OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT

TERMINATIONS REPRESENT A RANGE

OF ACTIONS

SIGIR 09--004

OCCTTOOBBEERR 27,, 2008
 

 

October 27, 2008

Iraq Reconstruction Project Terminations Represent a 

Range of Actions 

What SIGIR Found

As of June 2008, SIGIR identified 1,262 DoD Iraq reconstruction projects that 

have been terminated, including 732 for the convenience of the government, 

and 530 for default on the part of the contractor. These terminated projects 

had initial obligations of nearly $1 billion of which approximately $600

million has been paid to contractors, including $89.7 million to contractors on 

projects terminated for default. Although a few projects were nearly 

completed at termination, the vast majority were not. SIGIR selected 195 

terminations for more detailed review, drawing largely from projects valued at 

$1 million or more, representing about 80 percent of the projects’ initial 

obligation amounts.

SIGIR reviewed 135 terminations for convenience, 56 terminations for default, 

and 4 that were listed incorrectly as terminations. SIGIR found that 

terminations for convenience were often due to changes in scope or 

requirement, security problems, or because the project was no longer needed. 

In a few cases, projects were terminated because the Government of Iraq did 

not provide the expected support. SIGIR noted that several projects were 

terminated for convenience despite indication of poor contractor performance. 

SIGIR also noted instances where, following terminations, other contractors 

received contracts to complete work associated with the terminated contracts.

SIGIR found that most terminations for default were due to poor contractor 

and subcontractor performance; a few were for security problems. Some of 

these projects were later awarded to other contractors to complete.

SIGIR identified several large projects that were started, terminated (some 

more than once), and not subsequently completed. Other projects were 

terminated shortly after work began, requiring the government to pay for 

contractor-incurred expenses. For these projects, millions of dollars might 

have been wasted.

SIGIR found no records of action taken to suspend or debar contractors from 

future contracts as a result of poor performance. In a few cases, poorperforming contractors were awarded additional contracts. SIGIR also 

confirmed that two contractors who were suspended for fraud and other 

criminal problems related to other contracts received new reconstruction 

contracts after being placed on the Excluded Parties List System (EPLS),

which meant they should have been prevented from receiving new contracts. 

Two other contractors were permitted to continue with existing contracts after 

being suspended and placed on the EPLS. Although the Federal Acquisition 

Regulation does not require agencies to suspend or debar contractors for poor 

performance, they do authorize agencies to suspend or debar contractors for 

failure or refusal to perform on a contract, and for any other action of a serious 

and compelling nature affecting responsibility.

Finally, SIGIR found that closed out, terminated projects contained about 

$16.62 million in unliquidated obligations that the government might be able 

to deobligate. After informing the agencies of these unliquidated obligations 

in June 2008, the agencies began reviews to determine if the funds could be 

deobligated. As of September 2008, $14.50 million in unliquidated 

obligations remained.

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

For more information, contact SIGIR Public Affairs 

at (703) 428-1100 or PublicAffairs@sigir.mil

Summary of Report: SIGIR-09-004

Why SIGIR Did This Study

SIGIR has often been asked about problems in 

the U.S. reconstruction program, including the 

extent to which contracts have been 

terminated because of poor performance on 

the part of the contractor. Government 

contracts generally contain clauses allowing 

the U.S. government to end a contract when 

the need for the supplies or services no longer 

exists, the contractor’s performance becomes 

unsatisfactory, or some other situation 

develops that warrants contract closure.

SIGIR previously provided an interim report 

on the availability of aggregate information on 

such contract actions involving Iraq 

reconstruction managed by Department of 

Defense (DoD) implementing agencies

(SIGIR-08-013). This follow-on report 

provides additional insights on factors and 

circumstances related to contract terminations 

of selected projects and the reasons for them.

SIGIR’s reporting objectives include

determining (1) the numbers, types, and basis 

for all DoD terminations of Iraq 

reconstruction projects, and the characteristics 

of selected termination actions; (2) if 

terminated projects resulted in wasted 

government resources; (3) actions DoD 

agencies took against poor performing 

contractors; and (4) whether funds were still 

obligated against terminated projects.

What SIGIR Recommends

SIGIR recommends actions to reinforce the 

importance of screening contractors against 

lists of those debarred or suspended from 

receiving contracts, and deobligate excess 

funds that remain obligated against terminated 

contracts.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the 

Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 

concurred with SIGIR’s recommendations.

Special Inspector General for IRAQ Reconstruction

SIGIR
S PE CI AL I NS PECTO R GE NE R AL FO R I RA Q RE CO NST R UC TIO N

October 27, 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

JOINT SECRETARIAT

OSD POLICY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE – IRAQ

COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL SECURITY 

TRANSITION COMMAND – IRAQ

DIRECTOR, IRAQ TRANSITION ASSISTANCE OFFICE

SUBJECT: Iraq Reconstruction Project Terminations Represent a Range of Actions (SIGIR 

09-004)

We are providing this audit report for your information and use. The report discusses Iraq 

reconstruction projects terminated for convenience or default by the Department of Defense. We 

performed this audit in accordance with our statutory responsibilities contained in Public Law 108-

106, as amended. This law provides for independent and objective audits of policies designed to 

promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of programs and operations and to prevent and detect 

fraud, waste, and abuse. This audit was conducted as SIGIR project 8020.

We considered written comments from The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division, 

and Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan, as well as technical comments from the MultiNational Force Iraq and Multi-National Corps-Iraq, in finalizing this report. GRD’s and JCCI/A’s written comments are included in the Management Comments section of this report.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the SIGIR staff. For additional information on this report, 

please contact Mr. Glenn Furbish (glenn.furbish@sigir.mil,703-428-1058).

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.

Inspector General
Table of Contents

Executive Summary i

Introduction 1

Project Terminations 5

Some Terminations Resulted in Unfinished Projects and 

Wasted Funds 11

Few Adverse Actions Taken Against Problem Contractors and 

Some Suspended or Debarred Contractors Continue to Work 14

Some Terminated Projects Retain Unliquidated Obligations 18

Conclusions and Recommendations 19

Appendices

A. Scope and Methodology 20

B. Examples of Projects Terminated for Convenience 23

C. Terminated Contracts with Unliquidated Obligations 27

D. Acronyms 28

E. Audit Team Members 29

Management Comments

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 30

Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 32
i

Iraq Reconstruction Project Terminations Represent a 

Range of Actions

SIGIR-09-004 October 27, 2008

Executive Summary

Introduction

Since 2003, the U.S. government has appropriated more than $50 billion for Iraq reconstruction. 

Approximately $46 billion was appropriated through four Iraq reconstruction accounts, which 

were managed primarily by two Department of Defense (DoD) agencies:

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division (GRD) 

the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A)

As of July 2008, approximately $38.37 billion of this amount had been obligated, much of it 

under contractual arrangements.

SIGIR has often been asked about problems in the U.S. reconstruction program, including the 

extent to which contracts have been terminated because of poor performance by contractors. 

Government contracts generally contain clauses that allow the U.S. government to end a contract 

for a number of reasons, including

if the need for the supplies or services no longer exists,

if the contractor’s performance becomes unsatisfactory, and

if some other situation develops that warrants contract closure.

In addressing contract terminations, SIGIR previously issued an interim report on the availability 

of aggregate information on such contract actions involving Iraq reconstruction projects 

managed by DoD implementing agencies.1 That interim report provided an overview of the 

process for terminating contracts for convenience and default, as well as available information 

about contract terminations. This follow-on report provides additional insights on factors and 

circumstances related to contract terminations of selected projects and the reasons for them.

In this report, SIGIR’s objectives were to determine:

the numbers, types, and basis for all DoD terminations of Iraq reconstruction projects, as 

well as the characteristics of selected terminations actions;

 

1

Interim Report on Iraq Reconstruction Contract Terminations (SIGIR-08-013, April 28, 2008)
ii

whether terminated projects resulted in wasted government resources;

whether DoD agencies ensured the integrity and competence of companies selected for 

projects terminated for default and took appropriate action, including suspension and 

debarment, against poor-performing contractors; and

whether funds were still obligated against terminated projects.

SIGIR’s review was limited somewhat by incomplete contract files for the projects reviewed,

which made it difficult to thoroughly evaluate the reported terminations. Although most files 

contained termination modifications or notices, only a few contained other required management 

documents such as a record of the required legal review of awards, rights of parties, termination 

procedures, liabilities, settlement proposals and agreements, and other contractual matters. Few 

files contained any information regarding the percentage of work completed by the contractor at 

termination; when a percentage was cited, at times it was simply a calculation of the amount of 

funds expended. Also, the contract files rarely contained a record of agency actions to determine 

the contractor’s prior awards and performance before awarding new contracts.

Results

As of June 2008, SIGIR identified 1,262 projects that DoD had terminated, including 732 for the 

convenience of the government, and 530 for default on the part of the contractor. These 

terminated projects had initial obligations of about $1 billion, of which approximately $600 

million had been paid to contractors, including $89.7 million to contractors on projects 

terminated for default. Although a few projects were nearly completed at the time of 

termination, the vast majority were not. SIGIR selected 195 terminations for more detailed 

review, drawing largely from projects valued at $1 million or more, which account for 

approximately 80% of the initial obligation amounts.

