### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE May 14, 200 8 S es sio n
JOSEP H V ERM EAL v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Warre n Coun ty Nos. F -8351, F -8405 Larry B. Stanley, Jr., Judge

No. M2007- 01676-CCA -R3-P C - F iled Jul y 3, 2008

A Warre n County

jury convicted the Petitioner o f aggravated se x ual batter y and attempted ag g ravated sexual battery in se parate ca ses, and this Court aff irmed the judg ments on appea l. The Pe tit ion e r f

ile d tw o p os t- c on vict io n peti tio ns a sse rt ingva ri ou s g ro un ds fo r r e lie f. Th e po stconviction cour

t denied the pe titions for post-c onviction relief a fter a consolidated he aring . On appea l, the Petitioner alleg es: (1) he was denied the rig ht to a fair trial beca use a ca se re lied upon by the trial cour

t and on direc t appea l to ex clude e x pert testimony proff ere d by the Petitioner has since been ove rturned; a

nd (2) he was denied the eff ective assistance of counsel. After a thoroug h revie w of the re c or d a

nd a pp lic a ble law, we a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he po st- c on vic tio n c ourt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J., d e liv e re d th e op ini on of the c ourt , in

wh ic h J.C. M C L I N and D. K ELLY T HOMAS , J R ., J J ., joined.

L y nn Br ooks (at hea

ring ), McMinnville, Tenne ssee, a nd Michae l M ei s e (o n appea l), Dickson, Te nn e sse e , f

or the Ap pe lla

nt, Jose phVe rm e a l. Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney Gene ral and Reporter ; Michael E. Moore , Solicitor Genera l; Andrew Hamilton Smi th, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; David Puckett, District Attorney Gene ral P ro Tem, f or the Appellee , the State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

I. F acts
Or ig inatin g fr om s e pa

rate c a se s and

tr ia ls, the fa c ts und e rl yingthi s a pp e a l are se t f

or th i n two opinions from this C ourt. The f acts of the first ca se (he reina fter “ Ve rm e al I ” ) a re a s f oll ow s:2

T h e a p p e l l an tw a s i n d i c t e d

b y t h e W ar r e nC o u n t y

G r an d J u r y f o r r a p e o f a c h i l d

. In the light most favor able to the State, the pr oof adduc ed at tria l reve aled t h at on Aug ust 26, 2000, Pi oneer Communi ty Ba ptist Church sponsore d a block pa rty in the parkinglot of near

by Country Place Apar

tments. The party beg an at 10:00 a .m. and lasted until 2:00 p

. m

. Duringthe par ty , J ohn Thompson, the pastor of the churc h, saw the a ppellant on his porch at t h e apartment complex. Thomps on introduced himself to the appellant, a nd the t wo men spoke br iefly . Thompson observed that the appellant wa s drinking beer , but he did not a ppear intox icated. L ater , Thompson saw t h e a p p e l l an ts t an d i n g n e ar a d u n k i n g m a c h i n e t h a th a d b e e ns e tu

p f o r t h e p art y. Thompson stated that a number of childre n wer e takingturns g oing into the water. Thompson s aw a ch i l d enter the appe llant’s apar

tment and exit wit h towels. The
a p p e l l a n t d i s t r i b u t e d

t h e s e t o w e l s t o t h e w e tc h i l dr e n

. T h r o u g h o u tt h e p art y, Th omp so n s aw c hil dr e n g oin g int o a nd le avin g the a

pp e lla nt’ s a pa rtme nt.
After the party ended, the victim, J P, and her f riend, [NO], both of whom were eig ht y ear s old, rode their bic y cles with some friends. One of the other children told [NO] that th e y c ou ld o bta in i c e c re am at the a pp e lla nt’ s apa rtme nt. Th e c hil dr e n w e nt t o the appe llant’s apar

tment and found that the a ppellant was home

. The children g ot popsicles from the a

ppellant’s fr eezer , and ate them on the appellant’ s front porc h. After war d, the childre n went inside the a ppellant’s apa

rtment to watch te levision and jump on the appellant’s waterbe d. Soon, all of t he childre n except [NO] and JP went home. At trial, [NO] rec alled that she w as in the living room while J P wa s jumping on the appellant’ s bed. The a

ppellant went into the bedr oom. Orcu t t l o o ked into the be dr oo m and

saw t hat th e a pp e lla nt “ ha d ta ke n s ome of

[JP’s] c lothes off

and his pants and ha d his, um, private par t to her private part.” J P testified that the appe llant kn oc ke d h e r o nto the be d, re mov e d he r pants and un de rw e ar, re mov e d h is o wn pa nts and under

wea r, and pe netrated her

vag in a wi t h h i s penis. After the incident, the
c hil dr e n le ft

the a pp e lla nt’ s a pa rtme nt.
Charles I kear d, who testified for the appe llant, remembe red g oing to the a ppellant’s apar tment after

the block par

ty . He sa

w that [NO] and J P we re p l ay ing on the
a pp e lla nt’ s b e d. I ke ard

tol d th e a

pp e lla nt t hat “i t didn ’t

loo k g oo d” tha

t th e g ir ls
wer e in the apa

rtment with the appellant. Then, I kear d told the childre n to go home

. I kear d also informed the children’ s pare nts of the g irls’ location.

Howar d Orc utt, [ NO]’s father , stated that on the night of the offe nse he w as told that his daug hter wa s in the appellant’s a partment. After rec eiving the information, Mr. Orc utt approac hed the a

ppellant, who wa s on his porch. Mr. Orc utt c onfronted the appellant, a s k in g w h y h is d a u g h te r h a d b e e n in th e a p p e ll an t’ s a

p ar tm e n t. The appellant pushe d Mr. Orc utt. Then, Mr. Orc utt “ put him in the hospital,” be ating the appellant so seve rely

that an ambulanc e wa s called.3

[ NO] and JP wer e take n to the District Attorney Gene ral’s O ffice for que stioning. I nit ia lly , th e c hil dr e n d e nie d th a t any thi ngha d h a

pp e ne d. Ho wev er, a lmo st imm e diate ly

the re a ft e r, JP state d th a t th e a pp e lla nt a bu se d h e r a ft e r p lyinghe r w ith liquor and threatening her with a knife. At trial, J P ex plained that she ma nufac tured these a dditional details due to her f ear that she would g et in trouble with her mother beca use she was not suppose d to be in the appellant’ s apar tment, a nd she just wanted the orde al to be over . [NO] also ex plained that her previous stateme nts may have contained inc onsisten ci es bec ause she was “ fre aked out” by the incident and “ now Ican r emember

ever y thing that ha

ppened be cause Iain’t that sca red.”

