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46–166 PDF 2008

S. HRG. 110–682 

THE CRISIS IN ZIMBABWE 

AND PROSPECTS FOR RESOLUTION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 15, 2008 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin, Chairman

BILL NELSON, Florida 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Almquist, Hon. Katherine J., Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa, 

U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC ........................ 11 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 12 

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator From Wisconsin .................................... 1 

Frazer, Hon. Jendayi, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC .......................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 7 

Gavin, Michelle D., Adjunct Fellow for Africa, Council on Foreign Relations, 

New York, NY ...................................................................................................... 36 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 38 

Isakson, Hon. Johnny, U.S. Senator From Georgia .............................................. 4 

Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator From Massachusetts ..................................... 20 

Melia, Thomas O., Deputy Executive Director, Freedom House, Washington, 

DC .......................................................................................................................... 27

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 30 

Nelson, Hon. Bill, U.S. Senator From Florida ....................................................... 22 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Obama, Hon. Barack, U.S. Senator From Illinois, prepared statement ............. 48 

(III)

(1) 

THE CRISIS IN ZIMBABWE 

AND PROSPECTS FOR RESOLUTION 

TUESDAY, JULY 15, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russell Feingold, 

chairman of the subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Feingold, Kerry, Nelson, and Isakson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN 

Senator FEINGOLD. The hearing will come to order. 

On behalf of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, I welcome all of you to this hearing on the crisis in 

Zimbabwe and prospects for resolution. 

I am pleased to be joined shortly by my colleague and ranking 

member of this subcommittee, Senator Isakson, and I will invite 

him to deliver some opening remarks when he arrives. 

I had hoped that today’s hearing would not be necessary. The 

March 29th elections offered a chance to turn the page on what has 

become a very long and very tragic chapter in Zimbabwe’s history. 

Although it fell short of international democratic standards, the African Union observer mission reported that the first presidential 

election in Zimbabwe expressed the general will of the people. But 

it took 5 weeks, after significant bloodshed and violence, to learn 

that Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of the opposition Movement for 

Democratic Change, had won 47.9 percent of the vote, while the incumbent, Robert Mugabe, won 43.2 percent. 

And then rather than respecting the will of the people, the 

Mugabe regime chose, as they have done time and time again, to 

repress it. In the weeks after the election, the Mugabe regime 

launched a deliberate campaign of state-sponsored violence against 

the MDC’s members, supporters, and the families in an attempt to 

cling to power. Reports of killings, abductions, torture, and sexual 

violence are staggering. The MDC reported just last week that 129 

of its supporters have been killed, 1,500 detained, and another 

5,000 remain missing since the March elections. It is no wonder 

that Mr. Tsvangirai decided to withdraw from the runoff of the 

Presidential election on June 27 and take shelter in the Dutch Embassy. Unsurprisingly, in a climate of fear and sheer terror, 

Mugabe reportedly won 90 percent of the vote. 

2 

Once considered a liberator of his people, Mugabe has become increasingly despotic and his reign increasingly disastrous. According 

to the best estimate, Zimbabwe’s gross domestic product has decreased over 40 percent in the last decade. Unemployment has 

risen over 80 percent and inflation is believed to be over 10.5 million percent. Yes; 10.5 million percent. Food shortages, land grabs, 

and repression have led more than 4 million people to flee into 

neighboring countries, destabilizing the wider region. And as Secretary Rice said in April, Mugabe has ‘‘done more harm to his 

country than would have been imaginable.’’ 

There are some who suggest that now is the time for caution to 

avoid escalating the violence and unleashing civil war. However, 

Zimbabwe’s descent has been underway for over a decade, and such 

a wait and see approach has only allowed this nightmare to grow. 

In the year 2000, I actually remarked on the Senate floor that we 

must act before Zimbabwe’s problems become more complex and 

deeply entrenched. Eight years later, this remains the case. 

Now, I respect those who have been involved in genuine efforts 

to mediate a peaceful settlement in Zimbabwe. But open-ended dialogue has largely been manipulated by Mugabe and his inner circle. 

Any serious negotiation between Mugabe and the opposition party 

will require a more robust mediation effort backed by united international support and leverage. I believe the current mediation 

team must be expanded beyond South Africa, to include representation from regional and international bodies. And I now call on 

the administration to press strongly for this expansion. 

The unwillingness of a few key regional leaders to criticize the 

regime for its abuses or consider punitive measures against those 

responsible has been deeply disappointing. This has led some to 

speak of a divide between the West and the rest, an unhelpful divide that Mugabe exploits through his rhetoric. China and Russia’s 

veto last Friday of a robust U.N. Security Council resolution imposing international arms embargo and multilateral sanctions exposed 

the poisonous nature of this divide. And I am, of course, deeply disappointed by their veto, especially considering China’s increasing 

role on the continent. 

I also find it discouraging that this veto was one of the new Russian President’s first actions in Africa. Until we have a comprehensive, coordinated action by both regional and international leaders, 

including a combination of incentives and punitive measures, I fear 

the situation will only get worse. 

I welcome the efforts of the Bush administration thus far, but I 

think more has to be done to overcome this divide as we press for 

tighter sanctions on those individuals responsible for this crisis. 

Now is the time to scale up, not give up on global action. We must 

not allow Zimbabwe to fall out of the international spotlight as it 

has many times before. 

On Friday, Senator Isakson, the ranking member, who just 

joined us, and I, along with 16 of our colleagues introduced a resolution encouraging the administration’s continued efforts and calling for more robust efforts by all regional international actors to 

bolster efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution to Zimbabwe’s crisis. 

I am pleased that the Senate has now passed this resolution, which 

occurred yesterday. 

3 

Today’s hearing will assess the volatile situation there and what 

is needed to resolve the crisis. It will explore how U.S. policy can 

be strengthened to maximize leverage, and expedite a negotiated 

agreement that respects the will of the people. 

Now I would like to introduce our two distinguished panels so we 

can begin that discussion. First we will hear from Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer, who has been actively and directly 

involved in trying to bring an end to this crisis. We will also hear 

testimony from Katherine Almquist, the Assistant Administrator 

for Africa at the U.S. Agency for International Development, who 

will specifically address the humanitarian and development challenges faced by Zimbabwe. 

With more than 4 million Zimbabweans having fled the country, 

the humanitarian dynamic is directly linked to the political concerns. And both of these witnesses have, of course, testified before 

the Africa Subcommittee, and so it is my pleasure to welcome you 

back. I appreciate your willingness to testify today, as I know this 

is a particularly busy day at the State Department. I look forward 

to a frank and productive discussion. 

Our second panel features two nongovernmental experts who 

offer unique perspectives on the dynamics in Zimbabwe and potential for transformation. Mr. Thomas Melia is the deputy executive 

director of Freedom House, an organization that has reported on 

political and human rights violations in Zimbabwe for many years. 

Mr. Melia has long worked on issues of democracy in Africa and 

will provide us with his analysis of how the United States can best 

contribute to security, stability, and democracy in Zimbabwe and 

the wider region. 

We will also hear from Ms. Michelle Gavin, adjunct fellow for Africa at the Council on Foreign Relations. Most recently Ms. Gavin 

authored the council’s special report on Zimbabwe, titled ‘‘Planning 

for Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe,’’ and has been a leading analyst of 

U.S. policy in Zimbabwe. Prior to her work with the Council on 

Foreign Relations, I was lucky enough to have Ms. Gavin as my 

foreign policy advisor here in the Senate. Ms. Gavin and I worked 

together for 6 years, and I am indebted to her for her work and 

her analysis on a very broad range of issues related to Africa and 

beyond. 

And I can tell you that she and I met with President Mugabe in 

December of 1999 in what had to be one of the most surprising and 

difficult meetings I have ever experienced in my career. This was 

before this all happened. And we were able to come back and say 

something really bad is about to happen here, and we have never 

forgotten it. 

So it is particularly pleasing for me, of course, to have her here 

to get her expert insights on how the United States tools and leverage can best be used to address the situation in Zimbabwe and to 

thank her again for her fabulous work for me. 

Thank you to all our witnesses for being here. I look forward to 

your testimony and our subsequent discussion. 

And now before the panel begins, I would like to turn to the distinguished ranking member, Senator Isakson for his opening comments. 

4 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I 

associate myself with every word of your statement. I was pleased 

to join you in the resolution that passed the Senate last night regarding Zimbabwe. 

And I welcome our witnesses today. I have had the privilege of 

hearing both of them testify before. They are a great asset to our 

State Department and are experts in this region. 

There is no more grave situation in my mind than what exists 

in Zimbabwe, and I think your statement to encourage the world 

community through both sanctions and leverage and pressure to 

try and bring about free and fair elections and a civilized society 

in that country is absolutely paramount. And I look forward to joining you, Mr. Chairman, in every effort we can make on this committee to make that happen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, sir, and thank you for being so 

cooperative and helpful on this and other matters. 

Just so you know, apparently we will be having a vote at 11 

o’clock. I will simply recess the hearing for as long as it takes me 

to get over there and come back and vote. 

But subject to that, let us get started. Assistant Secretary Frazer, please. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JENDAYI FRAZER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. Chairman Feingold, Senator 

Isakson, I am pleased to testify before you today on the situation 

in Zimbabwe and the world’s response. I thank you for your sustained strong support that has been so important in bringing this 

tragedy to the attention of a world that is beginning to join together for action. 

Our goals have been consistent to push for an end to the violence, to achieve a democratic transition that is consistent with the 

will of the people of Zimbabwe as expressed on March 29, and to 

provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Zimbabwe. 

To achieve these goals, we are pursuing several lines of action, 

including seeking a strengthened negotiation facilitated by the 

Southern African Development Community, the African Union, and 

the United Nations, preparing for more robust targeted sanctions 

if the regime refuses to negotiate and continues its massive violations of human rights, collaborating with international NGO’s and 

African civil society to ramp up humanitarian assistance to the 

population, and cooperating with international financial institutions, like-minded countries, and African leaders to isolate the 

Mugabe regime and prepare for economic recovery and social rebuilding once Zimbabwe is on a credible path of democratic transition. 

On June 27, the regime of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe conducted an election that by any standard was neither free nor fair. 

In a ruthless and methodical campaign of violence against the opposition, the regime succeeded in creating conditions that forced opVerDate Aug 31 2005 08:27 Jan 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\46166.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
5 

position leader Morgan Tsvangirai to withdraw his candidacy. The 

United States does not and will not accept the legitimacy of any 

process that does not reflect the will of the Zimbabwean people. 

The opposition Movement for Democratic Change, MDC, has explained why a free and fair election was impossible, citing statesponsored violence and threats against MDC supporters and their 

family members, the Mugabe regime’s attempt to circumscribe citizens’ rights to express their views and freely elect their government, the regime’s unlawful arrest and prohibition of MDC rallies 

making it impossible for the opposition to organize and campaign 

and for voters to safely and freely vote their conscience, partisanship of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, and lack of MDC access to the media. In addition, Mugabe’s statements that an MDC 

victory would not be accepted, ZANU–PF’s planned election rigging, and other factors all prevented a credible election. 

Indeed, in order to ensure that Tsvangirai would not win the 

runoff, the regime carried out a massive campaign of murder, harassment, and intimidation to claim victory in the June 27 runoff. 

We know that more than 100 people have been murdered, more 

than 3,000 have sought medical treatment for beatings and torture, 

and more than 30,000 have been driven from their homes because 

of the violence. Many Zimbabweans fled for their lives to neighboring states. At least two MDC Parliamentarians, winners in the 

March 29 elections, are missing and presumed dead. And a third 

MDC Parliamentarian’s whereabouts are unknown. MDC Secretary 

General Tendai Biti was detained and charged with treason. 

Tsvangirai himself was detained four times and forced to seek protection in safe houses and the Dutch embassy. 

The United States has responded with aggressive regional and 

multilateral diplomacy, as well as targeted bilateral sanctions. 

President Bush and Secretary Rice have encouraged African leaders to take responsibility to prevent the further collapse of 

Zimbabwe. 

I attended the recent summit of the African Union 2 weeks ago 

in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, in which 53 African Member States 

participated. The official theme of the summit was water and sanitation, but discussion of Zimbabwe dominated the agenda. Only a 

very few leaders publicly welcomed Mugabe. Little was said about 

Zimbabwe in public sessions, but there was substantial behind-thescenes criticism of Mugabe and much discussion of Zimbabwe. 

The final AU statement on June 30 said that ‘‘the election process fell short of accepted AU standards.’’ The AU summit thus followed the statements of all the African observer missions, the 

Southern African Development Community, the Pan-African Parliament, and the AU observer missions, which all made similar observations that the runoff election was not free, fair, or credible 

and took place in an environment of government-sponsored violence 

and intimidation. Importantly, the African Union resolution expressed its concern about the impact of the crisis in Zimbabwe on 

the stability of the region, highlighting the ‘‘urgent need to prevent 

further worsening of the situation and with a view to avoid spread 

of conflict with the consequential negative impact on the country 

and the subregion.’’ 

6 

Individual African leaders have stood up against Mugabe as well. 

Many have spoken out. These include Prime Minister Raila Odinga 

of Kenya, Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa, also chairman of 

the Southern African Development Community, Botswana President Ian Khama, former South African President Nelson Mandela, 

and Africa National Congress Party head Jacob Zuma. Sierra 

Leone and Liberia cosponsored the U.N. Security Council resolution in Zimbabwe, which regrettably did not pass in the Security 

Council on July 11. 

We commend them for their stance that reflects the views of a 

vast majority of the continent. 

On July 1, the United States circulated in the Security Council 

capitals the text of a draft chapter VII resolution on Zimbabwe that 

would have imposed a comprehensive arms embargo and an annex 

of individuals who would be subject to an asset freeze and a travel 

ban for having ordered, planned, or participated in acts of politically motivated violence. The resolution also called on the U.N. Secretary General to appoint a dedicated special representative for the 

situation in Zimbabwe who would support the negotiation process 

between the regime and the opposition. The U.S. formally introduced the draft resolution in the council on July 3 and held over 

four rounds of discussions on the text. 

Despite receiving nine votes to pass the resolution, it failed due 

to China’s and Russia’s vetoes. Thus, the U.N. Security Council 

missed the opportunity to support the courageous efforts of the 

Zimbabwean people to change their lives peacefully through elections and show the Mugabe regime that the international community means what it says in demanding an immediate end to the violence, reinstatement of humanitarian assistance, and the start of 

serious negotiations with the opposition leading to a solution that 

respects the will of the Zimbabwean people. 

This will not deter us since the U.N. action would have been in 

addition to unilateral financial and travel sanctions already applied 

by the United States against more than 150 Zimbabweans who 

have undermined the country’s democratic institutions and processes. We are adding to our list and will increase our enforcement 

efforts. These targeted measures offer a means of holding officials 

accountable for their actions without inflicting further hardship on 

the general population. 

What are the next steps? First, we will continue to isolate the 

regime until there is a democratic transition. Africans are starting 

to take a more public stance, criticizing Mugabe and the electoral 

process. The United States will continue its own sanctions and encourage others to impose additional sanctions to increase pressure 

on the Mugabe regime. Second, we will support and encourage expanded regional mediation. Finally, we will prepare for the day 

when the will of the Zimbabwean people is respected by supporting 

planning for economic recovery, social reconciliation, and rebuilding. 

As President Bush said to the United Nations, ‘‘In Zimbabwe, ordinary citizens suffer under a tyrannical regime. The government 

has cracked down on peaceful calls for reform and forced millions 

to flee their homeland. The behavior of the Mugabe regime is an 

assault on its people.’’ President Bush reiterated at the G–8 SumVerDate Aug 31 2005 08:27 Jan 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\46166.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
7 

mit that he cares deeply about the people of Zimbabwe and was extremely disappointed in the election which he has labeled a ‘‘sham’’ 

election. 

I will end by emphasizing that Mugabe’s electoral sham has had 

the positive effect of galvanizing the world to act. We have witnessed in the past 3 weeks the United Nations, the G–8, the African Union, the European Union, and SADC all condemning the 

fraud and violence in Zimbabwe. Africans themselves are acting. 

The world has a precious window of opportunity increase the international pressure on this illegitimate government. I ask for your 

support as we look for ways to help keep that pressure on and end 

the nightmare that the proud and inspiring people of Zimbabwe 

have suffered for too long. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Frazer follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JENDAYI FRAZER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF

AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Feingold, Senator Isakson and members of the committee, I am honored to testify before you today on the situation in Zimbabwe and the world’s response. I thank you for your sustained strong support that has been so important 

in bringing this tragedy to the attention of a world that is beginning to join together 

for action. 

Our goals have been consistent to: (1) Push for an end to the violence and to provide humanitarian assistance to the Zimbabwean people, and (2) achieve a democratic transition that is consistent with the will of the people of Zimbabwe as expressed on March 29. Ways to achieve these goals include: (1) An expanded and 

inclusive negotiation facilitated by the Southern African Development Community, 

the African Union, and the United Nations; (2) more robust targeted sanctions regime if the regime refuses to negotiate and continues its massive violations of 

human rights; (3) collaboration with international NGOs and African civil society, 

to ramp up humanitarian assistance to the population; and (4) cooperation with 

international financial institutions, like-minded countries, and African leaders to 

isolate the Mugabe regime and prepare for economic recovery and social rebuilding 

once Zimbabwe has achieved democratic transformation. 

