 

and have seen other reports on the subject. The two issues you ask about are related. Clearly the leadership in the Air Force has focused on other issues since the 

end of the Cold War, including two current active wars and flying combat missions 

constantly for over the past 15 years. Like most organizations, if the boss doesn’t 

pay attention, the troops quickly lose focus, and that appears to be what happened 

in the Air Force. It is going to require that the leadership in the Air Force, from 

the very top, down to the individual airman on the ramp or at the missile silo be 

continually reminded that our nuclear deterrent is the most important job they can 

do to maintain the security and freedom of the United States. 

For my part, if confirmed I hope to assist the Air Force in restoring that culture 

of perfection and importance, and in the process gather the support of the senior 

leadership in DOD to insure it continues long after we are all gone.

2. Senator WARNER. Mr. Celec, what role, if any, would you envision for the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense 

Programs (ATSD(NCB)) in ensuring the safety and reliability of our nuclear deterrent forces? 

335

Mr. CELEC. Safety, reliability, and an equally important third factor, effectiveness 

are the key factors in maintaining our Nuclear Deterrent so that potential enemies 

respect and fear it, our Allies continue to rely on it, and the American people continue to support it. The primary responsibility of the ATSD(NCB) is to insure that 

our Deterrent remains safe, reliable, and effective, and if confirmed I will work 

closely and very personally with the Services, DOD, combatant commanders, National Nuclear Security Administration, and our Allies to ensure that the standards 

for these factors are maintained, and where possible, improved. 

[The nomination reference of Frederick S. Celec follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

June 10, 2008. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

Frederick S. Celec, of Virginia, to be Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, vice Dale Klein, resigned. 

[The biographical sketch of Frederick S. Celec, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, 

follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF FREDERICK S. CELEC

Upon joining the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) in 2003, Mr. Celec became 

part of the IDA staff working for the congressionally-mandated Electromagnetic 

Pulse Commission. While at IDA he has worked on a variety of tasks including the 

U.S. capability to exercise treaty monitoring rights under the Threshold Test Ban 

Treaty, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Nuclear Weapons Physical Security Program to protect our Nations nuclear weapons, and development of an Interagency 

Program to secure radiological and nuclear materials of potential threat to the U.S. 

worldwide. In 2005 he became an adjunct member of the Assistant to the Secretary 

of Defense staff. 

Mr. Celec retired from government service in August 2003 as the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense 

Programs for Nuclear Matters with 18 years as a civil servant and 21 years in the 

Air Force. Upon retirement he joined IDA as a consultant. 

Mr. Celec originally joined the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 

for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs as the Deputy for Nuclear Matters in 1996 in the Pentagon. In this position he was responsible for overseeing all U.S. nuclear weapons and delivery programs. Among those were U.S. programs to recover lost or stolen nuclear weapons, improvised nuclear weapons, as 

well as security programs to prevent unauthorized use of U.S. nuclear weapons. 

From 1985 until his Pentagon assignment, Mr. Celec was part of the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) staff and worked security issues associated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Senior Level Weapons Protection Group and the 

Air Force Weapon Storage Security System. He became Deputy Director for Operations at DNA in 1987, and was responsible for stockpile management, CINC Nuclear Support, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, Verification Technology, 

Nuclear Weapon Accident Exercises, and the Department of Energy Science Based 

Stockpile Stewardship Program. 

Previously Mr. Celec spent 21 years in the Air Force where most of his assignments were associated with the nuclear weapons area. His last assignment before 

retiring from the Air Force was as a member of the policy staff in Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) working stockpile size in Europe, NATO High Level Group 

and Nuclear Planning Group issues. 

Prior to his OSD assignment he had assignments on the Air Staff in Studies and 

Analysis, where he worked strategic force structure issues and Single Integrated 

Operations Plan/weapon effectiveness. At the State Department, where he worked 

both nuclear and chemical issues, and was a principal author of the ‘‘Yellow Rain’’ 

chemical warfare report to Congress. At SHAPE, where he planned nuclear operations—including target identification, weaponeering, and deconflication of operational missions. He also wrote the annual Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study 

336

and the European Deployment Plan, which formed the basis for force structure, 

numbers and types of nuclear weapons needed in Europe during the Cold War: At 

Headquarters Air Force Systems Command, where he managed nuclear research 

programs throughout the Air Force Research and Development community, including the building of the Trestle Emp simulator. At the Defense Atomic Support Agency (later called DNA), he served as the U.S./U.K. liaison officer for the U.K. Polaris 

Improvement Program, and finally at the Air Force Weapons Laboratory, where he 

developed nuclear simulators—including underground nuclear tests to evaluate strategic systems. He has participated in almost two dozen underground nuclear tests. 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Frederick S. Celec in connection with his 

nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228

Washington, DC 20510–6050

(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Frederick (Fred) Stephen Celec.

2. Position to which nominated: 

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs.

3. Date of nomination: 

June 10, 2008.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.]

5. Date and place of birth: 

June 8, 1941; Youngstown, OH.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Irene Aurelia (Dagys) Celec.

7. Names and ages of children: 

Christine Gold, 46; Kenneth Celec, 42.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received, and date degree granted. 

Air Force Institute of Technology, 1968–1970, MS Nuclear Engineering. 

The Ohio State University, 1959–1964, BS Engineering Physics.

337

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

2003–Present, Adjunct Research Associate, Institute for Defense Analysis, 4850 

Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA. 

1996–2003, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, 

and Biological Defense Programs for Nuclear Matters, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Pentagon, Washington, DC. 

1985–1996, Deputy Director for Operations, Defense Nuclear Agency, 6801 Telegraph Road, Alexandria, VA.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

1964–1985, Lt. Col., USAF (Ret.).

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

None, other than Institute for Defense Analysis.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

None.

13. Political affiliations and activities:

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

None. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 

None.

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals, and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

Presidential Distinguished Executive, 1998. 

Medal for Distinguished Civilian Service, January 2001 and August 2003. 

Secretary of Defense Meritorious Civilian Award, March 1997. 

Defense Superior Service Medal, July 1985. 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

Government Reports and technical reports while at Institute for Defense Anaylsis 

for the Federal Government.

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

None.

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–

F are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

338

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

FREDERICK S. CELEC. 

This 13th day of June 2008.

[The nomination of Frederick S. Celec was reported to the Senate 

by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2008, with the recommendation 

that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed 

by the Senate on July 23, 2008.] 

(339)

NOMINATIONS OF MICHAEL B. DONLEY TO 

BE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE; GEN. 

NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED 

STATES AIR FORCE; AND GEN. DUNCAN J. 

MCNABB, USAF, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO 

THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

TUESDAY, JULY 22, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room SR–

325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) 

presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Clinton, Pryor, McCaskill, Warner, 

Inhofe, Sessions, Chambliss, Graham, Dole, Thune, Martinez, and 

Wicker. 

Other Senators present: Senators Conrad and Stevens. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; 

Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Creighton Greene, professional staff 

member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. 

Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J. 

McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican 

staff director; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Lucian 

L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; 

and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel. 

Staff assistants present: Ali Z. Pasha and Breon N. Wells. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Jay Maroney, assistant 

to Senator Kennedy; Bonni Berge, assistant to Senator Akaka; 

Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R. 

Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator 

340

Clinton; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Chani W. Wiggins, assistant to 

Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum 

and Todd Stiefler, assistants to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, 

assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; Jason 

Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Brian W. Walsh, assistant 

to Senator Martinez; and Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator 

Wicker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. This morning the 

committee considers the nominations of Michael Donley to be Secretary of the Air Force, General Norton Schwartz to be Air Force 

Chief of Staff, and General Duncan McNabb to be Commander, 

United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). 

We welcome our nominees and their families to today’s hearing. 

We know the long hours that senior Department of Defense (DOD) 

officials put in every day. We appreciate the sacrifices that our 

nominees are willing to make for our country. We also know that 

they’re not going to be alone in making these sacrifices, so we 

thank in advance the family members of our nominees for the support and assistance that we know that they’re going to need to provide to our nominees. 

Each of our nominees has a long career of public service. Mr. 

Donley has served in the Army, on the staff of the National Security Council, as an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, and in the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense. He served for 4 years on the 

staff of this committee from 1981 to 1984, and many of us and 

many of our staffs know him well and we hold him in high regard. 

General Schwartz has served in the Air Force for 35 years, most 

recently as Director of the Joint Staff and as Commander of the 

U.S. Transportation Command. 

General McNabb has served in the Air Force almost as long, 

most recently as Commander of the Air Mobility Command (AMC) 

and Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force. 

If confirmed, Mr. Donley and General Schwartz will assume leadership positions in the Department of the Air Force at a very difficult time. Over the last year, the Air Force has been severely 

criticized for its handling of nuclear weapons security and command and control, which according to Admiral Kirkland H. Donald 

has been characterized by inattention to detail, lack of discipline, 

and a degradation of authority, technical competence, and standards of excellence. 

Reports on the mistaken movement of nuclear weapons from 

Minot Air Force Base to Barksdale Air Force Base confirmed that 

Air Force nuclear procedures reflected a ‘‘breakdown in training, 

discipline, supervision, and leadership.’’ The challenge facing the 

next Air Force Secretary and Chief of Staff will be to fix the underlying problems and not just to address the obvious symptoms. 

Also of great concern to the continuing problems in the Air Force 

is acquisition systems. Earlier this month the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found serious defects in the Air Force’s 

341

evaluation of proposals for new tanker aircraft and the Secretary 

of Defense has been required to step in and take over the program 

for the second time in 4 years. In addition, the DOD’s Inspector 

General has found disturbing evidence of favoritism and the award 

of a series of contracts to companies closely linked to high-ranking 

Air Force officials. We have asked the Inspector General to make 

recommendations as to accountability of those officials. 

A few months ago, GAO reported that unit costs on the Air 

Force’s largest acquisition program, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), 

have grown by almost 40 percent, costing us an extra $36 billion. 

This cost growth is symptomatic of problems in Air Force acquisition programs, which are all too frequently subject to overly optimistic cost estimates and overly ambitious performance expectations, resulting in programs that are technically challenged, behind 

schedule, and over budget. 

To address these problems, the Air Force leadership will have to 

live up to its commitments to establish reasonable requirements, 

ensure the use of mature technologies, and ensure the programs 

are adequately and accurately funded from the outset. 

The next Secretary and Chief of Staff will have their work cut 

out for them to address these problems and restore public confidence in the ability of the Air Force leadership to handle its critical national security and fiscal responsibilities. 

If confirmed, General McNabb will also face critical challenges in 

his new position. The strategic mobility of our Armed Forces enables us to project power anywhere around the globe. The U.S. 

TRANSCOM, which encompasses the Air Force’s Mobility Command, the Navy’s Military Sealift Command, and the Army’s Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, is the 

linchpin of that strategic mobility. 

At a time when our forces remain engaged at high operating 

tempos around the globe, it is critical that we fully leverage the capabilities of these commands. These are all extremely important 

positions which merit the attention that we give them today. 

I will submit for the record a copy of statements of support for 

General Schwartz and General McNabb from our colleague from 

the House of Representatives, Representative Jerry Costello. 

[The prepared statements of Represenative Costello follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENTS BY REPRESENTATIVE JERRY F. COSTELLO

Thank you, Chairman Levin for holding this hearing. I am pleased to support the 

nomination of General Norton A. Schwartz, currently Commander of the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) at Scott Air Force Base (AFB), IL, to Chief of 

Staff of the Air Force. 

I have known General Schwartz since he became Commander of U.S. 

TRANSCOM in 2005 and I am proud of the work TRANSCOM has done under his 

command. Early on, General Schwartz integrated himself in the community, attending many local events, and sought input from civic and business leaders. He has 

consistently worked with the local community to help shape the future of Scott AFB. 

As a result, he has made the base and our area stronger. General Schwartz has a 

record of listening to and working with all stakeholders, a quality that is extremely 

important for the Air Force Chief of Staff job. 

General Schwartz has had a distinguished career. In 1973, he graduated from the 

U.S. Air Force Academy. Since that time, he became a command pilot with more 

than 4,200 flying hours in a variety of aircraft. He participated as a crewmember 

in the 1975 airlift evacuation of Saigon, and in 1993 served as Chief of Staff of the 

Joint Special Operations Task Force for Northern Iraq in Operations Desert Shield 

and Desert Storm. 

342

General Schwartz is also an alumnus of the National War College, a member of 

the Council on Foreign Relations, and a 1994 Fellow of Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology’s Seminar XXI. He has served as Commander of the Special Operations 

Command-Pacific, the Alaskan Command, Alaskan North American Aerospace Defense Command Region, and the 11th Air Force. Prior to coming to Scott AFB, General Schwartz, was Director of the Joint Staff here in Washington, DC. 

General Schwartz’s awards are too numerous to mention all of them, but I will 

highlight a few. He has received the Defense Distinguished Service Medal with oak 

leaf cluster; the Defense Superior Service Medal with oak leaf cluster; the Legion 

of Merit with two oak leaf clusters; the Air Force Commendation Medal with oak 

leaf cluster, and the Army Commendation Medal. 

His impressive career shows General Schwartz is a man that rarely if ever takes 

time for himself. His motto at U.S. TRANSCOM is ‘‘a promise made will be a promise kept’’ which captures his remarkable commitment to excellence, service, and sacrifice, all the hallmarks of true leadership. 

In my view, General Schwartz possesses the necessary qualities to be an outstanding Chief of Staff of the Air Force. I strongly support his nomination and urge 

the Senate to do so as well. 

Thank you, Chairman Levin, for holding this hearing today. I am pleased to support the nomination of General Duncan J. McNabb, currently Vice Chief of Staff of 

the Air Force, to Commander of U.S. TRANSCOM. 

U.S. TRANSCOM is the single manager for global air, land, and sea transportation for the Department of Defense and I am proud to have U.S. TRANSCOM at 

Scott AFB, in my hometown, and the congressional district I am privileged to represent. 

General McNabb was formerly the Commander of Air Mobility Command (AMC) 

from 2005–2007. It was during this period that I worked closely with him on issues 

important to the local area and our Nation’s defense. At AMC, General McNabb was 

responsible for global mobility, including air refueling, operational support airlift, 

and aeromedical evacuation and he did a superb job of leading 134,000 airmen in 

that mission. 

Prior to that assignment, he held numerous positions, including a variety of planning, programming, and logistical duties. To name just a few, he was commander 

of the 89th Operations Group at Andrews AFB, commander of the 62nd Airlift Wing 

which earned the Riverside Trophy as the 15th Air Force’s outstanding wing, and 

commander of the Tanker Airlift Control Center at Scott AFB. He accomplished 

each of his missions with distinction. 

General McNabb graduated from the Air Force academy in 1974 and since then 

has served the Air Force and our country with pride. He has made a difference in 

the lives of millions of people worldwide through implementation of his policies and 

vision for the Air Force. 

General McNabb has had three prior tours at Scott AFB and during that time, 

he has gotten to know the local community and its business and civic leaders. 

Through that working relationship, we have all put forth a unified vision for the 

future of Scott AFB. The base would not be where it is today without this strong 

relationship and vision. I believe the characteristics of true leadership are desire, 

vision, creativity, expertise, and respect and General McNabb embodies all of these. 

Scott AFB and the Nation will benefit immensely from his service as Commander 

of TRANSCOM. I strongly support this nomination and urge you to do the same.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Warner. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our distinguished presidential nominees this morning and 

our great friend and colleague Senator Stevens, who will soon participate in the introductions. 

I think we really should pause for a minute here this morning 

to reflect that the Nation, and most specifically the Department of 

the Air Force, lost some brave men here in that B–52 airplane loss. 

It’s an old airplane. I checked it out yesterday. The oldest one is 

59 years old, almost twice the age of the young men and those 

women who are flying those aircraft. So we must remember even 

343

in times in that particular theater, with no conflict in progress, 

these operational accidents always pose a great danger to the uniformed people, and our hearts go out to the families of these victims. 

I’ve had the privilege to have been associated with the Pentagon 

since 1969 and through the many years on this committee. The Department of the Air Force has recently undergone some of the most 

extraordinary chapters in the history of DOD in terms of its reorganization and the withdrawing of senior leadership at the decision 

of Secretary Robert Gates. 

I’d like to say a word about Secretary Gates. I’ve known him for 

a very long time. I think he’s doing an absolutely extraordinary job 

as Secretary of Defense. This was not an easy decision. I can think 

of few parallels, very few parallels in the history of DOD since it 

was formed many years ago. But he made it and, presumably with 

the backing and support of the President, and in the place of those 

two individuals specifically he has selected you, Mr. Donley, to be 

the new Secretary and you, General Schwartz, to be the new Chief 

of Staff, the two key positions. 

Your charter quite clearly is to restore the Department of the Air 

Force to its rightful place as a coequal among the military branches 

of our United States. How proud we are of you, Mr. Donley. You’re 

one of our own, as we might say, thoroughly trained by this committee at a time when the distinguished chairman and I were 

somewhat junior, but nevertheless you were a part of the great 

teams of John Stennis and Henry Jackson, and Barry Goldwater 

and John Tower, and many others, Sam Nunn and the like. 

You come with the experience that is needed to take this outfit 

by the bootstraps and bring it right back up just as fast as you can. 

Equally important, as the chairman touched upon, is the need to 

go forward with the modernization program, most specifically the 

tanker program, which would be in large part under your cognizance, General McNabb, if confirmed by the Senate. There again, 

it’s an old aircraft. I suppose that fleet of aircraft is second in aging 

perhaps to the B–52s. Would that be about right, somewhere right 

along in there? We’re asking an awful lot of those young aviators, 

night and day, any place in the world, roll them out, take them 

down that runway, and take them off, and hope and pray they 

come back with a good safe landing. 

I hope we can proceed with the resolution of the contract consistent with law and other applicable regulations and we can put 

that behind us. 

But I really believe that the Congress of the United States is 

going to give you the strongest of support. We recognize the situation the Department’s in and consequently I think this committee 

is going to give strong support, Senator Stevens’ committee will 

give strong support, and I hope the other body will do likewise, to 

help it, under your leadership, subject to confirmation, bring this 

Department back to its rightful place. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner. 

We’re always delighted to have Senator Stevens with us. Again, 

we welcome you, our friend and colleague, to make an introduction 

344

here this morning. Senator Stevens, why don’t you proceed and 

then we’ll go in our regular order after that. 

STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE 

STATE OF ALASKA 

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I’m delighted to be here with my good friend 

General Norty Schwartz. Norty’s been a friend for many years and 

I think Secretary Gates has made a great decision when he decided 

to recommend Norty to become the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. 

He and his wife Suzie, who is behind us here now, have been 

good friends with Catherine and me for several years. He was Commander of the 11th Air Force and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) at the Alaska Command, and we’ve 

worked with him to a great extent. He has, I think, a wonderful 

record in the Air Force. When he’s confirmed, he’ll be the first nonfighter, non-bomber pilot to be the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. 

His principal service has been the Special Operations Command 

and the Air Mobility Command. He’s a C–130 pilot and he’s the 

right man to lead our Air Force at this time in terms of people in 

uniform. 

I do believe he has an uncanny ability to improve morale wherever he goes. He has earned the respect and admiration of his civilian and military counterparts wherever he’s been. I have enjoyed 

his vast intellect and quiet, confident manner. Particularly when 

he was, on September 11, 2001, the leader of the Alaska Command 

and NORAD airspace. He’s a graduate of the Air Force Academy 

and the National War College. His combat experience included 

being involved in the airlift evacuation of Saigon in 1975. He was 

Chief of Staff of the Joint Special Operations Task Force in Northern Iraq in Operation Desert Shield-Desert Storm. Since 2005 he’s 

done an impressive job heading TRANSCOM as you mentioned, 

Mr. Chairman. He’s focused on delivering resources to Iraq and Afghanistan, and he brought really a fresh look at the concepts of fulfilling that job. 

I think his experience has given us the skills and ideas necessary 

to face the challenges of the Air Force in the days ahead. I do urge 

the committee to confirm General Schwartz expeditiously. I think 

our Air Force very much needs the leadership now. There’s been 

sort of a traumatic change of command and it’s not going to be 

helped if there’s a delay in confirming my good friend Norty 

Schwartz. 

I appreciate your giving me the time to be here and make comments upon his abilities and really urge you to act as quickly as 

possible. Thank you all very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. We thank you, Senator Stevens, very much for 

that introduction. It’s an important statement. We know the schedule that you have to keep. So you of course are leaving us, as we 

understand. 

Now we’ll ask the standard questions of our three nominees, and 

we would ask that you respond to these together. Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir. 

345

Mr. DONLEY. Yes, sir. 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken 

any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 

General SCHWARTZ. No, sir. 

General MCNABB. No, sir. 

Mr. DONLEY. No, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions 

for the record in hearings? 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DONLEY. Yes, sir. 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and 

briefers in response to congressional requests? 

Mr. DONLEY. Yes, sir. 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir. 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal 

for their testimony or briefings? 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DONLEY. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear to testify 

upon request before this committee? 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DONLEY. Yes, sir. 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree to provide documents, including 

copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner 

when requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult with 

the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Mr. DONLEY. Yes, sir. 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir. 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. [Pause.] 

Chairman LEVIN. This question is asked of our two uniformed officers. In order to exercise our legislative oversight, this is the traditional question we ask. The reason it was left out was because 

this is not generally asked of our civilian nominees, but it should 

be asked of our general officers here. 

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, 

it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other 

communications of information. My question: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress, and do you agree when asked to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in 

power? 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir. 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DONLEY. Yes, sir. 

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Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Donley, let me call upon you first. We believe that each of you have some family members, and of course we 

would be delighted to have you introduce those members as you 

give us your opening statements. Mr. Donley? 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL B. DONLEY TO BE SECRETARY OF 

THE AIR FORCE 

Mr. DONLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, and thank you for this opportunity to appear before you 

today. I want to first thank you for your reference to the importance of family. Without my wife Gail and the support of my three 

daughters over the last 30 years, this would have been an incredibly difficult journey. They have been supportive every step of the 

way and I want to thank them for being here today to be with me. 

Let me also express my thanks to Secretary Gates for his confidence and to the President for nominating me to lead America’s 

Air Force. As a former staff member of this committee, it is truly 

an honor to be back testifying before you today. I have great respect for the indispensable role that Congress fulfils in shaping our 

Nation’s defenses, as well as the vital support you provide to our 

men and women in uniform. 

I especially appreciate your steadfast support for the nearly 

700,000 total force airmen, regular, Reserve, Guard, and civilians, 

who continue to distinguish themselves in joint operations around 

the world and in the global war on terror. Indeed, in the 15 years 

since I last served as Acting Secretary of the Air Force our Nation’s 

airmen have been continuously deployed and in the joint fight. If 

confirmed, it will be an honor and a privilege to once again serve 

with these dedicated men and women. 

The circumstances that brought General Schwartz and me to this 

table are indeed difficult and unprecedented. I wish to acknowledge, as did Secretary Gates, that former Secretary Mike Wynne 

and General Buzz Moseley have given decades of faithful service to 

the Nation, and we are all grateful for that service. In particular, 

I want to thank them for their assistance in this recent transition. 

I also want to acknowledge the other Air Force nominees here 

today. Both General Schwartz and General McNabb bring the 

broad defense-wide perspectives that are so essential to joint operations and effective collaboration in DOD’s headquarters. If confirmed I would consider it a privilege to work with them and especially with General Schwartz in leading the world’s finest Air 

Force. 

Unusual circumstances place me in the position of Acting Secretary while I await your deliberations on this nomination. I appreciate your understanding as I step forward to address the urgent 

business confronting the Air Force. At the highest level, I believe 

the most urgent tasks for the new leadership are to steady this 

great institution, restore its inner confidence, and your confidence 

in the leadership team, and rebuild our external credibility. 

My immediate focus has been on the nuclear enterprise. On June 

26 I directed the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff to establish a Nuclear Task Force to synchronize corrective actions underway across 

major commands and to unify these efforts at the strategic level. 

The task force is charged to deliver a comprehensive road map by 

347

the end of September, fully recommitting the Air Force to this critical national mission. 

The Secretary of Defense has also asked former Secretary Jim 

Schlesinger to provide recommendations in this area. I have met 

with Dr. Schlesinger and his panel and the Air Force schedule is 

structured so that we can incorporate their recommendations as we 

move forward. 

The KC–X tanker issue has also received my attention. I support 

Secretary Gates’ decision to reopen the request for proposal and address the issues raised by GAO and move source selection authority 

to the Under Secretary of Defense, John Young. Secretary Young 

will have whatever support he needs from the Air Force to continue 

forward. 

The Air Force needs a new tanker. The joint warfighters need a 

new tanker. This is a critical capability that facilitates the projection of U.S. influence around the globe. 

At the same time, I have directed the Assistant Secretary of the 

Air Force for Acquisition to assess lessons learned from GAO’s decisions on the KC–X and to ensure appropriate adjustments are 

made as the Air Force prepares for future program decisions and 

source selection. We need to strengthen confidence in the Air Force 

and DOD’s capability to manage these large, complex competitions 

and successfully withstand contractor protests. 

In addition to these matters, I look forward to working with you 

and other Members of Congress in the weeks ahead to resolve outstanding issues in the authorization and appropriations processes. 

Mr. Chairman, over the past 4 weeks I have spoken with all of 

the Air Force’s senior civilian and military leadership and conducted town hall meetings at four installations. Without exception, 

leadership and airmen at all levels are ready to put the difficulties 

of the past few months behind them, to learn the appropriate lessons from these experiences, and to move forward. 

The way ahead includes a recommitment to upholding the high 

standards of excellence that have always been the Air Force’s hallmark, and for our core values of integrity first, service before self, 

and excellence in all we do, to underpin every action by every airman at all times. 

The men and women of the Air Force are volunteers all and 

there is no quicker recovery of our inner confidence and credibility 

than the power of tens of thousands of airmen recommitting to our 

own high standards. Our values and our high standards form the 

core of all Air Force actions. They serve us well in today’s joint 

fight and I believe they point the way to a bright future. 

If confirmed, I commit to the men and women of the Air Force 

and to you all my energies in these efforts. 

Mr. Chairman, my door is always open and I thank you again 

for your continued support of the men and women of the United 

States Air Force. I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Mr. Donley. 

General Schwartz? 

348

STATEMENT OF GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE 

CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 

General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I’d like to introduce my wife of 27 years, Suzie. She’s my best friend and there is 

absolutely no doubt that I would not be sitting here today were it 

not for her love and her support. 

Chairman Levin and distinguished members of the committee: It 

is an honor to be nominated by our Commander in Chief and recommended by Secretary Gates to be the Chief of Staff of the United 

States Air Force. Their expression of confidence is humbling. For 

more than 35 years, I have been fortunate to serve the United 

States of America in uniform. It represents an Air Force that 

serves as the cornerstone of the Nation’s defense, capable of delivering combat power and support to the joint warfighter any time, 

any place. 

I fully understand and appreciate the enormous responsibility to 

lead and sustain those capabilities on behalf of the Air Force and 

the Nation. I will not lose sight of this responsibility. 

The circumstances that have placed Mr. Donley and me here 

today have been difficult and I truly believe that the Air Force is 

still fundamentally a healthy organization, comprised of dedicated 

professionals. Mr. Chairman, if I am confirmed I will personally 

champion the Active Duty, National Guard, Reserve, and civilians, 

and all who serve the Air Force in defense of our great Nation 

around the world. These men and women are a national asset and 

together we will recommit ourselves to our core values and uphold 

the highest standards of excellence that have made our Air Force 

the best in the world. Our Nation deserves nothing less. 

Furthermore, I will strive to improve and transform processes, 

organizations, and systems, and maintain the highest standards of 

performance to enhance the effectiveness and the efficiency of our 

service. We will be ready if called upon. 

We will, at the same time, be mindful of cost, be good stewards 

of our country’s treasure, and be worthy of the Nation’s trust and 

confidence. All that I do will be based on the absolute knowledge 

that protection of our Nation and support of our joint warfighters 

is our number one priority. 

If confirmed, sir, Suzie and I will serve with dedication, with optimism, with enthusiasm, and a profound sense of purpose. I am 

grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, and the committee for allowing me 

to appear before you today, and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, General. 

General McNabb?

STATEMENT OF GEN. DUNCAN J. MCNABB, USAF, NOMINATED 

FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO 

BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

General MCNABB. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, distinguished members of the committee: Thank you. I am humbled and 

honored to be nominated by the President and recommended by the 

Secretary of Defense for the position of Commander of U.S. TransVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00354 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
349

portation Command, to be considered by the Senate, and to be with 

you here today. 

Mr. Chairman, I’d like to take the opportunity to introduce my 

wife Linda and son Duncan. Linda is the love of my life and I 

would not be here today without the joy that she brings to me 

every day. For the last 29 years she has been an Air Force family 

patriot, just like so many wonderful loved ones across our country 

who allow our great soldiers, sailors, marines, Coast Guardsmen, 

and airmen to serve. My son Duncan is a tremendous young man 

who is working on the ground floor of the biodiesel industry. I very 

much appreciate you allowing them to be here today. 

From my earliest days flying C–141s in the Pacific to being the 

aide to the first Commander of TRANSCOM, to recently serving as 

General Schwartz’s air component commander as the Commander 

of the AMC, I have been part of the great transportation enterprise. Sir, I believe our global mobility is one of our Nation’s true 

crown jewels. It gives us the strategic ability to move. No other nation can match it, which gives us a true asymmetric advantage on 

the global stage, whether delivering our warfighters to the fight or 

our compassion to those in need. 

I know TRANSCOM’s success depends on the strength of the 

total force and of our industry partners. Sir, if confirmed I will 

work to continue to strengthen and leverage these partnerships 

across the entire joint deployment and distribution enterprise. 

Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, distinguished members of the 

committee: I fully understand and appreciate the enormous responsibilities and trust that go with this command. If confirmed, I will 

never lose sight of these responsibilities and I will give you all I 

have to be worthy of that trust. 

We are a Nation at war and supporting our warfighters will be 

my number one priority. I’m grateful to you, sir, and the committee 

for having me here today and I look forward to answering your 

questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General. 

Let’s try a 7-minute round for the first round. I believe we have 

a vote at 10:30. 

Senator WARNER. 11 o’clock, I think. 

Chairman LEVIN. At 11 o’clock, that’s right. The vote is at 11 

o’clock. 

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, could I ask an administrative 

question first? This committee under your leadership recently had 

a closed door hearing with Admiral Donald on the issues of the nuclear programs and the problems associated with the U.S. Department of the Air Force. Also, we now have former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger working on that problem. It would seem to me 

wise that the chairman consider a closed hearing and that our 

members know that that will be available if they desire to pursue 

that or other issues that could be in the form of classified information. 

What’s the chair’s disposition on that? 

Chairman LEVIN. I thought I would ask a few questions about 

that which could be answered in an unclassified setting, and then 

if any of us wish a classified continuation we would do that, of 

course we would consider that. Let’s start with a few questions that 

350

I’m going to ask about those reports, see if they can answer them 

in a way which is satisfactory, and then of course if you or any 

other member of the committee wishes to proceed in classified we 

could do that. Would that be all right? 

Senator WARNER. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. 

On that subject, let me address to Secretary Donley and General 

Schwartz this question. The Air Force nuclear program has suffered from a lack of oversight and attention, leading to a general 

devaluing of the mission within the Service, according to several of 

the investigations and reports dealing with the Air Force. Whatever the political view one has as to the size of the stockpile or the 

appropriate role for nuclear deterrence, there can be no debate 

about the fact that nuclear weapons and all related components 

must be absolutely safe and secure. 

General Schwartz and Secretary Donley, have you had discussions with the authors of the various reports and investigations, including General Larry Welch and Admiral Donald, as to what they 

see as the key problems that need to be fixed? Secretary Donley, 

let me start with you. 

Mr. DONLEY. Yes, sir, I have. I’ve met both with General Welch 

and with Admiral Donald on their respective reports. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Have you, General Schwartz, met 

with them? 

General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, I have not, pending confirmation. 

Chairman LEVIN. Have you read their reports? 

General SCHWARTZ. I have read the portion of the Donald report 

which was made available to me, less chapter 7. 

Chairman LEVIN. Let me ask you first then, Secretary Donley. 

Do you agree with their conclusions? 

Mr. DONLEY. I do. 

Chairman LEVIN. General Schwartz, do you agree? 

General SCHWARTZ. I certainly do, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Secretary Donley, in the few weeks you’ve had, 

what steps have you taken to fix the problems, if you can tell us 

in an unclassified setting? 

Mr. DONLEY. If I can summarize, Mr. Chairman. When I arrived 

I received several briefings on the current status of Air Force actions, ongoing actions to address both the Minot-Barksdale incident 

and also the Taiwan nose cone issue. In being briefed on the status 

of those actions, it was apparent to me that the Air Force had been 

working on both of these for a number of months and had underway perhaps over 100 individual actions, first in response to the 

Minot-Barksdale incident, those were sort of underway, then in a 

serial fashion to address the Taiwan incident as the facts of that 

situation became known. 

What I felt was appropriate and necessary to take the next step 

for the Air Force was to pull together this information and all these 

activities and pull them up to the strategic level to begin to address 

the more systemic issues that were outlined in the Donald report. 

These individual incidents, as I think Admiral Donald alluded to, 

are evidence of some deeper systemic issues that need to be addressed by the Air Force. 

351

What I’ve asked from the Nuclear Task Force is that they prepare a strategic road map that will collate and synchronize all the 

individual activities underway, but pull them up to the strategic 

level so we can see all the training, all the procurement, all the 

personnel, all the leadership issues, all the doctrinal issues, all the 

sustainment issues that need to be addressed to ensure we are 

fully recommitted to our stewardship of the nuclear enterprise. 

There must be no question about the Air Force’s support for this 

fundamental national mission. 

Chairman LEVIN. Secretary Donley, chapter 7 of the Donald report deals with accountability. Secretary Gates has charged the Air 

Force leadership with the responsibility for implementing that 

chapter within the Air Force. Can you tell us what the schedule is 

for review and action? 

Mr. DONLEY. I have set in motion a review of the accountability 

of officers associated with the Taiwan incident in particular, following the lead of the Donald report in these areas. I have asked 

for a report or advice in 30 days and expect to address appropriate 

action at that point. 

I would also add that there already had been disciplinary actions 

taken in both of these incidents. Some 17 officers or officials had 

been relieved of their duties, 11 had been reassigned, and 5 received Article 15s. So action had already been taken, but we are 

following——

Chairman LEVIN. Below a certain level, is that correct? 

Mr. DONLEY. That’s correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. But there’s a review at all levels; is that correct? 

Mr. DONLEY. That’s correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. General Schwartz, in response to the prehearing questions regarding the Air Force’s aircraft inventory, you 

said that DOD’s revised fiscal guidance for the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) beginning in fiscal year 2010 authorized an 

approximately $5 billion boost for our recapitalization efforts, and 

that will certainly help. You went on to say that ‘‘The additional 

resources that we receive will be used in part to increase the F–

35s annual production rate.’’ 

Now, is increasing the F–35 JSF production rate the best way for 

dealing with the potential Air Force fighter inventory shortfalls, or 

should we continue to buy F–22A aircraft to deal with inventory 

shortfalls? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, it is the major strategy for addressing 

the inventory shortfalls as we go out toward 2025. That is, increasing the production rate from 48 per year to as high as 110 per year. 

That is the key strategy for achieving that outcome, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is there any less-than-key strategy which you 

would recommend in addition? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, it seems to me, first of all with regard 

to the F–22, that is an essential part of the force mix. As you’re 

aware, there are many who think that the F–22 is only an air-toair platform. In fact it has important capability for destruction of 

enemy air defenses in an era when surface-to-air missile threats 

are available from the commercial market and are increasingly lethal. 

352

So for the F–22 in particular, there are a number of studies, sir, 

that talk about inventories in the range of 180 to 381. If confirmed, 

I will delve deeply into that analysis and the assumptions associated with that, and I will be happy and be able to come back to 

the committee with my best recommendation on the total procurement for F–22. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you have any current position as to whether 

we should continue production of the F–22? Are you awaiting 

those——

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, the position of the Department——

Chairman LEVIN. I mean your personal position. 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, my personal position is that I believe 

that 183 is not the ceiling on the low end, but that 381 is too high 

on the high end. So yes, I think we should preserve production at 

least for the near term. 

Chairman LEVIN. My time is up. 

Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. Secretary Donley, in recent years GAO protests 

by bidders have resulted in the reversal of a number of significant 

Air Force contract award decisions, including those of the KC tanker replacement, combat search and rescue helicopter replacement, 

and the C–130 avionics modernization program. 

In your remarks on July 9 at a DOD press briefing with Secretary Gates, you stated that: ‘‘The underlying Air Force acquisition system is not somehow fatally flawed.’’ Now, how do you 

square that conclusion with the facts? 

Mr. DONLEY. Senator, the KC–X announcement by GAO was 

made just a few days before I was appointed Acting Secretary. As 

I looked at the facts associated with that particular decision, I did 

not see mismanagement by the Air Force. I did not see misconduct 

or gross incompetence in the acquisition process. 

As GAO looked at the protests, they evaluated over 100 items 

that were brought to them and were at issue in terms of how the 

Air Force conducted its business. The Air Force was sustained on 

the majority, the vast majority of those items. 

Senator WARNER. You still stand by your statement, then, that 

you do not think there is any fatal flaws in the system? 

Mr. DONLEY. No, sir. I think the Air Force acquisition system is 

the DOD acquisition system, it is the Federal acquisition system 

that we all have lived with, with its many complexities, for over 50 

years. Generally speaking, my experience in this area is that we 

do not throw the whole thing overboard and start over. 

Senator WARNER. No one’s suggesting that. But it’s a fairly tight 

statement you made, that it’s not fatally flawed, and I think on reflection you feel that there’s some strong—maybe it’s a question of 

semantics. But to me when you make a statement that it’s not fatally flawed against a background of a lot of problems, I find a disconnect. Maybe we respectfully have differences of point. But I 

think you’ve assured the committee this morning it’s high on your 

agenda to get things straightened out. 

Mr. DONLEY. It is, Senator. We do have lots of work to do and 

I have set that in motion with the acquisition community. 

Senator WARNER. I mentioned that this committee had a briefing 

by Admiral Donald and I intend to go into that to some extent, Mr. 

353

Chairman. But I would first just ask you, General Schwartz. As I 

look through your very distinguished career and assignments, you 

never had any real command authority over those areas of the Department of the Air Force that have been brought to the attention 

in the Donald report. Would I be correct in that? 

General SCHWARTZ. Senator Warner, in fact when I was the commander of the 36th Tactical Airlift Squadron at McCord Air Force 

Base in the State of Washington in the late 1980s, we were the 

only C–130 unit that had the primary nuclear airlift force mission, 

that is for transporting America’s nuclear weapons and components. So I have had experience in terms of the rigor and the attention to detail required to transport nuclear weapons in that context. 

Senator WARNER. I presume at that time you felt that there were 

adequate checks and balances in the system, and I believe that to 

be correct because I think most of the problems outlined in the 

Donald report were subsequent to that period. But subsequent to 

that assignment you had, you had no direct responsibility? 

General SCHWARTZ. That is correct. 

Senator WARNER. Therefore I just assume you were not aware of 

these problems, many of which are cultural, in that area. 

General McNabb, your career, pretty much I do not see any direct area of responsibility (AOR). Nevertheless, when you were Vice 

Chief—now, I have some familiarity with that position. It really is 

just as broad as the Chief’s, and perhaps there are specific areas 

that the Chief and you work out together you’ll handle. But you 

have the Air Force across the board, wouldn’t that be correct? 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. 

Senator WARNER. How do you feel about the Admiral Donald report with respect to the performance of your functions? Did you at 

any time encounter some of those problems, and if you did what 

did you do or not do to correct them as Vice Chief? 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. As the Vice Chief, I got to see specifically the blue ribbon panel recommendations following the General 

Welch review as well as the accident investigation board that General John D.W. Corley did following the Minot to Barksdale movement. The consolidation of those findings and the recommendations 

that came out of that, I got to see how our Air Force—they would 

come and brief me on what they recommended and what they were 

doing. I got to see the Air Force as they tried to get at this problem. 

I will say that since that time Secretary Donley as he came in, 

and after reading the Donald report, one of the things that there 

is no question is that, as we look deeper into these issues, there 

was in fact some cultural problems. There were some other problems, that every time you look in one place you would realize that 

from a cultural and oversight standpoint there were some very 

deep issues. 

The Air Force was trying to get at that and I would say that the 

part that Secretary Donley has done, has said, let’s bring all of that 

together and let’s make sure that we look at all parts of it, and 

that’s that integrated road map that he is asking. 

Senator WARNER. Quite frankly, we’re trying to sit here and 

judge your qualifications to take on your next important command. 

354

But bearing on that is when you were Vice Chief these problems 

were out there, but you at this time represent to us that you were 

just not aware of them, they were not brought to your attention, 

and therefore you did not take any action remedial to correct them? 

General MCNABB. Senator Warner, in fact what we did was we 

looked at the 128 findings and aggressively moved out on fixing 

those issues, I think that what we had to do is go in deeper. I think 

that was ongoing. I just think that it wasn’t as quick as we needed 

to do it. 

Senator WARNER. There’s been a recent series of articles regarding these executive containers to be put into planes for various individuals to utilize or better utilize their abilities as they’re in the 

air. I remember very well, Mr. Chairman, in our early days when 

we took congressional delegations we used the old Air Force tankers and there were no windows. Do you remember that? There was 

a little window in the back and that was about it. 

We did have plywood encasements that were put into the plane. 

I remember vividly sharing one with old Hal Heflin. Remember 

him? He was 6 foot 3 and slightly large around the girth, and he 

was a big man to share a little compartment with, but he was a 

wonderful man. We all loved him a great deal. 

Chairman LEVIN. A great man. 

Senator WARNER. A great Senator. 

So I’ve had some familiarity with this issue. We also know only 

too well on this committee in the years that we’ve been on it—we 

had the very unfortunate history of the procurement of the commode situation, and then the hammer situation, whether it was a 

$400 or $500 hammer. I mean, these problems have been out there, 

regrettably, through the years. 

Along comes this one. You had some responsibility, as I understand from the record, with regard to that program. I’d like to give 

you the opportunity now to clarify what your understanding of your 

responsibility was and, to the extent that you, in exercising your 

official duties, took any corrective actions or in any way otherwise 

tried to avoid what is a very unfortunate story out here, which—

these are the sort of stories that trouble the American public so 

greatly, when they give of their taxes to provide for the defense of 

this country. 

I can tell you from long years of experience, and all of us on this 

committee know, that when we go back home we’re not asked the 

complicated questions that we’re covering here this morning. They 

just shake their fist at us: You’re responsible and you’re on that 

Armed Services Committee; how could you have let this happen? 

This is your opportunity. 

General MCNABB. Yes, thank you, Senator. One of our most important missions is the movement of our national leadership, both 

military and civilian. We take that very seriously. We have two 

ways of doing that. We have about 31 dedicated airplanes that we 

use to move our leadership around. Those are shared assets, so 

they’re prioritized. 

The other way that we do it, depending on the threat that we 

face, is we may put them on combat airlift airplanes or tankers, as 

you mentioned, and we will take them in, again because of the nature of the threat, where we have to have a reduced signature or 

355

where the threat requires defensive systems or tactics, techniques, 

and procedures that our combat Air Force—— 

Senator WARNER. I don’t question the advisability and the need 

for some sort of system. It’s how this system was evolved and the 

trappings and so forth that were associated with it, which I think 

the public is just standing in awe of as to how this happened. To 

what extent were you personally responsible for those decisions, 

which now are under careful public scrutiny? 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. I was the AMC Commander. I had 

been the J–4 on the Joint Staff, and as the AMC Commander I said 

that, given September 11, given the tremendous additional need for 

our leadership to go to the theater and then come back out—what 

I ended up tasking was, let’s come up with a prototype, a one to 

two-pallets, kind of much smaller capsule, that we could put on any 

of our airlift or tanker airplanes and therefore satisfy this requirement. 

The idea was that this module could be placed in theater as well, 

so that you could take advantage of any organic opportunities 

available as well. 

What we wanted to do is I asked them to make sure that it met 

the security, the communications, the work environment, and most 

importantly the safety, the Federal Aviation Administration standards that need to be met. Sir, I believe that we have done that. Obviously, I left the AMC Commander position about a year ago and 

I have not dealt with that since. 

Senator WARNER. So in your capacity as Vice Chief you didn’t 

look back on one of your responsibilities to see if it was moving 

along in a manner you felt was consistent with the best interests 

of the Department? 

General MCNABB. Sir, as the Vice Chief I did not deal with this 

issue. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Warner. 

Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to add my welcome to the nominees who are here and also 

to your families that are here. 

I’d like to direct my first question to Mr. Donley and General 

Schwartz. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring 

Freedom (OEF) in Iraq and Afghanistan have developed into conflicts where the Army and the Marine Corps comprise the main effort. The Air Force has played more of a supporting role, yet critically needed, but a role in a very ground-centric counterinsurgency 

effort over the past 5 years. 

My question is, do you believe that the Air Force should continue 

to build its capacity and capabilities in the counterinsurgency support mission, or do you believe that this kind of support-specific 

focus would adversely affect the preparation for the future of the 

Air Force? 

Mr. Donley? 

Mr. DONLEY. Senator, this is a very good question and it strikes 

to the heart of what the Air Force leadership is responsible for addressing, and that is the balance of capabilities across the many 

warfighting missions that we support. 

356

A couple of points of reference, if I might. The Air Force’s contribution to OIF and OEF and the global war on terrorism is comprehensive. The Air Force is operating some 60-plus satellites that 

are supporting the communications, the weather, the intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) work. We’re supporting the 

air bridge that General McNabb and General Schwartz are so familiar with, that links us so easily and so facilely from the continental United States (CONUS) and all the bases of the Army, 

Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps here in the CONUS and North 

America, all the way across the world to that theater of operations. 

That is a huge mission that we do seamlessly with the other Services on a daily basis. 

The Air Force is committed to this in the intelligence area. We 

are flying unmanned aerial systems that 10 years ago were hardly 

even in the inventory. We are fully committed on the Special Operations side. So the Air Force is contributing to the global war on 

terror with these operations across a range of capabilities. 

In addition, we are also sending airmen, about 4,000 to 6,000 at 

any given time, to assist with convoy duty and other ground operations to relieve pressure on the Army and the Marine Corps. So 

we are fully committed to this fight, and I believe Secretary Gates, 

and I believe most members of this committee who follow military 

operations recognize those contributions. 

That is our first priority right now as we build capability. We 

need to continue to make decisions about how we spread resources 

across these many mission areas that the joint warfighters need 

and balance the here and now with potential future threats. That 

is something that we have always done and we will continue to try 

to do to the best of our ability. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Akaka, forgive me for interrupting, but 

we have a quorum now present and that gives us an opportunity 

to consider a list of 1,981 pending military nominations. They’ve all 

been before the committee the required length of time. Is there a 

motion to favorably report these 1,981 military nominations to the 

Senate? 

Senator WARNER. So moved. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is there a second? 

Senator BEN NELSON. Second. 

Chairman LEVIN. All in favor say aye. [A chorus of ayes.] 

The motion carries. 

Now, a couple other items. One is the vote is now scheduled for 

11:20 instead of 11:00. 

Second, I’m going to have to leave, so the following order would 

be followed: After Senator Akaka would be Senator Inhofe and then 

Senator Ben Nelson. Are you going to be here for a few minutes? 

Then Senator Warner can make any changes in that if necessary. 

Excuse the interruption, Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Schwartz, would you comment on that? 

General SCHWARTZ. Senator Akaka, thank you for that question. 

Fundamentally, I do not believe it is an either-or condition; that 

the United States Air Force, like the other Services, needs to be a 

full spectrum capability. At the moment, as Secretary Donley suggested, our focus obviously is in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have 

357

provided the kinds of capabilities on which the ground forces that 

you addressed depend: lift, resupply, strike, ISR, even evacuation 

of the wounded. Those are important missions. 

We have people who are running detention facilities. There are 

members of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and they are involved in transportation and ground convoys and so on. 

The bottom line, Senator, is that we as an Air Force can provide 

both the kind of concentrated effort required by the joint team in 

Central Command today and posture ourselves for future potential 

adversaries at the same time. 

Senator AKAKA. General Schwartz, the number five priority on 

the Air Force’s procurement list is the development of the so-called 

Next Generation Long-Range Strike Aircraft. According to the Air 

Force, the plan is to have a three-pronged approach in modernizing 

the Nation’s bomber fleet: first, upgrade our aging B–52s and B–

1s; second, field a new bomber by 2018 with existing technologies; 

and third, develop a bomber representing a quantum leap forward 

in capability by 2035. 

Ahead of this priority includes the new air refueling tanker, the 

new combat search and rescue helicopter, and F–35 fighter bomber, 

and upgrades to space systems. 

My question to you, General, is what is the role of the 2018 

bomber or the second pronged approach? What is that 2018 bomber 

supposed to fill, given that the kinds of missions it would carry out 

could also be fulfilled by the new F–35 fighter bomber scheduled 

to be fully operational in a few years prior to that time? 

General SCHWARTZ. Senator, they perform similar missions, 

strike missions, but the question is how do you access the target 

set. In some cases that is possible from relatively close in. In other 

cases it’s much more desirable to be able to reach out from a distance. The new bomber will enable us to maintain the capability 

to engage targets at a distance, and recognizing again the threat 

environment is likely to become more complex and more demanding and thus we’ll need an airplane that’s properly designed to perform in that environment. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Senator, for your questions. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Schwartz, I think that was an excellent answer you gave 

and I think it points out the complexity of the various vehicles that 

we have. 

Senator Warner in his opening statement talked about the B–52 

situation, about the aging aircraft. I think we talk about it, we 

touch on it, and then nothing ever seems to happen. Yet we’ve 

flown some 96,000 sorties in the last year. Our equipment is old. 

We know what’s happening in terms of the average age and the 

flight hours of fighter aircraft is 20 years and 5,400 hours; bombers, 32 years, 11,000 hours. 

