E PLURIBUS UNUM

NATIONAL TRA SPORTATION

B OAR D

SAFE T Y

N

National Transportation Safety Board 

Washington, D.C. 20594 

Marine Accident Brief

Accident No.: DCA-05-MM-021 

Vessel: Uninspected small passenger vessel, Sydney Mae II, official 

No. 647664, length 38 feet, gross tons 24, fiberglass hull, built 

in 1980 

Accident Type: Sinking 

Location: Pacific Ocean, at entrance to Umpqua River, near Winchester 

Bay, Oregon, latitude 43o40.0′ N, longitude 124o13.5′ W 

Date: September 19, 2005 

Time: 2030 Pacific daylight time 

Owner: Pacific Pioneer Charters, LLC, Winchester Bay, Oregon 

Property Damage: $120,000 (total loss of vessel) 

Injuries: 3 passenger fatalities (2 recovered; 1 missing, presumed fatal) 

Complement: 1 crew (captain) 

4 passengers 

Accident Description 

About 08001 on the morning of September 19, 2005, the uninspected small 

passenger vessel Sydney Mae II, operated by Pacific Pioneer Charters, took on 200 

gallons of diesel fuel at Salmon Harbor Marina and departed Winchester Bay, Oregon, 

with the captain and four passengers on a 12- to 15-hour trip offshore to troll for tuna. 

The captain held a U.S. Coast Guard masterís license for vessels of not more than 50 tons 

and had 30 years of experience operating fishing vessels from Alaska to southern 

California. 

About 0830, after transiting the 2.5 nautical miles (nm)2

 to the Umpqua (UHMPkwah) River jetties (see figure), the Sydney Mae II crossed the Umpqua River bar 

westbound into the Pacific Ocean. The Coast Guard reported bar conditions at the time to 

 1

 Times are Pacific daylight time, using a 24-hour clock. 

2

 One nautical mile equals 6,076 feet. 

 NTSB/MAB-05/04 
be a 2- to 4-foot ebb3

 chop in all areas, with an occasional 6-foot chop in the midchannel 

and to the north. 

Figure. Looking east from the Pacific Ocean toward Winchester Bay, Oregon. North jetty is to the

left of the photo, training jetty is to the right, and south jetty is to the far right. Photo courtesy 

Oregon State Marine Board, Boating in Oregon Coastal Waters <http://www.marinebd.

osmb.state.or.us/CoastalWaters/Umpqua.htm>.

The Sydney Mae II was constructed of fiberglass and was authorized to carry not 

more than six passengers. Required manning consisted of one licensed captain.4 Twin 

diesel engines rated at 420 horsepower each provided the vesselís propulsion. At the time 

of the accident, the engines had operated for approximately 2,100 total hours, and 

according to the captain, they were in good working condition. 

The vesselís navigation equipment consisted of two global positioning system 

(GPS) units, chart plotting units, a handheld GPS unit, 48-mile-range radar, a color depth 

finder, a very-high-frequency (VHF) marine radio, and a citizens band radio. The captain 

stated that all were in good working order at the time of the accident and that the most 

recent chart programs were loaded into the chart plotters. The vessel was also equipped 

with a six-person inflatable liferaft, an emergency position indicating radio beacon 

(EPIRB), a ring buoy, and the required number of lifejackets. 

 3

 Tidal current moving seaward or away from land. 

4

 The Sydney Mae II was required by Title 46 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 15 

section 605 (a) to be under the direction and control of an individual holding a Coast Guard license as 

operator. The captain of the Sydney Mae II held a license as ìmaster of steam or motor vessels of not more 

than 50 gross tons upon near coastal waters.î His license satisfied the required manning of an uninspected 

passenger vessel. 

2 NTSB/MAB-05/04
The captain was uncertain whether he had given a safety briefing before departing 

the marina or anytime thereafter. According to the one surviving passenger, no safety 

briefing of any kind was ever given. 

About 1200, the Sydney Mae II arrived at the fishing grounds, approximately 

50 nm offshore. The weather was clear and sunny, with good visibility. The day was 

uneventful and operations were normal for trolling for tuna. 

Bar Restrictions. Between 1330 and 1400, a swell started to increase, and about 

1600, the captain heard over the radio that the bar at Depoe Bay was restricted (closed to 

recreational and uninspected passenger vessels). He was unable to hear the bar report for 

the Umpqua River, his intended destination, at that time. A short time later, he contacted 

the Umpqua River Coast Guard station during intermittent cellular service and learned 

that the Umpqua River bar was also closed.5 Bar restrictions were imposed by the Coast 

Guard at 1630. 

About 1700, the captain told the passengers to reel up. He informed them that 

they might have to head to Coos Bay, Oregon, because the Coast Guard had closed the 

Umpqua River bar. He also told them they would return to Winchester Bay by car and 

would be given monetary compensation because the trip was cut short. 

