United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ROBERT J. LABONTE, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

 

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2021-1432

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in No. 1:18-cv-01784-RAH, Judge Richard A. Hertling.

______________________ 

Decided: August 12, 2022

______________________ 

ALEXANDER FISCHER, JOSHUA HERMAN, Veterans Legal 

Services Clinic, Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization, Yale Law School, New Haven, CT, argued for plaintiffappellant Robert J. Labonte, Jr. Also represented by 

LERNIK BEGIAN, CASEY SMITH, MICHAEL JOEL WISHNIE. 

 RICHARD PAUL SCHROEDER, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also 

represented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, MARTIN F. HOCKEY, JR.,

DOUGLAS K. MICKLE. 

 JULIE VEROFF, Cooley LLP, San Francisco, CA, for 

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2 LABONTE v. US

amici curiae John Brooker, Eleanor Morales, Brian D. 

Schenk, Eugene R. Fidell, Hugh McClean, Raymond Jewell 

Toney. Also represented by KATHLEEN R. HARTNETT. 

 LIAM JAMES MONTGOMERY, Williams & Connolly LLP,

Washington, DC, for amici curiae National Veterans Legal 

Services Program, Protect Our Defenders. Also represented by AMY MCKINLAY, MIRANDA PETERSEN. 

 ______________________ 

Before CHEN, SCHALL, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

SCHALL, Circuit Judge. 

Appellant, Robert J. LaBonte, Jr., is a veteran who 

served in the United States Army. In 2006, he went absent 

without leave (“AWOL”) for six months. After he voluntarily returned to his base, he pleaded guilty to a charge of 

desertion in a court-martial proceeding and was separated 

from the Army with a Bad Conduct Discharge.

In 2015, Mr. LaBonte applied to the Army Board for 

Correction of Military Records (“ABCMR” or “Board”), 

seeking retroactive medical retirement. He alleged that, 

while in the Army, he had had a permanent disability resulting from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), traumatic brain injury (“TBI”), depression, and anxiety 

incurred during service. He also alleged that these disabilities had rendered him unfit for service prior to his absence 

without leave, his court-martial, and his discharge. In 

2018, the Board denied his claim.

Mr. LaBonte then filed suit in the United States Court 

of Federal Claims challenging the ABCMR decision. On 

December 3, 2019, the court remanded the case to the 

Board for further proceedings. LaBonte v. United States, 

No. 18-1784C (Fed. Cl. Dec. 3, 2019), J.A. 2716. On April 

29, 2020, on remand, the Board again denied Mr. LaBonte’s 

claim for disability retirement. J.A. 2763–65. Subsequently, with the case back before the Court of Federal 

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LABONTE v. US 3

Claims, Mr. LaBonte challenged the ABCMR’s April 2020 

decision and moved for judgment on the administrative record. The government renewed a previous motion to dismiss 

for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 

granted and, in addition, cross-moved for judgment on the 

administrative record.

On October 30, 2020, the Court of Federal Claims 

granted the government’s motion to dismiss. LaBonte v. 

United States, 150 Fed. Cl. 552, 564–65 (2020). The court 

determined that, in order for the ABCMR to grant Mr. LaBonte disability retirement, the Board would have to correct Mr. LaBonte’s DD-214 Form (“DD-214”) to show that 

he was separated due to physical disability rather than due 

to a court-martial conviction. Id. at 561–62.1 Concluding 

that a statute, 10 U.S.C. § 1552(f), prohibited the Board 

from correcting Mr. LaBonte’s DD-214 in this manner, the 

court held that the Board was without authority to grant 

Mr. LaBonte the relief he was seeking. Id. at 562–64. Pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6), it therefore dismissed Mr. LaBonte’s claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

could be granted, without reaching the merits of his challenge to the Board’s decision. Id. at 564–65. 

Mr. LaBonte now appeals the Court of Federal Claims’ 

dismissal of his complaint. For the reasons set forth below, 

we hold that the Court of Federal Claims erred in holding

that the ABCMR lacked authority to grant the relief 

1 The DD-214 is titled “Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty.” J.A. 754. A DD-214 provides 

“an accurate and complete summation of active military 

personnel service” and serves as “an authoritative source 

of personnel information for administrative purposes, and 

for making enlistment or reenlistment eligibility determinations.” Department of Defense Instruction (“DoDI”) 

1336.01 ¶ 4(a) (Aug. 20, 2009); see LaBonte, 150 Fed. Cl. at 

559 n.4. 

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4 LABONTE v. US

Mr. LaBonte is seeking. The court therefore erred in dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief could be granted. Accordingly, we reverse the 

court’s decision and remand the case to the court for consideration of the merits of Mr. LaBonte’s challenge to the 

April 2020 decision of the Board.

BACKGROUND

I 

The pertinent facts are set forth in the decision of the 

Court of Federal Claims.2

Mr. LaBonte enlisted in the Army in 2002. LaBonte, 

150 Fed. Cl. at 555. In 2004, he was deployed in Iraq. During that deployment, he sustained injuries when he fell 

from a 30-foot guard tower. After returning from Iraq, 

Mr. LaBonte sought help from his chain of command and 

from the Fort Hood Mental Health Clinic for symptoms of 

mental distress, anxiety, disrupted sleep, and panic attacks. An intake specialist at the Mental Health Clinic documented his symptoms and diagnosed him with an 

adjustment disorder. Id.

In 2004, shortly after his visit to the Mental Health 

Clinic, Mr. LaBonte learned that he was scheduled to 

2 In ruling on the government’s motion to dismiss,

the Court of Federal Claims properly assumed the truth of 

the facts alleged in Mr. LaBonte’s complaint. LaBonte, 150 

Fed. Cl. at 555 n.1; see Call Henry, Inc. v. United States, 

855 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that, when 

deciding whether a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim should be granted, the court “must accept wellpleaded factual allegations as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the claimant” (citing 

Bell/Heery v. United States, 739 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 

2014))). 

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LABONTE v. US 5

deploy again to Iraq. Upon learning this, he informed his 

chain of command that he was not mentally prepared to 

return to Iraq, and eventually he went AWOL for six 

months. In 2006, Mr. LaBonte voluntarily returned to Fort 

Hood. Subsequently, he pleaded guilty to a charge of desertion in a court-martial proceeding and was separated 

from the Army with a Bad Conduct Discharge. Id.

In 2012, Mr. LaBonte sought treatment from a clinical 

psychologist, who diagnosed him with PTSD stemming 

from his combat service in Iraq. In 2014, Mr. LaBonte was 

evaluated by a psychiatrist who also diagnosed him with 

service-connected PTSD. Id.