I’ve had numerous experiences over there. I look over and see my 

good friend Senator Martinez, who was with me when we had a little surface-to-air missile (SAM) problem coming out of Baghdad. 

This was one in an old beat-up C–130E model. Actually, the trip 

before we didn’t lose one engine in an E model, we lost two engines 

in an E model. I keep telling them, work on some of these other 

358

guys, not on me. I want more and I want bigger ones and I want 

J models and H models. 

But nonetheless, this is the problem. We recalculated the problem that we had when Senator Martinez and a few others were 

taking off. It was about 7 minutes after takeoff. If we had been in 

even an H model, we would have been at an altitude where we 

would not have been vulnerable. I have to say, though, in that incident, with the flares and the responses, you would have been very 

proud, Senator Warner, of our pilots and the way they conducted 

themselves. 

But the bottom line is these are life-threatening things. There’s 

something where someone could have been killed only because 

they’re not performing as to the minimum expectations, at least of 

me and several others on this committee. 

We have these problems up there and we all seem to think, well, 

how do we get through the next 3 months? I’m thinking on down 

the road. 

What is your solution to what we’re going to ultimately have to 

do to get rid of this aging aircraft problem that we have, General? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, there is only one way that I am aware 

of to address this, and that is that you have to embark on a recapitalization profile that will reduce the average age of the fleet. As 

you suggested, the average age now is about 24 years. In order to 

sustain that level, you have to have about 160 aircraft a year in 

terms of procurement of the various kinds. 

To drive that average age down could require somewhere toward 

200 aircraft a year. We’re currently purchasing about 110 or so. 

The way to address this is, number one, we have to, I think, identify what our priorities are. We have said that it’s the tanker first 

that is the appropriate first priority. But I think we have to look 

across the fleet and dialogue with you, make sure that each of the 

members of the committee appreciates the risks and the opportunities, and then gain consensus on a program for recapitalizing that 

fleet. 

Senator INHOFE. I want to get to a couple of specific vehicles in 

a minute. But in the mean time, we saw this coming. At least I 

saw it coming. Many other members did. During the 1990s when 

we had this euphoric attitude that the Cold War is over, we don’t 

need a military any more, and during that time we actually for all 

practical purposes reduced our procurement, our modernization, 

our end strength, by about 40 percent. 

At the same time, the Chinese during that same period of time 

were increasing their procurement by 1,000 percent. I’d like to get 

out of the mentality of just taking care of what’s bleeding today. 

What do you think, Mr. Donley, about the long-term future? 

What should we be doing now? Was Secretary Rumsfeld right in 

his first confirmation hearing when he said that we need to get 

back up to what we did during the 20th century, 5.7 percent of our 

gross domestic product, as opposed to down to 3 percent? 

Mr. DONLEY. There’s no question, Senator, that the recapitalization challenge for all the military departments is one of the most 

critical issues that we face, because it is not, as you appreciate, it 

is not just in one aircraft series or in one mission area. It is across 

a full range of activities. It is in some cases in the tactical airlift 

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fleet, it’s in the search and rescue fleet, it’s in the tanker fleet, it’s 

in the bomber fleet. There are big numbers in the fighter fleet as 

well. 

So how to do this is going to be a neat trick. We need more resources to get it all done in the time that we would be most comfortable getting it done. 

Senator INHOFE. We need more resources. 

Mr. DONLEY. But I have been in this town for 30 years and we 

always live in a resource-constrained environment, where we have 

to make these tradeoffs. We are not always able to choose and implement the most effective acquisition profile for every program at 

the same time. 

Senator INHOFE. I’m sorry, my time is running out. I agree with 

what you’re saying. I think that is a problem. But when you name 

all the missions and the vehicles to accommodate, to address these 

missions, we don’t have any idea—in 1994 they testified that in 10 

more years we wouldn’t need ground troops. You’re going to be relying on very smart generals, General McNabb and others, but 

you’re going to be wrong in trying to anticipate what our needs are 

going to be. 

It would appear to me that the American people do expect our 

guys going out there, and gals, that they’re going to have the best 

of equipment. I want to specifically talk about the F–22. I think 

others are going to bring this up also. But when we had to ground 

some 600 of the F–15s after one broke up there—now I guess 

they’re going back up; maybe the F–15Es were never completely 

grounded—you start looking at the numbers. The F–15s right now, 

426; the E models, 224; the F–16s, 1,214. 

Now, if we were to cut this off with the F–22s right now that 

would be 183. I think you answered the question, General 

Schwartz, that’s not adequate and maybe something more than 

that is. When you look at the sheer numbers and let me just ask 

you the question: Did all three of you agree with the statement 

that General John Jumper made back in 1998 when he said that 

we have to do something about our modernization program because 

the Su–27, Su–30 vehicles in Russia that they’re cranking out are 

better in some ways than our best strike vehicles, which were the 

F–15 and F–16? Did anyone take issue with that? [No response.] 

Nonetheless, I guess what I’m saying is that we are going to end 

up with 183, as opposed to, just look at China alone. They have 

bought some 1,744 vehicles from, Su series vehicles, from China. 

Does this concern you folks, that we’d only have 183 strike vehicles 

competitive with a potential adversary? 

Mr. DONLEY. Senator, we have to be attentive to numbers, but 

the United States, and particularly the Air Force, has relied on 

technologies and operational concepts that we have been able to 

meld into giving us increased capabilities, even though we have 

been shrinking the number of airframes over the years. We have 

a smaller Air Force than we had in the past and in most cases it’s 

much more capable. 

But I share your concern to keep an eye on those potential 

threats that might develop around the world. Technology continues 

to move abroad both in Russia and in China in ways that we need 

to be attentive to. 

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Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much. Let me just ask one more 

question. I agree with you, Mr. Donley, in terms of the F–35 and 

the F–22; those are—they fall in the category that you’re talking 

about. I’m just concerned that we stay ahead of the curve so that 

some other adversary—right now they’re talking about a fifth generation Su series, I think it’s the Su–35, and we don’t want to wait 

until we find out we’re in the same situation we were in 1998. 

One last question to General McNabb. On the Africa Command 

(AFRICOM), we have made, in our authorization bill, we have 

made requests, transportation requests, vehicles, assets. Are you 

supportive of and on line to try to direct these assets to the 

AFRICOM? 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir, absolutely. General Ward actually 

came by and saw me early on. I know he talked to General 

Schwartz as well. But basically, as he outlines what he needs in 

AFRICOM, both from the standpoint of long-range airplanes that 

he can get his hands on, we talked about a C–37 and a C–40, but 

also so that we would make sure that we give him the ability to 

get to the long-range lift, given the distances on that continent. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Senator. An important line of questions and I think the record should reflect that you’ve had a distinguished career as a civilian aviator. You understand airplanes. 

How many hours have you flown? 

Senator INHOFE. A little over 10,000. 

Senator WARNER. That qualifies you, my good friend. 

Senator Nelson, you’re up. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, not only for your willingness to take on 

new responsibilities, but for your previous service. We appreciate 

it so much, and that of your families, and of course all the men and 

women in uniform here and abroad. 

You take over the Air Force at a very critical point in time, not 

simply because of the manner of the change and the timing of the 

change, but also because it’s an opportunity to take a look at transformation and transition for the Air Force. As you consider the 

questions of the type of airframes and aircraft and the numbers of 

aircraft, aren’t there going to be questions about when was the decision made establishing the number of required aircraft? Is that 

current today? Are we faced with an Air Force that is based on 

fighting the last war, the perceived next war, as opposed to the 

most likely war involving cyber space, involving terrorism? 

Based on that, are you in a position to go back and evaluate all 

of those assumptions about the number of aircraft, the type of aircraft? Because that’s going to be very helpful to us in deciding what 

we help fund for the present and the future. If we always do what 

we’ve always done, we’ll end up right where we are today tomorrow, trying to replace aircraft without asking the question, do we 

need all those, do we need others, what do we need? 

Mr. Donley, could you respond first, and then of course General 

Schwartz? 

Mr. DONLEY. Senator, that’s a very astute observation, I think, 

in the sense that the numbers that we look at now in terms of 

what’s required going forward are built on study after study, which 

361

have attempted to assess what the new requirement is for a given 

airplane. As we get to critical decisions on F–22, critical decisions 

on C–17 and other airframes which we have built out——

Senator BEN NELSON. There certainly are some airframes that 

we know what the future is going to be required for lift and for 

transportation. We certainly know that. But when we get to some 

of the other aircraft, would that be the same? 

Mr. DONLEY. I would take slight issue, sir, in the sense that the 

requirements for these airframes continue to change. They continue 

to change in the operational environment, and they also change in 

our assumptions about what kind of threat we might need to face 

in the future. The assessments that are put together to evaluate 

individual airframes are often not as helpful as those assessments 

that look at airframes in combination. 

So the combination of the F–22 and the F–35 together are the 

right kinds of things to look at, I think. The combination of that 

combat air fleet with ISR assets in comparison. Those are the kind 

of good tradeoffs that help us find the right balance across different 

kinds of capabilities, whether it be attack aircraft, the ISR that 

goes with it and informs air to ground decisions, or even air to air 

engagement decisions. 

We’re developing comprehensive capabilities, systems of systems, 

not just one airframe at a time. 

Senator BEN NELSON. I understand that and I’m not trying to 

talk the Air Force out of airplanes. I don’t want you to have to 

change your name, among other things. But aren’t there new 

emerging areas that are critically important, such as unmanned 

aerial vehicles? 

Mr. DONLEY. Absolutely, and this is——

Senator BEN NELSON. Is that on an accelerated level or can you 

tell us something about that? 

Mr. DONLEY. It is. I believe—and I would stand corrected by my 

colleagues, but I believe half of the airframes requested by the Air 

Force in this year’s budget are for unmanned aerial systems. That 

is a trend that as I understand it is probably going to continue. 

This has been one of the most thorough going and remarkable evolutions I think since I was Acting Secretary in 1993, the introduction of unmanned aerial systems and their use, not just in an ISR 

capacity, but also in an attack capacity, in a strike capacity. 

This is a new and growing area for DOD and the United States 

Air Force, and we are smack dab in the middle of that. 

We’re also growing and getting more serious about the cyber 

threats to this country, which is clearly an area of concern. So the 

Air Force has been working on that. We need to recapitalize and 

add new capabilities in space. These are the new and growing 

areas which offer opportunities for transformation. They’re based 

on sort of new demands coming from the warfighters based on our 

current experience and also what we forecast going forward as providing the best balance of capabilities across this attack, situational awareness spectrum of activity. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Has there been any change in assumptions 

as to the number of F–22s required in the last, let’s say, the last 

10 years? Or is it the same number? 

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Mr. DONLEY. Sir, I would defer to my uniformed colleagues, but 

I believe there are at this point probably six or seven different 

studies on the table over the last roughly 10 years that have spoken to sort of what is the right number for the F–22. 

Senator BEN NELSON. General Schwartz? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, clearly I think it is important for any 

new leadership team in any discipline to come in and look at an 

organization and sort of revisit all the assumptions, the sort of 

business model, if you will, to assure that it’s viable going forward. 

If confirmed, I commit to you and to the committee to revisiting 

those assumptions on all those things that drive requirements. It 

needs to be done. As I suggested, certainly in the F–22 area there 

are other studies that we need to nail down. 

But Senator, you’re absolutely correct, and I think your notion of 

transformation and looking at new ways of doing things suggests 

that the old way of sort of packaging is not correct. I think the Secretary has it exactly right. There is trade space between strikers 

and ISR. There is trade space between air and surface lift. This is 

what we have to become more sophisticated at, and if confirmed 

you certainly will see me endeavoring to do that. 

Senator BEN NELSON. My time is up, and I hope that you’ll take 

a look at what your predecessor said, General Schwartz, when I 

think he said that even with the budget that was submitted for authorization that it was $100 billion short that had to be made up 

over the next 5 years. I assume you’ll have a sharp pencil to tell 

us how we’re going to be able to do that as well. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Senator, very much. 

Senator Thune. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Donley, General Schwartz, General McNabb, thank 

you very much for your distinguished service to our country and to 

your families. Thank you all for your sacrifices that you make and 

for all that collectively you’ve accomplished for our country. You’ve 

all served with distinction and we appreciate very much your service. 

General Schwartz, I want to come back to some questions that 

Senator Akaka touched on regarding long-range strike and the 

bomber and ask you if you are committed to long-range strike and 

bomber roles in terms of the missions of the Air Force? 

General SCHWARTZ. I am, sir, absolutely. 

Senator THUNE. Are you committed to fielding a new bomber by 

2018, which is right now what the——

General SCHWARTZ. That is the plan and if that is physically 

achievable we will do so. 

Senator THUNE. Could you talk a little bit about the role that the 

current bombers have played in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

General SCHWARTZ. Certainly, sir. As you’re aware, we have operated with bombers in the theater since 2001, and in fact it was 

bombers that began the strike operations in Afghanistan in October of 2001 and in the days that followed. The bottom line is that 

these are very important platforms for reaching out, as I suggested 

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earlier, to engage target sets. We have done that in Afghanistan repeatedly. We continue to have long duration, long dwell platforms 

above the battlefield in both Iraq and Afghanistan for on-call delivery of precision munitions in support of the joint team, and that 

certainly will continue. That has been extremely useful and I am 

certain that will continue, sir. 

Senator THUNE. I assume that, because of that continued need 

for that sort of requirement, the next generation bomber obviously 

is going to have to step in and fill that role for the current generation? 

General SCHWARTZ. That is certainly my view, Senator. 

Senator THUNE. With regard to Air Force energy matters, just 

last week the Air Force asked to reprogram $72 million to buy 

more jet fuel due to increased costs that were not foreseen. Could 

you discuss the impact of higher fuel costs on the Air Force and 

your views on the Air Force’s current synthetic fuels program? 

General SCHWARTZ. Senator, I know there is much here that the 

members of the committee are concerned about for our Air Force. 

One of the areas, though, that I think represents the excellence 

and the genius of our people is the effort to find alternative ways 

to operate. Certainly in the area of fuel, this is the case. 

There is no question that the Air Force and air forces generally 

are the largest consumer of hydrocarbons in DOD. In our case, it’s 

a difference in terms of $600 million or more associated with the 

change in the price of oil. So there are three components to it, sir. 

One is the basic operational approaches that we take. There are 

ways, just like driving our cars more slowly, there are ways to operate aircraft more efficiently and we have to do that in order to 

conserve resources. 

Second is to look at alternatives, such as Fischer-Tropsh and 

other ways to enable use of alternative fuels. As you are aware, we 

have the B–52, the C–17, and the B–1 have all been tested with 

blended alternative fuels successfully and the B–52 has been certified to operate in that fashion. 

Finally, there is a longer term issue of platforms that are more 

fuel efficient than the current generation. This is something that 

we need to keep in our technology focus, which is thinking about 

ways that machines can do the job and be less hydrocarbon intensive. 

Senator THUNE. I appreciate the answer to that, and I might ask 

maybe Secretary Donley to react to that as well. I want to follow 

up with a question regarding the Air Force’s goal to have all aircraft certified on synthetic fuels by 2011 and to acquire 50 percent 

of its domestic aviation fuel requirement from a domestically 

sourced synthetic fuel blend by 2016, if that continues to be the 

goal. The Air Force being the biggest user of fuels in this country, 

if we are going to break this dependence on foreign sources of energy, it really starts I think with a lot of the procurement that we 

do for the Government. I’m just curious to know what your 

thoughts are with regard to that, at least what has been a stated 

goal of the Air Force. 

Mr. DONLEY. Senator, I’m currently reviewing the Air Force’s energy policy. It’s been on my desk for just a few days now. I am, 

like General Schwartz, impressed with the ingenuity and the scope 

364

of this effort after 3 or 4 years of work. It’s gotten great attention 

in the Air Force and I do believe it is a success story. 

I think we ought to remain fully committed to getting all our air 

frames certified for blended synthetic fuels by 2011. I intend to follow through with that if confirmed. 

Looking ahead, one question I have going forward that I believe 

requires a little bit more discussion, collaboration with this and 

other committees of Congress, is figuring out how and where this 

change and reshaping of Air Force demand is going to be met, 

where is the supply going to come from for synthetic fuels in high 

volume, probably commercially connected, in ways that will drive 

down the cost, because as we approach this problem going forward 

synthetic and blended fuels, even at the higher costs per barrel 

that we’re experiencing today, as I understand it will be higher yet 

per gallon for us to operate with these synthetic fuels. So we need 

a market-based solution across the Government and across the 

commercial aviation sector that will help drive that change and 

push down the cost. 

Senator THUNE. My time has expired. Could you react quickly, 

though. One of the things that in the years since September 11 

that we’ve really seen is the Guard and Reserve provide an incredibly important part of our national defense capability. Could you 

just discuss briefly your views on the Air Force’s total force initiative? 

Mr. DONLEY. My colleagues I know are well versed in this as 

well, but I would just like to say that, as I come back to the Air 

Force after being gone for 15 years, this remains a real strength 

of the Air Force and the collaboration across the Active, Guard, and 

Reserve components in associating themselves with each other in 

progressively more collaborative and creative ways in bringing joint 

warfighting capability to the table in ways that we had never imagined before, and doing it in a fairly seamless way. I’m impressed 

with what I have seen thus far. 

General SCHWARTZ. Senator, I certainly agree. The Air Force for 

50 years has been using associations with the Guard and Reserve 

and maintaining the identical levels of readiness. I think that’s exactly the way to go forward. We are capitalizing on the experience 

and the community association of the National Guard, for example, 

and bringing Active Duty personnel in an associate arrangement, 

so that we get the benefits of the National Guard experience and 

community setting as well as the productivity that comes with fulltime Active Duty—important principle. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Thune. 

General MCNABB. If I could—I’m sorry, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. No, that’s all right, if you have a quick comment to add. 

General MCNABB. Sir, I was going to add that I think the Air 

Force does total force better than anybody. I believe that we continue to look for innovative ways. Especially if I think about the 

TRANSCOM and AMC, obviously that’s something that I would 

really push across the board. I think the total force is what gives 

us that great synergy to meet those needs at a reduced fraction of 

the cost of what it would do to have Active Duty do all of this. The 

sharing of airplanes in the associate relationship that General 

365

Schwartz mentioned is one of the best ways. As we bring new aircraft on, it is something that’s worked for many years in the mobility world and now we’re doing the same thing in the combat air 

forces and so forth. We think it’s absolutely essential. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Thune. 

Senator Bill Nelson. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Good morning, gentlemen. 

General Schwartz, the Washington Post is reporting that Russia 

has stated that they would consider basing their nuclear-capable 

bombers in Cuba if the U.S. installs a missile defense system in 

Eastern Europe. What would be your recommendation if that were 

to occur? 

General SCHWARTZ. I certainly would offer my best military advice that we should engage the Russians not to pursue that approach, and if they did I think we should stand strong and indicate 

that is something that crosses a threshold, crosses a red line for 

the United States of America. 

Senator BILL NELSON. General Schwartz, in an 8-month period 

between March 2003 and October 2003 you testified to this committee over a number of times in closed classified sessions regarding issues that were happening in Iraq before the war started and 

all the way up to October after the war had started. Do you want 

to share with the committee, do you feel that you were adequately 

forthcoming with the committee during those classified sessions? 

General SCHWARTZ. Senator Nelson, it is painful to know that 

one or more members of the committee feels that I didn’t measure 

up with my testimony in 2003. I fully appreciate the necessity for 

committees of Congress to receive answers that are crisp, responsive, and that are serious answers to serious questions. 

At the time I attempted to do my best to be loyal to the needs 

of the committee and to my own reluctance to speculate on matters 

in which I did not have personal or professional experience. I am 

well aware, sir, of the gravity of the position for which I have been 

nominated and your need and the committee’s need for crisp military advice and answers to your questions. 

Sir, I ask you to judge my performance since 2003. I have grown 

since that time and I ask you to accept my assurance that, if confirmed, I will provide answers and best military advice worthy of 

a Chief of Service. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Do you feel that you were not adequately 

forthcoming with this committee in that testimony over that 8-

month period? 

General SCHWARTZ. Senator Nelson, I did not answer your questions directly and by definition that is not sufficiently forthcoming. 

Senator BILL NELSON. By ‘‘your questions,’’ you’re referring to 

several members of the committee’s questions? 

General SCHWARTZ. That is correct, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Chairman, under your guidance we 

will pursue this in executive session. Do I still have some time remaining? 

366

Chairman LEVIN. I think you do. There has been a request for 

an executive session on a number of issues and so there will be an 

executive session following this. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Donley, you and I had visited when 

you were kind enough to come by about the deplorable situation in 

the housing for airmen at Patrick Air Force Base and other bases, 

basically where the Government has been fleeced, where the Government has given away 100 acres of oceanfront barrier island land 

worth $17 million, and now where the Government is about to give 

away its remaining interest in another 200 acres that was supposed to be housing for airmen and their families, 560 some units, 

and the only thing that has been built is about 160 units. 

Of course, I’ve raised a fuss about this. Since we spoke about this 

issue, why don’t you reflect on what you think we can do to 

straighten it out. 

Mr. DONLEY. Senator, I have had one meeting with the environmental office, the Installations and Environment Office, to discuss 

this matter. We have not been able to resolve completely your concerns and I continue to work this issue, as I pledged to do. 

Senator BILL NELSON. What are the other options other than 

going through with this give-away that the Air Force has proposed 

and which we have as a part of our National Defense Authorization 

Bill, we have included a part in that there needs to be a cost-benefit analysis before the Air Force would move? What do you think 

are the other options that the Air Force could exercise? 

Mr. DONLEY. I’m trying to uncover what the options are. I’m also 

trying to uncover what the fact base is here, because I believe we 

may have a disconnect with your office on what the facts are. So 

I’m trying to get that straight. 

You have sent a letter on this subject and I’ve asked the staff to 

begin drafting an answer. I do not have all the answers I need to 

be responsive today, but will continue to work this issue. 

[The information referred to follows:]

Senator Nelson, I share your concerns and thank you for your continued advocacy 

for our airmen and their families. 

As I understand it, 101 acres of property, was sold previously for $25 million by 

the Patrick Family Housing LLC to a third party developer to provide cash equity 

to assist in construction of the new housing units. 

With respect to the remaining acreage, the Air Force still retains all rights on the 

undeveloped portion of the 172 acre project site, and development is currently restricted solely to military family housing. The Air Force is currently conducting a 

cost-benefit analysis, in accordance with section 2805 of the Senate report to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, which requires 

that I submit this cost-benefit analysis before dissolving the Patrick Family Housing 

LLC. We are currently working to complete that cost benefit analysis and we will 

discuss the results with you and the committee before any final action is taken. 

I am currently reviewing possible courses of action and I have asked my staff to 

meet with you and your staff during the week of July 28, 2008 to go over possible 

courses of action being considered. Like you, my goal remains to provide quality 

housing for airmen and their families at all of our military installations. Thank you 

again for you continued support of our Air Force.

Senator BILL NELSON. I certainly strongly suggest that we come 

up with some answers that will fix the problem for Moody Air 

Force Base and Little Rock, but would also get more housing for 

the airmen at Patrick. Otherwise they’re left holding the bag with 

400 less units and a give-away of all of the remaining 200 acres 

367

there on oceanfront barrier island, and no recovery of damages 

from the defaulting developer. 

I have been handed the card, Mr. Chairman, that my time is up. 

I will pursue this later. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson. 

Senator Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Warner mentioned the age of the B–52 aircraft. Of 

course, it’s also a fact that the KC–135 is also an aging aircraft and 

needs to be replaced. I just want to comment briefly about the 

tanker rebid. Mr. Secretary, I understand and fully agree with your 

statement in your testimony about rebidding these eight items that 

need to be looked at. But I would also state that Congress should 

not intervene in the process of setting the requirements for the Air 

Force tanker program. We’re not experts on the military requirements. There are professional military men and women who are 

and they know how best to satisfy those needs. 

I want to quote Under Secretary Young’s recent comments before 

the House Armed Services Committee, where he said: ‘‘Grounded 

in the warfighter’s requirements and the pursuit of best value for 

the taxpayer, the Defense Department is the only organization that 

can fairly and knowledgeably conduct this competition.’’ 

I want to associate myself with those remarks, to say that I hope 

that the process will move quickly. Of course, if the Northrop 

Grumman bid eventually succeeds I’ll be delighted. I suspect that 

Senator Sessions will be delighted. But we want it called straight 

and called by the numbers, and we want the best aircraft for our 

troops, and we need to move forward quickly because it’s an old 

aircraft. 

Having said that, I want to move to a matter in my own State 

of Mississippi. I have the honor of representing many military installations. But I want to call the attention of the committee and 

the witnesses to the 186th Air Refueling Wing of the Mississippi 

Air National Guard in Meridian, MS. The 186th’s mission has included training, maintenance, and operation of the KC–135R. 

By way of background, Key Field, home of the 186th in Meridian, 

is literally the birthplace of air-to-air refueling. It is the site of Al 

and Fred Key’s 27-day refueling flight in 1935, which still stands 

as a record. I will say to the witnesses that I recall as an advanced 

Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps cadet at the University 

of Mississippi having the opportunity to hear Al Key come and 

speak at our dining-in on the Ole Miss campus. 

Now, the problem is this. The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) decision removes the KC–135s from the 186th and 

from Meridian. We’re slated to receive a warfighting headquarters 

in the near future and possibly a joint cargo aircraft mission. But 

I’m concerned about a potential gap of 3 to 5 years that would exist 

between the tankers leaving Meridian and the arrival of a followon flying mission. This would be devastating to the facility and to 

the community of Meridian, and I don’t think it would be in the 

national interest. 

I understand there are discussions concerning a bridge mission. 

I hope we can find an answer which will maintain the 186th’s high 

level of proficiency. 

368

Also in that regard, I would like to take this opportunity to invite 

all three of you to visit this impressive installation with me. It has 

a great history, as I’ve said. Its physical assets are impressive and 

are a tribute to the leadership over some 30 years of my late colleague, Representative and Chairman Sonny Montgomery. 

The 186th houses a plus-85,000 square foot maintenance hangar. 

I believe it to be the only double-bay hangar in the Air National 

Guard. It has ramp capacity to accommodate 18 KC–135s. I think 

it’s worth a visit, gentlemen. We could combine that with a facility 

that I know General McNabb is familiar with, the 172nd flying C–

17s in Jackson, MS. So I hope each of you will work with my staff 

and with me in seeing if we can schedule a visit and a solution to 

this potentially devastating gap. 

Having said that, let me move on. Mr. Chairman, you can now 

begin my 7 minutes of questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. You’re already at 8 minutes. [Laughter.] 

Senator WICKER. Then I’ve said my peace. 

Let me follow on with Senator Thune on the synthetic fuels, Mr. 

Secretary. By 2016, how much of a component of that is coal to liquid, and would you comment about your understanding so far of 

the cost effectiveness of that component of the new synthetic fuels? 

Mr. DONLEY. Senator, first of all, thank you for the invitation 

and the piece of history on the 135s and aerial refueling. 

Senator WICKER. It’s a remarkable achievement for 1935. 

Mr. DONLEY. It sounds to be so. 

I’m not familiar with the liquid coal piece of the synthetic fuel 

options, I just have not gotten into that level of detail, but I’d be 

happy to do so. 

Senator WICKER. Okay. Are either one of you other witnesses 

able to comment on that? 

General SCHWARTZ. Senator, likewise I do not have that readily 

available. I’d be happy to report that for the record. 

[The information referred to follows:]

I have not had a chance yet to thoroughly review the Air Force Energy program, 

but I do support the ongoing initiative to certify all of the Air Force aircraft to operate on a 50/50 blend of Fischer-Tropsch and JP8 fuel by 2011. 

As I understand it, there are many possible feed-stocks for the Fischer-Tropsch 

process. For the original tests on the B–52, the feed-stock was natural gas, but I 

understand that many companies are currently considering or pursuing the use of 

coal as their feed-stock. 

With respect to cost, I understand that domestically produced Fischer-Tropsch 

fuels are currently more expensive than petroleum fuels. I would defer to the Department of Energy on projected costs for Fischer-Tropsch fuel in the future, but I 

understand that companies would need to pursue market-scale domestic production 

in order to make this fuel cost competitive.

Senator WICKER. All right. Then I thank the chair for his indulgence. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker. 

Senator Pryor, you are next and I understand you, graciously as 

always, yielded a bit of your time to Senator Conrad. We welcome 

Senator Conrad, chairman of our Budget Committee. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KENT CONRAD, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE 

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA 

Senator CONRAD. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: 

I just very briefly wanted to come by and put in a word for General 

369

McNabb. We have two very large Air Force bases in North Dakota 

at Grand Forks and Minot. General McNabb was head of AMC and 

in that role we had a relationship with him, and I just want to report how impressed our entire delegation was with General 

McNabb and how he conducted himself in that position. 

I also want to say that Secretary-designate Donley enjoys a very 

fine reputation, as does General Schwartz. I graduated from high 

school from American Air Force Base in Tripoli, Libya, Wheelus Air 

Force Base, North Africa. I’ve had a long association with the Air 

Force, and we are very lucky to have people of this quality and 

character who are willing to serve. I just wanted to have a chance 

to make that statement. 

I thank the chairman. I thank very much the members of the 

committee, and special thanks to Senator Pryor for his allowing me 

this time. 

Chairman LEVIN. We thank you very much for your comments, 

Senator Conrad. 

Senator WARNER. I’d like to join the chairman in thanking you 

for coming up to speak. I judge that your father was then in the 

Air Force? 

Senator CONRAD. Actually, I lived with a family. The family I 

lived with, the man was the vice president of Mobil Oil in Libya 

when that was the hot spot in the world, and I was allowed to, as 

were all American dependents at that time, allowed to go to the Air 

Force base high school. 

Senator WARNER. That’s very interesting. Thanks for joining us. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much. 

Senator Pryor. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me pick up, if I may, where Senator Nelson of Florida left 

off, and that is on the military housing on the bases. It was recently announced that the Air Force has reached an agreement in 

principle for the sale of a renegotiated housing privatization contract for Little Rock Air Force Base, for Moody, Hanscomb, and 

Patrick Air Force Bases. As this issue has progressed, I just want 

you to know I’ve spoken with Secretary Michael Wynne, met with 

Assistant Secretary William Anderson, sat down with bondholder 

representatives and the current project owners involved in this initiative, and I look forward to working with you on this. I know Senator Chambliss and I have been working on this for a long time, 

but we look forward to working with you to get this over the finish 

line, and I just stand ready to help in any way that I can. 

You don’t have to comment on that, but it’s something that’s very 

important to the men and women in uniform on those bases that 

we get that right. 

Let me talk about something very briefly that the Senate Armed 

Services Committee heard on June 3 of this year, and that is relating to DOD acquisitions of major weapons systems. GAO reported 

to us at that time that there’s a current portfolio of 95 major defense acquisition programs that has experienced a cost growth of 

$295 billion. That’s 95 programs that are $295 billion over budget. 

Many of these are overdue as well in terms of they’re behind schedule. 

370

I would like to hear your thoughts on what you can do to try to 

fix this acquisition problem where we see these cost overruns and 

where timetables seem to chronically slip. I will note that of the 

95 programs, not all of them are in the Air Force. Those are systemwide. I know only a portion are Air Force. But I would like to 

hear from you what you can do to try to rein in the spending and 

get us back on track. 

Mr. DONLEY. Certainly, Senator, I would bring no silver bullets 

to this longstanding issue. I have some experience in this area. To 

me, the core of the issues is back to basics: making sure that we 

understand and can justify the requirements that we are setting 

for these systems; that we are proceeding with technologies that 

are mature and well understood; that we are using reliable cost estimates that reflect the true scope of costs as best as we can understand them; that we have the acquisition work force in place that 

is bringing the experience, properly trained in the right areas, to 

not only prepare but evaluate proposals, and to push these programs along, keep them on schedule. 

So it’s basics. I think it’s basic blocking and tackling. I think the 

Department’s record is when those things occur we get capability, 

we’re more likely to get capability on cost and on schedule. 

General SCHWARTZ. Senator, there are some good examples of 

that occurring. The Joint Direct Attack Munition is a case in point. 

The Global Positioning System 3 is a case in point. It is back to 

basics. I would only add to what the Secretary said that I also believe there is some merit perhaps in assuring that there is sufficient uniform representation in the acquisition process as well, and 

that is something that, if confirmed, he and I certainly will work 

together. 

Senator PRYOR. I’m glad to hear you say that, General Schwartz, 

because that’s one thing I picked up on, is that apparently in some 

branches of the Service they’re having trouble recruiting and retaining the right mix of people there because of the way the overall 

system works. So I would love for you to spend some time and 

maybe address that if it makes sense inside the Air Force. 

We really have to get control of spending. Again, it’s not just the 

Air Force. It’s the other branches of Service as well. 

Let me change gears if I can and ask about close air support in 

Afghanistan. I guess this might be for you, General Schwartz. Do 

you believe we have adequate close air support assets in Afghanistan to complete the mission we have there? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, I believe we have adequate close air support in theater. By the way, this is not just Air Force assets. This 

is the joint team, naval aviation, and so on. It’s not just fighter aircraft. As we spoke earlier, it also includes the bomber platforms 

that support the mission. 

Importantly, there’s a ground component to this. These are the 

folks that guide the weapons onto targets, and they’re an unsung 

part of our Air Force. 

So in short, Senator, I believe we have the resources that are required at this time, and if more are requested more will be provided. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

371

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Pryor. 

This is the current schedule, after consulting with Senator Warner. First of all, we’re going to try to work right through the vote, 

see if we can do that so Senators who haven’t had a chance to ask 

questions can hopefully arrange it so they can ask questions, vote, 

or go vote and come back and ask questions. 

Second, if we can finish this open session by noon; if we do, we’ll 

go directly into executive session and hope to finish by 12:45 or so. 

If we don’t finish by noon, we’ll begin our executive session immediately after the caucuses, and we’ll do that at 2:15. Or if we begin 

the executive session before caucus, but can’t complete it, then we 

would come back and complete the executive session after the caucuses. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your 

leadership in moving us through these issues. 

Certainly the Air Force is facing many challenges. I think we’ve 

had some difficult times in recent months. I know each one of you 

are going to be faced with some difficult choices. So we would expect that within the constraints of budgeting you give us the kind 

of priorities that are critical for the Air Force, and we’ll do our best 

in Congress to fund that, what you need, in the right way. There’s 

just not an unlimited source of money, as you well know. 

I would also note that Secretary Gates has proven to be an exceptionally fine leader. I believe he has unusual support throughout Congress on both sides of the aisle. We’ve had some criticism 

in the past that when errors have occurred higher level people have 

not been held to account, and Secretary Gates has made some decisions that I’m sure people could disagree with. But he made some 

decisions and as a result you’re here today. 

I guess I would say to my colleagues that I do believe that the 

decisive action that Secretary Gates has undertaken puts us in a 

position of fulfilling our responsibilities decisively, which means we 

need to finish these hearings and get you people into place. I just 

don’t think it’s good in these months, with the war going on and 

all the challenges the Air Force faces, that we go weeks and weeks 

without getting you fine nominees into place. We’ll examine any 

questions and Chairman Levin will ensure that occurs, and then if 

you meet the standards I think you should be confirmed, and I 

hope that we will confirm you. 

General Schwartz, you have mentioned, I believe, the tanker 

being the number one priority for the Air Force. We’re already 

maybe 5 or 6 years behind schedule. Do you believe it’s important 

that competition go forward promptly and not be unnecessarily delayed? 

General SCHWARTZ. Absolutely, Senator. Few disagree with the 

essentiality of the modernization program and it is my view that 

we have to keep the timeliness of this foremost in our minds as we 

go forward. 

Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Donley, do you share that view? 

Mr. DONLEY. I do, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. Congress mandated this be bid by statute 

after the Air Force had quite a difficult time and the top civilian 

procurement officer actually later went to jail. But we wanted a 

372

competition. We asked for a competition. I’ll just ask you plainly: 

If you have a competition, should not the best aircraft be the one 

selected, General Schwartz and Secretary Donley? 

General SCHWARTZ. Absolutely, sir. 

Mr. DONLEY. Yes, sir, we want the best tanker for the warfighter 

and the best value for the taxpayer. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think that’s what we told you to do and 

that’s what we’ll have to expect. I hope and trust that you will 

make that on a meritorious basis and not any pressure or anything 

else that would come up, although in truth this decision now will 

be above the Air Force’s level. It will be at the Secretary of Defense 

level, is that right, Mr. Donley? 

Mr. DONLEY. You’re correct, Senator. 

Senator SESSIONS. But I guess your information, technical information, will be shared with the Defense Department? 

Mr. DONLEY. Yes. Secretary Young will have all the support he 

needs and wants from the Air Force in the course of his work. 

Senator SESSIONS. With regard to the fuel question, I was very 

proud of the Air Force. They had taken steps to utilize synthetic 

fuels from energy sources, particularly coal, and seemed to be on 

track to utilizing a substantial portion of jet fuel from synthetic 

fuels, proving that it works already in most aircraft. I think you’ve 

already tested and proven that. 

I guess my concern is that Congress intervened, has it not, and 

that language was slipped in the energy bill that barred the Air 

Force from long-term contracts, which is the kind of long-term contract that would be necessary for this fuel to be manufactured at 

a commercially feasible rate. I was told by the Air Force procurement officer that they expected the costs to come in below the current world price of jet fuel. 

Would either one of you comment on that first? Are you now 

being stopped in that program essentially by being denied the right 

to a long-term contract, and do you expect the price to be competitive? 

Mr. DONLEY. Senator, I need to take that for the record. I’m not 

familiar with the provision that you have cited that may be out 

there. 

[The information referred to follows:]

Currently, Department of Defense (DOD) contracting authority is limited to 5 

years for the procurement of fuel, with options for up to an additional 5 years, not 

to exceed 10 years in total. 

I am told that industry has indicated that DOD long-term contract authority with 

a 10–20 year range could reduce uncertainty for initial entrants to the synthetic 

fuels production market by mitigating risks associated with return on capital. 

With respect to new language regarding fuel procurement. Section 526 of the 2007 

Energy Independence and Security Act restricts the Federal Government from purchasing commercial quantities of alternative and synthetic fuels that have greenhouse gas emissions that are greater than currently available fuels, on a lifecycle 

basis. This does not affect the Air Force aircraft synthetic fuel-blend certification 

program, as section 526 exempts research/test quantities of fuel from application of 

the statute. I understand, however, that DOD is concerned that this statute may 

be overly restrictive, particularly with respect to purchasing fuel overseas for deployed forces and from the perspective of quantifying/certifying a fuel’s lifecycle 

greenhouse emissions. 

With respect to cost, I understand that domestically produced Fischer-Tropsch 

fuels are currently more expensive than petroleum fuels. I would defer to the Department of Energy on projected costs for Fischer-Tropsch fuel in the future, but I 

373

understand that companies would need to pursue market-scale domestic production 

in order to make this fuel cost competitive.

Senator SESSIONS. I just feel like it’s another example of denying 

ourselves domestic energy, putting us on the world stage of having 

to buy from the world market at high prices, which may continue 

to go up, who knows. I really think the Air Force deserves a lot of 

credit for being innovative and creative in looking to do that. 

General Schwartz, you have previously noted that you hope that 

this tanker aircraft would be the kind of aircraft that would be a 

game-changer and that you believe its capabilities with regard to 

personnel, transport, and cargo are important factors in that evaluation; is that correct? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, its primary mission will be air refueling, 

but we can no longer afford to have platforms that are sort of single mission, point mission focused. So the versatility of being able 

to carry passengers and cargo is also important. 

Senator SESSIONS. In fact, the fuel is in the wings, with the main 

cargo compartment available for cargo and personnel in these aircraft; is that generally correct? 

General SCHWARTZ. That’s generally correct, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Secretary, with regard to the Air Force 

Air War College, I’m extremely impressed with that institution and 

believe that for the Air Force to meet its future, which is uncertain, 

it requires constant study and evaluation. I guess I would agree. 

How do you see the role of the Air War College at Maxwell in 

Montgomery, AL, in the future of helping to establish the kind of 

doctrine and to identify the capabilities we need for the future? 

Mr. DONLEY. Senator, Air University is a great asset to the Air 

Force and it provides not only the good training to officers as 

they’re coming up through the ranks, but it also provides a research arm for us to address future innovative ways of doing business, new mission areas, in a research environment. I view it as 

a great resource for Air Force leadership, as well as a teaching institution. 

Senator SESSIONS. I agree. 

Mr. Chairman, my time is up. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

Senator Clinton, would you when you’re completed, if there’s nobody back, recess us until somebody is back, because there is a vote 

on. 

Senator CLINTON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. There’s only 6 or 7 minutes left. 

Senator CLINTON. Would you mind telling them I’m on my way 

as soon as I finish my questions? 

Chairman LEVIN. I will do that. 

Senator CLINTON. I appreciate that. 

Thank you, gentlemen. I’m looking forward to your leadership. I 

think that in fact the Air Force and the country are looking forward to your leadership. 

I’d like to take just a minute to run through quickly the New 

York installations. The Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station, home to 

the Reserve 914th Airlift Wing and the Air National Guard 107th 

Aerial Refueling, survived the last base closing round, but a recommendation was made to convert the 107th to an airlift wing that 

374

would be associated with the Reserve wing at the base. Thus far, 

four C–130s have been identified for the 107th, but I’m eager to 

work with you to identify additional aircraft for the 107th or additional ways to keep the 107th viable going into the future. 

Second, Hancock Field Air National Guard Base in Syracuse is 

transitioning from the 174th Airlift Wing to a Predator mission. 

Again, I’m eager to work to ensure that the transition is smooth 

and that the base does not experience any gaps in service during 

the transition. 

Stratton Air National Guard Base in Schenectady is home to the 

109th Airlift Wing, which has the Polar Ski Bird mission. I think 

these pilots do remarkable work on their skis on the ice and the 

snow, and I think there are additional capabilities for search and 

rescue that should be explored. 

The Stewart Air National Guard Base in Newburgh is home to 

the 105th Airlift Wing, which currently has aging C–5As. Now, 

Stewart itself is a modern, well-equipped installation, and again I’d 

like to work with you to make sure that the mission assigned to 

Stewart can be performed to the highest level of capacity. 

Dublinski Air National Guard Base in Westhampton, Long Island, is home to the 106th Rescue Wing. We successfully obtained 

funding for the first phase of a new pararescue training facility in 

last year’s military construction appropriations bill. We’re in the 

process of obtaining the second phase. But this is so critical along 

the east coast, not only for search and rescue at sea, but also for 

homeland security and weather incidents in terms of providing that 

capacity. 

Now, we also are home to the Air Force Research Laboratory in 

Rome, NY, and the Northeast Air Defense Sector Air National 

Guard unit, also in Rome. The work that is being done at the lab 

in Rome is absolutely amazing in respect to the cyber security and 

support of our men and women in uniform, and I look forward to 

working to develop a very close relationship between the research 

lab and the newly created Cyber Command. 

I would invite each of you to visit with me New York’s Air Force 

installations as your schedule permits and to make sure that we 

meet these tremendous opportunities and resolve any of the challenges that we face. 

Second, when the Air Force announced its tanker refueling contract award to Airbus A–330 last February, I was struck when the 

spokesperson indicated that the Air Force could not and did not 

take into consideration the impact of the award on the U.S. industrial base. Yet title 10 of the U.S. Code requires the Secretary of 

Defense to do just that for ‘‘each major defense acquisition program.’’ 

If you look at title 10, which is in our laws for a purpose, I have 

to ask you to please respond both now and perhaps in writing how 

you will comply with title 10 in regards to the tanker refueling contract process that the Secretary has put into motion. Could I start 

with you, Mr. Donley? 

Mr. DONLEY. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate your listing the 

Guard installations in New York. I’ve had a conversation with the 

Director of the Air Guard, who’s briefed me on the Air Force’s overall plans in response to BRAC to pursue total force initiatives and 

375

associate units in some of these cases. So while I’m not familiar 

with all the details, I have gotten a first cut at that, and in fact 

I have been invited to Niagara already. 

Senator CLINTON. Good. 

Mr. DONLEY. So thank you for that. 

With respect to KC–X, I would defer to the acquisition experts 

on the issues of foreign content. But I would just note as a general 

observation that we live in a global economy, in which most of 

these national companies that we regard as U.S. companies have 

international connections. So attempting to go with U.S. sources 

only in particular situations where it seems to advantage one company over another is really sort of a temporary perspective on I 

think where all of these companies are headed. Aerospace is an 

international business. 

Senator CLINTON. Mr. Donley, it won’t surprise you to hear that 

I disagree. But more important than my disagreement are the very 

specific requirements within title 10, subtitle A, part 4, chapter 

144, section 2440, which reads: ‘‘The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations requiring consideration of the national technology and industrial base in the development and implementation 

of acquisition plans for each major defense acquisition program.’’ 

So I would appreciate receiving in writing from each of you the 

specific answer to my question in relation to title 10. I’m very well 

aware that we live in an international economy, but I’m also extremely conscious of the impact of decisions made by our Government with taxpayer dollars that undermine our competitiveness for 

the long run and eliminate jobs and thereby undermine technical 

skill acquisition in a way that I think will come back to haunt us. 

This is something that I take very seriously. 

In addition, I will submit some other questions for the record. 

[The information referred to follows:]

Mr. DONLEY. Senator Clinton, if confirmed, I can assure you that the Air Force 

will make every effort to comply with all statutes, regulations, and policy guidance 

for every acquisition program. With regard to your specific question concerning consideration of the industrial base in the KC–X contract process, I defer to the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, as Secretary Gates 

has appointed him to serve as the Source Selection Authority for the KC–X, and he 

will be conducting the remaining competition activity. 

General SCHWARTZ. I echo Secretary Donley’s comments. On behalf of the Secretary, I will ensure that our KC–X acquisition team complies with this, and all 

other, title 10 requirements as we move ahead with the KC–X acquisition effort. It’s 

my understanding that under the relevant Department of Defense regulations, the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics is the person 

charged with ensuring compliance with § 2440 and determining whether the KC–X 

program has properly considered national industrial base capabilities in the acquisition planning process. We will work with the Under Secretary’s office to ensure this 

takes place as the KC–X acquisition effort unfolds. 

General MCNABB. Senator Clinton, regarding your concerns for the industrial 

base in the KC–X contract process, I respectfully defer to the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Secretary Gates has appointed 

him to serve as the Source Selection Authority for the KC–X, and he will be conducting the remaining competition activity.

Senator CLINTON. I ask that we now stand in recess until someone else returns to continue the questioning, and I thank each of 

you for your willingness to serve. [Recess.] 

Senator WARNER [presiding]. We’ll continue our questions here. 

Chairman Levin is anxious to have us work right through the vote, 

376

and I believe he announced the fact that we’re going to have the 

executive session. Senator Levin and I have discussed it. We’re 

going to try and hold an executive session following this open session, and that way hopefully wrap up this hearing today. But I’ll 

leave to the chairman the specifics on that. 

General Schwartz—staff will advise me if a member comes and 

I will stop—one of the most difficult aspects of military life is the 

permanent change of stations, and TRANSCOM is in charge of contracting with movers who pack and deliver household goods. We’re 

here talking about weapons systems and so forth, but we have to 

focus on family issues. I think you’ve had a well-deserved contribution to making this happen when you were TRANSCOM Commander. You devoted a great deal of your personal time and energy 

to ensuring that promises for improved moves made by the predecessors in TRANSCOM and the ‘‘Family First’’ program were delivered. In doing so, you kept the promise you made when you were 

confirmed, and we’re grateful for the progress you led in that regard. 

Now, General McNabb is subject to confirmation as the future 

commander. Will you devote similar emphasis on the quality of life 

in the moving? 

So first a comment from General Schwartz, to be followed by 

General McNabb’s observations. 

General SCHWARTZ. Senator Warner, you are absolutely correct 

that one of those activities that happens in any military family 

every so often is relocating. Ways that we can make that relocation 

less stressful, less costly to our personnel, and to raise the level of 

performance of those who provide this service to DOD is an obligation. With the Senate’s and the House’s assistance, we found a way 

to go about doing that, and we’ll be rolling it out this fall, something I think we can be proud of. 

Senator WARNER. Briefly, General McNabb? 

General MCNABB. Senator Warner, absolutely, sir. It’s one of 

those real plusses as I watched General Schwartz and TRANSCOM 

do this, really take it on with the Family First, full replacement 

value, those kinds of initiatives. There’s no question that we recruit 

the individual, but we retain the family, and this is very important 

to all of our DOD families to make sure that they can continue to 

serve. 

Senator WARNER. Momentarily I’ll recognize Senator Chambliss, 

but I want to say that I will provide for the record a series of questions to follow up on this issue of the executive package. There was 

the famous compartment to transport senior officers and civilians. 

We need to have that record tightened up and have clarity of some 

of the issues, because they’re important issues, and we’re going to 

do it by way of putting in questions for the record for you to respond. 

Senator Chambliss. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Gentlemen, first of all, to each of you, thank 

you for your service. Secretary Donley, the first time you and I had 

an opportunity to meet was when you came by my office, but obviously, General Schwartz, General McNabb, I’ve known both of you 

for many years and I appreciate the service of each and every one 

of you. 

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Secretary Donley, we’ve had some questions asked to General 

Schwartz about the F–22, but I want to see where you are on this 

issue. Have you had a chance to look and see with respect to the 

number of tactical aircraft that we have, where the F–22 comes 

down, and formulate an opinion as to what you think with respect 

to the total number that we ought to have in inventory? 

Mr. DONLEY. Sir, I have not had an opportunity to formulate a 

particular number. I am aware that this is an active issue and I 

do support Secretary Gates’ decision to kick this over, essentially, 

to the new administration for their consideration as well. 

In the mean time, I’m focused on the potential need to provide 

bridge funding between the 2009 and the 2010 years that are at 

play here, that will look to providing some bridge capability for 

suppliers to leave this option open. In general, if we delay a decision on the future of the F–22 too far into next year or even late 

next year and we have not provided for this bridge funding, it’ll be 

sort of almost a cold start for many of the sub-tier suppliers, and 

that would be a more expensive option for restarting the line if 

somebody wanted to do that. 