The Sydney Mae II headed east at approximately 18 knots6 toward the Oregon 

coast. The surviving passenger and captain were on the flying bridge and the other three 

passengers, two men and a woman, were in the cabin on the main deck. The survivor 

asked the captain for permission to be on the flying bridge because the fumes emitted 

from the engine exhaust were bothersome. Because the captain granted permission, the 

passenger heard many of the telephone and radio calls between the captain and 

individuals ashore. 

At 1830, when the vessel was 35 nm out and the sea was getting rough and the 

wind was coming up, the passenger on the flying bridge heard over the VHF radio that 

the Umpqua River bar was closed. He recalled that the captain then made various 

telephone calls to his office in Winchester Bay, to Coos Bay to make travel arrangements 

for the passengers, and to the Umpqua River Coast Guard station to ask if the bar would 

be opened. At 25 nm out, according to the passenger, the bar report had not changed, the 

wind was still up, the swells were big, and the sea was becoming rougher. The captain 

told the passenger that by the time they got to the bar, it might be open because the tide 

would change and they would be going in on the flood.7

 In the passengerís opinion, the 

captain expressed displeasure that the bar was closed and seemed determined to go in and 

at least have a closer look. 

 5

 The terms closed and restricted describing the status of the bar are used interchangeably with 

regard to witness statements. At the time of the accident, the bar was closed to the Sydney Mae II because 

the vessel was an uninspected passenger vessel. 6

 One knot equals 1 nm per hour. 

7

 Tidal current moving toward land. 

3 NTSB/MAB-05/04
At 8 nm out, the captain again called the Coast Guard to ask about the bar. The 

Coast Guardsman on duty restated that the bar was closed and told the captain to proceed 

to Coos Bay. During the transit toward the Umpqua River entrance, the captain had 

exchanged numerous telephone calls with the Umpqua River Coast Guard station and 

local vessel operators. According to statements that were corroborated by the written 

testimony of Coast Guard personnel at the Umpqua River station, two charter operators 

told the Sydney Mae II captain that the bar was ìlaying downî and that he could make it 

across. The operators went so far as to contact the Coast Guard station (call and visit) and 

ask for the bar restrictions to be lifted. 

The last bar report from the Coast Guardís 47-foot motor lifeboat (MLB), which 

was on scene at the Umpqua River bar, was made at 1945. The report stated that the 

restrictions were to remain in place and that the bar was showing sloughing8

 and 

breaking waves of 14 to 16 feet. Sometime after 2000, the captain of the Sydney Mae II

called the Coast Guard on his cell phone for the last time. The Coast Guard remained 

adamant that the restrictions would remain in place until the following morningís firstlight bar report. The Coast Guardsman on duty reiterated that the Sydney Mae II was not 

allowed to enter and should proceed to Coos Bay. According to the Coast Guard 

communications watchstander, ìI told him that the bar was still restricted to all 

recreational vessels and uninspected vessels, and the captain replied, ëFine Iíll take my 

passengers to Coos Bay but it would be even more dangerous.í That was when the phone 

cut out, he was angry and I thought he had hung up on me.î 

While the Sydney Mae II began motoring back to the coast, a group of local 

fishing vessel operators made their way to the lookout area at the Umpqua River 

lighthouse. The lookout area is a scenic overlook off the main road that passes in front of 

the lighthouse. The observation area is 100 feet above sea level and approximately 1 mile 

from the tips of the Umpqua River jetties. 

The group arrived about 1700 to observe the conditions at the bar because they 

were concerned about the charters they had booked for the next day. Upon seeing the 

state of the bar and knowing that the forecast was for the swell to increase, they left and 

started calling their customers and canceling their charters for the following day. While at 

the lookout, they learned that the Sydney Mae II was still out. At about 2000, according to 

one of the operators, the group returned to the lookout area because ìthey were concerned 

the Sydney Mae II might try to cross the bar in low light conditions.î The sky was dark 

and visibility was deteriorating, but the lights on the Sydney Mae II and the jetty marker 

were still visible, according to the operators. 

The group at the lookout hailed the Sydney Mae II over the VHF radio. One 

operator told the captain that he had fished the bar all day, the bar was building, he knew 

how bad it was out there, and he recommended that the captain not cross the bar. The 

captain of the Sydney Mae II responded, ìOh, I saw it. Itís okay for me,î as recalled by 

two of the operators. The passenger on the Sydney Mae II who heard the conversation 

 8

 Sloughing or spilling waves are defined as when the crest (top) of the wave tumbles down the 

face (front) of the wave, i.e., only the top rolls. 

4 NTSB/MAB-05/04
understood that the charter boat operator at the lookout was advising the captain not to 

cross the bar. 