SIGIR reviewed 195 terminations, including 135 for convenience of the government, 56 

terminations for default, and 4 terminations incorrectly identified in the Iraq Reconstruction 

Management System. SIGIR found that terminations for convenience were often the result of 

changes in scope or requirement, security problems, or because the projects were no longer 

needed. In a few cases, the projects were terminated because the Government of Iraq (GOI) did 

not provide the expected support. Several projects were terminated for convenience despite 

indications of inadequate contractor performance. SIGIR also noted cases in which contracts 

terminated for convenience were awarded to other contractors for completion.

SIGIR reviewed 56 terminations for default: 39 from GRD, 16 from JCC-I/A, and 1 from MultiNational Corps-Iraq. Most of the contracts were terminated for poor performance by contractors 

and subcontractors, but a few were terminated for security reasons. Some of the projects were 

later completed by other contactors.

Waste can result if projects are terminated prior to completion and not subsequently completed 

or used. SIGIR identified several large projects that were started, terminated (some more than 

once), and not subsequently completed. Other projects were terminated shortly after work 

began, requiring the government to pay for contractor-incurred expenses. For these projects, 

millions of dollars might have been wasted.
iii

Regarding the projects reviewed, SIGIR found no records of actions taken to suspend or debar 

defaulting contractors because of their poor performance. Some contractors were awarded 

additional contracts. Although the Federal Acquisition Regulation does not require agencies to 

suspend or debar contractors for poor performance, agencies are authorized to suspend or debar

contractors for failure or refusal to perform on a contract, and for any other action of a serious 

and compelling nature affecting responsibility.

SIGIR found that in two instances the government awarded new reconstruction contracts to 

suspended or debarred companies on the Excluded Parties List System (EPLS) based on 

activities unrelated to the projects we reviewed. In addition, SIGIR identified two contractors on 

the EPLS that continue to work on contracts awarded to them before their suspension. 

Subsequently, DoD initiated actions to terminate one of these contracts. The other contract was 

delayed because the GOI did not provide title to the land. In summary, DoD continues to use 

two contractors that have been suspended for fraud and responsibility issues.

Finally, SIGIR found that terminated projects contained about $16.62 million in unliquidated 

obligations that the government may be able to deobligate. JCC-I/A officials speculated that the 

contract terminating official may not have released the funds. However, GRD officials said that 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Financial Management System should identify why the funds 

were being held. After SIGIR informed the DoD agencies of these unliquidated obligations in 

June 2008, the agencies stated that they would investigate all of the obligations and take any 

necessary actions to deobligate unneeded funds. As of September 2008, $14.50 million in 

unliquidated obligations remained.

Recommendations

SIGIR recommends that:

1. GRD and JCC-I/A reinforce the importance of screening contractors to ensure that they have 

not been suspended or debarred; and

2. GRD, JCC-I/A, and the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment review all 

terminated contracts to ensure that unneeded funds have been deobligated.

Management Comments and Audit Response

GRD and JCC-I/A provided written comments concurring with SIGIR’s recommendations. 

GRD and JCC-I/A, as well as Multi-National Force Iraq and Multi-National Corps-Iraq provided 

technical comments which we considered in finalizing this report. GRD’s and JCC-I/A’s written 

comments are included in the Management Comments section of this report.
1

Introduction

The United States has now appropriated more than $50 billion for Iraq’s reconstruction, 

primarily from four Iraq reconstruction accounts: $20.86 billion from the Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund (IRRF); $18.04 billion from the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF); $3.74

billion from the Economic Support Fund (ESF); and $3.56 billion from the Commander’s 

Emergency Response Program (CERP).2 These four funds account for about 90% of all the 

money appropriated for Iraq reconstruction through mid-2008. As of July 2008, approximately 

$38.37 billion of this amount had been obligated, much of it under contractual arrangements.

This report provides information on Iraq reconstruction contracts and task orders, and 

corresponding projects managed by Department of Defense (DoD) agencies and terminated 

either for the convenience of the government or for default on the part of the contractor. SIGIR 

did not review the termination of projects managed by either the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) or the Department of State (DoS).

Background

In the early years of Iraq reconstruction, the U.S. government awarded large, cost-plus award-fee 

contracts to design and build projects throughout Iraq. Some of these large contracts included 

numerous task orders for individual projects. More recently, the norm has been to award 

smaller, fixed-price contracts, many to Iraqi firms. Contracts for reconstruction projects have 

been undertaken in specific sectors of Iraqi governance and society, including security and law 

enforcement, justice and public safety, electricity, oil, water and sanitation, transportation and 

telecommunications, health care, private sector development, and education. Over the past four 

years, some of these contracts were terminated by the government either for its convenience or 

for default. SIGIR has often been asked about problems in the U.S. reconstruction program, 

including the extent to which contracts have been terminated because of poor performance by 

contractors.

These contracts generally contain clauses that allow the U.S. government to terminate them 

when the need for the supplies or services no longer exists, the contractor’s performance is 

deemed unsatisfactory, or other circumstances that warrant ending the contract. In Iraq, these 

other circumstances included changes in strategies or plans, unforeseen security conditions, or 

the inability of the government and the contractor to come to terms on the cost of the work to be 

performed. When termination of a project is being considered, the government must decide 

whether to terminate the contract for the convenience of the government or for default on the part 

of the contractor .

3

The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Part 49, contains detailed 

procedures for terminating these contracts.

 

2 CERP enables U.S. military commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan to undertake a variety of projects to respond to 

urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements in their areas of responsibility. These may include 

making condolence payments after combat operations, providing funds for repairs, purchasing critical infrastructure 

equipment, or conducting large-scale civic cleanups that employ as many Iraqis as possible.

3 When a contractor fails to deliver a commercial item, the contract is terminated for ―cause.‖
2

The government can cancel work under a contract for ―convenience‖ if it determines that 

cancellation is in its best interest; for example, when funds are no longer available for continued 

contract performance, the requirements are no longer needed, or changed circumstances make it 

impossible to perform the work. The government needs no particular reason to terminate a 

contract for convenience other than ―best interest.‖ When a contract is terminated for 

convenience, the government must pay the contractor for the effort it has expended on its behalf. 

For example, the government must pay the contractor for all materials and supplies purchased 

and labor costs incurred at the time the government ordered the contractor to stop all work on the 

project. By issuing a termination for convenience, the government limits its liability only to 

work completed at the time of termination.

The government can also completely or partially terminate work under a contract for ―default‖ if 

it determines that the contractor has failed or will fail to perform its contractual obligations. 

Default terminations are most often due to the contractor’s failure to make delivery of the 

required supplies or perform the required services within the time specified in the contract. 

Under a termination for default for a firm fixed price contract, the government is not liable for 

the contractor’s costs on undelivered work and is entitled to the repayment of advance and 

progress payments, if any. Under a termination for default for a reimbursable contract, the 

government is liable for (1) all costs reimbursable under the contract not previously paid, (2) 

costs of settling and paying termination settlement under terminated subcontracts that are 

chargeable to the terminated portion of the contract; (3) reasonable costs of settlement of the 

work terminated, including accounting, legal, clerical and other expenses necessary for the 

preparation of terminal proposals and supporting data, and (4) a portion of the fee payable under 

the contract, normally based upon the percentage of work completed.

It is important to note that contracts and task orders that incur problems are sometimes modified 

to change or reduce the scope of work to be performed, rather than terminated. When applied to 

contracts with problems, it can have the effect of ending the contract or task order without the 

need to terminate for convenience or default. SIGIR’s work has identified numerous instances in 

which contract modifications are used in lieu of a termination, but data are not available that 

show the frequency of these actions. Descoping is an appropriate process but can mask the 

universe of problem projects.

Although the FAR does not require agencies to suspend or debar contractors for poor 

performance, it does authorize the agencies to suspend or debar contractors for failure or refusal 

to perform on a contract, and for any other action of a serious and compelling nature affecting 

responsibility. Suspensions are temporary actions taken by agencies to immediately protect the 

public interest by excluding contractors from receiving further Federal contracts pending the 

outcome of a criminal investigation or proposed debarment action based on a number of actions, 

including a contractor’s poor performance. Suspensions can be issued based on ―adequate 

evidence‖ of wrongdoing and generally do not last more than one year. Debarments are more 

permanent actions to exclude contractors from such contracts, based on preponderant evidence of 

wrongdoing, having given the party proposed for debarment notice and opportunity to be heard. 

Debarments are for a specified period of time as determined by the debarring agency, based on 

the seriousness of the offense or inadequacy of performance and a finding of a lack of present 

responsibility on the part of the contractor. Suspension and debarment actions are not to be 
3

punitive measures but rather are designed to protect the public interest by assuring the integrity 

of the contracting process.

Agency Roles and Responsibilities

To support Iraq relief and reconstruction efforts, the U.S. government has entered into contracts 

with U.S., Iraqi, and other international firms for thousands of projects for both construction and 

non-construction activities. Since reconstruction began, six government organizations, have 

been primarily responsible for implementing Iraq reconstruction efforts: four with the DoD,

including the Gulf Region Division (GRD) of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Joint 

Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A), Air Force Center for Engineering and the 

Environment (AFCEE), and the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I); USAID; and DoS.