I’m focused for the next few months on getting the bridge funding in place. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. I appreciate your comment relative to the 

potential increase in cost that might occur if we don’t have this 

bridge funding and, frankly, if it doesn’t get spent. I look back on 

some testimony by General Donald Hoffman before Senator 

Lieberman’s Airland Subcommittee on April 9 of this year. At the 

conclusion of that hearing Senator Lieberman said to General Hoffman: ‘‘So what you’re saying is that there is time and money to be 

saved by doing the advanced procurement in November of this 

year’’—which is the bridge funding you’re talking about —‘‘and 

that’s your understanding of Secretary Gates’ position about giving 

the next administration an option, basically meaning that they can 

stop the process if they choose.’’ 

General Hoffman said: ‘‘Yes, sir. Depending on what the next administration would form as a team to build and get that decision 

through Congress as well.’’ 

So my question to both you and General Schwartz is: Do you 

agree with the concept that if we don’t have this bridge funding 

and if we don’t spend the money—and it’s about $550 million that 

will have to go to the subcontractors out there—that will immediately increase the cost per copy of the F–22 and will in effect 

mean that we’re operating with a cold line versus an operating line 

if we don’t spend that money during this period of time going into 

the next administration? 

Mr. DONLEY. Yes. 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. I don’t want to get into much detail relative 

to the issue at Patrick, at Little Rock, and at Moody Air Force 

Base, except, Secretary Donley, to say that this has been a very difficult process. It’s obviously been a very sensitive process. In my 

case at Moody, for example, we’re going to have a significant increase in men and women coming to Moody beginning next year. 

The housing, the privatization housing initiative, was supposed to 

have a certain number of houses available for those men and 

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women coming. Now that’s not going to be available. There’s no 

way under the best scenario it can be. 

I think that the way that the issue has been handled by the Air 

Force was very poor initially. I think some very bad decisions were 

made by the Air Force. But to the credit of the Air Force, since this 

issue has been elevated to the top level I think the issue has been 

addressed very appropriately. I think there has been an agreement 

reached that what’s in the best interests of all the men and women 

that wear the uniform of the United States Air Force ought to be 

taken into account and housing provided, better housing across the 

board at all four of these installations that are in question. 

I applaud the Air Force for moving, for entering into an agreement that we hope will be completed by September of this year. 

You’re going to have this on your plate initially and we may have 

some disagreement within this committee from a parochial standpoint, but I think that the sales agreement that is proposed is fair 

and reasonable across the Air Force and will work. 

General Schwartz, let me just get into a little bit with you an 

issue which you and I have talked about in my office, because I 

don’t want there to be any misunderstanding or anything left on 

the table, either from your perspective or our perspective. It regards some conversations that you as the J–2 had back in the 

2003–2004 timeframe relative to certain ammunition sites that 

were located in Iraq and action taken by you relative to the securing of those sites. 

First of all, as the J–2 what was your responsibility with respect 

to activities going on inside of Iraq during that timeframe of 2003–

2004? 

General SCHWARTZ. Senator, I actually was serving as the J–3 at 

the time. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. I’m sorry. J–3. 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir. But I had no operational responsibility inside Iraq at that time. As the J–3, I acted on behalf of the 

Chairman, who was General Dick Myers at the time, and worked 

in my channel with the J–3 at Central Command and the counterpart at the time at the Combined Joint Task Force 7. But I had 

no directive authority, if you will, for activity that occurred on the 

ground in Iraq. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. You became aware of the ammunition sites 

that were unsecured in Iraq during the course of that period of 

time, early 2003, I believe; is that a fair statement? 

General SCHWARTZ. It was post-major combat operations, so it 

was in the summer of 2003 onward. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. The issue was obviously very sensitive. It 

was discussed within this committee both in classified settings as 

well as otherwise with you and with other members of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. What action did you take to ensure that the information relative to the fact that there were a number of sites that 

were unsecured were in fact going to be secured so that there could 

not be pilferage of the ammunition sites and the consequences of 

that being insurgents would have the munitions with which to 

make improvised explosive devices, which in fact they did? 

General SCHWARTZ. Senator, we received information from a 

Member of the House of Representatives on the existence of caches 

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that had pilferable munitions. We devoted analytical resources to 

that information to try to confirm the locations and what have you, 

and in fact much of that information did prove valid. 

I provided that information to my counterparts at Central Command and Combined Joint Task Force 7 and expressed our view 

that those sites which were pilferable, in other words small arms 

and such, that were more easily carted away, rather than other locations that had larger weapons that were more difficult to move, 

should be addressed first. 

We passed that information. We passed the intelligence work 

that we had done and certainly encouraged the commanders that 

had tactical control of the battle space to accord that, those locations, appropriate priority for what, how, and how much to protect. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Did you follow up to see that the information that you passed on to Central Command was in fact acted 

upon? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, I confirmed that the information was received and understood and that the commander was aware and 

again had made a judgment based on the resources at his disposal 

what he was going to do. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. As the J–3, did you have any chain of command control over any officers on the ground in Iraq during that 

period of time? 

General SCHWARTZ. No, sir, I did not, Senator. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Mr. Chairman, I think the remainder of my 

questions will be for executive session. 

Chairman LEVIN [presiding]. Thank you. There will be questions 

asked for the record, additional public session questions. Senator 

Warner has an additional question or two. We’re going to I think 

be able to conclude in the next 5 minutes. We do have another Senator on her way, which means we may not be able to get to executive session. Let me withhold that comment about executive session 

and see if Senator McCaskill is able to get here. 

Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, this 

is a subject that the two of us have worked on for many years. In 

fiscal year 2001—I think I was the chairman; we’ve gone back and 

forth—we put into law a framework that established goals that 

within 10 years one-third of the U.S. military operational deep 

strike aircraft would be unmanned. I’m sure that each of you are 

familiar with that. I look back on that with a sense of pride at 

what the committee did at that point in time, because it really energized a lot of the systems that are being utilized today in both 

Iraq and Afghanistan, the unmanned surveillance vehicles and the 

like. 

I’d like to have your comment, Mr. Secretary. Do you support 

that goal that Congress established and will you take affirmative 

actions to implement your Department to achieve them? This is a 

subject I think Secretary Gates—again I commend him for specifically expressing his concerns about the Department of the Air 

Force and their emphasis on the unmanned vehicle program. 

First you, Mr. Secretary. Then we’ll have General Schwartz. 

Mr. DONLEY. Thank you, Senator. This is a very important issue 

and I think a very laudable goal that the committee has laid out 

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in front of the Department. I have not had a chance to look specifically at where we stand in terms of meeting the specific numerical 

goal established by the committee. But I can tell you that the Department is pushing in this direction and I think you have seen 

that in the last couple of years with the growth in the requests for 

unmanned aerial systems in the Air Force budget. I believe this 

year it’s 50 percent of the air frames that have been requested are 

for unmanned systems, and I think you will see that trend generally continuing. 

Exactly where we are on the road to meeting the committee’s 

goal, I’m sorry I can’t say right now. But this is an important development for DOD, not just the Air Force, but for the joint 

warfighters, in both the air-to-ground attack modes and also in the 

ISR modes. Those areas are working very closely together. The 

joint warfighters have been signaling demand and the military departments have been responding with more supply. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you. 

General Schwartz? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, it is clear that that’s the path we are on, 

and in fact we have migrated from the Predator now to the Reaper, 

a more capable, multi-mission platform for either the strike or the 

surveillance mission. In fact, the first Reaper mission was executed 

yesterday in the Central Command AOR, and that clearly will continue. 

[The information referred to follows:]

‘‘In fact, the first Reaper mission was excuted yesterday in Central Command 

area of responsibility, and that clearly will continue.’’

While that statement is correct, it would be more factually accurate to say the 

Reaper mission was executed in Iraq. I wanted to clarify that point for the record.

Senator WARNER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. On the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) question, are there adequate UAVs in both Iraq and Afghanistan to 

meet the requirements in each country, do you know, Secretary 

Donley? 

Mr. DONLEY. Sir, I would defer to my military colleagues on the 

specific requirements. I will say my understanding is the requirements have been increasing because as the capability gets there 

the commanders ask for more. We’ve been working hard with the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense to put together an ISR task force, 

challenging the Air Force and the other military departments to 

deliver more capability more quickly to the theater. 

Chairman LEVIN. General? 

General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, we currently have 26 orbits 

of unmanned capability in theater, growing to 31 by the end of this 

year. The truth of the matter is that there is more demand than 

we are able to provide supply. But my sense is, based on what I 

know, we’re acting aggressively in that regard, and if confirmed I 

will continue to do so. 

Chairman LEVIN. We need you both to look to make sure that we 

are going 24–7 on this production of these capabilities. They’re absolutely essential and we’re still short. Senator Warner’s leadership 

back in the early 1990s should have led to a much greater capability by this time. But without that leadership, we wouldn’t even 

381

be as advanced as where we are. That was an important initiative 

of his and this committee’s, and it is something that we’re proud 

of because there was a lot of foresight involved in it. But again, 

we’re going to keep the pressure on you folks to come across with 

the capability that we need to meet the requirements. 

Senator McCaskill is now here and I’ve already announced that 

we would go into executive session if we could get there by noon. 

We obviously won’t be there by noon now and I’m wondering 

whether Senator McCaskill—will you be using your full 7 minutes, 

so I can make a judgment? 

Senator MCCASKILL. I probably can do it in less than 7 minutes. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. I don’t think there are any additional 

questions. Do either of you have additional questions? 

Senator WARNER. We’ll submit them for the record, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. The record will be kept open for questions. When Senator McCaskill finishes we will go to executive session, even though it’ll be about 12:15. Would all the staff notify 

members who want to participate? We’ll try to finish that in a half 

an hour. If we can’t do it, we’ll have to continue after the caucuses. 

Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the 

committee showing the courtesy of allowing me to run over here as 

quickly as possible. 

I do not want to let this hearing conclude without sounding a 

note of contract accountability and contract overruns. As you are 

very aware, General Schwartz and Mr. Donley, your predecessors, 

there were some significant questions about a contract that was let 

for the public relations contract for the Thunderbirds. 

General McNabb, for you, I was embarrassed about changing the 

color of the leather in the comfort pods. Blue leather doesn’t show 

less dirt than brown leather. I’m a mom; brown leather is your best 

friend. I would like to start with you speaking to a culture that 

would take funds from the global war on terror and think it was 

appropriate to spend money changing the color of the leather on 

the comfort pods for the highest levels of the Air Force from brown 

to blue. 

General MCNABB. Senator, I am not aware of that decision to 

change brown to blue, other than what I’ve read in the Post. The 

part that I would say is that the whole idea of the comfort pod was 

to save money versus dedicated airplanes. It was directly to try to 

get to something that we could put on our 900 sorties a day that 

we have in airlift airplanes and be able to take advantage of that, 

to include in the theater, but also to the theater, for our senior 

leaders. It’s military and civilians, it’s all Services. 

As the discussion has gone through and we’ve developed the prototype, there have been decisions made. I left Scott last August and 

so I would just say that as this prototype has developed there have 

been additional decisions that have been made. 

Senator MCCASKILL. This decision was made while you were 

there. This was a decision that was while you were there. This 

wasn’t as if we’re picking it ahead of time. They’d already been 

done in brown and someone decided it was appropriate to rip off 

the brown leather and go to the expense of changing it to blue. 

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This is just one little thing, but it speaks to a culture, and that’s 

what strikes fear in my governmental accountability heart, that 

there was a culture that said: Rip off the brown leather, take off 

the brown seat belts; there’s not a pocket in the side for our reading material. We would spend money on that kind of item. That’s 

what I’m trying to get to. 

Maybe, General Schwartz and Mr. Donley, you can speak to this 

and to that culture. That is offensive to the American taxpayer. It 

seems capricious. It seems arbitrary. It seems like folks up there 

have lost touch with the fact that this isn’t monopoly money. I 

know it’s a little bit of money compared to a tanker. It’s a little bit 

of money compared to the budget. But it is in fact a culture that 

shows that there is not the level of accountability that I think the 

American taxpayer and our men and women in uniform deserve. 

General Schwartz, Mr. Donley? 

General SCHWARTZ. A strong ethical culture in the United States 

Air Force is a personal priority, ma’am. If confirmed I will deal decisively with identified deviations, ethical lapses, if you will, while 

strengthening education and training related to ethical conduct. If 

confirmed, ma’am, I will make it clear to all commanders, senior 

noncommissioned officers, and civilians that they have an obligation to live an ethical lifestyle each and every day in our Air Force. 

Mr. DONLEY. Senator, I am firmly of the belief that accountability at all levels is essential for the daily operation of the Air 

Force in all the missions that we do. So none of this makes sense 

to me as a taxpayer. I will say that, to just echo General McNabb’s 

point and to elaborate just briefly on the cost effectiveness of this 

approach overall, the Air Force does operate a fleet of 30 aircraft 

to support the executive operations of this government 24–7—the 

President and the Vice President, the members of the Cabinet, the 

DOD leadership, and Members of Congress. This is a mission that 

we have, that we will continue to perform. 

These pallets are a very cost effective way of going about that 

mission for a fleet that is tightly controlled and in high demand. 

But this color issue, none of this makes sense to me. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. I have no problem with the pallets if 

it’s going to make it more cost effective and I’m assuming there 

was a cost-benefit analysis that was done that bore that out. I certainly get it that you guys have to fly around all the mucketymucks, including us, and that’s understandable. 

But I will tell you, if there’s anybody that’s going to complain 

about the color of the leather on the seat and if we’re going to 

change and spend taxpayer money to change the color of the seat, 

they don’t deserve to be in that airplane. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. 

What we’ll do now is we’re going to adjourn and we will go to 

executive session, go to our regular committee room, Russell 222, 

and take 5 minutes to do it. So we’ll start right at 20 minutes after 

12:00. 

We thank you, we thank your families, and we will stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:14 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

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[Prepared questions submitted to Michael B. Donley by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of 

command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms 

have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution 

of military operations. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. I strongly supported these reforms from my early days on the Senate 

Armed Services Committee staff through my service at the National Security Council where I fought for their enactment in what eventually became the GoldwaterNichols Act. If confirmed, I will be mindful of the need to periodically review organizational and management frameworks to ensure their continued validity and consistency with the provisions of Goldwater-Nichols. I will work closely with the Secretary of Defense and Congress to continually review Goldwater-Nichols and implement any changes that may be needed. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. I have no suggested modifications at this time. 

Question. Do you believe that the role of the service chiefs under the GoldwaterNichols legislation is appropriate and the policies and processes in existence allow 

that role to be fulfilled? 

Answer. I do believe that the roles of the service chiefs under Goldwater-Nichols 

are appropriate and the policies and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled. 

Question. Do you see a need for any change in those roles, with regard to the resource allocation process or otherwise? 

Answer. I do not see a need to modify the roles of the service chiefs under Goldwater-Nichols, particularly as that regards the resource allocation process. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 8013 of title 10, U.S.C., discusses the responsibilities and authority of the Secretary of the Air Force. Other sections of law and traditional practice, also establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Secretary of the Air Force to 

the following officials: 

The Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Secretary of Defense is responsible for all matters within the Department of Defense (DOD). The Secretary of the Air Force is subject to the authority, 

direction and control of the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed I look forward to 

working closely with the Secretary of Defense. 

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense assists the Secretary of Defense in carrying out his duties and responsibilities and performs those duties assigned by the 

Secretary of Defense or by law. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense on all matters. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 

Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD, AT&L) is DOD’s most senior acquisition official. If confirmed, I look forward to working with this official on all matters related to acquisition, technology 

and logistics programs impacting the Department of the Air Force. 

Question. Chief of Staff of the Air Force. 

Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force is subject to the authority, direction, 

and control of the Secretary of the Air Force, presides over the Air Staff, and is a 

principal advisor to the Secretary. In addition, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff he is a military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and 

the Secretary of Defense. There is no more important relationship within the Air 

Force than that between the Secretary and the Chief of Staff. If confirmed, I would 

foster a close working relationship with the Chief of Staff to ensure that policies and 

384

resources are appropriate to meet the needs of the Air Force and respect his additional responsibilities as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Question. The Under Secretary of the Air Force. 

Answer. The Under Secretary of the Air Force is authorized, subject to the Secretary of the Air Force’s direction and control, to act for and with the authority of 

the Secretary of the Air Force on all matters for which the Secretary is responsible; 

that is to conduct the affairs of the Department of the Air Force. In addition, the 

Under Secretary of the Air Force has duties and responsibilities, when delegated by 

the Secretary of the Air Force, as the DOD Executive Agent for Space. 

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. 

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chairman through the Chief of Staff of 

the Air Force on all joint matters affecting the Air Force. 

Question. The Combatant Commanders. 

Answer. I will work with the Chief of Staff to ensure that the Air Force is properly organized, trained, and equipped to provide the capabilities the combatant commanders need to execute their missions. This goal can be achieved through forthright dialogue which I will encourage. 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition. 

Answer. The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition acts as the Senior Acquisition Executive for the Air Force. If confirmed, I will work closely with 

the Assistant Secretary on acquisition matters. I will also ensure that military views 

are well represented in the Air Force acquisition process and that the Chief of Staff 

is fully informed on acquisition matters. 

Question. The General Counsel of the Air Force. 

Answer. The General Counsel is the chief legal officer and chief ethics official of 

the Department of the Air Force and serves as the senior legal advisor to Air Force 

leaders. She is responsible, on behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force, for the effective and efficient provision of legal services in the Air Force. If confirmed, I would 

look forward to developing a good working relationship with the General Counsel. 

Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force 

Answer. The Judge Advocate General (TJAG), per 10 U.S.C. § 8037, is the legal 

advisor of the Secretary of the Air Force and of all officers and agencies of the Department of the Air Force. He is also responsible for directing judge advocates in 

the performance of their duties. If confirmed I will endeavor to maintain the close 

working relationship the Secretary of the Air Force has historically enjoyed with 

TJAG. 

Question. The Superintendent of the U.S. Air Force Academy. 

Answer. The United States Air Force Academy is an invaluable institution that 

continues to attract the brightest young women and men from across the United 

States. The Academy functions as a separate Field Operating Agency reporting 

through the Chief of Staff to the Secretary of the Air Force. If confirmed, I will work 

closely with the Superintendent to address issues faced by the Academy and to promote the Academy’s sustained commitment to excellence and fulfillment of its mission to train and educate future Air Force leaders. 

Question. The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). 

Answer. Under current organizational relationships, the Under Secretary of the 

Air Force is no longer dual-hatted as the Director, NRO. However, a strong collaborative relationship between the Air Force and the NRO remains essential to facilitate continuing Air Force technical and personnel support for the NRO’s mission. 

If confirmed, I will work to foster a close working relationship with the Director, 

NRO. 

Question. The Director of National Intelligence. 

Answer. It is also vital that a strong collaborative working relationship exist between the Air Force and the Director of National Intelligence. If confirmed, I will 

work with the Director of National Intelligence to foster that relationship, particularly in coordination of national security space matters. 

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Secretary 

of the Air Force? 

Answer. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. section 8013 and subject to the authority, direction 

and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force is responsible 

for and has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the Department of the 

Air Force. These functions include organizing, supplying, equipping, training, maintaining, and administering the Air Force. The Secretary of the Air Force is also perVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00390 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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forming the duties of the DOD Executive Agent for Space in the absence of an 

Under Secretary to whom these duties had previously been delegated. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect 

that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you? 

Answer. If confirmed as the Secretary of the Air Force, I would expect the Secretary of Defense to assign me duties consistent with the responsibilities outlined 

above. 

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your 

ability to perform the duties of the Secretary of the Air Force? 

Answer. Title 10 provides for two staffs in the same headquarters, a predominantly military Air Staff and a predominantly civilian Secretariat. My intention is 

that these two staffs will function effectively together as a single headquarters team 

supporting the needs of both the Chief of Staff and the Secretary, while protecting 

the Chief of Staff’s independent advisory role as a member of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. I will foster close working relationships between the civilian and military 

staffs and work with them on matters within their areas of responsibility in order 

to more effectively lead and manage the Department of the Air Force. 

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies 

you for this position? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will bring 30 years of experience in the national security 

community. I have served on the professional staff of this committee, on the staff 

of the National Security Council, and held various leadership positions within DOD 

and the defense industry. Most recently, I served as Director of Administration and 

Management in the Office of the Secretary of Defense with broad responsibilities in 

the Pentagon and the National Capital Region. In 1993, I served as Acting Secretary of the Air Force for 7 months, after serving 4 years as the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller). 

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Secretary of the Air Force? 

Answer. The joint nomination of both a new Secretary and new Chief of Staff 

under the current circumstances is unprecedented. The immediate challenges are to 

restore confidence in the Air Force among those to whom we are responsible, build 

personal and institutional relationships with Congress and the national security 

community, and undertake actions to address the issues—such as re-establishing 

focus on the nuclear enterprise—that brought us to this point. 

Other key challenges include: Maintaining focus on support to current operations 

while also planning to meet potential future threats; maintaining aging fleets of aircraft while conducting recapitalization; migrating supplemental funding to the Air 

Force’s base budget; rising operational costs, especially in personnel support, medical care, and fuel; meeting new mission requirements in intelligence, surveillance 

and reconnaissance, space, and cyber domains; and preparing for transition to a new 

administration. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. Working with the Chief of Staff and the Air Force leadership team, and 

OSD and the Joint Staff, I plan to address these issues within DOD’s existing planning, programming, and budgeting cycles. 

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Secretary of the Air Force? 

Answer. The immediate challenge is to build trust and confidence in the Air Force 

leadership team. 

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would you establish to address these problems? 

Answer. I am a strong believer in the Air Force core values of Integrity First, 

Service Before Self, and Excellence in All We Do. If confirmed, I will work with the 

Air Force leadership team to define specific plans to meet these challenges that 

build on these core values and enable the Air Force to support joint, interagency, 

and coalition operations when and where needed. 

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish? 

Answer. As Acting Secretary since June 21, following Admiral Donald’s report to 

the Secretary of Defense, I have directed preparation of a strategic roadmap within 

386

90 days for rebuilding the Air Force nuclear enterprise and also set in motion a review of related accountability matters. In addition, I have directed a review of acquisition lessons learned from the GAO’s sustainment of Boeing’s protest on the KC–

X program. 

Going forward, my broad priorities will be consistent with those set by the Secretary of Defense for DOD as a whole—Prevail in Global War on Terror; Strengthen 

Joint Warfighting Capabilities; Focus on People; and Transform Enterprise Management. 

READINESS LEVELS

Question. What is your assessment of the current readiness of the Air Force to 

execute its assigned missions? 

Answer. I have not yet had time to make a fully informed assessment of current 

readiness. 

Question. What do you view as the major readiness challenges that will have to 

be addressed by the Air Force over the next 5 years, and, if confirmed, how will 

you approach these issues? 

Answer. My initial impression is that we have a high operational tempo 

(OPTEMPO), aging aircraft, personnel shortages, and several stressed career fields. 

I plan to review these matters during ongoing Air Force and DOD discussions on 

the fiscal year 2010 program and budget. 

PERSONNEL AND HEALTH BENEFIT COSTS

Question. The cost of the Defense Health Program, like the cost of medical care 

nation-wide, is escalating rapidly. Similarly, the cost of personnel as a key component of the Services’ budgets has risen significantly in recent years. 

If confirmed, how would you approach the issue of rising health care and personnel costs? 

Answer. One of our top priorities is to take care of our airmen and their families. 

As a retention force, quality of health care is of critical concern to our airmen and 

any degradation of benefits or service risks hurting our recruiting and retention. 

If confirmed, I will continue efforts from the past 10 years to streamline our organic medical infrastructure and take advantage of advancements in the field of 

medicine. I also understand that the Air Force is continuing to work with DOD and 

the other military services to streamline medical infrastructure; leveraging civilian 

trauma centers and other Service/Veterans Administration medical facilities to reduce the number of facilities/personnel required to reduce costs. We will continue 

to optimize the use of our assets and those of our partners to ensure the greatest 

return on our investments. 

With regard to personnel costs, increasing pay and benefits, along with other efforts to recruit and retain our high quality airmen, have resulted in increasing personnel costs. I believe that these benefits are appropriate, particularly in light of 

our high OPTEMPO. If confirmed I would expect to continue to budget for all authorized personnel pay and health care benefits in our President’s budget submission. If necessary, these nondiscretionary accounts will be paid first before deciding 

on programmatic funding levels. 

SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED AIRMEN

Question. Wounded airmen from Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom deserve the highest priority from the Air Force for support services, healing 

and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition 

from Active Duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. 

What policies and practices does the Air Force have in place to deal with severely 

wounded and injured airmen? 

Answer. The Air Force runs two main programs that work together for our 

wounded airmen and their families: the Survivor Assistance Program and the 

Wounded Warrior Program. The Survivor Assistance Program tracks the wounded 

Airman from the time of injury and arranges for a sister unit to assign a Family 

Liaison Officer (FLO) at each en-route stop and treatment location. The FLO serves 

as the personal representative of the member’s commander, a bond between the Air 

Force and the family members, and a link to the array of Air Force assistance and 

support services. FLOs play an important role in taking care of the needs of the 

wounded airman: keeping their families informed, arranging to reunite family members with the wounded at the earliest opportunity, and providing whatever assistance the wounded or families need for lodging, transportation, or administrative 

chores. 

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Our first priority is to retain those seriously wounded airmen who want to remain 

a part of the Active-Duty Force. We may do this by offering a limited duty assignment to the airman, or through retraining opportunities into a career field for which 

the airman is otherwise qualified. Our combat wounded airmen have a wealth of 

experience to offer and I strongly support the retention of these heroes in our Air 

Force. 

Wounded airmen may elect to accept a medical retirement, or due to the severity 

of their injuries, may not be able to remain on Active Duty. In these cases, our 

Wounded Warrior program will step in to offer a host of services, including employment assistance, financial counseling, and to serve as an advocate with numerous 

Federal, State, and private organizations. We owe our airmen who have made tremendous sacrifices for our country every ounce of support we can provide to ensure 

they have an opportunity to lead a fulfilling life despite their severe injuries. 

Question. How does the Air Force provide follow-on assistance to wounded personnel who have separated from active service? How effective are those programs? 

Answer. The Air Force Wounded Warrior program provides follow-up for a minimum of 5 years to those airmen who have separated as a result of their wounds. 

This support includes regular contact with the wounded member, a variety of services including resume writing, job placement assistance, serving as a liaison with 

the Veterans Administration, and a host of other services based on the needs of the 

airman and family. The personalized service provided seems very effective, and if 

confirmed, I will keep my fingers on the pulse of the program by giving it a fresh 

look on a regular basis and personally visiting Air Force Wounded Warriors. 

Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you 

would pursue to increase the Air Force’s support for wounded personnel, and to support their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life? 

Answer. The joint DOD–DVA Senior Oversight Committee (SOC) has laid the 

groundwork for added improvements to the wounded warrior program for all of the 

Services. If confirmed, I’d like to see these improvements implemented expeditiously 

and plan for the Air Force to be both a leader and a partner with our sister Services 

in making this happen. Support of the families of our wounded is a fundamental 

responsibility where we as a country cannot fail. For example, families who provide 

nonmedical attendant care for a loved one, in many cases, do so at the expense of 

their job and that lost income is crucial to the financial well-being of the family. 

This is the type of situation where we must do better and is one of the many areas 

being addressed by the SOC. If confirmed, I will look forward to working with our 

sister Services to continue improving programs and policies that serve our wounded 

airmen and their families. 

SURGE CAPABILITY FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES

Question. The Army Mental Health Advisory Team’s reports, which look at the 

mental well-being and morale of Army soldiers deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan 

each year, have stated that soldiers on their third or fourth deployments were at 

high risk for mental health problems. In addition, reports have stated that deployment length was related to higher rates of mental health problems. In light of the 

fact that many Army units have endured multiple deployments, it is anticipated 

that there will be a sharp increase in the need for behavioral health services to help 

returning servicemembers and their families cope with reintegration into a non-combat environment. 

If confirmed, will you assess the sufficiency of Air Force behavioral health assets 

to support the Army on a temporary basis during these surge periods when Army 

combat teams return from their deployments and provide such support to the extent 

that Air Force assets are sufficient to do so? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would want the Air Force to extend our support of the 

Army by assessing the mental health needs of deployed and returning personnel 

and assist in determining how best to utilize all available resources to support those 

needs, to the maximum extent that our assets would allow. Roughly 40 percent of 

deployed Air Force mental health personnel currently support joint missions. 

POST-DEPLOYMENT HEALTH CONCERNS

Question. The health-related problems experienced after Operations Desert Shield 

and Desert Storm led to the Department, at congressional direction, undertaking extensive efforts to establish a comprehensive health database on deployed forces 

based on pre- and post-deployment health surveys. 

If confirmed, what actions would you expect to take to ensure that the Air Force 

uses available data on the health of returning airmen to ensure that appropriate 

treatment is available and that all signs of deployment-related illnesses or potential 

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illnesses (including post-traumatic stress disorder and traumatic brain injury) are 

identified and documented in health records? 

Answer. The health and well-being of our airmen are the cornerstone of our mission readiness. We aggressively assess, track and manage physical and mental readiness upon accession; during yearly health assessments; prior to deployments; immediately following deployments; and again 90–180 days post-deployment. Each assessment provides an opportunity for airmen to discuss any and all health concerns 

with their healthcare provider. Traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder and other combat related health concerns are assessed during these health assessments. If confirmed, I would expect to continue these practices. 

MEDICAL PERSONNEL SHORTAGES

Question. The military medical and dental corps of all three Services are facing 

unprecedented challenges in the recruitment and retention of medical and dental 

personnel needed to support DOD’s medical mission. 

What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address recruitment and retention 

challenges in the Air Force Medical Services including the Air Force Reserve? 

Answer. In response to the challenging recruiting and retention environment for 

health professionals, the AF stood up the Recruiting and Retention Investment 

Strategy Council (RRISC). The RRISC is chartered to review, integrate and approve 

policies and strategies that drive recruiting and retention programs and funding requirements and to approve the prioritization of programming inputs to the AF Corporate Structure for those programs. The initial focus has been on critically manned 

health professionals, specifically defining the optimal investment strategy for the 

Dental Corps and select AFSCs of the Medical Corps. If confirmed, I would expect 

to continue this approach and to seek others that will assist in recruiting and retention of medical professionals. 

Question. Are you confident that the Department has sufficient tools to achieve 

goals for recruitment and retention of highly-skilled health care personnel? If not, 

what additional tools should be considered? 

Answer. I do not have a fully formed opinion on this question, but will consider 

those tools best suited to this challenge, such as accessions bonuses for fully qualified healthcare providers and an increase in medical and dental scholarships. 

BATTLEFIELD AIRMEN

Question. Operations in Iraq have required Air Force personnel to provide direct 

support to ground forces, including participation in convoy duty. The training provided to deployed airmen who may be required to defend a convoy and installations 

against insurgents must be sufficient to prepare them for combat. 

What nontraditional roles and missions can the Air Force assume to assist the 

ground forces? 

Answer. Currently 93 percent of airmen who perform in-lieu-of (ILO) duties do so 

within their core-competency in 34 distinct skill sets. These include civil affairs, 

public affairs/legal/chaplain, Intel/counter-intel, medical, communications, logistics, 

civil engineers, and security forces. Some airmen (7 percent of ILO) form Ad Hoc 

teams and provide individual skills that no Service is organized, trained, or 

equipped to perform. By continually assessing and modifying ILO training to meet 

the ever-changing threat, we ensure airmen have the most current skill sets necessary to perform their assigned mission. If confirmed, I will expect the Air Force 

to aggressively assess ways that we can can continue to support the ground forces. 

Question. What training is being provided to airmen who are assigned to, or who 

volunteer to perform, convoy duty, or other duties requiring proficiency in small 

arms or crew served weapons? 

Answer. Airmen that perform convoy duty attend Basic Combat Convoy Course 

(BC3) training at Camp Bullis, TX. Other ILO airmen attend training at various 

Army Power Projection Platforms tailored to their specific mission. Additionally, 

Second Air Force established a Training and Equipment Review Board (TERB) to 

monitor and modify training to meet the gaining commander’s needs and ensure 

ILO airmen can operate and survive in their deployed environment. 

Question. What is your assessment of the sufficiency of the training currently 

being given to Aerospace Expeditionary Force airmen deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Answer. I have not yet had the opportunity to address this issue but, if confirmed, 

would expect to do so in advance of AEF rotations scheduled for later this year. 

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AIR FORCE END STRENGTH

Question. The Secretary of Defense recently announced he would halt the reduction in Air Force Active-Duty end strength, and keep the Active Air Force at 

330,000. For fiscal year 2008, Congress authorized an Active-Duty Air Force end 

strength of 329,563 and for fiscal year 2009, the Department requested, and budgeted for, an Active-Duty end strength of 316,600. 

How does the Air Force plan to fund the extra end strength? 

Answer. In the near-term, the Air Force is halting the previously planned drawdown. By stopping the drawdown in fiscal year 2008, force shaping initiatives, such 

as Voluntary Separation Pay, will not be needed in fiscal year 2009 as originally 

budgeted. The Air Force will apply those funds to cover costs associated with fiscal 

year 2009 manpower increases. The long-term manpower increases supporting ongoing, new and emerging missions are being addressed in the fiscal year 2010 Program Objective Memorandum (POM). 

Question. Does the Air Force plan to formally request Congress to authorize an 

Active-Duty Air Force end strength of 330,000 for fiscal year 2009, or does it plan 

to rely on its authority to suspend end strength limitations in time of war or national emergency? 

Answer. I understand the Air Force included in its fiscal year 2009 Unfunded Priority List to Congress a request for funding end strength at 330,000 in fiscal year 

2009. If funded, then the Air Force expects to receive authorization. If not funded, 

then the Air Force will consider exercising its authority to suspend end strength 

limitations in time of war. 

Question. Does the Air Force plan to identify and formally request reprogramming 

authority to pay for the end strength of 330,000? 

Answer. The Air Force is committed to resource the manpower within fiscal year 

2009 funding. While a reprogramming cannot be ruled out completely, right now we 

do not believe it will be necessary. 

Question. Are there any increases to the Air Force Reserve or Air Guard planned 

in addition to the increases in the Active component? 

Answer. Yes, there is a commensurate increase to Air Force Reserve end-strength 

planned. Both Reserve and Regular staffs are working to ensure we are adding back 

the correct mix of part-time and full-time reservists. 

There are currently no plans to increase Air National Guard (ANG) end strength. 

As part of their planned reductions under Program Budget Decision (PBD) 720, the 

ANG elected to accept budget offsets versus manpower reductions. While this offered a temporary solution to funding their portion of PBD 720, the budgetary offsets will have direct impact to their overall declining readiness. We intend to seek 

solutions through either reimbursement or through the use of associate constructs 

to maximize the capability of all components. 

Question. Your predecessor said earlier this year that the reductions in end 

strength, even to 316,600, were not enough to allow the Air Force to realize its recapitalization goals. 

How does keeping Air Force Active end strength at 330,000 impact recapitalization? 

Answer. The Air Force initiated a manpower drawdown from 360,000 to 316,000 

in an effort to free up funding to self finance the recapitalization effort. 

Looking at ongoing missions and the expected growth in new mission areas, the 

Air Force realized it needed to stop the drawdown at 330,000. 

The drawdown halt will keep us at 330,000, but the content of people/skill sets 

within the 330,000 will need to be shaped in order to meet evolving mission requirements. We are looking to utilize Defense Department’s revised fiscal guidance for 

the FYDP beginning in fiscal year 2010, to help sustain 330,000 and minimize the 

impact on our recapitalization efforts. 

TRANSFORMATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Question. Legislative proposals introduced in 2008, and recommendations by the 

Commission on the National Guard and Reserves submitted on March 1, 2007, and 

January 31, 2008, are currently under consideration. 

How do you assess the proposed changes in the roles and mission of the National 

Guard and the National Guard Bureau? 

Answer. I supported the broad intent of this legislation to better connect the National Guard Bureau with DOD and joint leadership, while maintaining necessary 

connectivity with the Army and Air Force. 

Question. Do you think the Air Force processes for planning, programming, and 

budgeting sufficiently address the requirements of the National Guard? What is the 

appropriate role for the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in this regard? 

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Answer. Yes. The Director of the Air National Guard has been, and will remain, 

a valued, active participant in Air Force Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 

Execution (PPBE) processes. The Air National Guard is a full participant in the 

Total Force approach to our missions, and its requirements accommodate our planning, programming and budgeting. 

The Chief National Guard Bureau participates in Joint Staff capability-based 

planning and assessments, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System and DOD PPBE process deliberations and actions pertaining to National Guard 

capabilities, including but not limited to homeland defense and defense support of 

civil authorities. 

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that the resourcing needs of the Air 

National Guard and Air Force Reserve are fully considered and resourced through 

the Air Force Budget? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Chief of the Air Force Reserve and 

the Director of the Air National Guard maintain their highly influential roles within 

the corporate structure of the Air Force, and that the Chief, National Guard Bureau 

remains well-connected to Air Force resourcing decisions. Air Force Reserve and Air 

National Guard advisors are fully integrated throughout the entire structure of the 

Air Force and actively participate in resourcing discussions. I would expect this to 

continue. 

Question. What is your view of the appropriate role of the National Guard Bureau 

in relation to the military departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff? 

Answer. If confirmed as the Secretary of the Air Force, I will look forward to 

working with the Chief, National Guard Bureau, in executing the new National 

Guard Bureau Charter. The Air Force will maintain connectivity to joint matters 

involving the National Guard Bureau through established Joint Staff processes. 

RESERVE DEPLOYMENT AND MOBILIZATION

Question. In recent years, Reserve Force management policies and systems have 

been characterized as ‘‘inefficient and rigid’’ and insufficiently integrated with Active-Duty units and personnel, and readiness levels have been adversely affected by 

equipment stay-behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies. 

What are your views on the optimal role for the Air Force Reserve and Air Guard 

in meeting combat missions? 

Answer. I believe the Air Force is the model for melding Guard, Reserve, and civilians with its Active-Duty elements through a Total Force philosophy in essentially all Air Force mission areas. To meet the needs of the Nation, we continue to 

develop concepts, force management policies and practices, capitalizing on legal authorities to access sufficient Air Reserve component forces. The Air Force seamlessly 

provides the joint warfighter right, ready, and trained Active, Reserve, or Guard 

Forces today, with little to no additional training required to support this Nation 

in times of war or national emergency and at such other times as national security 

requires. The Air Force is actively updating our Air Expeditionary total force generation construct in line with the Secretary of Defense’s current force utilization 

policies. 

Question. What is your opinion about the sufficiency of current Reserve Force 

management policies? 

Answer. I have not yet had the opportunity to form an opinion on this matter. 

Question. Do you support assigning any support missions exclusively to the Reserves? 

Answer. In general, I do not support assigning support missions exclusively to the 

Reserve Forces. We need to retain flexibility to provide the right mix of Active, 

Guard, and Reserve Forces, at the right time, to meet the wide ranging, and changing needs of the combatant commanders. The few Air Force missions that currently 

are solely Reserve missions, such as WC–130 weather mission at Keesler AFB (the 

‘‘Hurricane Hunters’’) and the Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System C–130s, have 

a very small footprint and are not required all the time, which has made them excellent missions for the Air Force Reserve. 

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. The Department of the Air Force has implemented changes in policy 

and procedures aimed at preventing and responding appropriately to incidents of 

sexual assault. 

What is your view of the responsibility of senior military and civilian leaders in 

the Secretariat and the Air Force staff in overseeing the implementation of policies 

relating to sexual assault? 

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Answer. Senior Air Force leaders, including the Chief and me, form the leadership 

team that must set the tone for the rest of the institution: sexual assault is criminal 

behavior that cannot and will not be tolerated. I am aware of commander focused 

programs in place to address prevention/education efforts, a robust victim response 

program (Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARCs) and victim advocates). 

There is a strong emphasis on accountability at all levels. 

Responsibility lies with me and all of our senior leaders to ensure that we have 

sound policies and that they are resourced and implemented effectively. If confirmed, I will continue to work with Congress and the Office of the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to ensure that we monitor implementation 

and respond effectively. 

FAMILY SUPPORT

Question. In your view, does the Air Force have adequate programs in place to 

ensure support for Active and Reserve component families, particularly those who 

live great distances from military installations? 

Answer. The Air Force has world-class programs, but I understand resources continue to be a challenge. For example, we have expanded our efforts to provide child 

care options close to home for dispersed members located far from military installations: people like Air Guard, Air Reserve, recruiters, Reserve Officer Training Corps 

instructors, Military Entrance Processing Station personnel, and others on independent duty assignments. 

Question. If confirmed, what additional steps would you take to enhance family 

support to airmen? 

Answer. Family support and child care are important components of quality of 

life. They are top priorities for our airman and their families, and ultimately support personnel retention and a motivated, experienced workforce. If confirmed, I 

would continue to support these programs, particularly those which support the 

total force and families of deployed personnel. 

MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are critical to enhancement of military life for members and their families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments. These programs must be relevant and attractive to 

all eligible users, including Active-Duty and Reserve personnel and retirees. 

What challenges do you foresee in sustaining Air Force MWR programs and, if 

confirmed, what improvements would you seek to achieve? 

Answer. I understand that competing requirements to modernize our weapon systems have forced commanders at all levels to make some hard decisions on funding 

for MWR and other Quality of Life programs, with cutbacks in fitness, food service, 

child care, libraries, and other areas. However, I have not had the opportunity to 

review this issue. If confirmed, I will revisit the status of these programs to ensure 

we strike the right balance in resource allocation between support for equipment 

and support to people. 

GENERAL OFFICER MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Question. Incidents of misconduct or substandard performance and findings of inspectors general and other command-directed investigations are documented in various ways in each of the Services. Procedures for including and forwarding adverse 

and alleged adverse information in connection with the promotion selection process 

are set forth in title 10, U.S.C. and in DOD Instruction 1320.4. 

How is the Air Force ensuring compliance with requirements of law and regulation regarding the review of adverse information? 

Answer. The Air Force is required by law and DOD policy to present all adverse 

information of a credible nature to general officer promotion and Federal recognition 

boards. Upon receipt of the names of officers meeting a general officer promotion 

or Federal recognition board, SAF/IG initiates a review of Air Force, DOD, and 

other Government investigative files for potential adverse information. If substantiated adverse information is uncovered that does not already exist in the officer’s 

selection record, a summary of the adverse information, plus any written comments 

from the officer, are placed in a senior officer unfavorable information file and attached to the officer’s selection record. If the officer is selected for promotion or Federal recognition, this file stays with the officer’s nomination package through its coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the White House, and the 

Senate. If unfavorable information is discovered about an officer after selection for 

promotion or Federal recognition, that information will be presented to a promotion 

review board. The promotion review board will consider the adverse information and 

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make a recommendation to the Secretary of the Air Force whether to continue to 

support the officer for appointment to the next higher grade. If the Secretary continues to support the officer, the information will be added to the nomination package. 

Question. What standards and procedures are in place in the Air Force to ensure 

that allegations of adverse information relating to a nominee for promotion are 

brought to the attention of the Department and the Committee in a timely manner? 

Answer. The Air Force has rigid procedures in place to ensure any adverse or potential adverse information is presented with the nomination packages. Prior to the 

promotion selection board the Air Force conducts an initial screening for adverse information as outlined in the response to the question immediately above. The Air 

Force performs additional such checks following the selection board, and every 60 

days throughout the nomination process. 

For 1- and 2-stars, if there is substantiated adverse information, the selection 

board will review the information as part of the process and that information will 

be included in the nomination package. If allegations or adverse information arise 

after the board is complete the Air Force typically will separate the individual’s 

name from the list until the investigation is complete and if necessary, until command action is complete, and then convene a promotion review board to determine 

if the individual should continue to be a nominee for promotion to the next higher 

grade. The Air Force always includes substantiated adverse information with its 

nomination packages through OSD to the Senate. 

For 3- and 4-star nominations, substantiated adverse information is included in 

the nomination packages and the Air Force performs adverse information checks 

every 60 days throughout the nomination process from OSD to the Senate. 

MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE (SES)

Question. The transformation of the Armed Forces has brought with it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and forward thinking management of 

senior executives. 

What is your vision for the management and development of the Air Force’s senior 

executive workforce, especially in the critically important areas of acquisition, financial management, and the scientific and technical fields? 

Answer. The Air Force has implemented a corporate approach to overall management of the senior executive corps, which facilitates recruitment, development, compensation, and succession planning for about 280 senior civilian leaders. I subscribe 

to this approach. 

Senior leaders are matched to developmental opportunities based on gaps in training related to their current responsibilities or their ability to meet future corporate 

requirements identified in succession plans. The methodology focuses limited resources on those individuals who demonstrate potential to assume higher levels of 

responsibility. 

Question. Do you believe that the Air Force has the number of senior executives 

it needs, with the proper skills to manage the Department in the future? 

Answer. While I believe our current executive workforce is highly competent and 

effective, today’s emerging missions may drive the need for additional executive resources. 

The Air Force has several emerging missions requiring previously unforeseen civilian leadership assignments across numerous functional areas. Additional SES allocations will be necessary to provide support to the combatant commands and Joint 

Staff or to back-fill positions previously filled by general officers when the uniformed 

officer is needed in a uniquely military assignment. 

Over the last 3 fiscal years, the Air Force has requested significantly higher numbers of additional allocations, while also ensuring that existing allocations were consistently filled. 

NATIONAL SECURITY PERSONNEL SYSTEM

Question. What are your views on the strengths and weaknesses of the implementation of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) within the Department 

thus far? 

Answer. I understand that the Air Force has successfully completed implementation of NSPS for nearly all eligible, no bargaining unit, title 5 employees (approximately 39,000 employees or 32 percent of total Air Force civilian workforce). By law, 

the Air Force Research Laboratory cannot convert to NSPS before October 1, 2011. 

Title 5 employees of the Air National Guard are planned to convert with the rest 

of the National Guard. We will not convert bargaining unit General Schedule (GS) 

employees until DOD gives us the green-light. The Air Force’s network of NSPS 

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champions at major command and base levels, robust training program for employees and supervisors, and practice conversions, have ensured a smooth transition. 

From my recent experience outside the Air Force, the strengths of NSPS are in 

its pay for performance features and the increased communication between managers and employees. Weaknesses relate mostly to the extra efforts required to learn 

a new personnel system, including introduction of new electronic tools and implementation of a new annual cycle. 

Question. What do you believe will be the benefits of NSPS when implemented, 

and what steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure both a smooth transition and 

effective employee support? 

Answer. The key benefit of NSPS is increased communication between employees 

and their supervisors on goals, objectives, and expectations. If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize the importance of communication, accountability, and the link 

between performance and pay and mission accomplishment. 

SENIOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ACCOUNTABILITY

Question. While representative of a small number of individuals, revelations of 

abuses of rank and authority by senior military and civilian leaders and failures to 

perform to accepted standards are frequently reported. Victims of such abuses often 

report that they felt that no one would pay attention to or believe their complaints. 

Accusations of unduly lenient treatment of senior officers and senior officials against 

whom accusations have been substantiated are also frequently heard. 

What are your views regarding the appropriate standard of accountability for senior civilian and military leaders of the Department? 

Answer. Accountability is an essential element of a well-disciplined force. Leadership requires accountability and our senior leaders must be ready and willing to accept responsibility for things that happen on their watches. An organization that 

fails to hold its senior leaders accountable for failures to perform to accepted standards or for misusing their authority sends the wrong message to our Air Force personnel and to the public. It is important that all Air Force personnel feel comfortable in exercising their obligation to bring issues forward—this is a basic element of an ethical culture. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that senior leaders 

of the Air Force are held accountable for their actions and performance? 

Answer. If confirmed as the Secretary of the Air Force, I will take all appropriate 

steps to ensure timely accountability of individuals at all levels within the Air Force 

for their actions and their performance, including senior leaders as warranted. I will 

make the fullest use of the various tools available to me both to ascertain the facts 

and to deal effectively with problems that are identified. All accountability actions 

will be executed in strict adherence to fairness and due process as provided by law 

and regulation. 

ACQUISITION ISSUES

Question. Major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) in the Air Force and the 

other military Services continue to be subject to funding and requirements instability. 

Do you believe that instability in funding and requirements drives up program 

costs and leads to delays in the fielding of major weapon systems? 

Answer. Yes. Funding instability can drive up costs but cost growth is also a consequence of changing requirements, relying on immature technologies when committing to new programs or underestimating the amount of systems engineering work 

that will be required (the integration/test/trouble-shoot/fix/retest loop). The Department has learned how important it is to carefully vet weapon system requirements 

and eliminate ‘‘requirements creep’’ to minimize cost growth. 

Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Air Force should take to address 

funding and requirements instability? 

Answer. I believe that programs perform better both for cost and schedule when 

programmatic risk is reduced through overarching systems engineering, the use of 

mature technologies proven in a realistic operational environment, and programs 

are funded to high-confidence cost estimates. It is also critical to establish and hold 

constant the performance requirements once they are validated and approved. I understand the Air Force has also implemented senior level configuration steering 

boards, as directed by USD(AT&L), to balance emerging requirements with funding 

during program execution. 

Question. The Government Accountability Office has reported that the use of insufficiently mature technologies has resulted in significant cost and schedule growth 

in the MDAPs of the Air Force and the other military departments. Section 2366a 

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of title 10, U.S.C., requires the Milestone Decision Authority for an MDAP to certify 

that critical technologies have reached an appropriate level of maturity before Milestone B approval. 

Do you believe that the use of insufficiently mature technologies drives up program costs and leads to delays in the fielding of major weapon systems? 

Answer. Yes, working to mature technology at the same time it is being integrated with other technologies in a development effort is a significant contributor 

to increased program cost and schedule delays. 

Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to make sure that the Air Force 

complies with the requirements of section 2366a? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that all Air Force MDAPs for which I am the 

Milestone Decision Authority are in compliance with the law before giving Milestone 

B approval. For those MDAP programs where I am not the Milestone Decision Authority, I will ensure they are in compliance with the law before they go forward 

to their Milestone Decision Authority for a Milestone B approval. I will also ensure 

the Air Force has incorporated this requirement into our acquisition policy. 

Question. The Government Accountability Office has reported that the use of unrealistically optimistic cost and schedule estimates by the Air Force and the other 

military departments is a major contributor to cost growth and program failure. 

Do you believe that the use of unrealistically optimistic cost and schedule estimates leads to program disruptions that drive up program costs and delay the fielding of major weapon systems? 

Answer. Yes, using unrealistically optimistic cost and schedule estimates can lead 

to cost, schedule and performance baselines that are unexecutable and potentially 

lead to Nunn-McCurdy breaches. 

Question. What steps do you believe the Air Force should take to ensure that cost 

and schedule estimates are fair and independent and provide a sound basis for Air 

Force programs? 

Answer. The Air Force has taken several steps to ensure better cost and schedule 

estimates, from higher confidence levels for cost estimates to in-depth Air Force Review Boards to review program schedules and acquisition strategies. If I am confirmed, we will continue to review these processes and make adjustments to ensure 

sound estimates and to fund programs at the appropriate confidence level. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has issued a memorandum directing the military departments to institute new 

‘‘Configuration Steering Boards’’ to review and approve new requirements that could 

add significantly to the costs of major systems. 

Do you support this requirement? 

Answer. Yes, I support this requirement. 

Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Air Force 

complies with this new requirement? 

Answer. The Air Force has already instituted Configuration Steering Boards in 

compliance with the policy and, if confirmed, I will ensure that these boards continue so that all programs are reviewed on a regular basis. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has also issued a memorandum directing that the largest DOD acquisition programs undergo competitive prototyping to ensure technological maturity, reduce 

technical risk, validate designs, cost estimates, evaluate manufacturing processes, 

and refine requirements. 

Do you support this requirement? 

Answer. USD(AT&L) has implemented a competitive prototyping philosophy 

which I support for all appropriate acquisitions; but in some instances, such as 

large, complex satellite acquisitions, the cost to carry two vendors may be prohibitive. While we cannot typically afford to prototype a complete space system with all 

competitors, we do prove the critical technologies in their relevant performance environment before we enter full scale development. 

Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Air Force 

complies with this new requirement? 

Answer. The level of prototyping varies with each program. For commercially derived items, the basic article is already in use and the prototyping should focus on 

the risk areas associated with military adaptation. For new development items, risk 

areas should certainly be prototyped, but the entire system may have to be 

prototyped before selecting the winning vendor. If confirmed, I will work with OSD 

through the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) to clearly set prototyping guidance as we tailor acquisition strategies for each program. 

Question. Numerous acquisition reviews over the last decade have identified 

shortcomings and gaps in the acquisition workforce of DOD. Section 852 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 establishes an Acquisition 

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Workforce Development Fund to provide the resources needed to begin rebuilding 

the Department’s corps of acquisition professionals. 

Do you believe that a properly-sized workforce of appropriately trained acquisition 

professionals is essential if the Air Force is going to get good value for the expenditure of public resources? 

Answer. Yes, it is absolutely essential that we have a properly sized and trained 

acquisition work force. If confirmed, I will expect the Department to use this recent 

legislation to enhance our ability to attract, recruit, develop, and retain qualified 

personnel. 

Question. What steps do you expect to take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Air 

Force makes appropriate use of the funds made available pursuant to section 852? 

Answer. I understand the Air Force is working closely with USD (AT&L) on numerous initiatives enabled by Section 852, ‘‘Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund,’’ which provides funding for recruiting, training, and retention. I also 

understand there is pending legislation in both Senate and House authorization 

bills to provide expedited hiring authority for the Defense Acquisition Workforce, 

which would improve our ability to hire and retain the right people. 

Question. Five years ago, Air Force leadership failed to follow acquisition statutes 

and regulations and ensure good stewardship of taxpayer funds in the proposed 

tanker lease. Last month, the DOD Inspector General released a report indicating 

that senior Air Force leaders had improperly influenced the award of a contract to 

a company managed by individuals with close personal ties to the Air Force leadership. Last week, the Government Accountability Office recommended that a new 

contract to replace the Air Force’s tanker fleet be set aside because of serious errors 

in the evaluation process. 

Do you believe that there are serious problems in the Air Force acquisition system? 

Answer. The three examples provided each involve different circumstances. In the 

first two cases where criminal or improper behavior—or even the appearance of 

such behavior, was involved the individuals have been sanctioned and held accountable. We need to constantly reiterate the importance of adherence to the core values 

of the Air Force and individual accountability. This applies not only to the acquisition process but to all other areas of Air Force operations. 

In its recent decision on KC–X, the GAO validated the Air Force’s decisions in 

roughly 100 areas but, importantly, found problems in 8 areas that caused them to 

sustain Boeing’s protest. While I do not believe the Air Force acquisition is fatally 

flawed, GAO’s findings are troubling. They indicate the need for changes that will 

ensure we are better prepared in the future to more fully document the details of 

source selections such that Air Force decisions will successfully withstand protests 

and thereby restore confidence in the acquisition process. 

Question. What steps do you believe the Air Force should take to address such 

problems and restore the confidence of Congress and the public in Air Force acquisition? 

Answer. I have directed the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) to 

identify the lessons learned from the recent GAO decision on KC–X, and previous 

decisions in which protests were sustained, and outline a near-term plan for improvement that will strengthen the major program and source selection decisions 

pending for later this year. I also plan two 90-day reviews of the Air Force acquisition process, one internal and one external, to recommend opportunities for longerterm improvement. 

CONTRACT MANAGEMENT

Question. By some estimates, DOD now spends more money every year for the acquisition of services than it does for the acquisition of products, including major 

weapon systems. Yet, the Department places far less emphasis on staffing, training, 

and managing the acquisition of services than it does on the acquisition of products. 

What steps, if any, do you believe the Air Force should take to improve the staffing, training, and management of its acquisition of services? 

Answer. I understand the Air Force has established a credentialing system for individuals who award and manage services contracts so that their authority to manage larger programs is based on their track record of success with smaller programs. 

In addition, the Air Force is working with the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) 

to enhance training courses and opportunities for nontraditional acquisition parties 

often involved in the acquisition of services. 

Question. Do you agree that the Air Force should develop processes and systems 

to provide managers with access to information needed to conduct comprehensive 

spending analyses of services contracts on an ongoing basis? 

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Answer. The Air Force currently uses the Federal Procurement Data System-Next 

Generation (FPDS–NG) to pull data for spending analysis. I am advised that, while 

not perfect, we can get sufficient insight into our spending rates to do some strategic 

decision making and that the Air Force is improving its abilities to do so. 

Question. The last decade has seen a proliferation of new types of governmentwide contracts and multi-agency contracts. DOD is by far the largest ordering agency under these contracts, accounting for 85 percent of the dollars awarded under one 

of the largest programs. The DOD Inspector General and others have identified a 

long series of problems with interagency contracts, including lack of acquisition 

planning, inadequate competition, excessive use of time and materials contracts, improper use of expired funds, inappropriate expenditures, and failure to monitor contractor performance. 

What steps, if any, do you believe the Air Force should take to ensure that its 

use of interagency contracts complies with applicable DOD requirements and is in 

the best interests of the Department? 

Question. In August 2007, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air 

Force (Financial Management) and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) issued a guide titled ‘‘Air Force Purchases Using Military Interdepartmental 

Purchase Requests (MIPRs).’’ The guide applies to all purchases to non-DOD agencies using interagency contracts and agreements. I am advised that this guide implements DOD policies directed in response to audit findings and is closely aligned 

with the Office of Federal Procurement Policy guide on interagency acquisitions 

published in June 2008. 

AIR FORCE ACQUISITION SYSTEM FLAWS

Question. Over the last 4 years, GAO protests have resulted in the reversal of a 

number of significant Air Force contract award decisions, including award decisions 

on the KC–X tanker replacement contract; the Combat Search and Rescue Helicopter Replacement Program (CSAR–X) contract; the C–130 Avionics Modernization 

Program (AMP) contract; the Small-Diameter Bomb contract; the Thunderbird video 

contract; and a contract for F–15 training simulators. 

In your remarks at the July 9, 2008, DOD press briefing with Secretaries Gates 

and Young on the Department’s path forward on the KC–X contract you concluded 

‘‘that the underlying Air Force acquisition system is not somehow fatally flawed.’’ 

Do you believe that there are significant problems in the Air Force acquisition 

system today? 

Answer. In its recent decision on KC–X, the GAO validated the Air Force’s decisions in roughly 100 areas but, importantly, found problems in eight areas that 

caused them to sustain Boeing’s protest. While I do not believe the Air Force acquisition is fatally flawed, GAO’s findings are troubling. They indicate the need for 

changes that will ensure we are better prepared in the future to more fully document the details of source selections such that Air Force decisions will successfully 

withstand protests and thereby restore confidence in the acquisition process. 

Question. If so, what are those problems and how would you propose to address 

them? 

Answer. I have directed the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) to 

identify the lessons learned from the recent GAO decision on KC–X, and previous 

decisions in which protests were sustained, and outline a near-term plan for improvement that will strengthen the major program and source selection decisions 

pending for later this year. I also plan two 90-day reviews of the Air Force acquisition process, one internal and one external, to recommend opportunities for longerterm improvement. 

Question. If not, why do you believe that the Air Force has been the subject of 

so many adverse bid protest decisions? 

Answer. Although I believe that the Air Force acquisition system is not fatally 

flawed, I agree there are opportunities for improvement. Major weapon systems contracts require complex, in-depth evaluations across many functional areas. The Air 

Force is continuing to examine processes and factors to ensure fair evaluations of 

these highly complex proposals that protect the interests of both the warfighter and 

the taxpayer. Because of the consolidation of the defense industrial base, especially 

in the aerospace sector, major contracts can be make-or-break events for the remaining companies, which I believe is a factor in explaining an increase in the number 

of protests. 

ACTIONS OF AIR FORCE OFFICIALS

Question. Over the last several years, senior Air Force officials are alleged to have 

advocated the funding of a number of programs that were not included in the PresiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00402 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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dent’s budget and for which there was no currently validated joint requirement. 

These programs include the procurement of additional C–17s, the continuation of 

the C–130J multi-year contract, and the multiyear procurement of additional F–22 

aircraft . Senior Air Force officials are also alleged to have advocated a legislative 

proposal that would overturn a decision of the base realignment and closure commission relative to Joint Basing. 

What is your view of the propriety of efforts by senior Air Force officials to advocate the funding of programs that are not included in the President’s budget and 

for which there is no currently validated joint requirement? 

Answer. There are established processes for informing Congress of the Air Force’s 

funding needs and priorities. I believe it is inappropriate for Air Force officials to 

step outside of those procedures to advocate for funding of items that are not included in the President’s budget and especially in cases where there is no validated 

joint requirement. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to curb such efforts? 

Answer. As Acting Secretary I have made my views on this subject known to the 

staff and have had private conversations with individuals where necessary. If confirmed as Secretary of the Air Force, I intend to use established procedures for advocating program funding and priorities. In addition, I will reinforce with Air Force 

Legislative Liaison and Appropriations Liaison personnel those procedures for responding to congressional requests for information, and providing professional military advice, in a manner consistent with DOD decisions reflected in the President’s 

budget. 

DEFENSE BUDGETING

Question. On January 27, 2008, the Washington Post reported on internal Air 

Force briefing slides which included statements that: ‘‘the Air Force is targeting the 

other Services;’’ the ‘‘Budget Battle’’ is a ‘‘Zero Sum Gain’’ and a ‘‘Non-Permissive 

Environment;’’ and ‘‘some Services are going to win and some are going to lose.’’ 

What is your view of these briefing slides and the views that they appear to be 

intended to communicate? 

Answer. Competition for resources is as old as Washington itself. While I am not 

familiar with the details of these slides or the context in which they were presented, 

they seem a bit ‘over the top’ and not helpful. 

PILOT PROGRAM ON COMMERICAL FEE-FOR-SERVICE AIR REFUELING

Question. Section 1081 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2008 requires the Air Force to establish a pilot program to assess the feasibility and 

advisability of using commercial fee-for-service air refueling tankers for Air Force 

operations. 

What is the status of implementation of the pilot program, and, if confirmed, what 

steps would you take to ensure that the program meets the elements set forth in 

section 1081? 

Answer. I understand that there was no fiscal year 2008 appropriation to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 direction, so the 

Air Force is working on reprogramming funds for the program in fiscal year 2008–

2009. The Air Force has already released a Request for Information and had dialogue with industry for concept refinement. A Request for Proposal is planned to be 

released in first quarter of fiscal year 2009, after which the Air Force anticipates 

receiving proposals from interested/qualified offerors. The program requires industry 

commitment and investment to develop and certify a commercial boom-equipped aircraft. The Air Force must determine the feasibility of executing a program based 

on industry responses. If executed, we anticipate industry will require 18–24 months 

to accomplish boom design, modification, and integration. A minimum of an additional 6 months will be required for boom system operation, aircrew certification, 

and receiver qualification. Once complete, we can conduct the pilot program in fiscal 

year 2012–2016. 

If confirmed, I will monitor progress on this plan to ensure we meet the pilot program objective. 

TRANSFORMATION

Question. If confirmed as the Secretary of the Air Force, you would play an important role in the ongoing process of transforming the Air Force to meet new and 

emerging threats. 

If confirmed, what would your goals be for Air Force transformation? 

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Answer. While I have begun to assess major Air Force challenges and priorities, 

I have not yet had the opportunity to assess past progress on, or future goals for, 

Air Force transformation. 

Question. In your opinion, does the Air Force POM have adequate resources identified to implement your transformation goals? 

Answer. N/A. 

UNMANNED AIR VEHICLES

Question. In the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2001, Congress set a goal that within 10 years, one-third of U.S. military operational deep strike aircraft would be unmanned. 

Do you support the 10-year goal established by Congress? 

Answer. The rapid increase in research, development, and fielding of Unmanned 

Aerial Systems (UAS) in multiple roles is without question among the most dramatic changes since I last served with the Air Force in 1993. Though I am not yet 

clear on where the Air Force currently stands in relation to the stated congressional 

goal, the application of UASs in support of the global war on terror and other current missions has clearly been a success; and continuing the development and fielding of unmanned aerial systems is a trend I fully support. 

Question. Do you believe the current level of investment in the various Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicle programs is sufficient to the program objectives and schedules of 

these programs and to comply with the 10-year goal? 

I am advised that the 10-year goal set in 2001 is not yet achievable. However, 

the current POM is aggressively pursuing UASs in greater numbers than any previous POM submission with vehicles having greater capabilities in range, altitude 

and payload than their predecessors. 

Thanks to Congress’ supplemental funding, nearly 30 percent of our strike capable 

platforms procured during fiscal year 2008 were UASs, including MQ–1s and MQ–

9s. The fiscal year 2009 President’s budget procurement reflects that over 50 percent of the strike capable platforms requested were UASs. We anticipate the same 

percentage of manned versus unmanned procurement in fiscal year 2010 for strike 

capable platforms. 

Question. If not, what recommendations would you make to comply with the statute? 

Answer. I have not yet had time to review the status of currently planned investments in relation to the statutory goal. 

JOINT BASING

Question. The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission directed, at the 

request of DOD, the establishment of 12 joint bases. Nine of these recommendations 

involve the Air Force. 

Does the Air Force support or oppose this joint basing effort? 

Answer. The Air Force fully supports joint basing and is committed to making it 

a success. 

Question. Does the Air Force support joint basing in cases where the Air Force 

will not be the lead Service for the joint base? 

Answer. Yes. To accomplish this, we advocated for and in conjunction with the 

other Services and OSD, established installation support common output level 

standards. Our airmen, soldiers, sailors, marines, DOD civilians, and their families 

will benefit from efficient, consistent installation support services. Such standards 

will ensure the Air Force and our sister Services continue to provide all personnel 

with the level of installation support services they deserve. 

If I am confirmed, we will work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and 

our sister Services to ensure all Joint Basing initiatives contribute to DOD’s ability 

to perform its mission. 

Question. What concerns, if any, does the Air Force have about establishing joint 

bases? 

Answer. The Air Force remains committed to ensuring that all bases, joint or otherwise, maintain their capability to perform their missions and provide the highest 

standards for all warfighters and their families. We want joint bases to be so efficient and effective that an assignment to a joint base would be a highlight for every 

servicemember. 

Question. What effort is the Air Force making inside DOD, at both the senior and 

working group levels, to find solutions for these concerns? 

Answer. The Air Force has a long and successful history of working toward common goals in a joint environment—joint basing will be no different. To guarantee 

success, each joint base should be required to provide a suitable setting to all of its 

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assigned personnel, their families, and other customers within the local communities our bases support. To accomplish this, we have successfully advocated for the 

establishment of 265 common joint base quality of life standards that are the ‘‘highest standards’’ for all Services. 

Question. In your opinion, can the joint basing decision be carried out in a manner 

that will result in significant cost savings and will not adversely impact the Air 

Force? 

Answer. I believe joint basing will likely result in greater efficiencies in installation management and can be carried out in a manner that will not adversely impact 

the Air Force. 

ENCROACHMENT ON MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

Question. Various Air Force Bases (AFBs) have encroachment issues, some of 

which are significant. These include population growth near military installations, 

environmental constraints on military training ranges, airspace restrictions to accommodate civilian airlines, and conflicts with civilian users over the use of radio 

frequency spectrum. 

In your opinion, how serious are these problems for the Department of the Air 

Force? 

Answer. I have not yet had the opportunity to address this issue, but recognize 

that encroachment can be a critical matter for the safety and effectiveness of flight 

operations, and that it also impacts community relations. 

Question. If confirmed, what policies or steps would you take to curtail the various 

encroachment issues? 

If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in addressing these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the policy initiative already underway to institutionalize operational sustainability across the Air Force. This naturally involves 

focused implementation and follow-up to adapt the initial policy and guidance to 

changing regional circumstances and new challenges. 

ENERGY CONSERVATION AND USE OF ALTERNATE FUELS

Question. In the past year, the Department of the Air Force has assumed a leadership role within the Federal Government for the advocacy, research, and testing of 

alternate fuels for use in military aircraft. In addition, the Air Force has encouraged 

proposals for the use of Federal property to construct refineries and power plants 

to include nuclear power. 

In your view, which energy alternatives offer the greatest potential for benefit to 

Air Force programs and operations? 

Answer. I am still reviewing the Air Force energy program. In general, I support 

the program’s three-part strategy of reducing energy demand and consumption, increasing supplies from alternative sources, and shaping the Air Force culture to increase energy awareness in all we do. I also support the focused effort to certify Air 

Force aircraft on a synthetic aviation fuel blend by 2011. 

Do you support the goals adopted by the Air Force related to the increased use 

of alternate fuels? 

Answer. I have not yet had an opportunity to assess the specific goals outlined 

in the Air Force energy program. 

Question. In your opinion, what constraints does the Air Force face in carrying 

out initiatives to reduce reliance on fossil fuels? 

Answer. My initial assessment is that it would be difficult for the Air Force alone 

to economically convert to a synthetic fuel blend for aircraft without broader market 

forces for commercial aviation fuel in place to make this viable. In addition, the potential hosting of nuclear power sites on Air Force installations has broad policy implications extending well beyond the immediate responsibilities of the Air Force. In 

my opinion, moving beyond the level of technical and economic feasibility studies 

in both of these areas will require more comprehensive consultation and coordination within DOD, across the executive branch, and with Congress and industry. 

INVESTMENT IN FACILITIES

Question. Air Force leaders have stated in testimony, ‘‘MILCON is an essential 

enabler of Air Force missions; however, due to fiscal constraints, we must reduce 

funding and accept greater risk in facilities and infrastructure in order to continue 

our efforts to recapitalize and modernize our aging aircraft and equipment.’’ 

In your opinion, at what point is the reduction of funding for facilities and infrastructure too much of a risk for the Air Force? 

Answer. I understand that the Air Force has managed or mitigated risk by balancing limited resources among Facility Sustainment, Restoration and ModernizaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00405 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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tion, and MILCON accounts. Taking manageable risk in infrastructure seems prudent given the Air Force’s previous investment in infrastructure combined with its 

current investment in maintaining our facilities by increasing Facility Sustainment 

to 90 percent of the DOD requirements and increasing restoration and modernization (R&M) by $160 million compared to fiscal year 2008. While these actions help 

to manage risk in the short run, higher levels of investment will likely be required 

to support new missions and capabilities as they enter the total force. 

Question. If confirmed, would you support goals established by DOD for certain 

levels of funding dedicated to the recapitalization and sustainment of facilities? 

Answer. Yes. The Air Force supports the existing DOD goal for Facility 

Sustainment by funding our program to at least 90 percent of the modeled requirement. If I am confirmed, I will support Facility Recapitalization efforts because installations provide a critical capability to the Air Force—we fight from our bases, 

they are our Installation Weapon Systems. 

Question. What is your position on the use of public-private ventures to address 

critical deficiencies in family housing and utility infrastructure? 

Answer. Congress provided the Services public-private venture authorities designed to attract private sector financing, expertise and innovation to improve the 

quality of life for our airmen and their families; enable our utility infrastructure to 

meet current standards; and improve mission capability by leveraging existing real 

estate assets faster and more efficiently than traditional Military Construction and 

Operations and Maintenance (O&M) processes would allow. Consistent with the conditions outlined by Congress, I would continue to take advantage of these powerful 

authorities because they enable us to obtain private capital to leverage government 

dollars, making efficient use of limited resources to build, renovate and operate our 

military housing and infrastructure. 

LONG-RANGE BOMBERS

Question. The B–1s, B–2s, and B–52s will begin to be retired in the 2030 timeframe. 

When do you believe that the United States needs to develop a new manned 

bomber? 

Answer. The current bomber fleet (B–1, B–2, and B–52) is already being modernized through various sustainment, electronic warfare, and communications initiatives in order to close emerging capability gaps and remain relevant through 2030. 

Current air-launched weapons also face similar performance issues and the Air 

Force is committed to increasing the lethality of its Long Range Strike force through 

advanced weapons. While I understand the Air Force does not have a formal position on future status for the current inventory, it is developing a new generation 

of scalable weapons with improved accuracy, standoff, penetration, and stealth. 

Available in the near to mid-term, these weapons would help to mitigate the risks 

now evolving. 

Based on the current projections, a Next Generation Bomber would achieve initial 

operational capability in 2018. This date is directed by the 2006 QDR based on the 

realization that the current bomber fleet has projected capability gaps in the antiaccess environment for the 2015–2020 timeframe. 

Question. At a recent hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics indicated that the 

next generation long range bomber is already over budget and behind schedule. 

Do you agree with this statement? 

Answer. I have not yet had the opportunity to review this program in detail. 

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE AND THE AIR FORCE

Question. The responsibilities of the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) were once included in the responsibilities of the Under Secretary of the 

Air Force. Dual-hatting the Under Secretary ensured that there was close cooperation between the NRO and the Air Force. 

What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that DOD space programs and 

NRO programs are managed in a coordinated fashion? 

Answer. I understand that in June 2006, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and 

the Director of the NRO implemented a Statement of Intent documenting the specific responsibilities and actions the Air Force and NRO will take to ensure our historical relationship remains strong, while continuing to effectively achieve mission 

success and meet user needs. 

If confirmed, I will work with the Director of the NRO to ensure we coordinate 

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mand, control and operations, space launch, defensive space operations, and professional development of our personnel. 

OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE

Question. The Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) Office stood up just about 

a year ago. One of the primary goals of the office is to provide military commanders 

with an ability to utilize small satellites to rapidly augment or reconstitute capabilities for such things as communications and surveillance. 

If confirmed, would you support ORS? 

Answer. Yes, ORS was established to develop concepts for surge, augmentation, 

and reconstitution. It is a vital element of our space protection strategy in the contested space environment and I understand is strongly supported by the commander 

of the United States Strategic Command. 

Question. Do you believe there are other opportunities for ORS including support 

to research and development? 

Answer. It is my understanding that ORS is already providing the launches for 

Tactical Satellites (TacSats) being developed by the scientific and technology (S&T) 

community. ORS is also leveraging past research and development investments, as 

well as advancing specific technologies to support the development of enabling technologies for responsive satellite building, launch, on-orbit operations, and direct 

links to the warfighter. These activities will ultimately mature ORS into a national 

strategic capability able to rapidly develop and deploy smaller, single-purpose, 

shorter-lived platforms tailored to a specific warfighter need or to augment or reconstitute our core space capabilities. 

SPACE ACQUISITION

Question. Virtually all current space acquisition programs are suffering from cost 

overruns and schedule slips. 

If confirmed, how would you propose to ensure that the space acquisition process 

is successfully revamped to deliver future systems within promised costs and schedules? 

Answer. Ensuring future space systems are delivered within promised cost and 

schedule requires an intense focus on affordable and executable acquisition strategies, realistic cost estimates, stable requirements and funding, and sound systems 

engineering practices. Implementing policies which ensure continuity of program 

leadership, coupled with thorough upfront program planning, should create a balance between cost, schedule and performance that can be sustained throughout a 

program’s life cycle. 

Question. Milestone decision authority for space programs currently resides with 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. If confirmed will you seek to return this authority to the Air Force or are you comfortable 

with this authority residing with the Under Secretary? 

Answer. I believe the Air Force should be taking steps internally to raise confidence in its ability to manage space programs and carry out its responsibilities as 

DOD Executive Agent for Space such that Milestone Decision Authority for space 

Major Defense Acquisition Programs would be returned to the Air Force at the earliest opportunity. 

EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR SPACE

Question. The Secretary of the Air Force has previously been designated as the 

DOD Executive Agent for Space. 

If confirmed will you retain this designation? 

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to exercise all responsibilities and authorities assigned to this office, including those associated with the DOD Executive Agent for 

Space consistent with DOD Directive 5101.2. This includes planning, programming, 

and acquisition of space systems within DOD in concert with the heads of DOD components, and the USD (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), USD (Policy), and 

USD (Intelligence). 

AIR FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Question. What metrics will you use to assess the effectiveness of the Air Force 

S&T programs? 

Answer. One of the best metrics to assess S&T effectiveness is to measure technology transition into developmental programs and, ultimately, into operational use. 

There is solid evidence that past investments in S&T have resulted in a significant 

number of technologies being incorporated into fielded systems, thereby, securing 

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the Air Force’s position as the premier air force in the world. To maintain this legacy of success into the future will depend on ensuring programs are in place to transition mature laboratory technologies into developing and fielded systems. 

Question. What metrics will you use to assess the effectiveness of the Air Force’s 

basic research programs? 

Answer. The very nature of basic research makes it difficult to determine effective 

measures of merit. However, indicators such as the number of referred journal publications, certificates of research merit, and other awards and publications can provide a general sense of how well the basic research program is laying the foundation 

for future military capabilities. 

Question. Do you believe the current balance between short- and long-term research is appropriate to meet current and future Air Force needs? 

Answer. I have not yet had time to review details of the R&D program. 

Question. What metrics will you use to assess the adequacy of investment levels 

in Air Force S&T programs? 

Answer. The Air Force uses a number of different inputs to determine the adequacy of the total S&T investment beginning with overall national strategy followed 

by Guidance for the Development of the Force, the Air Force Strategic Plan, Advanced Air Force Planning Guidance, and guidance from the Air Force S&T Executive. This entire determination process revolves around identifying capability gaps 

to determine what breakthrough technologies might be required in the future. 

Question. What role do investments in S&T play in reducing costs and technical 

risk of acquisition programs? 

Answer. The S&T Program is a key element in making demonstrated mature 

technologies available for transition into development programs. The manufacturing 

technology program is also a key to reducing costs and risks to acquisition programs. The S&T Program provides a strong foundation for reducing technical risk 

and costs. 

TEST AND EVALUATION

Question. What are your views on the effectiveness of the Air Force’s test and 

evaluation (T&E) activities? 

Answer. It is my understanding that Air Force T&E activities are sufficient to 

support testing requirements and that the T&E budget has been certified as adequate each year by OSD’s Test Resource Management Center. 

Question. What are the major weaknesses and deficiencies with the Air Force 

T&E enterprise in meeting current and emerging Air Force testing requirements? 

Answer. The development of weapon systems with increased technical complexity 

and capabilities is challenging Air Force T&E organizations to be technically innovative and resourceful. I understand that the T&E budget has been certified as adequate each year by OSD’s Test Resource Management Center. 

Question. The Air Force has recently contemplated a number of steps to reorganize both development and operational test activities. Some of these proposals included significant government and contractor workforce reductions and potential closures of test assets. 

If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that any reorganizations or 

closure of test assets or reductions in test workforce result in actual cost reductions 

and do not entail undue risk to Air Force or other DOD current or future acquisition 

programs? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would expect the Air Force T&E community, like other 

functional areas, to continually pursue efficiencies that add value to acquisition and 

promote needed test capabilities. Any proposals for significant reorganizations or realignments would require thorough analysis and consultation with stakeholders and 

Congress. 

Question. I have recently reviewed a report prepared in response to congressional 

guidance, assessing the potential realignment of functions between Edwards AFB 

and Eglin AFB. The report discusses the benefits of having test capabilities at both 

locations and concludes that previously planned realignments would not result in 

significant savings or benefits and therefore should not go forward. 

What is your view of the role of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation 

and the Director of the Test Resource Management Center in ensuring that such 

reductions do not undermine the ability of the Air Force to carry out needed test 

programs? 

Answer. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and the Director of the 

Test Resource Management Center are responsible to ensure our Nation’s T&E infrastructure, processes, and workforce are adequate, responsive, and available to 

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support the development of the technologically advanced weapon systems that our 

warfighters need. 

Question. The Air Force has some unique requirements with regard to prompt 

global reach and affordable, responsive space lift missions. 

In your view, are changes in current test range structure, operations, and mission 

assurance parameters required to accommodate Air Force experimentation and 

small launch needs? 

Answer. I have not yet had time to review this area. 

AIR FORCE RESEARCH LABORATORIES

Question. What are the major challenges facing the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL)? 

Answer. I recognize the value of Air Force labs and the technical expertise of that 

workforce as critical resources for the Air Force. However, I have not yet had time 

to review the current status of AFRL. 

Question. How do you plan to address these challenges? 

Answer. N/A. 

Question. Are you supportive of efforts of the AFRL to expand and enhance their 

unique laboratory personnel demonstration program to ensure that they can attract 

and retain the finest technical workforce? 

Answer. I recognize and support the need to attract and retain the finest technical 

workforce, but have not had time to review this area. 

AIRBORNE INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

Question. The airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets 

developed and operated by the Air Force form an indispensable part of the Nation’s 

overall intelligence architecture. These assets are often referred to as high demand, 

low density systems because of the extensive number of requirements and high 

OPTEMPO on their systems and crews. 

In your view, does the Air Force have sufficient airborne ISR assets to meet current and projected requirements? 

Answer. The Air Force is striving to meet current ISR demand by rapidly increasing actual numbers of ISR platforms, integrating nontraditional ISR means, and establishing mechanisms to improve analysis, processing, targeting, and systems to 

expand ISR dissemination. For example, I understand the Air Force is currently increasing combat air patrols (CAPs) of our unmanned airborne systems (UAS). Our 

JROC-approved UAS requirement is 21 CAPs, and we are already flying 26 today 

to meet the additional needs of the combatant commanders. We are also working 

to increase the number of CAPs to 31 by December 2008. Continued production will 

increase the density of these assets but demand will continue to be high. We will 

find ways to satisfy this demand both in capability terms and, importantly, execute 

the function in a manner that meets supported commander expectations. 

Question. What changes would you recommend, if confirmed, to current plans for 

the development and acquisition of airborne ISR platforms? Will these changes remove ISR platforms from the ‘‘high demand, low density’’ category? 

Answer. I have no changes to recommend at this time. My initial impressions are 

that more widespread arming of UAVs recently considered as ISR platforms, along 

with the availability of sensors and targeting pods on new fighter/attack aircraft, 

are two trends further blurring functional lines between intelligence and operations. 

Both of these trends are positive and present opportunities; and as they are fully 

integrated, should increase operational capability and flexibility for the warfighter. 

At the same time, these trends will force questions about how air vehicles should 

be classified and where they should be assigned. 

Question. If confirmed, will you review the necessity for requiring rated pilots for 

the operation of ISR assets? 

Answer. Yes. 

AFRICA COMMAND

Question. In the committee-passed version of the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2009, the committee expressed concern that the Commander of 

U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) lacks the necessary air support to execute effectively his mission in a continent comprised of 53 countries, spanning a geographic 

area larger than the United States, China, and Western Europe combined. The 

Commander of AFRICOM recently indicated before the Air Force Defense Strategy 

Seminar this shortage of aircraft remains. 

If confirmed, what would you do to support AFRICOM, given the demand on existing assets within other geographic combatant command AORs? 

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Answer. My understanding is General Ward is satisfied with our proposed Air 

Force component support, but has expressed concern over airlift requirements for 

his command. 

For component support, we are establishing and assigning a Numbered Air 

Force—17th Air Force—consisting of a two-star general, his staff, and a tailored air 

and space operations center to provide command and control capabilities. We are 

committed to declaring initial operational capability this fall. 

The near-term plan for airlift support to AFRICOM is not yet certain. In the absence of validated requirements, the Air Force submitted a $30 million O&M request in fiscal year 2009. I understand there is a $20 million mark against that request and this will likely be a conference issue. If the request is not fully funded 

by Congress, there will be some risk associated with the shortfall. General Ward is 

in a better position to describe the risk. 

Our long-term plan for airlift is becoming clearer. TRANSCOM recently completed 

an airlift analysis for AFRICOM and recommended 2 key actions. First, 

TRANSCOM recommended we acquire or assign a C–37 and a C–40 to AFRICOM. 

Second, they recommended we allocate O&M funds for common user airlift requirements. I understand the Air Force plans to support those recommendations in its 

POM 10 submission and the Forces For Unified Commands Memorandum. 

NUCLEAR MATTERS

Question. Over the course of the last year substantial systemic problems have surfaced with the ability of the Air Force to manage all aspects of the nuclear weapons 

programs. These problems have generated several reports highlighting very serious 

shortfalls and setting forth over 100 recommendations to address the problems. 

If confirmed, what would you do to identify the various problems and restore 

credibility to the ability of the Air Force to manage nuclear weapons and systems? 

Answer. I believe most of the problems concerning the Air Force’s stewardship of 

its nuclear enterprise have been identified and documented in both external and internal reports over the past few years. As outlined below, restoring Air Force credibility in our stewardship of the nuclear mission has been a high priority since my 

first day as Acting Secretary. I have reviewed the situation with four major command (MAJCOM) commanders who have nuclear-related missions, visited four 

bases, and spoken to airmen regarding the need to recommit ourselves to high 

standards of excellence. In our approach to the nuclear mission, we should not be 

‘managing risk’, but eliminating risk. 

Question. If confirmed, what would you do to review all of the recommendations 

that have been made by the various review teams to put these recommendations 

in place and then ensure that these recommendations do, in fact, fix and resolve 

the many problems? 

Answer. Upon arrival as Acting Secretary, I set in motion a Nuclear Task Force 

to coordinate and synchronize the corrective actions underway across various 

MAJCOMs and prepare a strategic roadmap for improvement that fully recommits 

the Air Force to this critical mission. This roadmap will be comprehensive, covering 

all dimensions of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, 

facilities, and inspection regimes. The roadmap will be prepared in coordination 

with other DOD components, including STRATCOM, and the Department of Energy; 

and will incorporate appropriate recommendations from the panel established under 

former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. I expect to see a final version of this 

roadmap by the end of September. 

Question. Do you disagree with any of the recommendations, and if so, which ones 

and why? 

Answer. While I am not personally tracking every recommendation from all the 

relevant reports, the Nuclear Task Force support staff is performing this function 

and MAJCOM commanders are leading implementation plans within their respective commands. 

I understand that one of the recommendations from the Air Combat Command 

Commander Directed Investigation was not implemented because it would have 

been in violation of current DOD security requirements and may have resulted in 

increased vulnerability to our nuclear security response posture. 

I am advised that all other recommendations have either been implemented or are 

in the works at this time. The Air Force has much more work that needs to be done. 

Question. If confirmed, what specific actions will you take to assess, sustain, and 

improve the professional development and experience base of Air Force personnel 

supporting nuclear systems and operations? 

Answer. I expect to receive recommendations in this area from the Nuclear Task 

Force that will be included in our roadmap for the nuclear enterprise. 

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Question. What specific resources do you believe are most urgently needed to restore the Air Force’s stewardship of its nuclear mission? 

Answer. We are currently evaluating the established unfunded requirements as 

well as the resourcing requirements resulting from the findings and recommendations of the Donald Report and the internal Air Force Inventory and Assessment 

Report. This work is in progress. 

Meeting funding requirements, however, is just one aspect of rebuilding the Air 

Force nuclear enterprise. Daily mission success in this most vital mission area demands unwavering focus that results in rigid adherence to standards. Ensuring our 

great airmen have resources, policies, procedures, engaged leadership and strict accountability at all levels will restore credibility and confidence in Air Force stewardship of its nuclear mission. We are actively working all of these related areas to ensure success. 

NUCLEAR TASK FORCE

Question. In a memorandum you sent as Acting Secretary on June 26, 2008, to 

the Air Force Chief of Staff and all major commands, you discussed rebuilding of 

the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise. You directed the establishment of a Nuclear Task 

Force to perform key functions including an organizational review to assess and recommend options for alternative assignments of responsibility and/or command arrangements. You have required the Task Force to submit a draft roadmap, including 

recommendations for organizational adjustments, in 60 days. 

What are your expectations of the effect this Task Force will have on the Air 

Force’s nuclear-related policies and procedures, logistics, sustainment, organization, 

and personnel force shaping? 

Answer. The task force is a means to integrate related ongoing efforts and ensure 

we have a comprehensive way ahead to rebuild the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise. 

This will necessarily include nuclear-related policies and procedures, logistics, 

sustainment, organization, and personnel force shaping. 

Question. When do you intend to provide this committee with the results of this 

review? 

Answer. I will provide the defense committees with the results upon completion 

of this activity, which I expect to be early this fall. 

AIR FORCE REORGANIZATIONS

Question. In recent years the Air Force has reorganized to create warfighting 

headquarters and to place maintenance squadrons under air combat wings. Both 

initiatives have been criticized as creating unnecessary bureaucracy and attempting 

to create more general officer or command billets than is necessary. 

What is the status of the implementation of these initiatives? 

Answer. I have not yet had the opportunity to review the status of the warfighting 

headquarters implementation, which I understand is well underway. 

Likewise, I have not had the opportunity to review the Global Wing maintenance 

initiative. Because this initiative was scheduled to be implemented beginning 1 

July, as the recently arrived Acting Secretary, I put this initiative on hold for further review by the incoming leadership team. 

Question. What is your personal view of the merits and justification for these organizational changes? 

Answer. N/A. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Secretary of the Air Force? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

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Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic communications, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

STRATEGIC POSTURE COMMISSION

1. Senator LEVIN. Mr. Donley, Congress established the Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States in the National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008. The Commission is chaired by former Secretary of Defense William Perry and is tasked to make recommendations on the future strategic 

posture of the United States including the nuclear posture. Will you cooperate fully 

with the Commission and the various working groups established by the Commission? 

Mr. DONLEY. Yes.

AIR FORCE END STRENGTH

2. Senator LEVIN. Mr. Donley, the Air Force previously announced that it was not 

going to reduce end strength to the previously planned level of 316,000; rather it 

was going to maintain an end strength of 330,000. We understand that the Air 

Force plans to use available funds in fiscal year 2009 to support this level of end 

strength even though the funds for this level were not requested in the fiscal year 

2009 budget request. What is the plan to identify the source of the funds to sustain 

the 330,000 end strength in fiscal year 2009? 

Mr. DONLEY. The Air Force is committed to fund the 330,000 end strength requirement within existing fiscal year 2009 funding. This funding will almost exclusively come from two sources. First, by stopping the drawdown in fiscal year 2008, 

the fiscal year 2009 funding that was originally programmed for force shaping initiatives, such as Voluntary Separation Pay will be freed up. Second, end strength 

at the beginning of fiscal year 2009 will be lower than originally planned, which will 

free up additional funding.

3. Senator LEVIN. Mr. Donley, this 330,000 end strength level is also not sustained in the out year budget request. In your answers to the advance policy questions, however, you indicate that this out year funding shortfall will be fixed in the 

fiscal year 2010 budget request. How do you intend to fix this problem and where 

will the additional funds come from? 

Mr. DONLEY. The Air Force intends to address this issue within the context of the 

fiscal year 2010 Program Review deliberations with the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD). At present, the Air Force has established an OSD/Air Force End 

Strength Issue Team to formally address any funding shortfall concerns.

4. Senator LEVIN. Mr. Donley, will this be an increase to the previously planned 

Air Force top line or will reductions be made to procurement or other investment 

accounts? 

Mr. DONLEY. We will work with OSD to find the appropriate resources to fund 

our 330,000 end strength requirement. Until this review is complete. we will not 

know if the funding will be from additional top line or from realigning funds within 

the current Air Force top line. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

PATRICK AIR FORCE BASE MILITARY HOUSING PRIVATIZATION

5. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Donley, the Air Force can repair the housing privatization projects at Moody, Little Rock, and Hanscom Air Force Bases (AFBs) (the 

‘‘American Eagle projects’’) without sacrificing the Air Force’s property rights to 200 

acres of Government land, foregoing legal rights to recover damages, or giving away 

rights to 389 houses that were never built by defaulting developer American Eagle 

(a partnership between The Shaw Group and Carabetta Management). Unfortunately, the current Air Force plan to repair the American Eagle projects will result 

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in a windfall for American Eagle, which has already received and sold 100 acres of 

Government-owned, barrier island property, valued by the Air Force at $26 million. 

On April 30, 2008, the Senate Armed Services Committee voted 22–0 to require the 

Air Force to conduct a cost-benefit analysis before executing this plan. As clarified 

by the committee, the evaluation should include an analysis of all options available 

to the Air Force to repair all American Eagle projects, including Patrick AFB. If confirmed, what steps will you take to review the housing privatization projects at 

these four bases before executing the current Air Force plan? 

Mr. DONLEY. I share your concerns and thank you for your continued advocacy 

for our airmen and their families. 

As I understand it, 101 acres of property was sold previously for $25 million by 

the Patrick Family Housing LLC to a third party developer, with a substantial portion of the proceeds of that sale coming into the housing privatization deal as the 

Air Force’s cash equity contribution to build houses at Patrick AFB. 

With respect to the remaining acreage, the Air Force still retains all rights on the 

undeveloped portion of the 172 acre project site, and development is currently restricted solely to military family housing. The Air Force is currently conducting a 

cost-benefit analysis, in accordance with Section 2805 of Senate bill S. 3001 (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009), which requires the Secretary 

of the Air Force to submit this cost-benefit analysis before dissolving the Patrick 

Family Housing LLC. We are currently working to complete that cost benefit analysis and we will discuss the results with you and the committee before any final 

action is taken. 

I am currently reviewing possible courses of action and I have asked my staff to 

meet with you and your staff during the week of July 28, 2008, to go over possible 

courses of action being considered. Like you, my goal remains to provide quality 

housing for airmen and their families at all of our military installations. Thank you 

again for you continued support of our Air Force.

6. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Donley, if confirmed, will you execute any plan involving Patrick AFB before the completion of all Federal investigations into housing 

privatization at Patrick AFB? 

Mr. DONLEY. As part of any sale transaction, the Air Force will provide a Release 

to the project owners that specifically excludes environmental, suspension and debarment. and any criminal matters from the release. If the sale occurs before any 

Federal investigation is completed, the exemptions in the release protect the interests of the Government.

7. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Donley, if confirmed, will you execute any plan to 

transfer the American Eagle project at Patrick AFB to another developer before all 

Federal investigations involving the project have concluded, with findings presented 

to Congress? 

Mr. DONLEY. As part of any sale transaction, the Air Force will provide a release 

to the project owners that specifically excludes environmental, suspension and debarment, and any criminal matters from the release. If the sale occurs before any 

Federal investigation is completed, the exemptions in the release protect the interests of the Government.

8. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Donley, aside from its current plan, has the Air 

Force explored other options to repair the American Eagle projects? Please describe 

all such options and explain why they were rejected. 

Mr. DONLEY. As I understand it, the Air Force has worked closely with the project 

owners and bondholders on the proposed sale of all four projects together, but also 

looked at other options including other groupings of the projects, such as: (1) three 

bases without the Moody project; (2) Air Force termination of the lease and use 

agreement; (3) allowing the bondholders to foreclose on the projects; and (4) the 

Project Owners declaring bankruptcy. 

The other groupings considered for the sale all included Patrick AFB because of 

the value of the project, but were rejected because they did not address the problems at Moody AFB. The other options were rejected because of the uncertain 

timelines from potential litigation, the failure to address payment of liens and 

claims at each of the four projects, and the fact that the Air Force would be required 

to take over the operations and maintenance and development responsibility for the 

projects. 

In no case does the Air Force intend to give up its current legal or contractual 

rights absent favorable consideration. The Air Force’s goal remains providing quality housing for the airmen and their families.

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CYBER COMMAND

9. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Donley, a major initiative of the Air Force is the 

creation of a Cyber Command, whose purpose as defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

is the ‘‘use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures.’’ If confirmed, will you continue to support the creation of this command according to the 

current timeline including stand up date of October 1, 2008? 

Mr. DONLEY. I do not yet have a fully formed opinion on this question, but it is 

an area that I will focus on in the near future. I do agree that this is an increasingly 

important domain, and that Air Force efforts in this area need to be coordinated, 

not only within the Air Force, but with similar DOD and Service initiatives.

SPACE

10. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Donley, the previous Secretary of the Air Force had 

responsibility to be the Defense Department Executive Agent for Space. If confirmed, will you also be charged with this responsibility and what do you see as your 

highest priorities in that role? 

Mr. DONLEY. If confirmed, I intend to exercise all responsibilities and authorities 

assigned to this office, including those associated with the Department of Defense 

(DOD) Executive Agent for Space, consistent with DOD Directive 5101.2. This includes evaluating and advising OSD on the planning, programming, and acquisition 

of space systems within DOD, in concert with the Heads of DOD Components, and 

the Under Secretary of Defense (USD) (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), USD 

(Policy), and USD (Intelligence). I have not yet had time, however, to develop a 

prioritized list in this area.

11. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Donley, as Executive Agent, what role would you 

have in reviewing space programs of the Missile Defense Agency? 

Mr. DONLEY. The Missile Defense Agency is not subject to oversight by the Executive Agent for Space. However, if confirmed. I would continue to work to foster the 

strong collaborative relationship that has been developed with the Missile Defense 

Agency, to include participating in the Missile Defense Executive Board.

12. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Donley, space acquisition programs are behind 

schedule, over budget, and often plagued with technical problems. What is your assessment of the root causes of these problems and what will you continue or change 

to improve the acquisition process if confirmed? 

Mr. DONLEY. It appears that many of our legacy space acquisition programs suffered from overly optimistic cost estimates, development based on immature technologies, and a shortfall in overarching systems engineering. I believe that programs 

perform better both for cost and schedule when programmatic risk is reduced 

through overarching systems engineering, the use of mature technologies proven in 

a realistic operational environment, and programs are funded to high-confidence 

cost estimates. It is also critical to establish and hold constant the performance requirements once they are validated and approved. I understand the Air Force has 

also implemented senior level configuration steering boards, as directed by USD (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L)), to balance emerging requirements 

with funding during program execution, and has implemented a ‘‘Back to Basics’’ 

approach for space acquisition that stresses the factors above.

13. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Donley, many of the space programs that the Air 

Force funds and operates are used to support a wide variety of military and other 

users. As a result, there is periodically a concern that the Air Force may underfund 

these programs to ensure that Air Force funding goes to more Air Force-focused programs. If confirmed, will you take steps to ensure that Air Force meets its broad 

commitments? 

Mr. DONLEY. I am mindful of the vast reliance on space capabilities for which the 

Air Force maintains stewardship. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Air 

Force meets its broad commitments, in air, space, and cyberspace, in the most effective way possible within the funding available.

14. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Donley, what is your reaction to a recent proposal 

to create a space directorate that reports directly to the Secretary of Defense and 

the Director of National Intelligence? 

Mr. DONLEY. I do not yet have a fully formed opinion on this proposal, but I do 

believe that space related efforts across DOD must be synchronized with those of 

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the DNI. If confirmed, in my role as the DOD Executive Agent for space, I would 

work to continue to foster a strong, collaborative relationship between the DOD 

agencies and components, USD(P), USD(AT&L), USD(I), as well as the DNI on national security space matters.

ALTERNATIVE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES

15. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Donley, in the Air Force posture statement in 

March 2008, your predecessor said that the Air Force was committed to reducing 

its consumption of fossil fuels. One of the goals was to have all aircraft certified to 

use synthetic fuels by 2011. Another was to have the Air Force to continue to lead 

the U.S. Government in green power for base operations. What plans, if any, would 

you put in place to have the Air Force develop and procure alternative energy technologies and alternative fuels to reduce energy costs? For example, what plans does 

the Air Force have now and what would you do to accelerate the use of alternate 

energy support vehicles (hybrids, etc.) on AFBs in order to reduce costs? 

Mr. DONLEY. I am still reviewing the Air Force energy program. In general, I support the program’s three-part strategy of reducing energy demand and consumption, 

increasing supplies from alternative sources, and shaping the Air Force culture to 

increase energy awareness in all we do. I also support the focused effort to certify 

Air Force aircraft on a 50/50 blend of Fischer-Tropsch and JP–8 fuel by 2011, and 

to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels. 

I support the innovative efforts such as current Air Force initiative to convert 30 

percent of its light duty vehicles to low-speed vehicles by 2012, with the goal to convert the entire fleet by 2015, as well as the efforts to increase the procurement of 

renewable energy—such as the Photovoltaic Solar Array at Nellis AFB and the 

Waste-to-Energy project at Eielson AFB—as well as the pursuit of advanced engine 

technology to develop more efficient jet engines.