In 2014, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs 

(“VA”) concluded that Mr. LaBonte was eligible for VA benefits for service-connected PTSD, TBI, depression, headaches, back pain, tinnitus, a painful scar, and ulcers. Id. 

And subsequently, in 2016, Mr. LaBonte received a 100% 

service-connected disability rating from the VA. Id. at 556. 

II

Following his PTSD diagnosis, Mr. LaBonte sought formal review of his service history and post-discharge benefits.3 In 2014, the Army Discharge Review Board (“ADRB”) 

upgraded the characterization of Mr. LaBonte’s discharge. 

LaBonte, 150 Fed. Cl. at 556. The ADRB stated:

[I]n light of the clear evidence of PTSD, a [Bad Conduct Discharge] in retrospect is too harsh. If the 

applicant had a firm diagnosis of PTSD and indication of TBI, this would have been mitigating at his 

trial, [which] in turn would have led to a more lenient sentence.

3 In our discussion of the procedural history of the 

case, we cite to relevant portions of the record in addition 

to the decision of the Court of Federal Claims. 

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. . . This recommendation is made after full consideration of all of the applicant’s faithful and honorable service, as well as the record of misconduct. 

The evidence in this case supports a conclusion 

that the applicant’s characterization of service may 

now be too harsh and as a result inequitable.

J.A. 1839. The upgrade was reflected on Mr. LaBonte’s 

DD-214, where Block 24, Character of Service, was 

changed from “BAD CONDUCT” to “GENERAL, UNDER 

HONORABLE CONDITIONS.” J.A. 754. Relevant to this 

appeal, the ADRB declined to change the reason for Mr. 

LaBonte’s discharge, which was his 2006 court-martial. 

See J.A. 754, 1833, 1840.

In 2015, having secured the upgrade of his discharge 

from the ADRB, Mr. LaBonte applied to the ABCMR for 

retroactive medical retirement. LaBonte, 150 Fed. Cl. at 

556.4 Before the Board, Mr. LaBonte alleged that he had a 

permanent disability for PTSD, TBI, depression, and anxiety incurred during service. He argued to the Board that 

his disability caused him to be unfit for service prior to his 

absence without leave, his court-martial, and his discharge. Id.5 On October 19, 2017, the ABCMR denied Mr. 

4 A service member who is physically disabled during service is eligible to apply for military disability retirement under 10 U.S.C. § 1201. See Jones v. United States, 

30 F.4th 1094, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2022). Where a service member has not been considered or has been rejected for disability retirement prior to leaving active service, the service 

member can pursue disability retirement before a correction board. Chambers v. United States, 417 F.3d 1218, 

1225 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Friedman v. United States, 

310 F.2d 381, 392, 396 (Ct. Cl. 1962)).

5 Mr. LaBonte’s application for correction sought retirement pay from no later than June 30, 2004, the date he 

sought help at the Fort Hood Mental Health Clinic, to 

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LABONTE v. US 7

LaBonte’s application for medical retirement. The Board 

stated:

[B]ased on the available post-service medical evidence, it could be argued the applicant met the criteria for referral to the [disability evaluation 

system for possible medical retirement] prior to going AWOL. However, in accordance with 

[10 U.S.C. §] 1552, the ABCMR is not empowered 

to set aside a conviction. As such, and since his discharge resulted from his court-martial conviction, 

he is ineligible for processing through the [disability evaluation system] for possible medical retirement.

ABCMR, No. AR20160000403 (Oct. 19, 2017), 

https://boards.law.af.mil/ARMY/BCMR/CY2016/20160000

403.txt, J.A. 162; see also LaBonte, 150 Fed. Cl. at 556. The 

Board concluded that there was “no basis to amend 

[Mr. LaBonte’s] DD Form 214 by changing the reason and 

authority for separation.” J.A. 162.6

The ABCMR’s decision was reviewed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army Francine Blackmon. Secretary

Blackmon found that “there [wa]s sufficient evidence to 

grant additional relief.” LaBonte, 150 Fed. Cl. at 556 (alteration in original) (quoting J.A. 198). Accordingly, she 

directed the Office of the Surgeon General to determine if 

Mr. LaBonte “should have been retired or discharged by 

November 20, 2012, the date he submitted an informal 

claim for VA benefits. J.A. 294.

6 Block 28 of Mr. LaBonte’s DD-214 reflects the 

“Narrative Reason for Separation” as “COURT-MARTIAL, 

OTHER.” J.A. 754. Block 26 provides the corresponding 

“Separation Code” of “JJD.” Id.; see Br. for Nat’l Veterans

Legal Servs. Program 6. 

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8 LABONTE v. US

reason of physical disability through the [disability evaluation system].” Id. (quoting J.A. 198).

In response to Secretary Blackmon’s directive, two 

Army physicians conducted an evaluation of Mr. LaBonte 

as part of a Medical Evaluation Board (“MEB”).7 LaBonte, 

150 Fed. Cl. at 556. The physicians sought to determine 

whether processing through the disability evaluation system was warranted at the time of Mr. LaBonte’s separation. The physicians concluded that Mr. LaBonte failed to 

meet medical-retention standards in 2003 because of his 

PTSD, generalized anxiety disorder, and major depressive 

disorder, and in 2004 because of his TBI. They found it 

“unlikely that any further interventions for these conditions would have returned the service member to duties 

consistent with [his] rank and [Military Occupation Specialty].” Id. at 556 (second alteration in original) (quoting 

J.A. 178). 

Following the review by the two MEB physicians, 

Dr. Eric Doane, a Senior MEB physician, issued a medical 

advisory opinion, reviewing Mr. LaBonte’s medical records 

for the ABCMR. Id. He found that, at the time of 

7 Mr. LaBonte asserts that he was evaluated by military physicians through the Army’s Legacy Disability 

Evaluation System, which is the proper disability evaluation system for Army Veterans referred by the ABCMR. 

Compl., LaBonte v. United States, No. 18-1784C (Fed. Cl. 

Nov. 20, 2018), ECF No. 1, at 14–15 n.2. Under that system, an MEB determines if a service member met medical 

retention requirements at the time of separation. If the

MEB finds the service member did not meet the military’s 

standards for retention, the MEB will recommend referral 

of the service member to a Physical Evaluation Board 

(“PEB”). The PEB determines the service member’s past 

fitness for duty and eligibility for benefits. See generally

Army Regulation (“AR”) 635-40. 

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LABONTE v. US 9

Mr. LaBonte’s separation in 2006, there were no indications of disabling PTSD and no symptoms of TBI. 

Dr. Doane concluded that Mr. LaBonte was not in need of 

disability processing at the time of his separation from the 

Army. The Board, on June 21, 2018, adopted Dr. Doane’s 

opinion in full as the basis for its denial of Mr. LaBonte’s 

claim. Id.; see J.A. 188.

III

On November 20, 2018, Mr. LaBonte filed suit in the 

Court of Federal Claims, alleging that the denial of his 

claim was arbitrary and capricious, in bad faith, unsupported by substantial evidence, and a violation of the due 

process clause of the Fifth Amendment. LaBonte, 150 Fed. 

Cl. at 556.

After briefing and oral argument, the court held that it 

had jurisdiction under the Tucker Act over Mr. LaBonte’s 

claim for medical retirement. Id. at 556–57. It then vacated the ABCMR’s decision to deny Mr. LaBonte’s claim 

as contrary to law because the Board had relied on a medical opinion—the Doane opinion—“that failed to consider 

medical evidence as required by 10 U.S.C. § 1552(h)(2)(B).” 

Id. at 557 (quoting J.A. 2716).8 As a result, the court remanded the case to the Board to “obtain a further medical 

opinion that considers the medical evidence as required by 

8 Paragraph (h) of 10 U.S.C. § 1552 pertains to a 

claim by a former member of the armed forces for review, 

by a correction board, of a discharge, based on matters relating to PTSD or TBI. In such a case, the correction board 

reviews the claim “with liberal consideration to the claimant that post-traumatic stress disorder or traumatic brain 

injury potentially contributed to the circumstances resulting in the discharge or dismissal or to the original characterization of the claimant’s discharge or dismissal.” 

10 U.S.C. § 1552(h)(2)(B).

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10 LABONTE v. US

law and thereafter resolve [the] plaintiff’s claim.” Id. (quoting J.A. 2716). 

On remand, on April 29, 2020, the ABCMR again denied Mr. LaBonte’s request for disability retirement. Id. 

Pursuant to the remand order, the Board obtained a medical advisory opinion from the Office of the Surgeon General. In her advisory opinion, Dr. Denise M. Richardson 

stated that there is “a dearth of medical records available 

during [Mr. LaBonte’s] time in service.” Id. (quoting J.A. 

2787). “Therefore,” she concluded, “there is no evidence to 

support the need for disability processing prior to his discharge.” J.A. 2787; see also LaBonte, 150 Fed. Cl. at 557. 

In rejecting Mr. LaBonte’s claim for disability retirement, 

the Board stated in pertinent part as follows:

The Board, while noting that the applicant was ineligible for referral into the Disability Evaluation 

System . . . prior to service separation because . . . 

he was charged with an offense under the Uniform 

Code of Military Justice . . . that could, and did, result in a punitive discharge, considered whether 

the applicant failed medical retention standards 

and was unfit prior to service separation in light of 

the previous upgrade of the discharge to general 

(under honorable conditions). . . . The Board determined that a preponderance of the evidence does 

not support a finding that the applicant failed medical retention standards or had any unfitting conditions, to include PTSD and TBI, warranting a 

disability separation/retirement prior to service 

separation. 

J.A. 2763; LaBonte, 150 Fed. Cl. at 557. 

IV

A 

Following the ABCMR’s remand decision and the return of the case to the Court of Federal Claims, the 

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LABONTE v. US 11

government renewed its motion to dismiss for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief could be granted and, in the 

alternative, moved for judgment on the administrative record. LaBonte, 150 Fed. Cl. at 557. Mr. LaBonte responded 

in opposition and also moved for judgment on the administrative record. Id.

As noted above, on October 30, 2020, the Court of Federal Claims granted the government’s motion to dismiss. 

The court first affirmed that Mr. LaBonte’s disability retirement claims came within the court’s jurisdiction under 

the Tucker Act. Id. at 557–58. In that regard, the court 

determined that the statute governing military retirement 

for disability, 10 U.S.C. § 1201, is a money-mandating statute because “when the requirements of the statute are 

met—i.e., when the Secretary determines that a service 

member is unfit for duty because of a physical disability, 

and that disability is permanent and stable and is not the 

result of the member’s intentional misconduct or willful neglect—the member is entitled to compensation.” Id. at 557 

(quoting Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1175 (Fed. 

Cir. 2005)). Next, the court held that Mr. LaBonte’s suit 

was timely filed within six years of the ABCMR’s October 20, 2017 decision, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2501. Id.

at 559. On appeal, the government does not challenge either the court’s ruling with respect to the Tucker Act or the 

statute of limitations. 

B 

The Court of Federal Claims turned next to the merits 

of the government’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim. In that regard, the government made two arguments. First, it contended that Mr. LaBonte was not eligible for disability processing under AR 635-40.9 Second, it 

9 As the court noted, AR 635-40 has changed since 

the time relevant to this case, but the parties accept the 

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12 LABONTE v. US

argued that, in order to grant Mr. LaBonte the relief he 

was seeking, the ABCMR would have to correct his DD214. The government argued, though, that the Board was 

without authority under 10 U.S.C. § 1552(f) to correct Mr. 

LaBonte’s DD-214. Although § 1552(a) authorizes correction boards to grant disability retirement, the government 

urged that the statute could not be relied upon for that purpose in Mr. LaBonte’s case because § 1552(f) bars correction boards from making such a correction to records that 

note court-martial proceedings. The government urged 

that Mr. LaBonte’s DD-214 was such a record. 

C 

Turning to the government’s first argument, the court 

noted that, at the time relevant to Mr. LaBonte’s claim,

¶ 4-1 of AR 635-40 limited eligibility for disability retirement in the case of a service member charged with an offense:

4-1. Soldiers charged with an offense

a. Uniform Code of Military Justice action. The 

case of a Soldier charged with an offense under the 

Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or who is 

under investigation for an offense chargeable under the UCMJ which could result in dismissal or 

punitive discharge, may not be referred for, or continue, disability processing unless— 

(1) The investigation ends without charges.

(2) The officer exercising proper court-martial jurisdiction dismisses the charges.

applicability of the version of the regulation in effect at the 

time of Mr. LaBonte’s court-martial in 2006. LaBonte, 150 

Fed. Cl. at 560 (citing AR 635-40 (Feb. 8, 2006)) & n.5. 

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LABONTE v. US 13

(3) The officer exercising proper court-martial jurisdiction refers the charge for trial 

to a court-martial that cannot adjudge such 

a sentence.

AR 635-40 ¶ 4-1; LaBonte, 150 Fed. Cl. at 560. Paragraph 

4-2 of AR 635-40 provided that a soldier “may not be referred for, or continue, disability processing if under sentence of dismissal or punitive discharge.”

The Court of Federal Claims rejected the government’s 

argument that Mr. LaBonte was not eligible for disability 

processing under AR 635-40. LaBonte, 150 Fed. Cl. at 560–

61. The court reasoned that, although Mr. LaBonte was 

separated by court-martial, his punitive discharge—Bad 

Conduct Discharge—was, in view of the 2014 action of the 

ADRB, no longer reflected on his DD-214. Id. at 561. “The 

punitive discharge limitation in paragraph 4-2,” the court 

stated, “therefore does not apply to the plaintiff because he 

is no longer ‘under’ a punitive discharge.” Id. Since 

Mr. LaBonte was not currently facing charges or undergoing a court-martial, and since he had received clemency 

from the ADRB, the court determined that he was no 

longer subject to a punitive discharge. Id. “Therefore,” the 

court concluded, “by its own terms, Army Regulation 635-

40, in effect at the time of [Mr. LaBonte’s] discharge, does 

not preclude [him] from disability-retirement processing.” 

Id. On appeal, the government does not take issue with 

the court’s ruling regarding AR 635-40.

D 

Having disposed of the government’s first argument, 

the Court of Federal Claims proceeded to address the government’s contention that the ABCMR was without authority to correct Mr. LaBonte’s records to grant him 

disability retirement.

Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1), “[t]he Secretary of 

a military department may correct any military record of 

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14 LABONTE v. US

the Secretary’s department when the Secretary considers 

it necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice.” 

However, as the Court of Federal Claims noted, LaBonte, 

150 Fed. Cl. at 561 & n.6, under 10 U.S.C. § 1552(f), when 

the correction involves “records of courts-martial and related administrative records pertaining to court-martial 

cases,” the authority to correct a record is limited to 

“(1) correction of a record to reflect actions taken by reviewing authorities” under the UCMJ, or “(2) action on the sentence of a court-martial for purposes of clemency.”10

As noted above, the government took the position that, 

in order to grant Mr. LaBonte disability retirement, it 

would be necessary to change his military records to reflect 

that he was medically separated. Def.’s Renewed Mot. to 

Dismiss and, In the Alternative, Cross-Mot. for J. on the 

Admin. R., and Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot., LaBonte v. United 

States, No. 18-1784C (Fed. Cl. Aug. 19, 2020), ECF No. 74,

at 27–29. One example of a military record that would 

need to be changed, the government argued, was 

10 Section 1552(f) provides in full:

(f) With respect to records of courts-martial and related administrative records pertaining to courtmartial cases tried or reviewed under chapter 47 of 

this title (or under the Uniform Code of Military 

Justice (Public Law 506 of the 81st Congress)), action under subsection (a) may extend only to— 

(1) correction of a record to reflect actions 

taken by reviewing authorities under chapter 47 of this title (or under the Uniform

Code of Military Justice (Public Law 506 of 

the 81st Congress)); or

(2) action on the sentence of a court-martial 

for purposes of clemency.

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LABONTE v. US 15

Mr. LaBonte’s DD-214. Specifically, the government contended that “[t]o place Mr. LaBonte in retirement processing, at the very least, the narrative reason for 

separation on his DD-214 Form would need to be changed 

from ‘court-martial’ to reflect medical retirement.” Id. at 

29. According to the government, however, this change 

could not be made because Mr. LaBonte’s DD-214 was a

“related administrative record” under 10 U.S.C. § 1552(f). 

Id. Mr. LaBonte responded with two arguments: first, that 

no statute or regulation prevented his records from reflecting both a court-martial conviction and medical retirement 

status; and second, that to the extent retirement processing 

requires that his DD-214 be altered, § 1552(f) did not bar 

the correction. Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of his Mot. for J. on the 

Admin. R., Resp. in Opp. To Def.’s Cross-Mot., and Resp. to 

Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, LaBonte v. United States, No. 18-

1784C (Fed. Cl. Sept. 23, 2020), ECF No. 82, 7–11; LaBonte, 150 Fed. Cl. at 561–62.

The Court of Federal Claims began its analysis by determining that, in order to grant Mr. LaBonte disability retirement, it would be necessary for the Board to correct his 

DD-214. The court arrived at this conclusion based upon 

the following reasoning:

Although Secretary Blackmon subsequently determined that the evidence supported the plaintiff’s 

request for relief, the Board’s original decision in 

2017 informs this discussion. The Board found 

that the plaintiff had requested “in effect” a correction of his DD-214 to show that “he was retired due 

to physical disability.” The Board concluded that 

because the plaintiff’s court-martial made him ineligible for disability processing, there was “no basis to amend [his] DD Form 214 by changing the 

reason and authority for separation.” The Board 

itself therefore has answered the question; it would 

need to correct the plaintiff’s DD-214 in order to 

grant the relief the plaintiff seeks.

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16 LABONTE v. US

LaBonte, 150 Fed. Cl. at 562 (alteration in original) (first 

quoting Admin. R. 86, then quoting Admin. R. 115 (J.A. 

162)).

Having determined that granting Mr. LaBonte the relief he sought required changing his DD-214, the court 

turned to the government’s argument that 10 U.S.C. 

§ 1552(f) barred correction of Mr. LaBonte’s DD-214 because the form is an “administrative record” that is “related” to his court-martial. Id. Addressing that argument, 

the court first considered 10 U.S.C. § 801(14), which defines the term “record,” when used in connection with the 

proceedings of a court-martial. It states: 

(14) The term “record”, when used in connection 

with the proceedings of a court-martial, means— 

(A) an official written transcript, written 

summary, or other writing relating to the 

proceedings; or

(B) an official audiotape, videotape, or similar material from which sound, or sound

and visual images, depicting the proceedings may be reproduced.

The court concluded that, although Mr. LaBonte’s DD-214 

noted his court-martial, it was not covered by any of the 

terms mentioned in § 801(14). LaBonte, 150 Fed. Cl. at 

562. Hence, the court determined, it was not a record of a 

court-martial under § 1552(f). Id. Next, the court considered dictionary definitions for the word “related.”11 The 

11 The court relied on definitions from two dictionaries. Related, Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2009) 

(“Connected or having relation to something else.”); Related, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“Connected 

in some way; having relationship to or with something 

else.”).

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LABONTE v. US 17

court reasoned that, because § 1552(f)’s “records of courtsmartial” already encompasses the broad category of “other 

writing[s] relating to the proceedings” in § 801(14), for the 

phrase “‘related administrative record[s]’ [in § 1552(f)] to 

have any meaning, it must incorporate a broad definition 

of ‘related’ to include any administrative document that is 

connected or has a relationship with a court-martial but is 

not part of, or contained within, the official records of the 

court-martial itself.” Id. at 563. The court thus concluded: 

“§ 1552(f) captures any administrative record that reflects 

the decision of the court martial.” Id. Thus, because

Mr. LaBonte’s DD-214 notes his court-martial as the reason for his separation (in Block 28), the court determined

that it is an administrative record “related” to the courtmartial under § 1552(f). Id. The court therefore concluded

that the ABCMR “is without authority to change the reason 

for separation due to the court-martial. Because such a 

change would be necessary for the Board to grant disability 

retirement in place of separation due to court-martial, the 

Board is without the authority to grant the plaintiff the relief he seeks.” Id. at 564. Accordingly, the court ruled that 

it could not grant Mr. LaBonte the relief he sought. It 

therefore dismissed his complaint for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief could be granted. Having dismissed the complaint, the Court of Federal Claims did not 

reach the merits of Mr. LaBonte’s challenge to the decision 

of the Board. Neither did the court reach Mr. LaBonte’s 

claim that, in rejecting his claim, the Board had violated 

his Fifth Amendment right to due process.

Mr. LaBonte has timely appealed the Court’s decision. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

I 

We review a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted by the Court of Federal Claims

de novo. Steffen v. United States, 995 F.3d 1377, 1379 (Fed. 

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18 LABONTE v. US

Cir. 2021). We also review statutory interpretation by the 

Court of Federal Claims de novo. FastShip, LLC v. United 

States, 968 F.3d 1335, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2020). 

II

On appeal, Mr. LaBonte argues that the Court of Federal Claims erred in granting the government’s motion to 

dismiss. First, he contends that the court erred in holding 

that 10 U.S.C. § 1552(f) creates a bar to what he says is the 

Board’s “otherwise broad authority” to act in his case, by 

preventing the Board from amending his DD-214 to remove 

the reference to his court-martial. Appellant’s Br. 21. Second, he argues that even if we were to hold that § 1552(f) 

prohibits correcting his DD-214 because it currently states 

that he was court-martialed, nothing prevents the Board 

from granting Mr. LaBonte disability retirement without 

removing the court-martial reference on his DD-214.

As explained below, we agree with Mr. LaBonte that 

the ABCMR was not required to change his DD-214 in order to grant him disability retirement.

III

In arguing that it is not necessary for the ABCMR to 

correct his DD-214 in order to grant him the relief he seeks, 

Mr. LaBonte states at the outset that he “does not primarily seek to correct his DD-214; he seeks disability retirement.” Appellant’s Br. 40. Addressing the Court of Federal 

Claims’ ruling that the Board must remove the reference 

to his court-martial in order to grant him disability retirement, Mr. LaBonte argues that the Board “can, and does, 

grant disability retirement by issuing retirement orders 

without ordering a specific correction to the veteran’s DD214.” Id. at 41. Mr. LaBonte states that this practice is 

consistent with the regulatory requirement that, at the 

conclusion of the disability evaluation process, the Army 

issues “retirement orders or other disposition instructions.” 

Id. (citing AR 635-40 ¶ 4-24(b)). In support of this 

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LABONTE v. US 19

proposition, Mr. LaBonte cites to several correction board 

decisions where, he says, disability retirement was granted 

without ordering correction of the veteran’s DD-214. Appellant’s Br. 41 nn. 7–9. 

In response, the government argues that the Court of 

Federal Claims correctly held that, in order to grant Mr. 

LaBonte disability retirement, it would be necessary to 

change his DD-214 to reflect that he was medically separated instead of separated pursuant to a court-martial conviction. The government discounts the relevance of the 

correction board decisions cited by Mr. LaBonte, urging 

that they did not involve a claim for disability retirement 

benefits by a service member who, like Mr. LaBonte, was 

discharged by a court-martial. Neither, the government 

contends, did those decisions involve the restrictions set 

forth in 10 U.S.C. § 1552(f). Appellee’s Br. 57–58. 

IV

We begin our analysis, as we must, with the pertinent 

statutory language. Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2364 (2019) (“In statutory interpretation disputes, a court’s proper starting point lies in a 

careful examination of the ordinary meaning and structure 

of the law itself.”); Nicely v. United States, 23 F.4th 1364, 

1368 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“When interpreting a statute, we 

‘begin with the language employed by Congress.’” (quoting 

Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 

U.S. 246, 252 (2004)) (addressing the language of 10 U.S.C. 

§ 1552(a)(1))). 

The language of the correction board statute is broad 

and unqualified. In relevant part, it states that “[t]he Secretary of a military department may correct any military 

record of the Secretary’s department when the Secretary 

considers it necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice.” 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1). We have stated that “[t]he 

Secretary [of a military department] is obligated not only 

to properly determine the nature of any error or injustice, 

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20 LABONTE v. US

but also to take ‘such corrective action as will appropriately

and fully erase such error or compensate such injustice.’” 

Roth v. United States, 378 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 

(quoting Caddington v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 604, 

606 (Ct. Cl. 1959)). 

Relevant to this case, as seen, AR 635-40 provided the 

eligibility criteria for disability evaluation. Again, ¶ 4-1 of 

the regulation stated: 

a. Uniform Code of Military Justice action. The 

case of a Soldier charged with an offense under the 

Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or who is 

under investigation for an offense chargeable under the UCMJ which could result in dismissal or 

punitive discharge, may not be referred for, or continue, disability processing unless— 

(1) The investigation ends without charges.

(2) The officer exercising proper court-martial jurisdiction dismisses the charges.

(3) The officer exercising proper court-martial jurisdiction refers the charge for trial 

to a court-martial that cannot adjudge such 

a sentence.

As also seen, ¶ 4-2 of the regulation provided that a soldier “may not be referred for, or continue, disability processing if under sentence of dismissal or punitive 

discharge.” The Court of Federal Claims held that because 

Mr. LaBonte was not currently charged by or undergoing a 

court-martial, and because his punitive discharge—Bad 

Conduct Discharge—was no longer reflected in his official 

record, AR 635-40, in effect at the time of his discharge, did 

not bar him from disability-retirement processing. As 

noted, on appeal the government does not challenge this 

ruling, and for our part we do not discern error in it.

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LABONTE v. US 21

V 

We conclude, though, that the Court of Federal Claims 

erred when it held that, in order to grant Mr. LaBonte the 

relief he seeks, the Board would have to change his DD214. As noted above, the DD-214 is titled “Certificate of 

Release or Discharge from Active Duty.” J.A. 754. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1168(a), “[a] member of an armed force 

may not be discharged or released from active duty until 

his discharge certificate or certificate of release from active 

duty, respectively, . . . are ready for delivery to him.” DoDI 

1336.01, which prescribes procedures for the preparation 

of DD-214 Forms, and which applies to all the military departments, see DoDI 1336.01 ¶ 2, provides as follows: “The 

DD Form 214 will provide an accurate and complete summation of active military personnel service [and] will provide the Military Services with an authoritative source of 

personnel information for administrative purposes, and for 

making enlistment or reenlistment eligibility determinations.” DoDI 1336.01 ¶ 4(a). In addition, the form serves 

as “the authoritative source of information required for the

administration of State and Federal laws applicable to personnel who have been discharged, released, or transferred 

to a Reserve Component while on active duty.” Id. at ¶ 4(f). 

The Instruction further provides that “[e]very Service 

member who is being separated shall be given a completed 

DD Form 214 describing relevant data regarding the Service member’s service and the circumstances of termination.” DoDI 1336.01 ¶ 4(c). And, it provides, in addition, 

that “[t]he DD Form 214 will be accurately prepared to provide the Service member a clear, concise summary of active 

service with the Military Services at the time of transfer, 

release, discharge, or Service member change of component 

or status while on active duty.” DoDI 1336.01 ¶ 4(d). Paragraph 3(a) of Enclosure 3 of DoDI 1336.01, which deals 

with the preparation of DD-214s, emphasizes that a “DD 

Form 214 is an important record of service that must be 

prepared accurately and completely.” 

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22 LABONTE v. US

AR 635-8 (2019), previously AR 635-5 (2000), implements DoDI 1336.01. AR 635-8 ¶ 5-1 (2019) states: 

The DD Form 214 is a summary of the Soldier’s 

most recent period of continuous active duty. It 

provides a brief, clear-cut record of all current active, prior active, and prior inactive duty service at 

the time of [release from active duty], retirement, 

or discharge. The DD Form 214 is not intended to 

have any legal effect on termination of a Soldier’s 

service. 

See also AR 635-5 ¶ 2-1 (2000).12 This language also is 

used in the regulation implementing 10 U.S.C. § 1168. See

32 C.F.R. § 45.3 (2006) (“DD Forms 214 are not intended to 

have any legal effect on termination of the member’s service.”).

In our view, 10 U.S.C. § 1168(a), DoDI 1336.01, and the 

cited regulations make it clear that the DD-214 is a record 

document. Its purpose is to record and reflect the pertinent 

events of a person’s time in the military department in 

which he or she served. The DD-214 does not establish

those events or bring them into being. Rather, it documents that they have occurred or taken place. In other 

words, a DD-214 Form merely reflects the events of the 

past. This is highlighted most clearly, we think, by the instruction in 32 C.F.R. § 45.3 (2006) and AR 635-8 ¶ 5-1, 

12 Paragraph 2-1 of AR 635-5 (Sept. 15, 2000), used 

slightly different language. It recited that “The DD Form 

214 is a summary of a soldier’s most recent period of continuous active duty. It provides a brief, clear-cut record of 

active duty service at the time of release from active duty, 

retirement, or discharge.” Paragraph 2-1 of AR 635-5, like 

current AR 635-8, stated that a “DD Form 214 is not intended to have any legal effect on termination of a soldier’s 

service.” 

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LABONTE v. US 23

formerly AR 635-5 ¶ 2-1, that “[t]he DD Form 214 is not 

intended to have any legal effect on termination of a Soldier’s service.”13 Further support for this conclusion can be 

found in AR 635-8, which explains that a DD-214 is prepared using various “source documents,” including the 

“[s]ervicemember’s record brief,” “[s]eparation approval 

documents, if applicable,” the “[s]eparation order,” and 

“[a]ny other document authorized for filing in the [Army 

Military Human Resource Record].” AR 635-8 ¶ 5-4 (2019); 

see also AR 635-5 ¶ 2-3 (2000) (discussing the preparation 

of a DD-214 worksheet using “source documents” to include 

the service member’s “record brief,” “[s]eparation approval 

authority documentation, if applicable,” “[s]eparation order,” and “[a]ny other document authorized for filing in the 

Official Military Personnel File”).

Our conclusion that it is not necessary for the Board to 

alter Mr. LaBonte’s DD-214 in order to grant him disability 

retirement is supported also by the practice of the military 

departments. That practice is reflected in the correction 

board decisions Mr. LaBonte cites. In those decisions, service members’ underlying records were altered to grant all 

or part of their requested relief. See ABCMR, No. 

AR20130022069 (Sept. 11, 2014), https://boards.law.af.mil/

ARMY/BCMR/CY2013/20130022069%20.txt (granting a 

service member disability retirement by voiding his prior 

discharge and issuing him new retirement orders, without 

mentioning his DD-214); ABCMR, No. AR20150007051 

(May 28, 2015), https://boards.law.af.mil/ARMY/BCMR/

13 Indeed, a service member’s discharge can be effected without actual delivery of a DD-214. United States 

v. Butler, 637 F.3d 519, 522 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that 

delivery of an Air Force member’s DD-214 was not necessary to effect his discharge where the form was ready for 

delivery and he could not reasonably have misunderstood 

his discharged status).

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24 LABONTE v. US

CY2015/20150007051%20.txt (same); ABCMR, No. AR 

20120015742 (July 2, 2013), https://boards.law.af.mil/

ARMY/BCMR/CY2012/20120015742.txt (same). In none of 

these cases did the Board purport to alter the Applicant’s 

DD-214. This approach is consistent with that taken by 

other branches of the military, which have corrected the 

records of service members previously separated for reasons of misconduct to reflect a discharge by “Secretarial 

Authority” independently from a correction to the service 

member’s DD-214.14 

14 In one of the decisions Mr. LaBonte cites, the Board 

for Correction of Naval Records (“BCNR”) recommended

that a service member’s “naval record” (as opposed to his 

DD-214) be corrected to reflect that he was discharged by 

reason of “Secretarial Authority” (with the corresponding 

separation code), after the Naval Discharge Review Board 

upgraded the characterization of his service subsequent to 

a prior conviction by special court-martial. BCNR 5448-

14/8917-13 (June 17, 2014), https://boards.law.af.mil/

NAVY/BCNR/CY2014/NR5448%2014.pdf. This is notable 

because the BCNR recommended correction of the service 

member’s “naval record . . . to reflect, in [a block] of his DD214” a medal the service member had earned. Id. No such 

reference to any block of the service member’s DD-214 was 

made with respect to correction of the service member’s 

reason for discharge in his “naval record.” 

In yet another decision provided by amicus National 

Veterans Legal Services Program, the BCNR corrected a 

petitioner’s “naval record” to reflect “Secretarial Authority” 

as the reason for his discharge despite the petitioner’s prior 

bad conduct discharge due to a court-martial conviction. 

See Addendum to Br. for Nat’l Veterans Legal Servs. Program, BCNR [Title and Docket No. Redacted]. In that case, 

the BCNR recommended that these corrections be made to 

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LABONTE v. US 25

As noted above, in ruling that, in order to grant Mr. 

LaBonte the relief he was requesting, the Board would 

have to alter his DD-214, the Court of Federal Claims 

stated:

Although Secretary Blackmon subsequently determined that the evidence supported the plaintiff’s 

request for relief, the Board’s original decision in 

2017 informs this discussion. The Board found 

that the plaintiff had requested “in effect” a correction of his DD-214 to show that “he was retired due 

to physical disability.” . . . The Board concluded 

that because the plaintiff’s court-martial made him 

ineligible for disability processing, there was “no 

basis to amend [his] DD Form 214 by changing the 

reason and authority for separation.” . . . The 

Board itself therefore has answered the question; it 

would need to correct the plaintiff’s DD-214 in order to grant the relief the plaintiff seeks.

LaBonte, 150 Fed. Cl. at 562 (alteration in original) (first 

quoting Admin. R. 86, then quoting Admin R. 115 (J.A. 

162)). 

We have two difficulties with the court’s reasoning. 

The first is that it fails to address 10 U.S.C. § 1168, 

32 C.F.R. § 45.3, AR 635-8, and DoDI 1336.01, which we 

have just discussed. The second is that it misreads the action of the Board in this case. The court relied on language 

in the Board’s 2017 decision where the ABCMR noted, but 

declined to grant, Mr. LaBonte’s request to amend his DD 

Form 214 to reflect a different authority and narrative reason for separation. Specifically, in its 2017 decision the 

Board stated:

the service member’s “naval record,” and that he be issued 

a new DD-214. Id. 

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26 LABONTE v. US

12. With respect to the portion of the request that 

pertains to a separation/retirement for medical 

reasons, based on the available post-service medical evidence, it could be argued [Mr. LaBonte] met 

the criteria for referral to the [disability evaluation 

system for possible medical retirement] prior to going AWOL. However, in accordance with 

[10 U.S.C. §] 1552, the ABCMR is not empowered 

to set aside a conviction. As such, and since his discharge resulted from his court-martial conviction, 

he is ineligible for processing through the [disability evaluation system] for possible medical retirement. 

13. Based on paragraph 12 above, . . . there is no 

basis to amend the applicant’s DD Form 214 by 

changing the reason and authority for separation. 

J.A. 162. This language does not establish that it was necessary for Mr. LaBonte’s DD Form 214 to be altered in order for him to receive disability retirement. Instead, it 

simply reflects that the reason the Board declined to 

amend Mr. LaBonte’s DD-214 was because it found “no basis” to do so, not because it found such a correction to be 

required before Mr. LaBonte could receive disability retirement. Further, the Board’s reasoning for saying it had “no 

basis” to change Mr. LaBonte’s form was its inability to set 

aside his conviction, but his prior conviction does not stand 

in the way of his eligibility under the court’s unchallenged 

ruling with respect to AR 635-40. In any event, Mr. LaBonte does not seek to set aside his conviction. See, e.g., 

Oral Arg. at 10:30–11:20, https://oralarguments.

cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=21-1432_04042022.mp3

(Apr. 4, 2022). 

We also note that, before our court, the government has 

failed to provide any authority to support the proposition 

that in order to receive disability retirement an applicant’s

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LABONTE v. US 27

DD-214 must be corrected. See, e.g., Oral Arg. at 21:55–

23:55. 

Accordingly, we hold that the Court of Federal Claims 

erred in ruling that it was necessary for the ABCMR to alter Mr. LaBonte’s DD-214 in order to grant him the relief 

of disability retirement that he is requesting. The court 

therefore erred in dismissing Mr. LaBonte’s complaint on 

the ground that he had failed to state a claim upon which 

relief could be granted. The decision of the court is reversed and the case is remanded to the court for further 

proceedings addressing Mr. LaBonte’s challenge to the 

ABCMR’s 2020 remand decision as well as, if necessary, his 

claim that the Board violated his Fifth Amendment right 

to due process. 

VI

One issue remains to be addressed, however. At oral 

argument, counsel for Mr. LaBonte stated that Block 23 of 

his DD-214 “would actually need to be changed under 

standard practice” should Mr. LaBonte be awarded medical retirement. Oral Arg. at 53:55–54:20. Block 23 of Mr. 

LaBonte’s DD-214 currently states that his “Type of Separation” was “DISCHARGE.” J.A. 754. However, if Mr. LaBonte’s disability retirement claim is successful, this entry 

would be changed to state “RETIREMENT.” AR 635-8, ¶ 5-

6.w. In that case, we cannot see how providing Mr. LaBonte with a DD-214 reflecting that his “Type of Separation” was “RETIREMENT,” while the “Narrative Reason 

for Separation” and “Separation Code” continue to refer to 

his court-martial proceedings, would provide him with the 

“accurate” and “complete” DD-214 that is required by DoDI 

1336.01 ¶ 4(a).15 To the extent that it may become 

15 To be clear, as we explained above, changing Mr. 

Labonte’s DD-214 is not a condition precedent to granting 

him disability retirement. But if Mr. Labonte is granted 

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28 LABONTE v. US

necessary to alter Mr. LaBonte’s DD-214 at some point in 

the future in this regard, we see no impediment to doing so 

in 10 U.S.C. § 1552(f).16 

As seen, the Court of Federal Claims’ primary rationale 

for its ruling that 10 U.S.C. § 1552(f) bars alteration of 

Mr. LaBonte’s DD-214 was its reliance on dictionary definitions for the meaning of the term “related” in § 1552(f)’s 

“related administrative records” and its determination that 

“related” must be broadly construed so as to avoid rendering the language of § 1552(f) “surplusage,” in view of 

10 U.S.C. § 801(14).17 LaBonte, 150 Fed. Cl. at 563. Most 

respectfully, we do not agree with this reasoning. 

disability retirement, his DD-214 should be corrected to accurately and completely reflect his situation.

16 We state our views on this issue in the interest of 

judicial economy and for the benefit of the parties and the 

Court of Federal Claims on remand. See Hansen Bancorp, 

Inc. v. United States, 367 F.3d 1297, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2004)

(providing guidance on the proper measure of restitution in 

the interest of judicial economy and for the benefit of the 

parties and the trial court where, on remand, the court 

could decide the issue of restitution anew); see also Larson 

Mfg. Co. of S.D., Inc. v. Aluminart Prods. Ltd., 559 F.3d 

1317, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (giving guidance to the district 

court on an issue not before the appellate court in the interest of judicial economy); Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., 

927 F.3d 1306, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“In the interest of judicial economy, however, we also address certain errors in 

the district court’s attorney fees analysis that could remain 

issues on remand.”). For the reason just stated, alteration 

of Mr. LaBonte’s DD-214 could become an issue on remand.

17 As previously noted, the court relied on definitions 

from two dictionaries. Related, Oxford English Dictionary

(3d ed. 2009) (“Connected or having relation to something 

else.”); Related, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) 

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LABONTE v. US 29

To begin with, the court’s reasoning focused solely on 

the term “related” in § 1552(f)’s phrase “related administrative records.” In its entirety, however, § 1552(f) states 

“related administrative records pertaining to court-martial 

cases” (emphasis added). The court thus failed to consider 

the impact of the phrase “pertaining to court-martial cases” 

in its statutory analysis.

To “pertain” to something means “to belong, be connected (in various ways); e.g. as a native or inhabitant, as 

part of a whole, as an appendage or accessory, as dependent,” Pertain, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989), or 

“to belong as a part, member, accessory, or product,” Pertain, Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 

2003). Section 1552(f)’s reference to administrative records 

“pertaining to court-martial cases” (emphasis added) 

clearly places Mr. LaBonte’s DD-214 outside the scope of 

the statute. As we have explained, a DD-214 is a record 

document, reflecting what has taken place. Plainly, it cannot be said to pertain to a court-martial in the sense of being part of the court-martial, which is what “pertaining to” 

in § 1552(f) requires.

Moreover, “[i]t is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their 

context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Nat’l Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of 

Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 666 (2007) (quoting FDA v. Brown 

& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132–33 

(2000)).18 Therefore, to properly analyze the meaning of 

(“Connected in some way; having relationship to or with 

something else.”).

18 Sections 801 and 1552 reside in different chapters 

of Title 10. We note that § 801 provides definitions for use 

“in this chapter,” referring to Chapter 47, the Uniform 

Code of Military Justice. Section 1552, however, resides in 

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30 LABONTE v. US

the phrase “related administrative records pertaining to 

court-martial cases,” we must consider the purpose of 

§ 1552(f). Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics 

Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 7 (2011) (“[I]nterpretation of [a] phrase 

‘depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the purpose and context of the statute . . . .’” (quoting 

Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006))). Congress passed § 1552(f) as part of the Military Justice Act of 

1983. The Senate Report that accompanied the bill clarifies that the purpose of § 1552(f) is to protect the courtmartial process from collateral review through the recordcorrection process. S. Rep. No. 98-53, at 36–37 (1983) (“The 

proposed legislation makes it clear that the appellate procedures under the UCMJ provide the sole forum under title 

10, United States Code, for a legal review of the legality of 

courts-martial.”). The Senate Report explains that correction boards “have no authority to modify, as a matter of 

law, findings or sentences of courts-martial” so as to “channel[] all appellate proceedings and claims for post-conviction relief into the judicial forums established for such 

actions by Congress in the UCMJ.” Id. at 36. Indeed, the

Senate Report also explains that correction boards are generally comprised of “laymen who have no judicial training” 

and “have extremely large caseloads, with neither the time 

nor the expertise for the judicial review of courts-martial.” 

Id. Accordingly, and “[b]ecause the UCMJ provides a comprehensive system for appellate review and post-conviction 

relief, these boards need not be involved in the issues of law 

concerning the court-martial process.” Id. We think it is 

clear from this legislative history that the purpose of 

§ 1552(f) supports an interpretation of “administrative records pertaining to court-martial cases” that is not broadly 

defined to encompass, in the words of the Court of Federal 

Claims, “any administrative record that reflects the 

Chapter 79, which pertains to the Correction of Military 

Records. 

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LABONTE v. US 31

decision of the court-martial.” LaBonte, 150 Fed. Cl. at 

563. Rather, a document, such as a DD-214, which simply 

reflects that a court-martial took place, but is not a part of, 

or a product of, the court-martial itself, lies outside the 

scope of § 1552(f). 

Further, an interpretation of “related administrative 

records pertaining to court-martial cases” that does not encompass documents that do not have a legal impact on a 

finding or sentence of a court-martial is consistent with 

guidance provided by the Department of Defense to the 

Military Discharge Review Boards and Boards for Correction of Military and Naval Records. In the 2014–2018 time 

period, the Department of Defense issued a series of interpretive memoranda that instructs the boards to give liberal 

consideration to, for instance, veterans who received less 

than fully honorable discharges based on misconduct and 

who were suffering from mental health conditions developed during service, including PTSD and TBI. See Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Charles Hagel to 

Secretaries of the Military Departments (Sept. 3, 2014); 

Memorandum from Principal Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense Brad Carson to Secretaries of the Military Departments (Feb. 24, 2016); Memorandum from Under Secretary 

of Defense A.M. Kurta to Secretaries of the Military Departments (Aug. 25, 2017) (“Kurta Memo”); Memorandum 

from Under Secretary of Defense Robert Wilkie to Secretaries of the Military Departments (July 25, 2018) (“Wilkie 

Memo”) (all on file with the Dep’t of Defense); see also Hassay v. United States, 150 Fed. Cl. 467, 483 (2020) (noting 

that, in that case, the government conceded these memoranda were binding on the BCNR). The Kurta Memo and 

Wilkie Memo, at least, make clear that this liberal consideration applies not only to upgrades to the character of a 

discharge, but also to requests for changes to the narrative 

reason for separation on a veteran’s DD-214. The Kurta 

Memo, for example, provides clarifying guidance to correction boards and discharge review boards considering 

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32 LABONTE v. US

veterans for “modification of their discharges,” and provides that “[u]nless otherwise indicated, the term ‘discharge’ includes the characterization, narrative reason, 

separation code, and reenlistment code.” Kurta Memo at 

3. And the Wilkie Memo specifically refers to “[c]hanges to 

the narrative reason of separation” as a form of relief that 

can be granted “on equity, injustice, or clemency grounds.” 

Wilkie Memo at 2. 

In sum, a DD-214 is not a part of, or a product of, a 

court-martial itself, nor does it have a legal impact on a 

finding or sentence of a court-martial. Indeed, as seen, a 

“DD Form 214 is not intended to have any legal effect on 

termination of a Soldier’s Service.” AR 635-8 ¶ 5-1 (2019). 

And, as Mr. LaBonte acknowledges, regardless of what his 

DD-214 says, his conviction will not be removed from his 

underlying military records, nor could it be under 10 U.S.C. 

§ 1552(f). But that is not what Mr. LaBonte seeks. He 

merely seeks the opportunity to obtain disability retirement benefits for his PTSD and TBI. Should he be awarded 

such benefits, we conclude that § 1552(f) does not prohibit 

changing his DD-214 in order for it to be accurate and complete.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of 

Federal Claims is reversed. The case is remanded to the 

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

COSTS

Costs to Mr. LaBonte.

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