SIGIR Interim Report

In an April 2008 report,4SIGIR provided an overview of the termination for convenience and 

default processes and general information on Iraq reconstruction contracts terminated. 

Information used in this interim report was collected primarily from the Iraq Reconstruction 

Management System (IRMS).5SIGIR noted that this database does not provide a complete or 

consistent picture of all reconstruction activities and does not contain complete information on 

USAID or DoS projects.

Scope and Objectives

Given the continued high level of interest in the issue of terminations, especially those for 

default, SIGIR completed this follow-on review to more closely determine the basis and impact 

of these terminations. This follow-on review is based on information obtained not only from 

IRMS, but from additional databases and contract files of individual projects. Our review of 

project files also allowed us to examine whether the contracting officers had considered the 

defaulted contractors’ prior performance before awarding such contracts and whether any of 

these contractors were awarded follow-on contracts.

SIGIR collected contract data from several databases, including IRMS, MAXIMO, and the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers Financial Management System (CEFMS) to determine the total 

number of Iraq reconstruction contracts and projects terminated by DoD agencies involved in 

managing Iraq reconstruction projects: GRD, JCC-I/A, MNC-I, and AFCEE. From this total 

number of terminations, SIGIR then selected 195 projects for detailed review based primarily on 

their award amount. To ensure that project files reviewed included a large amount of all the 

monies spent on terminated projects, SIGIR judgmentally selected for review largely those 

projects with contract amounts of $1 million or more. SIGIR selected for review, 96 projects 

with initial obligation amounts of $1 million or greater. The remaining 99 projects were selected 

from IRMS and lists provided by the agencies. Also, because many of GRD’s project files were 

located in numerous locations throughout Iraq and not easily accessible, SIGIR also selected for 

review some project files readily available at GRD. Although the use of a judgment sample 

 

4

Interim Report on Iraq Reconstruction Contract Terminations (SIGIR-08-013, April 28, 2008)

5 Operation and maintenance support for this system is provided by GRD.
4

limits the projection of the results to the entire universe of terminations, we still believe the 

results are significant since collectively, the 195 project files reviewed represent over 80% of the 

initial award amount of all terminations. Additional information on scope is provided in 

Appendix A.

SIGIR’s reporting objectives were to determine:

the numbers, types, and basis for all DoD terminations of Iraq reconstruction projects, as 

well as the characteristics of selected terminations actions;

whether terminated projects resulted in wasted government resources;

whether DoD agencies ensured the integrity and competence of companies selected for 

projects terminated for default and took appropriate action, including suspension and 

debarment, against poor-performing contractors; and

whether funds were still obligated against terminated projects.

Data Limitations

The scope of SIGIR’s audit work was limited by incomplete contract documentation. DoD 

agencies provided us with either electronic or hard copies of requested individual contract files 

on terminated projects. Because these files were dispersed throughout Iraq and the continental 

United States, many were provided to us electronically; as a result, it was not possible to 

determine whether SIGIR had received all of the information in the official files. Some 

electronic files SIGIR received contained no contract information at all, while others contained 

incomplete and insufficient information to address all of the objectives of this audit. The lack of 

basic data in some files prevented us from discerning the basis or justification for the 

terminations.

For projects terminated for default, neither the databases nor the project files SIGIR received 

contained records on whether the contracting officer had reviewed the contractor’s performance 

history prior to awarding the contract. Also, just under half of the files contained detailed

information on the percent of project completion at time of termination; at times the percent cited 

was simply a ratio of the amounts paid to the contractor and the contract amount. On average, 

only one in four files contained data on whether the contract had undergone the required legal 

review regarding contract provisions and settlement proposals and agreements.

For a full discussion of the audit scope and methodology, use of computerized data and data 

limitations, and summary of prior coverage, see Appendix A; for examples of contracts 

terminated for convenience, see Appendix B; for terminated contracts with unliquidated 

obligations, see Appendix C; for a list of acronyms, see Appendix D; and for a list of the audit 

team members, see Appendix E.
5

Project Terminations

SIGIR identified from DoD databases 1,262 terminations of Iraq reconstruction projects as of 

June 2008. The majority were terminated for the convenience of the government, but also a 

sizeable number for contractor default. When awarded, these terminated projects had obligations 

of about $1 billion. As of June 2008, DoD had paid approximately $600 million to contractors 

for these projects6, including $89.7 million to contractors on projects terminated for default.

Although a few projects were nearly complete at the time of the termination action, the vast 

majority were not. Table 1 summarizes by contracting activity the number of DoD-terminations

for convenience and default that SIGIR identified.

Table 1—Terminated Iraq Reconstruction Related Projects

DOD Activity

Terminations for 

Convenience

Terminations for 

Default

Total

Terminations

GRD 137 (60.4%) 90 (39.6%) *227

JCC-I/A 544 (55.5%) 437 (44.5%) 981

AFCEE 15 (100%) 0 *15

MNC-I 36 (92.3%) 3 (7.7%) 39

Total 732 (58.0%) 530 (42.0%) 1,262

Source: IRMS and JCC-I/A list of terminations

*These numbers reflect a downward adjustment by SIGIR from 230 (GRD), and 72 (AFCEE) projects initially identified as terminations in 

IRMS. SIGIR subtracted those projects that were actually descoped as the result of project changes or cancellations.

As shown in Table 1, JCC-I/A had the largest number of both terminations for convenience and 

terminations for default, followed by GRD. JCC-I/A’s large number of terminations is the result 

of it assuming responsibility for the large design build contracts and the contracts awarded by the 

former Project and Contracting Office.

Selected Terminations Reviewed

In addition to compiling data on all termination actions by DoD agencies, SIGIR judgmentally 

selected 195 terminated projects for more detailed review, focusing primarily on those projects 

with initial obligation amounts of $1 million or greater. The sample also included a smaller 

number with initial obligations less than $1 million because the contract files were already at 

GRD. In total, the projects reviewed by SIGIR account for approximately 80% of the projects’ 

initial obligation amounts.

 

6

SIGIR calculation of amount paid to contractors was based mostly on information in DoD databases. However, this data was not available for 

JCC-IA and GRD/Gulf Region South. For these agencies, SIGIR used amounts found in project files reviewed. As a result, the $600 million 

figure likely under represents the actual amount paid to contractors. 
6

Table 2 lists, by DoD activity, the type of termination (for convenience or for default). Table 3 

summarizes, by DoD activity, the contract amounts and amounts paid to contractors.

Table 2: Summary of Termination Actions Reviewed

DOD Activity Terminations for 

Convenience

Terminations for 

Default

Other Total 

Terminations

GRD 72 (62.6%) 39 (33.9%) 4 (3.5%) 115

JCC-I/A 38 (70.4%) 16 (29.6%) 0 54

AFCEE 15 (100%) 0 0 15

MNC-I 10 (90.9%) 1 (9.1%) 0 11

Total 135 (69.2%) 56 (28.7%) 4 (2.1%) 195

Note: ―Other‖ includes projects listed incorrectly as terminations in IRMS. These were not discovered until we began our detailed review of 

files.

Source: SIGIR analysis

Table 3: Summary of SIGIR-reviewed Contracts – Contract 

Amounts and Amounts Paid Contractors ($ Millions)

DOD Activity Contract Amounts Amounts paid to Contractors

GRD $115.5 $25.2 (21.8%)

JCC-I/A 483.9 445.1 (92.0%)

AFCEE 209.0 106.4 (50.9%)

MNC-I 1.5 0.7 (46.7%)

Total $809.9 577.4 (71.3%)

Source: Contract files and CEFMS

Most Terminations Were for the Convenience of the Government

Of the 195 terminations reviewed by SIGIR, 135 were for the convenience of the government. 

SIGIR found that terminations for convenience were often due to changes in scope or 

requirement, security problems or because the project was no longer needed. In a few cases, the 

projects were terminated because the GOI did not provide the expected support. SIGIR noted 

that despite evidence in the contract files of poor contractor performance, several projects were 

terminated for convenience instead of default. SIGIR also noted several instances where

terminated contracts were awarded to other contractors for completion. SIGIR also noted

instances where the databases identified a contract as terminated for convenience but the contract 

file showed the contract was descoped rather than terminated. The following summarizes what 

SIGIR identified in the contract files by individual DoD contracting activities. More detailed

examples are provided in Appendix B.
7

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division

SIGIR examined 72 GRD projects terminated for convenience; all but two have been closed out. 

These 72 projects were initially estimated to cost about $82.5 million; of which about $9.9 

million was paid to the contractors. Sixteen of these projects had original estimated costs of $1 

million or more. On 38 projects, work was never started and no payments were made. On 32 

projects, work was started and payments averaging about $300,000 were made to the contractor. 

One project was 90% complete when it was terminated because an attack destroyed the project.

In that instance the contractor was paid about $964,000 for costs incurred.

Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan

JCC-I/A reported 544 terminations for convenience. About 36 of these projects had estimated 

costs of $1 million or more and were awarded mostly to large U.S. corporations, including 

Parsons Global Services, Inc.; KBR, Inc.; Fluor, LLC; and Washington International/Black & 

Veatch. About half of the projects were for services or commodities costing less than $25,000, 

and about one third were for less than $10,000. The majority of these had been awarded to Iraqi 

firms for items such as transformers, water tanks, personal electrical equipment, lights, fans, 

tools, and gym equipment. SIGIR reviewed 38 projects terminated for convenience and found 

that although all of them were identified by JCC-I/A as terminations; two were listed in IRMS as

completed, four were ―cancelled,‖ and two were ―no-cost settlements.‖ Six JCC-I/A files lacked 

termination notices.

Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment

Of the 72 projects AFCEE identified as terminated in IRMS, SIGIR determined that 57 had been 

closed as a result of scope changes and were not true terminations. The contracting officers had 

neither provided the contractor with a termination letter nor processed the action as a 

termination. The remaining 15 contract files were for terminations for the convenience of the 

government. These 15 projects had original estimated costs of about $268.1 million, of which

$116.2 million (43%) was paid to the contractors. Two of the projects were terminated because 

of land ownership problems and ten were terminated due to changes in requirements or because 

the work planned was no longer needed. Nine of these projects have been closed out.

Multi-National Corps-Iraq

MNC-I initially identified 36 projects as terminations for convenience; all were CERP projects. 

SIGIR reviewed the files of 11 of these projects and found that 4 contained no information 

detailing why the contracts were terminated. None of the files contained modifications or 

notices that officially confirmed the termination. The lack of standard documentation is due, in 

part, to DoD having authorized waivers to FAR requirements for CERP projects. Seven files 

contained documentation explaining the reason the project was terminated for convenience. 

Three examples are discussed in Appendix B.

SIGIR could not determine from information in the databases if follow-on awards had been 

issued for projects or if the projects had been completed. In addition, there was insufficient 

documentation in the files to determine if actions had been taken against the contractors for poor 

performance. Moreover, SIGIR could not determine the reasons why MNC-I classified the 
8

actions as a termination for convenience when documents show that the contractors performed 

poorly. Of note, however, is one terminated project of special concern.

The Dawoo Al Hassan compact water treatment project was terminated, according to a July 2007

CERP Closure Report, when the contractor took money he had been advanced on the project and 

fled to Syria and nothing was built. According to documents in the project file, the likelihood 

that funds from this project were funneled to the insurgency is high. The contractor was 

advanced $100,000 in two incremental payments of $50,000, and the remaining $95,500 was deobligated. We have referred information regarding this incident to SIGIR’s Investigations 

Directorate for further review.

According to DoD officials, CERP projects do not have to comply with the FAR requirements. 

They noted that Section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal 

Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163), as amended by section 1205 of the NDAA for FY 2008 (Public Law 

110-181), authorizes the use of DoD operations and maintenance funds in fiscal years 2008 and 

2009 for the CERP established for Iraq. Section 1202 also authorizes the Secretary of Defense to 

waive any provision of law that, if not waived, would prohibit, restrict, limit or otherwise 

constrain the exercise of authority under CERP. DoD asserts that the nature of the CERP 

precludes the application of federal procurement and contracting rules, and requires payments to 

individuals and other nongovernmental entities that may not be consistent with federal laws, or 

subject to military claims laws and procedures.

Most Terminations for Default are the Result of Poor Contractor

Performance

SIGIR reviewed 56 terminations for default; 39 from GRD, 16 from JCC-I/A, and one from 

MNC-I. Virtually all of these terminations were due to poor contractor and subcontractor 

performance; a few due to security problems. Some of the projects were subsequently awarded 

to other contractors to complete the work. SIGIR noted that in some instances contractors

received additional contracts after having defaulted on earlier ones. Following are examples of 

some GRD and JCC-I/A large-dollar projects terminated for default.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division

SIGIR reviewed 39 GRD projects terminated for default and all had been closed out. Most of 

these projects were terminated because contractors and/or subcontractors failed to meet project 

requirements and timeframes, or because security issues made it impossible for the contractor to 

continue work. Generally, SIGIR found the required termination modifications or notices in the 

project files. However, only a limited number of files contained documentation of the agencies’ 

reviews of the contractors’ experience prior to awarding the contract, and few files contained 

evidence of the required legal review of the project awards, rights of parties, termination 

procedures, liabilities, settlement proposals and agreements, and other contractual matters. Also, 

based on the available databases and the files provided by GRD, we were unable to determine 

whether follow-on contracts were awarded for many of these projects. Following are summaries 

of four large projects terminated by GRD for default.
9

An Iraqi company was awarded an indefinite delivery indefinite quantity contract in December 

2004 (W916QW-05-D-0014). The contractor was issued task order 1 to construct an Iraqi 

National Guard battalion barracks. The task order was modified six times to change the 

statement of work and increased funding to about $10.6 million. This project was terminated for 

default in March 2007 when the contractor was unable to make appropriate progress on the final 

punch list. A punch list contains the final items the contractor should complete before turning 

over the building to GRD. The punch list identified leaking septic tanks, latrine sinks pulling 

away from the wall, and structural failures of balconies. The contractor blamed his 

uncooperative sub-contractor for his inability to complete the work. The contractor was paid 

$10.6 million, the total contract amount. In April 2007, an Iraqi company was awarded a 

contract for $328,000 to complete the project. The contractor completed the project in December 

2007.

In October 2005, an Iraqi company was awarded a $2.38 million contract (W917BG-06-C-0007)

to design and build a 250-man Iraq police station in Falluja. (Note: this project was originally 

awarded in April 2005 to another Iraqi firm--W917BG-05-C-0051--and also was terminated for 

default; this original contractor was paid $1.44 million.) The project was to be completed by 

March 2006 but contract files show that between April and November 2006, the contractor failed 

to make significant progress on the project. The contractor complained that his workers were 

being intimidated by insurgents at the site and that his son had been kidnapped (this was refuted 

by the local Chief of Police). This contract was terminated for default in November 2006, and 

the contractor paid $1.57 million for costs incurred. GRD reported that at termination, the 

project was 66% completed. (Note: 66% is exactly the percent of the contract paid to the 

contractor). While the Contracting Officer reported that it would not be a problem to solicit and 

award the contract again, SIGIR’ review of IRMS data did not reveal a follow-on contract award 

to complete this project.

In September 2005, another Iraqi company was awarded a $2.0 million contract (W917BG-05-C0270) to construct a water production and treatment plant in Falluja. After several letters of 

nonperformance, a cure notice, and a show-cause letter, the project was terminated for default in 

December 2006 because of the lack of progress. At termination, the contractor had been paid 

$864,950 and GRD reported that approximately 43% of the project had been completed. (Note: 

43% is the same percent as the amount of the contract paid to the contractor). Contract 

documents show that the contract would be re-competed in order to complete the work.

However, IRMS did not identify a follow-on contract award.

Between August and September 2006, GRD also awarded three firm fixed-price construction 

contracts to an Iraqi firm to complete road projects. These projects (W917BK-06-P-0171; 0172; 

0173), with a combined award amount of $985,825, were terminated for default in December 

2007 after the contractor indicated that he could not financially afford to finish the work. 

Contract documents show that at termination, between 60% - 70% of the work had been 

completed and the contractor was paid $587,817. IRMS did not identify a follow-on contract 

award to complete these projects. 

Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan

As of June 2008, JCC-I/A reported 437 terminations for default. SIGIR reviewed 16 of these 

projects, all of which had awards of over $1 million. Most projects were terminated based on the 
10

contractors’ failure to perform the work or their noncompliance with the contract. Following are 

summaries of three projects terminated by JCC-I/A for default,

7

two involving separate task 

orders terminated within a single contract.

Parsons Global Service, Inc. (U.S.) was awarded a cost-plus award-fee contract (W914NS-04-

D0009) with a $900 million ceiling and issued several task orders to provide design and 

construction services in Iraq’s security and justice sector.8 Two task orders—for western-style 

prisons—were not completed and were terminated for default. The stated reasons for the 

termination were Parsons’ failure to make sufficient progress on the projects, which endangered 

performance; lack of schedule adherence; and a failure to control costs which endangered the 

government’s ability to adequately fund the projects to completion.

In May 2004, Task Order #7 under the above contract was issued for $40.50 million to 

design and build the Kahn Bani Sa’ad Correction Facility. In June 2006, the task order 

was terminated for default; the contractor was paid $31.06 million. At termination, four

security buildings were approximately 25% complete and 15 other buildings required 

under the task order were no more than 30% complete. A bridge contract was then 

awarded and $3.3 million paid to a subcontractor to continue construction until a new 

contract could be awarded. In September 2006, two follow-on contracts were issued: an 

Iraqi firm was awarded a $42.47 million contract (W91GXZ-06-C-0035) to complete 

construction of the first phase of the prison, and Secure Global Engineering (U.S) was 

awarded a contract and paid $1.6 million to provide electrical feeder lines to the prison. 

In June 2007, the construction project was terminated for convenience because of poor 

quality construction work and security problems. Documents show that at termination, 

large amounts of unused equipment and materials were left on site and unsecured. 

Though none of the planned construction was completed, the Iraqi contractor was paid 

$7.2 million to cover expenses. In total, approximately $43.2 million was spent and the 

prison was not completed.