MISSILE INDUSTRIAL BASE

16. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Donley, in fiscal year 2009, for the first time the 

United States will no longer have intercontinental ballistic missiles in production, 

or active plans for a future replacement. Have you thought about any plans to sustain this industrial base to ensure the U.S. could meet any future production capability for a land-based strategic deterrent? 

Mr. DONLEY. The U.S. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) production concluded with Peacekeeper in the early 1990s. Since that time, the ICBM industrial 

base has supported various modernization efforts for the deployed ICBM fleet. By 

exercising unique strategic missile skills, the current ICBM Demonstration/Validation program is one of the several avenues which will help bridge the gap between 

the completion of the ICBM Modernization programs and the beginning of a followon ICBM or Minuteman III life extension program. 

The Air Force is also currently working, in response to Senate Report 110–155, 

to provide a ‘‘Report on ICBM Industrial Base Capabilities to Maintain, Modernize, 

and Sustain Minuteman III through 2030 and Provide a Replacement Land-Based 

Strategic Deterrent System After 2030,’’ which will address these issues in greater 

detail. This report is due to Congress in August 2008.

SPACE PROTECTION

17. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Donley, protecting our space assets is an important 

mission of the Air Force as well as the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). To 

that end Congress has required a joint space protection be developed. The Air Force 

and the NRO have recently established a joint protection program. Will you ensure 

that this program is adequately funded including the highest priority of ensuring 

that the United States has adequate space situational awareness (SSA)? 

Mr. DONLEY. Given our national dependence on our space systems, Space Protection and SSA continue to be of great concern to the Air Force. The joint AFSPC/

NRO Space Protection Program was established to preserve national security space 

effects through an integrated strategy to articulate vulnerabilities, assess threat impacts, identify options and recommend solutions leading to comprehensive space protection capabilities. Once determined, these solutions will then be implemented to 

provide the most cost effective capability for protecting the space environment. 

As I understand it, AFPSC conducted a Best Value Architecture Study for SSA 

to determine where the near/far-term investments in SSA should occur. Based on 

these results, they determined that first we have to do a better job in exploiting the 

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data we already have. This means in the near-term fusing the data to obtain more 

precise and accurate information we can use efficiently. Second, they determined we 

need to increase our sustainment efforts to support the infrastructure and systems 

keeping those sources of data online. Finally, we need to look at developing better/

more sensors to improve our capabilities in the far-term. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

AIR NATIONAL GUARD

18. Senator CLINTON. Mr. Donley, the Air Force is now developing the Program 

Objective Memorandum (POM) for fiscal year 2010. With the new guidance from the 

Secretary of Defense to protect end strength as well as re-examine the proposed 

modernization accounts to meet the needs of the Total Force, what are your plans 

to ensure in the POM the adequate capitalization of the Air National Guard from 

its equipment, personnel, and sustainment perspectives? 

Mr. DONLEY. The Air Force’s budget submission included a detailed review of all 

applicable guidance, and is the result of a careful review of Total Force modernization, personnel, and sustainment. The Air Force remains committed to Total Force 

Integration and in the 2010 POM will expand on the progress we have made to integrate the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Forces into the Total Force in 

all areas including equipment, personnel, and sustainment. 

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

19. Senator CLINTON. Mr. Donley, Secretary Gates has stressed the importance of 

the Air Force providing a more robust Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) to the warfighter. How will you enable the Air Force to meet the Secretary’s objectives, and within what timeframe will you be able to do so? 

Mr. DONLEY. The Air Force has been responsive to the war in Iraq and Afghanistan by innovating means to rapidly put ISR data directly into the hands of our 

joint and combined force at all levels. For example, the Air Force fielded 4,000 remotely operated video enhanced receivers that allow ground forces to directly receive unmanned aircraft system (UAS) pictures; accelerated MQ–1 Predator operations well beyond the DOD-directed program of record; and introduced the MQ–

9 Reaper into combat a year ahead of schedule. We continue to field more UAS capability at maximum capacity with near-term focus, and we’re proud of the dedicated airmen around the globe who are making this happen. 

The original Predator UAS requirement was 21 CAPs by 2010, but the Air Force 

is currently flying 26 CAPs today, and planning to further increase Predator CAPs 

to 31 by December 2008. The Air Force is pushing ISR capability into the field as 

soon as it is becomes available. We have issued a request for proposal (RFP) for new 

UASs, and we are shifting our UAS procurement from the older MQ–1 to the more 

capable MQ–9. When equipped with the new wide area airborne surveillance pod, 

our MQ–9 UASs will be able to provide 30 to 60 times more capability than a single 

MQ–1 Predator. 

In addition, the Air Force has pushed legacy ISR ‘‘workhorses’’—the U–2s, RC–

135s, and Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)—to the 

maximum tempo possible to get as much collection capability to the fight as possible. We are also embedding ISR liaison teams at division and brigade combat team 

levels to tailor ISR capabilities for the specific tactical fights of these units. Further, 

we are also capitalizing on important technical advances in our ISR analysis enterprise, to turn data into actionable intelligence. These advances-coupled with upgrades to our Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS—our primary imagery 

analysis capability) and increased efficiency through reachback to continental 

United States resources—ensure that joint warfighters get the maximum ISR support possible. 

Finally, the Air Force is working as part of the Secretary of Defense’s ISR Task 

Force to push even more ISR capability to the fight in the near term, through both 

additional buys of equipment (such as RC–12 aircraft tailored to the irregular warfare fight) and creative concepts that will add value in the near term. The Air Force 

and our airmen are committed to winning the current fight, and our ISR posture 

reflects that commitment. 

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C–5 FLEET

20. Senator CLINTON. Mr. Donley, the recently signed Iraq Supplemental Appropriations bill included 15 additional C–17s for the Air Force to meet its strategic 

airlift requirements. The Air Force has continued to state its need to balance the 

cost of sustaining the C–5 fleet with ensuring modern strategic air lifters are available to meet global needs. Please articulate what the Air Force sees as the need for 

additional C–17s, as well as the relationship of that need with the C–5 fleet. 

Mr. DONLEY. Our first priority is always to provide the best overall airlift capability to the joint warfighter. There are two issues with respect to the proper balance between the C–5s and C–17s that comprise our strategic airlift fleet. The first 

is the total number of tails. The current requirement of 299 tails was set by the 

2007 NDAA, and this requirement as outlined in the fiscal year 2009 program of 

record for strategic airlift is 190 C–17s, 52 C–5Ms, and 59 C–5As. 

The second issue is the minimum number of million ton miles per day (MTM/D) 

available in our total fleet. During Nunn-McCurdy certification, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated a requirement for 33.95 MTM/D of organic strategic airlift (C–5s and C–17s). A fleet of 190 C–17s and 111 C–5s does not meet the 

33.95 MTM/D goal. The addition of 15 C–17s in the Global War on Terrorism Supplemental bill allows the Air Force to meet the 33.95 MTM/D requirement. A fleet 

of 205 C–17s and 111 C–5s meets both these requirements and is aligned with objectives sought by the U.S. Transportation Command Commander and cited in the 

USD(AT&L) Nunn-McCurdy Acquisition Decision Memorandum. 

The Air Force continues to review options for the modernization and retirement 

of portions of the C–5A fleet. The C–17 has proven itself to be a highly reliable and 

versatile strategic airlift platform that will serve the Nation well across the full 

range of military operations. We will continue to analyze the overall requirement 

and make sure we maintain the proper balance in our fleet. The ongoing Mobility 

Capabilities Requirements Study 2016, with informal results available in the spring 

of 2009, is the next big force design milestone. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

PILOT PROGRAM ON COMMERCIAL FEE-FOR-SERVICE AIR REFUELING

21. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Donley, in your advance policy question responses you 

state, ‘‘The Air Force must determine the feasibility of executing a program based 

on industry responses. If executed, we anticipate industry will require 18–24 months 

to accomplish boom design, modification, and integration. A minimum of an additional 6 months will be required for boom system operation, aircrew certification, 

and receiver qualification. Once complete, we can conduct the pilot program in fiscal 

year 2012–2016. If confirmed, I will monitor progress on this plan to ensure we 

meet the pilot program objective.’’ Understanding the final fee-for-service air refueling RFP is planned for the first quarter fiscal year 2009, please provide the committee with the anticipated date for the draft RFP. In addition, please provide the 

anticipated pilot program contract award date. 

Mr. DONLEY. The planned date for the draft RFP will be 45 days prior to final 

RFP release and is anticipated no later than 15 Nov 08. The planned contract award 

date, pending successful completion of competitive source selection, is anticipated no 

later than 12 months after receipt of proposals or approximately second quarter fiscal year 2010. This will begin the industry funded boom integration and certification 

effort, which is required prior to start of the 5-year evaluation period.

22. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Donley, given the success of the U.S. Navy commercial 

fee-for-service aerial refueling program since 2001, the committee does not foresee 

any impediments to the feasibility of executing a commercial fee-for-service Air 

Force pilot program to demonstrate and validate Air Force air refueling in the mission areas identified in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008, pending industry ability to 

provide boom capable aircraft. Please confirm to the committee that the Air Force 

fee-for-service RFP will specifically demonstrate ‘‘a pilot program on commercial feefor-service air refueling support for the Air Force’’ as required in section 1081 of the 

NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008, and will not require passenger and cargo capability. 

Mr. DONLEY. The Air Force intends to execute the pilot program as directed in 

section 1081 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008. I have not yet had time to review 

the actual implementation plan, but I understand that section 1081 requires that 

all tanker mission areas be evaluated and specifically lists Aeromedical Evacuation 

as a mission area to include in the pilot program evaluation. I also understand that 

industry will likely find it more difficult to field boom technology on derivative airVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00417 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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craft, as compared with the current probe and drogue configuration used for the 

U.S. Navy commercial fee-for-service aerial refueling program, but I will look into 

this program in the near future.

AIR FORCE LOBBYING ON BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE JOINT BASING DECISION

23. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Donley, in recent months, this committee has expressed 

concerns about a legislative provision inserted in the recent enacted 2008 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act that would undermine the Secretary of Defense’s authority to carry out a 2005 base realignment and closure (BRAC) decision 

related to the establishment of 12 joint bases. In a May 28, 2008, letter responding 

to my concerns about lobbying efforts by senior Air Force leaders related to this provision, Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England stated, ‘‘The Secretary of the Air 

Force has been asked to conduct an internal investigation of this matter and to recommend appropriate actions.’’ Are you aware of this internal investigation? 

Mr. DONLEY. I am aware of this issue and will provide a response to the committee shortly, as committed to in Secretary England’s May 28, 2008 memo.

24. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Donley, what is the status of this investigation? 

Mr. DONLEY. I am aware of this issue and will provide a response to the committee shortly, as committed to in Secretary England’s May 28, 2008 memo.

25. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Donley, if not yet completed, when will the investigation 

be completed? 

Mr. DONLEY. I am aware of this issue and will provide a response to the committee shortly, as committed to in Secretary England’s May 28, 2008 memo.

26. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Donley, when the investigation is complete, will you 

promptly provide to this committee the findings and who is accountable for the lobbying efforts within the Air Force to undermine this BRAC joint basing recommendation? 

Mr. DONLEY. I am aware of this issue and will provide a response to the committee shortly, as committed to in Secretary England’s May 28, 2008 memo.

JOINT BASING

27. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Donley, as one of the prime sponsors of the BRAC process, I am very concerned about the negative precedent established by a legislative 

provision to allow a Service Secretary to interfere with the implementation of a 

BRAC recommendation. I noticed from your answers to the advance policy questions 

that you did not specifically reply whether, in your view, the joint basing BRAC decision will result in significant cost savings. This is important because current law, 

absent any future actions by Congress, requires you to certify this fact to Congress 

before the Secretary of Defense can carry out the BRAC decision. In your opinion, 

will the BRAC decision that directs the establishment of 12 joint bases result specifically in significant cost savings? 

Mr. DONLEY. I believe joint basing will likely result in greater efficiencies in installation management and can be carried out in a manner that will not adversely 

impact the Air Force. I have not yet seen DOD’s specific cost analyses associated 

with the Joint Basing initiatives, but it is my experience that similar initiatives in 

the past have provided savings over time.

28. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Donley, in your opinion, will the establishment of joint 

bases not negatively impact the morale of members of the Air Force? 

Mr. DONLEY. The Air Force remains committed to ensuring that all bases, joint 

or otherwise, maintain their capability to perform their missions and provide the 

highest standards for all warfighters and their families. We want joint bases to be 

so efficient and effective that an assignment to a joint base would be a highlight 

for every servicemember. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

JOINT SURVEILLANCE AND TARGET ATTACK RADAR SYSTEM

29. Senator CHAMBLISS. Mr. Donley, Congress appropriated $16 million in the Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 3222) to demonstrate the Senior 

Year Electro-optical Reconnaissance System (SYERS) electro-optical sensor on the 

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E–8 JSTARS in support of the requirement for a combat identification capability on 

JSTARS, to reduce the sensor-to-shooter timeline. I understand the Air Force has 

issued an urgent operational need for a stand-alone combat identification capability 

on E–8C JSTARS. In light of the Secretary of Defense’s call for more intelligence, 

reconnaissance, and surveillance capabilities to support the warfighter, what are the 

Air Force’s plans for expeditiously executing this demonstration program so that the 

E–8C JSTARS platform can more effectively and efficiently prosecute targets of interest in the war in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Mr. DONLEY. The JSTARS program office has researched how the $16.0 million 

SYERS congressional add could best be utilized. The program office concluded the 

most reasonable approach is to conduct a feasibility study to determine how to install and employ SYERS on JSTARS without hindering other systems and to accurately estimate the costs associated with the effort. The JSTARS program office 

awarded the contract on July 11, 2008, to initiate the feasibility study. The study 

is expected to take approximately 4 months.

30. Senator CHAMBLISS. Mr. Donley, the current TF–33–102C engines on the 

JSTARS do not satisfy desired safety margins or meet operational needs, and also 

limit JSTARS’ operational parameters. I am pleased that the Air Force has contracted for the first two ship sets to re-engine the JSTARS aircraft. Re-engining the 

JSTARS fleet will increase mission efficiency as well as significantly reduce maintenance and fuel costs. Given the expected savings and increased capability that new 

engines will provide to this critical high demand asset, can you provide your assurance of the Air Force’s commitment to fully re-engine the JSTARS fleet? 

Mr. DONLEY. The JSTARS program office awarded an Undefinitized Contract Action for the first two ship sets in May 2008, with deliveries scheduled for November–December 2010. The fiscal year 2009 Presidents’ budget funds retrofit of 10 aircraft out of 17. Funding for the remaining seven operational aircraft remains an Air 

Force Priority and is being considered in the fiscal year 2010 POM process within 

the DOD. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAX BAUCUS AND SENATOR JON TESTER

UNIT/INVENTORY RETIREMENTS

31. Senator BAUCUS and Senator TESTER. Mr. Donley, the Air Force’s General 

Counsel has determined that the Air Force may retire an aircraft squadron as soon 

as a BRAC direction to establish a squadron is achieved. Under the General Counsel’s definition, the term ‘‘establish’’ includes the assignment of personnel and construction of military construction (MILCON) necessary for the unit’s operation. Do 

you believe it is an efficient use of taxpayer dollars to retire a squadron when the 

Air Force has spent scarce funds to assign personnel and conduct MILCON activities for that squadron? 

Mr. DONLEY. The situation you describe results from BRAC decisions that directed changes to the Air Force’s force structure plan. Changing mission requirements and follow-on analyses have identified additional options to consolidate aircraft by type and location to maximize combat capability and achieve efficiencies in 

our operations. If confirmed, we will review those mission assignments directed by 

the 2005 BRAC legislation, and subsequent POM and budgetary decisions to assure 

we are making the very best use of taxpayer resources.

32. Senator BAUCUS and Senator TESTER. Mr. Donley, understanding the need for 

the Air Force to retain discretion to move or retire units as needed to organize, train 

and equip, do you believe that it is consistent with the spirit and intent of BRAC 

law to move or retire Air Force units within a year or 2 of their BRAC-required establishment? 

Mr. DONLEY. The Air Force is committed to complying with the BRAC law. I have 

not yet had time to review this area, but I will look into it in the near future to 

ensure that any potential adjustments due to evolving mission requirements or economic factors are thoroughly reviewed and discussed with Congress prior to taking 

action.

33. Senator BAUCUS and Senator TESTER. Mr. Donley, please describe your understanding of the Air Force’s plans to reduce the F–15 aircraft inventory. What in 

your view is the strategic and operational risk associated with this reduction in the 

near- and mid-term as well as the potential impact on pilot readiness, especially in 

414

the Air National Guard. Is this risk acceptable? At what level is it unacceptable? 

A classified reply is acceptable for the questions relating to risk level. 

Mr. DONLEY. The Air Force’s long-range plan is to ramp down the F–15 force to 

177 aircraft and base them with Total Force Integration (TFI) units. The impact to 

risk and readiness with respect to a reduction in force structure is being evaluated. 

However, based on proposed F–15 force structure and the TFI construct, preliminary analysis shows there will be no impact to pilot readiness and risks are acceptable.

34. Senator BAUCUS and Senator TESTER. Mr. Donley, if confirmed, will you rapidly re-examine all scenarios under consideration by the Air Force for inclusion in 

the fiscal year 2010 POM that proposes to move or retire aircraft and units that 

were established by the 2005 law? Will you share with Congress your assessment, 

including analysis of costs or savings associated with these moves or retirements? 

Mr. DONLEY. If confirmed, we intend to perform a thorough review of the Air 

Force’s fiscal year 2010 POM submission to ensure compliance with BRAC implementation. We will identify in our fiscal year 2010 budget submission any BRAC 

implementation issues that may arise, and will discuss these issues with Congress 

as appropriate. 

[The nomination reference of Michael B. Donley follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

June 25, 2008. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

Michael Bruce Donley, of Virginia, to be Secretary of the Air Force, vice Michael 

W. Wynne, resigned. 

[The biographical sketch of Michael B. Donley, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, 

follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MICHAEL B. DONLEY

Michael B. Donley is the Acting Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, DC. He 

was designated by the President to perform the duties of this position, effective 

June 21, 2008. His formal nomination to be Secretary is pending in the U.S. Senate. 

He is responsible for the affairs of the Department of the Air Force, including the 

organizing, training, equipping, and providing for the welfare of its over 300,000 

men and women on Active Duty, 180,000 members of the Air National Guard and 

the Air Force Reserve, 160,000 civilians, and their families. He also oversees the Air 

Force’s annual budget of approximately $110 billion. 

Mr. Donley has 30 years of experience in the national security community, including service in the Senate, the White House, and the Pentagon. 

Prior to assuming his current position, Mr. Donley served as the Director of Administration and Management in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He oversaw 

organizational and management planning for the Department of Defense (DOD) and 

all administration, facility, information technology, and security matters for the 

Pentagon. 

From 1996 to 2005, Mr. Donley was a Senior Vice President at Hicks and Associates, Inc., a subsidiary of Science Applications International Corporation, and a consultant to DOD and the State Department on national security matters. 

From 1993 to 1996, Mr. Donley was Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defense 

Analyses. During this period he was a Senior Consultant to the Commission on 

Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces and participated in two studies on the organization of the Joint Staff and the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Prior to this position, he served as the Acting Secretary of the Air Force for 7 

months, and from 1989 to 1993 he served as the Assistant Secretary of the Air 

Force (Financial Management and Comptroller). 

Mr. Donley supported two Presidents and five National Security Advisors during 

his service at the National Security Council (NSC) from 1984 to 1989. As Deputy 

Executive Secretary he oversaw the White House Situation Room and chaired interVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00420 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
415

agency committees on crisis management procedures and continuity of government. 

Earlier, as Director of Defense Programs, Mr. Donley was the NSC representative 

to the Defense Resources Board, and coordinated the President’s quarterly meetings 

with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He conceived and organized the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (the Packard Commission), coordinated 

White House policy on the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, and 

wrote the National Security Strategy for President Reagan’s second term. 

He was also a professional staff member on the Senate Armed Services Committee 

(1981–1984). 

Mr. Donley served in the United States Army from 1972 to 1975 with the XVIII 

Airborne Corps and 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), attending the Army’s Intelligence and Airborne Schools and the Defense Language Institute. 

Mr. Donley earned both Bachelor of Arts and Master of Arts degrees in international relations from the University of Southern California. He also attended the 

Senior Executives in National Security Program at Harvard University. 

RE ́SUME ́ OF CAREER SERVICE OF MICHAEL B. DONLEY

Education: 

1972 U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Huachuca, AZ. 

1973 Defense Language Institute, Monterey, CA. 

1974 U.S. Army Airborne School, Fort Benning, GA. 

1977 Bachelor of Arts degree in international relations, University of Southern 

California, Los Angeles, CA. 

1978 Master of Arts degree in international relations, University of Southern 

California, Los Angeles, CA. 

1986 Senior Executives in National Security Program, JFK School of Government, 

Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.

Career chronology: 

1972–1975, U.S. Army, XVIII Airborne Corps and 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Bragg, NC. 

1978–1979, Editor, National Security Record, Heritage Foundation, Washington 

DC. 

1979–1981, Legislative Assistant, U.S. Senate, Washington DC. 

1981–1984, Professional Staff Member, Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington DC. 

1984–1987, Director of Defense Programs, National Security Council, the White 

House, Washington DC. 

1987–1989, Deputy Executive Secretary, National Security Council, the White 

House, Washington DC. 

1989–1993, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management & Comptroller), Washington DC. 

1993, Acting Secretary of the Air Force, Pentagon, Washington DC. 

1993–1996, Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, VA. 

1996–2005, Senior Vice President at Hicks and Associates, Inc., a subsidiary of 

Science Applications International Corporation, McLean, VA. 

2005–2008, Director of Administration and Management, Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, Washington DC. 

2008–present, Acting Secretary of the Air Force, Pentagon, Washington DC. 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Michael B. Donley in connection with his 

nomination follows:]

416

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228

Washington, DC 20510–6050

(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Michael Bruce Donley.

2. Position to which nominated: 

Secretary of the Air Force.

3. Date of nomination: 

June 25, 2008.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.]

5. Date and place of birth: 

October 4, 1952; Hamilton Air Force Base, CA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Gail Louise Ellestad Donley.

7. Names and ages of children: 

Katherine Marie Donley, age 28. 

Cameron Rice Donley, age 26. 

Jacqueline Suzanne Donley, age 25.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received, and date degree granted. 

Georgetown University—PhD Coursework—09/02–06/03 

University of Southern California—Master of Arts—06/77–06/78 

University of Southern California—Bachelor of Arts—09/75–06/77

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment. 

05/05–Present, Director, Administration and Management, Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, Pentagon, Robert M. Gates. 

04/96–05/05, Senior Vice President, Hicks & Associates, Inc., SAIC, McLean, VA, 

Richard Mies. 

09/93–03/96, Senior Fellow, Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, VA, Larry 

D. Welch. 

11/89–09/93, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Department of the Air Force, 

Pentagon, Donald B. Rice. 

01/88–11/89, Deputy Executive Secretary, National Security Council, White 

House, G. Phillip Hughes. 

06/84–01/88, Director, Defense Programs, National Security Council, White House, 

Robert Linhard. 

01/81–06/84, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Rhett B. Dawson.

417

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above. 

1995—Senior Consultant, Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed 

Forces. 

1996—Advisor, Secretary of Defense Task Force on Defense Reform. 

2003–2004—Special Advisor, Defense Reform Commission, Bosnia-Herzegovina. 

2005—Co-Chair, Interagency Panel, Defense Science Board Summer Study on 

Transformation.

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other 

institution. 

None.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

Elder, Westminster Presbyterian Church, Alexandria, VA.

13. Political affiliations and activities:

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate. 

None. 

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years. 

None. 

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years. 

None.

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals, and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements. 

Air Force Decoration for Exceptional Civilian Service (1993) 

Army Commendation Medal (1975) 

National Defense Service Ribbon 

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written. 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.]

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. 

None.

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee 

of the Senate? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–

F are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

MICHAEL B. DONLEY. 

This 26th day of June, 2008.

[The nomination of Michael B. Donley was reported to the Senate 

by Chairman Levin on September 26, 2008, with the recommendaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00423 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
418

tion that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on October 2, 2008.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, 

USAF, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of 

command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms 

have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution 

of military operations. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. In my prior assignments I have had ample opportunities to observe the 

implementation and impact of Goldwater-Nichols and the Special Operations reforms on all Services, including the Air Force. I completely agree with the goals of 

those defense reforms; they remain essential to the effective employment of our Nation’s military forces. Most importantly, these reforms have yielded a demonstrated 

improvement in the joint warfighting capabilities of the United States Armed 

Forces. I have no specific modifications that I would recommend based on my prior 

assignments. However, if confirmed as the Chief of Staff, I will work closely with 

the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force, and other senior leaders 

of our Nation’s military forces, as well as Congress, to continually review GoldwaterNichols and implement any changes that may be needed. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. At this time I have no suggested modifications to the Goldwater-Nichols 

legislation. However, if confirmed, I look forward to the opportunities to further explore and assess Goldwater-Nichols from the vantage point of a Chief of Service. 

Question. Do you believe that the role of the service chiefs under the GoldwaterNichols legislation is appropriate and the policies and processes in existence allow 

that role to be fulfilled? 

Answer. Over the two plus decades since the passage of Goldwater-Nichols 

‘‘jointness’’ has been institutionalized in the Armed Forces of the United States. 

Service chiefs have played a critical role in those efforts. Their roles and responsibilities are critical to further progress in integrating unified, interdependent action 

within the Armed Forces. Based upon my years of service, I believe that GoldwaterNichols appropriately establishes those roles and that policies and processes in existence allow the fulfillment of them. However, if confirmed, I look forward to the 

opportunities to further explore and assess Goldwater-Nichols from the vantage 

point of Chief of Service and would welcome the opportunity to share my thoughts 

and ideas with the committee as appropriate. 

Question. Do you see a need for any change in those roles, with regard to the resource allocation process or otherwise? 

Answer. At this time I have no suggested modifications to roles of the service 

chiefs in the resource allocation process. While there may be areas that could benefit from legislative or policy changes (funding for the Unified Commands, for example), I would like to reserve judgment until after I have further studied the resource 

allocation process, as it has been more than 10 years since I personally participated 

in those Air Force processes. If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to share 

my thoughts and ideas with the committee as appropriate. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 8033 of title 10, U.S.C., discusses the responsibilities and authority of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Section 151 of title 10, U.S.C., discusses the composition and functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including the authority of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, to submit advice and opinions to the President, the National Security Council, 

or the Secretary of Defense. Other sections of law and traditional practice, also esVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00424 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
419

tablish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your 

understanding of the relationship of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force to the following officials: 

The Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Secretary of Defense serves as the principal assistant to the President on all Department of Defense matters. Senior Air Force leadership operates 

subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed as a Service Chief and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will work closely with the other members of the Joint Chiefs to provide the best possible military 

advice to the Secretary of Defense, particularly with regard to matters of air and 

space operations, policy, and strategy. 

Question. The Secretary of the Air Force. 

Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force is directly responsible to the Secretary 

of the Air Force and performs duties subject to his authority, direction, and control. 

For the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff is responsible for providing 

properly organized, trained, and equipped forces to support the combatant commanders in their mission accomplishment. The Chief of Staff oversees members and 

organizations across the Air Force advising the Secretary on plans and recommendations, and, acting as an agent of the Secretary, implements upon approval. 

If confirmed as the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, I will work very closely with the 

Secretary to ensure our ability to rapidly provide forces tailored to meet the needs 

and objectives of our combatant commanders. 

Question. The Under Secretary of the Air Force. 

Answer. The Under Secretary of the Air Force is authorized, subject to the Secretary of the Air Force’s direction and control, to act for and with the authority of 

the Secretary of the Air Force on all matters for which the Secretary is responsible; 

that is to conduct the affairs of the Department of the Air Force. In addition, the 

Under Secretary of the Air Force has duties and responsibilities as the Department 

of Defense Executive Agent for Space. If confirmed, I would foster a close working 

relationship with the individual serving as the Under Secretary when one is appointed. 

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. 

If confirmed, I will work with and through the Chairman in formulating military 

advice as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by advising him on Air Force capabilities and our preparations to support the combatant commanders in the conduct 

of military operations. I look forward to performing the duties assigned to the Chief 

of Staff by law to provide properly organized, trained, and equipped forces as needed 

by the combatant commanders and to providing military advice on matters within 

my expertise, as required. 

Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. The Vice Chairman has the same statutory authorities and obligations 

of other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When performing duties as the Acting 

Chairman, the Vice Chairman’s relationship with the combatant commanders is exactly the same as that of the Chairman. If confirmed, I will assist the Vice Chairman to execute the duties prescribed by law or otherwise directed by Secretary of 

Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Question. The Chiefs of the other Services. 

Answer. A whole host of factors underscore the importance of close cooperation 

among the Services in order to ensure the preparation, equipping and availability 

of the military forces our Nation needs, perhaps more so now than at any other 

time. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chiefs of the other Services to capitalize on our individual strengths, complement our capabilities and enhance mutually beneficial relationships as we carry out our responsibilities as members of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. I know each of them well. My goal will be to work with each 

of them to enhance joint interoperability and other joint warfighting capabilities in 

order to provide the force mix desired by the combatant commanders. 

Question. The Commander, U.S. Transportation Command. 

Answer. I am keenly aware of the importance of a strong close working relationship between the Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and the Air Force, its primary source of airlift. The Air Force remains a key contributor to TRANSCOM’s 

success in meeting national military requirements. If confirmed, I will work to further enhance the Air Force’s support to the Commander of TRANSCOM. 

Question. The Commander, U.S. Strategic Command. 

Answer. A very close working relationship with the U.S. Strategic Command 

(STRATCOM) commander will be essential to identifying and implementing effective 

and enduring solutions to any issues that remain regarding the Air Force’s role and 

420

ability to support our Nation’s nuclear deterrent capabilities. If confirmed, I will ensure that the STRATCOM commander is constantly apprised on the readiness of Air 

Force air and space forces required to support STRATCOM’s missions, and will 

strive, in particular, to collaborate on Service efforts to maintain the highest standards of performance in the nuclear and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) mission areas. 

Question. The other combatant commanders. 

Answer. If confirmed as the Chief of Staff, I will work with the Secretary of the 

Air Force to ensure that the Air Force is properly organized, trained, and equipped 

to provide the capabilities the combatant commanders need to execute their missions. This goal can be achieved through forthright and direct dialogue with the 

combatant commanders which I will undertake. 

Question. The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition. 

Answer. The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition serves as the Air 

Force’s Senior Acquisition Executive. If confirmed, I would work closely with the 

Secretary of the Air Force and Assistant Secretary on matters affecting the acquisition of the resources needed to train and equip of Air Force, and strive to ensure 

military expertise is readily available in accomplishing his or her responsibilities. 

Question. The General Counsel of the Air Force. 

Answer. The General Counsel is the chief legal officer and chief ethics official of 

the Department of the Air Force and serves as the senior legal advisor to Air Force 

leaders. She is responsible, on behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force, for the effective and efficient provision of legal services in the Air Force. If confirmed, I would 

look forward to developing an excellent working relationship with the General Counsel. 

Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force. 

Answer. The Judge Advocate General (TJAG), per 10 U.S.C. § 8037, is the legal 

advisor of the Secretary of the Air Force and of all officers and agencies of the Department of the Air Force and I would use him as such. He is also responsible for 

directing judge advocates in the performance of their duties. If confirmed I will endeavor to maintain the close and important working relationship the Chief of Staff 

has historically enjoyed with the Judge Advocate General. 

Question. The Superintendent of the U.S. Air Force Academy. 

Answer. I have a strong affinity for the United States Air Force Academy. It remains a key source of and venue for the development of tomorrow’s leaders of the 

Air Force. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Superintendent to address 

issues faced by the Academy and to promote the Academy’s sustained commitment 

to excellence and fulfillment of its very important character building mission. 

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Chief of 

Staff of the Air Force? 

Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force fulfills a number of duties and functions. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he or she serves as a military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. 

The Chief of Staff is also subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of the Air Force, providing plans and recommendations to the Secretary, implementing policy, overseeing the Air Staff and other members and organizations of 

the Air Force. He is a principal advisor to the Secretary. Working for and through 

the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff is responsible for providing properly organized, trained, and equipped forces to support the combatant commanders’ 

accomplishment of their missions. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect 

that the Secretary of the Air Force would prescribe for you? 

Answer. If confirmed as the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, I would expect the 

Secretary of the Air Force to assign me duties consistent with the responsibilities 

outlined above to ensure that the Air Force is appropriately organized, trained, and 

equipped to meet its institutional obligations and force provider responsibilities. 

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to section 8034 of title 10, 

U.S.C., relating to the Air Staff and its composition and functions? 

Answer. Based on my military service and experience to date, I do not believe 

changes are necessary to section 8032 of title 10, U.S.C., which outlines the general 

duties of the Air Staff. It has, however, been 10 years since my last service on the 

Air Staff. I would, therefore, like to reserve judgment until I have observed Air Staff 

performance, if confirmed. 

Question. What do you believe are your qualifications to assume this office? 

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Answer. In the 35 years that I have been on Active Duty in the Air Force, I have 

served in a range of positions and have enjoyed a variety of opportunities and experiences which helped prepare me to serve as Chief of Staff, if I am confirmed. During that time I have been privileged to serve with and learn from a host of exceptional service men and women, including members of our sister Services and many 

in joint positions of trust. 

Prior to my current assignment I served in Joint Staff positions that involved direct and frequent contact with the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, and other Service Chiefs on an array of 

major issues confronting our Nation and our military. 

As the TRANSCOM commander, I have been on the ‘‘receiving’’ end of the efforts 

of Air Force leaders to organize, train and equip the great men and women of the 

Air Force. In addition, this position gave me a broad leadership perspective on the 

interaction of the Department of Defense, the combatant commands (COCOMs), and 

our Services in executing our National Military Strategy. These experiences and 

perspectives will be invaluable if I am confirmed to serve as Chief of Staff. 

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your 

ability to perform the duties of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force? 

Answer. If confirmed as the Chief of Staff I will need a complete understanding 

of the issues and challenges facing the Air Force. I will work closely with the Secretary of the Air Force to identify, assess, and address these challenges and to ensure the readiness and relevance of our Air Force and the safety and well-being of 

our people. I will strive every hour of every day to ensure I am prepared to help 

lead the military service to which I have dedicated my life’s work. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Chief 

of Staff of the Air Force? 

Answer. The next Chief of Staff must restore the national trust and confidence 

in the U.S. Air Force to organize, train, and equip forces proficient across the spectrum of peacetime and wartime missions. In order to accomplish this, we must reinvigorate our nuclear enterprise, refine and adapt our ways and means for winning 

today’s irregular fight, take good care of airmen and their families, and prepare our 

organizations, training, and equipment for an uncertain future. 

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing 

these challenges? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will immediately focus on implementing recommendations 

of the various reports and studies on the Air Force nuclear enterprise. I will ensure 

that we take proper action with respect to the findings detailed in the Donald Report, the Welch report, the Blue Ribbon Review, and the forthcoming Schlesinger 

report. Additionally, the other major challenges we face in the Air Force are similar 

to the ones facing the other Services: managing the competing imperatives of current readiness versus longer term modernization, instituting continuous process improvements and caring for people. If confirmed, I expect to be heavily engaged with 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Services, combatant commanders, 

and Congress to address these challenges. 

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force? 

Answer. The most serious problem facing our Service is the restoration of trust 

and confidence in the U.S. Air Force. To do this we must work with our joint and 

coalition partners to fight and win today’s irregular conflict while maintaining excellence across the spectrum of peacetime and wartime operations, especially our nuclear and ISR forces, and in our acquisition functions. The Air Force remains committed to providing Global Vigilance, Reach, and Power for and with our joint partners. 

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems? 

Answer. We face immediate challenges today, and there are significant challenges 

ahead. If confirmed, I will prioritize and focus on these concerns and develop solutions for the nuclear enterprise, ISR and acquisition in the near term, others to follow. 

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish? 

Answer. My priorities are: (1) reinvigorating the Air Force nuclear enterprise, (2) 

partnering with the joint and coalition team to win today’s fight, (3) developing and 

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ment for 21st century challenges. If confirmed, my emphasis will be on providing 

Total Force Global Vigilance, Reach, and Power for the joint team. 

HEALTH BENEFIT COSTS

Question. The cost of the Defense Health Program, like the cost of medical care 

nation-wide, is escalating rapidly. 

If confirmed, how would you approach the issue of rising personnel costs, including health care costs, as a component of the annual Air Force budget? 

Answer. Over the past 10 years, my sense is we have worked diligently to streamline our medical infrastructure and take advantage of advancements in the field of 

medicine. This has resulted in rightsizing many of our facilities without compromising the care we provide our airmen and their families. It hasn’t been pain free, 

but in my own experience at Scott AFB, it is working. We currently are leveraging 

strategic partnerships with civilian trauma centers, university medical centers, the 

VA, and other DOD facilities such as Landstuhl to provide the broadest range of 

clinical opportunities for our entire medical team. I understand we have maintained 

our ability to support the Air Force mission, broadened the scope of practice for our 

health care professionals, and ensured our beneficiaries received the highest quality 

care. Our medical coverage at Balad and Bagram on behalf of the joint team reflects 

the quality and conviction of our medical professionals. 

One of our top priorities is to take care of our airmen and their families. As a 

retention force, quality of health care is of critical concern to our airmen and any 

degradation of benefits or service will hurt our recruiting and retention. I fully expect to properly budget for all appropriate personnel pay and health care costs in 

our PB submission. 

LEADERSHIP

Question. The resignation of the Secretary of the Air Force and the retirement of 

the Chief of Staff of the Air Force resulted from a failure of leadership related to 

nuclear safety. There have also been a number of other problems relating to administrative, acquisition and operational matters that point to a failure of leadership 

and lack of accountability. 

If confirmed, what plans do you have to restore confidence in the uniformed leadership of the Air Force to deal with these problems? 

Answer. Air Force core values—Integrity First, Service before Self, and Excellence 

in All We Do—will see us through this critical transition as we recommit ourselves 

to the sacred trust of this great Nation. If confirmed, I will follow these core values 

and hold myself and our airmen accountable as we restore our Nation’s confidence. 

I will expect Air Force leaders to embrace and enforce accountability, especially in 

the focus areas of our nuclear enterprise, winning today’s fight, and Air Force acquisition programs. We will match our words with our actions. In doing so, we will 

achieve our priorities as well as reclaim and uphold the reputation which has sustained our Air Force through the years. 

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

Question. The airborne ISR assets developed and operated by the Air Force form 

an indispensable part of the Nation’s overall intelligence architecture. These assets 

are often referred to as high demand, low density systems because of the extensive 

number of requirements and high operational tempo on their systems and crews. 

In your view, does the Air Force have sufficient airborne ISR assets to meet current and projected requirements? 

Answer. The Air Force is striving to meet current ISR demand by rapidly increasing actual numbers of ISR platforms, integrating nontraditional ISR means, and establishing mechanisms to improve analysis, processing, targeting, and systems to 

expand ISR dissemination. For example, I understand the Air Force is currently increasing combat air patrols (CAPs) of our unmanned airborne systems (UAS). Our 

JROC-approved UAS requirement is 21 CAPs, and we are already flying 26 today 

to meet the additional needs of the combatant commanders. We are further increasing CAPs to 31 by December 2008. Continued production will increase the density 

of these assets but demand will continue to be high. We will find ways to satisfy 

this demand both in capability terms and, importantly, execute the function in a 

manner that meets supported commander expectations. 

Question. What changes would you recommend, if confirmed, to current plans for 

the development and acquisition of airborne ISR platforms? Will these changes remove ISR platforms from the ‘‘high-demand/low-density’’ category? 

Answer. I believe we need to move away from the notion of discrete ISR operations in separate domains and focus on integration of ISR capabilities to meet curVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00428 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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rent and future ISR demand. This includes integrating nontraditional ISR capabilities such as targeting pods and sensors on fighters, new UAVs, exploring the potential of airships with sensors, and then merging the ISR from all sources in networks 

that can be accessed by any warrior. 

Question. Secretary Gates has publicly complained that the Air Force has not put 

sufficiently high priority on fielding unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to provide ISR 

support for the forces operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the Air Force answers Secretary Gates’ concerns and provides greater priority to providing ISR support of field 

operations? 

Answer. I would ensure that our Air Force ISR experts continue to work closely 

with the supported commanders and the recently-established OSD ISR Task Force. 

By increasing the number of MQ–9 vehicles, pursuing the ‘‘Liberty Ship’’ construct 

for acquisition of more ‘‘light’’ manned ISR aircraft, and accelerating the development of the Wide Area Airborne Surveillance sensor system, the Air Force is working very hard to get more ISR capability to the combatant commanders in support 

of ongoing operations. If confirmed, this will have my personal attention from day 

one. Question. The Air Force has indicated that the limiting factor in accelerating the 

fielding of UAV assets to provide ISR support for field operations has been the availability of trained operators, who, under current Air Force policy, must be rated pilots. 

If confirmed, will you review the necessity for requiring rated pilots for the operation of ISR assets? 

Answer. I’ll need time to assess the arguments. With respect to who flies UAS, 

the Air Force has both non-rated enlisted operators as well as rated officer pilots 

accomplishing that function. The level of responsibility involved and the flight regime of the UAS system influences the appropriate level of qualification required. 

For instance, UAS that operate at the local level, versus theater level, are operated 

by both USAF and U.S. Army non-rated personnel. 

Multi-mission, weapons delivery capable UAS such as MQ–1 Predator and MQ–

9 Reaper, are part of a complex kill chain. To complete that kill chain often involves 

real-time command and control of lethal assets, and time-sensitive decision making 

for the delivery of ordnance in closely packed, dense environs, where the enemy is 

purposely hiding or shielding his whereabouts, and where collateral damage assessments, weaponeering calculations, and sensitive intelligence are necessary for making a targeting decision. Qualified rated pilots generally have the training and experience that is crucial to the success of this effort. Finally, the Air Force operates 

high and medium altitude UAS in and through positive-control airspace—by FAA 

and ICAO rules—that currently requires an instrument-qualified pilot. It may well 

be that a blend of rated and non-rated operators makes the most sense. If confirmed, I will come to a conclusion on this issue quickly. 

TRICARE FEE INCREASES FOR MILITARY RETIREES

Question. In its fiscal year 2009 budget request, the Department of Defense assumed $1.2 billion in cost savings based on implementing increases in TRICARE 

costs for certain beneficiaries, including higher enrollment fees for military retirees 

and their families. 

What is your understanding of the Department’s proposals for changes in 

TRICARE fees for retired airmen, and, if they are implemented, what do you see 

as the likely impact of these changes on the Department of the Air Force? 

Answer. I am told the Air Force supports the findings and recommendations of 

the Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care and will continue to work 

with our counterparts to find responsible, equitable adjustments to TRICARE fees 

that maintain commitments previously made to our retirees. 

Question. What is your personal view of the justification for increases in 

TRICARE enrollment fees for retirees, and are there alternatives to such increases 

you would recommend if confirmed? 

Answer. As health care costs continue to rise we anticipate increasing pressure 

on other vital programs if we cannot control costs. I am not an expert in this discipline but, if confirmed, will quickly avail myself of information related to alternative means to assure availability of services at affordable cost. 

INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

Question. What are your views about the responsibility of the Judge Advocate 

General of the Air Force to provide independent legal advice to the Chief of Staff 

and the Air Staff, particularly in the areas of military justice and operational law? 

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Answer. I believe it is critical that the CSAF receive independent legal advice 

from his senior uniformed judge advocates. Our senior uniformed lawyers bring a 

wealth of experience and perspective shaped by years of working with commanders 

in the field. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §§ 8031 and 8037, the Judge Advocate General 

is the legal advisor of the Secretary of the Air Force and of all officers and agencies 

of the Department of the Air Force. TJAG also responds to CSAF direction and directs and supervises the Judge Advocate General’s Corps in providing legal advice 

and related services to commanders, agencies, and people Air Force-wide. TJAG’s 

ability to provide independent legal advice is not only statutorily guaranteed, it is 

important to Air Force senior leader decision making. Senior leaders are better 

equipped to make the best decisions when they are aware of both judge advocate 

advice and the advice from the Office of the General Counsel. 

Question. What are your views about the responsibility of Staff Judge Advocates 

(SJAs) throughout the Air Force to provide independent legal advice to military 

commanders in the field and throughout the Air Force establishment? 

Answer. SJAs are essential to the proper functioning of both operational and support missions. SJAs have a major responsibility to promote the interests of a command by providing relevant, timely, and independent advice to commanders, and 

this independence is reflected in statute (10 U.S.C. § 8037(f)(2). Commanders are required by statute (10 U.S.C. § 806) to communicate with their SJAs on issues related 

to military justice matters, which is critical to disciplined mission execution. In addition, commanders and other leaders rely on their staff judge advocates for advice 

on all types of legal and policy matters. SJAs understand the rhythm; they understand the commander’s thought process; they know what his or her priorities are; 

and they understand what is happening in the field. They can offer advice and are 

somewhat independent of other policy concerns that might apply, so there is no preemption of the thought process. I think that it is very important, that commanders 

continue to receive uniformed legal advice. 

AIR FORCE FUTURE TOTAL FORCE PLANNING

Question. What do you consider to be the most significant barriers to effective integration of Air Force Reserve and Active component personnel and units? 

Answer. The Air Force has always operated as a Total Force, operating seamlessly 

in peacetime as well as war. In fact, the highly successful Classic Associate model 

has been in use for almost 40 years and is the baseline as we continue to optimize 

what each component brings to the fight. 

Legally, title 10 and title 32 of United States Code have presented some of the 

more difficult challenges to the Total Force mission. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 has helped knock down many of the barriers between title 10 Federal and title 32 State chains of command impeding successful 

integration. Continued discussion of legislative and policy changes are occurring and 

will need to continue to ensure that the Air Force is able to operate as a Total Force 

with the most effective use of resources. 

Question. What do you consider to be the most appropriate and achievable goal 

for integrating units of the Air National Guard into the operational missions, including homeland defense missions, of the U.S. Air Force? 

Answer. The Guard and Reserve continue to be full partners in Total Force Integration (TFI) and will be involved in all new missions as they come on line. In fact, 

Air National Guard airmen are flying the first operational F–22s as part of a classic 

associate unit at Langley AFB. They are also performing high tech emerging missions: operating Predators, flying satellites, and processing battlefield intelligence 

which is providing direct support to the joint warfighter. We are integrating our 

Guard and Reserve components into many new weapon systems as well as continuing to explore ways to better associate the components in our enduring missions, 

capitalizing on the tremendous experience levels resident in the Guard and Reserve. 

We are standing up a number of classic, active, and ARC associate units in a variety 

of missions, stationing inexperienced Active Duty members at Guard and Reserve 

locations to be trained by seasoned pilots and maintainers. Of current note, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve airmen help protect the homeland through the 

aerial firefighting capability they provide in cooperation with the U.S. Forest Service. Every Air Force mission and platform can benefit from the experience and 

knowledge of our citizen airmen and the community connection they bring to the 

Air Force. 

Question. What role and mission do you expect the Air Force Reserve to perform 

now and in the future? 

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Answer. In our Total Force Air Force we consider the Air National Guard and the 

Air Force Reserve to be equal partners and as such the previous answer applies to 

this question also. 

Question. How would you assess the progress being made in further integrating 

the Air Force Reserve into the operational mission of the Air Force? 

Answer. Integration of both the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard 

into operational missions continues to go very well. In fact, the first Associate unit 

was an Air Force Reserve unit back in 1968. Over the past 4 years we have expanded from 6 to over 130 Total Force Initiatives and developed additional organizational constructs. The Air Force has formalized the Total Force Integration process 

through official policy, guidance and oversight. These efforts have accelerated the 

transformation to a smaller, more capable, and more affordable Air Force composed 

of Regular, Guard, and Reserve airmen that magnify the unique assets of each component. 

AIR FORCE END STRENGTH

Question. The Secretary of Defense recently announced he would halt the reduction in Air Force Active Duty end strength, and keep the Active Air Force at 

330,000. For fiscal year 2008, Congress authorized an Active-Duty Air Force end 

strength of 329,563 and for fiscal year 2009, the Department requested, and budgeted for, an Active-Duty end strength of 316,600. 

How does the Air Force plan to pay for the extra end strength? 

Answer. In the near-term, the Air Force is halting the previously planned drawdown. By stopping the drawdown in fiscal year 2008, force shaping initiatives, such 

as Voluntary Separation Pay, will not be needed in fiscal year 2009 as originally 

budgeted. The Air Force will apply those funds to cover costs associated with fiscal 

year 2009 manpower increases. The long-term manpower increases supporting ongoing, new and emerging missions are being addressed in the fiscal year 2010 Program Objective Memorandum. 

Question. Does the Air Force plan to formally request Congress to authorize an 

Active-Duty Air Force end strength of 330,000 for fiscal year 2009, or does it plan 

to rely on its authority to suspend end strength limitations in time of war or national emergency? 

Answer. The Air Force included in its fiscal year 2009 Unfunded Priority List 

(UPL) to Congress a request for funding end strength at 330,000 in fiscal year 2009. 

If funded, then Air Force expects to receive authorization, if not then the Air Force 

will exercise its authority to suspend end strength limitations in time of war and 

will readdress the program with the Department and Congress in the fiscal year 

2010 cycle. 

Question. Are there any increases to the Air Force Reserve or Air Guard planned 

in addition to the increases in the Active component? 

Answer. Yes, there is a commensurate increase to Air Force Reserve end strength 

planned. We have worked extensively across our staffs to ensure we are adding back 

the correct mix of part-time and full-time reservists. I understand the Air Force Reserve proposes to increase end strength by 7,095 military personnel to a total of 

74,795 by fiscal year 2015. This must be a total force solution as the Regular and 

Reserve components continue to associate over a wide variety of mission sets creating greater efficiencies for the total force. 

There are currently no plans to increase Air National Guard (ANG) end strength. 