On June 27, the regime of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe conducted an election that 

by any standard was neither free nor fair. In a ruthless and methodical campaign 

of violence against the opposition, the regime succeeded in creating conditions that 

forced opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai to withdraw his candidacy. The United 

States does not and will not accept the legitimacy of any result that does not reflect 

the will of the Zimbabwean people. 

I want to walk through the key events of the last 3 months. The first round of 

voting in Zimbabwe took place on March 29, followed by an extended period of 3 

weeks of calculated delay before results were released by the official electoral commission. When they were finally released, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) 

Presidential candidate Morgan Tsvangirai was credited with over 48 percent of the 

vote compared to Mugabe’s 43 percent (there was a third independent candidate as 

well). Since the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission announced that neither candidate 

secured the required 50-percent-plus-one vote to win the election outright, a runoff 

date was announced. 

On June 22, Tsvangirai withdrew from the runoff election due to the violence that 

had taken place against his party and its supporters that began on March 29. The 

MDC enumerated why a free and fair election was impossible, citing state-sponsored 

violence and threats against MDC supporters family members, the Mugabe regime’s 

attempts to circumscribe citizens’ right to express their views, and change the government, by making it impossible for the opposition to organize and campaign and 

for voters to safely and freely vote their consciences through unlawful arrests and 

prohibition of MDC rallies, partisanship of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, and 

lack of MDC access to the media. In addition, Mugabe’s statements that an MDC 

victory would not be accepted, planned election rigging, and other factors also prevented a credible election. 

8 

Indeed, in order to ensure that Tsvangirai wouldn’t win the runoff, the regime 

carried out a massive campaign of murder, harassment, and intimidation to claim 

‘‘victory’’ in the June 27 runoff. We know that at least 100 people have been murdered; over 3,000 have sought medical treatment for beatings and torture; and over 

30,000 have been driven from their homes. Many Zimbabweans fled for their lives 

to neighboring states. At least two MDC parliamentarians—winners in the March 

29 elections—are missing, perhaps dead. And, a third MDC parliamentarian’s 

whereabouts are unknown. MDC Secretary General Tendai Biti was detained and 

charged with treason. Tsvangirai himself was detained four times and forced to seek 

protection in safe houses and the Dutch Embassy. 

The Government of Zimbabwe continues its reign of terror against Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). On June 26, several hundred IDPs arrived at the South African Embassy in Harare seeking shelter and assistance. On June 27, ‘‘election day,’’ 

following a reported arrangement between some international agencies and 

Zimbabwean authorities, the IDPs were relocated to a facility run by the Ministry 

of Labor and Social Welfare outside Harare. On July 3, over 300 displaced MDC 

supporters arrived at U.S. Embassy Harare seeking shelter, food, medical care, and 

supplies. Mission staff, through considerable effort and despite the harassing presence of government security officers, were able to provide initial help. With only a 

limited Zimbabwean Government response and civil society and Western and international organizations trying to fill the void with inadequate resources, the situation 

with the IDPs continues to be bad. 

ECONOMY

It wasn’t so long ago that Zimbabwe was a model in Africa for democracy and 

prosperity. This is a country that maintained steady economic growth, was building 

a middle class, and was educating its entire population to Africa’s highest levels of 

literacy. It is a country that was succeeding and now is in the process of disintegrating. 

The economic figures are staggering. Over 80 percent of the country is unemployed. Inflation is the highest in the world by far. The Zimbabwean Government’s 

own Central Statistical Office’s most recent inflation estimate was 164,000 percent 

for February. There’s an indication that the June rate may have reached 9,000,000 

percent—unimaginable numbers. This spring, the IMF forecast a 2008 annual 

growth rate of negative 4.5 percent. After close to 8 years of severe economic decline, 

a quarter of the population has left the country to seek better opportunities elsewhere, mostly in South Africa. The U.N. Development Index shows that Zimbabwe’s 

statistics are worse today than in 1975, at the height of the country’s war for independence. 

While the current violence has uprooted thousands and turned them into IDPs, 

this pattern of displacement is not new. In 2005, the government has also purposely 

destroyed an entire community near Harare. Operation Murambatsvina (Drive out 

the Trash), another brutally executed well-planned and executed security scheme, 

wiped out thousands of homes and made 700,000 homeless in one fell swoop. An 

additional 700,000 workers once employed and living on commercial farms no longer 

have either jobs or homes. 

A year ago, the government tried in its peculiar way to vanquish hyperinflation 

by command. It ordered all stores to freeze prices immediately. It came as no surprise that the shelves were emptied quickly and many businesses were forced to 

close or go bankrupt. And it resorted to printing bills for reserves it didn’t possess. 

Simply put, Zimbabwe has been and is collapsing. What is unusual, however, 

about the Zimbabwean case, is that there is no outside factor that has caused it— 

no natural disaster, no war, no international economic or financial phenomenon that 

we can often point to elsewhere in the world. Zimbabwe’s collapse is entirely selfinflicted by the government’s misrule over the course of many years. 

HOW ZIMBABWE GOT TO WHERE IT IS

How did Zimbabwe get to this point? Mugabe’s economic policies in the 1980s 

were auspicious, reflecting an understanding that markets and trade-based growth 

were the country’s foundation. A far-sighted education policy of promoting mass literacy and schooling through high school began to bear fruit. A new generation of 

Zimbabweans came into the marketplace literate, politically aware, and technologically savvy. They enjoyed a multitude of information sources, the Internet, domestic radio, international radio beamed by satellite and aired on FM, domestic and 

international television, and a healthy independent press. 

Early on, however, Mugabe gave the world a glimpse of his capacity for ruthlessness against his own people. Mugabe’s base has always been among the majority 

9 

Shona-speakers. His rival for liberation leadership, Joshua Nkomo, drew his support 

from the minority Ndbele speakers, centered in the country’s southwest. Determined 

not to brook any serious opposition, the government’s security forces planned and, 

working with North Korean advisors, executed a calculated campaign against the 

Ndbele, killing as many as 20,000. 

By the 1990s, ZANU–PF was evolving from a people’s liberation movement into 

an entrenched and corrupt elite. The turning point came in 2000, when the government lost a referendum on a constitutional revision that would have substantially 

expanded the Presidential authority. By all accounts, the rejection took the government and ZANU–PF by complete surprise, so isolated had they become from ordinary Zimbabweans. 

The new generation of well-educated Zimbabweans promoted by Mugabe’s education policies was sophisticated, well-informed, and hungry for new political leadership. They joined hands with labor, churches, and civil society organizations to 

create the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The MDC’s initial success 

prompted the government to respond forcefully to hold on to power. 

ZANU–PF answered the MDC challenge with every weapon characteristic of a police state. It passed new laws limiting political activity and restricting the media. 

There was an organized campaign of intimidation and violence against opposition 

leaders and supporters. So-called ‘‘war veterans’’ led invasions of commercial agricultural lands, occupations that would within a few years destroy most of the country’s 4,000 highly productive farms that had been the backbone of the nation’s economy and had fed the entire region of southern Africa. 

These brutal tactics succeeded in maintaining ZANU–PF in power. ZANU–PF won 

parliamentary elections by a small margin in late 2000. In 2002, Mugabe would 

claim a highly disputed victory. But the political victories came at a huge price as 

the economy went into a tailspin where it has stayed ever since. The government’s 

inability to reverse the economic disaster has been its undoing and to this date, it 

has shown no sign of taking serious, realistic measures to halt a decline into chaos. 

GOVERNMENT EXCUSES

When faced with criticism at home or abroad, the Mugabe regime has a long habit 

of generating excuses. After the land seizure in 2000, officials rejected claims of a 

steep decline in food production, then later accepted them but blamed it on drought 

conditions. There actually was a drought, so the partial truth made the excuse more 

plausible. 

The government also has blamed foreign conspiracies for the faltering economy. 

Targets have included the British Government, the International Monetary Fund 

(IMF), and an alleged plot to bring down the regime. Sanctions imposed by the U.S. 

and U.K. governments, although carefully targeted to affect only the regime’s elite, 

have provided fodder for the foreign conspiracy mindset, and been sold to the people 

as evidence that the West is trying to bring down the regime by wrecking the economy. All of these excuses indicate an isolated regime cut off not only from most of 

the world, but from the reality of the conditions affecting its own people as well as 

Zimbabweans’ expressed desire for change. 

CURRENT U.S. RESPONSE

The United States has responded with aggressive regional and multilateral diplomacy as well as targeted bilateral sanctions. President Bush and Secretary Rice 

have encouraged African leaders to take responsibility to develop African solutions 

to the collapse of Zimbabwe. I attended the summit of the African Union 2 weeks 

ago in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, in which 53 African Member States participated. 

The official theme of the summit was water and sanitation, but discussion of 

Zimbabwe dominated the agenda. Only a very few leaders publicly welcomed 

Mugabe. Little was said about Zimbabwe in public, but there was substantial behind-the-scenes discussion. 

The final AU statement on June 30 said that ‘‘the election process fell short of 

accepted AU standards.’’ The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) made a similar observation in its interim statement the same day, saying that the elections were not free, 

fair, or credible. Importantly, the African Union resolution expressed its concern 

about the impact of the crisis in Zimbabwe on the stability of the region, highlighting the ‘‘urgent need to prevent further worsening of the situation and with a 

view to avoid spread of conflict with the consequential negative impact on the country and the subregion.’’ 

Individual African leaders have spoken out as well. Prime Minister Raila Odinga 

of Kenya has urged the AU to suspend Mugabe and send peacekeeping forces to 

Zimbabwe. Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa, chairman of the SADC, has called 

10 

the situation in Zimbabwe an embarrassment to southern Africa and said ‘‘it is 

scandalous for the SADC to remain silent.’’ 

Former South African President Nelson Mandela called the situation ‘‘a tragic 

failure of leadership.’’ And ANC party head Zuma said after the extended delay in 

announcing the March 29 results: ‘‘It’s not acceptable. It’s not helping the 

Zimbabwean people who have gone out to . . . elect the kind of party and Presidential candidate they want, exercising their constitutional right.’’ 

On June 23, the Security Council unanimously adopted a Presidential Statement 

(PRST) that condemned the preelection violence that made it impossible for free and 

fair elections to take place. The statement also expressed the Council’s concern over 

the impact of the situation in Zimbabwe on the wider region. It called on the 

Zimbabwean Government to cooperate in regional mediation efforts that would 

allow a government to be formed and to permit humanitarian organizations to resume their services. 

On June 27, after U.N. Security Council consultations on Zimbabwe, members of 

the Council authorized Ambassador to the U.S. Mission Khalilzad, in his capacity 

as President of the Security Council, to make a statement to the press reaffirming 

the Council’s June 23 statement and its intention to come back to the issue in the 

coming days. 

On July 1, the United States circulated in U.N. Security Council capitals the text 

of a draft chapter VII resolution on Zimbabwe that would impose a comprehensive 

arms embargo and an annex of 12 individuals who would be subject to an asset 

freeze and a travel ban and asset freeze on those designated as having ordered, 

planned, or participated in acts of politically motivated violence. The resolution had 

an Annex of 14 individuals who would be designated upon adoption of the resolution, with Robert Mugabe at the top of the list. The resolution also called on the 

U.N. Secretary General to appoint a dedicated Special Representative for the situation in Zimbabwe, who would support the negotiation process between the regime 

and the opposition. The U.S. formally introduced the draft resolution in the Council 

on July 3 and held over four rounds of discussions on the text. 

Despite receiving nine votes to pass the resolution, it failed due to China’s and 

Russia’s vetoes. Thus, the U.N. Security Council missed the opportunity to support 

the courageous efforts of the Zimbabwean people to change their lives peacefully 

through elections and show the Mugabe regime that the international community 

means what it says in demanding an immediate end to the violence, reinstatement 

of humanitarian assistance, and the start of serious negotiations with the opposition 

leading to a solution that respects the will of the Zimbabwean. This will not deter 

us, since the U.N. action would have been in addition to unilateral financial and 

travel sanctions applied by the U.S. against more than 150 Zimbabweans who have 

undermined the country’s democratic institutions and processes and entities they 

control. These targeted measures offer a means of holding officials accountable for 

their actions without inflicting further hardship to the general population. 

NEXT STEPS

What are the next steps?: (1) We will continue to isolate the regime until there 

is a democratic transition; Africans are starting to take a more public stance, criticizing Mugabe and the electoral process; the United States will continue its own 

sanctions and encourage others, especially the European Union, to impose additional sanctions to increase pressure on the Mugabe regime; (3) we will support and 

encourage regional mediation. Finally, we will prepare for the day when the will of 

the Zimbabwean people is respected by supporting planning for economic recovery, 

social reconciliation, and rebuilding. 

As President Bush said to the United Nations, ‘‘In Zimbabwe, ordinary citizens 

suffer under a tyrannical regime. The government has cracked down on peaceful 

calls for reform and forced millions to fell their homeland. The behavior of the 

Mugabe regime is an assault on its people.’’ President Bush reiterated at the G– 

8 summit that he cares deeply about the people of Zimbabwe and was extremely 

disappointed in the elections which he has labeled as ‘‘a sham.’’ 

I will end by emphasizing that Mugabe’s electoral sham has had the positive 

effect of galvanizing the world to act. We have witnessed in the past 3 weeks the 

United Nations, G–8, African Union, European Union, and SADC all condemning 

the fraud and violence in Zimbabwe. Africans themselves are acting. The world has 

a precious window of opportunity to increase the international pressure on this illegitimate regime. I ask for your support as we look for ways to keep that pressure 

on, and end the nightmare that the proud and inspiring people of Zimbabwe have 

suffered for too long. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Assistant Secretary Frazer. 

11 

Ms. Almquist. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KATHERINE J. ALMQUIST, ASSISTANT 

ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR 

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. ALMQUIST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Isakson, 

and members of the committee for the opportunity to testify today 

on the grave situation in Zimbabwe. I have submitted a longer 

written statement that I would request be added to the record. 

Zimbabwe has reached a tipping point as the Mugabe regime is 

faced with the daunting multifaceted socioeconomic and political 

crisis. USAID is strengthening democratic forces and institutions, 

contributing to heightening pressure on the Mugabe regime, and 

providing humanitarian assistance to those made vulnerable by a 

decade of government mismanagement and abuse. 

USAID engagement is more important than ever as the nation 

sits on a knife’s edge following the conclusive March 29 harmonized 

elections, the post-election violence, and the widely discredited elections that illegitimately left Mugabe holding power. Deep fissures 

in ZANU–PF, increasing pressure from regional and international 

governments, and strengthening civil society institutions will hopefully lead to a transitional government for a populace hungry for 

a more accountable and responsible government and a return to 

prosperity. 

The socioeconomic and political environment has significantly deteriorated in the past several months. The food security outlook, 

exacerbated by heavy rains and gross economic mismanagement, is 

dismal. One-third of the population required food aid this past 

year, and the need is likely to increase in August and through the 

next hunger season. 

The political environment remains highly restrictive and polarized. ZANU–PF’s campaign of intimidation and violence has led to 

a growing number of displaced persons. In the past, the regime targeted key activists and opposition leaders, but it is now unleashing 

violence on anyone suspected to be an MDC supporter as well. 

At the same time, a politically controlled security and justice system is conducting unlawful and arbitrary arrests and indiscriminately applying the law. Freedom of speech, movement, and assembly are severely curtailed. 

Blatant disregard for economic tenets have resulted in an inflation rate of now over 10 million percent as of July 2008, a rapidly 

shrinking GDP, expected to decline by 7 percent this year, and 

basic commodity shortages. 

Out-migration of skilled professionals continues unabated, 

hollowing out education and health care systems and capacity of 

the government, the private sector, and NGO’s to provide essential 

services. Drugs and health care commodities are in short supply 

and basic services are either unaffordable or unavailable. 

USAID assistance is pivotal to restore good governance and economic prosperity and to provide for the needs of those most adversely affected by the crisis. USAID programs support prodemocracy forces, including the democratic opposition, to pressure the regime for change and to enhance democratic entities’ ability to participate effectively in the transition process and future governance. 

12 

Restoration of rule of law and democratic freedoms remain core 

program elements. Food and nonfood humanitarian assistance, including livelihood support and water, sanitation, and hygiene interventions, help meet the critical needs of the most vulnerable. 

In addition, the USAID program provides for the immediate 

needs of those displaced or injured by political violence. HIV/AIDS 

prevention, care and treatment initiatives, inclusive of family planning and TB and coinfection interventions, are also critical elements of the USAID program to address an HIV prevalence rate 

of 16 percent and the needs of approximately 1.3 million orphans 

and vulnerable children. 

In the event of political change, USAID would adjust its program 

focus to rebuild tattered democratic institutions, restore rule of law 

and good governance, and build national consensus. The USAID 

program would also undertake economic stabilization support as a 

complement to the work of the international financial institutions 

and increase private sector and agricultural productivity. 

The social sector program would expand to better address the 

devastating effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and to more ably respond to health care system weaknesses and to malaria and maternal and child health needs. 

USAID would continue to be the principal provider of humanitarian assistance to help meet the food and nonfood needs of those 

hardest hit by the economic stabilization programs. 

To prepare to respond more fully, quickly, and collaboratively, 

USAID is participating in the World Bank’s Multi-Donor Trust 

Fund to conduct sector-specific baseline analyses and to develop 

and create public debate on policy options and recommendations for 

a transition period. 

I would be happy to take additional questions that you have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Almquist follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. KATHERINE ALMQUIST, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, 

BUREAU FOR AFRICA, USAID, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify 

today about USAID’s support for U.S. foreign policy goals in Zimbabwe. We appreciate the strong bipartisan support in Congress for improving the lives of people in 

this deeply troubled country. 

Since Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, USAID has partnered with the people of 

Zimbabwe to overcome many obstacles on the path to democracy and prosperity. 

Our commitment to this goal remains strong. Today, our programs provide critical 

support for the people of Zimbabwe as they pursue peaceful democratic change. 

USAID programs also provide crucial legal, medical, health, food and other humanitarian assistance to the millions of innocent victims of the regime’s violence and 

mismanagement. 

Despite the current severe crisis facing the people and friends of Zimbabwe, we 

remain optimistic about the country’s long-term potential and its prospects for positive change. When genuine reform does occur, our mission and partners stand ready 

to work with this committee to assist the new government and people in facilitating 

the country’s successful transformation to its former status as a constructive and 

prosperous member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), 

Africa and the greater international community. 

CURRENT SITUATION

Many difficult challenges confront Zimbabwe. The country faces what experts call 

the worst harvest in decades due primarily to government mismanagement. As a 

result, the survival of an estimated 5 million people—more than a third of Zimbabwe’s population—will depend on imported food aid this year. At present, the next 

13 

year looks equally bleak as agricultural inputs are scarce and farmers have little 

incentive to cultivate their land. 

State-sponsored violence and torture continue as ruling party militants systematically oppress the opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), 

and anyone else who does not comply with the autocratic demands of the Mugabe 

regime. According to human rights monitors, more than 100 MDC activists have 

been killed and thousands more have been seriously injured since the March 29 

elections. Emergency care for many of these victims is provided by brave doctors 

and nurses who are often beaten themselves for performing this critical medical 

work. 

The violence has forced tens of thousands of Zimbabweans to flee their homes and 

villages. Most of these internally displaced persons (IDPs) have found temporary 

shelter with relatives and friends. Some IDPs have sought refuge in so-called ‘‘safe 

areas,’’ supposedly protected by negotiated security arrangements with government 

and United Nations (U.N.) agencies. However, state-sponsored militias are now attacking even these ‘‘safe havens,’’ sending victims running for their lives once again. 

With no one to turn to and no place to go, many Zimbabweans are opting to join 

the millions of their countrymen who have fled to an uncertain fate in neighboring 

lands. 

Compounding the humanitarian crisis, the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) suspended the operations of humanitarian NGOs in early June. Rigidly enforced by 

local government authorities, military and militias, this suspension means that 

NGO staff cannot even leave offices to assess the conditions and needs in most parts 

of the country. Actual aid provision is increasingly difficult. Even churches and 

faith-based organizations are afraid to provide aid and sanctuary to IDPs because 

of intimidation and fear of violent reprisals. 

In short, Mugabe’s regime has unleashed organized brutality on an enormous 

scale, and largely prevented humanitarian aid from reaching the bloodied, hungry, 

terrorized, and displaced people of the country. 

USAID PROGRAM RESPONSES

USAID has aggressively responded to the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe 

through both humanitarian assistance as well as our ongoing democracy and governance initiatives. 

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

USAID’s Food for Peace program provided 175,000 metric tons of food worth $171 

million to millions of the country’s most vulnerable people in the past year. About 

half of this food was distributed through a consortium of NGOs known as C–SAFE, 

consisting of World Vision, CARE, and Catholic Relief Services. The other half was 

distributed by the U.N. World Food Program. Over half of all the food distributed 

by the U.N. World Food Program was given by USAID. In total, the U.S. Government contributed 72 percent of all food assistance given to Zimbabwe last year. About $115 million for food aid is already in the funding pipeline for this next 

hungry season. More is on the way, but we need GOZ assurances that our partners 

will have access to freely distribute this food to the most vulnerable communities. 

Since the beginning of Zimbabwe’s deterioration in the year 2000, the U.S. has provided this country well over 1 million metric tons of food assistance. 

USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance has also provided $5.9 million in 

FY08 through several partner organizations including Mercy Corps, World Vision, 

OXFAM, FAO, OCHA, and IOM for nonfood relief items such as blankets, feeding 

utensils, personal hygiene supplies, water and sanitation improvements, emergency 

medical supplies, logistics support, and protection and coordination mechanisms. We 

are prepared to rapidly respond with more assistance if the situation deteriorates 

further. 

As part of its ongoing humanitarian effort, USAID also implements a $26 million, 

HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and treatment program to help Zimbabwe fight one of 

the most severe HIV and AIDS epidemics in the world. Even as the general health 

of the population declines progress is being made, as HIV prevalence has declined 

from 24 percent in 2001 to 15.6 percent in 2007. Implemented through a variety of 

partner organizations, USAID’s program elements include: 

• Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission; 

• Behavior Change Promotion; 

• Antiretroviral Therapy (ART) Services; 

• Commodity Logistics and Drug Procurement; 

• Testing and Counseling; 

• Palliative Care; 

14 

• Orphans and Other Vulnerable Children. 

USAID efforts confront not only a huge disease burden, but also a badly deteriorated public health system. Thus, our programs are designed with intentional spillover effects to shore up overall systems within the public health sector, while we 

address specific HIV/AIDS-related needs. 

Our NGO partners are the real heroes in the humanitarian sphere, as they struggle to maintain critical, life-saving assistance in spite of severe constraints. We want 

to express our deep appreciation and admiration for their excellent, unstinting 

efforts in meeting the critical needs of Zimbabweans, often at great risk of personal 

peril. 

The restrictions on aid agency operations are prohibiting us from responding in 

typical ways. Without permission to access displaced and vulnerable populations, 

the humanitarian organizations are handicapped. To create the ‘‘humanitarian 

space’’ necessary for aid operations, we are working with other donors to encourage 

the U.N. to strengthen its efforts to press the Government of Zimbabwe to put a 

stop to the violence and open up humanitarian access. We are hopeful that these 

U.N. interventions—on behalf of the donor and humanitarian community—will soon 

bear fruit. 

DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE INITIATIVES

The U.S. Government seeks the restoration of truly representative democracy and 

responsible governance for Zimbabwe. To that end, USAID programs have focused 

on restoring the rule of law, protecting human rights, fostering good governance, enhancing citizen participation and consensus-building, expanding media communication, strengthening civil society and democratic institutions, promoting transparent 

elections and supporting citizen oversight of the electoral process. 

USAID partners and programs provide technical assistance and other support to 

boost the capacity of nongovernmental actors and citizens to more actively participate in the debate on the future direction of the country. Within an extremely restrictive environment, these civil society actors are working to shape and strengthen 

democratic institutions in an effort to make them more responsive and accountable 

to Zimbabwean society. 

Although sometimes overshadowed by the country’s continuing turmoil, USAID 

programs have made significant gains with civil society and the forces of democracy 

within Zimbabwe. In the historic March 29, 2008, poll—the first ever defeat for 

Mugabe and his ruling ZANU–PF—prodemocracy groups mobilized millions of 

Zimbabweans to ‘‘get out the vote,’’ leading to a remarkable expression of the 

people’s choice under the difficult conditions prevailing at that time in the country. 

The ruling party was not able to rig the elections outright in part due to a USAIDfunded ‘‘parallel vote tabulation’’ (PVT) that released results of sample-based counting in a rapid and transparent manner. Despite the difficult country conditions, this 

initiative was one of the most successful such undertakings of this PVT technology 

practiced anywhere to date. 

Legal and medical support to victims of state oppression, made possible largely 

through USAID assistance, have encouraged activists to continue pressing for democratic change. In addition, USAID supports programs that document human rights 

abuses, torture, and other crimes for future accountability and reconciliation. 

Initiatives to inform and mobilize regional and international media and civil society groups have resulted in increasing condemnation and isolation of the discredited 

Mugabe regime. This pressure has garnered increased room for engagement with 

SADC and the African Union, and increased prospects for a negotiated solution to 

the crisis. These gains need to be protected and advanced with continued USG 

support. 

USAID’S CONTINGENCY PLANNING

USAID stands ready with other donors to provide substantive development assistance to Zimbabwe once conditions permit. Such assistance would be premised on a 

new government which respects and demonstrates clear progress on the following 

common donor principles: 

• Full and equal access to humanitarian assistance; 

• Commitment to macroeconomic stabilization in accordance with guidance from 

relevant international agencies; 

• Restoration of the rule of law, including enforcement of contracts, an independent judiciary, and respect for property rights; 

• Commitment to the democratic process and respect for internationally accepted 

human rights standards, including a commitment to freedom of expression, freeVerDate Aug 31 2005 08:27 Jan 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\46166.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
15 

dom of print and broadcast media, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association; 

• A commitment to timely elections held in accordance with international standards, and in the presence of international election observers. 

With the support of Congress, upon the return of democracy, we will seek to invest in Zimbabwe so that it can begin its process of stabilization and recovery. Our 

staff and partners are ready to engage with a new, reform-minded government and 

other donors to build a comprehensive reconstruction program. A Multi-Donor Trust 

Fund, administered by the World Bank, is already completing analyses on various 

social and economic sectors to give us a collective, coordinated roadmap for reconstruction to discuss with a new democratic government. 

However, if the violence does not stop, if aid organizations are not allowed to 

resume life-saving assistance, if widespread fighting escalates and forces mass population displacement, then the international community will be faced with a humanitarian disaster on a much larger scale than the serious situation which we already 

face. 

With our partners and donors, USAID is simultaneously working to both prevent 

a worst case scenario while responding to immediate needs. We do not know which 

turn Zimbabwe will take in its tumultuous journey, but USAID stands ready to support the people of Zimbabwe in realizing their rightful aspirations for liberation 

from the current brutal and despotic regime and in the transition to a new, more 

just and prosperous society. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I welcome any questions that you 

and other members of the committee may have. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Ms. Almquist. 

We will begin with a 7-minute round, and for all the Senators 

here, if and when the vote starts, I will just briefly recess the committee until I run over and vote and come back. 

Assistant Secretary Frazer, with the unfortunate veto by Russia 

and China of the U.N. Security Council resolution, how do you intend to generate support for an international arms embargo and 

multilateral sanctions against those responsible for these recent 

abuses? And what is the strategy moving forward to secure greater 

international pressure on Robert Mugabe, the individuals who are 

listed in the U.N. resolution, and more broadly, the relevant 

ZANU–PF? 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. Thank you, Senator. 

Right now we are focused on the regional effort. We will continue 

to work very closely with the European Union on increasing our 

sanctions. We are looking at additional new sanctions, both in 

terms of on individuals and also on government entities as well, so 

moving beyond the targeted sanctions. We are working with European countries to do the same. 

We are working with like-minded countries within Africa to increase their engagement with their subregional bodies, as well as 

with the African Union, to try to bring that additional pressure. 

We will have to work at the Foreign Minister and head of state 

level in Asia. Right now we do not see a lot of interest on the part 

of China and, of course, Russia, but in general, in Asia or in the 

Middle East to have true international sanctions, but we think that 

the Zimbabwe Government has been oriented more toward the European Union economies. And so we—Africa, the United States, 

and Europe—can probably bring greater pressure. 

Senator FEINGOLD. And then can you say more specifically about 

your particular efforts to engage African governments and secure 

their support? I mean, this is an area where there are some positive things, certainly the Zambian approach, Botswana approach, 

others. I understand the Angolan approach is more moderate and 

16 

helpful than it used to be. And then there would be other obvious 

relevant countries. But I fear that a perceived divide again between 

the West and regional leaders could undermine a coordinated response. So could you say a little bit more about that? 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. Yes. I do believe that there has been 

a bit of sea change in the attitudes of African governments, especially in the southern Africa region, where there are many more 

countries in SADC who are openly criticizing President Mugabe. 

And that is critically important to bring the necessary pressure. 

But across Africa, you have many countries, especially those like 

Sierra Leone and Liberia that have themselves gone through turmoil and civil war, publicly calling for the Mugabe Government to 

stop the violence and have a credible electoral process to prevent 

a decline into civil war. And even Nigeria, which had its own 

flawed election, is saying that they are trying to take responsibility 

for that flawed election through their legal process. 

So I do think that there have been significant voices, and it matters for our policy because without the support, especially of the 

subregion, but of Africa as a whole, it is very difficult to mount the 

necessary pressure for a democratic transition in Zimbabwe. 

Senator FEINGOLD. And I appreciate your reference to the sea 

change, which is largely in words, but it also has to be reflected, 

obviously, in actions. What actions do you think you can expect 

from these countries? 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. Well, the immediate issue are the 

transparency and the credibility of the negotiation process. I think 

we have all heard from the MDC that they would like that mediation to be broadened to include not only SADC, as led by President Mbeke, but also to have an African Union envoy included in 

the mediation. So I think that that is critically important. 

There is expected to be a SADC extraordinary session on Thursday of this week. We will be watching with interest to see what decisions are taken out of that SADC session. But I believe that the 

mediation process is probably the focal point at this point. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I understand that so-called talks about talks, 

as they are called, between ZANU–PF and the opposition, MDC, resumed in Pretoria last week and will continue in Harare tomorrow. 

What role is the United States playing and what role will we be 

playing in these talks in the weeks ahead? What specific contributions can we make to the ongoing mediation efforts? 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. Well, we certainly should play a role 

and can be very constructive. We are playing a role on the outside 

of the talks in the sense that, as I mentioned, we have been pushing for greater transparency. We are clearly in touch with the 

MDC. We are also in touch with the Foreign Ministers and regional 

leaders of SADC and the African Union. We have not been party 

to, or seen, any of the negotiating documents, which is actually 

quite rare in Africa in conflict mediation. Normally we would be 

more informed of the specifics of what is taking place. 

So we have only heard from one side that in fact they are just 

talking about the conditions for holding talks. But we see in the 

South African media often the impression that there are more substantive discussions taking place, but we cannot confirm that. We 

certainly hope for greater transparency and for more engagement 

17 

of the international community in general, but most certainly of 

the United States. 

Senator FEINGOLD. What are the options for broadening the current mediation to include SADC, AU, and/or U.N. representation? 

And talk about the prospects for each of those institutions to become more involved, what role they can best play in a coordinated 

mediation effort. 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. Well, the African Union in its resolution took a decision that the mediation should be strengthened, 

but they asked SADC to go back and look at how they can 

strengthen it. So the meeting that is planned for Thursday will be 

critical. 

My expectation is it depends on the time line. If the South Africans are truly brokering a real agreement, i.e., substantive talks, 

which I do not believe is happening, but if that is happening, then 

there will not be an opportunity for really strengthening that mediation process. 

But I think the feeling of everyone at the African Union, or as 

reflected in their resolution, is certainly the feeling of the G–8 

when they also called for a strengthened mediation, and of the Security Council when it took its formal statement on Zimbabwe. And 

that is the need for a more permanent presence who can negotiate 

some type of transitional government or coalition government. For 

example, there might be a secretariat much like Kofi Annan’s mediation in Zimbabwe where there is a dedicated person who stays 

in Harare and works with the parties through the negotiation. I 

think that that is the idea of both a strengthened and expanded 

mediation. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank you very much. 

Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Frazer, you were at the Sharm el-Sheikh meetings a couple 

of weeks ago? 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. Yes. 

Senator ISAKSON. In your printed testimony, you say that although it was about water and sanitation, the most topic of conversation was Mugabe. Was Mugabe there? 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. Yes; he was. 

Senator ISAKSON. So these were backroom conversations, not—— 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. In the hall, back room, in their formal but closed door sessions, Zimbabwe featured very prominently, 

as well as in many of the bilateral meetings which were taking 

place. 

Senator ISAKSON. What was the consensus of the comments? 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. Well, I think that the general consensus was that the June 27 election could not be considered credible, that it took place in an environment of intimidation and violence, that there is a crisis in Zimbabwe of a constitutional nature, 

and that there needed to be some type of negotiated outcome. The 

formal statement of the AU called for a government of national 

unity. People called it a government of national unity, a coalition 

government, a transitional government. So they did not define 

what the nature of that government would look like. 

18 

But clearly, there was no one who accepted the legitimacy that 

Robert Mugabe won the runoff election. There was no congratulation. There was no acknowledgement. There was rejection of his 

claim to having been a victor on June 27. 

Senator ISAKSON. Actually the MDC candidate actually withdrew 

before the runoff. Is that not correct? 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. That is right. 

Senator ISAKSON. And that was because of the fear and the violence and intimidation. 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. That is right. The violence against 

his supporters, the dismantlement of his election machinery. 

Senator ISAKSON. They have a parliamentary form of government? 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. Yes. 

Senator ISAKSON. What percent of the Parliamentarians are 

MDC? 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. The MDC now enjoys a majority of 

the members of Parliament after the March 29 election. 

Senator ISAKSON. I notice Prime Minister Odinga of Kenya spoke 

out publicly. Has Mugabe’s intimidation gone beyond his borders? 

Has there been any retribution against any of the leaders that 

have spoken out outside of Zimbabwe? 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. There was a bit of a diplomatic fray 

between Zimbabwe and Botswana in particular, but Mugabe made 

statements that were considered hostile to the neighboring countries who spoke out against him at the AU summit—Zambia, Botswana, and others. And so there is greater tension in the region, 

especially among the heads of state. 

Senator ISAKSON. Given the action of China and Russia in the 

Security Council, is it fair to say they are enablers of Mugabe? 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. Most certainly they enabled 

Mugabe. By preventing us from putting an arms embargo on the 

government when the government is using violence against the 

population and when civil society across southern Africa rejected 

the shipment of Chinese arms, you would have thought that they 

would have learned a lesson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Given that and given what has happened with 

the Chinese vis-a-vis Darfur, how do they talk about China in 

these conversations when you are at these meetings? 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. It is very mixed because many of 

them enjoy the loans that the Chinese are providing. They are 

seeking greater investment from China. 

On the other hand, I think that many believe that they are enabling authoritarian governments. Certainly African civil society has 

expressed continuing concern about China’s role. 

I think that it is fair to say that China is finding its way in Africa, and I would, if I were advising, caution them that they should 

be on the side of the people of Africa. Obviously, supporting governments is important and necessary in their diplomatic relations, but 

they need to look at the Zimbabwean Government as one in which 

the people have largely rejected that leadership. A new day is coming in Zimbabwe, and China would want to be on the right side of 

the forces of democratic change. 

Senator ISAKSON. What is Russia’s interest? Is it economic? 

19 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. Well, I would certainly say that for 

those who opposed the U.N. Security Council resolution, that we 

should follow the money. I would certainly say that. 

Senator ISAKSON. That usually works. 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. But I am not sure of Russia because 

at the G–8 summit, the Russian President indicated his willingness 

to support further tougher measures against Zimbabwe, and then 

for Russia to veto the UNSC resolution, it was a bit of a whiplash 

for us. It is hard to explain. 

Senator ISAKSON. Ms. Almquist, did I hear you correctly that the 

infection rate is 16 percent of citizens with AIDS? 

Ms. ALMQUIST. There is a 16-percent prevalence rate, yes. 

Senator ISAKSON. We are obviously talking about PEPFAR on the 

floor of the Senate today and the African AIDS program. Has our 

program been able to reach into Zimbabwe? 

Ms. ALMQUIST. Oh, very much so. We have about an $18–$20 

million PEPFAR program there providing some level of care for 

HIV-infected and AIDS population. And we are able to see some 

success with that. 

It is a difficult environment to work in because of the general situation in the country and because we have to work with the Ministry of Health in order to carry out our PEPFAR programs. We 

work through partner organizations and we coordinate with the 

Ministry of Health. We think that there is much more that we can 

do, particularly if we succeed in getting a transition to a more reform-minded government, and we would hope very much to be able 

to scale up our assistance on HIV/AIDS in that case. 

Senator ISAKSON. So the overall governmental situation may be 

somewhat of an inhibitor, but is Mugabe directly an inhibitor of the 

AIDS assistance? 

Ms. ALMQUIST. In fact, the government suspended NGO activity, 

you may have heard, on June 4, and then subsequently clarified 

that they would permit NGO’s to provide assistance for school feeding and for HIV clinics. And so we have an indication of support 

from Mugabe’s government for those activities to go forward. Unfortunately, our partners have not felt that those instructions were 

communicated down through all the systems of government and 

that the space has not been there up till now to actually resume 

those activities. 

We think that in the coming week or 2, some of our partners will 

begin trying to resume HIV-related feeding programs and school 

feeding programs and some of the activities in that regard. So it 

will be tested very quickly here to see if, in fact, there is space even 

now for those programs to go forward. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you both. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. 

We generally go on the basis of seniority on the subcommittee, 

but if you want to defer to Senator Kerry, it is fine with me. 

Senator BILL NELSON. I will defer to you and ask you to do the 

same for me in future. [Laughter.] 

20 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

Senator KERRY. I will try to minimize those opportunities. 

Thank you, and Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for convening this hearing. I would also like to thank our witness for coming here today. 

Madam Secretary Frazer, it is great to see you again. I saw you 

in Sharm el-Sheikh and we had a good dinner and an opportunity 

to talk about all of these issues. I appreciate your efforts that you 

were making there. I know you were working hard to move toward 

a positive resolution with respect to Zimbabwe. 

But I have to tell you, first of all, and share with my colleagues 

how disturbing it was to have Robert Mugabe at that conference. 

And then to watch some of the continent’s leaders, including the 

host I might add regrettably, turn a kind of blind eye to 

Zimbabwe’s agony except for the discussions that you described. 

And was there a lot of consternation? Yes. Was there a lot of backroom chatter? Yes. But when it came time to have the African 

Union respond, as I think and you think and many of us believe 

it should have responded, it did not. And that is the measure. That 

is the bottom-line test here. 

I could not help but feel, as I thought about what is happening 

on the continent there and in other places, that there is a sense 

that the world has lost its capacity for appropriate outrage. Darfur 

and Zimbabwe are two of many widespread violations of the norms 

of decency across the globe. And the words are beginning to fall 

flat, big-time flat. And the actions are just not there. 

For months now, Mugabe’s thugs have been savaging opposition 

politicians and members of the opposition party and anyone else 

who dared to dream of a peaceful end to this reign of terror. 

I was in South Africa last November and I was particularly surprised to hear the bitter comments from people in South Africa 

about their own President’s inaction with respect to Zimbabwe and 

Mugabe. 

During the last months, Zimbabwean villagers were literally 

handed bullets and told to choose between their lives and democracy. And in the process while the balloting was occuring, MDC believes that 113 of its supporters were killed, about 10,000 were injured, more than 2,000 unlawfully detained and over 200,000 fled 

their homes. And frankly, the details are much more horrifying 

than those statistics convey because, as we know, women were 

burned to death. Young men were tortured and dismembered. The 

elderly were savagely beaten, and Mugabe had the audacity to say 

to the world, ‘‘what do I care about an election? An ‘X’ on a ballot 

means nothing against the power of a gun.’’ 

And against all of this, where are we? Where is the world? I 

mean, where are we? China and Russia get to veto this and sort 

of walk away, and there is no outrage and indignity even at the 

U.N. I guess all of us would hope that Morgan Tsvangirai’s bold 

move to step back and not continue his candidacy in order to save 

lives would have mobilized the continent and the world. But it did 

not. 

And indeed, a day and a half after the outrage of this nonelection, Mugabe was allowed to walk in and walk around, albeit there 

21 

were comments about him. But that is the full extent of it. A verbal 

tongue-lashing is simply not enough. 

On the plus side, at least Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia, Kenya, 

Angola, Liberia, and Sierra Leone’s governments ended the conspiracy of silence that has surrounded such activities and they 

spoke out. But as you know, both SADC and the AU could do more. 

So let us lay on the table at this committee today the administration’s best judgments about exactly what it is going to take here 

and what the possibilities are. 

Do you really see mediation changing this? 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. Can I answer that? 

Senator KERRY. Yes. 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. It depends on the quality of mediation and it depends on whether the March 29 result is respected 

in terms of the nature of the government that would come out of 

the mediation. I would believe that a mediation that led to some 

type of transitional government that could then prepare for elections so that we could get back to a democratic path is the right 

way. 

Senator KERRY. Why would mediation without adequate sanction 

leverage be able to do what the last election failed to do? Because 

Mugabe declared unequivocally that he will not give up power. If 

the world sort of walked away at the African Union and the world 

walked away on the election and he is sitting there with all the levers of power, why mediate? 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. Senator, the way I view it is that 

fundamentally we all agree that while the world has to pressure 

the Mugabe Government, the Zimbabwean people have to find a 

way ahead. And the fundamental problem here is that there is a 

leadership challenge within ZANU–PF. There is a succession problem. You have an old man clinging to power who refuses to move 

aside. This is a problem for his own party. And so part of it has 

to be his party has to deal with him. 

Senator KERRY. Can you shed more light on that? I know there 

is this struggle, and we have been hearing reports about the divisions within ZANU–PF. How deepare those, and what are you 

reading into that? If the world, particularly South Africa, were to 

suddenly speak up and offer a bolder set of sanctions, does that not 

encourage such divisions and perhaps isolate Mugabe within his 

own party? 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. It does, indeed. In fact, his main 

base of support right now is with the security sector, his army, his 

police, intelligence officers, the air force. Those are the supporters 

of the status quo, not sort of more moderate political civilian leadership. And so there is a fundamental divide in the party. 

The MDC itself is challenged with divisions. The MDC needs to 

stand strong for the will of the people and not just a seat in government. 

Senator KERRY. My final question is, What are we able to do to 

hasten that, encourage that, leverage it, and make it happen? 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. We will continue to lead on the 

international stage, but we also have to push for greater leadership 

within SADC itself. SADC is now divided, and the balance of opinion in SADC is against the Mugabe government, but there are 

22 

many silent countries in SADC who are saying nothing while a few 

are fighting, some who were shielding Mugabe and others who 

were saying it is now time for him to be expelled from their council 

until there is a return to democracy. And so SADC’s own house is 

problematic, but we are trying to push for those silent majority to 

also speak out. 

Senator KERRY. Well, thank you, Madam Secretary, and I want 

to thank my good friend and colleague for his courtesy. 

Thank you. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Senator Nelson. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator BILL NELSON. First of all, I want to compliment both of 

you that you are giving straight answers and they are to the point. 

That has not been the experience of this Senator with a lot of the 

administration witnesses in this committee, as well as my other 

committees. So, thank you. 

Two weeks ago during the recess, in meeting with the government leaders in four southern Africa countries, I was struck, for example, with the President of Uganda and the President of Rwanda 

both basically punting the issue of Mugabe to the Southern African 

Development Community and basically punting to the Government 

of South Africa, whose leader is simply not putting the pressure on 

Mugabe. 

So my question is they are about to have an election, and if the 

leadership shifts to the one that we think is going to be elected 

President, do we expect a change in tune of South Africa toward 

how Mbeke, the present President, has been coddling Mugabe in 

Zimbabwe? That is the question. 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. Senator, I am optimist, and so I am 

very hopeful that we can actually move toward a return to democracy before early 2009 when that election in South Africa happens. 

But you are quite right that the head of the ANC, Jacob Zuma, 

who is expected to be the next President, if he stands for election, 

has taken a tough stance on Mugabe. And the ANC as a party has 

taken a tough stance against ZANU–PF and has clearly said thatit 

is now siding with MDC because MDC is siding with the people of 

Zimbabwe, and MDC is a party for change. And the people of 

Zimbabwe tried to elect that party on March 29. So, yes; we would 

expect a difference in policy between Jacob Zuma and the current 

mediation efforts of President Mbeke. 

Senator BILL NELSON. I certainly hope so, and is it not interesting that Nelson Mandela has been very critical of the 

Zimbabwean regime, as has Bishop Tutu, and yet President Mbeke 

takes a different tune? 

So when do you think that election—when is there going to be 

a change that Zuma possibly could take over, and do we have to 

wait that long? Are we really looking at that? 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. The South African election is in 

March 2009. 

As I said, I think that we can have a change in Zimbabwe sooner 

than that, and I think that we need to expand the mediation. I 

think that we can clearly get there. Part of it is ZANU–PF, as I 

23 

mentioned to Senator Kerry, dealing with its own internal party 

struggles, their succession problems, but I definitely think that expanded, more transparent, credible mediation can bring Zimbabwe 

to a path of democratic change. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, I hope so. 

Now, let me point out another inconsistency. The Senator from 

Georgia just mentioned this very strong statement by the new 

Prime Minister of Kenya, Odinga. That occurred at the time that 

I held a joint press conference with him. Rather, he held the press 

conference and had me as part of it. And that was one of the questions to both of us. And I am telling you he did not spare anything. 

He let loose. And that was at the time that this African Union 

meeting was going on in Sharm el-Sheikh, and his President, lo 

and behold, did not say a word. So right there in a coalition Government in Kenya, you would think that there is a split on the idea 

of what to do with Zimbabwe. Tell us about that. 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. I am not sure that there is a split 

in terms of the substance of a policy toward Zimbabwe. I think the 

Kenyans are still working out the power-sharing arrangement and 

who gives instructions to the Foreign Minister between the President and the Prime Minister. So I think that that is a bit of an 

internal process working its way out. I do not think this is a substantive problem; I do not think anyone has tried to roll back the 

Prime Minister’s statements on Zimbabwe. So I think that they are 

unified on policy. 

Senator BILL NELSON. That is good to hear. 

Did you see this Reuter’s story, out right now, ‘‘Zimbabwe’s 

Christian Churches Reject Mugabe Victory’’? 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. Yes, Senator; I did see the story. 

Senator BILL NELSON. So, they have got enough courage to stand 

up and say that even with his goons running around. 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. Well, I think that that is the point. 

Civil society across Africa, in Zimbabwe, in the southern African 

region, in South Africa itself, across the entire continent are speaking out very clearly. There was a petition, as such, in the Financial 

Times with former heads of state, prominent civil society leaders 

across Africa, saying that it is unacceptable what is taking place 

in Zimbabwe. And so I do think that we are in a very different position than we were just a year ago. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Normally they would darken the lights 

when my time was up, but I still have 37 seconds left to go. Well, 

since the mike is still on, let me—let there be light. [Laughter.] 

Senator KERRY. It is the cost of fuel. [Laughter.] 

Senator BILL NELSON. My last comment is again a compliment 

to you all. Well, interesting, the lights turn on when I am ready 

to make a compliment to you. [Laughter.] 

Senator BILL NELSON. And that is, you know, I have been a lot 

of places on Planet Earth and the Government policies of the 

United States Government are not held in high esteem by the peoples in other countries, but there is a notable exception in Africa. 

And that is in large part because of the success of PEPFAR and 

the success of USAID in the feeding program that has to go hand 

in glove with the PEPFAR program. 

24 

As a matter of fact, in Kenya, representatives from across the 

board, government and business, told me that they think that 

America’s favorability rating is upward in the 1980s, of which I 

made a crack. If a certain person is elected President, I expect it 

will probably be in Kenya 99.9 percent. 

However, even in a country like Tanzania, our Ambassador, who 

is a political appointee but is doing a very good job, said that he 

thinks that the favorability because, in large part, of PEPFAR is 

upward of 60 percent toward America in that country. 

So I pass along that compliment to you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

We will start a second round. 

Ms. Frazer, I would like to ask you to talk about the U.S. sanctions on Zimbabwe. I had hoped we would hear from Treasury on 

this, but they were apparently unable to send a representative. 

Give me your assessment of the effectiveness of our current sanctions regime, how much money has been frozen, where are the 

gaps, and how can these sanctions be more effective. 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. Thank you, Senator. 

I think that our sanctions regime is fairly robust. We have two 

types of sanctions on Zimbabwe, financial restrictions against individuals who are supporting the policies of Mugabe to undermine 

democratic institutions and processes in Zimbabwe. And those 

sanctions are against 135 people and 30 corporate entities. We also 

have travel restrictions on individuals who are undermining democracy in Zimbabwe. This includes members of Mugabe’s inner 

circle and broader members of the government and some of their 

family members. 

We are looking to expand the category of Zimbabweans who are 

covered. We are also looking at sanctions on government entities 

as well, not just individuals. 

I cannot tell you how much money has been blocked. I think 

Treasury really has that expertise, and OFAC in particular would 

be able to answer that question. But I do know that any individuals who were carrying out financial transactions with Zimbabwe 

would be fined up to $500,000 for corporations and $250,000 for individuals. So there are fairly hefty sanctions. 

Also, it is a signal to international financial institutions not to 

do business with those on OFAC’s list. Our banks are not allowed 

to do business with them, but other banks also look at that same 

list and decide on their own not to do so. 

Senator FEINGOLD. And specifically about investment in mining 

in Zimbabwe, 2 weeks ago the media reported that some Britishbased mining firms are actually increasing investment in 

Zimbabwe which either directly or indirectly benefits the Mugabe 

regime. What steps is the United States taking to reverse this 

trend and will the proposed EU sanctions effectively regulate this 

investment? 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. OFAC and Treasury, under Treasury’s direction, are looking into this very issue, and we are certainly considering in our next round of sanctions, which we are preparing now, to have an impact on any such investments. 

25 

Senator FEINGOLD. State Department officials have said publicly 

that we do not recognize the outcome of the June 27 runoff election 

and thereby do not recognize the Mugabe government. What tools 

exist to formalize that nonrecognition, and would they be helpful? 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. We consider the outcome of that 

election as illegitimate, and so we will not accept the legitimacy of 

Robert Mugabe on the basis of that election. Our lawyers, however, 

are looking at issues of recognition and nonrecognition and the impact that nonrecognition would have on our ability to carry out our 

policy in Zimbabwe. And so we have not taken any decision as far 

as formal government recognition, but we have been very clear that 

the election itself was illegitimate and therefore has led to a constitutional crisis within Zimbabwe that needs resolution in favor of 

democracy. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Now, when the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan in the 1990s, the Clinton administration announced that 

it would not recognize the regime. The State Department even ordered the Afghan Embassy here in Washington, DC, to be shut 

down in 1997. 

Do you think such high-level statements from the White House 

or diplomatic actions, such as revoking the credentials of the 

Zimbabwean ambassador to the United States would be helpful? 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. Again, I think that we are clearly 

looking at all of these options, but I think that we do not want to 

do anything that prevents our ability to support the people of 

Zimbabwe. So our direct engagement is going to be necessary, and 

so we are trying to look very carefully at how options of recognition, nonrecognition, recalling our ambassador, revoking the 

Zimbabwe ambassador’s credentials would do on our ability to operate. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I hope it is understood that these options are 

at least being considered. 

Assistant Secretary FRAZER. Yes. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Ms. Almquist, there has been substantial increase in U.S. humanitarian assistance to Zimbabwe in the last 2 

years. Can you tell me specifically where that increased assistance 

is being directed and how would you assess its effectiveness? 

Ms. ALMQUIST. Yes. Last year we provided 72 percent of all food 

assistance to Zimbabwe. In years prior to that, we were about 40 

percent of the total food aid for the country. This year already, in 

fiscal year 2008, we have provided $120 million in humanitarian 

assistance. Approximately $114 million of that is food assistance, 

and about $6 million is in nonfood assistance. 

Our support is for the most vulnerable and affected by the current political crisis and the economic deterioration in the country. 

We are concerned with mobile and vulnerable populations. We are 

concerned with school feeding with programs that complement our 

HIV/AIDS programs, et cetera. 

So when our partners can work, we think our assistance is very 

effective. It does not go through the government. It is handled by 

NGO partners and U.N. agencies. And so we have a high degree 

of confidence, when they can work, that it gets to needy populations. Right now, they cannot work, and so our concern for the 

humanitarian situation is growing daily. 

26 

Senator FEINGOLD. The State Department congressional budget 

justification has said that if a change in government does not take 

place in 2008, increased aid resources should be directed towards 

supporting opposition efforts to press for reforms. I would like to 

know what would this increase consist of and how is USAID currently working with the opposition, MDC, to strengthen that political party. 

Ms. ALMQUIST. We have our democracy and governance program 

that is outside of humanitarian assistance, and PEPFAR, our largest sector of support, in Zimbabwe. In fact, we feel that most other 

areas of development assistance are too problematic at this point 

to engage. If we had a transition to a reform-minded government 

of some sort, we would further strengthen our democracy and governance programs. 

We are working right now on democratic political processes. We 

are supporting democratic political parties, which is primarily the 

MDC, of course, and institutions of governance. We have provided 

critical support to the elections for March 29 in particular, the 

Zimbabwe Elections Support Network and the parallel vote tabulation, which allowed us and the world to know that Morgan 

Tsvangirai did outstrip Mr. Mugabe in that election. 

We have U.S. support for civil society organizations. Right now, 

we have been supporting about 25 organizations. We will probably 

move to narrow our focus a bit on those organizations which can 

particularly work and operate in rural areas because we think that 

is the most critical going forward, to increase the demand for accountability for responsible governance, to work on civic participation in legislative processes. 

We are also working on parliamentary strengthening. As the Assistant Secretary mentioned, the MDC did win a majority of seats 

in the Parliament. So there are many new Parliamentarians for 

training, as well as the engagement of civil society in parliament. 

And then last, we are working on free and independent media. 

USAID provides support to VOA programming and broadcasts, 

which are critical for transmitting independently information about 

what is happening in the country, as well as supporting local township-level newspapers and training for journalists. 

We are also providing support for victims of the politically motivated violence in terms of legal assistance, psychosocial support, 

and medical care, and also for documenting the human rights 

abuses that are taking place. 

So we will continue to do those activities in the current environment. If there is a move and a transitional government that we can 

engage with much more broadly, then we will work on the issues 

of constitutional reform, electoral reform, restoring democratic institutions of governance in terms of our democracy and governance 

program, and we will also focus on economic stabilization and recovery with complementary humanitarian support in the meantime, and then expanding our health programs to complement the 

current HIV/AIDS work but much more broadly work on the health 

care system which is literally falling apart right now. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. 

A vote has started. So to allow Senators to vote, we will briefly 

recess and return to this panel. 

27 

[Recess.] 

Senator FEINGOLD. We will call the committee back to order, and 

since the Senators were satisfied with the opportunity to ask questions, I want to thank the first panel again for all their responses 

and their testimony. 

And now we will go to the second panel. Thank you for joining 

us. Let us begin with Mr. Melia. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS O. MELIA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE 

DIRECTOR, FREEDOM HOUSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. MELIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman Feingold. Thank you for 

asking Freedom House to testify today. 

My remarks are based on my personal observations from a recent 

visit to Harare just before the March 29 elections and frequent 

communication that my colleagues and I have had with civil society 

partners in Zimbabwe over the last 2 and a half years 

When Ms. Almquist was talking about the large USAID- supported effort to strengthen civil society in Zimbabwe, she was talking largely about a program that we have been implementing these 

last 2 and a half years. In fact, in the month leading up to the 

March 29 election, we transferred about $750,000 worth of grants 

and material assistance to an array of 25 or so civic groups that 

were mobilizing people to get out the vote and to monitor those 

elections. That assistance included things like satellite phones to 

communicate results from polling stations and bicycles for the observers to get out to those polling stations. 

I also want to begin by thanking you, Senator, for your leadership on the Zimbabwe issue. A lot of us in human rights community appreciate your efforts in this regard. And I want to thank you 

especially for meeting recently with several Zimbabweans that 

were in town with us and you took time out of your schedule to 

meet with them and listen to their story from Zimbabwe. 

With all that is going on in the world, Sudan and elsewhere, the 

subcommittee is correct to focus special attention on Zimbabwe 

today for at least these four reasons. 

The humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe is catastrophic and deteriorating daily. We have recited some of those statistics already 

today. I will not review them again. But it is clear that every day 

that Robert Mugabe remains at the helm is a day that Zimbabwe 

sinks noticeably deeper into the quagmire of hunger, disease, economic collapse, and the ruination of future generations. 

Second, the violent assault on the people of Zimbabwe, the country’s constitution, and its electoral process by the Joint Operations 

Command in the implementation of the June 27 runoff constitutes 

a coup d’etat. This should already have led to Zimbabwe’s suspension from the African Union and the invocation by the U.S. of section 608, as it is now called, in the foreign aid appropriation, the 

standard provision in U.S. foreign aid law that requires a cutoff of 

aid to any government installed by a coup. 

We all read the story in the Washington Post on July 5 by Craig 

Timberg describing the Joint Operations Command’s military style 

plan to extinguish the opposition, code named CIBD for coercion, 

intimidation, beating, displacement. 

28 

Now, the African Union’s Charter on Democracy, Elections and 

Governance, adopted just last year in January 2007, makes clear 

that—and I am quoting now—‘‘any refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party or candidate 

after free, fair and regular elections’’ belongs in the same category 

as a ‘‘putsche or coup d’etat’’ or intervention by ‘‘mercenaries, 

armed rebels or dissidents.’’ In consequence, according to the AU’s 

own charter, as soon as the Peace and Security Council of the AU 

would observe that there has been such a change in government in 

a state party, it shall suspend the state party immediately. 

While one can discuss how fair and regular were the elections in 

Zimbabwe, due to the behavior of the government, it is clear that 

the will of the people was expressed on March 29 and is well 

known to the world. Neither Robert Mugabe nor ZANU–PF speaks 

any longer for the majority of the people of Zimbabwe. 

Third, the established institutions of the global international 

order are being directly challenged at present by this coup d’etat 

and the acquiescence in that coup by key global actors, including 

the Governments of South Africa, China, and Russia. Last Friday’s 

double veto of a U.N. Security Council resolution reflects the growing antidemocratic assertiveness that we have seen on the part of 

the Governments of both Russia and China and the increasingly 

active global campaign they wage to lower the standards on human 

rights and democracy in international forums. 

Senator Isakson asked earlier about the Russian Government’s 

motivation in all this. The Russian Foreign Ministry made it clear 

in a statement it issued on Saturday that Moscow’s veto on Friday 

should be understood not only as a ‘‘principled position on 

Zimbabwe,’’ but that it was also intended to be read much more 

broadly. The Russian statement said that ‘‘the adoption of this document by the U.N. Security Council would have set a dangerous 

precedent, opening the way to the Security Council interfering in 

countries’ internal affairs over various political events, including 

elections.’’ 

Now, while Friday’s failure of the Security Council to act is an 

indicator of the deterioration of the ability of the U.N. to serve as 

a bulwark of democracy and human rights, we think that there are 

some other hopeful signs at present related to this situation. 

The decline in U.S. influence in these global institutions stems 

in equal measure from the present administration’s policy of estrangement from the U.N., which has dissipated our country’s ability to shape outcomes, also by the fecklessness of too many other 

democratic states who are not willing to confront bad behavior by 

their neighbors, and by the growing confidence and effectiveness of 

the world’s dictators in seizing control of these bodies. So that 

while the American posture on Zimbabwe has generally been quite 

admirable, as President Bush and the Congress alike have stepped 

up to the challenge with unequivocal statements, making plans for 

the massive infusion of aid immediately upon the establishment of 

a legitimate government in Harare, it is clear that the U.S. has lost 

its ability to lead the Security Council to adopt even minimal sanctions against a regime as odious as the now illegitimate Government of Zimbabwe. 

29 

Now, at the same time, the disarray on Zimbabwe within the African Union and SADC is a promising development. Just as inaction in one body at the global level is a bad sign, inaction in the 

regional and subregional institutions is actually a promising development because it marks an end to that conspiracy of silence that 

Senator Kerry spoke about a little while ago. 

Important African voices have been speaking out on the problem 

in Zimbabwe. For the first time ever, a SADC election observer delegation concluded that the elections did not represent the will of 

the people. And led by the President of Zambia, Dr. Mwanawasa, 

a growing chorus of African heads of state have spoken out in more 

and more compelling terms over the last few weeks. This is important and significant. 

The rising tide of African support for a democratic outcome in 

Zimbabwe, along with the rejection of the results of June 27, 

should be as unsurprising as it is significant, and it is significant. 

It has implications beyond the present moment in Zimbabwe and 

may signal a renewed and genuine commitment to democratic 

norms in sub-Saharan Africa, a region that has, at least in its formal multilateral politics, hitherto rarely been outspoken on such 

matters. 

In the back of the printed testimony that you have before you, 

you will see two charts. There is a table that shows the overall average score of freedom in Africa rising gradually and steadily over 

the last 25 years, which contrasts with the decline during much of 

the same period by Zimbabwe where the scores have declined from 

a high of 3 on political rights and a 4 on civil liberties to the point 

where in the last year Zimbabwe has joined the ranks of the 

world’s most repressive regimes. 

What can we do? I will just say very briefly in conclusion that 

I would recommend six steps. 

Support a transition government in Zimbabwe rather than a government of national unity. 

No. 2, support the MDC for as long as they speak for the people 

of Zimbabwe. As Michelle Gavin, who is sitting next to me, has 

written recently, focus on Zimbabwe’s people and not merely on the 

prominent political actors of the day. 

Third, support Zimbabwean civil society. Both Secretary Frazer 

and Ms. Almquist spoke to this in their presentations. Today in 

Harare there is being convened a national civil society consultative 

conference with a score or more of major Zimbabwean civic groups 

discussing how they can play a constructive role in effecting a transition arrangement to move toward a democratic regime in 

Zimbabwe, and USAID and the State Department should continue 

to support those efforts as they have up to this point. 

The United States should be poised to assist the transition government. You noted this earlier, Chairman Feingold. The administration has done well to request $45 million in funding to assist in 

the rehabilitation of Zimbabwe once a legitimate government comes 

into office. It is not too soon to convene expert groups to begin planning that transition, and that does not need to wait for the transition itself. 

Finally, I would say support and reward the African leadership 

on this transition. A lot has been discussed here already about 

30 

those brave African leaders who are stepping forward. The State 

Department and even the Congress in its dealings with African 

counterparts can provide tangible and intangible rewards for the 

African leadership on these issues, meeting with them, bringing 

them to the White House, bringing them to the Capitol Building, 

making them welcome, treating them like friends and democratic 

allies, as well as by providing additional aid and cooperation to 

those governments that are stepping up and trying to change the 

tenor of intra-African politics. 

I will be glad to respond to other questions. Thank you for this 

opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Melia follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS O. MELIA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

FREEDOM HOUSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Chairman Feingold, Senator Isakson, other distinguished members of the Senate 

Subcommittee on African Affairs, thank you for inviting Freedom House to testify 

at today’s hearing on the ‘‘Crisis in Zimbabwe and Prospects for Resolution.’’ 

I am pleased to represent Freedom House here today. My remarks are based on 

personal observations from a recent visit to Harare, in the week prior to the March 

29 elections; the frequent communication my colleagues and I have had on a neardaily basis with Zimbabwean civil society activists with whom we have partnered 

for 21⁄2 years in efforts to enable the people of Zimbabwe to use peaceful political 

processes to effect positive change in the governance of the country; and the historical perspective provided by Freedom House’s annual assessments of the state of political rights and civil liberties since prior to Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980. 

While our analytic work on Zimbabwe is funded from private sources, I would note 

that our program work in Zimbabwe has been funded since 2005 by grants from the 

U.S. Agency for International Development, and by complementary grants from the 

Australian Agency for International Assistance (AUSAID) and the British Government. 

Senator Feingold, I want to begin by commending you for your leadership in seeking to foster democratic change for the people of Zimbabwe. Your tireless efforts, 

particularly in strategically communicating to countries throughout the AU, have 

helped to chip away at this considerable problem. The sense-of-the-Senate resolution 

that you and Senator Isakson shepherded to passage yesterday makes clear that the 

United States should support the Zimbabwean people and African diplomatic efforts 

to resolve the crisis in Zimbabwe, while also making clear that the U.S. should play 

a proactive role in facilitating. I am sure I speak for many colleagues in the human 

rights community when I say we appreciate very much your leadership on 

Zimbabwe. 

There are certainly other important, compelling crises in the world that cry out 

for our attention, even in Africa (as we are reminded by the arrest warrant that 

was requested yesterday by the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 

against President Umar al-Bashir of Sudan, for the genocidal atrocities being waged 

by his government against the people of Dafur). 

Yet the subcommittee is correct to focus special attention on Zimbabwe today for 

at least these four reasons: 

The humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe is catastrophic and is deteriorating 

daily. Three socio-political indicators sum up the devastation wrought by the 

ZANU–PF government led by Robert Mugabe: The nation’s currency has become 

worthless, with inflation now running at an annual rate of 10 million percent and 

banknotes legally expire 6 months after they are printed; more than one-fifth of the 

country’s population has fled to neighboring countries in the past 3 years; and the 

current life-expectancy of a male born in Zimbabwe is 33 years, one of the shortest 

in the world today (and down from 57 years in 1990). These are horrific statistics 

that speak to the urgent need for a new direction for this once prosperous nation 

of 12 million people. 

Last weekend brought an additional, telling data point: According to Saturday’s 

edition of The Standard (of Zimbabwe), ‘‘more than 80 percent of the country’s 

bakers have temporarily closed shop as flour shortages take a toll on the battered 

industry.’’ International humanitarian assistance has been disrupted and blocked by 

the government in Harare, which last month has banned most international aid organizations from fulfilling their missions in Zimbabwe, leading to the destruction of 

31 

millions of tons of food aid and the cutoff of medical assistance to as many as onethird of the country’s population. Every day Robert Mugabe remains at the helm 

is a day Zimbabwe sinks noticeably deeper into the quagmire of hunger, spreading 

disease, economic collapse and the ruination of future generations. 

The violent assault on the people of Zimbabwe, the country’s constitution and its 

electoral process by the Joint Operations Command in the implementation of the 

June 27 runoff election for the Presidency constitutes a coup d’etat. This should already have led to Zimbabwe’s suspension from the African Union and the invocation 

by the U.S. of section 608 of P.L. 110–161, the standard provision in U.S. foreign 

aid appropriations requiring a cutoff of aid to any government installed by a coup. 

As reported in the Washington Post by Craig Timberg on July 5, the leadership of 

the Joint Operations Command designed and implemented a military-style plan to 

extinguish the opposition, code named ‘‘CIBD’’ for ‘‘Coercion, Intimidation, Beating, 

Displacement.’’ While the U.S. is not currently providing any assistance to the Government of Zimbabwe, the formal invocation would make clear the American view 

of the illegality of Mugabe’s hasty inauguration on June 28. The African Union’s 

Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, adopted in January 2007, makes 

clear—in Chapter 8, concerning ‘‘Sanctions in Case of Unconstitutional Changes in 

Government,’’ in Article 23—that ‘‘[a]ny refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party or candidate after free, fair and regular elections,’’ belongs in the same category as a ‘‘putsche or coup d’etat’’ or intervention 

by ‘‘mercenaries, . . . armed rebels or dissidents . . .’’ In consequence, according to 

the AU’s Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, as soon as the Peace 

and Security Council of the AU ‘‘observes’’ that there has been an unconstitutional 

change in government in a State Party, it shall suspend the State Party ‘‘immediately.’’ While one can discuss how ‘‘free, fair and regular’’ were the elections in 

Zimbabwe, due to the depredations of the government, the will of the people was 

expressed on March 29 and is well known to the world. Neither Robert Mugabe nor 

ZANU–PF speaks any longer for the majority of the people of Zimbabwe. 

The established institutions of the global international order are being directly 

challenged by this coup d’etat and the acquiescence in that coup by key global actors, 

including the Governments of South Africa, China, and Russia. Last Friday’s double 

veto of a U.N. Security Council resolution made clear that the international community is simply not able to respond in a serious manner to one of the crudest campaigns against the will of a nation’s people the world has seen in some time. The 

resolution would have imposed global arms sanctions on Zimbabwe, and travel and 

financial restrictions on 14 senior regime officials with the bloodiest hands. The resolution secured the necessary majority of 9 out of 15 states to be adopted, but was 

defeated by vetoes from China and Russia, while Libya and Vietnam also voted with 

South Africa against the measure. These vetoes reflect the growing antidemocratic 

assertiveness that we have seen on the part of the governments of both Russia and 

China, and the increasingly active global campaign they wage to lower the standards on human rights and democracy as addressed in international forums. 

The Russian Foreign Ministry made it clear that Moscow’s veto on Friday should 

be understood not only as a ‘‘principled position on Zimbabwe,’’ but that it was also 

intended to be read much more broadly. ‘‘[T]he adoption of this document by the 

U.N. Security Council would have set a dangerous precedent,’’ said the statement 

released by the Russian Foreign Ministry on July 12, ‘‘opening the way to the Security Council interfering in countries’ internal affairs over various political events, including elections . . .’’ China is the principal supplier of military equipment to 

Zimbabwe’s Government, and so may have cast its veto as much to sustain its export position as to make a comparable statement of diplomatic philosophy. The Government of South Africa, on the other hand, added another sordid act to its dismal 

record on the suffering of Zimbabwe’s people—and presumably has made its peace 

with the fact that it clearly does not deserve to be considered a permanent member 

of the Security Council. 

Friday’s failure of the Security Council to act is an indicator of the deterioration 

in the ability of United Nations institutions to serve as bulwarks of democratic 

ideals and human rights standards in the present age of authoritarian assertiveness. The U.N.’s Human Rights Council has similarly declined to take up 

Zimbabwe’s deteriorating situation. We at Freedom House believe that the decline 

in U.S. influence in these global institutions stems in equal measure from the 

present administration’s policy of estrangement from the U.N., which has dissipated 

our country’s ability to shape outcomes; the fecklessness of too many other democratic states who are not willing to confront bad behavior by their neighbors (especially in the absence of the United States from these battles); and the growing 

confidence and effectiveness of the world’s dictatorships in seizing control of these 

bodies. 

32 

The American posture on Zimbabwe has generally been quite admirable, as President Bush and the U.S. Congress have stepped up to the challenge with unequivocal 

statements and by making plans for a massive infusion of aid immediately upon the 

establishment of a legitimate government in Harare, and by proposing to tighten the 

targeted sanctions against key members of the regime. But it is clear that the U.S. 

has lost its ability to lead the Security Council to adopt even minimal sanctions 

against a regime as odious as the illegitimate Government of Zimbabwe, whose policies are clearly destabilizing the southern African region through the displacement 

of millions and the impoverishment of an entire nation. 

Disarray on Zimbabwe in the African Union and the Southern African Development Community is a promising development. While the double veto in the Security 

Council underscored the demise of democratic sensibilities in that venue, the fracturing of consensus in African regional and subregional organizations is a positive 

and hopeful sign. Even though Mr. Mugabe was permitted to attend the recent African Union summit in Egypt in the immediate aftermath of the coup on June 27, 

the cold welcome and the numerous critical statements that were made by African 

heads of state and government, both in private and public, speaks to the emergence 

of a stronger democratic sensibility in sub-Saharan Africa. Important African voices 

have been speaking out, with clarity and forcefulness, on the problem in Zimbabwe 

and the need for the region to respect the will of that country’s people, rather than 

to tolerate the descent into darkness of Mugabe’s Zimbabwe. 

For the first time ever, a SADC election observer delegation concluded, following 

Zimbabwe’s June 27 debacle, that ‘‘the elections did not represent the will of the 

people.’’ Led by the courageous President of Zambia, Dr. Levy Mwanawasa, a growing chorus of African heads of government has over the course of the past few weeks 

spoken out in ever more vociferous terms. Dr. Mwanawasa, the SADC chairman, 

said before the June 27 runoff, ‘‘What is happening in Zimbabwe is a matter of serious embarrassment to all of us. It is scandalous for the SADC to remain silent in 

the light of what is happening.’’ U.N. Deputy Secretary General Asha-Rose Migiro, 

the former Foreign Minster of Tanzania, said ‘‘When an election is conducted in an 

atmosphere of fear and violence, its outcome cannot have a legitimacy that is built 

on the will of the people.’’ She told the Security Council, as she briefed the 15-member body on the recent African Union summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, ‘‘the principle of 

democracy is at stake,’’ and that, in the case of Zimbabwe, ‘‘flawed elections produced illegitimate results.’’ The President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the 

President of Ghana, John Kufuor, and leaders in Botswana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra 

Leone, Senegal, have all made clear that the political process in Zimbabwe is not 

acceptable. 

Leading voices in South Africa, from Nelson Mandela to ANC chair Jacob Zuma, 

have distanced themselves from the approach being pursued by the current President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki. The leadership demonstrated by respected African figures outside of governing circles, such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who 

said that South Africa had ‘‘failed its Apartheid-era friends,’’ has inspired others to 

speak out forcefully. Reverend Mpho Moruakgomo of the Botswana Council of 

Churches stated, ‘‘What has happened in Zimbabwe is a slap in the face to all humanity. It is regrettable that a democracy so hard won, for which so many died, has 

been allowed to be desecrated by one egotist and his military junta.’’ 

Note in contrast, outlying statements such as that of the head of state of The 

Gambia, President Alhaji Dr Yahya Jammeh, who has given the June 27 Presidential election runoff in Zimbabwe a clean bill of health, saying ‘‘Zimbabwe’s election is valid.’’ President Jammeh, of course, came to power in July 1994, at the age 

of 29, as the leader of a coup that ended three decades of peaceful and largely fair 

elections in his country. Though still a young man, Jammeh’s is the view of the ‘‘old 

Africa,’’ now being replaced in more and more countries by the ‘‘new Africa’’ that 

is based increasingly, if not yet entirely, on respect for the rule of law and the will 

of the people. 

While headlines about misrule in Sudan, Somalia, and Zimbabwe may obscure the 

truth, the fact is that Africa is becoming more democratic over time, more respectful 

of civil liberties and political rights. The rising tide of African support for a democratic outcome in Zimbabwe, along with rejection of the results of June 27, is therefore as unsurprising as it is significant. It has implications beyond the present 

moment in Zimbabwe, and may signal a renewed and genuine commitment to democratic norms in sub-Saharan Africa—a region that, at least in its formal multilateral 

politics, has hitherto rarely been outspoken on such matters. It is not only because 

the situation in Zimbabwe is so egregious that so many African leaders are speaking 

out and calling for international action. It is because the democratic character of 

sub-Saharan Africa is improving. Even as Zimbabwe’s freedom scores have steadily 

33 

declined over the past two and one-half decades, the continental average has gradually moved upward. 

I enclose two charts summarizing data from the Freedom House annual survey, 

Freedom in the World. Note (in Figure 1) that the overall average score for Africa 

has moved, since 1990, from a rather low score of 6 (on a scale from 1 to 7, where 

7 is the lowest) in political rights, to 4.2 in 2008. Civil liberties scores have improved in the same period overall from 5.3 to 4. This is not only hopeful; it constitutes significant change that affects the quality of life for ordinary men and 

women across the continent. 

Zimbabwe, on the other hand, achieved its highest levels of freedom in 1981, receiving a 3 for political rights and a 4 for civil liberties. Since that year (as Figure 

2 conveys), freedom in Zimbabwe has steadily declined and finally fell into the ‘‘Not 

Free’’ category of our rankings in 2001 following the fundamentally flawed elections 

in June 2000 and the initiation of government seizures of white-owned farmland. 

Zimbabwe then joined the ranks of ‘‘The World’s Most Repressive Regimes’’ in 2005. 

The ruling party, ZANU–PF, has made a mockery of every election since the 

Movement for Democratic Change was created in 1999 and waged a successful campaign to reject the 2000 draft constitution that aimed to expand executive power. 

In fact, Zimbabweans today are denied just about every single fundamental political and civil right: 

Freedom of expression is severely curtailed through a Draconian legal framework 

that includes the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), the 

Official Secrets Act, the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), and the Criminal 

Law (Codification and Reform) Act. Journalists are routinely subjected to verbal intimidation, physical attacks, arrest and detention, and financial pressure by the police and supporters of the ruling party. Foreign journalists are rarely granted visas, 

and local correspondents for foreign publications have been refused accreditation or 

threatened with lawsuits and deportation. 

Academic freedom is limited. All schools are under state control, and education 

aid is often distributed based on parents’ political loyalties. Security forces and 

ZANU–PF thugs harass dissident university students, who have been arrested or 

expelled for protesting against government policy. In 2007, several protests by university students resulted in arrests and beatings; police closed the University of 

Zimbabwe in July. 

Freedom of Association is strongly impeded. The 2004 Non-Governmental Organizations Act explicitly prohibits groups that ‘‘promote and protect human rights’’ 

from receiving foreign funding. Public demonstrations and protests are severely restricted under the 2002 Public Order and Security Act (POSA), which requires police 

permission to hold public meetings and demonstrations. Such meetings are often 

deemed illegal and broken up, and participants are subject to arbitrary arrest by 

security forces (including intelligence officers) and attacks by ZANU–PF militias. 

The POSA also allows police to impose arbitrary curfews and forbids criticism of the 

President. The right to collective labor action is limited under the Labor Relations 

Act, which allows the government to veto collective bargaining agreements that it 

deems harmful to the economy. 

Rule of Law does not function. While some courts, thanks to courageous and clearminded magistrates and judges, have struck down or disputed government actions, 

increasing pressure by the regime has substantially eroded the judiciary’s capacity 

to act independently. The government has repeatedly refused to enforce court orders 

and has replaced senior judges or pressured them to resign by stating that it could 

not guarantee their security. Security and military forces abuse citizens with impunity. War veterans and ZANU–PF militias—including the youth militia—operate as 

de facto enforcers of government policies and have committed human rights abuses 

such as assault, torture, rape, extralegal evictions, and extralegal executions without fear of punishment. 

And the list goes on and on. 

The levels of violence and intimidation reached new heights of barbarity leading 

up to the June 27 runoff election, with nearly 90 opposition members and supporters dead and thousands harassed, tortured, and displaced. Techniques used to 

terrorize supporters of the opposition have included dismemberment and mutilation 

of limbs and genitals. This was done to a population already reeling from massive 

food shortages and a collapse of the health care system that has left one in four 

Zimbabweans HIV positive. Moreover, now that Mugabe has once again falsely 

claimed the Presidency, the violence against opposition has continued unabated with 

over 1,500 MDC supporters still in detention around the country. 

So, what is to be done by the United States? What can be done? There are six 

things I would suggest to inform U.S. policy in the period immediately ahead. 

34 

1. Support a transition government in Zimbabwe rather than a government of national unity. While the distinction may seem merely semantic, it is critical in the 

present context. To oblige the people of the MDC to enter into a forced marriage 

with those who have so severely abused them would be to prolong the agony of 

Zimbabwe’s suffering. A coalition based upon a genuine national election would be 

something for political leaders to negotiate later. But until that moment arrives, the 

international community would be better advised to work toward the installation of 

an interim government focused on a real transition to democracy than to paper over 

differences. 

2. Support the MDC, for as long as they speak for Zimbabwe. As Michelle Gavin 

of the Council on Foreign Relations has memorably written recently, in the Christian Science Monitor of July 9, ‘‘focus on Zimbabwe’s people,’’ and not merely on the 

prominent political actors of the moment. Without meaning any disrespect for the 

brave men and women of the MDC, and their courageous leaders, Morgan 

Tsvangirai and Tendai Biti, who have endured arrest, harassment, and beatings, 

the focus should be less on their installation in office than on the fundamental 

rights of the people of Zimbabwe to choose who shall govern. At present, the closest 

gauge we have of the sentiments of the people of Zimbabwe is that Mr. Tsvangarai 

and his allies in the parliamentary elections secured the largest number of votes 

and should be considered the legitimate spokespersons for the people of Zimbabwe. 

But as the people of Zimbabwe know so well, a popular mandate can be dissipated 

if leaders fail to perform in the best interests of their community. So, support for 

the MDC at this moment should be fulsome—and conditional. 

3. Support Zimbabwean civil society. Today, July 15, a ‘‘National Civil Society 

Consultative Conference’’ has been convened in Harare. Scores of civic group leaders 

have come together upon the initiative of the National Association of Non-Governmental Organizations to discuss how to further consolidate consensus on the way 

forward for the country. Many of the groups meeting today played important roles 

in educating voters, and implementing get-out-the-vote programs in March, and in 

monitoring the election process and the vote count. Many also have ongoing nonpolitical mandates and service delivery functions and so are well connected to the 

people of Zimbabwe. These are important voices and the international community 

should take heed of their deliberations and be inclined to be responsive to well-formulated requests for assistance in advancing toward accountable governance. 

USAID and other donors have supported such efforts in the past, and an attentive, 

supportive posture toward civil society should be sustained. 

4. Be poised to assist the transition government. As noted earlier, the administration has done well to request $45 million in funding to assist in the rehabilitation 

of Zimbabwe once a legitimate government comes into office. It is vital that, in the 

truncated appropriations legislative process that seems likely this year, Senators 

and Representatives stay focused on ensuring that this funding is available in the 

coming weeks or months to have maximum impact. It is also not too soon to convene 

working groups of international experts, from the U.S., Africa, and the world to advise Zimbabweans—for the lead must be taken by qualified Zimbabweans—to plan 

for the reconstruction of Zimbabwe when circumstances permit. These planning 

efforts should draw on the immense pool of talented Zimbabwean men and women 

available in-country or in the growing diaspora outside the country. At the same 

time, Freedom House calls upon Europe to match the U.S. commitment, either 

through the EU or bilateral assistance packages. Funding priorities should include 

feeding Zimbabweans, providing relief for HIV/AIDS patients, stabilizing the currency, and rewriting the constitution. 

5. Support and reward African leadership toward the transition. While the U.S. 

should appreciate that the scenario in Zimbabwe is playing out on a global stage— 

autocratic states (such as those who thwarted the July 11 initiative to impose U.N. 

sanction) are watching to see how well the democratic world can handle their challenge—it is also a scenario in which African states will play the leading roles. 

United States diplomatic efforts therefore should be focused on reinforcing the 

emerging leaders in the region, by rewarding—through political and economic and 

other means—those governments whose leaders have led on the Zimbabwe crisis. It 

may well be the case that not all states can do the same things, but an array of 

complementary actions, in sanctions and political initiatives, should result in commensurate and tangible recognition in the form of political rewards from the United 

States. The U.S. Government could, for instance, start by expressing its appreciation 

to governments such as Botswana and Zambia and Liberia for their forward-leaning 

posture to date—appreciation in the form of having their Presidents invited to the 

White House, not necessarily for a joint statement on Zimbabwe, but to talk about 

whatever those other Presidents have on their agendas. 

35 

6. Do not give up on the United Nations and other diplomatic venues. Notwithstanding the rationales offered for their stands by the Russian Government and others, the crisis in Zimbabwe does indeed constitute a threat to international peace 

and security—one for which U.N. Security Council action would be entirely appropriate. The U.S. ought therefore to reinvigorate its multilateral diplomacy, not least 

because this is but the first in a series of efforts by the dictatorships to undermine 

the institutions of international order. Basic human rights principles are being vigorously contested by world and regional powers alike on the basis of ‘‘national sovereignty,’’ despite the evident horrors in Zimbabwe. It is vital that the U.S. not be 

deterred. 

Thank you for this opportunity to discuss the present crisis in Zimbabwe. I look 

forward to your reactions and the discussion. 


melia.eps
36 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Melia, for your 

testimony. 

Ms. Gavin. 

STATEMENT OF MICHELLE D. GAVIN, ADJUNCT FELLOW FOR 

AFRICA, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEW YORK, NY 

Ms. GAVIN. Thank you so much, Chairman Feingold and Senator 

Isakson. It is a real honor to be here. I have tremendous respect 

for this subcommittee and have spent a lot of time thinking about 

the work of this subcommittee, and I am so pleased to be here. I 

think it is wonderful that you are focusing on this important issue 

today. I want to thank the staff as well because I know how much 

work goes into these hearings, and particularly, Mr. Chairman, to 

thank you for your kind words. I really have so much admiration 

for your commitment and knowledge, and I think that you have 

been quietly a hero for Africans for quite some time. 

I would request that my full written statement be included in the 

record. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Without objection. 

Ms. GAVIN. And I will just briefly summarize because there are 

mostly points of agreement between Mr. Melia and I and frankly 

with the first panel as well. 

The current state of play with regard to Zimbabwe is characterized, as we have heard, by a desperate internal situation, a divided 

and at this point fairly ineffective set of international responses, 

and a troubling lack of clarity and consensus about the most promising way forward. And the truth is the United States has very limited options and limited leverage, but that is not an excuse for inaction. 

Zimbabwe today, as you know, is a country held hostage by an 

illegitimate government. As the international community fails to 

come to consensus on a strategy for resolving the crisis, civilians 

continue to suffer terribly. We have heard the litany of statistics. 

I will not go through them again 

But this is an important time to be talking about this because 

last week’s failed attempt to pass a United Nations Security Council resolution applying additional international pressure on those 

most responsible for Zimbabwe’s suffering was deeply disappointing. It was a real illustration of the risks that still exist in 

the international community with regard to the crisis and it dramatically slowed multilateral momentum. And it is important to 

find ways to ramp that back up. 

In the first panel, I believe that Secretary Frazer talked about 

how important it is that we not lose focus. I think this was in the 

chairman’s opening statement as well. And I do think that is a critical point. 

The motives driving those who have acted to protect Zimbabwe’s 

repressive and illegitimate government are varied. But undoubtedly they include the following, in addition to others. 

There is just a glass houses element here. Governments that are 

themselves autocratic to some degree are uncomfortable with the 

idea of multilateral pressure on a despotic regime. There is not a 

whole lot we can do about that right now, but some of the others 

are things that we might be able to do something about. 

37 

There is the sense of discomfort of appearing to be at odds with 

South Africa and with South African President Mbeke, but as 

change comes in South Africa, as not just civil society but other elements of the South African Government find their voice, it might 

be less difficult to address that issue. 

There certainly had been for a long time the sense of discomfort 

with criticizing President Mugabe, as you pointed out, long known 

as a liberation hero, and his legacy is indeed complex. I think that 

we can address that in some ways by, as my colleague has said, 

spending more time talking about the civil and political rights of 

the Zimbabwean people and a little less time framing this crisis as 

one about a power struggle between political elites. We have to tell 

it like it is certainly about the Mugabe regime and be very 

straightforward about just how repressive it is. But I think for 

many African states, it would be a much more comfortable way to 

frame the issue to talk about restoring the rights of the 

Zimbabwean people—after all, that is what a liberation struggle 

was about—than to constantly be framing it as an issue about targeting a specific leader. 

And finally, I think that there is this misperception out there, 

and I think this speaks to this West and the rest divide, Mr. Chairman, that you identified. There is a misperception that Africans 

want to move forward on some kind of negotiated political process 

that will map out a path out of this crisis and that the United 

States and others want only to move forward on sanctions, and 

that there is some idea out there that these are mutually exclusive 

paths instead of complementary paths. And I do think by talking 

more about why these are routes that should be taken simultaneously could help in terms of framing the issues and restoring 

some multilateral momentum as well. 

And let me just explain a bit about what I mean. At this point, 

the opposition is basically being asked to negotiate at the point of 

a gun. Their supporters continue to be harassed and beaten and 

tortured, and yet they are supposed to walk into a negotiating 

room and assume some kind of good faith. They have very limited 

leverage in any negotiation without increased international pressure. It is essentially political extortion, not a negotiation, and it 

would be absurd for the international community to support that. 

But with additional pressure, I think that Secretary Frazer is 

right. A political process very well may be the way forward. ZANU– 

PF is certainly not going to simply disappear from the scene. A negotiation that can make the most of some of the riffs within the 

ruling party that she identified and critically that stresses what we 

need is a transitional government where there is some degree of 

power-sharing but there is a fixed timeframe leading to a new free 

and fair election, not some endless situation of power-sharing 

where political elites all get a seat at a table and the Zimbabwean 

people get forgotten. That does seem to be the most likely way forward. 

So in terms of recommendations, that leads to what I have already discussed, these framing issues, that it is important to talk 

about the complementarity between increased pressure and negotiations, that it is important to emphasize the dignity and rights 

of the Zimbabwean people and emphasize efforts to improve their 

38 

future prospects, not simply to condemn Robert Mugabe and his 

cronies. 

I would say it is critical to pay attention to Parliament and what 

is happening there or, rather, what is not happening when it is not 

being convened. And there are some very alarming reports about 

what the Government of Zimbabwe’s plans might be for undermining the results of the March Parliamentary elections. Any kind 

of recovery in Zimbabwe, any kind of negotiated deal is going to depend on an effective Parliament, and that is an issue that should 

be watched more closely, be spoken about a great deal more in our 

dialogue with African leaders. 

It makes sense to do what Secretary Frazer talked about, which 

is to keep working on these unilateral sanctions, trying to tighten 

up our own sanctions regime, but we have to be honest with ourselves. Those have limited efficacy, and they cannot be a substitute 

for trying to broaden the community of actors that are putting 

pressure on those most responsible for repression in Zimbabwe. 

Obviously, there has to be some supplement to President Mbeke’s 

mediation efforts. They are insufficient. And the United States can 

help not only by supporting that by ensuring that international actors and the mediation team are in a dialogue with Zimbabwean 

civil society. So again, this does not become just a process for political elites, but we are keeping that focus on Zimbabwe and 

Zimbabwean citizens. 

We should keep working on those in ZANU–PF who recognize 

that they do not have a very bright future if the status quo persists. They are working on a different time frame than President 

Mugabe is, and it is important to have quiet conversations with 

some of those actors. 

Finally, as Mr. Melia said, as the administration witnesses said, 

it is important to keep talking about Zimbabwe’s recovery. Laying 

out clear, concrete incentives for reform can help change the calculus of actors on the ground. It should not be abstract. It should 

not be theoretical. This is important for the region as well, for 

South Africans, and other Southern Africans to believe that there 

is a constructive project here that is going to benefit all of them 

if only we can get to that place. So I do think that it is not pie in 

the sky and it is critical to keep talking about Zimbabwe’s recovery. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Gavin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHELLE D. GAVIN, ADJUNCT FELLOW FOR AFRICA, 

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEW YORK, NY 

I am grateful to Chairman Feingold and Senator Isakson for this opportunity to 

testify before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, and I thank the subcommittee 

for its consistent and thoughtful efforts on the issue of Zimbabwe. 

The current state of play with regard to Zimbabwe is characterized by a desperate 

internal situation, a divided and ineffective set of international responses, and a 

troubling lack of clarity and consensus regarding the most promising way forward. 

The United States has limited options, but there are steps that can and should be 

taken to improve the prospects for a peaceful and swift resolution to the crisis. 

A MANMADE DISASTER

This subcommittee is more than familiar with Zimbabwe’s recent history. By the 

late 1990s, economic mismanagement, official corruption, and the dominance of the 

ruling ZANU–PF party had stoked significant frustration within the country. A referendum on constitutional change that would have strengthened President Mugabe 

39 

considerably catalyzed the forces opposed to the status quo and led to the emergence 

of a new opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), with roots 

in the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions. When the electorate rejected the government-backed draft constitution in February 2000, the ruling party embarked on 

an increasingly costly campaign to shore up its power and guarantee its continued 

dominance. 

Over the course of parliamentary elections in 2000 and 2005 and Presidential 

elections in 2002, ZANU–PF continued a campaign of intimidation aimed at the 

MDC, its supporters, independent journalists, civil society activists, and ordinary 

Zimbabweans (especially the 700,000 Zimbabweans displaced in 2005’s Operation 

Murambatsvina). The ruling party employed youth militia forces and ‘‘war veterans’’ 

in addition to using the regular security services to further its agenda. Senior security officers came to have a decisive role in all government decisions. Over time, the 

MDC was weakened to the point of splitting in 2005, with one faction led by Morgan 

Tsvangirai and another by Arthur Mutambara. Meanwhile, as the economy went 

into freefall, lucrative opportunities were provided to ZANU–PF elites to ensure 

their continued loyalty. 

The most recent round of elections demonstrated just how deep dissatisfaction 

with the ruling party has become within Zimbabwe—and just how far the Mugabe 

regime is willing to go to cling to power. The extraordinary nature of the MDC’s 

victories in the March 29, 2008, parliamentary and Presidential elections can only 

be understood when combined with a full appreciation for just how unfair the 

preelection conditions were in the runup to the balloting. Voting day itself was 

peaceful, but the campaigning period featured incidents of state harassment of opposition candidates, an extraordinarily strong state media bias in favor of the ruling 

party, manipulation of subsidized food to favor ZANU–PF, and widely publicized 

statements from senior security officials indicating that they would not recognize 

any victor but President Mugabe. Even with the deck stacked steeply against them, 

the official tallies, which the ZANU–PF-dominated electoral commission took 5 

weeks to announce, revealed that opposition candidates fared extremely well with 

voters, winning a narrow majority in the House of Assembly and a plurality of the 

votes for President, though not enough to avoid the need for a runoff. 

In the weeks before the runoff election, preelection conditions went from problematic to terrifying. The Government of Zimbabwe banned many humanitarian and development NGOs from operating in the country and launched a vicious and farreaching campaign of brutality and violence targeting MDC leaders and supporters 

as well as everyday citizens. Mugabe and members of his inner circle also made it 

clear that they would not respect any election result other than victory. In response, 

Tsvangirai withdrew from the June 27 sham exercise, which Mugabe won in a 

meaningless landslide. 

Zimbabwe today is a country held hostage by an illegitimate government. As the 

international community fails to come to consensus on a strategy for resolving the 

crisis, civilians suffer in the midst of a man-made economic catastrophe characterized by stratospheric hyperinflation, massive unemployment, and food shortages so 

severe that the World Food Program anticipates that some 5 million Zimbabweans 

will be in need of food aid by September. This humanitarian crisis is all the more 

alarming in light of the Government of Zimbabwe’s refusal to allow NGOs full access to populations in need. On top of this grim outlook, brutal political repression 

continues in Zimbabwe, as hardliners in ZANU–PF seek to continue punishing 

Zimbabweans for supporting democratic change and to decimate the organizational 

capacity of the opposition party and of independent civil society organizations. The 

ruling party continues to keep the press on a tight leash and takes deliberate steps 

to isolate and misinform the Zimbabwean people. 

THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

The international community’s response to these developments has been disjointed for years, and unfortunately it remains incoherent today. Over the course 

of the past 8 years, the United States, EU, Australia, and others condemned the 

repression in Zimbabwe and in many cases pursued targeted sanctions policies 

while still trying to provide humanitarian support to the population. In 2004, 

Zimbabwe withdrew from the Commonwealth rather than face expulsion. But many 

African states have long been reluctant to condemn Mugabe, and South African 

President Thabo Mbeki’s efforts to mediate between the MDC and ZANU–PF on behalf of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have produced very 

little in the way of results. Mugabe has exploited these different reactions, and often 

characterizes the crisis in Zimbabwe as a new liberation struggle against neocolonial 

Western powers. 

40 

The events of the past several months have focused renewed international attention on Zimbabwe’s crisis. Teams from the African Union, SADC, and the Pan-African Parliament all issued statements regarding the June 27 election indicating that 

it did not meet any appropriate standards. Several African governments, including 

those of Zambia, Botswana, Liberia, Senegal, Tanzania, and even Angola have, in 

one form or another, denounced the Zimbabwean Government’s actions. Powerful 

voices from within South Africa have spoken out as well. But at the recent AU summit, African leaders could come to consensus only around language expressing concern about the situation and encouraging negotiations aimed at forming a Government of National Unity. 

Despite resistance from some African leaders, the G–8 issued a strong statement 

on Zimbabwe on July 8, rejecting the legitimacy of the current Government of 

Zimbabwe, urging a negotiated resolution to the crisis that respects the results of 

the March 29 election, recommending the appointment of a U.N. envoy to report on 

the crisis and facilitate mediation, and pledging to take further action against those 

responsible for political violence. But last week’s failed attempt to pass a United Nations Security Council resolution applying additional international pressure on those 

most responsible for Zimbabwe’s suffering was a deeply disappointing illustration of 

the rifts that still exist in the international community with regard to Zimbabwe’s 

crisis that dramatically slowed multilateral momentum. Though the resolution had 

nine votes of support, Russia and China both exercised their vetoes to defeat the 

resolution, and South Africa, Libya, and Vietnam voted against it. 

The motives driving those who have acted to protect Zimbabwe’s repressive and 

illegitimate government are varied, but they undoubtedly include the following 

concerns: 

—A desire on the part of repressive governments to shield similarly autocratic 

and illegitimate regimes from international approbation; 

—A fundamental discomfort with the prospect of condemning a leader of a historic 

liberation struggle; 

—An unwillingness to publicly acknowledge the inadequacy of President Mbeki’s 

mediation efforts; and 

—A misguided belief that increased international pressure and an internationally 

supported political solution to the current crisis are mutually exclusive goals. 

THE SEARCH FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION

While the international community is in disarray regarding the issue of sanctions, 

there is widespread international consensus on the desirability of negotiating the 

formation of some new government that includes elements of both ZANU–PF and 

the MDC. However, the form such a government would take is unclear. All indicators suggest that ZANU–PF wishes to retain its power and simply co-opt the MDC. 

The opposition points out that it was the winner of the March 29 elections, which 

had some real legitimacy, and therefore should lead any new governing arrangement. 

While the MDC has participated in talks (which currently appear to be stalled) 

on the modalities for such a negotiation, the party continues to insist that it will 

not actually negotiate until political prisoners in Zimbabwe are released and the violent repression within the country stops. In short, the opposition does not wish to 

be forced to negotiate at gunpoint. Without the leverage of increased international 

pressure, however, this request for fundamental fairness is unlikely to be met. The 

MDC has also called for a new mediator from the AU to take the lead in facilitating 

negotiations, but despite having completely lost the confidence of one of the parties, 

President Mbeki is clearly reluctant to relinquish his exclusive role. 

Whatever the specifics of the process, one should be wary of too many glib calls 

for a ‘‘Kenyan solution.’’ Some actors, including Robert Mugabe, will have to exit the 

political stage, and only an enforceable transitional arrangement that guides the 

country to genuinely free and fair elections within a specified timeframe makes 

sense. To view power-sharing as an end in itself is to ignore the Zimbabwean people 

and to discount the decisive role that they should play in determining the future 

of governance in their country. The problem in Zimbabwe is not that Robert Mugabe 

and Morgan Tsvangirai are locked in a struggle for executive power. The problem 

is that the Zimbabwean people have been denied their fundamental rights. Keeping 

the population rather than political elites at the forefront of the international debate 

can help to ensure that political solutions actually create space for more accountable 

governance in the future. 

41 

NEXT STEPS

The hard truth is that this international landscape leaves the United States without many promising options, but this is not an argument for inaction or for empty 

gestures. A combination of public signaling, private communication, and concrete action can help to influence Zimbabwean and other African actors with more direct 

leverage than the United States possesses. 

With regard to public messages, it is vital that the United States underscore that 

increased international pressure on the current, illegitimate Government of 

Zimbabwe is not intended to be an alternative to a political negotiation leading to 

a transitional government. Instead, increased pressure is needed to make such a negotiated process possible, by compelling ZANU–PF to abandon its current strategy 

of trying to beat the opposition into bending to its will. That’s not a negotiation; 

that’s political extortion, and for the international community to rely upon such a 

process is absurd. 

As suggested above, the United States should make plain that the fundamental 

aim of its policy is to respect the dignity and rights of the Zimbabwean people and 

to improve their future prospects, not simply to condemn Robert Mugabe and his 

cronies. Certainly there is nothing wrong with speaking the truth about the appalling regime currently in power, and it is important to continue to note that this government has no claim to legitimacy. But efforts to encourage more effective African 

policies stumble when we overemphasize the role of individual political elites and 

underemphasize the point that the citizens of Zimbabwe, more than any political 

leader or group, deserve international support for their basic rights. They also deserve basic protections and assistance. The United States must continue to work 

with others to push for full humanitarian access in Zimbabwe, and this issue should 

be raised in regional and international organizations constantly until it is resolved. 

The United States should avoid focusing on the problems with the Zimbabwean 

Presidency to the neglect of the Parliament. Extremely worrying indications suggest 

that ZANU–PF will try to wrest the majority of seats in the House of Assembly back 

from the MDC before allowing the Parliament to function at all. By threatening 

elected opposition officials or arresting them, ZANU–PF is again thwarting the 

democratically expressed will of the citizens and doing further damage to the country’s governing institutions. The United States must keep a close watch on parliamentary developments, and should be discussing these alarming trends regularly 

with African leaders to ensure that the integrity of the parliamentary election results remains on the international agenda. 

Of course, the United States should act quickly and decisively to tighten targeted 

sanctions on individuals and institutions directing, perpetrating, or financing political violence and undermining democracy in Zimbabwe, but we must recognize that 

these actions, while they help to increase the costs of repression and lend themselves to satisfyingly tough announcements, cannot stand alone. Hard diplomatic 

work must accompany unilateral action to significantly broaden the community of 

countries taking meaningful steps to pressure the most problematic actors in 

Zimbabwe. That means that despite last week’s disappointment in the Security 

Council, the United States should keep working at the highest levels to encourage 

international and regional bodies to take stronger action that can set the stage for 

genuine political negotiations. 

President Mbeki cannot be effective as the sole mediator in talks between the 

MDC and ZANU–PF. Another mediator with a mandate from the African Union 

must be brought in to facilitate negotiations, and the United States should work 

closely with the AU to expedite the deployment of such an additional actor and to 

ensure that he has all of the resources required to succeed, including the capacity 

to call on members of the international community to provide vital guarantees and 

lay out clear consequences for bad faith. The United States can also work to ensure 

that international actors supporting an effective negotiation regularly consult with 

Zimbabwean civil society. 

The United States should recognize that Zimbabwe’s ruling party is not monolithic. Ultimately, actors within ZANU–PF who recognize that the country’s economy must be stabilized and that this will not happen if the political status quo persists, can be persuaded to abandon the hardliners who aim to cling to power at all 

costs. Where the United States has access to some of these actors, it should not miss 

opportunities to encourage them to act on what they know to be true: Mugabe must 

go, and the era of unaccountable ZANU–PF-dominance must end. 

In this vein, it is still useful to speak publicly and clearly about the recovery efforts that the United States and other members of the international community are 

prepared to support once sound governance mechanisms are in place in Zimbabwe. 

Moreover, the United States should continue efforts to establish sound reconstrucVerDate Aug 31 2005 08:27 Jan 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\46166.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
42 

tion plans and to marshal international resources toward this end. By making sure 

that incentives for supporting a change in governance are concrete rather than theoretical, the United States, working with others, can help to garner more ZANU–PF 

support for real reform, and to isolate those currently wielding the most influence 

within the party. 

Ideally, the Zimbabwean people will be able to make final decisions about accountability for crimes committed to date. But the United States and others can 

support efforts to establish the basic facts of the matter by backing a United 

Nations investigation of the human rights abuses that have occurred thus far. 

Finally, it is worth noting that the limits of U.S. leverage in this situation point 

toward the need for effective multilateral institutions and diplomatic credibility in 

order to address pressing foreign policy concerns. Not only does the United States 

have a clear interest in averting violent conflict and costly state collapse, it also has 

an obvious interest in promoting democracy and development in a region that 

should be an economic engine for the continent. None of these concerns will be addressed in Zimbabwe simply through unilateral action. Halting the decline of U.S. 

soft power, and doing the often-frustrating work of building consensus internationally, are indispensable building blocks of a policy response to Zimbabwe’s crisis, and 

to others that may emerge in the future. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Ms. Gavin, thanks for your excellent testimony. And your comments remind me of the meeting you and I attended of Zimbabwean civil society with people with enormous 

courage and ability and how critical it is that they be central to the 

future. 

I will start with a 7-minute round. 

Mr. Melia, your organization, Freedom House, works extensively 

with civil society in countries throughout Africa, and I know that 

domestic electoral observers, such as the Zimbabwean Electoral 

Support Network, played a courageous role in reporting on the 

March 29 elections and subsequent events. 

Is there still a need to protect domestic observers? And if so, 

what steps should be taken to do that? 

Mr. MELIA. Yes. The brave people of ZESN, that election network, which was itself a coalition of a number of preexisting civil 

society groups, went into the March elections with a fair amount 

of trepidation. They were afraid of being beaten and abused and 

losing jobs, et cetera. 

What was interesting—and that was the period when I was in 

Zimbabwe just before the March 29 election—was that they were 

out doing their thing. They were out educating people on how to 

vote because there was some reapportionment of districts that 

made it a little bit complicated on knowing where to vote on election day. And there were a lot of people in church groups, and civic 

groups, and women’s groups, et cetera that were out there telling 

people how to vote properly to make sure they got their vote cast 

and counted. And that made a big difference on election day and 

the fact that they were present in those places. And we and others 

supported those efforts with money, training, the provision of material goods. 

But they were waiting every day for the other shoe to drop, and 

what people told me, MDC leaders told me, civil society leaders 

were waiting for the other shoe to drop. They said the surge in violence that we were expecting from the regime has not arrived yet. 

And that was in those days before March 29. 

The surge in violence did not really come until 3 or 4 days after 

March 29. In June, it was all about the surge in violence by the 

regime against these people. So their efforts were severely disVerDate Aug 31 2005 08:27 Jan 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\46166.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
43 

rupted. There were some efforts at monitoring, but mostly they 

were not able to implement their monitoring program. The voter 

education groups mostly did not implement the plans they had in 

June, and ZESN did not issue a statement after the election. 

So those people are at the ready. They took it on the chin, quite 

literally, from the Joint Operations Command and the militias, the 

veterans, the groups that were out beating people who were supporting a legitimate process. So efforts by the international community to provide some protection to them would be very important. 

Senator FEINGOLD. What role does the Zimbabwean diaspora 

play in the current situation? How can they best contribute to a negotiated agreement, Mr. Melia? 

Mr. MELIA. Well, as you know, 2 million to 3 million 

Zimbabweans have left the country in recent years. The 

Zimbabwean diaspora is a huge, significant portion of the population, only recently departed from Zimbabwe. Most of them are in 

South Africa. 

A lot of talent is in that community. A lot of the people who 

would be necessary to rebuild Zimbabwe are present in that diaspora community in southern Africa and worldwide, but mostly in 

South Africa and the region. Those are among the people that could 

be brought together for planning the transition arrangement to put 

together the plans for the future of Zimbabwe, and the international community could play a role in convening these 

Zimbabweans both those in country and those out of country to 

work together to plan for the reconstruction of their country. 

Senator FEINGOLD. There is some concern. We have heard that 

the opposition MDC is facing internal strains largely as a result of 

the overwhelming repression by the security forces. What can be 

done, Mr. Melia, by the United States and others to ensure the cohesion of the MDC and its ability to negotiate effectively? 

Mr. MELIA. A lot of effort has been invested over the last 8 or 

10 years in working with the MDC to develop strategies and organizational coherence. In a democratic movement, people are going 

to disagree. It will not always be possible to have everybody on the 

same page. But I think that the consultative process that the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute has embarked on, working with the MDC and its different factions to keep venues for dialogue alive and working has been important in this process, just as the work that we have been doing 

on a parallel track with civil society to keep them talking with each 

other, to realize that they are fundamentally on the same side and 

on the same page. 

I think international groups have a role to play in convening 

meetings where they can discuss and strategize together. But I 

think if we overfocus on a particular result—it is consistent with 

what Ms. Gavin said in that if we overfocus on particular outcomes 

or particular leaders getting into a particular position, we may lose 

our focus which should be on the broader population of Zimbabwe 

and a broader process in which Zimbabwean voices can be heard. 

So I think there is a degree of modesty we should retain in going 

into these kinds of consultative efforts. It is not up to us to direct 

them to come to a predetermined plan or a plan of action, but to 

facilitate their learning process and their consultative process. 

44 

Senator FEINGOLD. Ms. Gavin, you mentioned in your testimony 

that international pressure on the Mugabe regime should aim to 

give leverage to political negotiations and a negotiated agreement. 

How can the U.S. Government maximize its leverage to bolster 

current mediation efforts? 

Ms. GAVIN. Well, unfortunately, the answer is doing the very 

hard slog of diplomatic work to ensure that we do not stand alone 

and that we do not just stand with a cast of characters that Robert 

Mugabe has in some ways effectively painted as neo-colonial or 

neo-imperialists. So we cannot sort of give up despite the frustration, and I understand the frustration—I feel the frustration—with 

the failure of the AU to take a more decisive stand with SADC’s 

insistence thus far on sort of clinging to President Mbeke’s mediation effort, which is simply inadequate. One does not have to criticize President Mbeke to acknowledge that you cannot have an effective mediation if you have lost the confidence in one of the parties. Well, there is no question that he does not have the confidence 

of the MDC. 

So we have to keep working to ensure that we do not stand 

alone. We cannot sort of comfort ourselves with a coalition of the 

willing approach and march forward with sanctions and advice regarding a political negotiation that does not include these other actors. 

Senator FEINGOLD. And do you believe that the current mediation can be strengthened or is there a need to make this happen 

for a new mediation team and initiative? 

Ms. GAVIN. I think that either is a possibility. I think it might 

be easier to finesse perhaps by simply supplementing the mediation that exists. That way no one has to reject anyone’s good efforts and good offices. But certainly I think the Secretary was 

using ‘‘expansion’’ as her preferred phrase, and I think that makes 

some sense. 

Clearly, there needs to be a new actor in the mix, ideally one 

with a mandate from perhaps the AU, perhaps the U.N., although 

that may be difficult. And I think it makes sense to talk about 

needing a presence on the ground, a secretariat. The United States 

can play an important role in providing resources to such a temporary institution to ensure that that can be as effective a process 

as possible. 

But if I may just very quickly say I do think it is important not 

to make too many close parallels to the Kenyan situation. 

Zimbabwe is different. We are not dealing with this closely elected 

contest where the integrity of the process largely fell apart in the 

coalition and counting of ballots. This is a situation where we had 

one election that despite completely unfair preelection conditions 

where the deck was stacked against the opposition, voting day 

went pretty well, and the opposition emerged largely victorious and 

then a complete sham of a runoff. So it is a different kind of process. It requires a different sort of strategy. 

But where the parallel with Kenya I think does make some sense 

is to point out that it was international pressure and leverage that 

forced Kenyan actors to the table making concessions. It did not 

simply spring up of its own accord. 

45 

Senator FEINGOLD. And what steps should the United States 

take to increase pressure on South African President Mbeke to address the crisis in Zimbabwe in a strong, just, and efficient manner? 

Ms. GAVIN. I am not sure that there things that we can do to 

change President Mbeke’s mind about his approach and certainly 

on other bilateral irritants. I do not think that we have had much 

success when President Mbeke has dug into a position in resolving 

any kind of antagonistic relationship with him on specific issues. 

But I do think what we can do is make the most of the other South 

African voices that are making themselves heard. It is very important to recognize that South Africa is not monolithic, the ANC is 

not monolithic. And to talk about supplementing his efforts perhaps rather than rejecting them just might be more constructive. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Finally—and then I will turn to Senator 

Isakson—Ms. Gavin, you have effectively said that any serious resolution of the current crisis must include Mugabe’s exit and an end 

to ZANU–PF dominance. Under what circumstances do you believe 

Mugabe would exit, and how can the United States contribute to 

fostering those circumstances? 

Ms. GAVIN. Here is where I do think quiet conversations with 

other parts of ZANU–PF come in because, obviously, President 

Mugabe would want some guarantees regarding his future. Ultimately decisions about accountability should be left in the hands 

of the Zimbabwean people. Ideally they will be able to make them. 

But in terms of the negotiation process, it seems reasonable to assume that some kind of arrangement to ensure his future security 

might be set up. 

But what would it take to get him to step aside? I think it would 

take pressure from within the ruling party. It would essentially 

take an act in which those in ZANU–PF who know that they have 

got no lasting future, that their investments are not secure—I am 

not pretending these people are terribly committed to good governance and democracy, but there is an enlightened self-interest that 

can be appealed to here. And I do think that it is going to take a 

decision within the party to take a different course and to isolate 

the hard-liners who right now are calling the shots. And that 

means some quiet conversations where we have access to important 

actors within ZANU–PF to try and encourage them to act. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. 

I apologize, Senator Isakson, for going over time, but please proceed. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I apologize, Mr. Melia. When I walked in and sat down, you were 

in the middle of a thought, and so I am going to ask you a question 

about what I think I remember I heard. 

You were talking about the inability of the U.N. to get the resolution through, and you made a reference to this administration’s 

estrangement from the U.N. Is that correct? Did I hear that right? 

Mr. MELIA. Yes; you did. 

Senator ISAKSON. Would you elaborate on that estrangement? 

Mr. MELIA. Well, for instance—and it relates directly to these 

discussions of human rights and democracy. The U.N.’s Human 

Rights Council in Geneva—the administration has chosen not to 

46 

present itself as a candidate, not to be active in the workings of the 

newly reorganized council. And it has left the field to the enemies 

of freedom and democracy. The Russians and the Egyptians and 

the Chinese and the Cubans are very active in these U.N. forums. 

It matters a lot to them that they be able to thwart efforts to pass 

resolutions, conduct investigations, develop reports. And as long as 

we are absent from these forums, the side of the democracies is 

weaker for that. 

So there has been—I do not need to revisit all of the rhetorical 

fireworks of the early part of the Bush administration in approaching the U.N. under Ambassador Bolton’s leadership, et cetera. But 

it has left the United States not as present and engaged in the 

U.N. system generally and specifically on matters of human rights 

and democracy as it could have been. 

Senator ISAKSON. Ms. Gavin made a comment about—where is 

my note here? Motives are varied in the reasons to vote against the 

resolution, but you referred to the autocratic glass house theory 

where sometimes autocrats just do not want to vote against somebody who is pretty autocratic themselves. Did I hear it that way? 

Ms. GAVIN. That is right. 

Senator ISAKSON. So really, I do not have a secret motive here. 

So really, what you are saying is, Mr. Melia, if we had been a better participant, for example, in the human rights negotiation or 

committee, whatever, we might have had more leverage on the Security Council to keep that from happening? 

Mr. MELIA. It is not clear that we would have been able to avoid 

the Russian and Chinese vetoes by any means. And if you look at 

the Security Council vote, the people that voted with the Russians 

and the Chinese were Libya and Vietnam, along with South Africa. 

All the rest of the Security Council voted for the sanctions. 

But my point is that there is an active campaign by those nondemocracies to seize control of these institutions and to use them 

to thwart the adoption of measures that reflect what we would see 

as fair standards on human rights and democracy. 

Senator ISAKSON. Sort of a self-preservation motivation. 

Mr. MELIA. Absolutely. Now, Michelle Gavin is right. Look at the 

voting both in the AU and in SADC and at the Security Council. 

It is clear it is not so much of a regional distinction or a left/right 

distinction. It is a democracy versus nondemocracy distinction. And 

that is the point I was making earlier about the sub-Saharan Africa more generally, is that over the last 10 and 20 years, there has 

emerged a democratic character in sub-Saharan Africa’s governance that was not there previously. It is still nascent. It is still 

fragile, but it is emerging. And that is what we saw in the outspokenness by President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, President Kufour of 

Ghana. 

You talked about the apparent split in Kenyan leadership between Prime Minister Odinga and President Kibaki. Well, that is 

a difference between people that like elections where they count 

the votes and people who do not like elections where they count the 

votes fairly. And that comes through again and again in the treatment of Zimbabwe. 

That is why I said that American diplomacy should be engaged 

much more assiduously in cultivating this emerging sensibility 

47 

among African governments so that it has a broader consequence 

than just the way we look at the Zimbabwe crisis. The Russians 

and the Chinese do not think this is just about Zimbabwe. They 

think this is about the way the U.N. system will operate more generally, and we should see it that way too. We should be building 

coalitions with like-minded allies. 

Senator ISAKSON. Ms. Gavin, you made a comment about we 

should frame our efforts at mediation in the interest of restoration 

of rights of the people versus getting rid of Mugabe. I think that 

is kind of how I heard it. And you also said sanctions should be 

a means to an end, meaning mediation. It should be effective to 

bring about mediation. 

If, in fact, mediation could take place and if, in fact, there was 

some negotiation to get Mugabe to withdraw or to accede from 

power, would the army support a freely elected government, or is 

their loyalty so strong to him ideologically that they would try and 

keep it from happening? 

Ms. GAVIN. That is a very important question I think, Senator 

Isakson. My sense, from talking to people on the ground, is that 

the security forces are not any more monolithic than the ruling 

party is. Certainly at the very top you have a set of hard-liners 

who see their fates as inextricably linked to that of President 

Mugabe, and to some degree these actors are sort of hostage to 

each other at this point. 

But if you look at the middle level and certainly the lower level 

of the security forces, you are dealing with masses of actors who 

have been struggling with the same economic circumstances as the 

rest of the Zimbabwean people and in many cases not getting paid, 

getting paid so little, given the stratospheric hyperinflation that 

they cannot feed their families. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that the MDC got quite a few votes from people who work 

in the security sector in the March elections. 

So while I think that there are actors besides President Mugabe 

whose futures would probably have to be part of any negotiation 

who would be concerned about various guarantees for themselves, 

et cetera, I do not think it is necessarily the case that the entirety 

of the security forces would necessarily be a problem. 

Senator ISAKSON. So the loyalty is kind of at the top, and if in 

fact, you did have a restoration of rights for the people and a transitional way, the lower end of the security system could possibly 

help support a new government rather than actually trying to overthrow it. 

Ms. GAVIN. I think that is true, and I think they would like a 

chance to see some economic stabilization just like any other 

Zimbabwean citizen so that they could have some security for their 

families. And they probably would like a chance to see their work 

reprofessionalized and be able to function like a professional and 

capable security service again. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize but I 

have got to run to a meeting. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I understand. 

Senator ISAKSON. I thank both of you very much. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Senator Isakson. 

48 

I thank the panel. I regret that we have to conclude this, but I 

have to proceed to yet another task Ms. Gavin sent me 2 years 

ago—the CSIS HIV/AIDS Task Force. So your legacy continues. 

But this was an excellent panel. 

This concludes the hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 12:28 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BARACK OBAMA, U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing on the crisis in 

Zimbabwe and the prospects for resolution. 

I find the recent events in Zimbabwe to be deeply disturbing and condemn the 

actions of President Robert Mugabe in the strongest possible terms. The United 

States and the international community must be clear, unequivocal, and united 

about the Government of Zimbabwe’s illegitimacy and lack of credibility. 

For far too long, the people of Zimbabwe have suffered, living in fear and struggling to survive. Opposition supporters and leaders, civil society activists, and ordinary citizens are subject to harassment, torture, and murder. The economic catastrophe brought about by the Government of Zimbabwe has led to hyperinflation and 

shortages of food and fuel. The deliberate disruption of humanitarian operations by 

the regime has caused misery for the Zimbabwean people. The entire Southern African region is affected by the crisis, which is ruining the vision of a more prosperous, 

just, and stable continent. 

I am encouraged by the growing support of African leaders for the civil and political rights of the Zimbabwean people. The Governments of Zambia, Botswana, Tanzania, Angola, Senegal, Kenya, and South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC), 

civil society leaders and trade unions have all denounced the Zimbabwean Government’s repression. However, these parties must do much more to help prevent the 

crisis in Zimbabwe from escalating out of control. The Government of South Africa 

and the ANC, in particular, must recognize the need and call for the kind of diplomatic action that is necessary to pressure the Zimbabwean Government to stop its 

repressive actions. 

With the support of the international community, regional leaders should work toward an enforceable, negotiated political transition in Zimbabwe that would end repressive rule and enable genuine democracy to take hold. The United States, for its 

part, must tighten its existing sanctions, just as the Southern African Development 

Community (SADC), the African Union (AU), and the U.N. should take concrete 

steps to isolate Zimbabwean officials who continue to thwart democracy and undermine the rule of law. 

I will continue to call for an end to the repressive and divisive actions of the 

Mugabe regime so the people of Zimbabwe can pursue their hopes for legitimate political change and opportunity. I look forward to working with the committee to address this important issue. 

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