In May 2004, Task Order # 8 under the above contract for $48.82 million was issued to 

design and build the Nassriya Prison Facility. In July 2006, this task order was 

terminated for default and the contractor was paid $31.0 million. A bridge contract was 

then awarded and $2.62 million paid to a subcontractor to keep the site secure. 

Construction on this facility was continued when the same Iraqi firm noted above was 

awarded a contract in September 2006 to complete Phase I of the prison. According to 

contract records, this contractor performed poorly on the Kahn Bani Sa’ad facility and the 

task order was terminated for convenience. Nevertheless, the contractor was awarded 

two additional contracts, one in May 2007 to complete Phase II of the prison and another 

in December 2007 to complete Phase III.

In 2007, AEY, Inc., (U.S.) was awarded a number of contracts to provide ammunition and 

weapons to troops in Iraq. Five of these contracts were terminated for cause (default) when the 

 

7

SIGIR determined that three projects were not true terminations, one project was reclassified as a termination for 

convenience upon the murder of the company owner, and one project was prematurely closed and eventually 

reopened. Contract files for two other projects lacked basic contract information.

8 Outcomes, Cost, and Oversight of the Security and Justice Contract with Parsons Delaware, Inc.; (SIGIR-08-019; 

July 28, 2008)
11

contractor failed to deliver the required ammunition in accordance with the delivery terms. No 

money had been paid to the contractor at termination.
12

Some Terminations Resulted in Unfinished Projects 

and Wasted Funds

As noted earlier, project files on projects terminated for convenience or default indicated varying 

degrees of project completion at the time of terminations; sometimes with other contracts 

awarded to complete the planned work. Waste can result if projects are terminated prior to 

completion and not subsequently completed or used. SIGIR identified several large projects that 

were started, terminated (some more than once), and not subsequently completed. Other projects 

were terminated shortly after work began, requiring the government to pay for contractorincurred expenses. For these projects, millions of dollars might have been wasted. For example:

In July 2005, Ellis Corporation (U.S.) was issued task order 12 under contract (FA8903-

04-D-8694) for $69.32 million to construct facilities for the Iraqi Army’s 4th Brigade of 

the 6th Division at Mahmudiya. This project was terminated for convenience by mutual 

agreement of both parties after the government determined that the contractor had 

significant management problems and was performing well below standards. At 

termination, AFCEE reported that 85% of the work had been completed. The contractor 

was eventually paid $69.27 million even though none of the facilities were ever fully 

completed and many were not even started. IRMS did not identify a follow on award for 

this project.

In September 2005, Lucent Corporation (U.S.) was awarded a $4.74 million contract 

(W917BG-05-C-0254) to provide a telecommunications network in the city of Falluja. 

The system was to be installed in a building provided by the GOI. The GOI never 

provided the building, and subsequent attempts to install the system in a new location 

were unsuccessful due to security problems. In the end, the contract was terminated for 

convenience, the telephone system was not installed, and the contractor was paid 

$288,700 for costs incurred. IRMS did not identify a follow on award for the project.

In May 2006, Ellis Corporation (U.S.) was awarded task order 17 under contract 

(FA8903-04-D-8694) for $34.20 million to construct facilities for the 1st Division of the 

New Iraqi Army Headquarters and three battalions at Ramadi. In April 2008, the project 

was terminated for convenience because the GOI was unable to resolve land ownership 

disputes, and in the end, according to a DoD audit report9, nothing was built. Despite 

these problems, the contractor was paid $31.89 million, including about $10.4 million for 

security, and $6.0 million for architecture design, building construction project 

management, and award fees. According to AFCEE, $15.0 million was paid to the 

contractor for materials available for future projects though the DoD audit report noted 

that the contractor’s vouchers did not show that these materials were ever purchased. In 

addition, a United States Air Force audit report10 identified unapproved subcontracts 

under this task order that may result in additional charges of $14.4 million. The auditors 

 

9 DOD Inspector General Report, Management of the Iraq Security Forces Fund in southwest Asia – Phase II,

(Report No. D-2008-026, November 30, 2007)

10 Air Force Audit Agency, Cancelled Iraq Reconstruction Program Task Orders (Report No. F2008-0013-FD1000, 

September 11, 2008)
13

also questioned $1.32 million of the fee awarded to the contractor. IRMS did not identify 

a follow-on award for this project.

In July 2006, CH2M Hill (U.S.) was awarded task order 2 under contract (FA8903-06-D8510) for $7.81 million to construct facilities to house an Iraqi battalion and to convert an 

existing light battalion to a motorized battalion at Sykes. This project was terminated for 

convenience due to contractor labor cost overruns that would have doubled the total 

project costs. The contractor was paid $4.07 million and nothing was constructed. IRMS 

did not identify a follow on award for this project
14

Few Adverse Actions Taken Against Problem 

Contractors and Some Suspended or Debarred 

Contractors Continued to Work

SIGIR reviewed 56 files on DoD terminations for default to identify agency efforts to (1) ensure 

the integrity and competence of selected contractors and (2) consider restricting poor performing 

contractors from receiving new contracts. Specifically, SIGIR examined whether the agencies 

had evaluated the contractors’ prior performance before awarding contracts and whether they had 

considered suspending or debarring the poor performing contractors. SIGIR examined whether 

follow-on contracts were awarded to complete the work. SIGIR found that after terminating 

contractors for default, DoD agencies did not initiate actions to suspend or debar any of the poor 

performing contractors, and some of these contractors received additional government contracts. 

SIGIR also found a few suspended or debarred contractors that were awarded new contracts.

As noted earlier, even though the FAR does not require agencies to suspend or debar contractors 

for poor performance, they do authorize the agencies to suspend or debar contractors for failure 

or refusal to perform on a contract, and for any other action of a serious and compelling nature 

affecting responsibility. Suspension and debarment actions both can result in the contractor 

being placed on the government’s Excluded Parties List System (EPLS). This list, maintained by 

the General Services Administration and available on-line to the public, identifies contractors 

that, because of their suspension or debarment, are declared ineligible to receive Federal 

contracts. To determine whether suspended or debarred contractors received new contracts, 

SIRIG checked their names against those contractors on the EPLS. SIGIR identified four 

contractors that received awards from DoD either after or just before they were suspended or 

debarred. Two of the contractors had been charged with fraud and other criminal violations and 

placed on the EPLS yet received new reconstruction contracts. Two contractors on the EPLS 

continued to work on contracts awarded to them prior to their suspension, although action was 

subsequently taken to terminate one contractor’s project. Contractors who received contract 

awards before their suspension are allowed to continue to perform under the prior contract 

award; however, agencies should consider the consequences of continuing to work with 

suspended or debarred contractors.

As noted earlier in this report, some of the contract files SIGIR reviewed were incomplete. 

Neither the databases nor the project files contained complete records on whether the contracting 

officer had reviewed the contractor’s performance history prior to awarding the contract. Also, 

the files reviewed contained limited information on any subsequent contracts awarded to 

continue the projects.

Poor Performing Contractors Not Added to the Excluded Parties 

List System

The U.S. Army, Legal Services Agency has been designated the debarring and suspending 

authority for the Army. The Procurement Fraud Branch within the Agency works with 
15

contracting officers to prevent and detect contractor fraud in Iraq reconstruction and support 

contracts and to suspend and debar contractors for fraud or corruption. These efforts are taken to 

ensure that contracts are awarded to, and performed by, contractors who are honest and ethical 

and who have the ability to successfully perform the required work. Policies and procedures 

governing actions that can be taken by agencies on contractors who do not perform—including 

debarment and suspension—are included in the FAR, Subpart 9.4. Contractors can be debarred 

for a number of criminal actions, including fraud, theft, embezzlement, bribery, falsification of 

records, making false statements, and lack of business ethics and integrity. As noted earlier, 

although the regulations do not require agencies to suspend or debar contractors for poor 

performance, they do authorize the agencies to suspend or debar contractors for failure or refusal 

to perform on a contract, and for any other action of a serious and compelling nature affecting 

responsibility.

In responding to a draft of this report, JCC-I/A noted that the particular circumstances 

surrounding each termination will determine whether a particular contractor will be placed on 

EPLS. Poor performance alone, without any showing of fraud or unethical behavior, will not 

generally result in the contractor being suspended or debarred. Rather, the FAR already has

procedures in place to screen poor performers from receiving future Federal contracts.

Our review showed that none of the poor performing contractors whose Iraq reconstruction 

contracts were terminated for default were placed on the EPLS. Also, we found at least eight 

contractors that had one or more of their projects terminated for default received new contracts 

and purchase orders. For example, in September 2006, JCC-I/A awarded two firm fixed-price 

contracts to an Iraqi contractor for about $45 million to rehabilitate electrical substations. 

However, in April 2007, the two contracts were terminated for default. Then, over the next 13 

months, JCC-I/A awarded the same contractor three additional procurements: in April 2007, the 

contractor received a purchase order for headphones; in September 2007, three purchase orders 

for radio equipment and boots; and in May 2008, a contract to provide solar lighting in Falluja. 

The latter project was three months behind schedule as of September 2008.