As part of their planned reductions, the ANG elected to accept budget offsets versus 

manpower reductions. While this offered a temporary solution, the budgetary offsets 

could have impact on overall readiness and, therefore, require continuing management attention. 

Question. Air Force leaders said earlier this year that the reductions in end 

strength, even to 316,600, were not enough to allow the Air Force to realize its recapitalization goals. 

How does keeping Air Force Active end strength at 330,000 impact recapitalization? 

Answer. In 2006 we initiated a 40,000 reduction in Air Force end strength in 

order to fund recapitalization of our aging weapons systems. This action was partially successful, but based on loss of buying power and increases in personnel costs 

we have not been able to reach the needed levels of recapitalization to turn the corner on the increasing average age of our fleets. The Air Force was on a drawdown 

path to reach 316,000 by the end of fiscal year 2009. The drawdown halt will keep 

us at 330,000, but the content in people and skill sets between the targeted 316,000 

and the 330,000 requires adjustment to meet current and new mission requirements. Some of these requirements are a result of additional TOA (fiscal year 2010–

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2015) provided to the AF for recapitalization. Other added manpower requirements 

include corrective actions associated with our nuclear enterprise. 

TRANSFORMATION

Question. If confirmed, you would play an important role in the process of transforming the Air Force to meet new and emerging threats. 

What do you believe should be the goals for Air Force transformation? 

Answer. I have two near-term goals. First, we must act quickly and rigorously to 

implement the improvements in training, procedures, schooling, and organization 

required by the Nuclear Task Force and the Secretary of Defense to restore the integrity and credibility of the Nuclear Enterprise. I expect to see rapid and substantial improvement in this area. 

Second, in light of the Secretary of Defense’s views, as well as my own, we must 

assess and implement quickly the measures needed to improve our support to the 

joint warfighters in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have already done a good deal, as 

evidenced by our increased UAS assets and the further increases programmed to 

come on line within the fiscal year 2010 FYDP. But, we have to be aggressive in 

exploring every avenue to further improve and provide more support in the conflicts 

we are waging right now. It is my personal view that being adaptive now will serve 

us well as other adversaries and challenges emerge. 

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. The Department of the Air Force has implemented changes in policy 

and procedures aimed at preventing and responding appropriately to incidents of 

sexual assault. 

What is your view of the appropriate role for, and actions that should be taken 

by, senior military and civilian leaders in the Secretariat and the Air Force staff 

in overseeing the effectiveness of implementation of new policies relating to sexual 

assault? 

Answer. Senior Air Force leaders, including the Secretary of the Air Force and 

me, form the leadership team that must set the tone for the rest of the institution: 

sexual assault is criminal behavior that cannot and will not be tolerated. It is a personal tragedy to the victim, her or his family and friends, and it affects our mission 

readiness. This is a multifaceted problem that will continue to have involvement by 

key Secretariat and Air Staff leaders: the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, the General Counsel, the SAF Inspector General, the Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Personnel, the Judge Advocate General, the Surgeon General and the Chief 

of Chaplains. In the Air Force, it is a commander-focused program. At each Wing, 

the Sexual Assault Response Coordinator reports to the Vice Wing Commander. If 

confirmed, I will ensure that, collectively, our senior leaders continue to promote our 

programs to ensure they are resourced and implemented effectively. In short, sexual 

assault is incompatible with our military mission. 

UNIFIED MEDICAL COMMAND

Question. The Department’s 2005 Base Realignment and Closure recommendations include significant realignments in military medical capability and support the 

goal of achieving greater efficiency through joint organizational solutions. The proposed recommendations regarding Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, as 

well as other joint medical centers in Landstuhl, Germany, and San Antonio, TX, 

are based on the assumption that staffing in the future will be joint with personnel 

from all three military departments. While various studies have been done regarding the concept and feasibility of establishing a joint military medical command, 

very little progress has been made on implementing such a command. 

Do you consider a joint military medical command to be warranted and feasible? 

Answer. We take pride in being part of a joint team and building ever greater 

interoperability between the Services. Our Air Force medical personnel are a key 

part of the Joint Theater Trauma System in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom . . . the most effective trauma system in the history of 

military medicine. Air Force, Army, and Navy medics are working together to save 

the lives of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines at unprecedented rates in the face 

of the most severe wounding patterns in the history of warfare. At Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Air Force and Navy medical personnel have been fully incorporated into one of our busiest military hospitals at home or abroad. We are fully 

supportive of joint medical capabilities and do not see a Joint or Unified Medical 

Command as necessary to accomplish what is already being done. Such a command 

would add overhead and incur additional costs with an uncertain return on that investment. 

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Question. What functions, in your view, are unique to the Air Force and should 

remain within the Air Force management structure? 

Answer. The Air Force Medical Service is a key component of the Air Force’s ability to meet title 10 responsibilities in assuring the health and well being of our airmen. Air Force medics work directly for their Line commanders in support of our 

Wing missions worldwide. Wing commanders are directly accountable to meet the 

mission and ensure the health of the force is preserved and sustained. 

Air Force medical capabilities presented to the combatant commanders in support 

of the joint warfight are key elements of the ‘‘enroute care system.’’ This includes 

the resuscitative trauma care in our Air Force theater hospitals, the aeromedical 

staging capability and the air evacuation and critical care aeromedical transport 

teams. All medical forces both home station and deployed are essential to the Air 

Force’s ability to prosecute our expeditionary mission in support of the AEF rotations and combatant commanders’ tasks. 

Question. With or without a unified medical command, what steps would you take, 

if confirmed, to improve joint medical readiness requirements in support of contingency operations? 

Answer. We can take great pride in the work our Air Force, Army and Navy medics are doing at home and deployed, but there is always room to improve. Sharpening and refining joint doctrine is essential to improving the interoperability and 

interdependence of our medical forces. The enabling platforms such as logistics, information management, education/training and research and development offer significant opportunity to improve our joint and interoperable capabilities. I will continue to work with my Service counterparts and combatant commanders to ensure 

interoperability. Our Air Force medics will remain fully supportive of joint medical 

requirements, planning, and training and will continue to fill leadership roles within 

the joint community. 

AIRCRAFT RECAPITALIZATION

Question. At times, approximately one third of the current Air Force aircraft inventory has been under some type of flight restriction, mainly due to aging aircraft 

problems. 

If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the Air Force recapitalizes 

its aircraft inventory and how would you prioritize the recapitalization effort? 

Answer. The Air Force would continue to analyze emerging threats affecting 

warfighters to determine what is needed to sustain the force, to modernize when 

necessary, and to recapitalize ensuring we can fight the future fight. Currently, the 

average age of Air Force’s aircraft inventory is 24 years with some nearing 50 years. 

Our goal is reduce that average to 15 years by 2030. To maintain the current average requires the Air Force to acquire 165 aircraft per year, and, per the fiscal year 

2009 President’s budget, we will be able to acquire only 115 aircraft per year. That 

will mean that the average age of Air Force’s inventory will grow to 27 years by 

2020. The Defense Department’s revised fiscal guidance for the FYDP beginning in 

fiscal year 2010, authorized an approximately $5 billion boost for our recapitalization efforts, and that will certainly help. 

Our priority is to bring F–35s into the Air Force as swiftly as possible. The additional resources we have received will be used in part to increase the F–35s annual 

production rate. Of equal priority in the near term, we must replace our aging tankers promptly, consistent with Under Secretary Young’s recent testimony. We will 

continue to modernize our space-based communications such as WGS, AEHF, and 

TSAT. Our ISR portfolio will continue to grow and mature. The Air Force will rapidly acquire increasingly unmanned ISR platforms to meet the growing demand of 

the combatant commanders. 

AIR FORCE BUDGET REQUEST

Question. In recent years, the Air Force budget request has not included funding 

requests for various aircraft, including C–17 and F–22, but these items ranked high 

on the Air Force’s UPLs. Some have suggested that the Air Force deliberately declined to include funding for such aircraft, relying instead on Congress to add funding for them. 

If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that the Air Force budget 

includes those items that you believe the Air Force needs? 

Answer. I would continue to work the delicate balance between the priorities of 

winning the global war on terrorism and preparing for tomorrow’s fight. I am 

pleased, based on what I have read, with the direction of our fiscal year 2010 POM, 

particularly that we were able to bolster the nuclear enterprise, support the global 

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wards recapitalization of our aging fleet. The additional topline we are expecting 

will help greatly to meet our manpower and recapitalization goals. We will continue 

to work closely with OSD to pursue these goals. But, as a consistent practice, if we 

truly wish for a program to be funded, we will fund it within the Air Force budget. 

JOINT BASING

Question. The 2005 base realignment and closure commission directed, at the request of the Department of Defense, the establishment of 12 joint bases. Nine of 

these recommendations involve the Air Force. 

Did the Department of the Air Force support or oppose this recommendation when 

it was being formulated inside the Department of Defense, prior to the transmission 

of the Secretary of Defense’s recommendations to the commission? 

Answer. I am told the Air Force supported and continues to support the goals of 

joint basing. The Air Force position has been and continues to be that we will 

achieve cost efficiencies without adversely impacting mission capability and quality 

of life. While complex and emotional endeavors, I believe we can attain the benefits 

and promise of joint basing with minimum disruption to mission and quality of life. 

Question. Does the Air Force support or oppose this joint basing effort today? 

Answer. The Air Force fully supports joint basing and is committed to making it a success. Question. Does the Air Force support joint basing in cases where the Air Force 

will not be the lead Service for the joint base? 

Answer. Yes. To accomplish this, we advocated for and in conjunction with the 

other Services and OSD, established installation support common output level 

standards. Our airmen, soldiers, sailors, marines, DOD civilians, and their families 

will benefit from efficient, common, and consistent installation support services. 

Such standards will ensure the Air Force and our sister Services continue to enjoy 

the level of installation support services their people deserve. 

Question. What concerns does the Air Force have about establishing joint bases? 

Answer. The Air Force remains committed to ensuring that all bases, joint or otherwise, maintain their capability to perform its missions and provide consistent 

standards of support for all warfighters and their families. Ideally, joint bases would 

be so efficient and effective that an assignment to a joint base would be a highlight 

for every servicemember. 

Question. What effort is the Air Force making inside the Department of Defense, 

at both the senior and working group levels, to find solutions for these concerns? 

Answer. The Air Force has a long and successful history of working toward common goals in a joint environment to guarantee success, each joint base should be 

required to provide a suitable setting for all of its assigned personnel, their families, 

and other parties within the local communities our bases support. To accomplish 

this, the Air Force successfully advocated for the establishment of 265 common joint 

base quality of life standards that are the right standards for all Services. 

AIR FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Question. If confirmed, what direction would you provide regarding the importance of innovative defense science in meeting Air Force missions? 

Answer. A critical Air Force priority is to recapitalize and modernize our air and 

space capabilities, while advancing new cyberspace capabilities. Innovative Science 

and Technology (S&T) efforts have and will continue to play an essential role towards this end. Drawing from national strategy followed by Guidance for the Development of the Force, the Air Force Strategic Plan, and in concert with the Air Force 

S&T Executive, I will provide direction that focuses and protects S&T investments 

that advance the state-of-the-art in areas critical to continued United States dominance of air, space, and cyberspace. 

Question. Do you believe the current balance between short- and long-term research is appropriate to meet current and future Air Force needs? 

Answer. Based on what I know, yes, the Air Force’s current S&T investment 

strategy of maintaining a balance between basic research, applied research, and advanced technology development is appropriate to meet current and future Air Force 

needs. 

Question. If confirmed, what role would you play in ensuring research priorities 

that will meet the needs of the Air Force in 2020? 

Answer. Having oversight of the Air Staff and Air Force Major Commands, and 

as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I ultimately play an important role in the 

process of identifying future capabilities critical to continued United States dominance of air, space, and cyberspace. It is vital that we understand and advance 

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ture threats. As stated before, I will draw upon national strategy and the Department’s Guidance for the Development of the Force to establish research priorities 

supporting both near- and far-term force needs. 

Question. In the face of rising acquisition costs for programs such as the Joint 

Strike Fighter, and programs to support space operations, if confirmed, how do you 

plan to ensure the protection of funding for long-term science and technology investments? 

Answer. The S&T Program is a key element in making mature technologies available for transition into development programs. The S&T Program provides a strong 

foundation for reducing risk and costs. As such, I will provide direction that focuses 

and protects S&T investments that mature and advance the state-of-the-art in areas 

critical to continued United States dominance of air, space, and cyberspace. 

TECHNICAL WORKFORCE

Question. The Air Force Research Laboratory relies on a strong technical workforce to conduct research for development of new weapons systems, platforms, and 

capabilities to meet its mission of: ‘‘leading the discovery, development, and integration of affordable warfighting technologies for our air and space force.’’ 

Are you concerned about the current or future supply of experts in defense critical 

disciplines, particularly personnel with appropriate security clearances, to hold positions in defense laboratories? 

Answer. I’m always concerned about the supply of experts in the critical defense 

disciplines needed in our laboratory and elsewhere in our acquisition enterprise. 

Today, the lab is able to meet its needs; however, given the current state of U.S. 

Science, Technology, Engineering and Math (STEM) resources, I expect this will become more difficult over time. Availability of technical talent will remain a key issue 

in and out of government. 

AIR FORCE TEST AND EVALUATION CAPABILITIES

Question. What do you feel are the biggest deficiencies in Air Force test and evaluation capabilities? 

Answer. Air Force test and evaluation must continue to develop test capabilities 

that keep pace with the development of our technically complex weapon systems. 

We need to strive to be efficient with our resources and at the same time responsive 

in meeting our test and evaluation requirements. 

Question. What steps will you take to ensure that the Air Force has a robust testing infrastructure and qualified test workforce? 

Answer. The Air Force will work with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the Director of the Test Resource Management Center, the Services and 

other DOD agencies, and industry to help shape the future of our Nation’s infrastructure and workforce. We will employ proven methodologies, like the Air Force 

Smart Operations for the 21st Century program, to develop efficiencies; support programs to recruit, train, and retain the necessary workforce; and focus our test infrastructure on supporting the current and future needs of the acquisition community 

and broader national interests. 

GENERAL OFFICER MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Question. Incidents of misconduct or substandard performance and findings of inspectors general and other command-directed investigations are documented in various ways in each of the Services. Procedures for including and forwarding adverse 

and alleged adverse information in connection with the promotion selection process 

are set forth in title 10, United States Code, and in DOD Instruction 1320.4. 

How is the Air Force ensuring compliance with requirements of law and regulation regarding review of adverse information? 

Answer. The Air Force is required by law and DOD policy to present all adverse 

information of a credible nature to general officer promotion and Federal recognition 

boards. Upon receipt of the names of officers meeting a general officer promotion 

or Federal recognition board, SAF/IG initiates a review of Air Force, DOD, and 

other government investigative files for potential adverse information. If substantiated adverse information is uncovered that does not already exist in the officer’s 

selection record, a summary of the adverse information, plus any written comments 

from the officer, are placed in a senior officer unfavorable information file and attached to the officer’s selection record. If the officer is selected for promotion or Federal recognition, this file stays with the officer’s nomination package through its coordination with OSD, the White House, and the Senate. If unfavorable information 

is discovered about an officer after selected for promotion or Federal recognition that 

information will be presented to a promotion review board. The promotion review 

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board will consider the adverse information and make a recommendation to the Secretary of the Air Force whether to continue to support the officer for appointment 

to the next higher grade. If the Secretary continues to support the officer, the information will be added to the nomination package. 

Question. What standards and procedures are in place in the Air Force to ensure 

that allegations of adverse information relating to a nominee for promotion are 

brought to the attention of the Department and the committee in a timely manner? 

Answer. The Air Force has procedures in place to ensure any adverse or potential 

adverse information is presented with the nomination packages. Prior to the promotion selection board the Air Force conducts an initial screening for adverse information. The Air Force performs additional such checks following the selection board, 

and every 60 days throughout the nomination process. 

For 1- and 2-stars, if there is substantiated adverse information, the selection 

board will review the information as part of the process and that information will 

be included in the nomination package. If allegations of adverse information arise 

after the board is complete the Air Force typically will separate the individual from 

the list until the investigation is complete and if necessary, command action is complete and then convene a promotion review board to determine if the individual 

should continue to be nominated for the next higher grade. The Air Force always 

includes substantiated adverse information with its nomination packages thru OSD 

to the Senate. 

For 3- and 4-star nominations, substantiated adverse information is included in 

the nomination packages and the Air Force performs adverse information checks 

every 60 days throughout the nomination process from OSD to the Senate. 

READINESS LEVELS

Question. What is your assessment of the current readiness of the Air Force to 

execute its assigned missions? 

Answer. Our Nation’s airmen are trained, equipped, ready, and are supporting 

joint force operations around the globe. The Air Force is constantly assessing lessons 

learned in operations, both combat and non-combatant, and making changes in how 

we train, equip, organize, and prepare our forces to better execute current and future operations. Whether integrating our ISR with ground operations to find the 

enemy, precisely delivering critical supplies or personnel to our joint partners, or increasing the number of air strikes against enemy positions, our airmen have continued to find ways to contribute to the effectiveness of the joint team. 

Question. What do you view as the major readiness challenges that will have to 

be addressed by the Air Force over the next 4 years, and, if confirmed, how will 

you approach these issues? 

Answer. High OPTEMPO combined with an aging fleet of aircraft and spacecraft 

continues to challenge readiness. We fly and maintain the oldest aircraft inventory 

in Air Force history. The Air Force has addressed aging aircraft issues by developing an overarching strategy for future fleet management. The Air Force has chartered the Air Force Fleet Viability Board to assess the viability of our inventories 

so that we posture ourselves to make the best informed modification, sustainment, 

and retirement decisions. 

In terms of stressed career fields impacted by a continuing high OPTEMPO, the 

Air Force actively tracks our stressed career fields and uses this data to focus on 

the specialties that require the most management intervention. Solutions we have 

put in place include Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) banding to better manage tempo 

in highly stressed air force specialties and alternate sourcing strategies to use other 

air force specialties to augment stressed career fields. We are also reducing stress 

on some career fields by adding additional manpower. For example, we’ve added additional battlefield airmen, combat weather and joint tactical air control personnel, 

to support U.S. Army modernization and transformation. We will look at other highly stressed career fields, such as Security Forces, Intelligence, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal and assess whether to increase their numbers of personnel. 

INVESTMENT IN FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Question. Air Force Leadership recently stated in testimony, ‘‘MILCON is an essential enabler of Air Force missions; however, due to fiscal constraints, we must 

reduce funding and accept greater risk in facilities and infrastructure in order to 

continue our efforts to recapitalize and modernize our aging aircraft and equipment.’’ 

In your opinion, at what point is the reduction of funding for facilities and infrastructure too much of a risk for the Air Force? 

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Answer. We’ve managed or mitigated risk by balancing our approach between Facility Sustainment, Restoration & Modernization, and MILCON accounts. Taking 

manageable risk in infrastructure is prudent given the Air Force’s previous investment in infrastructure combined with our current investment in maintaining our facilities by increasing Facility Sustainment to 90 percent of DOD requirements and 

increasing Restoration & Modernization (R&M) by $160 million compared to fiscal 

year 2008. While these actions help us to manage risk in fiscal year 2009, we will 

likely re-invest in infrastructure in fiscal year 2010 to ensure we preserve the capability of our bases—our Installation Weapon Systems. 

Question. If confirmed, would you support goals established by the Department of 

Defense for certain levels of funding dedicated to the recapitalization and 

sustainment of facilities? 

Answer. Yes. The Air Force supports the existing Department of Defense goal for 

Facility Sustainment by funding our program to at least 90 percent of the modeled 

requirement. We will support any Facility Recapitalization goal if and when it is 

developed because installations provide a critical capability to the Air Force—we 

fight from our bases, they are our Installation Weapon Systems. 

FEE-FOR-SERVICE COMMERCIAL TANKERS

Question. The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition testified last 

April that the Air Force is moving forward with a congressionally mandated plan 

to develop a Fee-For-Service Aerial Refueling Pilot Program. However, the Air Mobility Command Commander, General Arthur J. Lichte, has testified that he has 

questions ‘‘with regard to the operational procedures, FAA requirements and certifications, and legal issues that come up.’’ 

In your view, is the Air Force doing everything it can to ensure the intent of Congress is carried out in implementing the fee-for-service pilot program? 

Answer. The Air Force is providing the necessary groundwork to ensure the intent 

of Congress is carried out with respect to implementing the fee-for-service pilot program. The Air Force has already released a Request for Information and had dialogue with industry for concept refinement. A Request for Proposal (RFP) is planned 

to be released in first quarter fiscal year 2009, after which the Air Force anticipates 

receiving proposals from interested/qualified offerors. If executed, we anticipate industry will require 18–24 months to accomplish boom design, modification, and airframe integration. 

Question. What concerns, if any, do you have about the conduct and purpose of 

this pilot program? 

Answer. I do have some concerns regarding the funding and operational impacts 

of this program. There was no fiscal year 2008 appropriation to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 direction, so the Air Force is 

working on reprogramming funds for the program in fiscal year 2008–2009. Unlike 

the Navy program which uses a probe and drogue refueling system, this program 

requires significant industry commitment and investment to develop and certify a 

commercial boom-equipped aircraft. A minimum of an additional 6 months will be 

required for boom system operation, aircrew certification, and receiver qualification. 

Once complete, we can conduct the pilot program in fiscal year 2012–2016. 

We will assess progress and ensure we meet program requirements in the yearly 

reports submitted to Congress. 

UAV ROADMAP

Question. In 2001, Congress established as a goal that by 2010 one-third of the 

aircraft in the operational deep strike force should be unmanned. However, the recently issued Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007–2032 does not describe how it 

plans to achieve that goal, nor does it include striking targets as a key UAV role 

or mission in the future 

Given the varying positions the Air Force has held regarding unmanned combat 

air vehicles (UCAVs)—most recently removing itself from the joint UCAV program, 

do you see striking targets as a potential mission for UAVs? Why or why not? 

Answer. I understand that the Air Force fully supports using UAVs to conduct 

strike operations and is increasing current investments in this area to significantly 

enhance this capability. The Air Force is now fielding the MQ–9 Reaper as a followon to the MQ–1 Predator. The MQ–9 is a multi-role Unmanned Aerial System 

(UAS) whose roles include hunter/killer strike and ISR. The MQ–9 can carry up to 

3000 lbs of weapons (15 times more than the Predator) and is currently deployed 

in both Iraq and Afghanistan. 

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS HANDLING INCIDENT

Question. General Larry Welch, USAF (Ret.), Chairman of the Defense Science 

Board Task Force on Nuclear Weapons, testified earlier this year that the nuclear 

weapons handling incident which occurred in August 2007 resulted from long-term 

and systemic degradation of training and focus by the Air Force on the nuclear mission. 

Given the nature and severity of the incident, and General Welch’s report, are you 

satisfied with the accountability actions taken within the Air Force thus far? 

Answer. The invaluable assessment by the Defense Science Board’s Permanent 

Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety, led by General Welch, has had far-reaching 

impact on the Air Force, though it was not an assessment of personnel accountability related to the unauthorized munitions transfer. 

The Air Combat Command Commander Directed Investigation identified accountable individuals and a deliberate process followed resulting in a range of disciplinary actions. Subsequently, the Department of Defense Inspector General evaluated 

Air Force accountability actions related to this incident. 

Regarding the findings of the Donald Report involving the misshipment of Mk 12 

forward sections to Taiwan, the accountability review process is not complete and, 

if confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Air Force to ensure proper accountability. 

All processes and procedures involving nuclear weapons are exacting. Perfection 

is the standard. There is no room for incomplete knowledge or substandard performance. Precision, compliance, personal responsibility and enforced accountability are 

foundational to success in this vital mission area. 

Question. There are over $100 million in ‘‘unfunded requirements’’ related to the 

Blue Ribbon Review of the August 2007 incident on the Air Force’s unfunded priorities list for fiscal year 2009. 

What actions would you expect to take, if confirmed, to modify this list and seek 

reprogramming authority? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will evaluate the status of these associated unfunded requirements and take appropriate action, to include modifying the list, securing 

needed funding within our program and seeking reprogramming authority, if necessary. 

AIR FORCE ABILITY TO RESPOND TO WORLDWIDE CONTINGENCIES

Question. What impact, if any, do you see on the Air Force’s ability to respond 

to worldwide contingencies as a consequence of the demands of current operations 

in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Answer. The Air Force is organized, trained, equipped, and prepared to rapidly, 

flexibly, and precisely respond to worldwide contingencies. The Air Force has capabilities and manpower with specialized skills in high demand in Iraq and Afghanistan, such as airlift; ISR capabilities; explosive ordnance disposal; and security 

forces. Additional requirements in these areas will require the Secretary of Defense 

to allocate forces between Iraq, Afghanistan, in place Homeland Defense and global 

support missions, and another worldwide contingency. 

Question. How much additional risk is the United States assuming in this regard? 

Answer. The Air Force is fully supporting the Secretary of Defense and combatant 

commanders with in place and expeditionary forces. We have major commands and 

Component Numbered Air Forces who support all the Functional and Geographic 

Combatant Commanders in planning and executing operations. We use an AEF 

process to manage tempo and enable rapid and tailored responses to homeland and 

worldwide contingencies. For the Air Force, my sense is the risk is manageable. 

‘‘IN LIEU OF’’ AIRMEN IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

Question. The Air Force has provided significant ‘‘in lieu of’’ (ILO) ground forces 

to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Are you satisfied with the type and amount of ground combat training and preparation airmen assigned these support missions are receiving before deploying? 

Answer. We are confident that AEF airmen are receiving the required training 

to perform their AEF mission. The Air Force has developed Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 

3 expeditionary training policy, guidance and curriculum standards to ensure our 

airmen are ready to accomplish their missions in the combat environment. Tier 1 

training provides expeditionary skills for all airmen and is delivered through accessions, initial functional training, and in the foundational training curriculum for 

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ing to Basic Military Training and is developing Common Battlefield Airman Training (CBAT) for select career fields. 

To ensure every deploying Airman can achieve the same level of basic competencies in contingency skills, the Air Force developed Tier 2 ‘‘deployment-ready’’ 

standardized training. Expeditionary Combat Skills (ESC) includes weapons and 

body armor training and a field exercise to demonstrate their skills. 

Advanced Expeditionary Skills Training (Tier 3) is enhanced predeployment training for select mission-ready airmen as determined by deployment location, threat assessment, specific mission, duty assignment, role, operation or special requirement. 

The Air Force offers a wide variety of predeployment expeditionary training courses 

and 60+ air mobility resident/web-based courses to Air Force, joint and coalition personnel to include Eagle Flag Exercise and Air Advisor training. Additionally, our 

airmen selected for ILO taskings are collectively trained alongside soldiers, sailors, 

and marines by the same combat skills training instructors and develop into cohesive teams at Army power projection platforms before deploying down range. 

Lastly, the Air Force has established the Training and Equipment Review Board 

(TERB) to monitor the effectiveness of our training and modify that training to meet 

the gaining commander’s needs, to ensure airmen can operate and survive in their 

deployed environment. 

Question. Are these airmen getting the right equipment necessary to operate in 

that environment, particularly force protection equipment? 

Answer. This question specifically references the approximately 12,000 airmen 

who deploy annually in the ILO category. Yes, personnel are receiving the necessary 

force protection equipment to include the Advanced Combat Helmet and the Interceptor Outer Tactical Vest with Level IV Enhanced Small Arms Protective inserts. 

Question. What have been the effects of these manpower requirements on morale 

and readiness of airmen, and do you believe that Air Force leaders have been effective in communicating the importance of the mission to their personnel? 

Answer. In general, I don’t think we have sufficiently celebrated the contribution 

of our airmen performing non-traditional roles. The term ILO is itself, at least in 

some sense, pejorative. Those who have performed this duty are rightly proud of 

their service. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Air Force recognizes and 

properly honors nontraditional performance of duty in the ongoing global war on 

terrorism. 

JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT

Question. In June 2006, the Army and Air Force signed a memorandum of understanding regarding the merger of two separate small cargo aircraft programs into 

the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA), a plane that will be smaller than the Air Forces C–

130, but larger than the Army’s C–23 Sherpa. 

In your view, is there a roles-and-missions redundancy between the Army and the 

Air Force with respect to the JCA? 

Answer. No. There are valid direct support lift requirements that call for Service 

organic fixed wing aircraft to meet a ground commander’s need for Time Sensitive/

Mission Critical (TS/MC) delivery of passengers and cargo. 

Question. What changes to this program, if any, would you recommend? 

Answer. Based on what I know, and prior exposure at the U.S. TRANSCOM, the 

Air Force supports the program of record. 

COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE HELICOPTER (CSAR–X)

Question. After Boeing won the contract for development of the Air Force’s next 

generation combat search and rescue helicopter, the Lockheed and Sikorsky corporations protested the award to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and prevailed. 

What is your understanding of the Air Force’s way ahead on the CSAR–X program? 

Answer. The Air Force amended the RFP to accommodate the GAO findings. The 

road ahead includes receiving final proposals based on ongoing discussions, finalizing our evaluation, and making the source selection decision. I understand the Air 

Force anticipates a fall 2008 contract award with full OSD (AT&L) program review 

prior to award. 

Question. What is your understanding of the Air Force’s ability to achieve its goal 

of initial operating capability (IOC) by 2012? 

Answer. The RFP amendment #6 was issued on 22 April 2008. In this amendment 

the IOC was changed to a period of time. The first quarter of fiscal year 2013 is 

the desired IOC and the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2014 is the required IOC date. 

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AIR FORCE CYBER COMMAND

Question. The Air Force established a provisional Cyber Command in September 

2007 with the mission of training and equipping forces to conduct sustained global 

operations in and through cyberspace, fully integrated with air and space operations. 

How do you envision Cyber Command integrating and interacting with the Department and the other Services? 

Answer. Cyber Command, if permanently established, will provide forces, in coordination with our joint partners and the Department, to combatant commanders 

to protect and defend U.S. interests in the cyber domain at home and abroad. 

Question. What is your understanding of when a permanent headquarters will be 

established? 

Answer. The headquarters will declare IOC by October 2008 using distributed locations. The Air Force is studying a list of potential permanent basing locations 

with an expected final decision in fiscal year 2009. 

Question. How do you see the mission of the Cyber Command integrated into title 

10? 

Answer. Air Force Cyber Command’s (AFCYBER) primary mission will be to organize, train, and equip Air Force cyberspace forces to support joint operations. The 

Command will also be responsible for protecting Air Force networks. To that end, 

AFCYBER will be the Air Force’s lead advocate for cyberspace capabilities, and will 

drive related Air Force education and training. 

AIR FORCE IMPLEMENTATION OF ‘‘FAMILIES FIRST’’

Question. United States TRANSCOM has made great progress in implementing 

the promise of the ‘‘Families First’’ program, aimed at modernizing the system for 

moving household goods of servicemembers and their families pursuant to permanent change of station orders. One of the greatest challenges has been to replace 

the legacy Transportation Operational Personal Property Standard System (TOPS) 

with the web-based Defense Personal Property System (DPS). 

How would you assess the status of implementation of the Families First Program 

and DPS in the Air Force? 

Answer. The Air Force is committed to the development and fielding of DPS, the 

automated system for Families First and replacement system for TOPS. The Air 

Force continues to work with USTC J5/4 and J6, SDDC, and the services to provide 

subject matter expertise for testing and business rule development. We are encouraged by recent developments, new timelines, and increasing momentum in the program. We consider DPS to be heading in the right direction and standby for implementation in the fall of 2008. 

Question. What do you view as the most significant challenges that remain in the 

Air Force to ensuring that DPS and the modernized Families First system for contracting for the movement of household goods and responding to claims for damaged 

and missing property is successfully put into effect? 

Answer. We believe the most significant challenge is the return rate of customer 

satisfaction surveys. These surveys are vital to the new program and if inputs are 

not received customer feedback will not be available for program analysis and the 

carriers will not be aware of deficiencies. We have worked to market the importance 

of the surveys with all concerned through a number of media sources in the Air 

Force. We will continue to encourage customers to return surveys so course corrections can be made. We will make use of available authority to tie full replacement 

value reimbursements to submission of the customer satisfaction survey. 

AIR FORCE ACQUISITION SYSTEM FLAWS

Question. Over the last 4 years, GAO protests have resulted in the reversal of a 

number of significant Air Force contract award decisions, including award decisions 

on the KC–X tanker replacement contract; the Combat Search and Rescue Helicopter Replacement Program (CSAR–X) contract; the C–130 Avionics Modernization 

Program (AMP) contract; the Small-Diameter Bomb contract; the Thunderbird video 

contract; and a contract for F–15 training simulators. 

Do you believe that there are significant problems in the Air Force acquisition 

system today? 

Answer. These examples, while significant, need to be viewed in the context of the 

thousands of contracts the Air Force successfully executes every year. Nonetheless, 

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tary expertise across the enterprise; and attracting additional, proven engineering 

and management talent in supervisory roles. 

Question. If so, what are those problems and how would you propose to address 

them? 

Answer. See above. 

Question. If not, why do you believe that the Air Force has been the subject of 

so many adverse bid protest decisions? 

Answer. Although I believe that the Air Force acquisition system is not fatally 

flawed, I agree there are opportunities for improvement. Weapon systems require 

complex, in-depth evaluations across many functional areas against both objective 

and subjective criteria; we continue to examine processes and factors to arrive at 

fair evaluation of these highly complex proposals to protect the interests of our 

warfighter and the taxpayer. Representative actions outlined in the previous question apply. 

ACTIONS OF AIR FORCE OFFICIALS

Question. Over the last several years, senior Air Force officers are alleged to have 

advocated the funding of a number of programs that were not included in the President’s budget and for which there was no currently validated joint requirement. 

These programs include the procurement of additional C–17s, the continuation of 

the C–130J multi-year contract, and the multi-year procurement of additional F–22 

aircraft. Senior Air Force officers are also alleged to have advocated a legislative 

proposal that would overturn a decision of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission relative to Joint Basing. 

What is your view of the propriety of efforts by senior Air Force officers to advocate the funding of programs that are not included in the President’s budget and 

for which there is no currently validated joint requirement? 

Answer. Other than those occasions when individuals appear before appropriate 

committees of Congress and are asked to give their personal views, the military 

services cannot function effectively and credibly if senior officers advocate for programs or funding of requirements that are not a part of the President’s budget. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to curb such efforts? 

Answer. If confirmed as Chief of Staff, I would work closely with the Secretary 

of the Air Force both to foster a healthy debate within the Air Force on the allocation of valuable resources and to ensure an understanding that only established 

processes and procedures for advocating program funding and priorities outside the 

Air Force will be used. As a consistent practice, if we truly wish for a program to 

be funded, we will fund it within the Air Force budget. 

DEFENSE BUDGETING

Question. On January 27, 2008, the Washington Post reported on internal Air 

Force briefing slides, called ‘‘CSAF 2008 Leadership Forum Strategic Communication Update,’’ which included statements that: ‘‘the Air Force is targeting the other 

Services;’’ the ‘‘Budget Battle’’ is a ‘‘Zero Sum Gain’’ and a ‘‘Non-Permissive Environment;’’ and ‘‘some Services are going to win and some are going to lose.’’ 

What is your view of these briefing slides and the views that they appear to be 

intended to communicate? 

Answer. I am told the 2 slides that appeared in the Washington Post were part 

of a larger 10-slide internal briefing to Air Force retired senior leadership, to inform 

them of a Communication Campaign Plan underway to better plan and execute the 

message about the Air Force’s contribution to national security, and to encourage 

their participation. 

Articulating the Air Force contribution to national security and share of defense 

resources is an appropriate institutional effort for the Air Force. All Services and 

DOD agencies, to a greater or lesser extent, engage in similar activities. But, it is 

my view that the net result is a joint force capability tied to the highest priority 

needs of the Department of Defense. That, in my mind, is not zero sum for any participant. 

CHIEF OF STAFF UNFUNDED REQUIREMENTS LISTS

Question. The so-called ‘‘wish lists’’ that have resulted from Congress’s request for 

Service input on where to allocate funds added to the national defense budget have 

mostly proven to be an effective means of ensuring that such funds are apportioned 

appropriately in terms of what is best for the national interest. However, the Air 

Force Chief of Staff’s fiscal year 2009 UPL includes 152 programs and activities totaling $18.75 billion—far in excess of amounts listed by any of the other military 

Services. The Air Force’s UPL has more than four times the number of items that 

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are on the Army list—at five times the cost, eight times the number of items that 

are on the Navy list—at five times the cost, and seven times the number of items 

that are on the Marine Corps list—at more than six times the cost. 

If confirmed, will you examine how the Air Force determines the Chief of Staff’s 

UPL and take appropriate steps to ensure that in the future the Air Force provide 

lists to Congress that are limited to the items of greatest importance to the Air 

Force? 

Answer. As Chief of Staff of the Air Force, if confirmed, I will continue to fund 

our most critical requirements in the President’s budget. Furthermore, while recognizing that Service needs nearly always exceed the funds available, I understand 

the value in providing a more focused unfunded list to Congress. If Congress continues to offer the Services a chance to submit UPLs in the future, I will use that 

opportunity to submit a list highlighting our highest priority unfunded needs. 

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those 

views differ from the administration in power? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Chief 

of Staff of the Air Force? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic communications, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, 

or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

STRATEGIC POSTURE COMMISSION

1. Senator LEVIN. General Schwartz, Congress established the Commission on the 

Strategic Posture of the United States in the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2008. The Commission is chaired by former Secretary of Defense 

William Perry and is tasked to make recommendations on the future strategic posture of the United States including the nuclear posture. Will you cooperate fully 

with the Commission and the various working groups established by the Commission? 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes. Full cooperation is exactly what I will ensure this commission receives from my office and the Air Force at large.

RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY IN THE AIR FORCE

2. Senator LEVIN. General Schwartz, in June 2005, the Headquarters Review 

Group Concerning the Religious Climate at the U.S. Air Force Academy found ‘‘a 

religious climate [at the Air Force Academy] that did not involve overt religious discrimination, but a failure to fully accommodate all members’ needs and a lack of 

awareness over where the line is drawn between permissible and impermissible expression of beliefs.’’ As a graduate of the Academy, you are aware of the influence 

of instructors, officers, and upper class cadets over junior cadets to conform in order 

not to jeopardize their military careers. What is the current status of policies and 

programs at the Air Force Academy to reinforce the religious liberty rights of each 

cadet, chaplain, and commander? 

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General SCHWARTZ. The Superintendent, United States Air Force Academy, established in October 2005 that ‘‘Respect for Human Dignity’’ is the overarching and 

foundational policy for all activities across the Academy. The United States Air 

Force Academy remains officially neutral regarding religious beliefs, neither officially endorsing nor disapproving any faith belief or absence of belief. The Air Force 

Academy’s policy mirrors those of the entire United States Air Force: to accommodate free exercise of religion and other personal beliefs, as well as freedom of expression while not endorsing any religion or belief over any others. Academy leaders, instructors, officers, and upper class cadets are trained and educated on their 

duties to ensure that requests for religious accommodation are welcomed and dealt 

with as fairly and consistently as practicable, through their commands and/or areas 

of responsibility. Every basic cadet that enters the United States Air Force Academy 

is trained on religious tolerance and the accommodations and venues the Academy 

offers for different faiths. In addition to the training provided to all basic cadets, 

the upper class cadets and every permanent party member are required to complete 

religious toleration and awareness training. 

Leaders at every level, whether at the Air Force Academy or any other place in 

the Air Force, bear a special responsibility to ensure their words and actions cannot 

reasonably be construed to be officially endorsing nor disapproving any faith belief 

or absence of belief. In official circumstances or when superior/subordinate relationships are involved, superiors need to be sensitive to the potential that personal expressions may appear to be official or have undue influence on their subordinates. 

Subject to these sensitivities, superiors enjoy the same free exercise rights as all 

other airmen. 

Bottom line: All Air Force personnel have an obligation to keep the workplace professional in all cases, and our commanders throughout the entire Air Force understand that the religious liberty rights of each person are part of what they have 

taken an oath to defend.

3. Senator LEVIN. General Schwartz, if you are confirmed, what is your commitment to promoting acceptance of religious diversity at the Air Force Academy and 

throughout the Air Force? 

General SCHWARTZ. The very foundation of each of our Air Force’s core values (Integrity First, Service Before Self, and Excellence in All We Do) is respect . . . respect for oneself and each other. This respect includes each airman’s personal beliefs. Our airmen are Protestants, Jews, Catholics, Muslims, Buddhists, and many 

others, while some are Atheists and Agnostic, but all are airmen and all deserve 

respect. The right to worship or not to worship is enshrined in our Constitution. Additionally, operational necessity drives the importance of respect, because it enhances the trust that binds us together and that trust is critical to combat effectiveness. 

We must, however, avoid any perception that could imply our Air Force supports 

any one religion over another or religion over no affiliation. This does not mean we 

must exclude religion from our professional lives. Free, open, and respectful discussion of our beliefs and our differences, including religious diversity, is valuable. But 

there is a time and place for such discussions—we must be sensitive and act accordingly to the fact that individuals have different beliefs. These discussions must be 

learning experiences, not attempts to force a particular point of view, and they must 

never imply Air Force sponsorship or disapproval of a particular belief. In fact, this 

diversity allows us to better understand each other and our varying needs and as 

an expeditionary Air Force, understanding our own diverse beliefs helps us better 

understand those of our allies and hosts around the world. 

Leadership (to include commanders, supervisors, and first sergeants) must remain 

sensitive that their positions lend greater authority to their words and as such, it’s 

critical they be particularly careful when discussing religious issues and opinions 

with subordinates. As we speak to airmen, we must be inclusive rather than exclusive and use these situations to lighten the bonds and cohesion rather than promote 

a specific belief. Circumstances of each situation will be unique and our Chaplains 

and Staff Judge Advocates are available to provide advice. Ultimately, I will continue to emphasize acceptance of religious diversity and I will rely on our commanders’ good judgment and the broad range of options available to them to get this 

right for our airmen and their families.

AIR FORCE END STRENGTH

4. Senator LEVIN. General Schwartz, the Air Force previously announced that it 

was not going to reduce end strength to the previously planned level of 316,000; 

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rather it was going to maintain an end strength of 330,000. We understand that 

the Air Force plans to use available funds in fiscal year 2009 to support this level 

of end strength even though the funds for this level were not requested in the fiscal 

year 2009 budget request. What is the plan to identify the source of the funds to 

sustain the 330,000 end strength in fiscal year 2009? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force is committed to fund the 330,000 end strength 

requirement within existing fiscal year 2009 funding. This funding will almost exclusively come from two sources. First, by stopping the drawdown in fiscal year 

2008, the fiscal year 2009 funding that was originally programmed for force shaping 

initiatives, such as Voluntary Separation Pay will be freed up. Second, end strength 

at the beginning of fiscal year 2009 will be lower than originally planned, which will 

free up additional funding.

5. Senator LEVIN. General Schwartz, this 330,000 end strength level is also not 

sustained in the out year budget request. In your answers to the advance policy 

questions, however, you indicate that this out year funding shortfall will be fixed 

in the fiscal year 2010 budget request. How do you intend to fix this problem and 

where will the additional funds come from? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force intends to address this issue within the context 

of the fiscal year 2010 program review deliberations with the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense (OSD). At present, the Air Force has established an OSD/Air Force End 

Strength Issue Team to formally address any funding shortfall concerns.

6. Senator LEVIN. General Schwartz, will this be an increase to the previously 

planned Air Force top line or will reductions be made to procurement or other investment accounts? 

General SCHWARTZ. We will work with OSD to find the appropriate resources to 

fund our 330,000 end strength requirement. Until this review is complete, we will 

not know if the funding will be from additional top line or from realigning funds 

within the current Air Force top line. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

TEST AND EVALUATION AT EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE

7. Senator BILL NELSON. General Schwartz, prior Air Force leadership halted all 

consideration of realigning Developmental Test and Evaluation Center (DTEC) leadership under a single center at Edwards Air Force Base (AFB). This was due in 

large part to the major base realignment and closure (BRAC)-mandated realignments taking place at Eglin AFB and the need for further study into the effects of 

a potential leadership shift. What is your position on any future reorganization of 

Air Force Developmental Test and Evaluation as it pertains to Eglin AFB? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force Developmental Test and Evaluation Center 

(AFDTEC) construct does not affect personnel or locations of testing and would not 

impact the integration of the multi-Service F–35 training mission and the Army 7th 

Special Forces Group into the Eglin range and base infrastructure. Instead, alignment with AFDTEC (located at Edwards AFB, CA) would normalize command lines 

by adjusting the reporting chain for three Commanders: the Arnold Engineering and 

Development Center, 46th Test Wing, and 412th Test Wing Commanders. The 

AFDTEC concept is similar to the current Army model instituted in 1999 and has 

the potential to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of Air Force test operations. 

No implementation would occur until the Air Force conducted appropriate preparation and notification activities.

E–8C JOINT SURVEILLANCE AND TARGET ATTACK RADAR SYSTEM & MP–RTIP

8. Senator BILL NELSON. General Schwartz, the Air Force lists Multi-Platform 

Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP–RTIP) in the fiscal year 2009 Unfunded 

Requirements List, and General Moseley was supportive of putting the improved 

technology, as an interim measure, on the E–8C until a suitable next-generation aircraft platform is selected. Understanding the Air Force’s significant budget pressures, the MP–RTIP technology is, nevertheless, a critical and needed capability for 

the ground, sea, and air warfighters due to its ability to cue other strike assets and 

detect enemy weapons. What is your plan to continue these development efforts, including appropriate funding to put MP–RTIP on the E–8C aircraft? 

General SCHWARTZ. Development of a small MP–RTIP sensor is ongoing to provide enhanced capabilities for the Global Hawk. The Air Force is evaluating the 

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most viable platform to carry a larger, Wide Area Surveillance (WAS) variant of the 

MP–RTIP sensor as was previously planned for the E–10. Although WAS risk reduction activities were suspended in March 2008, funding appropriated in the fiscal 

year 2008 supplemental will allow the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar 

System (JSTARS) and MP–RTIP programs to resume risk reduction and technology 

maturation related to the sensor, Operation and Control (O&C) of the sensor, and 

platform integration, including potential fielding on JSTARS or other large aircraft.

AIR FORCE NUCLEAR COORDINATOR

9. Senator BILL NELSON. General Schwartz, a new position has been created in 

the Air Force to serve as the central coordinator for Air Force Nuclear issues. What 

is your vision for this new position? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Director of Nuclear Operations, Plans, and Requirements 

(A3/5N) was created in response to the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Review 

and the Defense Science Board reports that stemmed from the B–52 incident in August 2007. ‘‘The Air Force Chief of Staff should establish an office within A3/5 in 

the Air Staff headed by a flag officer whose daily business is the nuclear enterprise.’’ 

(DSB report) This reorganization was made to overcome fragmentation on the air 

staff and unify staff focus on the nuclear mission. 

This organization represents the Air Force to the Joint Staff, OSD, Department 

of Energy, the National Security Council, national laboratories as well as 

STRATCOM. It also is point of entry to the air staff for our Major Commands on 

all nuclear issues. 

The directorate impacts nuclear career field development and training; assesses 

nuclear employment and concepts; integrates nuclear capabilities into Air Force and 

joint planning, operations and exercises while advocating for nuclear safety, security 

and operational capability. 

Air Force success in the nuclear mission area depends upon sustained leadership 

focus and attention at all levels, all the time. This office will serve the Secretary 

and the Chief well by keeping nuclear issues in the forefront of our daily battle 

rhythm.

10. Senator BILL NELSON. General Schwartz, what responsibility and authority 

will it have? 

General SCHWARTZ. If confirmed, I will evaluate the authorities of this office and 

ensure my vision of constant vigilance of the nuclear mission across the Air Force 

nuclear enterprise is achieved and that Air Staff focus is assured. 

There may be requirements for further adjustments to our current organizational 

structures supporting the nuclear mission area. A critical measure in this end-toend assessment is to ensure unambiguous linkage between field operations, 

sustainment and policy.

MISSILE INDUSTRIAL BASE

11. Senator BILL NELSON. General Schwartz, in fiscal year 2009, for the first time 

the U.S. will no longer have intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in production, or active plans for a future replacement. Have you thought about any plans 

to sustain this industrial base to ensure the U.S. could meet any future production 

capability for a land-based strategic deterrent? 

General SCHWARTZ. The U.S. ICBM production concluded with Peacekeeper in the 

early 1990s. Since that time, the ICBM industrial base has supported various modernization efforts for the deployed ICBM fleet. By exercising unique strategic missile 

skills, the current ICBM Demonstration/Validation program is one of the several 

avenues which will help bridge the gap between the completion of the ICBM Modernization programs and the beginning of a follow-on ICBM or Minuteman III life 

extension program. 

The Air Force is also currently working, in response to Senate Report 110–155, 

to provide a ‘‘Report on ICBM Industrial Base Capabilities to Maintain, Modernize, 

and Sustain Minuteman III through 2030 and Provide a Replacement Land-Based 

Strategic Deterrent System After 2030,’’ which will address these issues in greater 

detail. This report is due to Congress in August 2008.

SPACE PROTECTION

12. Senator BILL NELSON. General Schwartz, protecting our space assets is an important mission of the Air Force as well as the National Reconnaissance Office 

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(NRO). To that end Congress has required a joint space protection be developed. The 

Air Force and the NRO have recently established a joint protection program. Will 

you ensure that this program is adequately funded including the highest priority of 

ensuring that the U.S. has adequate space situational awareness (SSA)? 

General SCHWARTZ. Given our national dependence on our space systems, Space 

Protection and SSA continue to be of great concern to the Air Force. The joint 

AFSPC/NRO Space Protection Program was established to preserve national security space effects through an integrated strategy to articulate vulnerabilities, assess 

threat impacts, identify options and recommend solutions leading to comprehensive 

space protection capabilities. Once determined, these solutions will then be implemented to provide the most cost effective capability for protecting the space environment. 