The Sinking. Shortly after the captain made his final telephone call to the Coast 

Guard and heard the charter operatorís advice, a 10- to 12-foot wave (as high as the 

flying bridge on the Sydney Mae II, by both survivorsí accounts) broke over the vesselís 

stern and it began listing to port. A following wave of similar size broke over the stern 

and the vessel sank farther down by the stern and lay farther over to port. The passenger 

on the flying bridge estimated that the vessel was somewhere between the red No. 2 buoy 

and the tips of the south rock jetty and ìonly a hundred feet or so from the bar.î9

At the moment the waves struck (at approximately 2030, according to the 

captain), two passengers and the captain were on the flying bridge. The other two 

passengers were in the cabin. None of the passengers was wearing a lifejacket, but the 

captain was wearing his personal type V inflatable lifejacket.10 When the boat started to 

sink and the captain became immersed in water, his lifejacket did not automatically 

deploy, as it should have. He had to remove his coat and inflate the lifejacket by blowing 

into the mouth tube. As the vessel continued to sink, he tried to retrieve the ring buoy on 

the aft rail of the flying bridge but could not because it was tangled in the rigging. 

As the vessel sank lower into the water, the two passengers who had been on the 

flying bridge and the female passenger who had been inside the cabin were able to cling 

together for a short time with the aid of a ring buoy that had now floated free. The captain 

swam to the liferaft on the bow of the vessel, but he could not manually deploy the raft 

because of the extreme motion of the vessel and the strength of the waves. By this time, 

the relentless wave action caused the three passengers to lose their hold on each other and 

the ring buoy. One of the passengers grabbed a lifejacket that floated by; the other two 

passengers drifted away. 

The captain was a short distance away. As the vessel sank deeper, the liferaft 

floated free of its cradle. The surviving passenger, after several attempts at tugging on the 

lanyard, inflated the raft. However, no one was able to grasp it, and the raft was carried 

away by the waves. Only the captain and one passenger were now together, clinging to 

the floating lifejacket. 

The water temperature, as recorded by the crew of the Coast Guard MLB, was 

53° F in the area of the accident. 

Search and Rescue. The witnesses at the lookout could not see the Sydney 

Mae II, but they heard a distinct crash and were unable to contact the vessel by radio or 

telephone. When they spotted a flashing strobe light (such as lifesaving apparatus emits), 

they immediately called the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard logs indicate that the call was 

 9

 The red No. 2 buoy is approximately 500 yards west of the south jetty tip. 

10 A type V lifejacket is a special-use personal flotation device. It can be inflated manually by 

pulling on a lanyard that activates a carbon-dioxide-gas cylinder; automatically by immersion in water, 

which activates the gas cylinder; or manually by blowing through an inflation tube. 

5 NTSB/MAB-05/04
received at 2042 and that a 47-foot MLB got under way from the station at 2044. About 

2105, after the MLB made its way over the bar and rounded the south jetty, the crew shot 

off flares and spotted the captain and the passenger. The two survivors were brought 

aboard the MLB at 2112, but after an extensive search in the vicinity of the accident site, 

the MLB crew did not find any other persons in the water. The MLB crew attended to the 

survivors until they were back at the station, where they were transferred to an ambulance 

and transported to the hospital. 

Coast Guard assets, including two 47-foot MLBs from the Umpqua River station 

and an HH-65 Dolphin helicopter from sector air station North Bend, Oregon, were 

launched to assist. In addition, Coast Guard personnel searched the beaches south of the 

river by automobile and on foot. The helicopter had to suspend operations after 45 

minutes because of zero visibility in fog. The bodies of two passengers were recovered 

on the beach. The first body was found that night, approximately 2 miles south of the 

south jetty. The second body was found the next morning, approximately 8 miles south of 

the south jetty. No third body was ever recovered, and that passenger is presumed dead. 

The boat operators who had gathered at the Umpqua River lighthouse contacted 

the Coast Guard as soon as they saw the flashing strobe light. The Coast Guard MLB 

rushed to the scene, spotted the survivors, and quickly rescued them. The rapid action of 

both groups probably prevented further loss of life. 

Waterway Information 

The Umpqua River is on the Pacific coast of Oregon, 180 miles south of the 

Columbia River. The river is approximately 120 miles long and is one of the principal 

rivers of the Oregon coast. It drains an expansive network of valleys in the mountains 

west of the Cascade Range and south of the Willamette Valley. The tidal change of the 

Umpqua River at Winchester Bay has a range of about 14 feet, and the current velocity 

can reach 4.5 knots. Low tide at the Umpqua River entrance occurred at 2001 on 

September 19, about 30 minutes before the accident. 

The Umpqua River entrance is bordered by a jetty system (refer to the figure). 

Various warnings about navigating in and around these areas (due to large swells, 

breaking seas, and strong currents) are listed in the United States Coast Pilot,

11 in Coast 

Guard and Oregon State Marine Board publications, and on those agenciesí websites. 

The Coast Guard staffs a lookout tower during daylight hours 365 days a year. 

The tower is on the south side of the channel, 0.6 nm from the tip of the south jetty. A 

ìrough barî advisory sign is located 1.0 nm from the south jetty tip and is directed at 

boaters as they make their way toward the channel entrance. The rough bar advisory sign 

has two flashing yellow lights that are illuminated when the Coast Guard determines that 

the bar is rough and should be closed to recreational and uninspected passenger vessels. 

 11 Vol. 7 (Pacific Coast: California, Oregon, Washington, Hawaii, and Pacific Islands), 

Washington, DC: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Ocean Service, 2005. 

6 NTSB/MAB-05/04
Weather Forecast 

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration weather forecast for 

Monday, September 19, 2005, for coastal waters around the Umpqua River bar and out to 

20 nm was for northerly winds at 15 to 20 knots through the evening and seas at 4 feet, 

with a mixed swell of 4 feet from the northwest and a 3-foot swell from the south. An 

8-foot northwesterly swell was forecast to build after midnight. 

Toxicological Tests 

Late in the evening of September 19, 2005, the captain of the Sydney Mae II was 

taken to the Lower Umpqua Hospital for first aid and a postaccident examination. No 

alcohol (BreathalyzerTM) test was administered. Upon completion of the examination and 

at the request of the Coast Guard, the captain submitted to testing for alcohol and drugs. 

The results of urine and blood tests were negative for alcohol and drugs. 

Safety Board Actions 

Before the Accident. In June 2005, as a result of an investigation into the 

capsizing of the Coast Guard-inspected small passenger vessel Taki-Tooo on June 14, 

2003, while trying to cross the bar at Tillamook Bay, Oregon, during hazardous 

conditions, the Safety Board issued recommendations to the Coast Guard concerning 

operations at Coast Guard-designated surf stations and regulated boating areas on the 

West Coast. On July 11, 2005, the Coast Guard held a meeting with the owners and 

operators of small passenger vessels at the Umpqua River station, a designated Coast 

Guard surf station. The captain of the Sydney Mae II was one of about six charter fishing 

boat operators who attended the meeting. 

The purpose of the meeting was to identify issues and address concerns about 

operations at the Umpqua River bar and on Winchester Bay. Items discussed included 

clarifying restrictions for vessels, jetty conditions, lifejacket regulations, dredging issues, 

and proposed warning or alert systems for rough bar notifications. According to the Coast 

Guard notes from the meeting, when the attendees discussed the Safety Board 

recommendation encouraging owners of small passenger vessels to develop and 

implement written go/no-go policies based on risk-management principles, the captain of 

the Sydney Mae II voiced opposition to the idea. 

After the Accident. A Safety Board investigator arrived on the scene of the 

Sydney Mae II accident the evening of September 23, 2005. A meeting with Coast Guard 

personnel was held immediately and a ride to the accident site was provided in one of the 

47-foot MLBs. Upon returning to the Coast Guard station, the investigator was contacted 

by Coast Guard Investigative Services, representing the U.S. Attorney. The Safety Board 

investigator was advised that the incident was going to be investigated by other Federal 

agencies. The investigator concluded his on-scene investigation a few days later and 

departed. The Coast Guard has provided the Safety Board with documentation and 

interviews collected before the Safety Board investigator arrived, and it has continued to 

cooperate in the production of this brief. 

7 NTSB/MAB-05/04
Discussion 

The Sydney Mae II accident is of particular interest to the Safety Board because of 

its similarity to the capsizing of the Taki-Tooo. The Safety Board issued its final report on 

the Taki-Tooo accident on June 28, 2005, just 2 1/2 months before the sinking of the 

Sydney Mae II. Tragically, both accidents resulted in the loss of life because the vessel 

operators failed to require passengers and crew to wear lifejackets during hazardous 

conditions. 

Two of the three safety recommendations issued to the Coast Guard in the Safety 

Boardís final report on the Taki-Tooo accident addressed requiring passengers and crew 

of small passenger vessels operating in Coast Guard-designated surf stations and 

regulated boating areas on the West Coast to wear lifejackets in hazardous conditions. 

The Coast Guard is beginning to take steps to address these recommendations. However, 

it is the responsibility of vessel operators to familiarize themselves with Coast Guard 

regulations and to ensure that passengers and crew wear lifejackets during hazardous 

conditions. 

Probable Cause 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of 

the sinking of the Sydney Mae II was the decision of the captain to closely approach the 

Umpqua River bar during hazardous conditions. Contributing to the loss of life was the 

failure of the captain to ensure that passengers were wearing lifejackets during hazardous 

conditions, as required by 46 CFR 26.03-2. 

Adopted: December 15, 2005 

8 NTSB/MAB-05/04