In August 2006, GRD awarded a firm fixed-price contract to an Iraqi contractor to build a public 

health center in Al Khalis. In October 2006, GRD terminated the contract for default. Between 

February 2007 and May 2008 the contractor was awarded six additional procurements for 

forklifts, starter bays, and backpacks, and for construction of divisional training centers and a 

police training center, and to upgrade a checkpoint.

In August 2006, GRD awarded a firm fixed-price contract to an Iraqi contractor to construct the 

Aziz-Balad electric power network. In November 2006, GRD terminated the contract for 

default. Over the next five months, between December 2006 and April 2007, the contractor was 

awarded six new purchase orders for the delivery of computers and internet phone lines, a 

copier/scanner, and other office supplies. It appears that these supplies have been delivered and 

the contractor was paid.

Although the above awards to defaulted contractors were within the authority provided by the 

FAR, they do raise questions about the degree to which contractor’s prior performance is being 

reviewed.
16

Two Suspended or Debarred Contractors Were Awarded New 

Contracts

Contractors that are suspended or debarred and placed on the EPLS, or who are proposed for 

debarment, are supposed to be prevented from receiving Federal contracts. Also, contracting 

agencies are prohibited from soliciting offers from, awarding contracts to, or consenting to 

subcontracts with these contractors unless the agency head determines that there is a compelling 

reason for such action. Such contractors are also excluded from conducting business with the 

government as agents or representatives of other contractors.

SIGIR found that in two instances the government awarded new reconstruction contracts to 

suspended or debarred companies on the EPLS based on activities unrelated to the projects we 

reviewed. It appears that contracting officers had not checked the EPLS prior to awarding the 

contracts. One contract was awarded to a contractor already on the list and this contract remains 

open. Another contract was awarded to a company just before it was suspended. However, the 

effective date of the contract was after the suspension date. In one instance, DoD took 

subsequent action to address the suspension issue and terminate the project, but in the other 

instance, the contractor was allowed to continue the project. There was insufficient 

documentation in the contract file to indicate why action was taken in one instance but not in 

another.

In the first instance, an Iraqi construction firm was debarred in June 2006 for allegations of 

bribery and false claims and was expected to be excluded from receiving further government 

contracts. However, the Army failed to notify the contractor of the action until October 12, 

2006. In September 2006, the firm was awarded a $3.8 million contract (W91GY1-06-C-0050) 

to build a waste water pump station in Falluja. (Note: SIGIR’s Inspections Directorate has 

completed a number of inspection reports on the Falluja Waste Water Treatment Plant (PA—08-

144 through 148.) According to a U.S. Army Legal Services Agency attorney, delays in 

notifying the contractor of the suspension were due to security concerns and the failure of 

contracting personnel to respond to requests for assistance in providing notice to the contractor. 

As of August 31, 2008, the contractor had been paid about $2 million under this contract, and 

contract modifications had increased funding to approximately $4.4 million. The contractor was 

to complete the construction by July 2007, but because of contractor delays, the completion date 

has changed to January 2009.

In the second instance, on July 11, 2007, Lee Dynamics, Inc. (U.S.) was awarded a contract 

(W91GY0-07-C-0058) to continue providing warehouse operation services in Iraq; the firm’s 

earlier contract expired on July 10, 2007. However, on July 9, 2007, the contractor was 

suspended from government contracting for allegations of bribery of government officials and 

money laundering, and JCC-I/A was notified by the Command Judge Advocate that the 

contractor was about to be suspended. Despite the notice, a decision was made by the 

contracting officer and Deputy Command Judge Advocate to go forward with the new contract. 

The contract file documented a meeting of government officials in October 2007 after concerns 

were raised about continuing to work with a suspended contractor. The Army decided to 

terminate the contract and to turn the warehouses over to the GOI. The contractor was notified 

that the government intended to terminate the contract for convenience with an end date of 
17

February 10, 2008. The contractor was paid approximately $1.07 million for providing 

personnel to operate the warehouses for seven months and other expenses incurred.

Two Contractors Continued With Existing Contracts After Being 

Debarred

Agencies may continue contracts or subcontracts in place at the time a contractor is placed on the 

EPLS or proposed for debarment unless the agency head directs otherwise. However, the agency 

is not supposed to add new work, exercise options, or otherwise extend the duration of these 

contracts or purchase orders. Following is a summary of the circumstances surrounding the 

contracts awarded to two debarred contractors who continued working on existing contracts after 

being placed on the EPLS.

From December 2004 through September 2007, GRD awarded nine contracts to an Iraqi firm for 

supplies and construction projects. In March 2008, DoD debarred the contractor for allegations 

of nonperformance of contract terms and trafficking in counterfeit goods and services, and 

placed it on the EPLS but allowed it to continue working on an existing contract. As of 

September 2008, seven of these contracts had been completed and one was terminated for 

convenience. The remaining contract (W917BG-07-C-0098) to construct a new elementary 

school in Bayaa for $1.4 million remains open, because the GOI did not provide the land title 

until July 2008. It is not clear to SIGIR whether DoD officials had reviewed this open contract 

to determine if they would continue working with this debarred contractor.

On March 25, 2008, DoD debarred another U.S. contractor AEY, Inc. for allegations of product 

substitution and placed it on the ESPL. The contractor had received a total of 13 contracts for 

arms and weapons and other supplies prior to the debarment from June 2005 through January 

2008. The contractor completed delivery on six of these contracts; five of the contracts were 

terminated for cause (default), and the contractor has made a partial delivery on two other 

contracts (W91GY0-07-M-0670 and W91GY0-07-C-0010). In July 2008, JCC-I/A was 

preparing a termination for cause notice to the contractor for one of those two contracts, a $4.6 

million weapons contract. The contractor had delivered about 90 % of the supplies under the 

$1.6 million second contract. At the time of our review, both contracts remained open.
18

Some Terminated Projects Retain Unliquidated 

Obligations

SIGIR examined financial documentation in CEFMS and individual contract files on terminated 

projects to identify funds obligated, expended, and deobligated, and those unneeded funds that 

remain unliquidated. SIGIR found that closed out contracts related to terminated projects 

contained about $16.62 million in unliquidated obligations that the government could deobligate. 

DoD has in place policies and procedures that require at least an annual review of unliquidated 

obligations and timely contract closeouts to determine if there is a continuing need for funds as 

currently obligated. SIGIR found that agencies’ procedures varied in the extent to which they 

reviewed, completed and documented their unliquidated obligations and contract closeouts. 

SIGIR also found limited documentation of and justification for their continued obligation of 

funds related to terminated contracts and task orders.

Obligations are recorded when an authorized agent of the federal government enters into a 

legally binding agreement to purchase specific goods or services. As bills are received and 

payments made, the recorded obligation is reduced by the payment amounts, with the balance 

referred to as the unliquidated obligation. Funds no longer needed may be deobligated. The 

contract closeout process includes actions involving physical, financial, and administrative 

closeout components. SIGIR conducted prior audits of controls over unliquidated obligations in 

IRRF-funded projects11 and agencies management of the closeout process for IRRF funds.12 

Based on these reviews, SIGIR concluded that DoD had opportunities to improve its 

performance, better document results, and expedite the deobligation of unneeded funds in the 

future.

SIGIR identified 26 terminated contracts with unliquidated obligations totaling about $16.62

million. Appendix C lists these terminated contracts, including remaining unneeded funds and 

unliquidated obligations as of September 2008. JCC-I/A officials speculated that the contract 

terminating official may not have released the funds. However, GRD officials said that CEFMS 

should contain information on why the funds were being held. After informing the DoD 

agencies of these unliquidated obligations in June 2008, the agencies stated that they would 

investigate all of the unliquidated obligations and take any necessary actions to deobligate 

unneeded funds. As of September 2008, $14.50 million in unliquidated obligations remained.

 

11 Controls Over Unliquidated Obligations in the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, (SIGIR-07-011, October 23, 

2007)

12 Agency Management of the Closeout Process for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Contracts, (SIGIR-07-010, 

October 24, 2007)
19

Conclusions and Recommendations 

Conclusions

From the sample of cases it reviewed, SIGIR identified a sizeable number of contracts 

terminated for default. SIGIR found that none of the poor performing contractors whose Iraq 

reconstruction contracts were terminated for default were placed on the EPLS. SIGIR also found 

that eight contractors that had at least one of their projects terminated for default received new 

contracts and purchase orders. Moreover, SIGIR found two instances where the government had 

awarded new reconstruction contracts to suspended companies already on the EPLS. SIGIR also 

found two contractors who were permitted to continue with their existing reconstruction 

contracts after being suspended and placed on the ESPL. These examples raise questions 

regarding the extent to which DoD agencies are screening Iraq reconstruction contractors’ prior 

performance before issuing them new contracts.

SIGIR’s review also identified GRD terminated projects containing about $16.62 million in 

unliquidated obligations that the government may be able to deobligate. These instances suggest 

insufficient attention to completing contract close-out actions.

Recommendations

SIGIR recommends that:

1. GRD and JCC-I/A reinforce the importance of screening contractors to ensure that they have 

not been suspended or debarred; and

2. GRD, JCC-I/A, and AFCEE review all terminated contracts to ensure that unneeded funds 

have been deobligated.

Management Comments and Audit Response

GRD and JCC-I/A provided written comments concurring with SIGIR’s recommendations. 