As I understand it, AFPSC conducted a Best Value Architecture Study for SSA 

to determine where the near/far-term investments in SSA should occur. Based on 

these results, they determined that first we have to do a better job in exploiting the 

data we already have. This means in the near-term fusing the data to obtain more 

precise and accurate information we can use efficiently. Second, they determined we 

need to increase our sustainment efforts to support the infrastructure and systems 

keeping those sources of data online. Finally, we need to look at developing better/

more sensors to improve our capabilities in the far-term. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

AIR NATIONAL GUARD

13. Senator CLINTON. General Schwartz, the Air Force is now developing the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for fiscal year 2010; with the new guidance 

from the Secretary of Defense to protect end strength as well as re-examine the proposed modernization accounts to meet the needs of the Total Force, what are your 

plans to ensure in the POM the adequate capitalization of the Air National Guard 

from its equipment, personnel, and sustainment perspectives? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force’s budget submission included a detailed review 

of all applicable guidance, and is the result of a careful review of Total Force modernization, personnel and sustainment. The Air Force remains committed to Total 

Force Integration and in the 2010 POM will expand on the progress we have made 

to integrate the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Forces into the Total 

Force in all areas including equipment, personnel, and sustainment. 

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR)

14. Senator CLINTON. General Schwartz, Secretary Gates has stressed the importance of the Air Force providing a more robust ISR to the warfighter. How will you 

enable the Air Force to meet the Secretary’s objectives, and within what time frame 

will you be able to do so? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force has been responsive to the war in Iraq and Afghanistan by innovating means to rapidly put ISR data directly into the hands of 

our joint and combined force at all levels. For example, the Air Force fielded 4,000 

remotely operated video enhanced receivers that allow ground forces to directly receive UAS pictures; accelerated MQ–1 Predator operations well beyond the DODdirected program of record; and introduced the MQ–9 Reaper into combat a year 

ahead of schedule. We continue to field more UAS capability at maximum capacity 

with near term focus, and we’re proud of the dedicated airmen around the globe who 

are making this happen. 

The original Predator UAS requirement was 21 CAPs by 2010, but the Air Force 

is currently flying 26 CAPs today, and planning to further increase Predator CAPs 

to 31 by December 2008. The Air Force is pushing ISR capability into the field as 

soon as it becomes available. We have issued a request for proposal for new UASs, 

and we are shifting our UAS procurement from the older MQ–1 to the more capable 

MQ–9. When equipped with the new wide area airborne surveillance pod, our MQ–

9 UASs will be able to provide 30 to 60 times more capability than a single MQ–

1 Predator. 

In addition, the Air Force has pushed legacy ISR ‘‘workhorses’’—the U–2s, RC–

135s, and JSTARS—to the maximum tempo possible to get as much collection capability to the fight as possible. We are also embedding ISR liaison teams at division 

and brigade combat team levels to tailor ISR capabilities for the specific tactical 

fights of these units. Further, we are also capitalizing on important technical advances in our ISR analysis enterprise, to turn data into actionable intelligence. 

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These advances-coupled with upgrades to our Distributed Common Ground System 

(DCGS—our primary imagery analysis capability) and increased efficiency through 

reachback to continental United States resources—ensure that joint warfighters get 

the maximum ISR support possible. 

Finally, the Air Force is working as part of the Secretary of Defense’s ISR Task 

Force to push even more ISR capability to the fight in the near term, through both 

additional buys of equipment (such as RC–12 aircraft tailored to the irregular warfare fight) and creative concepts that will add value in the near term. The Air Force 

and our airmen are committed to winning the current fight, and our ISR posture 

reflects that commitment. 

C–5 FLEET

15. Senator CLINTON. General Schwartz, the recently signed Iraq Supplemental 

Appropriations bill included 15 additional C–17s for the Air Force to meet its strategic airlift requirements. The Air Force has continued to state its need to balance 

the cost of sustaining the C–5 fleet with ensuring modern strategic air lifters are 

available to meet global needs. Please articulate what the Air Force sees as the need 

for additional C–17s, as well as the relationship of that need with the C–5 fleet. 

General SCHWARTZ. Our first priority is always to provide the best overall airlift 

capability to the joint warfighter. There are two issues with respect to the proper 

balance between the C–5s and C–17s that comprise our strategic airlift fleet. The 

first is the total number of tails. The current requirement of 299 tails was set by 

the 2007 NDAA, and this requirement as outlined in the fiscal year 2009 program 

of record for strategic airlift is 190 C–17s, 52 C–5Ms, and 59 C–5As. 

The second issue is the minimum number of million ton miles per day (MTM/D) 

available in our total fleet. During Nunn-McCurdy certification, the JROC validated 

a requirement for 33.95 MTM/D of organic strategic airlift (C–5s and C–17s). A fleet 

of 190 C–17s and 111 C–5s does not meet the 33.95 MTM/D goal. The addition of 

15 C–17s in the Global War on Terrorism Supplemental bill allows the Air Force 

to meet the 33.95 MTM/D requirement. A fleet of 205 C–17s and 111 C–5s meets 

both these requirements and is aligned with objectives sought by the TRANSCOM 

Commander and cited in the USD(AT&L) Nunn-McCurdy Acquisition Decision 

Memorandum (ADM). 

The Air Force continues to review options for the modernization and retirement 

of portions of the C–5A fleet. The C–17 has proven itself to be a highly reliable and 

versatile strategic airlift platform that will serve the Nation well across the full 

range of military operations. We will continue to analyze the overall requirement 

and make sure we maintain the proper balance in our fleet. The ongoing Mobility 

Capabilities Requirements Study 2016, with informal results available in the spring 

of 2009, is the next big force design milestone. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

FEE-FOR-SERVICE COMMERCIAL TANKERS

16. Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz, in your advance policy question responses 

you state, ‘‘The Air Force is providing the necessary groundwork to ensure the intent of Congress is carried out with respect to implementing the fee-for-service pilot 

program. The Air Force has already released a Request for Information and had dialogue with industry for concept refinement. A Request for Proposal is planned to be 

released in first quarter fiscal year 2009, after which the Air Force anticipates industry will require 18–24 months to accomplish boom design, modification, and airframe integration.’’ Understanding the final fee-for-service air refueling RFP is 

planned the first quarter fiscal year 2009, please provide the committee with the 

anticipated date for the draft RFP. In addition, please provide the anticipated pilot 

program contract award date. 

General SCHWARTZ. The planned date for the draft RFP will be 45 days prior to 

final RFP release and anticipated no later than 15 November 2008. The planned 

contract award date, pending successful completion of competitive source selection, 

is anticipated no later than 12 months after receipt of proposals or approximately 

second quarter fiscal year 2010. This will begin the industry funded boom integration and certification effort which is required prior to start of the 5-year evaluation 

period.

17. Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz, in your advance policy question responses 

you stated that you have some concerns regarding ‘‘operational impacts of this proVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00447 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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gram.’’ Please elaborate on the specific operation impacts of concern. Do you believe 

any of these concerns are insurmountable? 

General SCHWARTZ. I have concerns regarding the ‘‘negative training’’ aspects of 

Air Force aircraft refueling behind a ‘‘non-standard’’ Air Force tanker. I also have 

concerns with implementing an operational construct that requires integration of 

commercial boom/receptacle equipped refueling aircraft that have not yet been developed, so I want to proceed cautiously. Finally, there is concern with the potential 

cost of this fee-for-service pilot program that is not currently budgeted. None of 

these concerns is insurmountable.

18. Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz, given the success of the U.S. Navy commercial fee-for-service aerial refueling program since 2001, the committee does not 

foresee any impediments to the feasibility of executing a commercial fee-for-service 

Air Force pilot program to demonstrate and validate Air Force air refueling in the 

mission areas identified in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2008, pending industry ability to provide boom capable aircraft. Please confirm to 

the committee that the Air Force fee-for-service RFP will specifically demonstrate 

‘‘a pilot program on commercial fee-for-service air refueling support for the Air 

Force’’ as required in section 1081 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, and will not require passenger and cargo capability. 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force intends to execute the pilot program as directed 

in section 1081 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. Section 1081 requires that all tanker mission areas be evaluated and specifically lists 

Aeromedical Evacuation as a mission area to include in the pilot program evaluation. Additionally, we do not believe that the Navy’s experience with a probe and 

drogue solution is an indicator of the challenges we will have with a boom solution. 

We expect that industry will find it more difficult to field the boom technology on 

derivative aircraft and obtain FAA certification. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

INVESTMENT IN FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE

19. Senator WARNER. General Schwartz, on the issue of the risk taken in recent 

years by the Air Force on investments in facilities and infrastructure which we 

posed to you in the advance policy questions, I was encouraged by your acknowledgement in answers provided to this committee that the Air Force ‘‘will likely reinvest in infrastructure in fiscal year 2010 to ensure we preserve the capability of 

our bases—our Installation Weapon Systems.’’ In what areas of facilities and infrastructure do you perceive to have the most critical risk? 

General SCHWARTZ. There is no single ‘‘most’’ critical area of risk. The risk we 

have had to take in facilities and infrastructure is broad and varies according to the 

need of each installation. We balance this risk across all installations by building 

our investment program from the bottom up, with wing commanders defining the 

needs of their installation. The Air Force has, however, given additional attention 

to single enlisted member living accommodations.

20. Senator WARNER. General Schwartz, will the reinvestment you have proposed 

include an increase in the amounts proposed for facility repairs and new construction? 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, we intend to increase our investment in the facility repairs and new construction in the fiscal year 2010 program and across the fiscal 

year 2011–2015 FYDP. The Air Force is currently vetting our fiscal year 2010–2015 

POM through the corporate structure. We will know the exact level of investment 

in these areas after the final review and approval of our budget by OSD in December 2008.

21. Senator WARNER. General Schwartz, if so, do you have an idea of priorities 

you will propose for this increased investment? 

General SCHWARTZ. The need of MILCON investment is across all facilities type, 

such as operational, training, maintenance hangars, R&D, and quality of life. 

MILCON projects included in the program wilt be based on individual project merits, meeting Air Force priorities, and staying within our top line constraints. The 

Air Force has, however, given additional attention to single enlisted member living 

accommodations. 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

JOINT SURVEILLANCE AND TARGET ATTACK RADAR SYSTEM

22. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Schwartz, Congress appropriated $16 million in 

the Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 3222) to demonstrate the 

Senior Year Electro-optical Reconnaissance System (SYERS) electro-optical sensor 

on the E–8 JSTARS in support of the requirement for a combat identification (CID) 

capability on JSTARS, to reduce the sensor-to-shooter timeline. I understand the Air 

Force has issued an urgent operational need for a stand-alone CID capability on E–

8C JSTARS. In light of the Secretary of Defense’s call for more intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance capabilities to support the warfighter, what are the Air 

Force’s plans for expeditiously executing this demonstration program so that the E–

8C JSTARS platform can more effectively and efficiently prosecute targets of interest in the war in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

General SCHWARTZ. The JSTARS program office has researched how the $16.0 

million SYERS congressional add could best be utilized. The program office concluded the most reasonable approach is to conduct a feasibility study to determine 

how to install and employ SYERS on JSTARS without hindering other systems and 

to accurately estimate the costs associated with the effort. The JSTARS program office awarded the contract on 11 July 2008 to initiate the feasibility study. The study 

is expected to take approximately 4 months.

23. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Schwartz, the current TF–33–102C engines on 

the JSTARS do not satisfy desired safety margins or meet operational needs, and 

also limit JSTARS’ operational parameters. I am pleased that the Air Force has contracted for the first two ship sets to re-engine the JSTARS aircraft. Re-engining the 

JSTARS fleet will increase mission efficiency as well as significantly reduce maintenance and fuel costs. Given the expected savings and increased capability that new 

engines will provide to this critical high demand asset, can you provide your assurance of the Air Force’s commitment to fully re-engine the JSTARS fleet? 

General SCHWARTZ. The JSTARS program office awarded an Undefinitized Contract Action for the first two ship sets in May 2008, with deliveries scheduled for 

November–December 2010. The fiscal year 2009 President’s budget funds retrofit of 

10 aircraft out of 17. Funding for the remaining seven operational aircraft remains 

an Air Force Priority and is being considered in the fiscal year 2010 POM process 

within the Department of Defense. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAX BAUCUS AND SENATOR JON TESTER

UNIT/INVENTORY RETIREMENTS

24. Senator BAUCUS and Senator TESTER. General Schwartz, the Air Force’s General Counsel has determined that the Air Force may retire an aircraft squadron as 

soon as a BRAC direction to establish a squadron is achieved. Under the General 

Counsel’s definition, the term ‘‘establish’’ includes the assignment of personnel and 

construction of military construction (MILCON) necessary for the unit’s operation. 

Do you believe it is an efficient use of taxpayer dollars to retire a squadron when 

the Air Force has spent scarce funds to assign personnel and conduct MILCON activities for that squadron? 

General SCHWARTZ. The situation you describe results from BRAC decisions that 

directed changes to the Air Force’s force structure plan. Changing mission requirements and follow-on analyses have identified additional options to consolidate aircraft by type and location to maximize combat capability and achieve efficiencies in 

our operations. If confirmed, we will review those mission assignments directed by 

the 2005 BRAC legislation, and subsequent POM and budgetary decisions to assure 

we are making the very best use of taxpayer resources.

25. Senator BAUCUS and Senator TESTER. General Schwartz, understanding the 

need for the Air Force to retain discretion to move or retire units as needed to organize, train, and equip, do you believe that it is consistent with the spirit and intent 

of BRAC law to move or retire Air Force units within a year or 2 of their BRACrequired establishment? 

General SCHWARTZ. As the Secretary implies, time does not stand still. New force 

structure and other military requirements have arisen since the Department of Defense and the BRAC Commission made their recommendations in 2005. In a fiscally 

constrained environment, the movement or retirement of any Air Force unit will be 

444

carefully considered. Adjusting Air Force units where necessary to better meet current and future needs should be considered an appropriate use of public resources.

26. Senator BAUCUS and Senator TESTER. General Schwartz, please describe your 

understanding of the Air Force’s plans to reduce the F–15 aircraft inventory. What 

in your view is the strategic and operational risk associated with this reduction in 

the near- and mid-term as well as the potential impact on pilot readiness, especially 

in the Air National Guard. Is this risk acceptable? At what level is it unacceptable? 

A classified reply is acceptable for the questions relating to risk level. 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force’s long-range plan is to ramp down the F–15 

force to 177 aircraft and base them with Total Force Integration (TFI) units. The 

impact to risk and readiness with respect to a reduction in force structure is being 

evaluated. However, based on proposed F–15 force structure and the TFI construct, 

preliminary analysis shows there will be no impact to pilot readiness and risks are 

acceptable.

27. Senator BAUCUS and Senator TESTER. General Schwartz, if confirmed, will you 

rapidly re-examine all scenarios under consideration by the Air Force for inclusion 

in the fiscal year 2010 POM that proposes to move or retire aircraft and units that 

were established by the 2005 law? Will you share with Congress your assessment, 

including analysis of costs or savings associated with these moves or retirements? 

General SCHWARTZ. If confirmed, we intend to perform a thorough review of the 

Air Force’s fiscal year 2010 POM submission to ensure compliance with BRAC implementation. We will identify in our fiscal year 2010 budget submission any BRAC 

implementation issues that may arise, and will discuss these issues with Congress 

as appropriate. 

[The nomination reference of Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, USAF, 

follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

July 10, 2008. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

The following named officer for appointment as Chief of Staff, United States Air 

Force, and appointment to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., sections 8033 and 601: 

To be General 

Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, USAF. 

[The biographical sketch of Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, USAF, 

which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF 

General Norton A. Schwartz is Commander, U.S. Transportation Command 

(TRANSCOM), Scott Air Force Base, IL. U.S. TRANSCOM is the single manager 

for global air, land, and sea transportation for the Department of Defense. 

General Schwartz attended the U.S. Air Force Academy and graduated in 1973. 

He is an alumnus of the National War College, a member of the Council on Foreign 

Relations, and a 1994 Fellow of Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Seminar 

XXI. He has served as Commander of the Special Operations Command-Pacific, as 

well as Alaskan Command, Alaskan North American Aerospace Defense Command 

Region, and the 11th Air Force. Prior to assuming his current position, General 

Schwartz was Director, the Joint Staff, Washington, DC. 

General Schwartz is a command pilot with more than 4,200 flying hours in a variety of aircraft. He participated as a crewmember in the 1975 airlift evacuation of 

Saigon, and in 1991 served as Chief of Staff of the Joint Special Operations Task 

Force for Northern Iraq in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In 1997, he 

445

led the Joint Task Force that prepared for the noncombatant evacuation of U.S. citizens in Cambodia. 

RE ́SUME ́ OF CAREER SERVICE OF GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF 

Education:

1973 ..... Bachelor’s degree in political science and international affairs, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO. 

1977 ..... Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. 

1983 ..... Master’s degree in business administration, Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant 

1984 ..... Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA. 

1989 ..... National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC. 

1994 ..... Fellow, Seminar XXI, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge 

Assignments:

August 1973–September 1974 .. Student, undergraduate pilot training, Laughlin Air Force Base, TX. 

October 1974–January 1975 ...... Student, C–130 initial qualification training, Little Rock Air Force Base, AR. 

February 1975–October 1977 .... C–130E aircraft commander, 776th and 21st tactical airlift squadrons, Clark Air Base, 

Philippines. 

October 1977–December 1977 .. Student, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. 

December 1977–October 1979 .. C–130E/H flight examiner, 61st Tactical Airlift Squadron, Little Rock Air Force Base, AR. 

October 1979–November 1980 .. Intern, Air Staff Training Program, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Operations, and Readiness, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, DC. 

November 1980–July 1983 ......... MC–130E flight examiner, 8th Special Operations Squadron, Hurlburt Field, FL. 

July 1983–January 1984 ............ Student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA. 

January 1984–April 1986 ........... Action officer, Directorate of Plans, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, DC. 

May 1986–June 1988 ................. Commander, 36th Tactical Airlift Squadron, McChord Air Force Base, WA. 

August 1988–June 1989 ............ Student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC. 

July 1989–July 1991 .................. Director of Plans and Policy, Special Operations Command Europe, Patch Barracks, Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany. 

August 1991–May 1993 ............. Deputy Commander for Operations and Commander, 1st Special Operations Group, 

Hurlburt Field, FL. 

May 1993–May 1995 ................. Deputy Director of Operations, later, Deputy Director of Forces, Office of the Deputy Chief 

of Staff for Plans and Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, DC. 

June 1995–May 1997 ................. Commander, 16th Special Operations Wing, Hurlburt Field, FL. 

June 1997–October 1998 ........... Commander, Special Operations Command, Pacific, Camp H.M. Smith, HI. 

October 1998–January 2000 ...... Director of Strategic Planning, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, DC. 

January 2000–September 2000 Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, 

FL. 

September 2000–October 2002 Commander, Alaskan Command, Alaskan North American Aerospace Defense Command 

Region and 11th Air Force, Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK. 

October 2002–October 2004 ...... Director for Operations, the Joint Staff, Washington, DC. 

October 2004–August 2005 ....... Director, the Joint Staff, Washington, DC. 

September 2005–present ........... Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, IL. 

Flight information: 

Rating: Command pilot. 

Flight hours: More than 4,200. 

Aircraft flown: C–130E/H, MC–130E/H/P, HC–130, AC–130H/U, YMC–130, MH–

53, and MH–60.

Major awards and decorations: 

Defense Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster 

Distinguished Service Medal 

Defense Superior Service Medal with oak leaf cluster 

Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters 

Defense Meritorious Service Medal 

Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters 

Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster 

Army Commendation Medal

Effective dates of promotion:

Second Lieutenant .......................................................................................................................................... June 6, 1973 

First Lieutenant .............................................................................................................................................. June 6, 1975 

Captain ........................................................................................................................................................... June 6, 1977 

Major ............................................................................................................................................................... November 1, 1982 

Lieutenant Colonel .......................................................................................................................................... March 1, 1985 

Colonel ............................................................................................................................................................ February 1, 1991 

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Brigadier General ........................................................................................................................................... January 1, 1996 

Major General ................................................................................................................................................. March 4, 1999 

Lieutenant General ......................................................................................................................................... Janurary 18, 2000 

General ........................................................................................................................................................... October 1, 2005

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the 

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details 

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. 

The form executed by Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, USAF, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228

Washington, DC 20510–6050

(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Norton A. Schwartz.

2. Position to which nominated: 

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force.

3. Date of nomination: 

July 10, 2008.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.]

5. Date and place of birth: 

December 14, 1951; Toms River, NJ.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Suzanne E. (Ptak) Schwartz.

7. Names and ages of children: 

None.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive 

branch. 

None.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution. 

None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

447

- Air Force Academy Association of Graduates (member) 

- Air Force Academy Athletic Association (member) 

- Air Force Academy Society of Washington, DC (member) 

- Air Force Association (member) 

- Air Force Sergeants Association (member) 

- Air Commando Association (member) 

- Airlift/Tanker Association (member) 

- National War College Alumni Association (member) 

- National Defense Transportation Association (member) 

- Order of Daedalians (member) 

- Military Officers Association of America (member) 

- Council on Foreign Relations (member) 

- Concord Village Homeowners Association (member)

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch. 

- United Seamen’s Service Admiral of the Ocean Seas 

- National Defense Transportation Association Leadership Award 

- Massachusetts Institute of Technology Seminar XXI (Air Force Fellow) 

- Air Commando Association Hall of Fame 

- Toms River High School Hall of Fame 

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee 

of the Senate? 

Yes.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the 

administration in power. 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–

E are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF. 

This 12th day of June, 2008.

[The nomination of Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, USAF, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on July 31, 2008, with the 

recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on August 1, 2008.] 

[Prepared questions submitted to Gen. Duncan J. McNabb, 

USAF, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of 

command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms 

have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00453 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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manders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution 

of military operations. 

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? 

Answer. I have served the majority of my Air Force career under Goldwater-Nichols provisions and have had ample opportunities to observe the implementation and 

the beneficial effects of Goldwater-Nichols reform on all Services, including the Air 

Force. I am also a product of the joint education system that stemmed from that 

legislation. I completely agree with the goals of those defense reforms; they remain 

essential to the effective employment of our Nation’s military forces. Most importantly, these reforms have yielded a demonstrated improvement in the joint 

warfighting capabilities of the United States Armed Forces. I realize that any legislation enacted 2 decades ago, in the context of the Cold War, might need to be modified to reflect the current national security environment. I also realize that some 

members of this committee are hard at work on what is widely known as GoldwaterNichols II. If confirmed as a joint commander, I will work closely with the Secretary 

of Defense, my counterparts across the joint community, and other senior leaders, 

as well as Congress, to make sure that this seminal legislation continues to be suitable for the challenges our Nation faces. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in 

these modifications? 

Answer. If confirmed as the Commander of United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), I look forward to the opportunity to further explore and assess 

Goldwater-Nichols from the vantage point of a Joint Combatant Commander. 

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U.S. TRANSCOM? 

Answer. The mission of the Commander, United States TRANSCOM is to provide 

air, land, and sea transportation for the Department of Defense (DOD), in peace and 

war. The Commander relies on his Component Commands—Air Mobility Command 

(AMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the Military Surface Deployment and 

Distribution Command (MSDDC)—to accomplish this mission. The Commander also 

has the Distribution Process Owner (DPO) mission to improve the worldwide DOD 

distribution system. As DPO, the Commander works closely with the Defense Logistics Agency and the Services to identify inefficiencies, develop solutions and implement improvements throughout the end-to-end distribution system. The U.S. 

TRANSCOM team blends Active and Reserve Forces, civilian employees, and commercial industry partners to provide the mobility forces and assets necessary to respond to the full range of military operations. 

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties? 

Answer. My career in operational and strategic lift, including Commander of the 

Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC), service as Joint Staff Director for Logistics 

(DJ4) and as Commander, AMC, qualifies me for this challenging assignment. My 

most recent experience as Vice Chief of the United States Air Force and my ongoing 

interactions with the entire joint community, most specifically the Chairman and 

Vice Chairman, and the Army, Navy and Marine Vice Chiefs, as well as my service 

as a member of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) add to my qualifications. 

If confirmed, I will be honored to lead the men and women of U.S. TRANSCOM 

as they continue—as true joint warfighters—to transform the logistics backbone 

that TRANSCOM provides the Nation and its allies in peace, crisis, and war. 

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, U.S. TRANSCOM? 

Answer. As Commander, I need a complete understanding of current Defense Department and national transportation issues, including the challenges facing the 

commercial transportation industry and our national partners upon whom we so 

heavily rely. I will strive every hour of every day to ensure I am prepared for this 

critical duty. 

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the chain of command 

runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, 

however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U.S. TRANSCOM 

to the following offices: 

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The Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has full power and authority to act for 

the Secretary of Defense when serving as his designated representative. As such, 

the Commander, U.S. TRANSCOM, will report to and through the Deputy Secretary 

when serving in that capacity. 

Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense. 

Answer. Under Secretaries of Defense coordinate and exchange information with 

DOD components, including combatant commands, which have collateral or related 

functions. In practice, this coordination and exchange is normally routed through 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed as a combatant commander, 

I will act accordingly. 

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. The Chairman is established by title 10 as the principal military advisor 

to the President and Secretary of Defense. The Chairman serves as an advisor and 

is not, according to the law, in the chain of command, which runs from the President through the Secretary to each combatant commander. The President directs 

communications between himself and the Secretary of Defense to the combatant 

commanders via the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff. This keeps the Chairman 

fully involved and allows the Chairman to execute his other legal responsibilities. 

A key responsibility of the Chairman is to speak for the combatant commanders, 

especially on operational requirements. If confirmed as a Commander, I would keep 

the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense promptly informed on matters for which 

I would be personally accountable. 

Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Answer. The Vice Chairman has the same statutory authorities and obligations 

of other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, he chairs the Joint Requirement Oversight Committee—a critical function and a product of the GoldwaterNichols Act. When performing duties as the acting Chairman, the Vice Chairman’s 

relationship with the combatant commanders is exactly the same as that of the 

Chairman. If confirmed, I will assist the Vice Chairman to execute the duties prescribed by law or otherwise directed by Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Question. The Director of the Joint Staff. 

Answer. The Director of the Joint Staff assists the Chairman in managing the 

Joint Staff. The Director of the Joint Staff does not fall within the combatant commander’s chain of command; however, he enables important decisions to be made 

as the combatant commander’s staff interacts with the Joint Staff. 

Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments. 

Answer. Close coordination with each Service Secretary is required to ensure that 

there is no infringement upon the lawful responsibilities held by a Service Secretary. 

Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services. 

Answer. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services organize, train, and equip their respective forces. No combatant commander can ensure preparedness of his assigned 

forces without the full cooperation and support of the Service Chiefs. As members 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs have a lawful obligation to provide 

military advice. The experience and judgment the Service Chiefs provide is an invaluable resource for every combatant commander. If confirmed as Commander, 

U.S. TRANSCOM, I will pursue an open dialogue with the Service Chiefs and the 

Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard. 

Question. The other combatant commanders. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will encourage open dialogue with the other combatant 

commanders to foster trust and build mutual support. Today’s security environment 

requires us to work together to execute U.S. national policy. 

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Commander, U.S. TRANSCOM? 

Answer. Looking ahead, I see two major challenges for U.S. TRANSCOM. The 

first is to preserve the viability of our commercial transportation partnerships-Civil 

Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA), in 

an era of high oil prices, industry consolidation and, at some point in the future, 

a post-Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) environment with a significantly reduced business base. The second is to ensure we have 

the appropriate global en route infrastructure to support future force projection and 

sustainment as we shift to a smaller overseas military presence with more deployments from U.S. bases. In the near term, I am mindful of balancing worldwide moVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00455 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46092.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
450

bility requirements and supporting our ongoing deployment, redeployment and distribution operations in Central Command (CENTCOM). 

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges? 

Answer. The CRAF and VISA programs are key components of the Nation’s ability to project combat power. To that end I will ensure that I maintain a strong relationship with our industry partners, that I am mindful of the trends affecting the 

airline and sealift industries and that our contracts with our commercial partners 

deliver what the Nation needs. If confirmed I will also work closely with your staffs 

for any legislative support we believe is necessary to ensure the future viability of 

these programs. With respect to global en route infrastructure, I will work with the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, 

and the Services to maintain the existing en route network, and to ensure we make 

the necessary investments to expand strategic reach into emerging areas of interest, 

such as Africa, South America, and Southeast Asia. 

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish? 

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to opportunities to explore and assess the 

challenges confronting U.S. TRANSCOM. Initially my priorities will be to ensure a 

viable surge capability for the deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of the 

Nation’s military forces at a time when our commercial transportation partners are 

facing high oil prices and industry consolidation. I’ll also work to preserve appropriate global en route infrastructure to support force projection and sustainment. 

MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Commander, U.S. TRANSCOM? 

Answer. The first challenge is to continue to build a single unified Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE). Unified enterprise efforts will enhance 

delivery of forces and sustainment to the Joint Force Commander, link the joint 

force to the DOD supply chain and improve trust and confidence in the distribution 

system. The second challenge is to balance our engagement with industry partners 

to keep this vital commercial capacity viable in time of need and to maintain military readiness. We must continue to incentivize our industry partners to maintain 

a robust commercial surge capability. At the same time, we must sufficiently employ 

our military assets to maintain their readiness. Managing the balance between industry and readiness will be especially challenging in a post-OEF/OIF world. 

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize these concerns and then define specific actions, time lines and solutions to build a unified JDDE and find a balance between 

military readiness and industry partnerships. 

DISTRIBUTION PROCESS OWNER

Question. In September 2003, following a review of logistics operations for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Secretary of Defense designated the Commander, U.S. 

TRANSCOM, the Distribution Process Owner (DPO). As the DPO, U.S. TRANSCOM 

was tasked to improve the overall efficiency and interoperability of distribution related activities—deployment, sustainment, and redeployment support during peace 

and war. 

What is your understanding of U.S. TRANSCOM’s responsibilities as the DPO? 

Answer. The mission of U.S. TRANSCOM as the DPO is two-fold: first, to coordinate and oversee the DOD distribution system to provide interoperability, synchronization and alignment of DOD wide, end-to-end distribution; and, second, to develop and implement distribution process improvements that enhance the Defense 

Logistics and Global Supply Chain Management System. 

Question. What is your assessment of the progress U.S. TRANSCOM has made 

in improving the distribution process? 

Answer. The Command has made significant progress in transforming DOD distribution. U.S. TRANSCOM established a JDDE Community of Interest comprised 

of U.S. TRANSCOM and National Partners to develop a governance structure and 

measure performance framework, and to implement DOD distribution improvements. U.S. TRANSCOM now measures global DOD distribution performance from 

end-to-end using combatant commander defined measures of success. They then use 

those measures to make process improvements which increase distribution precision 

and reliability and decrease cost. For example, simple process changes in how ocean 

containers are booked has resulted in a 20 percent increase in velocity to the 

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CENTCOM AOR. Likewise, network changes and process improvements in the U.S. 

European Command (EUCOM) have resulted in a 42 percent reduction in overocean costs and a 22 percent reduction in channel air costs with improved delivery 

times to the customers. Finally, improved coordination as a result of DPO initiatives 

since 2003 has achieved Total Validated Cost Avoidances of $1.9 billion. 

Question. Do you believe that the current systems needs any changes to enhance 

the ability of U.S. TRANSCOM to execute the responsibilities of the DPO? 

Answer. I believe the Commander of U.S. TRANSCOM has the necessary authorities to execute his responsibility as the DPO. If confirmed, I will continue to build 

on the hard work and successes achieved to date. I will also find new areas in the 

DOD supply chain that emphasize a total cost management view, that balance inventory costs with transportation costs and achieve best value for the warfighter. 

STRATEGIC AIRLIFT

Question. The longstanding requirement for strategic airlift has been set at a level 

of 54.5 million ton-miles a day (MTM/D). 

Based on your experience, do you perceive a continuing shortage in intertheater 

airlift? 

Answer. The requirement for 54.5 MTM/D of combined organic and commercial 

capacity was set by the Mobility Requirements Study 2005 (released in 2000). Since 

then, the Mobility Capability Study (MCS) released in 2005 identified a range of 

292–383 organic strategic lift aircraft necessary to meet the National Military Strategy in 2012. Furthermore during the C–5 Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining 

Program (RERP) Nunn-McCurdy process, the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee took this one step further and certified 33.95 MTM/D as the organic portion 

of the requirement necessary to satisfy the MCS. Based on this 33.95 MTM/D requirement, I do not currently perceive there to be a shortage of inter theater airlift 

assuming we resource 205 C–17s, 52 RERP modified C–5Bs, and 59 Avionics Modernization Program modified C–5As. The upcoming Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS–16) will analyze whether or not the 33.95 MTM/D 

requirement is still valid. 

STRATEGIC AIRLIFT MODERNIZATION

Question. Two years ago, you produced a briefing talking about the possibility of 

retiring some C–5A aircraft and buying a like number of C–17 aircraft to replace 

them. This briefing, which was called the ‘‘30/30 Plan,’’ followed on the heels of senior Air Force officers’ suggestions that the so-called worst actors in the C–5A fleet 

were not worth fixing or upgrading. This number of C–5A aircraft was estimated 

to be some 30 aircraft. 

In making his certification following the Nunn-McCurdy breach of the C–5 RERP, 

Under Secretary Young evaluated this 30/30 option and found that this alternative 

was both more expensive and less able to meet the current requirement for strategic 

airlift than the existing force. 

Did you, in your position as Commander of the AMC, support the ‘‘30/30 Plan?’’ 

If so, why? 

Answer. The ‘‘30/30 Plan’’ started as a ‘‘what if drill’’ at SECAF direction of what 

options we had if cost growth of the C–5 RERP drove a Nunn-McCurdy breach. The 

Nunn-McCurdy process would require developing alternatives to fully RERPing the 

whole C–5 fleet (111 aircraft) to meet overall strategic lift requirements. The drill 

was to see if payback was feasible and the needed capability was satisfied if we recapitalized older C–5As with C–17s. The plan appeared to have merit and I supported further exploration. We found that there was potential for payback in life 

cycle costs in the out years. However, neither AMC nor the AF could afford the upfront bill and the SECAF and CSAF did not make it part of their 09–13 Program 

Objective Memorandum (POM) submittal to OSD. 

Question. Do you agree with Secretary Young’s testimony on this plan? 

Answer. Yes, I do agree with Secretary Young’s decision to RERP the C–5Bs. By 

this time (post Nunn-McCurdy), the JROC had established 33.95 MTM/day as the 

minimum capacity for all N–M options to be measured against. This was in addition 

to the MCS requirement for 292–383 and NDAA 2007 language mandating the Air 

Force maintain a minimum 299 strategic lift aircraft. Mr. Young had a very collaborative process and chose the best option to meet all these requirements. 

STRATEGIC SEALIFT

Question. Strategic sealift has always played a significant role in providing support to our forces overseas. Typically, we have seen strategic sealift delivering 95 

percent of the equipment transported to overseas contingencies. 

452

Are there any initiatives that you believe are necessary, if confirmed, in the area 

of strategic sealift? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the U.S. Navy and our commercial sealift 

partners to develop initiatives such as Joint Seabasing and Joint High Speed Vessels, which may play a role in enhancing strategic sealift. Strategic Sealift continues 

to play a vital role in the transportation of equipment and supplies for the DOD. 

The MSC, the MSDDC, and U.S. Maritime Administration, working in partnership 

with the U.S. maritime industry, have done a superb job at meeting the performance requirements of strategic sealift as we execute OEF and OIF and support other 

military missions around the globe. Current initiatives, in particular the Maritime 

Security Program, help ensure the viability of the U.S. flag maritime industry. I 

look forward to the results of the Mobility Capabilities Requirement Study to define 

required changes in capability needed by the military to transport equipment and 

supplies in the future. 

CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET

Question. With the expansion of military operations since September 11, 2001, the 

Air Force’s mobility requirements have increased. The Air Force has in the past, 

and may very well in the future, rely heavily on the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) 

to supplement its organic airlift. 

Do the changes in the commercial airline industry, characterized by bankruptcies 

and a move toward smaller and shorter-range aircraft, bring into question the future viability of the CRAF system? 

Answer. While it’s true that the industry is trending toward smaller aircraft for 

domestic service, several recent studies indicate that the airline industry will continue to provide sufficient numbers of large, long-range aircraft to meet our defense 

needs. However, the current trends in the U.S. commercial air industry are worrisome. The sudden jump in fuel costs has negatively impacted the industry and our 

CRAF partners as well. I am particularly concerned about the state of the passenger 

charter segment, the carriers who perform the bulk of our day-to-day personnel missions. If confirmed, I will work closely with this committee on legislative support 

like the CRAF Assured Business proposal currently under consideration by your 

staff. I will also work with our CRAF partners to ensure the business relationships 

are solid and the contracts support DOD requirements. 

JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL

Question. Initial reporting from recent military operations indicate joint command 

and control capabilities have greatly improved in recent years. 

What is your assessment of the performance of U.S. TRANSCOM’s global and theater command and control (C2) systems? 

Answer. U.S. TRANSCOM’s global C2 systems work remarkably well, as evidenced by our timely support of warfighter requirements. 

Question. What interoperability challenges remain between service-to-service and 

service-to-joint C2 systems? 

Answer. An immediate challenge is to improve information exchanges across the 

various classification boundaries and between Services and combatant commanders, 

while simultaneously improving information sharing with our commercial and coalition partners. Information sharing is crucial to successful and safe mission accomplishment, but there are clear and dangerous security risks that require constant 

attention. 

Finally, to enhance service-to-joint C2 systems, we are identifying key processes 

and information technology solutions that best integrate service unique or standalone applications to enhance the delivery of timely, accurate, and complete data. 

The U.S. TRANSCOM team is working with our commercial partners and individual 

services to ensure these interoperability risks are mitigated. If confirmed, I will 

maintain U.S. TRANSCOM’s superior service to our customers, and most importantly, our warfighters. 

Question. What role should the U.S. TRANSCOM Commander play in ensuring 

the development of reliable, interoperable, and agile C2 systems? 

Answer. As DPO, the U.S. TRANSCOM Commander must play a pre-eminent role 

in the integration of C2 systems across boundaries and domains from one end of 

the distribution chain to the other. Commercial partners, Defense Logistics Agency, 

Joint Staff, combatant commanders, Services, and coalition partners all have unique 

logistics systems that serve their mission. 

If confirmed, I will work with distribution partners and customers to make C2 improvements which will allow secure and unconstrained sharing of information across 

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these domains. This is a clear challenge, but necessary, if we are to maximize the 

combat multiplying effects of logistics for the warfighter. 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS MANAGEMENT

Question. Recently the Air Force has experienced several failures in its stewardship of nuclear weapons including the unauthorized transfer of nuclear weapons 

from Minot to Barksdale and the shipment of nosecones to Taiwan. 

As Vice Chief of Staff, did you play any role in supervising nuclear security, and 

command and control, and have you played any role in implementing corrective actions in response to the various reports and recommendations of these incidents? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. If yes, please explain what role you played in each circumstance. 

Answer. I assumed my position soon after the unauthorized munitions transfer 

back in September 2007. 

I played no role in nuclear surety supervision or command and control regarding 

the unauthorized transfer of weapons from Minot to Barksdale or the shipment of 

nosecones to Taiwan. As both Vice Chief and now acting Chief, I am deeply involved 

in implementing actions and initiatives to respond to recommendations of the various reports and studies on the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise. For example, I supported the CSAF creation of the Air Force Blue Ribbon Review. This was an independent review that looked across the entire AF Nuclear Enterprise. Out of that review, we took the initial steps to begin shifting resources to meet pressing requirements and address shortfalls we have identified. More work needs to be done—and 

that work is ongoing. 

I also oversaw the revision of the Air Force Nuclear General Officer Steering 

Group charter to broaden the membership and increase the level of leadership 

chairing the group to a three-star. The Air Force depends on this body to oversee 

the range of corrective actions underway and ensure the broadest application of best 

practices across the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise. This entity, which includes more 

than 20 active duty general officers plus SES, is a vital component to the oversight 

of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise. 

Most recently, at the direction of the acting Secretary of the Air Force, I stood 

up the Air Force Nuclear Task Force whose responsibilities include:

- Coordinating and synchronizing the ongoing implementation of specific 

actions underway in response to the Minot/Barksdale and Taiwan incidents. 

- Developing in coordination with STRATCOM, other DOD components 

and interagency partners, a strategic roadmap to rebuild and restore capabilities and confidence in our stewardship of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise. 

- Undertaking an organizational review to assess and recommend options 

for alternative assignments of responsibility and/or command arrangements. 

- Serving as Air Force focal point for coordination with and/or support to 

other nuclear-related panels, commissions or review groups outside the Air 

Force.

There is much work completed and even more underway, all benefiting from engaged leadership at all levels and dedicated airmen who are absolutely committed 

to this vital mission. 

AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION

Question. Following the cancellation of the C–9A aircraft for medical evacuation 

in 2003, the AMC adopted a new operational approach to its worldwide mission of 

aeromedical evacuation. The new concept employs other airlift, such as cargo and 

aerial refueling aircraft, for the air evacuation of wounded and ill patients. The committee has concerns about the level and quality of aeromedical evacuation support 

for our severely injured or ill personnel. 

If confirmed, how would you ensure that the highest quality standard of 

aeromedical evacuation is provided for severely wounded and ill patients? 

Answer. The transition to designated (vs. dedicated) aeromedical evacuation aircraft has transformed our global patient movement capability. This concept allows 

different aircraft to be rapidly configured for patient movement out of combat zones, 

a capability not offered by the C–9A. It includes newly designed patient support pallets and allows critical care teams to do intensive care of our wounded in flight if 

required. We have received tremendous support for this initiative across the board, 

including Congress. During 2007, over 11,000 patients—of which 2,700 were battle 

injuries—were moved to definitive care. Those patients categorized as urgent or priority were moved within 12–24 hours. Along with other medical improvements, this 

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timely movement has resulted in dramatically increased survival rates from combat 

injuries. If confirmed, I would continue to ensure the highest quality of care for our 

wounded and ill patients. 

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Question. U.S. TRANSCOM’s budget includes funding for a research and development activity designed to allow for examination and improvement of the entire supply chain as part of U.S. TRANSCOM’s role as DPO. 

What are the major capability gaps related to U.S. TRANSCOM’s mission that 

need to be addressed through research and development efforts? 

Answer. The major capability gaps are:

• Deployment and Distribution Velocity Management—Targeting optimized 

throughput at the nodes and through the conduits of the deployment and 

distribution supply chains, from origin to point of use and return. 

• Cross Domain Planning—Improving decisionmaking and collaboration 

within the supply chain, from the planning stage to real-time execution and 

retrograde operations. 

• End-to-End Visibility—Providing end-to-end visibility of all aspects of the 

projection and sustainment of forces and equipment to enable operations. 

• Distribution Planning and Forecasting—Providing distribution planning, 

based on an understanding of aggregated customer requirements, for optimizing the end-to-end distribution process. 

• Joint Transportation Interface—Synchronizing, through information exchange, strategic/theater delivery capabilities to meet increasingly dynamic 

customer needs. 

• Distribution Protection/Safety/Security—Providing the appropriate security in a timely manner during deployment and distribution operations.

Question. What unique processes and technologies do you feel U.S. TRANSCOM 

needs to develop through its own program and investments? 

Answer. U.S. TRANSCOM’s research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) 

projects should focus on processes and technologies to address challenges including:

• Command, Control, Computers, and Communications Information Operations—global C3 to include en route communications that support Joint 

Deployment Distribution Operations Centers, Port Opening Capabilities, 

Director of Mobility Forces, Very Important Personnel (VIP) airlift; requirements visibility, assessment, and planning; end-to-end in-transit visibility 

and improving container management. 

• Mobility Air Forces All Weather Capability—next-generation joint precision airdrop system and autonomous landing and refueling. 

• Defensive Systems—mobility asset protection to include protecting/mitigating risks of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. 

• Transportation and Connector Systems—synchronize strategic/theater delivery capabilities. Physical and command and control continuity in the 

DOD supply chain; optimize flow in the supply chain; improved visibility 

and synchronization with commercial lift providers. 

• Fossil Fuel Dependency—collaborate with DOD and industry research for 

alternative solutions.

Question. How will you work with other research and development organizations 

to ensure that U.S. TRANSCOM’s current and future capability gaps are addressed? 

Answer. Nearly 75 percent of U.S. TRANSCOM RDT&E projects are collaboratively funded and most of our efforts result in tangible improvements in the hands 

of the warfighter within 2 to 3 years. The command uses annual announcements 

to solicit national and Service laboratories, as well as industry proposals. The proposals are vetted throughout the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise for 

concurrence. If confirmed, I will continue U.S. TRANSCOM’s program of collaborative partnership with the Services, Defense Logistics Agency, the combatant commanders and Joint Staff to identify, validate and recommend RDT&E projects to explore emerging technologies to close logistics gaps. 

TECHNOLOGY PRIORITIES

Question. Serving the needs of the combatant commanders both in the near-term 

and in the future is one of the key goals of the Department’s science and technology 

executives, who list outreach to commanders as an activity of continued focus. 

What do you see as the most challenging technological needs or capability gaps 

facing U.S. TRANSCOM in its mission to provide air, land, and sea transportation 

to the DOD? 

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Answer. Certainly, mitigating fossil fuel dependency is of utmost concern. As previously mentioned, there is a collaborative effort to identify capability gaps to determine the top technical and operational challenges (listed above) facing the distribution community. If confirmed, I will continue to address these gaps and shift resources as necessary to meet the most critical need. Additionally, I would look at 

such critical areas as information security and assurance as well as new cyber technologies to ensure greater efficiency and mission accomplishment. 

Question. What would you do, if confirmed to make your technology requirements 

known to the department’s science and technology community to ensure the availability of needed equipment and capabilities in the long term? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will focus my efforts on the transitioning of successful 

technologies. I would continue to involve the JDDE in recommending technology investments, agreements with various Service labs, and annual announcements. I will 

continue U.S. TRANSCOM’s practice of advertising its RDT&E efforts by: (1) briefing projects to the Functional Capability Board community; (2) documenting efforts 

within Director Defense Research & Engineering R&D documents (e.g. Joint 

Warfighter Science & Technology Plan); (3) participation in government and industry sponsored technology symposiums; and (4) technology exchange visits with Service and national laboratories. 

TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION

Question. U.S. TRANSCOM has been active in the Advanced Concept Technology 

Development (ACTD) process. 

What are your views on the ACTD process as a means to spiral emerging technologies into use to confront changing threats and to meet warfighter needs? 

Answer. I fully support the Department’s ACTD program and believe it continues 

to be the joint community’s best opportunity to quickly leverage mature technology 

to meet warfighter needs. 

Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to enhance the effectiveness of 

technology transition efforts within your command and in cooperation with other 

Services and defense agencies? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will push rapid technology transition to ensure we get the 

maximum return on our RDT&E investments. Specifically, I will include the Services, the COCOMs, the JDDE partners, OSD, and the Joint Staff in the project selection process to ensure buy-in and avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. Finally, 

I will ensure that proposals have a program of record for transition identified and 

that rapid fielding is emphasized from day one. 

FAMILIES FIRST

Question. For over 10 years, U.S. TRANSCOM and its subordinate command, Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, have been working to improve the 

process of moving servicemembers’ household goods and gaining the support of the 

transportation provider industry for needed changes. Implementation of the new 

system—‘‘Families First’’—uses a ‘‘best value’’ approach to contracting with movers 

that focuses on quality of performance, web-based scheduling and tracking of shipments, servicemember involvement throughout the moving process, and a claims 

system that provides full replacement value for damaged household goods. Successful implementation of this system depends on replacement of the legacy Transportation Operational Personal Property Standard System (TOPS) with the web-based 

Defense Personal Property System (DPS). 

What is your understanding of the status of TOPS and the progress that has been 

made in implementing the DPS?

• TOPS is a 20 year old system that is at the end of its life cycle and has 

both technical and information security issues. 

• DPS will begin shipments at 18 selected Personal Property Shipment Offices on or about September 10, 2008. Full deployment to the remaining 

sites will follow by December 3, 2008 after completion of a new rate filing 

by Industry. TOPS will be decommissioned by April 30, 2009.

Question. What do you view as the most significant challenges that remain in 

fully implementing DPS? 

Answer.

• Training is critical to system success. As part of DPS rollout, we must continue to provide worldwide training to the Services personnel. 

• We have work remaining to mature the DPS system and Personal Property 

business processes for next summer’s peak season. 

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• Industry buy-in to provide full replacement value (FRV) for household goods 

that remain in storage for extended periods and are handled by multiple industry partners remains a challenge.

Question. What is your assessment of the success in implementing the requirement for FRV for damaged or missing household goods claims? 

Answer.

• FRV has been successfully implemented across the Services, and is now 

in place for all modes of shipments in support of Families First.

Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of the response rate on customer satisfaction surveys as a method for identifying best and worst performers? 

Answer. Customer Satisfaction Survey response rates are 20 percent. It is clear 

the survey response rates are key to ensuring only quality service providers participate in the program. To that end, if confirmed, I will work closely with the Service 

Chiefs to increase the response rate. 

Question. If confirmed, what role would you play in ensuring that Families First 

is fully funded and implemented and would you make every effort to ensure this 

program is successful in meeting its goals?

• If confirmed, I will leverage DPS to continue to improve our business 

processes for household goods and services. 

• I will continue General Schwartz’s efforts and fully fund the DPS program as an Information Technology enabler of Families First. Families 

First remains a team effort among U.S. TRANSCOM, the Service components and industry, and I will continue our close partnership to ensure success. 

FEE-FOR-SERVICE COMMERCIAL TANKERS

Question. The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition testified last 

April that the Air Force is moving forward with a congressionally-mandated plan 

to develop a Fee-For-Service Aerial Refueling Pilot Program. However, the AMC 

Commander, General Arthur J. Lichte, has testified that he has questions ‘‘with regard to the operational procedures, FAA requirements and certifications, and legal 

issues that come up.’’ 

In your view, is the Air Force doing everything it can to ensure the intent of Congress is carried out in implementing the fee-for-service pilot program? 

Answer. The Air Force is providing the necessary foundation to ensure the intent 

of Congress is carried out with respect to studying the fee-for-service pilot program. 

The Air Force has already released a Request for Information and had dialogue with 

industry for concept refinement. A Request for Proposal is planned to be released 

in first quarter fiscal year 2009, after which the Air Force anticipates receiving proposals from interested/qualified offerors. If executed, we anticipate industry will require 18–24 months to accomplish boom design, modification, and airframe integration. 

Question. What concerns, if any, do you have about the conduct and purpose of 

this pilot program? 

Answer. I do have some concerns regarding the funding and operational impacts 

of this program. There was no fiscal year 2008 appropriation to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 direction, so the Air Force is 

working on reprogramming funds for the program in fiscal year 2008–2009. Unlike 

the Navy program which uses a probe and drogue refueling system, this program 

requires significant industry commitment and investment to develop and certify a 

commercial boom-equipped aircraft. A minimum of an additional 6 months will be 

required for boom system operation, aircrew certification, and receiver qualification. 

Once complete, we can conduct the pilot program in fiscal years 2012–2016. 

We will assess progress and ensure we meet program requirements in the yearly 

reports submitted to Congress. 

AIR FORCE ABILITY TO RESPOND TO WORLDWIDE CONTINGENCIES

Question. What impact, if any, do you see on the Air Force’s ability to respond 

to worldwide contingencies as a consequence of the demands of current operations 

in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Answer. Our airmen have been vital to the success of the Joint team in the global 

war on terrorism, and have also provided global deterrence and assured our friends. 

The Air Force is organized, trained, equipped, and prepared to respond rapidly, 

flexibly, and precisely to worldwide contingencies. The Air Force has capabilities 

and manpower with specialized skills in high demand in Iraq and Afghanistan, such 

as strike, airlift, aeromedical evacuation, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, 

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explosive ordnance disposal, and security forces. Our airmen are honored to do their 

part, but our wartime tempo has had its effect on our people and our equipment. 

The high operations tempo accelerates the effects of aging on our inventory and 

erodes some skills necessary for future success. Despite these challenges, we are 

committed to our Nation’s defense and to the entire joint team, and we will keep 

our Air Force relevant, capable, and sustainable. 

Question. How much additional risk is the United States assuming in this regard? 

Answer. The Air Force is fully supporting the Secretary of Defense and combatant 

commanders with expeditionary and in place forces. Our Major Commands and 

Component Numbered Air Forces fully support all the Functional and Unified combatant commanders in planning and executing operations. We use an AEF process 

to manage operational tempo and enable rapid and tailored responses to worldwide 

contingencies as well as protecting the homeland through Operation Noble Eagle. 

Our forces engaged in combat today are fully ready to perform their missions, but 

our future full spectrum readiness and dominance are at risk unless we continue 

to reset the force and recapitalize our aging fleet. We must continue to ensure the 

U.S. military is capable of setting conditions for America’s success against emerging 

threats in an uncertain future. 

JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT

Question. In June 2006, the Army and Air Force signed a memorandum of understanding regarding the merger of two separate small cargo aircraft programs into 

the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA), a plane that will be smaller than the Air Forces C–

130, but larger than the Army’s C–23 Sherpa. 

In your view, is there a roles-and-missions redundancy between the Army and the 

Air Force with respect to the JCA? 

Answer. No. There are valid direct support lift requirements that call for Service 

Organic fixed wing aircraft to meet a ground commander’s need for Time Sensitive/

Mission Critical (TS/MC) delivery of passengers and cargo. 

Question. What changes to this program, if any, would you recommend? 

Answer. I support the program of record. However, if confirmed, I will take a hard 

look at lessons-learned from OEF and OIF to ensure the JCA is employed to support 

both the time sensitive needs of the Army and to maximize its utility to other users 

in theater. To that end, we will look at changes in doctrine and supporting capabilities to ensure the JCA can be used in multiple roles no matter which Service operates the aircraft. 

ACQUISITION OF SENIOR LEADERSHIP IN-TRANSIT CONFERENCE CAPSULES AND SENIOR

LEADER IN-TRANSIT PALLETS

Question. Since 2006, the AMC has pursued two programs to upgrade the level 

of accommodations for senior Air Force and Pentagon officials while in-transit on 

aircraft. These two programs are known as the Senior Leadership In-Transit Conference Capsule (SLICC) and Senior Leader In-Transit Pallet (SLIP). Currently the 

Air Force is seeking several million dollars in global war on terrorism supplemental 

funding for these programs. 

Do you believe that these upgrades to senior leadership travel quarters are a legitimate use of global war on terrorism funding? 

Answer. The global war on terrorism has raised new requirements across the 

board. Specifically, in the wake of September 11, there has been an ever-growing 

demand for Senior Leader transportation across the globe—especially into Iraq, Afghanistan, and other theaters of the global war on terrorism. Our efforts were 

aimed at responding as quickly and efficiently as possible to growing COCOM and 

senior leadership requirements, optimizing both dedicated aircraft and leveraging 

the existing air bridge whenever possible. Indeed, I started this initiative when I 

was the DJ–4 on the Joint Staff. My goal was to increase efficiency in the utilization 

of scarce assets, while safely accomplishing the mission. The concept was to take 

one to two pallet positions on an already tasked aircraft, integrating Senior Leader 

transport into pre-assigned missions. These missions could be from the continental 

United States or use prepositioned assets in theater to transport leaders who came 

by dedicated assets that did not have required defensive systems. By having these 

assets in theater, we could also take advantage of commercial flights into theater. 

Upon taking over as AMC/CC, I directed the development of prototypes that were 

built to the standards of Very Important Person Special Airlift Mission (VIPSAM) 

aircraft. At this point we have a prototype SLIP and just delivered the first operational pallet. We also have the prototype SLICC in development. These were done 

using baseline funding. We still need to complete operational test and evaluation 

of the systems to validate they meet the requirements. 

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Question. In your view are these emergency or time-critical requirements? 

Answer. While these are not emergency requirements in the traditional sense of 

the word, the need stems from the increased demand levied in the context of global 

war on terrorism. There is less of an urgent need now because, thanks to the efforts 

of Congress, more of the dedicated airlift aircraft have been equipped with the necessary defensive systems to fly senior leadership into higher threat areas. 

Question. Do you support these expenditures? 

Answer. The Air Force funded the development of these protoypes through baseline funding in February 2007. 

Question. Have you determined this to be a priority within AMC? 

Answer. When I was the AMC/CC, I thought the concept warranted the investment for prototyping and further evaluation. I’m confident that this requirement is 

being vetted through the normal resource allocation process within the Air Force 

and OSD. 

Question. Have you ensured that expenditures on SLICCs and SLIPs are reasonable and limited to only necessary costs? 

Answer. Yes, the driving force behind this entire initiative was efficiency and cost 

savings. The prototypes were designed and built to the same standards as the existing VIPSAM fleet. Careful attention was given to scaling the requirements to maximize security, communications and the ability to work enroute, while adhering to 

FAA safety standards. 

ACTIONS OF AIR FORCE OFFICERS

Question. Over the last several years, senior Air Force officers are alleged to have 

advocated the funding of a number of programs that were not included in the President’s budget and for which there was no currently validated joint requirement. 

These programs include the procurement of additional C–17s, the continuation of 

the C–130J multi-year contract, and the multi-year procurement of additional F–22 

aircraft. Senior Air Force officers are also alleged to have advocated a legislative 

proposal that would overturn a decision of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission relative to Joint Basing. 

What is your view of the propriety of efforts by senior Air Force officers to advocate the funding of programs that are not included in the President’s budget and 

for which there is no currently validated joint requirement? 

If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to curb such efforts? 

Answer. Our Nation was founded on the principle of civilian control of the military. That includes supporting the President’s budget and legislative programs. 

Other than those occasions when individuals appear before appropriate committees 

of Congress and are asked to give their personal views, the military services cannot 

function effectively and credibly if senior officers advocate for programs or funding 

of requirements that are not a part of the President’s budget. I am keenly aware 

of the responsibility I and others have to fully support the President’s budget and 

provide candid, honest information to our superiors. That would include responding 

accurately to questions from Congress. If confirmed I would ensure that members 

of my command understand the responsibility to fully support the President’s budget and always put answers in that context whether discussing present or future 

plans/requirements. 

DEFENSE BUDGETING

Question. On January 27, 2008, the Washington Post reported on internal Air 

Force briefing slides, called ‘‘CSAF 2008 Leadership Forum Strategic Communication Update,’’ which included statements that: ‘‘the Air Force is targeting the other 

Services;’’ the ‘‘Budget Battle’’ is a ‘‘Zero Sum Game’’ and a ‘‘Non-Permissive Environment;’’ and ‘‘some Services are going to win and some are going to lose.’’

What is your view of these briefing slides and the views that they appear to be 

intended to communicate? 

Answer. The two slides that appeared in the Washington Post were part of a larger 10-slide internal briefing to Air Force retired senior leadership, to inform them 

of a Communication Campaign Plan underway to better plan and execute the message about the Air Force’s contribution to national security, and to encourage their 

participation. 

Competition for funding is inherent in the Federal budgetary process; therefore, 

it does not seem unusual for the Air Force to communicate its contribution to National Security to obtain its share of defense resources. All Services and agencies 

engage in similar activities. If confirmed, my focus as the Commander of U.S. 

TRANSCOM, will be on joint strategic mobility and distribution programs which 

span all Service budgets. 

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CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able 

to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee 

and other appropriate committees of Congress? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those 

views differ from the administration in power? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate 

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, U.S. TRANSCOM? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms 

of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay 

or denial in providing such documents? 

Answer. Yes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

STRATEGIC AIRLIFT PROGRAMS

1. Senator LEVIN. General McNabb, in response to the advance policy questions, 

you mentioned the requirement of having enough organic airlift aircraft to meet the 

33.95 million ton-miles per day (MTM/D) requirement. You also said that the current program of 205 C–17s, 52 Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program 

(RERP) modified C–5Bs, and 59 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) modified 

C–5As would meet that goal. Do you have reservations that the 33.95 MTM/D requirement is understated? If so, why? 

General MCNABB. Based on analysis completed to date, the 33.95 MTM/D requirement is adequate. Looking ahead, however, the Department’s Mobility Capabilities 

and Requirements Study 2016, as well as a congressionally-directed analysis of airlift requirements and force mix, might develop a different MTM requirement. These 

studies are considering several new factors including revised Defense Planning Scenarios, emerging over-sized and out-sized requirements such as the Army’s Future 

Combat System, the reduction of our overseas footprint, Army and Marine troopstrength increases, and the standup of Africa Command (AFRICOM).

2. Senator LEVIN. General McNabb, if the Department were to decide that the 

total strategic airlift requirements (organic airlift plus commercial partners participating in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program) were larger, what would be 

the best way of meeting those needs? 

General MCNABB. This answer is based on understanding exactly how and why 

the requirement has changed. For example, if the new requirement relates to oversized and out-sized capacity, then the solution might lie within our organic fleet, 

since this capability is generally not available in CRAF. If increased passenger or 

bulk cargo movement drive the requirement, our CRAF partners could likely provide 

an adequate solution. In general, the best way to meet the Nation’s continuing strategic airlift requirement is through our proven DOD capabilities backed up with an 

effective pool of commercial capacity to meet both peacetime surge requirements and 

support full mobilization.

3. Senator LEVIN. General McNabb, should we be concerned about the balance of 

capacity between our commercial partners in the CRAF program and the Air Force’s 

organic capability? 

General MCNABB. I believe the balance of organic and commercial capacity is correct, but I do have concerns about CRAF and our organic capability. On the CRAF 

side, we need to review the economic health of that program in light of likely trends 

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in the national security environment as well as in the airline industry. Once this 

review is complete, we need to make appropriate changes in our business relationships and contracts with CRAF partners to ensure peacetime, surge, and mobilization requirements will be met. On the organic side, we must realize the programmed 

C–5 reliability improvements and the buy of C–17s because both are critical to 

meeting our strategic lift requirements. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

C–27J SPARTAN, JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT

4. Senator BILL NELSON. General McNabb, the Air Force will augment its fleet 

of intratheater transports and Air Force Special Operations Command, with U.S. 

Special Operations Command, will supplement its fleet of support aircraft with the 

C–27J. The Air Force’s initial order is for 24 aircraft, but it has projected a need 

for 70 to 100 more in future years. If confirmed, how will you support the Air 

Force’s efforts to procure the C–27J for the intratheater mission? 

General MCNABB. We will take into account lessons-learned from Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and other recent operations to ensure 

that the C–27J supports the needs of all customers in the theater. Initial Air Force 

analysis indicates that the U.S. Air Force primary intratheater General Support 

mission may best be met with additional C–130J aircraft. However, there are other 

Direct Support and General Support missions such as homeland defense, disaster 

relief, medical evacuation, reducing convoy vulnerability to improvised explosive devices, or AFRICOM support that may drive the need for additional Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA). Evaluating JCA capabilities across the full range of military operations 

will point the way to the optimal fleet mix which will maximize airlift efficiency 

across all platforms. A RAND analysis to address the broader set of missions is underway and will conclude by the end of 2008.

5. Senator BILL NELSON. General McNabb, explain how you will work with the 

Army to develop a comprehensive plan to provide inter- and intratheater lift in support of all military operations and contingencies. 

General MCNABB. I fully support all initiatives that embrace Service partnerships 

to enhance joint effectiveness and minimize unnecessary redundancy. 

U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) is leading a comprehensive Mobility 

Capability Requirements Study to evaluate all Joint Force Commander movement 

requirements and the necessary military and commercial capacity to satisfy those 

needs. The study will conclude in May 2009, and it incorporates Army requirements 

for intertheater and intratheater deployment as well as distribution support for 

movement to the point of need. 

The Air Force and the Army operate airlift capabilities in close proximity in 

intratheater airlift. If confirmed, I will ensure the Air Force and Army cooperate to 

maximize the utility of theater airlift assets. U.S. TRANSCOM is currently co-leading a Roles and Missions review of intratheater airlift operations with a focus on 

the JCA. 

The results of these efforts will improve joint synergy and effectiveness while 

minimizing duplication of effort. Their focus is the traditional division of General 

Support provided by the Air Force through a common-user airlift service and Direct 

Support conducted by the Services with organic aviation assets to meet the time 

sensitive and mission critical needs. The C–27J offers short field performance for 

Direct Support operations while providing significant payload and range to accomplish theater-level General Support missions. Given the C–27J’s significant capability to accomplish both General Support and Direct Support mission sets, we must 

provide the Joint Force Commander the ability to swing from one mission area to 

the other regardless of the Service assignment of the Joint Cargo Aircraft. This is 

accomplished through shared visibility and management of movement requirements 

as well as the ability to use available airlift capacity.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

AIR NATIONAL GUARD

6. Senator CLINTON. General McNabb, the Air Force is now developing the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for fiscal year 2010; with the new guidance 

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posed modernization accounts to meet the needs of the Total Force, what are your 

plans to ensure in the POM the adequate capitalization of the Air National Guard 

from its equipment, personnel, and sustainment perspectives? 

General MCNABB. If confirmed as U.S. TRANSCOM commander, I will have a 

very limited role in the Air Force’s POM submissions. The Air Force’s budget submission included a detailed review of all applicable guidance as well as a careful 

review of Total Force modernization, personnel, and sustainment. The Air Force remains committed to Total Force Integration and in the 2010 POM will expand on 

the progress we have made to integrate the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Forces into the Total Force in all areas including equipment, personnel, and 

sustainment.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR)

7. Senator CLINTON. General McNabb, Secretary Gates has stressed the importance of the Air Force providing a more robust ISR to the warfighter. How will you 

enable the Air Force to meet the Secretary’s objectives, and within what timeframe 

will you be able to do so? 

General MCNABB. We are working as part of the Secretary’s ISR Task Force to 

push even more ISR capability to the fight in the near-term through additional buys 

of equipment (such as RC–12 aircraft tailored to irregular warfare) and creative concepts that will add quantitative and qualitative value in the near-term. The Air 

Force and our airmen are committed to winning the current fight. Our ISR posture 

reflects that commitment. 

The Air Force has adapted traditional capabilities to Joint Force Commander requirements by fielding innovative ISR solutions. For example, the Air Force invented and fielded 4,000 Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receivers that allow 

ground forces to directly receive UAS pictures. We have accelerated MQ–1 Predator 

operations well beyond the DOD-directed program of record. We also introduced the 

MQ–9 Reaper into combat a year ahead of schedule. We continue to field more UAS 

capability at maximum capacity with near-term focus, and we’re proud of the dedicated airmen around the globe who are making this happen. General David 

Petreaus recently attested, ‘‘Predator teams have just been doing unbelievable work 

down there [International Zone] and in Baghdad as well. I think there’s some pathbreaking work ongoing here.’’ 

The DOD-approved Predator UAS requirement is 21 Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) 

by 2010. The Air Force is already flying 26 today, and we will further increase Predator CAPs to 31 by December 2008. We are pushing ISR capability into the field 

as soon as it becomes available. We have issued a request for proposal for new 

UASs, and we are shifting our UAS procurement from the older MQ–1 to the more 

capable MQ–9. When equipped with the new Wide Area Airborne Surveillance pod 

(WAAS), our MQ–9 UASs will be able to provide 30 to 60 times more capability than 

a single MQ–1 Predator. 

In addition, we have pushed our legacy ISR ‘‘workhorses’’—U–2s, RC–135s, and 

JSTARS—to the highest possible tempo to get as much capability to the fight as 

possible. Although still in development and procurement, our Global Hawk UAS is 

already a prized capability that is also deployed to the fight at the highest rate possible. To ensure that our ground partners are able to leverage Air Force ISR systems, we have embedded ISR liaison teams at the division and brigade levels to 

work hand-in-glove with ground commanders and with our battlefield airmen in tailoring ISR capabilities for specific tactical fights. Further, we have capitalized on 

technical analysis advances to accommodate rapidly growing collection capabilities 

and turn data into actionable intelligence. In light of these advances, we have reorganized globally through reachback for even more potency and efficiency through 

the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS)—our primary imagery analysis capability. This global approach provides real time flexibility and ensures that our 

warfighters get the maximum value from ISR collection and data.

C–5 FLEET

8. Senator CLINTON. General McNabb, the recently signed Iraq Supplemental Appropriations bill included 15 additional C–17s for the Air Force to meet its strategic 

airlift requirements. The Air Force has continued to state its need to balance the 

cost of sustaining the C–5 fleet with ensuring modern strategic air lifters are available to meet global needs. Please articulate what the Air Force sees as the need for 

additional C–17s, as well as the relationship of that need with the C–5 fleet. 

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General MCNABB. Our first priority is always to provide the best overall airlift 

capability to the joint warfighter. There are two issues with respect to the proper 

balance between the C–5s and C–17s that comprise our strategic airlift fleet. The 

first is the total number of aircraft. The current requirement of 299 aircraft was 

set by the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act, and this requirement as outlined in the fiscal year 2009 program of record for strategic airlift is 190 C–17s and 

111 C–5s. 

The second issue is the minimum number of MTM/D available in our total fleet. 

During Nunn-McCurdy certification, the JROC validated a requirement for 33.95 

MTM/D of organic strategic airlift (C–5s and C–17s). The recent Nunn-McCurdy acquisition decision memorandum signed by John Young, USD(AT&L), results in a 

fleet of 205 C–17s, 52 Reliability Enhancement Reengined Program (RERP) modified C–5s, and 59 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) modified C–5As. This 

fleet mix meets both requirements and is aligned with objectives sought by the U.S. 

TRANSCOM commander and the JROC. 

The Air Force continues to review options for the modernization and retirement 

of portions of the C–5A fleet. The C–17 has proven itself to be a highly reliable and 

versatile strategic airlift platform that will serve the Nation well across the full 

range of military operations. We will continue to analyze the overall requirement 

and make sure we maintain the proper balance in our fleet. The ongoing Mobility 

Capabilities Requirements Study 2016, with informal results available in the spring 

of 2009, is the next big milestone in this continuing analysis. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN AND SENATOR JOHN WARNER

SENIOR LEADER IN-TRANSIT COMFORT CAPSULES

9. Senator MCCAIN and Senator WARNER. General McNabb, according to Air Force 

documents, the requirement for Senior Leader In-Transit Comfort Capsules (SLICC) 

was added as an in-scope task order to the Agile Eagle Program—an indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contract managed by the Air Force Research Laboratory 

under the Air Force Materiel Command at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. The 

Agile Eagle contract was expressly for the ‘‘design, development, fabrication, testing 

and upgrading’’ of ‘‘Specialized Airborne Communications Packages.’’ The Agile 

Eagle Program ‘‘called specifically for communications packages with multiple-channel/multiple-path satellite communications and comprehensive airborne networking 

capability into an existing communications facility.’’ Is SLICC a new start program? 

General MCNABB. SLICC is a new start program. Congress was notified of the 

new start in January 2007.

10. Senator MCCAIN and Senator WARNER. General McNabb, please explain how 

the SLICC task order is in-scope to the Agile Eagle contract for ‘‘Specialized Airborne Communications Packages?’’ 

General MCNABB. The SLICC is in-scope to the Agile Eagle contract for ‘‘Specialized Airborne Communications Packages’’ in that it was intended to be used in conjunction with the Steel Eagle Command and Control Module (CCM) to provide the 

end user with worldwide, secure communications and networking capabilities such 

as secure video teleconferencing and other advanced networking operations. The 

Conference Eagle Module was an existing Contract Line Item Number on the Agile 

Eagle contract for an accompanying capsule for the Steel Eagle CCM to provide the 

user with a dedicated work/rest travel compartment. The SLICC meets the same capabilities, allowing a task order to be executed within that contract.

11. Senator MCCAIN and Senator WARNER. General McNabb, according to e-mails 

provided to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the attached March 26, 2008 

‘‘SLICC/SLIP Financial Update’’ by the Air Force Research Laboratory, in June 

2007 the ‘‘AMC request to implement ‘worldclass’ interior and changes to berthing 

module shelter and seating components,’’ led to cost increases of at least $493,000. 

(Please see attachment). As you were the Commander of Air Mobility Command 

(AMC) at the time of these changes, how can you answer, as you did, in your advance policy questions, that you ensured expenditures on the SLICC program are 

‘‘reasonable and limited to only necessary costs?’’

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General MCNABB. Costs presented in November 2006 were initial estimates by the 

Air Force Research Lab. Since then, costs have been generated to: (1) cover airworthiness testing from modifying the original design from a communications module to a conference working space; (2) cover nonrecurring engineering to modify the 

SLICC design to a ‘‘two capsule’’ configuration; and (3) to meet current DV fleet appearance standards.

12. Senator MCCAIN and Senator WARNER. General McNabb, what role did you 

play in determining the furnishings of SLICCs? 

General MCNABB. In June 2006, I approved a broad statement of requirements 

for the SLICC as part of the Operational Requirements document, and in May 2007, 

I approved the selection of the original colors for the SLICC.

13. Senator MCCAIN and Senator WARNER. General McNabb, in your answers to 

the advance policy questions, you stated ‘‘the driving force behind this entire initiative was efficiency and cost savings.’’ However, according to the attached ‘‘AF Form 

1768,’’ entitled ‘‘Staff Summary Sheet’’ signed by you in June 2006, the AMC requirements validated under your command were for ‘‘reclining first-class airline 

seats incorporating integral foot rests,’’ ‘‘a couch capable of seating at least two 

adults (three desired),’’ ‘‘a ‘flat panel’ monitor (TV screen)’’ with a ‘‘diagonal measurement of at least 37 inches,’’ ‘‘a full length mirror,’’ ‘‘internal illumination level 

[that] will automatically adjust to ambient lighting levels,’’ ‘‘independent heating 

and cooling’’ units, and ‘‘aesthetically pleasing’’ walls, ceilings and carpets. (Please 

see attachment). Is this the description of a project where cost savings are the driving force? 


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General MCNABB. SLICC was designed to leverage a large portion of our current 

and future cargo and refueling fleet at a fraction of the cost of purchasing new dedicated VIP aircraft. The original requirements defined in June 2006 were intended 

to provide a work and rest area suitable for the national leaders who would be authorized to use the SLICC. These include senior civilian members of the executive 

branch, Members of Congress, and selected senior military flag officers. SLICC requirements reflect the same standards present in our existing fleet of VIP aircraft 


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in a much smaller package. Further, although cost savings were a major consideration for the SLICC concept, it was not the only factor driving design. The design 

was a function of maintaining the current DV fleet standards given the intended 

occupants, providing FAA-certified materials to allow carriage on the KC–10, and 

an overriding need to ensure occupant safety and security.

14. Senator MCCAIN and Senator WARNER. General McNabb, why was the ‘‘first 

class seating’’ in SLICCs reupholstered from brown leather to blue leather? General 

Robert H. McMahon told the Washington Post that ‘‘it was probably because blue 

would not show dirt as much as tan or brown would.’’ Is this correct? 

General MCNABB. Neither General McMahon nor I were assigned to AMC when 

the change in color was made. General McMahon was speculating when he answered the Washington Post reporter. His response was incorrect. AMC made the 

color change to match the interior of the KC–10, a primary carrier of the SLICC, 

and to match the color of the other seat pallets that are used to move personnel 

on cargo aircraft.

15. Senator MCCAIN and Senator WARNER. General McNabb, in your advance policy questions you stated that when you were the AMC Commander, you were confident that this requirement was being vetted through the normal resource allocation process within the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). 

However, the Committee understands that this program was not vetted through the 

normal resource allocation process within OSD, but that the Air Force reprogrammed $3.5 million of fiscal year 2006 baseline dollars for the initial SLICC. 

Which statement is correct? 

General MCNABB. In my answers to the advance policy questions I stated that the 

concept warranted the investment in prototyping and further evaluation. To initiate 

this effort, the Air Force submitted a new start through OSD to the four Defense 

Committees for approval and identified baseline funding of $3.5 million for the required prototyping. Funding for any assets beyond the prototype is being vetted 

through the normal resource allocation process within the AF and OSD.

16. Senator MCCAIN and Senator WARNER. General McNabb, during your tenure 

when you were AMC Commander, the estimated cost of each SLICC grew from $1.7 

million in November 2006 to $2.7 million in June 2007—a 66-percent cost increase 

in less than 2 years. Do you still think the SLICC is a cost effective program? How 

do you explain this mismanagement under your command? 

General MCNABB. SLICC was designed to leverage a large portion of the current 

and future cargo and refueling fleet at a fraction of the cost of purchasing new dedicated VIP aircraft and associated flying hours, crews, maintenance personnel, and 

support equipment. Keeping the required size as small as possible was critical. For 

instance, if we had seats that allow our senior leaders to rest, we could modify the 

berthing requirement and reduce the size of the couch. The growth in cost of the 

prototype over the timeframe identified was due primarily to modifying the SLICC 

from a single capsule for both working and berthing to a dual capsule design with 

separate capsules for working and for berthing. The flexibility to tailor the package 

for shorter trips would free up space for other needs. This change in design provided 

for greater acquisition flexibility when procuring production SLICCs, and for greater 

operational flexibility depending upon the size of the travel group. It also would 

allow us to take better advantage of theater assets without the need to position or 

deposition dedicated VIP aircraft to meet theater requirements.

17. Senator MCCAIN and Senator WARNER. General McNabb, under your tenure 

as AMC Commander and later as Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, on three occasions, 

the Air Force requested to use global war on terrorism funds for the SLICC program. Is it not true that it is only because Congress has rejected these expenditures 

that no war supplemental funds have yet been used for SLICC? 

General MCNABB. Yes, this is true. However, the Air Force’s sole request for global war on terrorism funding was submitted as part of the Department of Defense’s 

fiscal year 2008 global war on terrorism request. OSD and the Office of Management and Budget supported this request. The Air Force believed this to be a valid 

global war on terrorism requirement due to the increased demand for flying and 

protecting senior U.S. Government officials traveling in and out of high threat 

areas. While the Air Force requested the use of global war on terrorism funding for 

this requirement, there was never an intention to use global war on terrorism funds 

without the approval of Congress.

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18. Senator MCCAIN and Senator WARNER. General McNabb, why did the Air 

Force continue to request funding SLICCs under the Fiscal Year 2008 Global War 

on Terrorism Supplemental, given that you acknowledged in your response to the 

advance policy questions that ‘‘There is less of an urgent need now. . .?’’

General MCNABB. SLICC was developed to address the growing gap between DV 

lift requirements and lift capability in the wake of September 11. One key requirement was to provide nondescript DV transportation capability into high threat environments to ensure their safety and security. Although congressional support for defensive systems on large aircraft helped reduce the total SLICC requirement, it did 

not address the enduring need for nondescript movement. This is especially important given the proliferation of threats such as manportable surface-to-air missiles 

(manpads). As a result, SLICC remains a needed capability.

19. Senator MCCAIN and Senator WARNER. General McNabb, how is the expenditure of global war on terrorism funds for SLICCs helping the troops on the ground? 

General MCNABB. Congress denied the use of global war on terrorism funds to 

meet this requirement, however it is very important for our national military and 

civilian leaders to assess theater progress first hand, and it is very motivating for 

the troops on the ground to see their leaders. Leaders strive to maximize their time 

on the ground with the troops, and SLICC would allow them to take full advantage 

of their en route time to work and rest.

20. Senator MCCAIN and Senator WARNER. General McNabb, is it not true that 

senior leaders go where they are needed or ordered, whether they are flying coach 

or first class? 

General MCNABB. Absolutely true. Senior military and civilian leaders below the 

equivalent rank of four stars routinely travel on commercial aircraft, usually in 

coach. Senior leaders at or above four star equivalent are ‘‘required users’’ of military aircraft for travel purposes as directed by the Secretary of Defense in DOD Directive 4500.56. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

EN ROUTE STRATEGIC MOBILITY INFRASTRUCTURE

21. Senator WARNER. General McNabb, I noticed from your answers to the advance policy questions submitted to you by the Committee that you list as one of 

your major challenges to ‘‘ensure we have the appropriate global en route infrastructure to support future force projection and sustainment as we shift to a smaller 

overseas military presence with more deployments from U.S. bases.’’ The global 

reach of our Nation’s Armed Forces depends on the physical infrastructure of ports, 

airfields, rail, and other lines of logistics worldwide to be able to transport military 

personnel and equipment. How would you assess the capability of the en route mobility infrastructure to support new requirements as a result of the global realignment of the stationing of U.S. forces and the growth of our Nation’s ground forces? 

General MCNABB. In general terms, I am confident in U.S. TRANSCOM’s ability 

to project the Nation’s combat power along an east-west axis. As operations in U.S. 

Central Command illustrate, we have significant worldwide capabilities in terms of 

airfields, seaports, roads, and associated infrastructure. We are also continuously 

working to improve that infrastructure to increase the velocity across the transportation enterprise. I am less confident about our abilities to project power south into 

emerging areas of interest in Africa and South America. If confirmed I will make 

it a priority to: (1) preserve and optimize the existing network of infrastructure; and 

(2) work with the combatant commanders and DOD to determine future infrastructure requirements.

22. Senator WARNER. General McNabb, are there any specific areas of concern regarding en route infrastructure you would want to address? 

General MCNABB. I am most immediately concerned about our ability to reach locations in South America and Africa.

23. Senator WARNER. General McNabb, how would you propose addressing them? 

General MCNABB. If confirmed, I will continue to make maximum use of DOD’s 

study efforts, like the Mobility Capability and Requirements Study, to validate current and define emerging infrastructure requirements. I will work closely with the 

other combatant commanders so we can efficiently and effectively meet their 

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dition, I would continue to leverage U.S. TRANSCOM’s Global En Route Infrastructure Committee structure. This committee includes members from each of the Geographic Combatant Commanders and meets to define and prioritize worldwide mobility infrastructure requirements. Those prioritized requirements are then passed 

to the Services for programming and become part of U.S. TRANSCOM’s Integrated 

Priority List. 

[The nomination reference of Gen. Duncan J. McNabb, USAF, 

follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 

July 10, 2008. 

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed 

Services: 

The following named officer for appointment in the United States Air Force to the 

grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under 

title 10, U.S.C., section 601: 

To be General 

Gen. Duncan J. McNabb, USAF 

[The biographical sketch of Gen. Duncan J. McNabb, USAF, 

which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH BY GEN. DUNCAN J. MCNABB, USAF 

General Duncan J. McNabb is Vice Chief of Staff, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, 

Washington, D.C. As Vice Chief, he presides over the Air Staff and serves as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Requirements Oversight Council and Deputy Advisory Working Group. He assists the Chief of Staff with organization, training, and 

equipage of more than 710,000 Active-Duty, Guard, Reserve, and civilian forces 

serving in the United States and overseas. 

General McNabb graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1974. A command pilot, he has amassed more than 5,400 flying hours in transport and rotary 

wing aircraft. He has held command and staff positions at squadron, group, wing, 

major command and Department of Defense levels. During Operations Desert Shield 

and Desert Storm, General McNabb commanded the 41st Military Airlift Squadron, 

which earned Military Airlift Command’s Airlift Squadron of the Year in 1990. The 

General commanded the 89th Operations Group, overseeing the air transportation 

of our Nation’s leaders, including the President, Vice President, Secretary of State 

and Secretary of Defense. He then served as Commander of the 62nd Airlift Wing. 

The wing’s performance in 1996 earned the Riverside Trophy as the 15th Air Force’s 

outstanding wing. 

He also commanded the Tanker Airlift Control Center where he planned, scheduled, and directed a fleet of more than 1,400 aircraft in support of combat delivery 

and strategic airlift, air refueling, and aeromedical operations around the world. 

Most recently, General McNabb was the Commander of Air Mobility Command, 

where he led 134,000 total force airmen in providing rapid global mobility, aerial 

refueling, special airlift and aeromedical evacuation for America’s Armed Forces. 

General McNabb’s staff assignments have been a variety of planning, programming and logistical duties. These include serving as the Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Plans and Programs on the Air Staff and Chairman of the Air Force Board having 

oversight of all Air Force programs. He also served as the Director for Logistics on 

the Joint Staff where he was responsible for operational logistics and strategic mobility support to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. 

RE ́SUME ́ OF CAREER SERVICE OF GEN. DUNCAN J. MCNABB, USAF 

Education:

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1974 ... Bachelor of Science degree, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO. 

1977 ... Distinguished graduate, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. 

1983 ... Air Command and Staff College, by correspondence 

1984 ... Master of Science degree in international relations, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 

1993 ... Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC. 

1994 ... Air War College, by correspondence 

1995 ... Program for Senior Officials in National Security, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. 

1998 ... Executive Program for General Officers of the Russian Federation and the United States, John F. Kennedy School 

of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. 

2000 ... National Security Decisionmaking Seminar, Center for Strategic Education, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced 

International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC. 

Assignments:

June 1974–May 1975 ............... Student, undergraduate navigator training, Mather Air Force Base, CA. 

August 1975–April 1978 .......... Instructor navigator, 14th Military Airlift Squadron, Norton Air Force Base, CA. 

April 1978–April 1979 .............. Airlift director, 63rd Military Airlift Wing, Norton Air Force Base, CA. 

April 1979–April 1980 .............. Student, undergraduate pilot training, Williams Air Force Base, AZ. 

August 1980–August 1983 ...... Instructor pilot and chief pilot, 14th Military Airlift Squadron, Norton Air Force Base, CA. 

August 1983–July 1984 ............ General’s aide, Air Force Inspection and Safety Center, Norton Air Force Base, CA. 

July 1984–June 1986 ................ Chief, Plans Integration Branch, Headquarters MAC, Scott Air Force Base, IL. 

June 1986–June 1988 .............. Aide to the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command and MAC, Scott Air Force Base, IL. 

June 1988–November 1990 ...... Chief pilot, later, operations officer, 17th Military Airlift Squadron, Charleston Air Force 

Base, SC. 

November 1990–January 1992 Commander, 41st Military Airlift Squadron, Charleston Air Force Base, SC. 

January 1992–August 1992 ..... Deputy Group Commander, 437th Operations Group, Charleston Air Force Base, SC. 

August 1992–June 1993 .......... Student, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC. 

July 1993–June 1995 ................ Chief, Logistics Readiness Center, the Joint Staff, Washington, DC. 

July 1995–July 1996 ................. Commander, 89th Operations Group, Andrews Air Force Base, MD. 

July 1996–July 1997 ................. Commander, 62nd Airlift Wing, McChord Air Force Base, WA. 

August 1997–June 1999 .......... Commander, Tanker Airlift Control Center, Headquarters Air Mobility Command, Scott Air 

Force Base, IL. 

June 1999–December 1999 ...... Deputy Director of Programs, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, 

Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, DC. 

December 1999–April 2002 ...... Director of Programs, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, DC. 

April 2002–July 2004 ............... Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, 

DC. 

August 2004–October 2005 ..... Director for Logistics, the Joint Staff, Washington, DC. 

October 2005–September 2007 Commander, Headquarters Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, IL. 

September 2007–present ......... Vice Chief of Staff, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, DC. 

Flight information: 

Rating: Command pilot, navigator. 

Flight hours: More than 5,400. 

Aircraft flown; T–37, T–38, C–141, C–17, C–21, C–20, and UH–IN.

Major awards and decorations: 

Defense Distinguished Service Medal 

Distinguished Service Medal 

Defense Superior Service Medal 

Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster 

Defense Meritorious Service Medal 

Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster 

Joint Service Commendation Medal 

Air Force Commendation Medal with two oak leaf clusters 

Air Force Achievement Medal 

Combat Readiness Medal with oak leaf cluster 

National Defense Service Medal with two bronze stars 

Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal 

Southwest Asia Service Medal with two bronze stars 

Global War on Terrorism Service Medal 

Humanitarian Service Medal 

NATO Medal (Former Republic of Yugoslavia) 

Kuwait Liberation Medal (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) 

Kuwait Liberation Medal (Government of Kuwait)

Other achievements: 

Commander’s Trophy, Undergraduate Pilot Training, Air Training Command 

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Orville Wright Award for outstanding UPT graduate, Order of Daedalians 

Order of the Sword, AMC

Effective dates of promotion:

Second Lieutenant .......................................................................................................................................... June 5, 1974 

First Lieutenant .............................................................................................................................................. June 5, 1976 

Captain ........................................................................................................................................................... June 5, 1978 

Major ............................................................................................................................................................... October 1, 1985 

Lieutenant Colonel .......................................................................................................................................... June 1, 1989 

Colonel ............................................................................................................................................................ January 1, 1993 

Brigadier General ........................................................................................................................................... July 27, 1998 

Major General ................................................................................................................................................. February 26, 2001 

Lieutenant General ......................................................................................................................................... April 19, 2002 

General ........................................................................................................................................................... December 1, 2005 

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the 

biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The 

form executed by Gen. Duncan J. McNabb, USAF, in connection 

with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228

Washington, DC 20510–6050

(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.) 

Duncan J. McNabb.

2. Position to which nominated: 

Commander, United States Transportation Command.

3. Date of nomination: 

July 10, 2008.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) 

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive 

files.]

5. Date and place of birth: 

August 8, 1952; Shaw Field, SC (Shaw AFB).

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.) 

Married to Linda Worden McNabb (Maiden Name: Worden).

7. Names and ages of children: 

Kathryn W. Cochran, 25; Duncan J. McNabb, Jr., 24; Marvie L. McNabb, 22..

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

484

those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive 

branch. 

None, in addition to service record.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business, enterprise, educational or other institution. 

Board of Directors, Sam Fox Association (89th Airlift Wing, Andrews Air Force 

Base, MD; an association of present and former Andrews Air Force Base personnel). 

Member of the Nominating Committee for National Airlift and Tanker Association.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. 

Associate of Graduates (AOG), USAF Academy, served as President of National 

Chapter AOG, Washington, DC 

Order of Daedalians (served as Flight Captain, Gateway Flight 26, Scott AFB, IL) 

Member of the Nominating Committee for National Airlift and Tanker Association 

Sergeants Association 

Air Force Association 

Armed Forces Escape and Evasion Society 

Board of Directors, Sam Fox Association (89th Airlift Wing, Andrews AFB, MD; 

an association of present and former Andrews AFB personnel) 

Logistics Officer Association (LOA) 

National Defense Transportation Association

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch. 

Distinguished Graduate, Squadron Officer School. 

Undergraduate Pilot Training Outstanding Graduate (Commander’s Trophy). 

Daedalians’ Orville Wright Award, Outstanding Undergraduate Pilot Training 

Graduate in the Air Force. 

Commander, 41st Military Airlift Squadron; Air Mobility Command’s Airlift 

Squadron of the Year, 1990. 

Commander, 62d Airlift Wing; Riverside Trophy for Outstanding Wing in 15th Air 

Force, 1996. 

Air Mobility Command’s Public Affairs Achievement Award, 1996. 

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee 

of the Senate? 

Yes.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the 

administration in power? 

Yes. 

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the 

committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth 

in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–

E are contained in the committee’s executive files.] 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

DUNCAN J. MCNABB. 

This 11th day of June, 2008.

[The nomination of Gen. Duncan J. McNabb, USAF, was reported 

to the Senate by Chairman Levin on July 31, 2008, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 

was confirmed by the Senate on August 1, 2008.] 

(485)

APPENDIX 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES QUESTIONNAIRE ON BIOGRAPHICAL

AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF CIVILIAN NOMINEES

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228

Washington, DC 20510–6050

(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more 

space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. 

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearing and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)

2. Position to which nominated:

3. Date of nomination:

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)

5. Date and place of birth:

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)

7. Names and ages of children:

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, 

degree received and date degree granted.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, 

whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location 

of work, and dates of employment.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed above.

486

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other 

institution.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations.

13. Political affiliations and activities:

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office 

for which you have been a candidate.

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political 

parties or election committees during the last 5 years.

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, po- litical party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 

5 years.

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding 

service or achievements.

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, 

reports, or other published materials which you have written.

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you 

have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics 

relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee 

of the Senate?

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

FINANCIAL AND OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Information furnished in Parts B through F will 

be retained in the committee’s executive files and will not be made available to the 

public unless specifically directed by the committee.

Name:

PART B—FUTURE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS

1. Will you sever all business connections with your present employers, business 

firms, business associations or business organizations if you are confirmed by the 

Senate?

2. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service with the government? If 

so, explain.

3. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements after completing government service to resume employment, affiliation or practice with your previous employer, business firm, association or organization?

4. Has anybody made a commitment to employ your services in any capacity after 

you leave government service?

5. Is your spouse employed and, if so, where?

6. If confirmed, do you expect to serve out your full term or until the next Presidential election, whichever is applicable?

487

PART C—POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

1. Describe all financial arrangements, deferred compensation agreements, and 

other continuing dealings with business associates, clients or customers.

2. Indicate any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other relationships which 

could involve potential conflicts of interest in the position to which you have been 

nominated.

3. Describe any business relationship, dealing or financial transaction which you 

have had during the last 10 years, whether for yourself, on behalf of a client, or 

acting as an agent, that could in any way constitute or result in a possible conflict 

of interest in the position to which you have been nominated.

4. Describe any activity during the past 10 years in which you have engaged for 

the purpose of directly or indirectly influencing the passage, defeat or modification 

of any legislation or affecting the administration and execution of law or public policy.

5. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including any 

that may be disclosed by your responses to the above items. (Please provide a copy 

of any trust or other agreements.)

6. Do you agree to provide to the committee any written opinions provided by the 

General Counsel of the agency to which you are nominated and by the Attorney 

General’s office concerning potential conflicts of interest or any legal impediments 

to your serving in this position?

PART D—LEGAL MATTERS

1. Have you ever been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics for unprofessional 

conduct by, or been the subject of a complaint to any court, administrative agency, 

professional association, disciplinary committee, or other professional group? If so, 

provide details.

2. Have you ever been investigated, arrested, charged or held by any Federal, 

State, or other law enforcement authority for violation of any Federal, State, county 

or municipal law, regulation or ordinance, other than a minor traffic offense? If so, 

provide details.

3. Have you or any business of which you are or were an officer ever been involved as a party in interest in any administrative agency proceeding or civil litigation? If so, provide details.

4. Have you ever been convicted (including a plea of guilty or nolo contendere) 

of any criminal violation other than a minor traffic offense?

5. Please advise the committee of any additional information, favorable or unfavorable, which you feel should be considered in connection with your nomination.

PART E—FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS

1. Have you or your spouse ever represented in any capacity (e.g., employee, attorney, business, or political adviser or consultant), with or without compensation, a 

foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please 

fully describe such relationship.

2. If you or your spouse has ever been formally associated with a law, accounting, 

public relations firm or other service organization, have any of your or your spouse’s 

associates represented, in any capacity, with or without compensation, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe 

such relationship.

488

3. During the past 10 years have you or your spouse received any compensation 

from, or been involved in any financial or business transactions with, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please furnish details.

4. Have you or your spouse ever registered under the Foreign Agents Registration 

Act? If so, please furnish details.

PART F—FINANCIAL DATA

All information requested under this heading must be provided for yourself, your 

spouse, and your dependents.

1. Describe the terms of any beneficial trust or blind trust of which you, your 

spouse, or your dependents may be a beneficiary. In the case of a blind trust, provide the name of the trustee(s) and a copy of the trust agreement.

2. Provide a description of any fiduciary responsibility or power of attorney which 

you hold for or on behalf of any other person.

3. List sources, amounts and dates of all anticipated receipts from deferred income 

arrangements, stock options, executory contracts and other future benefits which 

you expect to derive from current or previous business relationships, professional 

services and firm memberships, employers, clients and customers.

4. Have you filed a Federal income tax return for each of the past 10 years? If 

not, please explain.

5. Have your taxes always been paid on time?

6. Were all your taxes, Federal, State, and local, current (filed and paid) as of the 

date of your nomination?

7. Has the Internal Revenue Service ever audited your Federal tax return? If so, 

what resulted from the audit?

8. Have any tax liens, either Federal, State, or local, been filed against you or 

against any real property or personal property which you own either individually, 

jointly, or in partnership?

(The committee may require that copies of your Federal income tax returns be 

provided to the committee. These documents will be made available only to Senators 

and the staff designated by the Chairman. They will not be available for public inspection.)

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

—————————————————.

This ————— day of —————————————, 20——. 

489

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES QUESTIONNAIRE ON BIOGRAPHICAL

AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF CERTAIN SENIOR

MILITARY NOMINEES

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Room SR–228

Washington, DC 20510–6050

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF 

NOMINEES FOR CERTAIN SENIOR MILITARY POSITIONS 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: 

Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional 

sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which 

the continuation of your answer applies. 

If you have completed this form in connection with a prior military nomination, 

you may use the following procedure in lieu of submitting a new form. In your letter 

to the Chairman, add the following paragraph to the end:

‘‘I hereby incorporate by reference the information and commitments contained 

in the Senate Armed Services Committee form ‘Biographical and Financial Information Requested of Nominees for Certain Senior Military Positions,’ submitted to the committee on [insert date or your prior form]. I agree that all such 

commitments apply to the position to which I have been nominated and that 

all such information is current except as follows:... .’’ [If any information on 

your prior form needs to be updated, please cite the part of the form and the 

question number and set forth the updated information in your letter to the 

Chairman.]

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part 

of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior 

to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made 

available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)

2. Position to which nominated:

3. Date of nomination:

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses. Also include 

your office telephone number.)

5. Date and place of birth:

6. Marital Status: (Include name of husband or wife, including wife’s maiden 

name.)

7. Names and ages of children:

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other 

part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than 

those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive 

branch.

490

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations.

11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society 

memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee 

of the Senate?

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of the Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from 

the Administration in power?

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM 

FINANCIAL AND OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Information furnished in Parts B through E will 

be retained in the committee’s executive files and will not be made available to the 

public unless specifically directed by the committee.

Name:

PART B—FUTURE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS

1. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your military service. If so, explain.

2. Has anybody made a commitment to employ your services in any capacity after 

you leave military service?

PART C—POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

1. Describe all financial arrangements, deferred compensation agreements, and 

other continuing dealings with business associates, clients or customers.

2. Indicate any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other relationships which 

could involve potential conflicts of interest in the position to which you have been 

nominated.

3. Describe any business relationship, dealing or financial transaction which you 

have had during the last 10 years, whether for yourself, on behalf of a client, or 

acting as an agent, that could in any way constitute or result in a possible conflict 

of interest in the position to which you have been nominated.

4. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including any 

that may be disclosed by your responses to the above items. (Please provide a copy 

of any trust or other agreements.)

5. Do you agree to provide to the committee any written opinions provided by the 

General Counsel of the agency to which you are nominated and by the Office of Government Ethics concerning potential conflicts of interest or any legal impediments 

to your serving in this position?

6. Is your spouse employed and, if so, where?

491

PART D—LEGAL MATTERS

1. Have you ever been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics for unprofessional 

conduct by, or been the subject of a complaint to any court, administrative agency, 

professional association, disciplinary committee, or other professional group? If so, 

provide details.

2. Have you ever been investigated, arrested, charged or held by any Federal, 

State, or other law enforcement authority for violation of Federal, State, county or 

municipal law, regulation or ordinance, other than a minor traffic offense? If so, provide details.

3. Have you or any business of which you are or were an officer ever been involved as a party in interest in any administrative agency proceeding or litigation? 

If so, provide details.

4. Have you ever been convicted (including a plea of guilty or nolo contendere) 

of any criminal violation other than a minor traffic offense?

5. Please advise the committee of any additional information, favorable or unfavorable, which you feel should be considered in connection with your nomination.

PART E—FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS

1. Have you or your spouse ever represented in any capacity (e.g., employee, attorney, business, or political adviser or consultant), with or without compensation, a 

foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please 

fully describe such relationship.

2. If you or your spouse has ever been formally associated with a law, accounting, 

public relations firm or other service organization, have any of your or your spouse’s 

associates represented, in any capacity, with or without compensation, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe 

such relationship.

3. During the past 10 years have you or your spouse received any compensation 

from, or been involved in any financial or business transactions with, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please furnish details.

4. Have you or your spouse ever registered under the Foreign Agents Registration 

Act? If so, please furnish details. 

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the 

best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

—————————————————.

This ————— day of —————————————, 20——.

Æ