At the c on c lus ion

of the pr oo f, the jur

y a c qu itt e d th e a

pp e lla nt o f t he c ha rg e d o ff e ns e but found him guilty

of t he lesser-included of

fense of ag g ravated sexual battery . The trial court imposed a

sentenc e of nine y ear s.
State v. Joseph Ve rmeal , No. M2 00 4- 00 04 6- CCA -R 3- CD , 200 5 WL 10 00 23 7, a t *1 -2 (T e nn . Cr im. App., at Na shville, Apr. 29, 2005), perm. app. de nied (Tenn. O ct. 24, 2005). The fac ts of the sec ond
case (her einaf

ter “ Verme al II

” ) a re a s f oll ow s:
The a ppellant wa s indicted by the Warre n County

Gra nd J ury on one count of ag g ravated sexual battery

. I n the light most fa vorable to the State, the proof a dduced at trial re veale d that on Aug ust 26, 2000, Pioneer Ba ptist Church sponsored a block pa rt y in t he pa rk inglot of

the ne arb y

Countr y Pla c e Ap artme nts . A ft e r t he pa rt y ended , t h e v i ctim, N.O., who wa s seven y ear s old, rode her bicy cle with seve ral friends. The victim was dresse d in blue jeans a nd a Twe ety

Bird shirt. One of the other child

r e nto ld th e v ic ti m t

h a t t h e y c o u ld o b ta in ic e c r e am at t

h e a p p e ll an t’ s apa rt m en t

. The c hildren we nt to the appellant’s a partment a

nd found that the appellant wa s at home, sitting on the por ch. Af t er rece iving the a

ppellant’s permission, the children w ent i nside and got popsicles fr om the appellant’ s fre ezer. At the appe llant’s reque st, the children ate their pops i cl es on the a ppellant’s fr ont porch instea d of inside his apar tment. Af

t er wa rd, t he childre n went inside the appellant’ s apar

tment to watch television and jump on the a ppellant’s waterbe d. Soon, all of the children except the victim and J .P., another fe male child, we nt home. The victim rema ined in the appe llant’s living room for thirty m i n u t es to an hour,
watc hin g c art oo ns on

c a ble te le vis ion , w hil e J.P. w e nt i n th e a pp e lla nt’ s b e dr oo m to jump on the bed. The a

ppellant joined J .P. in the bedroom. Some time after the appellant we nt into the bedroom, the victim wa s standing by the front door

looking
outsi de wh e n s he fe lt s ome on e tou c h h e r r ig ht b utt oc k. Duri nghe r t e sti mony a t tr ia l, th e v ic ti m d e mo n s tr a te d h o w s h e w a s to u c h e d

. T h e v ic ti m b e li e v e d th a t J. P. ha d tou c he d he r, but wh e n sh e tur ne d aro un d sh e sa

w t he a pp e lla nt. Th e a pp e lla nt s lid his hand underneath her shirt a nd touched he r bre asts. She explained that when he touched he r, “he . . . presse d down.” The appe llant removed his hand, g ot a bee r fr om t he kit c he n, and

re tur ne d to the be dr oo m.4

The victim was a fra id that she would g et into trouble for be ing in the a ppellant’s apar tment and for le tting him touch her . She rema i n ed in the apar tment for a f

ew minutes then went outside. She rode her bike for ten minutes be fore beingstopped by “Unc le E.J.,” Elvis J oseph Ke rsey . Ker sey told the vi ctim that one of his fr iends had see n her in the a

ppellan t ’s ap ar tment. The victim did not tell Kersey what the appellant ha d done bec ause she was e mbarras s ed an d did not want to discuss the inc ide nt. Ke rs e y and the vic tim we nt to fin d the vic tim ’s da d, Ho wa rd Or c utt . B oth Ke rs e y and Or c utt liv e d in Countr y Pla c e Ap artme nts

. When the victim and Ker sey found Orc utt at his apar tment, K erse y

told Orcutt that the vic timha d b e e n in

the a pp e lla nt’ s a pa rtme nt. Or c utt

le ft , g oin g imm e diate ly

to the a pp e lla nt’ s a pa rtme nt. He fo un d th e a pp e llan t si ttingon

the po rc h o f h is
a pa rtme nt. Or c utt

ste pp e d o n th e a

pp e lla nt’ s p or c h a

nd a sk e d the a

pp e lla nt why his daug hter ha d been in the a ppellant’s apa

rtment. The a

ppellant g rabbe d Orc utt’s neck and pushed him. A scuf

fle e nsued with Orc utt emerg ing a s the victor. Up on his re tur n to his a pa rtme nt, Or c utt

fo un d the vic tim sittin g on the po rc h w ith her g randmother , Ba

rbar a Be vilag ua. The victim wa s cry ing. Be vilag ua aske d the vic timif th e a

pp e lla nt h a d to uc he d h e r. I nit ia lly , th e vic timstate d th a t he ha d n ot; howeve r, shortly

there afte r she a ckn o wl ed ged that the a ppellant had touche d her. When asked whe re the appellant touche d her, the victim, who was sitting down, g estured be low her waist. Orc utt we nt ba ck to the appellant’ s apar tment, intending to kill hi m. Howeve r, police ha d been called a s a re sult of the previous strug g le. The appellant wa s taken fr om the scene in an ambulanc e.
The victim was take n to the Department of Chi ldren’s Ser vices (D CS) where she wa s int e rv ie we d b y

a c a se wo rk e r, Me lba Moon e y ham. T he vic timini tia lly tol d Mo on e y ham th a t noth ingha

pp e ne d at th e a

pp e lla nt’ s a pa rtme nt. At

tr ia l, t he vic tim explained that at the time of the fir st statement, she had not wa n t ed t o discuss the inci de nt b e c a

us e sh e wa s e mba

rr a sse d, fr ig hte ne d, and

be lie ve d s he wo uld

g e t in trouble for being in a strang er’ s apar tment. At a sec ond interview w ith Mooney ham on October

10, the victim told Mooney ham about the de tails of the m o l es t at ion. Mooney ham believe d that the victim was more comforta ble wit h her and forthrig ht during the sec ond interview.

At the c on c lus ion

of the pr oo f, the jur

y a c qu itt e d th e a

pp e lla nt o f the c ha

rg e d o ff e ns e but found him guilty

of the lesse r-include d offe nse of attempted ag g ravated sexual battery . The trial c ourt imposed a sente nce of four y ear s. The cour

t order ed that the sentenc e for

the instant offe nse be serve d consec utively to the nine-y ear

sentenc e he had pre viously

rec eived f

or the a g g ravated sexual battery of J.P

. State v. Jose

ph Verme al , N o. M2 00 5- 00 56 8- CCA -R 3- CD , 2 00 5 WL 35 43 41 7, a t *1- 2 ( Te nn . Cr im.5

App., at Nashville, Dec . 28, 2005), perm. app. granted (T e nn . J un e 5, 20 06 ). Of imp or tanc e on thi s a p p e a l i s t h e P e t i t i o n e r ’ s p r o f f e r o f h i s e x c l u d e d

e x p e rt ’ s p r o p o s e d

t e s t i m o n y:
Dr. Be rnet testified that he was a g raduate of Ha rvar d Medica l School and was boa rd
c e rt if ie d “ in g e ne ra l ps y c hiatr

y and in c hil d a nd a do le sc e nt p syc hiatr

y and in f or e ns ic ps y c hiatr y .” Dr . Be rn e t ass e rt e d th a t hi s te sti mony wo uld re late to t hr e e iss ue s. F ir st, he wo uld e xpla in t o th e jur

y “ the pro per meth od s f

or int e rv ie wi ngc hil dr e n in inves t igating a lleg ations of maltreatment.” Second, he would discuss “the va rious mecha nisms, psy cholog ical m echa nisms, by which fa lse statements ar e made by childre n

. ” F in a ll y , h e w o u ld te s ti f y r e g a r d in g “ w h a t h a s b e e ns tu d ie d in r e sear ch with children in these situations and to be a ble to explain or to li st differe nt fac tors that are c on sis te nt w ithtr

ue a lle g a tio ns and dif

fe re nt fa c tor s that ar e c on sis te nt w ith false a lleg ations of abuse .”

As an e x ample, Dr . Be rnet e x plained that he w ould inform the jury t h at as k i n g a potential child sexual a

buse victim sug g estive, leading , or re petitive questions was ill-advised. Dr. Ber

net, had “re viewed the interview” of t he DCS worke r and J P and conclude d that J P had been a sked questions which influenc ed the answe rs she g ave. Dr. B erne t also noted that there wer e indications in J P’s pr evious statements which sug g ested that the a lleg ations were true, a nd there wer e other

indications which
wo uld su g g e st the a lle g a tio ns we re fa lse

. Dr

. B e rn e t st a te d th a t hi s te sti mony wo uld
se rv e to a id t

he jur y in d e te rm ini ngthe c re dib ili ty of th e st a te me nts of the c hil d witnesses and “ help them be a war e of issues they

need to be awa

re of .”

Ve rm e al I , 2 00 5 WL

10 00 23 7, a t *5 ; Verme al II , 2005 WL 3543417, at *5.

I n Ve rm e al I

, the Petitioner challeng ed the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e and the trial cour t’s exclusion of his e x pert witness. Id. at *5-7. This Court noted t hat t he trial court excluded the expert witness beca

use the “ testimony

did not meet the standar d of reliability announce d in McD aniel

and would not substantially assist the trier of f act . . . a s require d by

Rule 702.” Id

. a t* 5

. A d d i t i o n a l l y, this Court rec og nized that “the [trial] court re lied upon State v. Coley , 32 S.W .3d 831 (Tenn. 2000) , wh ic h [ ] pr ov ide d fo r the e xclu sio n of e xpe rt te sti mony g e ne ra lizin g the unre lia bil ity of e y e wi tne ss te s ti mo n y
. ” Id

. I n our ana ly sis, we examined the ca se under McD aniel and Rul e 70 2, and

wi th
a ssi sta nc e fr om Coleyand State v. Howard W alter Thomas , No. E2003-02090- CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 735040 (Tenn. Crim. App

. , at Kn ox ville, Mar. 30, 2005), perm. app. de nied (Tenn. O ct. 10, 2005), we conclude d that the trial cour t did not err in excluding the testimony beca use the e x pert’s “testimony

was g ear ed towar d assessingthe cr edibility of child witnesses.” Ve rm e al I , 2 005 WL 1000237, at *7. This Court, thus, affirmed the judgme nt of the trial cour t. Id

. I n Verme al II

, the Petitioner cha lleng ed the sufficie ncy of the e vidence , his sentence , and the trial court’ s exclusion of his ex pert witness. Verme al II , 2005 WL 3543417, at *2-8. As a ba sis for excluding the witness, the tr ial cou rt fo u n d t h e P etitioner’s late notice “did not allow the State ‘ a proper opportunity

to prepa re f or the witness’s testimony and the witness’s t estimony must therefor e be excluded.’” Id . at *4. Additionally , the trial cour t concluded that the testimony did not meet theT es t i mon y c on ce r n i n g a l l eg at i on s of i n ef f ec t i v en es s n ot a s s er t ed on a ppea l h as be en omi t t ed. 1
6 require ments of Rule 702. Id . I n an ana ly sis sim ilar to that of Ve rm e al I , this Court conclude d the trial court did not er

r in excluding the e x pert witness because “the testim ony of Dr. Be rnet re g arding the interview ing te chniques of a lleg ed child sexual abuse vic tims i s akin to that proposed in Coley .” Id. at *6. This Court, thus, affirmed the judgme nt of the trial cour t. Id. at *8.

Th e Pe tit ion e r t

he n f ile d a pe tit ion fo r p os t- c on vic tio n r e lie f o n h is Verme al I conviction on Janu ary 30 , 2 00 6, and

wa s a pp ointe d c ouns e l fou r d ay s late r. Th e pe tit ion e r f ile d a pe tit ion in Verme al II on S ept emb e r 2 5, 20 06 , a nd an ame nd e d p e tit ion

on No ve mbe r 2 6, 20 06 . T he po stconviction cour

t u l t imately

consolidated the pe titions and held a hear ing on Ma

y 31, 2007. The fo llo wi nge vid ence was prese nte d at th a t he ari ng : T he Pe tit ion e r t e sti fi e d th a t L isa Z avo g iann is repr esente d him in Ve rm e al I

. His first trial resulted in a hung jury , but a jury

convicted him af

ter a re -trial. Addr essing the claims he prese nted in his petition f or post-conviction re lief, the Petitioner state d th a t he fe lt h e wa s den ie d the ri g ht t o p re se nt a de fe ns e be c a

us e the tr ia l c ourt

pr e ve nte d h im fr om c a lli ngan e xpe rt

wi tne ss. Ad dit ion a lly , the Pe tit ion e r fe lt tha t c ouns e l wa s ine ff

e c tiv e be c a

us e she fa iled to photogr aph the sc ene the scene of the c rime, which c ould have be en used to impea ch wi tne sse s. 1

Ad dre s s i n g Verme al II

, the Petitioner also complained that he fa iled to rec eive the e ffe ctive assistance of counse l from Philli p Clemons, who was his counsel in that ca se. Specific ally , he stated that c ouns e l f

a ile d to c a ll t o te sti fy Mart ha Mo rr is and A. J. I ke ard and fa ile d to me e t w ithhim

un til the day of trial. Additionally , the Petitioner testified that counsel elicited detr imental testimony from a witness that had be en pre viously excluded by

a m o t i o n i n l imine and fa iled to object to leading questions of the victim.

On cr oss-examination, the Petit ioner a d mi tt e d th a t C le mo ns assisted Z avog iannis in Verme al I . Although Clemons visited him and discussed the evidence during the first trial, Clemons did not visit him until the day

of trial in Verme al II

. The Petitioner stated that Clemons was “ver y familiar” with the case beca

use of his pre vious work. In addre ssing the c omplaints speci fi ca l l y in Verme al I , th e Pe tit ion e r a dmi tte d th a t, a lth ou g h Z avo g iann is d id n ot i ntr od uc e a ph oto g ra phof the sc e ne to rebut testimony , she introduce d a diag ram. The Petitioner also stated t hat counse l cross-e x amined the victims with their previous inconsistent statements. Additionally , the Petitioner admitted t h at the trial cour

t excluded the testimony

of Dr. B erne t, and this Court affirmed that decision.

L isa Z avog iannis testified that she pre pare d a diagram of the apar tment instead of using pictures f or two re asons: first, bec ause the Petitioner’s apa rtment was unde r construc t ion; and, second, be cause pictures take n of an ide ntical apa rtment did not show the apar tment a s it looked on the day in question.

P h i l l i p C l e m on s, the Pe tit ion e r’ s c ouns e l in Verme al II

, t es t i fi edt h at t h e P etitioner mentioned callingMartha Mor

ris to te stify , but Clemons concluded that she w ould not be benef icial to his case. Wit h respe ct to A.J . I kear d, Clemons stated that I kear d had a prior c riminal history , and he be lieved7

the jur y wo uld no t hav e fo un d I ke ard c re dib le . I n a dd re ssi ngthe Pe tit ion e r’ s c la im that Cle mon s d id
no t vi sit him pr ior to t he se c on d tr ia l, C le mon s st a te d th a t he fe lt a s th ou g h h e kn e w the c a se be c a us e he assisted on the f

irst case . He visited the Petitioner in ja il be fore the first trial and discussed tria l strateg y with him. Clemons deter mined that further

visits would not help his prepa ration. Clemons admitted it was possible that he did not visit t he Petitioner prior to the se cond trial.

I n a dd re ssi ngthe te sti mony

so lic ite d f

ro m a de te c tiv e , Cl e mon s te sti fi e d that he move d to exclude evidenc e found in the Petit ioner’s a partment prior

to trial. At trial, he ca lled Der win Adcoc k from the Mc Minnvill e Police De partment t o t es t i fy about what wa s not found in the Petitioner’s
a pa rtme nt. Cle mon s st a te d that he pe rf or me d re se arc h ab out w hat pe do ph ile s u su a lly have in t he ir be dr oo ms, and

Ad c ock tes tif

ie d th a t th e Pe tit ion e r d id n ot h ave ma ny or mos t of the se thi ng s. Clemons admitted that the jury could view the thing s found in the Petitioner’s bedr oom – a child’s book, children’ s clothes, a video, a nd a knife – ag ainst the Petitioner, but he stated he ma de a ta ctical choice

. Clemons a lso state d that he did not fee l questions or statements by the State vouche d for the
cre dibilit y

of witnesses. Additionally , if any thing wa s objectionable, Clemons decide d not to object as trial strate g y
. On cr oss-examination, Cl emons testified that he had been to the j ail with Z avog iannis, met wi th t he Pe tit ion e r o n ma

ny oc c a sio ns , an d sat thr ou g h the fi rs t tria l. He wa s awa re of the wi tne sse s’ and victim’s testimon y , and he had copies of the trial transc ripts and the pre liminary hear ing transcr ipts. Cl emons reque sted money to hire Dr. B erne t, but the trial court denie d that reque st.

Mart ha Mo rr is t e sti fi e d th a t sh e kn e w t he Pe tit ion e r f

or six mo nth s b e fo re the inc ide nts underlying this ca se. She saw the Def endant at least three times a wee k and eve ry other we ekend beca use she dated the Petitioner’s ne ighbo r, M o dg lin. Morris stated that, a we ek bef ore the incidents, the P etitioner i nvited her and Modg lin to a barbeque wher e the victims wer e present. The Pe tit ion e r a llo we d th e c hil dr e n to pla y wh ile he vis ite d w iththe oth e r a du lts pr e se nt.
On cr oss-exa

mi n ation, Morris admitted she did not know the victims’ name s. She stated they
wer e “da rk-he aded, sma ll” but, in that ag e g roup, “they all look alike.” Morr is admitted she never mentioned the childre n to Z avog iannis or Clemons.
After hear in g a r g u me nt, th e post-convic tion court conc luded that the expert witness issue had alre ady been r aised a

nd ruled upon by this Court. Additionally , the court found t he Petitioner fa iled to pr ove Z avog iannis was def icient or that a

ny alleg ed def

iciencie s prejudice d the Petitioner. Although the post-conviction cour t found that Clemons should have m et wi t h the Petitioner prior to trial, the court conclude d that the P etitioner di d not prove prejudice beca use of Clemons’s failure to meet with him. The post-conviction court deter mined that the other issues r aised by the Petitioner
wer e matter s of trial strate g y not to be judge d in hindsig ht. The post-convic tion court denied the pe tit ion fo r p os t- c on vic tio n r e lie f, and it i s f ro m th is d e c isi on

that th e Pe tit ion e r n owa pp e a ls.

II. Ana lys is On appe al, the Petitioner pre sents two argu m en ts: (1) that, bec ause State v. Copeland8

o v e r r u ll ed S t a t e v

. Coley , the ca se used by the trial cour

t and this Court to ex clude the e x pert testimony , the Petitioner’s due pr ocess r ight to a f air tria l was violated when his expert was excluded; and (2) that he did not rec eive the e ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel. We w ill address ea ch issue in turn.

I n order to obta in post-c onviction r elief, a petitioner must show that his or her c onviction or sentenc e is void or voidable be cause of the a bridg ment of a c onstitut ional rig ht. T.C.A. § 40-30-103 (2 00 6) . T he pe tit ion e r b e ars the burd e n o f p rov ing fa c tua l a lle g a tio ns in t he pe tit ion

fo r p os tconviction re lief by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. T.C.A. § 40-30- 110(f) (2006). Upon r eview, this Court wil l not re-weig h or re -eva luate the e vidence below; all questions conce rning the
cre dibilit y

of witnesses, the w eig ht a nd value to be g iven their testimony and the f actua l issues raised by the evidenc e ar e to be r esolved by the trial judg e, not the appe llate cour ts. Mo mo n v . S

tate , 18 S.W. 3d 15 2, 15 6 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) ; He nle yv . S tate , 9 60 S.W. 2d

57 2, 57 8- 79 (T e nn . 1 99 7) . Apo stc on vic tio n c ourt ’s fa c tua l f ind ing s are su

bje c t to a de no vo re vie w b y

thi s Co ur t; h ow e ve r, we mus t acc ord these f

actua l findi n gs a p resumption of cor rec tness, which ca

n be over come only

when a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e is c ontrary to the post-conviction cour t’s fac tual finding s. Fields v. Sta te , 40 S.W .3d 450, 456-57 (Te nn. 2001). A post-c onviction court’s c onclusions of law a re subject to a pure ly

de novo re view by

this Court, wit h no presumption of cor rec tness. Id. at 457. A. Right to a F air Trial
The Petitioner’s f

irst claim is based o n t h e fac t that, on May 23, 2007, the Tenne ssee Supreme Court, in State v. Copeland , overturne d State v. Coley

. See State v. Copeland , 226 S.W .3d 28 7, 30 0 ( Te nn . 2 00 7) . B e fo re a dd re ssi ngthe iss ue on

the me ri ts, ho we ve r, we mus t f ir st a dd re ss the State ’s argume nt t

hat th e Pe tit ion e r h a s w a ive d th is cl aim by no t pr e se nti ngit t o th e po stc on vic tio n c ourt

. Th e State ’s argume nt is p re mis e d o n th e fa c t th a t Copeland was decided be fore the po st- c on vic tio n h e ari ng , a lbe it o nly e ig ht da y s b e fo re . We re c og nize tha t th e pe tit ion

fo r p os tconviction relief would be unlikely to contain a Copeland

argume nt a s Copeland

had not y et bee n de c ide d, but th e po st- c on vic tio n atto rn e y fa ile d to ra ise the iss ue a t th e he ari ng . Ins te a d, po stc on vic tio n c ouns e l si mpl y pr e se nte d a

re lativ e ly

str a ig ht- fo rw ard

a rg ument on the me ri ts o f t

his Court’s d e c isi on

on dir e c t a pp e a l. A c c or din g ly , th e po st- c on vic tio n c ourt dis mis se d th e c la im beca use we had alr eady

ruled upon that issue.
The statutes on post-conviction relief , located at Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-30- 106, descr ibe the rule on waiver as it relate s to a petition for post-convic tion relief: (g ) A g round for relief is waived if the petit ioner personally or t hroug h an attorne y failed to pre sent it for determination in any proce edingbefor e a c ourt of compe tent jur isd ic tio n in

wh ic h th e g ro un d c ou ld h ave be e n p re se nte d unle ss: (1) The c la im f

o r r e li e f is b a s e d u

p o n a c o n s ti tuti o n a l r igh t not re c og nize d a s e xistin g a t the tim e of tr ia l if eithe r the fe de ra l or s tate constitution requires re troac tive application of that rig ht; orW hi l e we have co nsi d ered remand i ng t he case i n ord er t o al l o w t he p o st

- co nvi ct i o n co urt t o ad d res s t he 2 Copel and ar gu ment , we concl ude t hat i s not ne ces s ar y i n t hi s ca s e beca us e Copel and , a s f u r t h er e x pl ai n ed, i s n ot
r et r oact i vel y appl i cabl e t o t he P et i t i oner ’ s ca s e.

In S w a n so n v . S ta te , t he p et i t i o ner had b een co nvi ct ed i n January 19 8 1 of f i rs t de gree murd er under t he 3

r u l e t h a t pr e s u me d a l l h om i c i de s w e r e ma l i c i ou s

. 7 49 S

. W

. 2d a t 73 2. Pr i or t o h i s t r i a l , t h e Un i t e d S t a t e s S u pr e me C o u rt h a d c o n c lud e d tha t suc h a n instr u c tio n w a s u n c o n stitutio n a l. I d. ; s ee Sands t r om v

. M ont ana , 442 U

. S. 510, (19 7 9 ). T he p et i t i o ner i n Swans on di d not r ai s e a S a n d s t r o m i s s u e u n t i l h i s s ec on d pe t i t i on f or pos t

- con v i ct i on re lief. Swans on , 74 9 S.W

. 2 d at 73 2

- 3 3

. T hi s co urt remand ed t he case t o t he p o st

- co nvi ct i o n co urt f o r a d eterm i na t i o n o f

wh ethe r t he p eti t i o ne r wa i ve d his S a n d s t r o m ar g u men t by f ai l i n g t o r ai s e i t i n h i s f i r s t pe t i t i on f

or p o st-co n v ic tio n re lief, an d the T e n n e sse e S u p re m e C o u rt a ff irm e d this C o u rt’s d e c isio n to re m a n d

. Id

. a t 733.
9 (2 ) T he fa ilure to p re se nt t he g ro un d w a s th e re su lt o f s tate a c tio n in violation of the fede ral or state constitution.

Be cause the Petitioner failed to pr esent this claim to the post-conviction court, “a court of c ompetent jurisdiction in which the g round could have bee n prese nted,” a nd beca use neither exception applied to the Petitioner, the Petitioner has risked wa iver of the Copeland issue. Despite this risk of wa iver, we will continue with our a naly sis. Se e Swa ns on v . S tate , 749 S.W .2d 731, 736 (Tenn. 1988) (“[A] mecha nical application of t h e law, without any rec og nition of the interval that is nec essar y for a pr e vio us ly unre c og nize d ru le of law to be a pp lie d in pr a c tic e , de fe a ts the purp os e of the [PostConviction] Act, divorc ing the case form re ality and putting f

orm above substance.” ). 2

The main thrust of Petitioner’s c laim is that, because the Ten n es s ee S u p reme Court has
overr uled the case upon which the tria l court and this Court partially relied to e x clude the te stimony of his e xpe rt , h e is e nti tle d to re lie f. Th is a rgume nt p re su

pp os e s th a t Copeland

is retroa ctive. Coleyg ener ally

held that a tria l court could e x clude a n expert on ey ewitness identification beca use such testimony

did not substantially

assist the jury

. See State v . Coley , 32 S.W .3d 831, 838 (Tenn. 2000). T h e Su

p r e me Co u rt’ s r a ti o n a le f o r th is r u le w a s th a t t

h e ju r y w a s r e s p o n s ib le f

or making cre dibilit y

deter minations, and expert testimony on ey ewitness reliability was ther efor e not nece ssary

. Id . I n this case, the tr ial court c ited Coley wh e n e xclu din g the Pe tit ion e r’ s e xpe rt wi tne ss who woul d h av e t est ified that ce rtain lea ding que stions can elicit ce rtain answe rs. This Court aff irmed that decision on appeal. See Verme al I , 2 00 5 WL

10 00 23 7, a t *7 ; Verme al II , 2 0 0 5 WL 3543417, at *6. On May

23, 2007, afte r the Petitioner filed his pe tition for post-conviction re lief but befor e the hear ing on the petit ion, the Tennessee Supreme Court overr uled Coleyand instructed that e xpert s o n e y e wi tne ss t e sti mony may be a llo we d to te sti fy

a bo ut t he unre lia

bil ity of e y e wi tne ss acc ounts. Copeland , 226 S.W .3d at 300. Thus, the questi on is whether the Petitioner may invoke Copeland

to assist him in his petiti on fo r p os t- c on vic tio n r e lie f. I n s up po rt of his po sit ion , th e Pe tit ion e r c ite s Pr ue tt v . S tate , 501 S.W .2d 807 (Tenn. 1973) , and Swa ns on v . S tate , 749 S.W .2d 731 (Tenn. 1988) . We view Pr ue tt as more on point with thi s case

. I n Pr ue tt , the post-conviction petitioner w as convic ted of burg lary

. Pr ue tt , 3 50 1 S. W.2 d a t 80 8. I n his po st- c on vic tio n pe tit ion , he ard in O c tob e r 1 97 2, he fa ile d to a lle g e do ub le jeopar dy beca

use a constitutional rule applicable to his situation ha d not be en g iven re t ro ac t ive10

eff ect. Id . Once the rule w as g iven re troac tive eff ect, in January

1973, the petitioner ra ised the issue in this C ourt. Id . We re mand e d f or fu rt he r p ro c e e din g s, and the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court up he ld that decision. Id

. a t8 1 0

. In o u r v i e w , i no r d e r

t o a p p l y Pr ue tt , Copeland must be retroa ctive.

I n g ener al, new r

ules of constitutional

law a re g ive n r e tr oa c tiv e e ff

e c t. Se e Va n Tra n v . S

tate , 66 S.W .3d 790, 810-11 (Tenn. 2001) (“‘ a new state constitutional rule is to be re troac tively applied to a c la im f or po st- c on vic tio n r e lie f i f t he ne w r ule mate ri a lly e nh anc e s the int e g ri ty and re lia bil ity
o f t h e f ac tfi n d i n g p ro ce s s o f t h e t ri al

. ’) (q u o t i n g Me ad ows v . S tate , 849 S.W .2d 748, 755 (Tenn. 1993) and c iting T.C.A. § 40-30-222 (1997))

. Be cause the rule in Copeland is an evidentiar y issue, not a constitutional issue, it does not fall under the c onstitut ional law rule

. Al tho ug h w e have be e n ab le to l oc a te c a se law i n w hic h a de fe nd ant a sse rt s th a t a

ne w r ule of evidenc e should not be applied to him beca use the c rime wa s committed prior to the ena ctment of rule, w e have had conside rable di ff iculty locatingany

case wher e a de fenda

nt, on collatera l revie w, attempts to a ssert that a ne w rule of evidenc e that wor

ks to his benefit and e stablished afte r his trial should be retroa ctively applied to his trial.
The most closely related i ssue is ex post fac to, such as that addr essed in State v. Bragan

. In S ta tev

. B r agan , t h i s Court addre ssed the cha ng e in the evide ntiary

rule c oncer

ning spousa l competenc y
. 920 S.W .2d 227, 240-41 (Tenn. Crim. App.1995). At the t ime of the c rime in Bragan , either the testifying spouse or the non-te stify ing spouse could invoke the pr ivilege

. Id

. at 240. At the time of trial, howe ver, the rule ha d been c hang ed to allow only the t estify ing spouse to invoke the privileg e. Id . at 240. In an ex post fac to analy sis, this Court held that a trial a pply ing the new rule wa s constitutionally

permissib le. Id. at 241 (“ [L ]aws which cha ng e a r ule of e vidence , but wh ic h d o n ot i nc re a se the punis hme nt n or c ha ng e the e le me nts of the of fe ns e or the ult imate fa c ts ne c e ssa ry to e sta bli shg uil t, b ut o nly

re mov e e xistin g re str ic tio ns on the c ompeten cy

of c e rt a in classes of evidenc e or of persons as witnesses do not constitute ex post facto laws.” ). Se e ge ne ra lly Hopt v. Territory of Utah , 110 U.S. 574, 589 (1884) ( concludingthat a Utah la w which c hang ed the previous rule that no convicted f elon could testify in a criminal case was not a n ex post fac to law).

I t has bee n g ener alized by the Pennsylvania S u p re m e C ourt that there are four a pproac hes to r e tr oa c tiv ity :
One a pproac h is to give the new rule purely prospec tive eff ect so that it is not even applied to the par

ties in the case in w h i ch t h e n ew rule is announc ed. Another approa ch is to limit retroa ctive application to the case i n which it is announce d. A thi rd c ho ic e is t o a

pp ly th e newru le to t

he c a se in whic h it

is a nn ounc e d a

nd to a ll
case s pending at t he ti me t he new rule is announc ed. A f ourth approa ch is to g ive the
ne w r ule fu lly re tr oa c tiv e e ff

e c t. Und e r t

his fo ur th c ho ic e , th e ne w ru le is a pp lie d to the c a se in whic h it is a

nn ounc e d, to a ll c a se s p e nd inga t th e tim e the ne w r ule is
announce d, and to ca ses which a re f inal at the time the new

rule is announc ed.
Blac k we ll v . P e nn sy lv an ia , 589 A.2d 1094, 1099 (1991) (internal citations omitted). The Petitioner would urg e us to apply

approa ch four

.11

I n our sea rch to find a

pplicable law

as to which appr oach is a pplicable to this situation, we f o u n d th a t th e M a s s a c h u s e tt s Su p r e me Co u rt s p e c if

ic a ll y s tate d th a t a n e w c o mm o n la w r ule of
e vid e nc e is t o b e a

pp lie d to the c a se in whic h it wa s de c ide d o n r e mand and , s ub se qu e nt t o th a t, o nly prospec tively

. Massachusetts v. Adjutant , 8 2 4 N

. E

. 2 d 1 , 1 5 ( M a s s

. 2 0 0 5 )

. T h is w o u ld u ti li ze app roac h tw o. Ap pr oa c h tw o is so un d in thi s c a se : if

we we re to gra

nt Copeland

retroa ctive appli ca t i o n to case s on collatera l appea l, ever y defe ndant whose c ase pr esente d a Coley issue and was de cided unde r Coley wo uld , a rgua bly , b e e nti tle d to a

ne w trial. Suc h a

n a pp lic a tio n c ou ld potentially

disrupt many

long- since settled c ases a nd place an enormous burden on c ourts. Fur ther the ide a c ou ld b e a

pp lie d to any

numbe r of ot her

iss ue s, the re by

re nd e ri ngfi na l ju dg me nts temporar y . The Petitioner has pr esente d no authority , and we can find no authority , mandatingor sug g esting this outcome. We conclude that, beca use Copeland does not apply to the Petitioner on his c oll a te ra l a

pp e a l, h e c an n ot t ake a dv anta g e of it in ar g uin g he wa s den ie d th e ri g ht t o a fa ir tr ia l. There fore , this iss ue has a lrea dy been decide d on direc t a

ppeal, and the post-conviction cour t was not in error

to deny relief

. B. Inef

fective Assistance of Cou nsel
The Petitioner asse rts that both Z avog iannis and Clemons were ineffe ctive in case s F-8351 and F -8405. We will address e ach c ase in turn. The rig ht of a c riminally acc used to repr esentation is gua rante ed by

both the Six th A mendment to the United States Constit ution and article I , section 9, of the Te nnessee Constit ution. Sta te v . W hite , 1 14 S.W. 3d 46 9, 47 5 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) ; State v. Burns , 6 S. W.3 d 4 53 , 4 61 (T e nn . 1 99 9) ; Ba x te r v . R os e , 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975) . The following tw o- pr on g te st d ir e c ts a

c ourt ’s e va luatio n o f a

c la im f or ine ff e c tiv e ne ss:
F ir st, the [pe tit ion e r] mus t sh owthat c ouns e l’ s p e rf or manc e wa s d e fi c ie nt. Th is require s showing that counsel made err ors so serious that counsel was not fu nc tio nin g a s th e “ c ouns e l” g ua ra nte e d th e [pe tit ion e r] b y

the S ix th A me ndme nt. Second, the [petitioner] m u st show that the defic ient perf ormanc e pre

judiced the defe nse. This require s showing that counsel’s err ors wer e so serious as to deprive the [petit ioner] of a fa ir trial, a tria l whose re sult is reliable. Unless a [ petitioner] makes both show ings, it cannot be sa id that the conviction or de ath sentenc e re sulted from a bre akdown in the a dversa ry proce ss that rende rs the re sult unreliable.
Strickland v. W

ashington , 4 66 U. S. 6 68 , 6 87 (1 98 4) ; State v. Me lson , 772 S.W .2d 417, 419 (Tenn. 1989).

I n revie wing a cla im of ineffe ctive assistance of counse l, this C ourt must determine whe ther the advice g iven or ser

vices re ndere d by

the attorne y

are within the rang e of compe tence demande d
o f a tt o r n e y s in c riminal case s. Baxter , 523 S.W .2d at 936. To pre vail on a cla im of ineffe ctive assistance of counse l, a petitioner must show that “c ounsel’s repr esentation f ell below an objec tive standard of

rea sonablene ss.” Ho us e v . S tate , 4 4 S

. W

. 3 d 5 0 8 , 5 1 5 (T en n

. 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Strickland , 466 U.S. at 688 (1984))

. W h en ev al u at i n g an i n ef

fe ct i v e a s s i s t an ce o f c o u n s el cl ai m , t h e r ev i ew i n g cou rt s h o u l d j u d ge12

the attorne y ’s per formanc e within the context of the ca se as a whole, taking into a ccount a ll releva nt circ umstances. Strickland, 46 6 U.S

. at 690; Sta te v . M itc he ll , 7 53 S.W. 2d

14 8, 14 9 ( Te nn . Cr im. App. 1988). The revie wing court must ev al u at e the questionable c onduct from the attorney ’s perspe ctive at the time. Strickland, 46 6 U.S. a t 69 0; He lla rd v . S tate , 629 S.W .2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982)

. I n doing so, the revie wing court must be hig hly defe rential a

nd “should indulge a strongpresumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide ra ng e of r easona

ble profe ssional assistance.” Burns , 6 S.W .3d at 462. Fina lly , we note that a def endant in a c riminal ca s e i s n o t enti tled to perfe ct repr esentation, only constitutionally adequate re prese ntation. De nto n v . S tate , 945 S.W .2d 793, 796 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ). I n o the r w or ds , “ in co ns ide ri ng c la ims of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l, ‘we addre ss not what is prudent or a ppropriate , but only

what is constitutionally

compelled.’ ” Burger v. Kem

p , 4 8 3 U. S

. 7 7 6 , 7 9 4 (1 9 8 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Un ite d S tates v . Cron ic , 466 U.S. 648, 665 n.38 (1984))

. Counsel should not be deemed to have bee n i n ef fective mere ly

beca use a diff

ere nt proce dure or

strateg y might have produce d a diffe rent r esult. W ill iam s v . S

tate , 599 S.W .2d 276, 279-80 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1980). The f act that a particula r strate g y or tact i c failed or hurt the defe nse does not, standingalone, e stablish unreasona ble re prese ntation. Ho us e , 44 S.W .3d at 515 (c i t i n g Go ad v . S

tate , 9 3 8 S

. W

. 2 d 3 6 3 , 3 6 9 (T en n

. 1 9 9 6 ))

. Ho we v er , d ef er en ce t o m at t er s o f s t ra t egy and tac tical choice s applies onl y if the choices are informed one s based upon a dequate prepa ration. Ho us e , 44 S.W .3d at 515.

I f the petitioner shows that counsel’s repr esentation fell below a r easona ble standar d, then th e p e ti ti o n e r

mu s t s a ti s f

y th e p r e ju d ic e p r o n g o f

the S t rickland

te st b y de mon str a tin g “ the re is a
rea sonable p ro b ab i l i ty

that, but for counse l’s unprofe ssional error s, the result of the pr ocee ding
wo u l d h av e bee n differ ent.” Strickland, 46 6 U .S. a t 69 4; Nic ho ls v . S tate , 9 0 S. W. 3 d

5 7 6 , 5 87 (Tenn. 2002)

. This rea sonable proba bility must be “suffic ient to undermin e co n fidenc e in the outcome.” Strickland , 4 66 U. S. at 69 4; Ha rri s v . S tate , 875 S.W .2d 662, 665 (Tenn. 1994)

. 1. Case Num ber F -8351

I n th is c a se , th e Pe tit ion e r a lle g e s t hat Zav og iann is w a s in e ff e c tiv e in f

a ili ngto u se photogr aphs of the a

partment a

nd in failing to impeach the vic tim’s testim ony with her g rand jury testimony . At the post-conviction hea ring , Z avog iannis testified that she wa s the second a tt o rney a pp ointe d to re pr e sen t th e Pe tit ion e r, and he r r e pr e se ntatio n b e g an o ne y e ar a ft e r t he inc ide nts occur red in this case . Be cause the P etitioner’s actual apartment was under construction when she
was a ppointed to repre sent him, she was una ble to acc urate ly rec reate t he ins ide of the apa rtment for
a ph oto g ra

ph

. Th e re fo re , Z avo g iann is t e sti fi e d, sh e uti lize d a dia g ra m of the a pa rtme nt. Th e po stconviction cour

t determined that Z avog iannis was not def icient, and we ag ree

. Withre sp e ct to th e vic tim ’s g ra nd jur y te sti mony , Z avo g iann is t e sti fi e d th a t th e State tol d he r n o g ra

nd jur y tr ans c ri pt w a s ava ila

ble . T he Pe tit ion e r a

rgue s, tho ug h, that Z avo g iann is c ou ld have us e d T e nn e sse e Rul e of Cr im in al P roce dure 6( k) (2 ), an e xce pti on to gra nd jur y se c re c y , to obtain the testimony . Even a ssuming that Z avog iannis could have obtain the gra nd jury testimony of the vic tim , th e Pe tit ion e r h a s n ot p re se nte d th e te sti mony he re on his po st- c on vict ion

a pp e a l. Th e re fo re , w e c ann ot c on c lud e that the Pe tit ion e r wa s pre jud ic e d by Z avo g iann is’ s fa ilure to o bta in g rand jury

testimony

. Se e Ow e ns v . S tate , 13 S.W .3d 742, 746 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) . He is not13

entitled to relief on this issue.

2. Case Num ber F -8405

I n this case, the Petiti oner a lleg es Clemons was inef fec tive in failing to confe r with him prior to the day of trial in Verme al II

, in f ailing to obje ct to the State’s use of leading questions dur ing the victim’s testimony , in calling a witness who gave detrimental testim ony , and in failing to call Mar tha Morris and A.J. I kear d. The post-c onviction court conc l u d ed that, although Clemons’s lack of visitation wit h the Petitioner cer

tainly left something t o be desire d, the Petitioner failed to pr ove he w as pre judiced. We ag ree . Clemons assisted Z avog iannis in the first trial, visited the Petitioner in jail a number of tim e s, int e rv ie we d w itn e sse s, and dis c us se d tr ia l strate g y

that wa s so me wh a t su c c e ssf ul i n th e fi rs t trial. Clemons testified that he fel t h e h ad suff icient knowledg e to try

the sec ond case . The Pe tit ion e r h a s p re se nte d n o e vid e nc e of ho w C le mon s’ s la ck of vis itatio n a ff

e c te d h is tri a l. There fore , he has not prove n the sec ond prongof Strickland

. I n addre ssing the State’ s use of lea ding que stions, Clemons stated that he did not object as tr ia l strate g y

and be c a us e he be lie ve d th e qu e sti on ingwa s p e rm iss ibl e fo r a c hil d v ic tim . T he po stcon v ic ti o nc o u rt f

o u n d th is d e c is io nw a s a

matt e r o f tr ia l s tr a te g y , an d

w e a g r e e

. M a tt e r s o f

tr ia l strateg y will not be second guessed on a ppeal if the y

are informed c hoices ba sed on sound prepa ration. He lla rd

v . S tate , 629 S.W .2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982)

. Wit h respe ct to the detec tive’s testimony , Clemons testified that h e per formed r esea rch a bout the t y pes of items usually found i n pedophiles’ r ooms. Throug h the detec tive Clemons attempted to elicit testimony

that most of those items were not found in the Peti t i o n er ’s room. Clemons
a dmi tte d th a t some of the ite ms fo un d in the Pe tit ion e r’ s r oo m, a s te sti fi e d to by the de te c tiv e , c ou ld be conside red de trimental to the P etitioner’s c ase, but he felt it was a ta ctical de cision. These ty pes of dec isions will not be over turned on post-c onviction. Id

. F ina lly , th e Pe tit ion e r c omp la ins that Cle mon s f a ile d to c a ll two wi tne sse s, Ma rt ha Mo rr is and A.J. I kear d

. C lemons testified that he de cided not to ca ll Morris to testify beca use he did not
wa nt t o o pe n th e do or

to t he Pe tit ion e r’ s c ha

ra c te r. I f h e ha d c a lle d he r to te sti fy , th e State wo uld have be en able to present a dditional witnesses that would testify about alleg ations of pre vious sex ual
ass a u lt s

. I n o u r v ie w , Cl e mo n s c o u ld r e a s o n a b ly c o n c lu d e th a t an y b e n e f it o f M o r r is ’s testimony would be outweig hed b y n eg ative conse quence s of openingthe door to additional cha rac ter witnesses. Simil arly , Clemons considered the potential benef its of A.J . I kear d, but determined that he wo uld no t pr ov ide any

be ne fi t to the Pe tit ion e r. We c on c lud e that Cle mon s c ou ld r e a so na bly de te rm ine t h a tA

. J. I k e ar d ’ s c r i m i n a l p a s tw o u l d r e n d e r t h e c r e d i b i l i t y

o f h i s t e s t i m o n y

s u s p e c tin the ey es of the jur

y and thus cloud the Petitioner’s case

. These are both matters of trial strateg y that we will not second guess on appe al. Id . The Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this issue.

III. Conclusi on14

Af te r a tho ro ug h r e vie w o f t

he re c or d a

nd a pp lic a ble law, we c on c lud e that th e Pe tit ion e r i s not entitled to post-conviction relief. T he judg ment of the post-c onviction court is aff irmed.

________________________________ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J UDGE