GRD and JCC-I/A, as well as Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I) and MNC-I provided technical 

comments which were considered in finalizing this report. GRD’s and JCC-I/A’s written 

comments are included in the Management Comments section of this report.
20

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology

The purpose of this audit was to examine government decisions to terminate Iraq reconstruction 

contracts and/or task orders funded by IRRF, CERP, ISFF, or ESF either for the convenience of 

the government or due to contractors’ default. SIGIR’s reporting objectives includes 

determining:

the numbers, types, and basis for all DoD terminations of Iraq reconstruction projects, as 

well as the characteristics of selected terminations actions;

whether terminated projects resulted in wasted government resources;

whether DoD agencies ensured the integrity and competence of companies selected for 

projects terminated for default and took appropriate action, including suspension and 

debarment, against poor-performing contractors; and

whether funds were still obligated against terminated projects.

To determine the total number, type and basis for all Iraq reconstruction contracts and projects 

terminated and related information, SIGIR relied on information in IRMS and CEFMS. IRMS

was established as a reporting database for reconstruction and nonreconstruction project data 

from the various U.S. implementing agencies operating in Iraq. Although it provides the most 

complete data available on project terminations, as SIGIR noted in its interim report, not all DoD 

agencies use the system on a regular basis. Furthermore, as GRD confirmed, the failure of these 

agencies to routinely input data into IRMS impacts the system’s ability to provide current and 

accurate information. For example, JCC-I/A did not include all its awards to AEY, Inc., and the 

related terminations in the IRMS system.

Within IRMS, GRD also uses a software program called MAXIMO for asset management and 

maintenance to help automate all aspects of maintenance operations, including equipment 

history, scheduling, preventive maintenance, work orders, labor and expense tracking, 

procurement and reporting. SIGIR used this program to identify all projects terminated for 

convenience and terminated for default. In addition, we requested a list of all terminated 

contracts from the individual organizations. SIGIR had direct access to MAXIMO.

CEFMS, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ automated financial management system, is 

intended to provide timely, accurate, and comprehensive financial information for all levels of 

management, especially at the program and project management level, through the interface with 

other information system programs. SIGIR had direct access to CEFMS data.

To access the basis for agency decisions to terminate some of the contracts and projects, SIGIR 

reviewed relevant contract files and agency policies and procedures, and held discussions with 

selected DoD officials in Baghdad and Washington, DC.

To examine efforts made by DoD agencies to ensure the integrity and competence of contractors, 

SIGIR reviewed relevant contract files and tracked through IRMS the extent to which defaulted 

contractors received new reconstruction contracts. SIGIR compared the list of contractors 

terminated for default to the EPLS to identify actions taken against the defaulted contractors. 
21

SIGIR also examined whether contractors on the EPLS received any new contracts after being 

suspended or debarred and whether any Iraq reconstruction contractors continue to work on 

contracts awarded prior to being suspended or debarred.

To develop information on how terminated projects could result in wasted government resources, 

SIGIR relied on information in IRMS to identify any follow-on contracts for DoD projects 

terminated. SIGIR also relied on IRMS to determine the project outcome. SIGIR relied on data 

in CEFMS to compile data on total obligations and expenditures for individual contracts and

projects.

To determine whether funds were still obligated against terminated contracts and projects, SIGIR 

reviewed the basic contract, contract task orders, change orders, scope changes and contract 

modifications. SIGIR relied on CEFMS to identify the individual contracts and projects and 

compiled data on obligations, deobligations and expenditures. We compared the CEFMS data to 

the individual contract files to identify any unliquidated obligations.

SIGIR performed this audit under the authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which 

incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act 

of 1978, as amended. It was conducted between May and September 2008 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that SIGIR plan and 

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. SIGIR believes that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives.

Use of Computer-Processed Data

To perform this audit, SIGIR used data that originated in IRMS, MAXIMO and CEFMS. To 

achieve our objectives, SIGIR examined computer-processed data contained in the above 

databases to identify, verify, and crosscheck information on projects terminated by DoD 

agencies. As noted in this report and our interim report, our review of system controls casts 

doubt on the data’s completeness and accuracy. Nevertheless, for purposes of this review, 

SIGIR relied greatly on the IRMS data system because it contained the most complete data on 

contract terminations. SIGIR identified a number of concerns about the accuracy and 

completeness of the data system. These concerns, as well as the limitations and relevance of the 

data, are discussed in this report.

We also obtained financial and management information from individual project files and used 

this information to crosscheck information from the databases. We believe these steps provide 

reasonable confidence in our presentation of the data. 

Internal Controls

SIGIR also assessed the management controls used to implement FAR requirements related to 

terminations for convenience and default. SIGIR did not look at the actual practices and 

procedures used to determine the effectiveness of these controls.
22

Most of the data on DoD agency project terminations was obtained from several DoD databases, 

including IRMS and CEFMS. As noted above, even though IRMS data is incomplete, it is 

recognized by DoD as having the most complete data on contract terminations. Although SIGIR

did not assess the overall DoD management controls related to this data, we did review and 

compare data from the different databases to identify anomalies. Even though we also used 

financial and management information from CEFMS, we did not perform an overall evaluation 

of the system.

We also obtained financial and management information from individual project files and used 

this information to crosscheck information from the databases. We believe these steps provide 

reasonable confidence in our presentation of the data. 

Prior Coverage

The Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction issued the following related 

audit reports, accessible on its website at http://www.sigir.mil.

Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of the Security and Justice Contract with Parsons 

Delaware, Inc. (SIGIR-08-019, July 28, 2008)

Review of Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Electricity-Sector Reconstruction Contract 

with Perini Corporation (SIGIR-08-011, April 29, 2008)

Interim Report on Iraq Reconstruction Contract Terminations (SIGIR-08-013, April 28, 

2008)

Review of Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Iraq Reconstruction Contract W914NS-04-D0006 (SIGIR-08-010, January 28, 2008)

Controls Over Unliquidated Obligations in the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

(SIGIR-07-011, October 23, 2007)

Agency Management of the Closeout Process for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

Contracts (SIGIR-07-010, October 24, 2007)

Issues Related to the Use of the $50 Million Appropriation to Support the Management 

and Reporting of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (SIGIR-05-026, January 27, 

2006)

Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Program: The Evolution of the Iraq 

Reconstruction Management System (SIGIR-06-001, April 24, 2006)

Review of Data Entry and General Controls in the Collecting and Reporting of the Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund (SIGIR-06-003, April 28, 2006)
23

Appendix B—Examples of Projects Terminated for 

Convenience

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division

The following two projects, with initial awards of over $1 million and with substantial payments 

to contractors, reflect some of the issues surrounding these large terminations for convenience.

In September 2004, Perini Corporation was issued a task order under contract W914NS-04-D0011 to improve the security and reliability of four electrical transmission network projects. In 

March 2005, after experiencing delays and high cost estimates, the project was terminated for 

convenience prior to construction. The contractor was paid $2.87 million for incurred costs. In 

September 2006, JCC-I/A awarded an Iraqi company two follow-on contracts (W91GXY-06-C0096 and W91GXY-06-C-0082) for $45 million to rehabilitate the electrical projects. These 

contracts were terminated for default in April 2007; the contractor was paid nothing for its work. 

That same month another contract was awarded to Pauwels International to complete the 

projects. As of May 2008, $29.04 million had been paid to this contractor. Three of the four 

projects under this contract are behind schedule.

In June 2005 an Iraqi firm received a contract (W917BG-05-C-0068) to build the $1.1 million 

Yousefiya Police Station in Baghdad. When the building was approximately 90 percent 

completed, it was destroyed by either a mortar or a rocket attack. The project was closed out in 

June 2006 and the contractor was paid $963,948 for costs incurred. While GRD initially listed it 

as a termination for convenience, contract files show that it was actually ―de-scoped‖; no 

termination modification was found in the files. Contract files indicate that GRD considered 

using the remaining funds to pay the contractor to remove the rubble from the building, but no 

follow-on contract was awarded.

Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan

Following are summaries of several of the large JCC-I/A terminated projects including issues 

surrounding these large terminations.

In March 2004, Parsons Global Services, Inc. was awarded a cost-plus-award-fee contract 

(W914NS-04-D-0006) to provide design and construction services in the electric, health, and 

water resources and sanitation sectors. SIGIR reported in detail on this contract in January 

2008.13 The government later issued a total of 14 task orders against the contract’s $500 million 

ceiling, mostly for maternity and pediatric hospitals and primary health care centers (PHC) in 

Iraq. Ultimately, eight of these task orders were terminated for convenience, including three task 

orders for 150 PHCs; follow-on contracts were awarded to Iraqi firms for the construction of 

some of these PHCs. Work was completed on six of the PHCs, and between 9% and 94% of the 

 

13 Review of Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Iraq Reconstruction Contract, W914NS-04-D-0006 (SIGIR-08-010, 

January 28, 2008).
24

required work was completed on another 135 PHCs. Summaries of four of these terminated task 

orders follow.

Task Order 04 – Issued in May 2004 to construct 150 PHCs and expected to cost $15 

million, the scope of this task order was reduced and modified to require construction of 

only 40 PHCs. Due to construction shortfalls and the contractor’s noncompliance with 

quality, safety, and schedule requirements, it was terminated for convenience in March 

2006. JCC-I/A estimates that the contractor had completed 80% of the project and, when 

closed out, was paid $50.1 million. SIGIR was able to locate only 34 of the 40 projects 

in IRMS. IRMS also showed follow-on contracts for 14 of the projects. SIGIR 

determined that of these 14 projects, only 9 had been completed and given to the GOI, 4

were terminated for convenience, and 1 was terminated for default. The remaining 20 

projects were cancelled.

Task Order 08 – Issued in September 2004 for $10.5 million to modernize three 

maternity and one pediatric hospitals in southern Iraq, this task order was terminated after 

it was determined that contractor was not making enough construction progress. At 

termination, contractor had completed work on three hospitals, and 79% of the fourth 

hospital. The contractor was paid $10.4 million.

Task Order 11 – Issued in October 2004 to construct 50 PHCs, this task order was 

modified to increase funding to $66.8 million. Due to construction shortfalls and the 

contractor’s noncompliance with quality, safety, and schedule requirements, the contract 

was terminated for convenience in March 2006. None of the PHCs were completed; 

Parsons completed 96% of four PHCs and an average of 65% of the remaining PHCs. 

The contractor was paid $45.78 million.

Task Order 12 – Issued in October 2004 to construct 60 PHCs for $40.9 million, this task 

order was modified to increase funding to $69 million. Due to construction shortfalls and 

the contractor’s noncompliance with quality, safety, and schedule requirements, the 

contract was terminated for convenience in March 2006. None of the PHCs were

completed; Parsons nearly completed three PHCs, and a weighted average of 53% of 55. 

Two PHCs were dropped from the contract. The contractor was paid $53.71 million.

In April 2004, Parsons Global Services, Inc. was awarded a cost-plus-award-fee contract 

(W914NS-04-D-0009) to provide design-build construction for security and justice projects. 

SIGIR reported in detail on this contract in July 2008.14 The government later issued 56 task 

orders under the contract, including 53 for construction projects. Of these, 18 were completed, 

seven were partially completed before being terminated for convenience, two were terminated 

for default, and 26 were cancelled before any significant construction activity. The government 

cited repeated delays in construction as the reason for terminating seven task orders for 

convenience and two for default. Summaries of two terminated task orders follow.

 

14 Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of the Security and Justice Contract with Parsons Delaware, Inc. (W914NS-04-D0009; SIGIR-08-019, July 28, 2008)
25

Task Orders 06 and 29 – Issued in May 2004 and June 2004 to construct the Baghdad 

Police Academy and expected to cost about $58 million, these task orders were 

terminated for the convenience of the government because of repeated construction 

delays, the failure to remediate construction deficiencies, and increasing costs. At 

termination, most of the buildings at the Academy were approximately 95% complete; a 

dining hall was approximately 75% complete, and the gymnasium was approximately 

55% complete. (SIGIR issued an inspection report on this project in January 2007.15) 

SIGIR found that the buildings constructed and given to the GOI had major plumbing 

problems. As of July 2008, about $57 million had been disbursed under these task 

orders.

After these task orders were terminated, the Multi-National Security Transition 

Command-Iraq chose to use AFCEE to award a contract to repair the defective work. 

AFCEE awarded task order 8 under contract FA8903-06-D-8515 for about $6.7 million 

to repair defective work under the original contract and to complete the facilities. Some 

problems, however, could not be fixed. For example, the failure to properly install 

expansion joints could not be remediated, and in several buildings plumbing deficiencies 

were so significant that the water had to be turned off and a separate building erected for 

shower and lavatory use.

In January 2004, KBR, Inc. (U.S.) was awarded a cost-plus award-fee contract (W9126G-04-D0001) and issued thirty task orders against the contract’s $1.2 billion ceiling to restore and repair 

Iraqi oil and gas infrastructure in the south. Task Order 11, was originally issued in May 2004 

with initial funding of $5 million and incrementally increased to $146.67 million. Escalating 

costs increases were a result of increased equipment, management, support, training, 

reconstruction and closeout costs. The task order was terminated for convenience in May 2007 

due to increases in project life support and security costs resulting in insufficient funds to 

complete the final phase of the project. At termination, essentially all the work had been 

completed except for installation of the rotors for the turbine gas compressors, and the purchase 

of new nitrogen plant due to the bankruptcy of a subcontractor. The contractor was paid $143.0 

million at termination.

In April 2004, FluorAmec, LLC (U.S.) was issued a $7.5 million task order under contract 

(W914NS-04-D-0008) to construct the Halabja Water Supply Line. The project was terminated 

for convenience in October 2004 as part of the reprogramming of funds from the Public Works 

and Water Sector. Even though construction was never started, the contractor was paid $2.02 

million to cover mobilization expenses and fees.

Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment 

Summaries of three large, projects terminated by AFCEE were reported in ―Some Terminations 

Resulted in Unfinished Projects and Waster Funds‖ of this report.

 

15 Baghdad Police College; PA-06-78.2 & PA-06-079.2; January 29, 2007
26

Multi-National Corps-Iraq

Following are examples of three MNC-I projects terminated for convenience.

The Khan Dhari irrigation canal cleaning project was terminated when the contractor 

stopped work on the project. The contractor was paid $58,979 for the approximate 20 

percent of work completed, and the remaining $232,280 was de-obligated.

The Al Watan school project was terminated due to insufficient progress and poor quality 

work by the contractor. The contractor was paid $60,000 and the remaining $21,240 was 

de-obligated 

A Heifa/Asale school project was terminated when the contractor refused to correct the 

deficiencies identified during the final inspection. The contractor was paid $11,000 and 

the remaining $30,000 was de-obligated.
27

Appendix C—Terminated Contracts with 

Unliquidated Obligations

Contract Number

Unliquidated 

Obligations Deobligated

Remaining Unliquidated 

Obligations

(5/2008) (9/2008)

Terminations for Convenience

W917BG-05-C-0029 $ 74,783 $ 74,783

W917BG-05-C-0244 736,200 $ 736,200

W917BG-05-C-0235 952,175 698,293 253,882

W917BG-05-D-0008/17 172,294 172,294

W917BG-06-C-0170 34,310 34,310

W917BG-06-D-0020/004A 440,370 440,370

W917BG-06-D-0006/14 222,700 222,700

FA8903-06-D-8510/02 5,613 5,613

FA8903-04-D-8683/83 114,188 94,195 19,993

FA8903-04-D-8694/12 52,708 52,708

FA8903-04-D-8676/62 15,000 15,000

FA8903-04-D-8694/17 2,316,857 2,316,857

FA8903-06-D-8511/33 42 42

FA8903-06-D-8515/08 1,232,937 186,047 1,046,890

FA8903-06-D-8505/05 135 135

FA8903-06-D-8512/03 4,357,702 4,357,702

Sub-Total $ 10,728,014 $ 1,093,241 $ 9,634,773

Terminations for Default

W917BG-05-C-0102 $ 84,010 $ 84,010

W917BG-05-C-0161 99,750 99,750

W917BG-06-C-0105 395,487 395,487

W917BK-06-P-0153 33,200 33,200

W917BK-06-P-0131 104,200 104,200

W917BG-07-C-0082 229,689 229,689

W91GXY-06-C-0082 736,215 736,215

W91GXY-06-C-0096 250,000 250,000

W917BE-06-C-0049 53,978 53,978

W91GXY-06-C-0046 3,900,602 3,900,602

Sub-Total $ 5,887,131 $ 1,019,415 $ 4,867,716

TOTAL $ 16,615,145 $ 2,112,656 $ 14,502,489
28

Appendix D—Acronyms

Acronym Description

AFCEE Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment

CEFMS U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Financial Management System

CERP Commanders Emergency Response Program

DoD Department of Defense

DoS Department of State

EPLS Excluded Parties List System

ESF Economic Support Fund

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation

GOI Government of Iraq

GRD U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division

IRMS Iraq Reconstruction Management System

IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund

ISFF Iraq Security Forces Fund

JCC-I/A Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan

MNC-I Multi-National Corps-Iraq

PHC Primary Health Care Center

SIGIR Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

ULO Unliquidated Obligation

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
29

Appendix E—Audit Team Members

This report was prepared, and the audit work conducted, under the direction of David R. Warren, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. The staff members who contributed to the report include:

Peter Lee

Richard McVay

George Salvatierra

Frank Slayton

Lovell Walls
30

Management Comments

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
31
32

Management Comments

Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan
33

SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, and 

operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction provides independent and objective:

oversight and review through comprehensive audits, 

inspections, and investigations

advice and recommendations on policies to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness

deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention and 

detection of fraud, waste, and abuse

information and analysis to the Secretary of State, the 

Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the 

American people through Quarterly Reports

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil).

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Programs

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline:

Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html

Phone: 703-602-4063

Toll Free: 866-301-2003

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional

 Affairs

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General

 for Iraq Reconstruction

 400 Army Navy Drive

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704

Phone: 703-428-1059

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil

Public Affairs Kristine R. Belisle

Director for Public Affairs

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General

 for Iraq Reconstruction

 400 Army Navy Drive

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704

Phone: 703-428-1217

Fax: 703-428-0818

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil