S. HRG. 109–765 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION OVERSIGHT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 27, 2005 

Serial No. J–109–36 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION OVERSIGHT 

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46–051 PDF 2009

S. HRG. 109–765 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION OVERSIGHT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 27, 2005 

Serial No. J–109–36 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

JON KYL, Arizona 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

DAVID BROG, Staff Director 

MICHAEL O’NEILL, Chief Counsel 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Democratic Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page 

Grassley, Hon. Charles E., a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa, prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 297 

Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont .................... 2 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 311 

Specter, Hon. Arlen, a U.S. Senator from the State of Pennsylvania ................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Fine, Glenn A., Inspector General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. .. 36 

Hamilton, Lee H., President and Director, Woodrow Wilson International 

Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. .............................................................. 38 

Mueller, Robert S., III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department 

of Justice, Washington, D.C. ............................................................................... 9 

Russack, John A., Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment, Director of National Intelligence, Washington, D.C. ............................................. 44 

Webster, William H., Partner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, Washington, D.C. ........................................................................................................... 40 

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Responses of Director Mueller to questions submitted by Senators Specter, 

Leahy and Feingold ............................................................................................. 54 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Fine, Glenn A., Inspector General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., 

prepared statement .............................................................................................. 275 

Hamilton, Lee H., President and Director, Woodrow Wilson International 

Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., prepared statement ........................... 299 

Mueller, Robert S., III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department 

of Justice, Washington, D.C., prepared statement ............................................ 315 

Russack, John A., Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment, Director of National Intelligence, Washington, D.C., prepared statement ......... 324 

Webster, William H., Partner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, Washington, D.C., prepared statement ....................................................................... 327 

(1) 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

OVERSIGHT 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 27, 2005 

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in room 

SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Arlen Specter, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Specter, Grassley, DeWine, Sessions, Cornyn, 

Leahy, Biden, Kohl, Feinstein, Feingold, Schumer, and Durbin. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Chairman SPECTER. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The 

Judiciary Committee will now proceed with our oversight hearing 

on the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

Before proceeding to the hearing at hand, I thought it would be 

useful to make a comment or two about the scheduling on the confirmation hearings of Judge Roberts. I had sent word to Senator 

Leahy earlier this morning that I wanted to spend a few minutes 

on that subject because we were being questioned about it incessantly. And Senator Leahy and I since the middle of last week, 

right after the appointment, have been talking about it repeatedly 

to try to work out an agreeable schedule. I compliment the distinguished Ranking Member for his cooperation and the way we have 

worked together in processing the work of the Committee, and to 

the maximum extent possible, that is what we want to continue to 

do. 

We have an obligation, as I see it, to finish the confirmation 

hearing so that the nominee is in place, if he is confirmed, on the 

first Monday in October, which is October the 3rd. 

My preference has been to start in September, but I have said 

from the outset that so far as I was concerned, I was flexible on 

the subject as to either August or September, depending upon all 

the circumstances. Notwithstanding the preference which I have 

expressed, I believe there is a duty to start the hearings at a time 

best calculated to finish by the October 3rd date. 

I talked to Senator Leahy yesterday repeatedly and posed the 

question: Is it realistic to get a commitment that we will vote on 

Judge Roberts by September 29th? And absent that commitment, 

it seems to me that we have to start in August, on August 29th. 

And it may be that we cannot finish by October 3rd starting on August 29th. There are too many imponderables which we have seen, 

2 

and the Senate in large measure functions on what each individual 

Senator is willing to do. And one Senator can throw a monkey 

wrench into the process, and we have seen from experience—Senator Leahy has been involved in ten confirmation hearings and I 

have been involved in nine; Senator Grassley has been involved in 

nine—that there are many unpredictable things which arise. 

We have already had discussions about reviewing the records, 

and I note yesterday that the eight Democrats on the Committee 

sent a letter to the White House, which I am not at all critical of. 

I think it is perfectly appropriate. But that sort of represents the 

differing views which Pat Leahy and Arlen Specter will have no 

matter how closely we coordinate. And we cannot control our committees. We cannot control our caucuses. All we can do is our very 

best. 

But the nub of my conclusion is that duty comes ahead of preference, and unless there is a commitment—and, again, I repeat, I 

am not asking for a commitment because I do not think it is realistic to get a commitment, because if Pat and I could solve it, we 

have no problems. We would come to terms promptly. But we do 

not control the whole situation. But absent that kind of a commitment, it seems to me that duty will call on us to go ahead with August 29th. 

Let me yield to my distinguished Ranking Member now. 

STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK J. LEAHY, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT 

Senator LEAHY. Again, I think if it was Senator Specter and myself, we could easily work this out. We could easily do it in September. I still think that is the better course. One, just a purely 

personal thing is that we have—it is not the members of this Committee will be back here in August, but there are dozens upon dozens—actually hundreds of people who work for the Senate, staff 

and so on, hundreds of members of the press, others who have determined that as a time that is always open, a time they could take 

their children back to school, a time they could actually spend time 

with their families. 

When I first came to the Senate, the only time you had a recess 

that you could count on was in the winter months because many 

of the older members wanted to go off to warmer climes. Of course, 

that did nothing for those with children. 

We then around the time I came to the Senate initiated the idea 

of having an August break, and it is the one time where families 

with children—and not only members but the hundreds upon hundreds of staff who work here—could plan time to actually be with 

their children. And the staff members work a lot later than we do. 

The press and everybody else could plan on that time. I think that 

that is something we ought to be considering if this is going to be 

a family-friendly Senate, as we have been promised it would be, or 

not. 

We are talking about somebody who is going to serve, if confirmed, to the year 2030, 2040. To spend a few days longer to make 

sure we do it right does not create a problem in my mind. If somebody is going to be there to the year 2030 to 2040, a few days one 

3 

way or the other to make sure we get it right makes some sense 

to me. 

Now, I am convinced today, with the record we have before us, 

that there will be a vote by the end of September. The irony is the 

vote will probably be the exact same day, whether we hold a hearing in August or whether we hold a hearing in September. The difference is, of course, families’ lives would be disrupted substantially in August. They would not be disrupted as much in September. But the end result would be the same. And for the life of 

me, I cannot understand why we should not do it this way. 

Now, we have worked cooperatively, and I commend the Chairman. As he knows, if the other party has to be in control, there is 

nobody I would rather have as Chairman than he. He has handled 

this as the smartest lawyer in the U.S. Senate, as he is. He has 

also handled this in the best manner of the bar to make sure we 

do it right. But I do worry that there are those special interest 

groups on the right and the left who want to make a game out of 

this when, after all, it is only the members of this Committee that 

are going to have the initial vote. I worry that—I saw a comment 

by the White House press secretary today suggesting that it is outrageous I might want to see something the President has not even 

read. 

Now, I know that the White House press secretary much prefers 

talking about Karl Rove, but I would suggest to him that that is 

probably an unrealistic standard to set, that I can only read things 

that the President has read, because I doubt very much the President, whom I respect greatly, has read Judge Roberts’s opinions, to 

give you one example. I intend to read all of Judge Roberts’s opinions. I do not expect the President has read all of Judge Roberts’s 

opinions, nor would I expect him to. But these are the kinds of semantic games that we ought to leave to the side. Let the Chairman 

and me work this out. 

So I would again hope that we would start in September. You 

know, the Republicans control the Senate and, of course, they can 

decide to do it in August. I think it will give the impression that 

we are rushing to something before we are even prepared to go to 

a hearing. And it would also, of course, disrupt many, many, many 

hundreds of families if we do it that way. The irony is the final 

vote will still be on the same day, whether we do it in August or 

whether we do it in September. 

So I wish all the conflicting groups would back off, including the 

Senate leadership and the White House, and let Chairman Specter 

and me work this out. I have an enormous amount of respect for 

the Chairman. He keeps his commitments to me and to others. I 

think if it is left to us, we will have a hearing the Senate can be 

proud of. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Leahy. 

Just one final word. We are very much aware of the commitments made in August, and in making this statement with all the 

staff here, I thought it would be better if the staff heard it from 

the Chairman and the Ranking Member than just reading about it 

in the newspapers and having a feel for what we are doing and 

what we are trying to accomplish. If we adjourn on the 29th of 

July, we will have 31 days until August the 29th. That does not 

4 

alter my preference, nor does it alter my duty. And Senator Leahy 

may be exactly right that we may vote on the same date no matter 

when we start. And I am not unaware that around here you get 

a lot more done customarily in 3 hours cooperatively than in 3 days 

or 3 weeks. But at the same time, that extra week could be determinative, and that is what is on my mind. 

Thank you for coming in, Director Mueller, and the indulgence 

of everyone in talking about the Roberts hearing, which is sort of 

taking a lot of—the whole Roberts proceeding is sort of taking a lot 

of oxygen out of Washington. But the number one problem in 

America and the world remains terrorism, and the issue of avoiding another attack is the most important issue facing the Government of the United States to protect its people. 

We have met with Director Mueller on a number of occasions to 

talk about the changes which have been going on in the FBI to see 

what is happening. We all know that there were many signals before Director Mueller’s watch which were not focused on: the Phoenix report, the Minneapolis report with Coleen Rowley, the wrong 

standard for probable cause, the information on Zacarias 

Moussaoui, the information that the CIA had about terrorists in 

Kuala Lumpur not passed on to Immigration. And we are all as determined as we can be to avoid that happening again. But it is 

going to take a lot of hard work, and a lot has already been done. 

This is the first in a series of oversight hearings. There have 

been very strong criticisms by both the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission and the 9/11 Commission. The WMD Commission 

found resistance to cultural changes as the FBI transitions to a 

‘‘hybrid law enforcement and intelligence agency.’’ The WMD Commission was critical about the FBI still putting law enforcement 

ahead of intelligence gathering. The Commission noted that the 

Counterterrorism Directorate has seen six directors since September 11th, and the New York field office, where much of the 

FBI’s counterterrorism efforts have been focused, has seen five directors since 9/11. Those are not encouraging signs. 

The WMD Commission concluded that the FBI ‘‘is still far from 

having a strong analytical capability to drive and focus the Bureau’s national security work.’’ Nearly one-third of the FBI’s intelligence analyst jobs remained unfilled in 2004 because of rapid 

turnover and other problems. The 9/11 Commission found that 66 

percent of the FBI’s analysts were not qualified to perform analytical duties. 

That is just the top of the iceberg, and I will put the rest in the 

record in order to save time and stay within my opening statement 

5-minute limit. There were faults found on the intelligence operations, and then you have the issue of technology, a subject that 

I personally have discussed in some detail with Director Mueller. 

And when you take a look at the Virtual Case File system, part of 

the FBI’s technology modernization product intended to replace the 

Bureau’s obsolete case management system, after spending 3 years 

and $170 million on the Virtual Case File system, the FBI declared 

it to be a complete failure. 

Director Mueller, we appreciate what you are doing, and we have 

great confidence in you personally. And it is a gigantic task, and 

we want to be helpful to you. But there has to be some way to 

5 

move through the tangle of problems because of the intensity and 

importance of our duty to prevent another attack and to be in a position to put all the pieces together. And had all of the so-called 

dots been on one format, I think 9/11 could have been prevented. 

And I know that is your most fervent wish and what you are working for, as are we. 

My red light has not gone on yet—there it goes. 

Senator Leahy? 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad you are 

holding this. I think it is a good hearing to continue our oversight. 

I welcome Director Mueller and the others, and I appreciate the 

time I spent with the Director a couple weeks ago. We went into 

this in some detail. 

As he knows, I mentioned the FBI translation program. I have 

been following this for years. I authored the PATRIOT Act provision aimed at facilitating the hiring of more translators at the FBI. 

The Inspector General this morning released an update to its 2004 

audit of the translation program. He gives credit where credit is 

due, says the FBI is making progress. I know that the Bureau is 

working hard to address this talent. I am frustrated, however, that 

it takes the Bureau on average 16 months to hire contract linguists. 

I am aware of the number of hours of unreviewed 

counterterrorism audio is increasing. I know all of have this horrible sinking feeling, what happens if there are plans for an impending attack and we do not translate the audio until some time 

after the attack? None of us want that. I know that the Director 

does not. But I worry that we are not moving fast enough to get 

those translated. All of us want to see this program succeed. Everybody on this Committee does. 

The FBI is the lead agency responsible for the Terrorist Screening Center. It made significant progress, but the Inspector General 

shows that their operations have been hampered by inadequate 

training and rapid turnover among the employees staffing the 24- 

hour call center, and, of course, deficient technology. 

They were charged with what I think was an enormously difficult charge of consolidating 12 terrorist watch lists, but we have 

seen what happens when inaccuracies come in there. We have 

heard stories of planes being diverted because terrorist suspects on 

the no-fly list were allowed to board the airplane. If a person is so 

dangerous that he or she is properly on a no-fly list, then mid-flight 

is much too late to respond. On the other hand, we have seen so 

many people that they or their children might have the same name 

and are constantly being stopped—people that have had top secret 

clearance, people who have had distinguished military careers, 

Senator Kennedy. Of course, these Irish terrorists all look alike, 

but Senator Kennedy has been stopped numerous times from going 

on the same flight that he has been taking for 30 years because 

he is on a no-fly list. 

That does not give me a great deal of confidence that we are necessarily getting the right people. It is also, of course, horribly disruptive to people who get their name on there by mistake and then 

cannot get their name off. If they have a business where they have 

6 

to travel around the country, they are loyal Americans losing their 

livelihood. 

I am displeased with the FBI’s handling of the Virtual Case File. 

The Chairman has already talked about it, but I feel they have bit 

off more than they can chew. They did not develop a finite and 

final list of project requirements, and they poorly chose to issue a 

contract without putting penalties in there. But what really bothered me is that the Congress, and this Committee in particular, 

was not given the full story of how poorly the project was progressing until it collapsed under its own weight. Not only are we 

out well over $100 million, but we are out several years of time, 

precious time that was lost, when we should be fighting terrorism. 

I am disturbed by recent reports from GAO that an audit of the 

project has been substantially delayed because the FBI has taken 

weeks to schedule meetings and months to produce documents. I 

think there should be a lot fuller cooperation by the FBI with the 

GAO. They are not your enemy. They are your friends. 

With respect to the VCF’s replacement program, I did ask the Director at a recent hearing about costs. He said he would rather discuss the issue in private citing procurement sensitivities. When we 

talked in private, he still did not want to reveal those figures. I 

would just state this: There have been figures in the media. I have 

not been able to get them. Somehow the media has had some figures. I can tell you right now that if the costs are anywhere near 

what the media is reporting, I think you are going to have a real 

problem with this Committee. 

So a lot has been undertaken since September 11th. The threats 

have changed. The Bureau is adjusting in several key areas. They 

have made some significant strides. I do want to underscore that. 

There is a lot of work to be done. We are not the enemy up here, 

even though some feel we are. We really do want to work together. 

This Committee has given an enormous amount of money, authorized an enormous amount of money for the FBI to make it better. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Leahy appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Leahy. 

We are going to proceed out of order because Senator Grassley 

chairs the Finance Committee and has a very pressing duty and is 

going to have to depart. He has been on this Committee since elected in 1980, sat next to me all that time. Quite a burden for Senator 

Grassley. And as I have just whispered to him and will repeat out 

loud, nobody has been more diligent on FBI oversight in the 25 

years we have been here than Senator Grassley has. I may be second or may not be second, but there is no doubt that Senator 

Grassley is first. 

Senator Grassley? 

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you very much. 

Director Mueller, maybe it is not fair for me to go first because 

you may have had something in your opening statement that would 

satisfy me, but I do have to chair the hearing. 

I have been asking a lot of questions about terrorist fund raising 

cases that have been developed by the Immigration and Custom 

Enforcement there in Houston, and so far your headquarters at 

7 

FBI and the field office at Houston have been giving contradictory 

answers. Essentially they have been pointing fingers at each other. 

Headquarters has blamed the field for mishandling the case, and 

the field has not accepted the blame. And since the FBI has refused 

to provide access to additional witnesses who might clear up the 

contradictions that are very obvious, how do you propose to resolve 

the conflicting statements? I think you are in a position to do it. 

They need to be resolved. And if it is determined that someone put 

the FBI’s interest in turf battles ahead of the fight against terror, 

what would you do to hold that person accountable? 

Mr. Mueller. Southeastern, we have had discussions on this, and 

I know our staffs have had lengthy discussions, and I am also well 

aware of your interest. It appears to be a difference of recollection 

between at least two individuals that is irreconcilable. It is a difference in recollection relating to the timing of bringing information together in order to undertake an application. 

We take full responsibility for that delay. There was a delay. The 

difference in the timing I think was somewhat—in terms of the difference in recollection as to the timing, it is inconsequential in the 

sense that there was a delay; there should not have been a delay. 

My expectation is that as a result of this, we will not see this occurrence again. We have put into place procedures to assure that 

it does not happen. I do think it was a unique case, a unique set 

of circumstances, but we are determined that these circumstances 

not repeat themselves. 

There was a delay in putting together information from two 

areas. It should have been put together sooner. Ultimately, I believe that the appropriate action was taken and that the case is ongoing with the full support of both agencies. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Director Mueller, I think it is difficult maybe 

for you to solve this. I can solve it if I just get a chance to see the 

people I want to see and question the people I want to question. 

And I think that that is only fair that we get to the bottom of this, 

and I think it is part of Congressional oversight to get the job done. 

I think it is a help to you, and I think we need to get to the bottom 

of it. 

On another matter, more than a month ago I had the opportunity to write the attorney for Basam Yusef, an Arab-American 

agent who is suing the FBI for discrimination, to request that he 

meet with my staff to provide information about problems in the 

Counter terrorism Division. His attorney sought permission from 

the FBI, but has not been given a clear answer on this. Given the 

FBI’s recent attempt to fire another agent, Bob Wright, Mr. Yusef 

is afraid to honor my request without clear permission from the 

FBI. 

We need a clear answer. Will you allow Mr. Yusef to meet with 

staff or not? And can you assure me that if Mr. Yusef complies with 

my request that the FBI will not retaliate against him? What we 

need is the cutting through of red tape within the FBI to get answers to our questions about whether or not this person can meet 

with my investigative staff, and we need this red tape cut 

crossways, not lengthways. 

Mr. Mueller. Well, Senator, I think you are aware that I have 

been, I believe, cooperative in allowing persons to talk to your ofVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:37 Jan 08, 2009 Jkt 045063 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\46051.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
8 

fice. There is a protocol that one has to go through that gives some 

assurance that issues that are classified will be and continue to be 

appropriately classified. I would be happy to go back and see where 

we are in that process. 

You alluded in your statement to the recommendation with regard to Robert Wright. As I believe I explained to you, I am concerned about allegations of retaliation. I requested that the Justice 

Department do the investigation in the allegations he raised. When 

that came back to us, there were additional concerns that we had. 

We made a recommendation. But I think I bent over backwards in 

allowing Mr. Wright to appeal that recommendation to the Department of Justice. 

I can assure you that we will not retaliate against Mr. Yusef, 

have not retaliated against Mr. Wright, and have bent over backwards to give the actuality and, indeed, including the appearance 

of fairness. I know that you have the letter that was sent by us 

explaining to Mr. Wright the circumstances under which we made 

that recommendation, which we believed to be appropriate but we 

have given him that additional right to appeal to an independent 

outside arbiter. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, then you are going to look at my opportunity to see Basam Yusef without retaliation? 

Mr. Mueller. Yes, absolutely. I can assure you there will be no 

retaliation. The circumstances under which the discussion is had, 

I will have to review where we are in that process. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Grassley. 

Just one concluding note. Senator Grassley and I are the two 

survivors of 16 Republicans elected in 1980, the last two. We have 

Senator Dodd on the Democratic side, but it is a small group which 

remains. 

Thank you very much, Senator Grassley, and without objection, 

we will put your opening statement in the record. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Grassley appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman SPECTER. We turn now to Director Mueller for his 

opening statement, really an extraordinary record, educational 

background, professional background, public service, graduate of 

Princeton University, 1966, international relations from New York 

University in 1967, law degree from the University of Virginia, 

served as an officer in the Marine Corps, led a rifle platoon in Vietnam, recipient of the Bronze Star, two Navy commendation medals, 

the Purple Heart, and the Vietnam Cross of Gallantry. 

Professionally, his career has been equally extraordinary, was 

United States Attorney in both the Northern District of California 

and in Boston, served as Acting Deputy Attorney General right before he became the FBI Director. And I think perhaps most noteworthy of his entire career, after having held lofty positions, he returned to public service as a senior litigator in the homicide section 

of the District of Columbia U.S. Attorney’s Office, which is really 

remarkable, attesting to the fact that the best job, notwithstanding 

all these fancy titles, is being an assistant prosecutor. 

9 

Director Mueller, thank you for the job you are doing, and we 

look forward to your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT S. MUELLER III, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL 

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Director MUELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

having me here today. As you well know, having been one yourself, 

that is the best job one can have as an assistant prosecutor, particularly doing a service in cases that are so meaningful— 

Chairman SPECTER. Senator Leahy just leaned over and said he 

agrees. 

Director MUELLER. Another assistant prosecutor. 

Thank you for allowing me to appear before you today, and let 

me start by updating you on recent changes within the FBI and additional changes that we anticipate in the near future. 

Let me start by recognizing that last month the President announced that he had approved certain recommendations of the 

WMD Commission. And while the Commission had recognized in 

its report that we have made substantial progress in building our 

intelligence program, as I believe, Mr. Chairman, you pointed out, 

it expressed concern that our existing structure did not give the Director of National Intelligence the ability to ensure that our intelligence functions are fully integrated into the intelligence community. 

At the direction of the President, we are currently prepared a 

plan to implement a national security service within the FBI. 

While the details of this plan are currently being discussed with 

both the Department of Justice and the Office of the DNI, I would 

like to share with the Committee the broad concepts under which 

this service is being developed. 

One of our guiding principles since September 11th has been that 

the FBI’s intelligence program be integrated with our investigative 

missions, and our FBI national security service will build on the 

progress of the Directorate of Intelligence and further promote this 

integration. 

The integration of our intelligence and investigative missions ensures that intelligence drives our investigative as well as our intelligence operations. And this integration enables the FBI to capitalize our capability, our capacity to collect information and to extend that strength to the analysis and production of intelligence. 

The national security service and intelligence service will be put 

together by combining our counterterrorism and counterintelligence 

components, and put it together with our Intelligence Directorate 

under the supervision of a single official who will report to the 

Deputy Director and to myself. 

The development of a specialized national security workforce is 

a key component of this new service, and we will develop this 

workforce through initiatives, many of which are already in place, 

but those initiatives are designed to recruit, hire, train, and retain 

investigative and intelligence professionals who have the skills necessary to the success of our National intelligence, national security 

programs. 

10 

Finally, the creation of a national security within the FBI will 

enhance our ability to coordinate our National security activities 

with the DNI and with the rest of the intelligence community. The 

single FBI official in charge of the service will be able to ensure 

that we direct our National security resources in coordination with 

the DNI and the Attorney General. Also, as we all know, the DNI 

will also have authority to concur in the appointment of this official. 

Mr. Chairman, this is a very broad outline of our plans for a national intelligence service within the FBI, and I am happy to provide the Committee with additional details as the implementation 

of this initiative progresses. 

Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the Foreign Language Program, 

as has Senator Leahy. Let me just comment, if I could, on the findings of the Inspector General in this regard. 

We welcome the input of the Inspector General. His findings 

have been exceptionally helpful in giving us guidance on where we 

need to improve, and I want to say that I appreciate the work that 

he spends and the guidance that he gives. 

I will tell you that prior to September 11, 2001, translation capabilities, like many of our other programs, were decentralized and 

managed in the field. Since September 11th, we have established 

a Language Services Translation Center at FBI headquarters to 

provide centralized management of the Foreign Language Program. 

This provides a command and control structure at headquarters to 

ensure that our translator resource base of over 1,300 translators, 

distributed across 52 field offices, is strategically aligned with the 

priorities set out by our operational divisions and with the national 

intelligence priorities. 

We have now integrated Language Services into the Directorate 

of Intelligence. This integration fully aligns our FBI foreign language and intelligence management activities across all of our field 

offices. 

We, in addition, have instituted a prioritization process to ensure 

that foreign language collection is translated in accordance with a 

clear list of priorities. The Foreign Language Program receives regular weekly updates to FISA prioritization, and we are careful to 

ensure that the FBI’s priorities are consistent with those of the intelligence community. 

I know, as you mentioned, Senator Leahy, you and we are concerned whenever there is a backlog, and the report of the Inspector 

General indicates a current backlog. I will tell you that we have 

triaged and prioritized so that we have our highest priority 

counterterrorism intelligence intercepts reviewed generally within 

24 hours. And this prioritization and triage process has helped us 

to reduce that accrued backlog. 

As to that accrued backlog, if you review it you will see that 

much of it is what is called white noise from microphone recordings, and there is another piece of that backlog that is attributable 

to highly obscure languages and dialects that we are working hard 

to recruit translators to address. 

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to address some of the Inspector 

General’s concerns about our hiring and vetting of linguists. Since 

September 11th, we have recruited and processed more than 

11 

50,000 translator applicants. These efforts have resulted in the addition of 877 new contract linguists and another 112 language analysts, less the attrition. The FBI has increased its overall number 

of linguists by 69 percent with the number of linguists in certain 

high priority languages, such as Arabic, increasing by more than 

200 percent. 

At the same time, however, we must ensure translation security 

and quality. All FBI translator candidates are subject to a pre-employment vetting process that eliminates almost 90 percent of those 

who apply. 

I will tell you that more than 95 percent of the FBI linguists are 

native speakers of their foreign language and hold Top Secret security clearances. Their native-level fluencies and long-term immersions within a foreign culture ensure not only a firm grasp of colloquial and idiomatic speech, but also of heavily nuanced language 

containing religious, cultural, and historical references. Beyond 

these qualities, over 80 percent of our FBI linguists hold at least 

a bachelor’s degree and 37 percent hold a graduate-level degree. 

These qualities make them extremely valuable to the FBI’s intelligence program, but also, unfortunately, particularly attractive to 

other employers who are seeking these scarce skill sets. 

Mr. Chairman, we recognize that the FBI’s Foreign Language 

Program is essential to our success, and we appreciate the oversight by the Committee. We appreciate the Inspector General indicating we have made progress. We understand that we have to 

make more progress and believe we are on track to do in those 

areas pointed out by the Inspector General. 

Let me spend just a moment, Mr. Chairman, on technology. 

As you or as anybody who looks at the intelligence community, 

indeed, the law enforcement community, we recognize the importance of collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information both 

internally and with other intelligence and law enforcement agencies. We have made since September 11th modernization of our information technology a top priority and have developed, I believe, 

in the last 2 years a coordinated, strategic approach to information 

technology under the centralized leadership of the Office of Chief 

Information Officer. 

I will not go into the details because my prepared statement covers much of that, but I do want to point out that our proposed information management system, which we call Sentinel, is a form 

of a ‘‘service-oriented architecture,’’ which is a suits of services 

geared to evolve with our new and emerging needs. This Sentinel 

project differs in many respects from Virtual Case File in that it 

will serve as the platform from which services can be gradually deployed, each deployment offering added improvements. Sentinel 

will pave the way, starting with our legacy case management system, for subsequent transformation of all legacy applications to 

modern technology under our enterprise architecture. 

As we briefed the staff yesterday, the staff of the Judiciary Committee, and as I believe they heard, we are planning to deploy Sentinel in four phases over the next 40 months. I know that, as Senator Leahy pointed out, he is interested in the total cost of the Sentinel program. I must say that at this time cost estimates are considered ‘‘source selection information’’ as defined by the Federal AcVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:37 Jan 08, 2009 Jkt 045063 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\46051.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
12 

quisition Regulations, meaning that any public disclosure might 

improperly affect the bidding process. 

I will assure you, Mr. Chairman, and the Committee that the 

FBI is committed to obtaining the best product at the lowest cost 

to the American people, and we do not want to prematurely disclose information which may influence bids from potential contractors. 

I might turn just for a second to the issue of our human resources, which have already been mentioned by yourself, Mr. 

Chairman, and by Senator Leahy. 

The men and women of the FBI are clearly our most valuable 

asset. In order to continue to recruit, hire, train, and retain quality 

individuals for our expanding human capital needs, we have undertaken a re-engineering of our human resource program. 

We have retained the services of outside consulting firms to review business processes for selection and hiring, training and development, performance management, intelligence officer certification, retention, and career progression. 

We have hired an executive search firm to identify a chief human 

resources officer for the FBI, an officer who has significant experience in the transformation of human resources processes in a large 

organization, not necessarily a governmental organization. 

At the same time, we have made substantial progress in building 

a specialized and integrated intelligence career service comprised of 

intelligence analysts, language analysts, physical surveillance specialists, and special agents. 

Finally, we have developed a special agent career path that will 

be implemented in October 2005. These career paths will take into 

account the background and experience of the agent in determining 

the agent’s future career path in one of five programs: 

counterterrorism, counterintelligence, intelligence, cyber, or criminal. This policy will promote the FBI’s interest in developing a 

cadre of special agents with subject matter expertise. 

These are just a few of the initiatives underway to improve the 

FBI’s human capital and to ensure that we develop a workforce 

that is prepared to meet the challenges of the future. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, when I last appeared before the Committee, my prepared testimony included a request for administrative subpoenas in support of our counterterrorism efforts, and I 

was remiss in not including that request in my oral remarks and 

would like to very briefly take the opportunity to do so now. 

As you know, the FBI has had administrative subpoena authority for investigations of crimes from drug trafficking to health care 

fraud to child exploitation. And yet when it comes to terrorism investigations, the FBI has had no such authority. 

We have relied on national security letters and FISA orders for 

business records. And although both are useful and important tools 

in our National security investigations, administrative subpoena 

power would greatly enhance our abilities to obtain information. 

Administrative subpoena authority would be a valuable complement to these tools and would provide added efficiency to the 

FBI’s ability to investigate and disrupt terrorism operations and 

would also assist in our intelligence-gathering efforts. 

13 

I would like to stress that the administrative subpoena power 

would allow and provide the recipient the ability to quash the subpoena on the same grounds as the recipient of a grand jury subpoena would have the opportunity to contest such a subpoena. 

Now, in closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to address the concern expressed by some, including yourselves, that the FBI is resistant to change. One would have to admit that there are those 

in our organization who would adopt change more slowly than others. But I will tell you, in the 31⁄2, almost going on 4 years that 

I have been with the FBI, I have witnessed the willingness of the 

vast majority of FBI employees to embrace change and to welcome 

recommendations for improvement wherever those recommendations come, whether it be Congress, the 9/11 Commission, the 

WMD Commission, or the Inspector General. 

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, the pace and 

breadth of change within the Bureau has been significant. Occasionally I liken it to trying to change the tires on a car as it hurdles at 70 miles an hour down the road. But examples of this 

change are the following: We have nearly doubled the number of 

agents working counterterrorism investigations from 2,500 to 

4,900. We have established 103 Joint Terrorism Task Forces across 

the country. We have embedded intelligence elements in each of 

our 56 field offices; they are called field intelligence groups. These 

did not exist prior to September 11th. We have established a Directorate of Intelligence to manage all intelligence production activities and intelligence resources. And we have collocated many of our 

counterterrorism personnel with counterterrorism personnel from 

other agencies, State and local agencies, in order to better address 

the global nature of the terrorist threat. 

And as a result of these changes and the commitment of FBI employees to that number-one priority that you have already articulated—that is, protecting the American people from another terrorist attack—we have over the past 31⁄2 to 4 years experienced a 

number of counterterrorism successes. While most of these successes remain classified or are pending matters, because of the continuing intelligence we are able to develop from them, the following 

are a few that you are well aware of: 

The arrest and guilty plea of a group in Lackawanna, New York, 

pleading guilty to providing material support to al Qaeda after undergoing training in an al Qaeda in Afghanistan; 

The arrest and guilty pleas of five men and one woman in Portland, Oregon, on a variety of charges, including money laundering 

and conspiracy to levy war against the United States, after several 

of them attempted to enter Afghanistan after September 11th in 

order to fight the American forces; 

The arrest of Jose Padilla for planning activities relating to the 

deployment of—or undertaking a terrorist attack within the United 

States; 

The arrest of Lyman Farris, who, after admitting to carry out 

surveillance and research assignments for al Qaeda, was sentenced 

to 20 years in prison for providing material and support. 

These are just a few of those instances where, working together 

with others, we have been successful over the last several years. 

I will say that any success we have had, Mr. Chairman, is attribVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:37 Jan 08, 2009 Jkt 045063 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\46051.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
14 

utable to the dedicated men and women who are serving in our 

Federal, in our State, in our local, and in our tribal law enforcement and intelligence communities. These successes were also the 

result of the cooperation and assistance offered by the MuslimAmerican and Arab-American communities within the United 

States who have provided tremendous support to our efforts. These 

individuals and the Muslim-American and the Arab-American community share our desire to prevent any terrorist attack from occurring on our shores again. And these successes were the result of 

the men and women of the FBI who have embraced our changing 

mission, worked to enhance our intelligence capabilities, and adapted to new ways of doing business. 

We still face the threat of terrorist attacks. We still face other 

threats that will continue to evolve. And as those threats evolve, 

so will the FBI as it strives to meet the challenges of the future 

while at the same time upholding the civil liberties we cherish. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I thank you again for 

the opportunity to discuss these issues concerning the transformation of the FBI, and I would be happy to answer any questions you have. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Director Mueller, for 

your opening statement. We will now proceed with the Senators 

asking questions on our customary 5-minute round. 

Let me start with the ultimate questions, Director Mueller. How 

secure is our homeland from a terrorist attack? Or, stated differently, what is the imminence of another terrorist attack on U.S. 

soil? 

Director MUELLER. We are, I will say, far safer than we ere before September 11th, and that is attributable to, I believe, three 

factors. 

The first is that we have removed in the wake of September 11th 

the sanctuary that al Qaeda had in Afghanistan, a sanctuary in 

which al Qaeda could plan, train, recruit, and coordinate, as was 

the case with the planning, the coordination, the recruiting for the 

September 11th attacks. We removed that as a sanctuary for al 

Qaeda to utilize. 

Secondly, a number of agencies, particularly the CIA, have been 

successful many times over, much of that which is not recorded and 

in the public, many times over working with our counterparts overseas to take off the leadership of al Qaeda, to detain, incarcerate, 

and remove them as capable leaders in the al Qaeda network: 

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaida, Hambali. A number of 

the leadership of al Qaeda has been removed as a potential source 

of managerial skill, organizational skill, and that is attributable to 

our brothers and sisters in other agencies, but it should not be 

overlooked. And, finally— 

Chairman SPECTER. Director Mueller— 

Director MUELLER. A final point, if I can just make one more 

point, and I will make it brief, and that is what— 

Chairman SPECTER. Okay. There are 3 minutes and 13 seconds. 

Director MUELLER. I will do it in 10. The work that has been 

done with State and local law enforcement to work together to assure that our communities are safe. That has been tremendously 

important. 

15 

Chairman SPECTER. Director Mueller, we have reviewed the 

problems in the Virtual Case File system with $170 million being 

expended without any results. We are now advised that on the new 

Sentinel system, we are projecting a date of 2009, which is a long 

ways away. We saw the lack of coordination on what information 

we had on the FBI Phoenix report, on the Minneapolis report, on 

Zacarias Moussaoui, on Kuala Lumpur and the CIA. Is it realistic 

to be able to put all the dots on the map and all the pieces together, which needs to be done in order to prevent another attack, 

if we do not have the technology in place? And how can we look 

for a date as far away as 2009 considering all the money which has 

been invested and the lack of results so far? 

Director MUELLER. Well, the Trilogy project had three components to it: new computers, new networks, as well as Virtual Case 

File. We were successful on the first parts of the Trilogy project. 

We have the new computers. We have the networks that support 

it. The Trilogy project did not at that time contemplate the database structures that we felt were necessary in the wake of September 11th to put into place to assure that counterterrorism information was in one place. We have developed— 

Chairman SPECTER. Do we need that database system in order 

to pull all these bits of information together to prevent another attack? 

Director MUELLER. We do, and we have put it together since 

early in 2002. We have the database structure. We have millions 

and millions of documents relating to counterterrorism, all of our 

documents relating to counterterrorism in an up-to-date, state-ofthe-art, relational database structure. 

The Sentinel project is due to—our hope is that we will have the 

contract in place by the end of this year. We expect that within a 

year afterwards, we will have the first deliverables. It is four 

stages. And the year 2009, it would take approximately 40 

months—yes, approximately 40 months as we now anticipate to put 

into place the various components that we believe will be in the 

Sentinel project. And as— 

Chairman SPECTER. One final question, Director Mueller, before 

my 5 minutes expire. There have been reports about the New York 

Police Department recruiting immigrants from Asia, Africa, the Pacific Islands where they have developed analyst and translator capabilities by drawing upon the immigrants familiar with languages 

and cultures under survey. Has the FBI undertaken a similar program? 

Director MUELLER. Well, we certainly have undertaken a broadbased program to bring on board language specialists that have the 

full capabilities across all of the languages that we need. Some of 

them may well be immigrants. I will tell you, however, we have a 

very high standard for hiring within the FBI in terms of the clearances that are required to be obtained in order to get access to the 

information that we put before our translators. 

But, yes, we have an active effort to recruit and bring in persons, 

particularly with persons who have information or capabilities in 

unique and very specialized dialects. 

Chairman SPECTER. My red light went on in the middle of your 

answer, so I will now yield to Senator Leahy. 

16 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Mueller, there are areas where I have been critical, as 

others have up here, of parts of the efforts down at the Bureau. 

But you and your leadership team and the hard-working men and 

women at the Bureau deserve the constant appreciation of all 

Americans for all you do, and also for the sacrifices that many of 

you make to do it. 

Now, after 9/11, the people of the FBI have put in untold overtime hours under great pressure. They have had to adjust to duties 

they never anticipated before that. And I compliment you and the 

people who work with you for doing that. And I think that it is also 

important that we have the oversight we do because I think it 

helps make everybody more effective. And that is what you and I 

and the Chairman and everybody else here are united in the same 

thing. We just want America to be safer. We want the bad guys behind bars. We want Americans to be safe. 

Now, the consolidated watchlist uses, as I understand it, four 

risk-based handling codes. They say how law enforcement should 

respond when they encounter people on the list. The Inspector General report found that nearly 32,000 armed and dangerous individuals are designated for the lowest handling code. That code does 

not require law enforcement to notify any other law enforcement or 

agency or the TSC. Some of there are described as having engaged 

in terrorism or likely to engage in terrorism. They enter the U.S. 

and are a hijacker or a hostage taker of use explosives or firearms. 

I understand there may be some legal requirements and there 

are strategic requirements, but I cannot understand why they are 

in such a low handling, why they are put so low. Does this put an 

officer who might pick them up at undue risk? 

I think in my own State—and this would be the same for most 

rural areas—if a State trooper stops somebody at 11 o’clock at 

night, his back-up may be an hour or 2 hours or more away. And 

the person may be in one of these dangerous categories, but they 

are at the lowest category. 

Am I missing something here? 

Director MUELLER. I would have to get back to you on that, Senator. I know if the person is on the watchlist, the reason why the 

person is on the watchlist, there has been reason to believe that 

there is information or reason or evidence or intelligence to believe 

that the person needs to be on the watchlist. And then there are 

various categories, as you point out, for the handling and treatment. 

The fact that the person is on the watchlist means that when 

that person is stopped, the Terrorism Screening Center will be 

alerted. And the usual practice is that when the call comes in, the 

Terrorism Screening Center then goes, looks at the file and talks 

to the agency— 

Senator LEAHY. But this says they don’t have to be. 

Director MUELLER. Pardon? 

Senator LEAHY. Those that fall in this number four category, 

they say the Terrorism Screening Center does not have to be notified, and yet some of them are said to be people who handle explosives— 

17 

Director MUELLER. I will have to get back to you on that, Senator. 

Senator LEAHY. Well, do me a favor. If you get back to me on it, 

would you review the answer yourself? 

Director MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator LEAHY. I understand from your testimony in another 

case that you usually do not review these answers. This one I am 

very concerned about. Whether they are in rural Pennsylvania or 

rural Texas or Alabama or Vermont, we have very brave police officers who are out there in the middle of the night with no back-up, 

and when they see a name come up, they should know whether 

this is somebody they ought to be a little bit more nervous about. 

Director MUELLER. Let me check one thing, if I could. 

Yes, I will review that answer. 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you. And I am disturbed by some reports 

from the GAO that an audit of the project, the Virtual Case File 

project, has been substantially delayed by the FBI. I understand 

that weeks go by before some meetings are scheduled. Sometimes 

the GAO has had to wait several months, as long as 9 months in 

once case, to receive documents, or the Bureau has provided wrong 

documents or posed other delays requiring the DOJ and the FBI 

attorneys to screen their documents. I know I have been told many 

times the FBI’s answers to questions I have asked have been tied 

up in DOJ reviews. 

DOJ has raised these problems with the Bureau. They have received assurances that things will go better. Are things going to go 

better? 

Director MUELLER. Well, I had heard this from—it came to me 

from your staff several months ago, and I immediately asked persons to look into it. They met thereafter with GAO. And I believe 

whatever issues that were outstanding have been resolved. 

Now, if you will allow me one second? 

That is what I understand. Yes, I believe that is taken care of. 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Leahy. 

Senator Cornyn? 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks, Director Mueller, for being here. You have earned all of our respect, and 

we appreciate your great service. 

Let me just ask you about two subjects, one that I think you will 

regard as a fairly straightforward question. The other is not designed to be hostile but, rather, constructive and that has to do 

with technology that you already touched on. 

I have, frankly, never understood the opposition to the use of the 

administrative subpoena in fighting the war on terror, as benign an 

instrument of law enforcement as it is to gain business records. It 

is already used in 335 different types of applications. Why we 

would deny that same tool to our law enforcement efforts when it 

comes to fighting the war on terror. Do you understand what the 

concerns are? I realize a lot of what we do here is not necessarily 

rational. This just seems to be totally irrational, denying that tool 

to the FBI, to other law enforcement in fighting the war on terror. 

Director MUELLER. As I discussed in other fora as well as here, 

I believe it is a tool that would be exceptionally helpful, and to the 

18 

extent that we have it in 300-plus other areas, it does seem that 

it would be appropriate to have it in this—for use in national security investigations and terrorist investigations, and I am hopeful 

that this Congress will see to support it. 

Senator CORNYN. Of course, the Intel Committee, in voting out 

its version of the PATRIOT Act, has included the administrative 

subpoena in its version. We did not in this Committee, but it is my 

hope that it can be restored on the floor and that tool can be made 

available. 

Let me talk to you about information technology, and you have 

been kind enough to come by my office and talk to me about my 

concerns in this area. And I guess I do not want to go over old territory with regard to the Virtual Case File, but I am concerned because in 2006 it is estimated that the Federal Government will 

spend $65 billion on information technology. And I just want to 

make sure that we do not waste the taxpayers’ money. 

I know every taxpayer in the country would willingly send their 

dollars to Washington to help the FBI and other Federal agencies 

perform the important work that you are doing to keep us safe. But 

they want to make sure the money is spent wisely and efficiently. 

And so would you just, in the few minutes we have remaining 

here, describe the steps that you have undertaken that you believe 

were going to result in successes in the FBI? I know the creation 

of the CIO has been one step, but would you describe that for us 

so we can have greater confidence that the FBI and other Federal 

Government agencies are going to be spending that money wisely? 

Director MUELLER. Well, one of the things we have done is have 

a very competent CIO we have brought on board. We have expanded his shop. Perhaps as important, we have given the CIO’s 

office the control over both the funds and the new projects. We 

have developed an enterprise architecture for the Bureau so that 

each new component of high-tech or information technology fits 

into the enterprise architecture for the Bureau. 

As we have developed the Sentinel project, we have elicited support from any number of outside groups and specialists and experts. We have brought several on board ourselves to expand the 

CIO’s office. 

I can tell you as we go down this path that we will be looking 

for outside scrutiny and suggestions in terms of how to do it. I have 

a Director of Science and Technology Board that I look to with a 

number of people who have expertise in this arena. We have had 

independent assessments by outside entities such as the RAND 

Corporation. We deal with the Markle Foundation that focuses on 

these issues. We have a Strategics Guidance Council within the 

FBI. I have special advisers who have accomplished this type of 

transformation in business in the past who I call upon and get an 

outside view from periodically. 

We want to work with the Inspector General’s office as we go 

along so that the Inspector General can point out to us any areas 

in which there are flaws. We will continuously brief Congress at 

will. I would like nothing more than to have the process of developing this IT transparent and will take any suggestions from anybody on how to make it better. 

19 

Senator CORNYN. It sounds like you are throwing everything you 

can at the problem, and I congratulate you for taking it so seriously. As you working closely with the Office of Management and 

Budget in their efforts across— 

Director MUELLER. Absolutely. 

Senator CORNYN.—Government agencies to try to develop strategies to avoid these failures and to increase the likelihood of success 

in the future? 

Director MUELLER. Absolutely, and there are some areas—and I 

think that the Office of Management and Budget will look at the 

work that has been done by our CIO shop in certain areas and say 

that we are leading in areas. And we in the future want to lead 

when it comes to information technology, as we have led in other 

areas. And I believe that we are building that capability. 

I will tell you that I meet every week with our CIO. Myself and 

the Deputy sit down and go through where we are on Sentinel, 

where we are on the other projects. It is as important a priority 

as we have in order to assure that we protect the United States, 

particularly against terrorist attacks. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Cornyn. 

Senator Feinstein? 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

I wanted to continue the discussion on administrative subpoenas, 

if I might. We discussed this privately. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time publicly that you have asked for an administrative subpoena for intelligence purposes. You have for law 

enforcement purposes, but this is the first time, to the best of my 

knowledge, for intelligence purposes. 

I voted against the intelligence bill in Committee because of the 

broad administrative subpoena language, and since Senator 

Coburn raised it, I would like to respond to it. 

The administrative subpoena language in the intelligence bill is 

extraordinarily broad. There is no requirement for a certification of 

an emergency. There is no requirement for a sign-off by the DOJ, 

just a sign-off by the SAC. And the non-disclosure is limited. 

Now, the reason that an administrative subpoena is different 

from the 350 other subpoenas in health and other areas is because 

it is not discoverable and the target essentially never knows that 

the Government is gathering information against them. And this 

can go on for years under the language in the intelligence bill. So 

that was one of two reasons why I voted against that bill. 

I did, however, move an amendment, which I would be prepared 

to support, and the first part of that amendment was a certification 

of emergency—in other words, the rationale for needing the subpoena, the fact that it would relate to some criteria with respect 

to cause, that it had a sign-off by the DOJ—this could be by an 

AUSA—and coming to some agreement on non-disclosure. 

Now, you asked for an administrative subpoena for certain specific documents that you are looking for. Let’s say you go into a 

hotel and you say I need all of the records of everybody that is registered in this hotel. Now, in my view, you have to have cause, a 

rationale to do it, and that would be the certification. And the signoff that the documents you are looking for really are relevant 

20 

would be by an AUSA, similar to what a judge might do when 

called on a weekend with respect to a search warrant. 

Would you agree to these provisions being added to an administrative subpoena provision? 

Director MUELLER. I would oppose it. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. You would oppose it. You would not want 

any criteria at all? 

Director MUELLER. I do not. Let me explain my thoughts on this, 

understanding your concerns. 

You raised a concern that persons whose records have been subpoenaed would not find out. Well, that may well be true also in a 

health care or a child pornography case. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. My understanding is it is all discoverable in 

a court of law. 

Director MUELLER. If there is a case. There may well not be a 

case. So there may be a case on either side. But I think I am not 

certain that I would give a lot of weight to that particular argument. 

The other argument with regard to certification of emergency— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Before you do that, let me just discuss that 

with you. Therefore, the Government could, under foreign intelligence, begin to collect data on people which conceivably could last 

for a very long time. 

Director MUELLER. Relevant to a particular investigation, absolutely, in the same way we collect data now as a national security 

letter, absolutely. But— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. But there is no criteria to show that— 

Director MUELLER. Relevant to an investigation— 

Senator FEINSTEIN.—it relates to an investigation. 

Director MUELLER. Relevant to an investigation. And I will tell 

you, we had an example a couple of weeks ago in the wake of the 

bombings in the U.K. We had an example of a case in which an 

individual who was associated with the room that was believed to 

be the room in which the bombs were constructed, it was no longer 

in that area, but whenever we find out—I guess it was up in Leeds, 

in the wake of the July 7th bombings in the U.K. And we had an 

occasion in which we believe this individual had been in the United 

States, had gone to college in a State in the United States. The person had expertise in chemistry that would enable that person to 

construct these bombs. We went to the university with a national 

security letter. They declined to produce the documents pursuant 

to a national security letter. We had to, because there is a case 

that was aligned to it, we had to go back with a grand jury subpoena. 

Now, in my mind, we should not in that circumstance have to 

show somebody that this was an emergency. We should have been 

able to have a document, an administrative subpoena that we took 

to the university and got those records immediately. 

The other point I would make, if I could— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Let me stop you. If you will, just allow me, 

because I think this is really important for many of us, Mr. Chairman. Why would you— 

21 

Chairman SPECTER. Senator Feinstein, take a few more minutes 

here. You have been at the core of this problem in both Intelligence 

and on this Committee. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

Why would you object to a DOJ sign-off, A, on emergency and, 

B, on the relationship to an investigation? I do not understand 

that. 

Director MUELLER. Because I believe that the special agent in 

charge should be— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. It is not going to slow anything down. 

Director MUELLER. There should be a level of review, and my belief is the review should be the special agent in charge. In this particular case, it resulted in a 2-day delay. 

And the other point that I would make with administrative subpoenas that is different with an NSL, and that is that the recipient 

of the subpoena has the right to go into court and challenge it. And 

so there is a process there that allows the recipient of the subpoena 

to go into court and challenge it before a Federal judge, and that 

in my mind is sufficient and adequate to assure that you will have 

sufficient review of that process. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Of course, with the administrative subpoena, 

that is not true. They do not know about it. The target does not 

know about it. 

Director MUELLER. The third party does not, but the recipient— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. But the hotel might object, using that analogy, but the target never knows. 

Director MUELLER. True. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. So you could do school records, you could do 

business records, you could do anything on anybody, and that is my 

concern. All I am asking for is certification of emergency, sign-off, 

just as you would get a judge, a police officer would pick up the 

phone and say, look, this has happened, I need this warrant. A 

judge at night would sign off on it. 

See, the resistance to this makes me suspicious. 

Director MUELLER. I would try to alleviate your suspicion. 

I will tell you, day in and day out, we get threat information, the 

Internet, letters, walk-ins, about a particular person at a particular 

place who is going to undertake a terrorist attack. In this day and 

age, in order to respond to every threat, we have to go out there, 

we have to get records of who is in a particular hotel room, who 

is utilizing a particular telephone, and the need for speed is such 

that it makes sense to us to have the ability of the SAC to sign 

off in this administrative subpoena and give us the flexibility and 

the speed in order to get those records we need to assure ourselves 

that the information we may have received from the Internet or 

from a walk-in is erroneous and that we have done everything we 

can to assure that there is no further terrorist attack. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. All we would be requiring would be the 

phone call. But it would be some oversight over the FBI within the 

DOJ. You do not want that. You do not want even a phone call? 

Director MUELLER. I believe oversight is appropriate with assuring that the upper levels of the FBI are required to sign off on the 

administrative subpoena. I believe that is sufficient. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

22 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. Have you 

convinced the Director? 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I beg your pardon? 

Chairman SPECTER. Have you convinced the Director? 

Senator FEINSTEIN. No, but then he has not convinced me either. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman SPECTER. Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Senator Feinstein is such a good law enforcement supporter, I think she will be convinced before long. I am just 

convinced of it. This is an area that it baffles me. I agree with Senator Cornyn completely. 

Director Mueller, if the Drug Enforcement Administration is investigating a drug dealer, and they are believed to have checked 

in at a motel, can that Drug Enforcement officer get an administrative subpoena and get the records of the motel without declaring 

an emergency and without having the approval of the Department 

of Justice? 

Director MUELLER. I believe so. I have to look at the specific statute, but I believe so. 

Senator SESSIONS. I believe so too. Can the IRS get people’s 

records? 

Director MUELLER. I believe that would be the case. 

Senator SESSIONS. They do not have to declare an emergency to 

get that. 

Director MUELLER. No. 

Senator SESSIONS. But if an FBI agent is investigating a terrorist 

who may be staying at a motel and would like to verify that 

through motel records, they cannot get it without going to the FISA 

Court and getting an order that may take who knows how much 

time before it ever comes back to them; is that not right? 

Director MUELLER. That is one of the avenues. We do have the 

NSL avenue, but that is one of the avenues. 

Senator SESSIONS. I just think this is unbelievable that we would 

provide all kinds of health care document that can be produced by 

the health care inspectors and other people that collect these documents and we cannot do it for our National security. Of course people collect the documents and the FBI maintains a file on it, but 

it does mean that they are going to produce that to the world or 

prosecute somebody who is innocent. I just really am concerned 

about that. I think this is a good thing. 

Would you think that if a FBI special agent in charge, which is 

a fairly august position at least in the eyes of those who work for 

that agent in charge, maybe send a copy of it to the U.S. Attorney 

or something if that would make people feel better, but to me we 

ought to have at least the powers that we have in other agencies 

of Government to investigate terrorism. Would you comment on 

that in general? 

Director MUELLER. I would agree. I do believe if you have it in 

300 plus other circumstances, including child pornography, IRS, 

and certain areas of the DEA, it would be not only appropriate but 

an important device for us to have as we address not just terrorism 

investigations, but counterintelligence investigation and investigation in which other countries, other people are seeking to steal our 

23 

secrets and provide it either to groups outside the United States or 

other countries outside the United States. 

Senator SESSIONS. I would just share this thought. Historically, 

public documents outside the control of an individual—you have 

been a long time prosecutor. You have handled these things for 

many years. You are a professionals professional. You serve Republican and Democratic administrations. You have been United 

States Attorney in a high position in the Department of Justice. 

You have personally prosecuted lots and lots of cases. You understand what it is like in a courtroom. 

So my question is essentially, has it not always been the legal 

principle that with regard to documents outside your control, not 

the records you have in your house or in your desk at your office, 

but where you sign a motel receipt or a phone receipt, you do not 

have the same expectation of privacy in that document as you do 

something that is within your own personal sphere of control; is 

that correct? 

Director MUELLER. That is accurate and the Supreme Court has 

so held. In fact, it was Sandra Day O’Connor in a case—I cannot 

remember the name off my head—that held that. 

Senator SESSIONS. So whenever you sign in at a motel, the clerk 

knows your name and what you filled out. Anybody that works at 

that motel you have an expectation has access to that document or 

else they would not have asked you to fill it out. It does not have 

the same degree of secrecy that you would if it were in a document 

maintained in your home. 

Director MUELLER. Correct. 

Senator SESSIONS. So that is why we have always done that, 

used to in the past, motel records, even telephone records were 

turned over by these entities whenever you asked for them. 

Director MUELLER. Grand jury subpoena generally, standard is 

relevance. 

Senator SESSIONS. But in the old days, when Dragnet and Jack 

Webb and all were investigating crimes, they would just go down 

to the motel and the guy would give it to them, right? Normally. 

Director MUELLER. Normally, yes, way back when. 

Senator SESSIONS. Then they started being afraid they would be 

sued or something, so they will not give any records. They want a 

subpoena, and an administrative subpoena will allow for that and 

maintain a record of it. If they do not want to turn it over, they 

can file a motion to quash. 

Just one more thing if you would. I think the Nation has been 

watching the case involving Natalie Holloway in Aruba. 

Director MUELLER. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. She is a resident of my State. We have been 

concerned about that. I understand that the Aruban authorities in 

recent days have been more open with the FBI. I think you have 

personally made some effort on it. What can you tell us about the 

status of that? 

Director MUELLER. Originally I did talk to the Attorney General 

down there, and we had a number of agents that were helping out, 

assisting in the initial stages of the investigation. We currently are 

offering expertise to the Aruban authorities to the extent that we 

can provide it, and in the last couple of days I believe we have been 

24 

in discussions where we are offering and providing expertise to the 

Aruban authorities in hopes of having a break in that case. 

Senator SESSIONS. I certainly hope so. I have been told by the 

Prime Minister that he welcomes any assistance, so if there is not 

full cooperation, I hope you would let me know so we could approach that with him. 

Director MUELLER. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

We now have Chairman’s call. Senator Feingold was here earlier 

but left, and Senator Durbin has been here longer. But we passed 

you by, Senator Feingold, so the tie goes to you. You are next in 

line. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Director, for not only being here today but for the 

time you spent with me in my office recently which was very helpful. 

I am pleased that there was a good exchange before I got here 

with Senator Feinstein about these administrative subpoenas. We 

talked about it at some length, and I do hope that you will continue 

to consider alternative ways that we can get at these problems 

which you explained very well to me in my office, but I really hope 

we do not have to have such broad powers used in order to get at 

these emergency situations. 

I would like to talk to you about the bill that the Senate Judiciary Committee unanimously reported out of Committee last week 

reauthorizing the USA PATRIOT Act and making some changes to 

some of its most controversial provisions. As I stated last week, the 

compromise bill made some meaningful improvements but did not 

address everything that I believe needs to be revised. One provision 

that I would have liked to have seen in the bill is an ascertainment 

requirement for roving taps under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, just as there is now an ascertainment requirement in the 

criminal law for roving taps. It is a simple concept. It ensures, 

when the order itself does not designate the phone or the computer 

to be tapped, that the investigator actually has a sufficient basis 

for turning on a wiretap of a particular phone or a computer. It 

just ensures that innocent people’s phone and computer conversations are not intercepted. 

Would you have an objection to including an ascertainment requirement for FISA roving taps? 

Director MUELLER. I would have to look at that, Senator. I will 

tell you one of the things that is a challenge is this day and age 

is the swiftness with which some discard communications devices 

and replace them. I would certainly look at and consider any language that you would propose, but I expect to balance it against 

our need to move efficiently from communications device to communications device without always having to go back to the FISA 

Court on a daily or hourly basis. So I would have to look at it. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I understand the need for that kind of balancing. I guess I would just like you to speculate on how this 

works, how an agent makes the decision of which phone or computer to tap. If you do not somehow ascertain that the target is 

25 

using the phone or the computer, how do you decide which phone 

or computer to tap? 

Director MUELLER. First of all there has to be the belief that the 

person is a agent of a foreign power or a terrorist so there has to 

be some initial threshold finding before you get to the device that 

is being used, and then the application would have some description of the device or types of devices or where they are being used 

or how they are being used in order for the court to be able to articulate an appropriate order to the facility that was providing the 

service. So inherent in that process is some degree of specification. 

Senator FEINGOLD. This is the whole point of ascertainment. You 

do have a target out there. You have somebody you are concerned 

about. But how do you connect that person to the particular phone 

or computer without an ascertainment requirement? 

Director MUELLER. It depends on the circumstances. I would 

have to look at your— 

Senator FEINGOLD. You have indicated a willingness to look at it. 

I think this is a gap that we need to change something about this 

in order to protect innocent people, and I hope we can work together on that. 

I would like to get your response to some testimony we heard at 

a PATRIOT Act hearing a few months ago. One of the witnesses 

at that hearing was Suzanne Spaulding, who has spent a good portion of her career working on intelligence issues at the CIA on two 

different commissions examining issues relating to terrorism and 

weapons of mass destruction, and in Congress where she had the 

privilege or working for our Chairman and on the Intelligence 

Committees. 

She explained why we have to be particularly careful in the oversight of intelligence investigation, and I want to read what she 

said. She said: ‘‘Intelligence operations by necessity are often wide 

ranging rather than specifically focused, creating a greater likelihood that they will include information about ordinary law-abiding 

citizens. They are conducted in secret, which means abuses and 

mistakes may never be uncovered, and they lack safeguards 

against abuse that are present in the criminal context, where inappropriate behavior by the Government could jeopardize a prosecution.’’ 

She continued: ‘‘Because the safeguards against overreaching or 

abuse are weaker in intelligence operations than they are in criminal investigations, powers granted for intelligence investigation 

should be no broader or more inclusive than is absolutely necessary 

to meet the national security imperative and should be accomplished by rigorous oversight by Congress, and where appropriate, 

by the courts.’’ 

Do you agree with the statement and sentiments that I just 

read? 

Director MUELLER. She said an awful lot in that statement. 

There are certain aspects that I would agree with. I do believe that 

one has to be careful in establishing, for instance, an intelligence 

directorate or a national security service, that one has an objective 

for the collection of intelligence. I do believe that one of the reasons 

both the 9/11 Commission as well as the WMD Commission believe 

that the growth of a domestic intelligence capability in the United 

26 

States should be in the FBI is because we have a lengthy detailed 

training with regard to the controls on our activity, whether it 

come from the Constitution, whether it come from statutes, whether it come from the AG guidelines. 

I do believe that one of the reasons that it is important for the 

FBI to undertake this capability is that I think we have a way of 

looking at sets of circumstances that is fact driven and is consistent 

with the Constitution, its applicable statutes and the AG guidelines. 

By the same token, I do believe that in order to address the 

threats of today and tomorrow in terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, there has to be a growth and some capabilities along the 

lines of administrative subpoenas to allow us to have access to the 

information that will alert us to the threats against the United 

States, with appropriate Congressional oversight. 

One of the things that I do believe is important for us and others 

is to see what you have done but not put impediments to action. 

In other words, in my mind, adding a test or issuing administrative 

subpoenas are impediments to swift action, where you can look 

after the fact and see if it was appropriate. And in my mind, as 

you build an intelligence capability, as you look at oversight, there 

needs to be oversight in the institution, in the Department of Justice, but the oversight should not inhibit the swift reaction to a set 

of circumstances that you just do not know where it is going to go 

and you have to act quickly. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Director. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Feingold. 

Senator Durbin. 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Director Mueller, for being here. I continue to have 

the greatest faith in you. I think you were an excellent choice by 

this administration. You have served our Nation well, and I would 

say the same for all the men and women who work at your Agency. 

We are fortunate as Americans to have people with your dedication 

to the common good and the protection of America. Thank you for 

your service. 

You have been very open with me. There have been times when 

we have had discussions where you were candid about your misfortunes and disappointments, and things that we had hoped would 

turn out better. So please take whatever I ask in that context. I 

respect you very much for your public service. 

Let me go if I can to the underlying—I have two questions, and 

I will state them both though they are unrelated, because I will 

run out of time otherwise. 

The first is this. We have had several colleagues talk about the 

PATRIOT Act. I voted for the PATRIOT Act. It was a strong bipartisan vote for passage of it, and I commend the Chairman and 

other members of the Committee. Our proposed revisions of the 

PATRIOT Act passed 18 to nothing on a strong bipartisan roll call, 

and that is exactly the way it should be. I think we found the right 

balance between security and liberty in what we have come up 

with to revise the PATRIOT Act. 

If you will listen to the questions of my colleagues and mine, you 

will understand there is still an underlying concern that maybe we 

27 

have gone too far in some specific areas of the PATRIOT Act, gone 

too far in compromising our basic rights and liberties as individual 

citizens. 

The reason I raised that—we are not going to resolve that today, 

not likely we will at any time in the near future. But the basis for 

the PATRIOT Act is to give the Government the authority it needs 

to collect enough information, intelligence, to protect us from terrorism, and crime for that matter, but protect us from terrorism. 

What troubles me is as we debate about how wide we are going 

to open the top of this funnel to collect information, once collected, 

that information passes through a very narrow chute when it 

comes to the analysis of the information, the collection, the analysis 

of that information and the sharing of that information, and it is 

at its narrowest point in your Agency at this moment. I think it 

is reflected in the fact first of the information technology problems 

which beset this Agency for a decade or more. According to Judge 

Webster, you are facing an obsolete system today at the FBI. It is 

clear from all analysis that it will take as long as 31⁄2 years from 

now to complete the Sentinel system which is the modernization of 

your information technology, which means from start to finish, 9/ 

11 to completion of the system, 8 years, 8 years. 

Secondly, the Inspector General talks about the backlog of collected counterintelligence and counterterrorism audio, that we still 

have more than one-fourth of that that goes unevaluated, 

unreviewed. Even as we collect more and more information we still 

do not have the people to review it to determine what is important 

there to keep us safe. 10 years to coordinate our fingerprint collection from start to finish when the Federal Government said to the 

then Immigration Naturalization Service and the FBI, can you collect the same sets of fingerprints so you can share this information? Maybe at the end of 10 years they will have been able to accomplish that simple task. Then of course the information that will 

come out in this hearing, that about one out of five of your intelligence analysts plan to leave within the next 5 years. 

So when you put all this together, my basic question to you is 

one that my former Congressional colleague and Commissioner of 

9/11, Mr. Hamilton, is going to raise later on. If it is going to take 

us another 31⁄2 years to get all this together, can we afford to wait? 

Can we say that that is an acceptable timeline? Is there anything 

you can do or we can do to speed this up and to make certain that 

intelligence gathering analysis and collection is done in a more 

timely fashion? 

The second question, totally unrelated, goes to the administration’s interrogation techniques. These have been extremely controversial. The idea that we would change our approach in interrogating prisoners and detainees in the war on terrorism has been 

the subject of a lot of debate, dissension from people like Secretary 

of State Colin Powell, JAG lawyers, an amendment pending on the 

floor yesterday from Senator McCain, Senator Graham and Senator 

Warner about whether or not we ought to be more explicit in saying the United States will not engage in cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of prisoners. 

Your FBI agents have been some of the most outspoken critics 

of this administration’s interrogation techniques, saying in memos 

28 

that we have received that have been declassified, that first, torture is ineffective. A person in pain will say anything to escape the 

pain. Secondly, that the techniques that are being employed go too 

far. Some of your FBI officials have said they are not permitted by 

the U.S. Constitution. Others have said that they are harsh techniques that do not produce good intelligence. 

My question to you is this. I want to commend the FBI for standing up for American values. I think you are recognized as the 

Agency that probably has been the premiere agency in effective interrogation techniques. What has been your reaction to the interrogation techniques of this administration, the critique of your 

agents, and to your knowledge, have the Defense Department’s interrogation changed because of FBI oversight and observations of 

excesses? 

Director MUELLER. Let me start on the delay that it is going to 

take in various areas to get where we want to be. I do not see an 

endpoint. Information technology has to grow month by month, 

year by year. Sentinel now is going to be in four stages. We have 

100 different programs, different systems, many of which are obsolete. You have to do a triage on those systems to put into place new 

systems that will give you the same information but in different 

ways. One of the things that people do not recognize, that it was 

a huge advance for us to have everybody with the most modern 

computers, to have the networks in place, the modern networks, 

and to have the database structures in place that will enable us to 

share that information. 

So I see Sentinel as one piece of a process where it is going to 

be in four stages. We get returns 12 months from December, hopefully. I will say ‘‘hopefully’’ given my experiences. And then several 

months or a year afterwards the next iteration of it. We tend to 

look at this as one project, look at it as a whole, but there are other 

things that will be happening at the same time, and it is an 

iterative process. What we have done in my mind is put into place 

the capability to manage this process as a large corporation, modern corporation would. When it comes to human resources, what 

we need to do is put into place the same capabilities that a large 

corporation would have in order to bring people on board to recruit 

them, to hire them, to train them and to retain them. We are putting in place the, redoing the infrastructure to put in place a modern human capital capability that will enable us to do this down 

the road. 

I see putting into place these building blocks that will enable us 

in these other areas, besides just investigation, besides just intelligence gathering, but enable us to conduct these two activities 

much more effectively and efficiently than we have done in the 

past. But it is a continuous iterative process. So we will have returns far before 2009 or 2011 or 2015, but you get to 2009, the 

process and the capability still has to be there to build. 

With regard to the question in terms of the interrogation techniques, I have not been— 

Senator DURBIN. If I could ask you one last follow-up on the— 

Chairman SPECTER. Senator Durbin, you are three-quarter minutes over. How much more time will you need? 

29 

Senator DURBIN. I was living by the Feinstein rule, but the Durbin rule is a much shorter one, so whatever you can say I would 

appreciate. 

Chairman SPECTER. You are past the Feinstein rule, Senator 

Durbin, but my question pending is how much more time do you 

need? 

Senator DURBIN. Just if he could answer the last question. 

Chairman SPECTER. Okay, fine. Go ahead, Director Mueller. 

Director MUELLER. Our agents have followed the protocols that 

have established in the Bureau over a period of time. To the extent 

that we have had information brought to our attention, where we 

believe that matters should be taken up by other authorities, we 

have provided that information to the Department of Defense the 

follow up on. 

Senator DURBIN. I am sorry. I did not understand your response. 

Director MUELLER. Where we have information relating to standards of interrogation that we did not believe may be appropriate, 

we have taken those pieces of information and provided them to 

the DOD to review and to address. 

Senator DURBIN. If I had time, I would ask you whether they had 

changed their interrogation techniques as a result. 

Chairman SPECTER. Senator Durbin, do you have another question? Go ahead. 

Senator DURBIN. That is my last question. 

Director MUELLER. I do believe they have, but I am not privy myself to the changes and the developments in that regard, but I believe they have. 

Chairman SPECTER. Senator Durbin, you did not have another 

question. Director Mueller just had another answer. 

Senator Kohl. 

Senator KOHL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Mueller, there was a story in the New York Times the 

other day about how fearful Londoners are to ride the subway. My 

question is, why should citizens here in our country feel any safer 

in the subways of America? What can you tell the American people 

about our law enforcement officers today and the system that we 

have going that would get them to feel that law enforcement here 

is better than it was in London, and that they should not be as 

fearful as Londoners are today? 

Director MUELLER. Allow me to say I happened to be on a prescheduled trip in London last week, and I can tell you the 

Londoners go about their business the next day. They have been 

through this before. The fact that there was a second wave certainly would cause some concern, I will tell you that the Londoners 

are back in those subways. The ridership was not down much at 

all, and if it was down, it was down a day and then was back up 

a day afterwards. 

We have, I believe, in the United States, together with Department of Homeland Security, the State and local law enforcement 

authorities, through our joint terrorism task forces, through our relationships, through understanding the threats to our communities 

including our subways, have worked together to do what we can to 

protect the subways, to do what we can to protect the trains, and 

there probably is more that can be done. The fact of the matter is, 

30 

you can never protect it 100 percent. You can never protect it 100 

percent. And so you want to minimize, reduce those risks. We are 

doing everything we can to minimize, reduce those risks. 

Throughout the United States we are sitting side by side with 

State and local law enforcement, understanding what is in the community, the threats in the community, and when we see a threat 

in the community, we have moved quickly I believe to address 

those threats either by prosecuting the individuals on material support where it is appropriate, prosecuting the individuals for other 

criminal offenses where it is appropriate, or in other case where 

the person is here illegally, deporting the person where it is appropriate. 

Senator KOHL. You feel that people in our country have legitimate reasons to feel safer because of the measures that we take, 

that you take with your Department, and Homeland Security 

takes, then perhaps people in London? 

Director MUELLER. I think that it is just not Homeland Security, 

it is not just the FBI, it is other Federal agencies, it is State and 

local law enforcement, and it is our intelligence community 

operatives overseas that have had as much or an effect in terms 

of disabling al Qaeda as any entity in the United States, as I pointed out before. Detaining and removing from the battlefield the 

leaders of al Qaeda were done by our sister agencies, and they have 

done a fantastic job and that has made us safer. I always say it 

has made us safer, not safe. 

Senator KOHL. Speaking about al Qaeda, how would you assess 

the level of threat that al Qaeda poses today? Is it closer to what 

the administration officials have repeatedly been telling the American public, or closer to the assessment of other terrorism and intelligence experts who believe that they are still today coordinating 

attacks as the London attack? 

Director MUELLER. I think most people would agree that there 

are a number of instances in the past where individuals who have 

an ideological compatibility with the violent extremism articulated 

by bin Laden have come together to undertake attacks. The extent 

of the direction from afar is different depending on the attacks. It 

may be financial support. It may be information and capabilities in 

manufacturing devices. But you have to look at each incident to determine to what extent there was support from outside the place 

in which the incident occurred, and to what extent that can be tied 

to a particular person who is known to be in the inner circle of al 

Qaeda, and that is difficult to do. 

I will say, as I was saying before, I think we are a lot safer, certainly a lot safer than we were before September 11th, but the fact 

of the matter is, while we are a lot safer, you cannot 100 percent 

guarantee there will not be another terrorist attack. 

Senator KOHL. What makes it so terribly difficult for us to capture Osama bin Laden? 

Director MUELLER. I would hesitate to speculate that. That probably should be directed to others in the intelligence community, because I am somewhat familiar with the terrain and the difficulty 

in operating in the terrain where he is believed to be. I am somewhat familiar with the difficulties in identifying with specificity 

where he is, but I am certainly no expert in that. 

31 

Senator KOHL. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Kohl. 

Senator Biden. 

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I apologize, I had to be in Delaware this morning at the State Fair to 

speak to the agricultural community, and I apologize for being late, 

Director. 

Let me begin by thanking you. I think you are doing a heck of 

a job, and I think you are doing a heck of a job under very, very 

difficult circumstance, and all of us so-called policymakers and administrations and Congress, we all like finding somebody else to 

blame for some of our problems, and your Agency has been I think 

the target of some criticism I do not think it has deserved. 

I would like to make one broad statement and then ask you to 

respond to a few specifics. It is sort of like we have had a perfect 

storm occurring here. We had a decision made based upon—and I 

am not asking you to comment—but a decision, right or wrong, to 

end the COPS program, drastically cut the aid to local law enforcement for no hiring and for a lot of other things. We were providing 

over $2.4 billion in local law enforcement aid. Now we are down to 

$167 million. The aid that goes through Homeland Security, none 

of that is allowed to be used for hiring personnel, and it is less 

than targeted. 

You have had enormous additional responsibility placed upon 

you in the counterterrorism area, enormous. You have justifiably 

and understandably had to tell local law enforcement, overstating 

it to make a point, we do not do bank robberies or interstate car 

theft any more; you guys are on your own. Violent crime task forces 

have had to be curtailed. It is not a criticism, it is an observation. 

I do not know how you could do it with the number of agents you 

have. My recollection—and I am sure they are in my notes here— 

I do not recall them exactly, but the total increase in the number 

of agents is de minimis since 9/11, and at the same time we are 

getting reports—and I am going to ask you to comment on this— 

from the Counterterrorism Center, John Brennan, and many others 

because all of us have been dealing with this in other capacities beyond this issue, that a greater threat is homegrown terrorism, not 

importation. I do not know if that is true. I am going to ask you 

whether you agree with that. 

The end result of all of this is, it seems to me—and I know you 

are in a tough spot; I do not know what your answer would be. I 

hope it would be candid or you would just demur, but not tell me 

something that is not—and that is, I think you need 1,000 more 

agents. I am not being facetious. I think you need 1,000 more 

agents. I think we have to reconstitute the Violent Crime Task 

Force. I think you have to be able to walk and chew gum at the 

same time. I think we cannot—not the you are leaving it hanging, 

but you are not able to assist locals like you were before. 

With all your intelligence work, and pray God—I see the CoChairman of the 9/11 Commission is here—pray God these fixes 

will be successful. But it is more likely to be some local cop coming 

from the Dunkin Donuts Shop, going behind a super mall in my 

State or yours, that detects a guy climbing out of a dumpster, who 

32 

has just put Sarin gas in the ventilation system. It is not going to 

be a guy with night vision goggles, and you are not going to be able 

to all the time have the intelligence to anticipate where this is 

going to occur. 

And I add one last factor. I think it is close to politically—if there 

is such a phrase—criminal for us to not have provided additional 

security for rail. We are nowhere near safer, notwithstanding what 

the great Director says. All I ask you to do is leave here, go get 

in the train that the Chairman and I get on as it takes out Union 

Station, go to the back window, look out the window. Tell me how 

many cops you see. Tell me whether you see any protection of the 

switching devices. Tell me if you see a single camera. Tell me 

whether you see anything, anything, anything. More people visit 

that facility than any other facility in Washington. 

This morning there were more people sitting in an aluminum 

tube underneath the tunnels of New York City than in 7 full 747s, 

virtually no ventilation I say to the Chairman of the Commission, 

no lighting, no escape of any consequence, tunnels built in 1917. Go 

through the Baltimore tunnel built in 1869, no ventilation, no 

lighting, no escape under the harbor. This is criminal. 

Now, it is none of your responsibility, Director, but if you add all 

these things up, it seems to me you need more resources. Are you 

able to do what you think you need to do with the roughly—what 

do you have now, about 14,000? 

Director MUELLER. We are up to 12,500 I think. 

Senator BIDEN. 12,500. 

Director MUELLER. Approximately. 

Senator BIDEN. Is that enough? 

Director MUELLER. Well, we have had to prioritize. We have been 

working, for instance, with the Inspector General’s Office to determine where there have been—since we have reprioritized and made 

our first priority counterterrorism, making certain that we follow 

every counterterrorism lead, there are areas in which we have not 

been as active as we have been in the past. I believe that the studies will show that there has been a picking up of the slack by the 

DEA in drug cases, as well as State and local law enforcement. We 

still will, in isolated circumstances, do bank robberies, where they 

are armed bank robberies, where we can add something. But where 

we do not add something to the table, we have had to prioritize and 

focus our efforts, and I think we are doing a fairly good job on it. 

There is one area in which I believe we will have to look at in 

the future, given what I believe the IG report may come out with, 

and that is when it comes to smaller white-collar criminal cases, 

with the Enron cases, with the Qwest cases, with all of those cases 

we have had to put substantial resources on the larger white-collar 

criminal cases, focusing on those, and the smaller white-collar 

criminal cases which we have done in the past, we are not doing 

so much of, and that is an area where I think there is a gap that 

we will have to look to. 

We have in front of Congress the 2006 budget, where we are receiving additional resources. My expectation is I will ask for additional resources in 2007. I will tell you that we have had to 

reprioritize and we will continue to have to do that, but that is not 

all together bad either, because we should use our unique capabiliVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:37 Jan 08, 2009 Jkt 045063 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\46051.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
33 

ties where they are necessary, and not replicate the capabilities of 

others because we like doing it. 

Senator BIDEN. May I have 30 seconds more, Mr. Chairman, to 

make a brief comment? 

Chairman SPECTER. Go ahead, Senator Biden. 

Senator BIDEN. My dad used to say, if everything is equally important to you, nothing is important to you. You are being asked 

to prioritize and you are put in a tough spot. I would like to throw 

you in the briar patch. I believe it is absolutely irresponsible for 

us not to be increasing substantially the FBI, substantially the aid 

for transit in this country, and substantially local law enforcement. 

And for the President to tell me there is a priority on a tax cut, 

tell me there is a priority on anything else, I find irresponsible. If 

you cannot walk your streets, if you cannot be safe, if you cannot 

provide for a better shot at dealing with terror, then it seems to 

me none of your other liberties from education to highways makes 

any sense. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am going to try very hard to throw you in the briar patch. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Biden. 

Director Mueller, just a couple of more questions before turning 

to the second panel with respect to your comments on the PATRIOT Act. We have made a fair number of changes to accommodate what the FBI have said after the Specter-Feinstein bill was 

introduced. We have eliminated the reporting on FISA, on the pen 

register because you thought that was troublesome. We have had 

sunsets on some of the provisions and not on other provisions. 

As to the roving wiretap, we have inserted a requirement to have 

some idea as to who is the subject, so you just do not have John 

Doe, and it is consistent with your prior representations that even 

when a target’s identity is unknown, you must have significant information about the person before initiating a roving wiretap. 

We have omitted the mail cover, but you did not even ask for the 

mail cover, which is an expansion of authority, which is in the Intelligence Committee. That is correct, is it not, Director Mueller, 

that you did not ask for the mail cover? 

Director MUELLER. Did not. That does not mean, however, that 

we would not like to at least have it. We did not request it, but 

in reviewing that bill, it is something that would be beneficial because it would enable us to have more authority over obtaining the 

mail cover information that we currently have, but I did not ask 

for it, you are right, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPECTER. Director Mueller, we would have to guess 

about what you wanted if we were to include things you did not 

ask for. And then on the scale of what is really necessary, we obviously weigh pretty critically what you have not asked for as not 

being as important as what you have asked for, pretty fundamental 

analysis. 

With respect to section 215, we have inserted language on relevancy which meets the grand jury standards. You had commented 

that you do not have to show probable cause to get a grand jury 

subpoena, which you are exactly right. The grand jury has a proceeding which seeks to establish probable cause. On the requirements of section 215, we have said that there ought to be a stateVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:37 Jan 08, 2009 Jkt 045063 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\46051.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
34 

ment of facts showing ‘‘reasonable grounds to believe that the 

records or other things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation.’’ 

The PATRIOT Act currently has a relevancy standard, but does 

not have any elaboration as to what that means. We have a number of prosecutors on the Committee who dealt with probable 

cause, and it is a lower standard. It is a standard, as I have said 

on RT enterprises. So what we have tried to do is to have a balance. As you well know, the PATRIOT Act has been challenged 

from both the right and the left, a lot of concern about civil liberties, a lot of concern about terrorism, and our Committee has 

tried to strike a balance. 

We had a remarkable result in getting all 18 Committee Members to agree, including the one Senator on a 99–1 vote in 2001, 

who did not favor it, and I am advised this morning that the two 

leaders are what we call shopping unanimous consent request, because it appears that the bill which the Senate Committee turned 

out has met with almost universal approbation. 

Let me give you one last chance to register whatever complaints 

you have as to what you think ought to be changed from the bill 

which passed out of our Committee. 

Director MUELLER. Let me thank you for all the work that has 

been done on the PATRIOT Act. This Committee and Congress as 

a whole, I saw some time ago a fairly broad gap, and I think that 

has been closed. It is very narrow at this point. There is one area 

in which— 

Chairman SPECTER. Very narrow at this point, a very narrow gap 

at this point? 

Director MUELLER. Very narrow at this point, very narrow. 

Chairman SPECTER. Good. 

Director MUELLER. There is one area under 215 where we would 

agree with the relevance standard, but there is an additional 

phrase in there—and I would have to get back to you on this—that 

ties it to an agent of a foreign power, and the relevance standard, 

given our—well, the relevance standard which we think is appropriate, should not be limited by a further showing of relating to an 

agent of a foreign power. I would have to get you the specific writeup on that phraseology, but that is the one piece that I think is 

still outstanding that we have some concern about. If you allow me 

just for a second to check. 

There is one other problem that I— 

Chairman SPECTER. The provisions that you may be referring to, 

Director Mueller, is the language pertains to a foreign power or an 

agent of a foreign power relevant to the activities of a suspected 

agent of a foreign power who was subject of such authorized investigation, or pertaining to an individual in contact with or known to 

a suspected agent of a foreign power. 

Director MUELLER. In our minds it should be relevant to an investigation as opposed to having to identify a particular person. 

Chairman SPECTER. If that is the only gap we have, provide additional information because we will be going to conference with the 

House and we want to very, very carefully consider any request 

you have. 

35 

Director MUELLER. Thank you very much. Thank you for that opportunity. We will do so. I appreciate it. 

Chairman SPECTER. Director Mueller, thank you for two hours 

plus. It is a long session, but you saw a lot of interest here by the 

Members. We know how busy you are, so when we have you at the 

witness table, we like to ask you lots of questions. 

There is one more that I told you I was going to ask you, and 

that is about the Journalist Privilege Statute. Deputy Attorney 

General Comey did not come in when we had that hearing last 

Wednesday, and we had given you notice in advance that this 

would be an opportunity for the administration to state whatever 

objections the administration has to that proposed legislation. So 

now is the time. 

Director MUELLER. If I could, I have not been involved in discussions there. I know Deputy Attorney General Comey filed a statement in opposition to the legislation, and I am sure as a representative of the Department of Justice and the administration, that 

statement should stand as the policy, or the views, I should say, 

of the Department of Justice on that legislation. 

Senator LEAHY. Mr. Chairman, if I could? 

Chairman SPECTER. Senator Leahy. 

Senator LEAHY. I was far from satisfied with Mr. Comey’s statement. I think part of it looked like it was prepared prior to some 

of the changes made and some of the legislation. I am very disappointed. 

This is not directed at you, Director Mueller, and your answer is 

the only one you can give I think under the circumstances, but I 

was very disappointed that Mr. Comey did not testify. I think this 

whole question of a shield law, however you describe it, is an important one. It is one that one way or the other the Congress is 

going to wrestle with. I would hope that we have Mr. Comey up 

here to testify, or the Attorney General, to testify on this because 

it is not fair to put you in the position to have to. I think at some 

point we are going to have to because there is going to be legislation that will be coming forward on a shield law, and a lot of us 

would like direction more than a out-of-date statement, with almost 

like a note saying, oh, by the way, I cannot show up. That is not 

at you. I am just saying that we have to have some. 

Director MUELLER. I am not certain what iterations the legislation has gone through the committees. I was alerted to the fact 

that I would be asked the question, and a statement would stand 

as the position of the Department. I will say that one of the concerns that I will voice here, I think is a very valid concern, is that 

one would not want to have a mini-trial every time you need information from somebody associated with some form of the media, 

whether it be television or the newsprint or what-have-you. So in 

looking over it briefly and not having spent any time on it, that is 

something that jumped out at me as a concern that we would have 

or I would have in terms of conducting investigations. 

But I preface this, or I guess add to it the fact that I have not 

had an opportunity to review the legislation itself. I have had an 

opportunity to look at the statement of Mr. Comey, and that is 

something that stuck out at me as something that I think we 

would be validly concerned about. 

36 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Director Mueller. 

Director MUELLER. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mueller appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman SPECTER. We will turn now to our second panel. Inspector General Glenn Fine of the Department of Justice; former 

Congressman Lee Hamilton; former FBI/CIA Director William 

Webster; and Program Manager, John Russack, of the Information 

Sharing Environment, Director of National Intelligence. 

Thank you for joining us gentleman, and thank you very much 

for your patience. 

Our first witness is Inspector General Glenn Fine, has an outstanding academic background, magna cum laude from Harvard, 

Rhodes scholar, BA and MA degrees from Oxford, law degree from 

Harvard. Prior to joining the Department of Justice’s Office of Inspector General, Mr. Fine practices as an attorney specializing in 

labor and employment law. In 1995 he joined the Department of 

Justice and served in varying positions, including Special Counsel 

to the Inspector General, Director of OIG Special Investigations, 

and Acting Inspector General. 

Thank you for joining us, Mr. Fine, and as you know, we have 

5-minute rounds, and then 5-minute rounds of questioning. Thank 

you for being here, and we look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF GLENN A. FINE, INSPECTOR GENERAL, 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. FINE. Mr. Chairman, Senator Leahy, Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify regarding the oversight 

work of the Office of the Inspector General within the FBI. 

In my written statement I provide a summary of the findings of 

several recent OIG reports, such as reviews of FBI intelligence analysts, FBI information technology, the Terrorist Screening Center, 

and intelligence information related to the September 11th attacks. 

I also describe several ongoing OIG reviews in the FBI of interest 

to the Committee, such as the FBI’s compliance with the Attorney 

General’s investigative guidelines, the FBI’s handling of the Brandon Mayfield case, and the FBI’s observations of alleged mistreatment of detainees at military detention facilities. 

In my testimony this morning I would like to provide observations on the FBI’s transformation and key challenges it faces, and 

briefly summarize the findings of an OIG report released today 

that examines the FBI’s foreign language translation program. 

The FBI is undergoing significant changes since the September 

11th terrorist attacks. Despite shortcomings we have found in some 

FBI programs, I believe that Director Mueller is moving the FBI 

in the right direction, but there are areas in the FBI in need of significant improvement. The first is the urgent need to upgrade the 

FBI’s information technology. Without adequate information technology, FBI employees will not be able to perform their jobs as fully 

and effectively as they should. 

Second, our reviews have found that the FBI is affected by high 

turnover and key positions at headquarters and in field offices. For 

example, in the past, rapid turnover in IT positions hurt the FBI’s 

37 

ability to manage its information technology modernization 

projects. 

A third critical challenge facing the FBI is its need to effectively 

and efficiently share intelligence and law enforcement information, 

both within the FBI and with its law enforcement and intelligence 

partners. 

Fourth, the FBI must value to a greater degree FBI staff with 

technical skills. While the FBI’s culture is changing, more needs to 

be done to support the work of intelligence analysts, scientists, linguists and other staff who are critical to meeting the FBI’s changing mission. 

Fifth, the FBI previously exhibited an insular attitude with an 

aversion to oversight. In the last several years the FBI has opened 

itself to outside scrutiny from the OIG as well as other groups. 

While not everyone in the FBI has welcomed such change, I believe 

the Director, senior FBI leadership, and many FBI employees recognize the benefits of this oversight. 

I would like to now turn to the OIG report regarding the FBI’s 

foreign language translation program. In July 2004 the OIG completed an audit which found that the FBI’s collection of 

counterterrorism and counterintelligence audio material had outpaced its translation capabilities. The audit also found that the FBI 

had difficulty in filling its need for additional linguists. 

Because of the importance of these issues, the OIG conducted a 

follow-up review this year to assess the progress of the FBI’s translation program. Our follow-up review concluded that the FBI has 

taken important steps to address recommendations from our previous report, and has made progress in improving its translation 

program. However, we found that key deficiencies remain, including a continuing backlog of unreviewed counterterrorism and counterintelligence materials. For example, the FBI estimated that its 

counterterrorism audio backlog was 4,086 hours as of April 2004. 

In this follow-up review we found that the counterterrorism audio 

backlog had doubled to 8,354 hours. Although that is a small percentage of total counterterrorism audio collections, the FBI has no 

assurance that these materials do not contain important 

counterterrorism information unless they are reviewed and translated. 

We also attempted to determine the priority of the 

counterterrorism material that was not reviewed. We found that 

none of the counterterrorism audio backlog was in the highest of 

the FBI’s five priority levels, that almost all of the backlog was in 

cases designated in the second and third highest priority levels. 

With respect to counterintelligence collections, the amount of 

unreviewed material is much larger and has also increased since 

our previous report. 

Our review also found that a continuing issue for the FBI is the 

time it takes to hire contract linguists. According to even the FBI’s 

statistics, the average time to hire a FBI contract linguist has increased from 13 months to 14 months. 

In sum, our follow-up review found that the FBI has made 

progress in improving the operations of its translation program, 

but key deficiencies remain. 

38 

While I believe the FBI is moving in the right direction, it needs 

to make further progress in its foreign language program as well 

as in other critical areas. To assist in these challenges the FBI will 

continue to conduct reviews in these important FBI programs. 

That concludes my statement and I would be pleased to answer 

any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fine appears as a submission for 

the record.] 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Inspector General 

Fine. 

I will not turn to former Congressman Lee Hamilton, a colleague 

on the Hill with both Senator Leahy and myself for many years. 

He has served some 34 years in the Congress before undertaking 

activities with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Congressman Hamilton’s resume is so long, it is difficult not 

to get lost in it. While a member of the House of Representatives 

for some 34 years, he was Chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chair of the Joint Economic Committee, 

Chair of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, and 

without objection, we will put a full copy of his resume into the 

record because it is very long. 

He was Co-Chair with former Senator Howard Baker on the 

Baker-Hamilton Commission to investigate security lapses at Los 

Alamos, and his most recent post was Vice Chairman of the 9/11 

Commission which did such an extraordinary job in leading to the 

revisions of our National intelligence structure. 

A graduate of DePauw University, Indiana University School of 

Law, attended the Goethe University in Frankfurt, Germany. 

While this is the last line, it may be the most important, former 

high school and college basketball star and a member of the Indiana Basketball Hall of Fame, which is no mean accomplishment. 

Thank you for joining us, Congressman Hamilton, and we look 

forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF LEE H. HAMILTON, PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR 

SCHOLARS, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Chairman Specter. Of course the reason I was elected 34 times was that I was in the Basketball Hall 

of Fame. I think that was the chief reason. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. HAMILTON. Chairman Specter and Senator Leahy, I am delighted to be with you this morning. 

I think the best thing for me to do is start with my conclusion, 

and that is simply to say that on the 9/11 Commission we said that 

our recommendation was to leave counterterrorism intelligence collection in the United States with the FBI, and that that assessment requires that the FBI make an all-out effort to institutionalize change, and if it does that, it can do the job. 

We still hold to that assessment. We believe that Director 

Mueller is making a very strong effort to effect change. We believe 

the obstacles are immense. We applaud the progress that he has 

made. We urge him to forge ahead, and we want to give him our 

support so that he can get the job done. We want to try to be helpVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:37 Jan 08, 2009 Jkt 045063 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\46051.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
39 

ful and constructive. We believe that the FBI has been reforming 

itself for 4 years, and everybody recognizes, as does this Committee 

for sure, there are still significant deficiencies. I will mention then 

in just a moment. It is fair, however, to ask the FBI how long is 

it going to take to make these reforms? Director Mueller’s timeframe for effecting reform at the FBI is not, should not be infinite. 

The United States has not been attacked at home since 9/11, but 

we all understand the threat of terrorism is very real. It is also 

true that the threat to reform is real. The threat is inertia and 

complacency. We need to maintain a sense of urgency to push the 

reform forward as quickly as possible. I believe this Committee has 

a very important job to do with its expertise in providing oversight 

to the Director, and I am pleased to see you had this hearing this 

morning. 

Let me identify very quickly for you the areas that I think need 

real emphasis with regard to the FBI’s progress, and that you need 

to watch carefully. One of course, as you have heard about already, 

that is the question of analysis. The FBI must have a strong analytical capability to drive and to focus its work. The traditional division between the agent and the non-agent—and we all know that 

in the past being an agent puts you in a very superior position in 

the FBI. The FBI, however, now, with its new function needs to 

have the best possible analysis. The collection of intelligence is not 

worthy very much if it is not adequately translated into realistic 

threat assignments. The FBI did not perform that job prior to 9/ 

11. 

Doing the job well has to be a priority. You cannot decide what 

actions to take, you cannot decide what priorities to make, if you 

cannot assess the nature of the threat. So the Bureau needs to become a premiere agency for analysis. In order to do that it has to 

give analytical capability the attention and respect that it deserves. 

There have been some problems, as have been cited for this Committee, with regard to attrition rate for analysts and many other 

things. 

A second point is information sharing. The biggest single impediment to all source analysis is the resistance to sharing information. 

We found of course that sharing the right information with the 

right people in a timely fashion is critical, and we again, and again, 

in the report stress the necessity of sharing intelligence. 

Now, there are a number of barriers to that, and so breaking 

down those barriers has to be a very high priority. You have to motive institutions and you have to motivate individuals to share information. Congress created this position of the Program Manager—he is sitting with us this morning—for Counterterrorism Information, sharing across the Federal Government and with State 

and local agencies, and also as appropriate with the private sector. 

But if you are going to be effective in sharing information, you 

have to have leadership at the top. 

The success of information sharing needs the personal attention 

and the support of the Director of the FBI. It needs the personal 

support and direction of the Director of National Intelligence, and 

it needs the personal attention and support of the President of the 

United States. Only the President can lead a Government-wide effort to bring national security institutions into the information revVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:37 Jan 08, 2009 Jkt 045063 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\46051.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
40 

olution, and that is absolutely critical if you are going to have the 

kind of information and the kind of analysis of the information that 

is necessary to stop terrorism. 

Two or three other matters and I will conclude. FBI management. Obviously there has to be greater stability in management. 

Mr. Chairman, you cited the figures early on. Another point is the 

relationship between the National Security Service and the Director of National Intelligence and the FBI. The FBI is shifting to an 

all together different paradigm to prevent counterterrorism, and it 

has to be institutionalized. The WMD Commission recommended 

the National Security Service. That is a good recommendation because it makes permanent some of the reforms that we have been 

talking about. 

I see my time is concluding. Let me just say very quickly that 

the FBI has to have strong relations with the CIA. The relationship 

between the two has to be seamless. We must not tolerate any 

more failures to share databases on terrorists between agencies. 

The FBI relationship with foreign and domestic intelligence services is critical and has to be strengthened, and setting priorities for 

State and local government is important as well. 

Often I have encountered sheriffs and policemen who say to me, 

in this whole effort of counterterrorism, what am I looking for? 

What am I trying to get from the FBI? What does the FBI want 

from me? The idea is that the FBI of course has to build a reciprocal relationship. 

Finally, let me say the whole question of civil liberties—you have 

been talking about that very much this morning—but I believe it 

is important for the Director of the FBI, Mr. Mueller, for Mr. 

Negroponte and others in leadership to say loudly and clearly by 

word and deed on law enforcement, terrorism prevention and also 

on the protection of civil liberties, and that becomes an immensely 

important part of the so-called war on terror. 

I have gone over things very, very quickly, Mr. Chairman. I will 

be glad to elaborate on them, and of course I ask that my statement be submitted into the record. 

Chairman SPECTER. Without objection, Congressman Hamilton, 

your full statement will be made a part of the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hamilton appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman SPECTER. We now turn to Judge William Webster, who 

has had a storied career, a Federal Judge in the District Court in 

Missouri, Court of Appeals Judge for the Eighth Circuit, Director 

of the FBI, Director of the CIA. We will put into the record his very 

long list of other public accomplishments. 

Amherst College graduate, law degree from Washington University. A frequent visitor to the Judiciary Committee over the year. 

Thank you for joining us, Judge Webster, and the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. WEBSTER, PARTNER, MILBANK, 

TWEED, HADLEY & McCLOY, LLP, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. WEBSTER. Thank you, Chairman Specter, Senator Leahy. 

Thank you for the privilege of appearing before you this morning 

to discuss generally the role of the FBI in collecting, assessing, 

data mining and sharing intelligence of interest to many agencies, 

41 

Federal, State and local, who have been waging the battle against 

terrorism, especially since the tragedy of 9/11 almost 4 years ago. 

While the emphasis is on an examination of progress made since 

9/11, I think, if you will permit me, some reminders of an earlier 

period are in order in order to add some context to what has become the FBI’s response to terrorism. 

I took office as Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

in February 1978 in the wake of the investigations which led to the 

Church and Pike Committee reports. When I called on Vice President Mondale as a new Director, he presented me with copies of 

both reports and admonished me to read them carefully. These reports contained strong recommendations against the CIA engaging 

in activities inside the United States, and discouraged the FBI 

from engaging in operational activities abroad. The predominant 

restrictions related to ‘‘need to know,’’ and that was the hallmark. 

In the 14 years that I served first as the Director of the FBI and 

then as Director of Central Intelligence, the guidance that we received from the Department of Justice and our own legal counsel 

was strongly influenced by those two Congressional documents. A 

reasonable shorthand would be: Stay away from each other. Beware of using evidence developed through intelligence sources in 

criminal investigation, and on it went. 

But of course there were exceptions, and important cooperation 

did occur in the worldwide struggle against terrorism. For example, 

in 1987 a notorious terrorist, Fawaz Younis, was located in Cyprus 

after he had left his Sudanese sanctuary. The CIA managed to lure 

him into open waters, where a U.S. Naval vessel was waiting just 

over the horizon. The arrest was effected by FBI special agents, 

and he was brought to the United States where he was tried and 

convicted. There are other examples, but of course they were largely overseas, but I mention the fact that it is not true that the FBI 

and the CIA could not, when called upon to do so, work closely and 

successfully together. 

In 1987 when I was Director of Central Intelligence, I signed a 

memorandum of understanding with the Director of the FBI, following the unfortunate Edward Howard investigation in which the 

CIA agreed to notify the FBI promptly whenever one of its employees became a suspect on national security issues. This is a recurring theme, getting the two organizations together in a timely way 

in order to do good work. 

The adoption of the PATRIOT Act following the 9/11 tragedy, 

shifted the emphasis to ‘‘need to share.’’ It was like a large ship 

changing course against the tides of Church and Pike. Getting the 

word out and understood was doable, but not an easy task. Moreover, the archaic condition of the Bureau’s electronic case management system, designed during the Church-Pike Committee days, 

did not lend itself readily to tasking from other agencies of the intelligence community. Efforts to patch what is now a 14-year-old 

mainframe has been both expensive and frustrating. I put this 

right at the top of problems affecting information sharing by the 

FBI with other agencies. 

When I chaired a special commission to examine the internal security provisions of the FBI in the wake of the arrest and conviction of Robert Hanssen in 2001, we filed four classified appendices 

42 

to our report relating to these computer deficiencies. I believe that 

more than patchwork, however expensive, is absolutely required so 

that the FBI can fulfill its mandate of sharing the vast amounts 

of intelligence which can be mined from its stored data. 

Although I have seen reports to the contrary, I believe it is unfair to attribute problems and information sharing to cultural attitudes. I believe they are more rightly attributed to the understandings that flowed from the Church and Pike Committee reports 

and were underscored and supported by departmental guidance 

and Congressional opposition to domestic intelligence sharing. In 

my 9 years at the FBI I found the men and women ready to respond to new directions that did not embroil them in unfair 

charges or put their careers at risk. The various joint projects, such 

as counterterrorist centers, brought the CIA and the FBI closer together in a common cause. 

Still, in my view, ‘‘need to share’’ is not a total substitute for 

‘‘need to know.’’ Sources and methods must be protected and honored if law enforcement and intelligence agencies are to be effective 

in recruiting and utilizing information obtained at great risk from 

such sources. There also continues to exist the problem of the third 

agency rule, under which the FBI or the CIA receives sensitive information from the intelligence agency of another country on condition that it not be shared outside the agency to whom it is presented. 

I see that my time is expiring if not expired, and I will try to 

be fast about this, but I am currently serving as Vice Chairman of 

the Advisory Council on Homeland Security, an organization established by President Bush shortly after the 9/11 tragedy, and with 

the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, we have 

been directed to work closely with the Secretary of Homeland Security, one of the challenges to make important sensitive information 

available to the Department of Homeland Security, and at the 

same time honor the ‘‘need to know’’ principle. There are as many 

as 100,000 first responder agencies, police departments, fire departments and so forth, who are most likely, as pointed out, to be 

first on scene, and may also be best suited to prevent a terrorist 

incident if they have the needed information. 

Homeland Security is entitled to and does receive intelligence 

from the CIA, the FBI and other members of the intelligence community. First responders rarely need to know the sources of the information or the methods by which the information was obtained. 

I believe it is sufficient to supply these agencies promptly with finished intelligence, which sets forth the information without disclosing sources or methods. There may be more exceptions, but this 

should certainly be the basic principle if sensitive sources are to be 

protected. 

In 1978 when I took office the three top priorities of the FBI 

were organized crime, white-collar crime and foreign counterintelligence, a considerable shift in gears from the days of stolen cars 

and bank robberies. I added terrorism to that list in 1980. 

We have been experiencing approximately 100 terrorist incidents 

a year, certainly not of the dimension of the attack on the World 

Trade Center, but life-threatening, lethal and a danger to our society. Within the FBI we focused on getting there before the bomb 

43 

went off. Prevention and interdiction obviously depended upon 

much better intelligence than we had had in the past, and we 

worked on this, developed our sources, worked effective undercover 

operations, and acted preemptorially when appropriate. As I moved 

to the CIA in 1987, we were down to 5 or 6 terrorist events. In the 

year following, there were none. I attribute this to highly skilled, 

dedicated professional law enforcement, and especially to better intelligence, along with cooperation from friendly agencies in Canada 

and other parts of the world. 

We have made very substantial progress in coming to grips with 

even larger terrorist activities and plotting in the past few years, 

but intelligence is the key, as every speaker before me has said this 

morning. Without it, the terrorist is likely to succeed in his terrorist activity, leaving it to law enforcement to track him down and 

prosecute him. Prevention requires intelligence. 

In summary, I believe the FBI has significantly transformed 

itself to meet the current threats. It does probably need to improve 

its analytical capability which historically has been under developing. Translators are badly needed to keep up with processing signals intelligence, documents and other important information. But 

the biggest challenge in my view is to confront in a rational way 

the consequences of an archaic electronic data system that preceded the PATRIOT Act and would be considered obsolete by any 

modern enterprise. It needs a search engine that can be navigated 

with much greater speed and with more precision in locating those 

dots that were not found when they were needed. 

The FBI deserves a great deal of credit for many forensic improvements, DNA, the computerization of fingerprints, psychological profiling and other scientific techniques, and these efforts 

should be supported and properly funded, but it makes no sense to 

have the best trained special agents I the world if they are not 

properly equipped and guided by the best available information. Sir 

William Stephenson, the famous ‘‘man called Intrepid,’’ once wrote 

about the importance of gathering intelligence and managing the 

process, and he concluded that in the integrity of that guardianship 

lies the hope of free people to endure and prevail. 

If you will permit me another moment, and with all respect, 

when we talk about guardianship there is also the matter of oversight. The special commission on 9/11 strongly recommended that 

the Congress streamlined its oversight procedures, and in my view, 

this has not yet happened. It is my understanding that there are 

some 88 Congressional committees that claim oversight responsibility in the Department of Homeland Security alone, and this 

needs to be addressed. 

Finally, we now have a new organization in the intelligence community and a new leader. While the 200-page Act covers many of 

the issues, the key authorities of the Director of National Intelligence were not as expressly granted as I would have liked, but 

I believe that Director Negroponte will assert them fully as needed. 

Of paramount importance is his responsibility to insist upon the 

level of cooperation and sharing among the members of the intelligence community that I believe the President and Congress— 

Chairman SPECTER. Judge Webster, how much longer would you 

need? 

44 

Mr. WEBSTER. I am finishing my sentence and that is it. 

That I believe the President and Congress intended in this reorganization, and that it be done with appropriate protection of 

sources and methods so essential to our National security. And as 

Congressman Hamilton, and in preserving at the same time the 

civil rights that are so important to us. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Webster appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Judge Webster. 

Our final witness on this panel is Mr. John Russack, recently 

designated by the President to be Program Manager, responsible 

for terrorism information sharing pursuant to Intelligence Reform 

and Terrorism Prevention Act. 

Mr. Russack has a long, distinguished career in the Navy, Navy 

Captain, commanded the Aegis cruiser, has worked in the CIA as 

Director of Operations, has worked with the CIA’s Nonproliferation 

Center, and I note is a graduate of the University of Kansas. Are 

you a native Kansan, Mr. Russack? 

Mr. RUSSACK. No, sir, I am not. 

Chairman SPECTER. Too bad for you. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator LEAHY. In case you did not realize, the Chairman is. 

Chairman SPECTER. And also ROTC graduate, but Air Force. If 

it had stuck to ROTC I might have had a distinguished career by 

this time. But I note your Kansas affiliation and I could not resist 

the temptation to ask you. 

Thank you for joining us, and we look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN A. RUSSACKS, PROGRAM MANAGER, INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. RUSSACK. Thank you, sir. Thank you for the opportunity to 

be here and appear before you and Senator Leahy and to join this 

panel. 

As you noted, I was appointed by the President in April to be the 

Program Manger for the Counterterrorism Information Sharing Environment. I am responsible for planning and overseeing the implementation of that environment, to make improvements on the already existing environment, to work on policies, procedures, guidelines, rules and standards that pertain to the environment, and 

then I am to support, monitor and assess the implementation, and 

in fact, report progress on the implementation to the Congress, to 

you, sir, to Senator Leahy, and to the President of the United 

States. 

Let me first of all say that the mandate for the Program Manager extends across the Federal Government, and then up and 

down from the Federal Government to State, local, tribal and the 

private sector. So the environment is not just Federal, it is all-encompassing. We are sharing information better than we ever have. 

However, the present environment at best is flawed. We need to 

share it even better than we do today, and that is my mandate. I 

am a volunteer for this job. I care very deeply about information 

sharing and in fact about the national security of my country. I will 

45 

be assisted in accomplishing this task by a very small staff of approximately 25 people, most of whom will come from detailees from 

other parts of our Government. I will probably hire about 5 or 6 

people, and the remaining 20 will come, as I said, as detailees. 

I will also be assisted in the job by an Information Sharing Council. As you recall, Executive Order 13356, which was signed by the 

President last August, started work on the information sharing environment. In fact, I led the mission team responsible for Section 

5, which was a plan for the information sharing environment. We 

divided in half, a technical side and a mission side. So I am familiar with the issue, and in fact the impediments to information 

sharing. 

I was required by law to issue to the Congress and to the President a report on the 15th of June. I did that. The basic content of 

that report was a summary of the impediments to information 

sharing. And to sum that report up, sir, I would say that the impediments are not the flow of electrons. In fact, technology is an 

enabler to information sharing. Most of the impediments that we 

have today to information sharing have to do with roles, missions, 

responsibilities that sometimes overlap, occasionally they conflict. 

They are training, they are fostering changes in the way we do 

business, and I think that we can achieve over the next 2 years— 

I have been appointed to this job for 2 years, and at the end of 2 

years I make a recommendation to the Congress and to the President on how the information sharing environment is at the end of 

2 years, and what the future of the present position I have been 

appointed to will be. 

But I think we can make dramatic improvements in information 

sharing. I will also say that most of the low-hanging fruit has been 

plucked. What is left to be done is really hard, and I welcome your 

oversight, and I look forward to reporting to you and to Senator 

Leahy, and the rest of the Committee on our progress as we make 

information sharing better than it presently is today. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Russack appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Russack. 

Mr. Fine, you have published reports going into some detail as 

to the failures on the FBI, noting five missed opportunities to prevent the September 11th attacks, lack of effective analysis, failure 

to use the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Beyond the role of 

being a critic, you get very, very deeply involved in all of these 

issues. Have you made any affirmative suggestions to the Bureau 

as to how to solve these problems? As I listen to the plight of the 

Bureau, there are lots of difficulties, and a constant theme is 

things are improving but not enough. But from your vantage point 

as Inspector General, it seems to me you would have the capacity 

to—maybe it is beyond your purview, but your purview could be 

changed—to make suggestions to the FBI as to how they ought to 

correct these problems. Have you worked that angle of the issues? 

Mr. FINE. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we absolutely do that. One of our 

missions is obviously to look backwards and find out what went 

wrong and to assess the current state of affairs within the FBI, and 

we have found key deficiencies, but we do believe it is one of our 

46 

most important missions to also provide recommendations to them 

on how to improve the operations of these very important programs. 

In each of our reports we make recommendations to the FBI. In 

our information technology report we made a series of recommendations on how to better oversee the acquisition of information technology, in our intelligence analyst reports as well. So in 

each of our reports we provide recommendations to them and we 

follow up on them to see whether they are implementing our recommendations. In many cases they say they have or will take corrective action. With healthy skepticism we try and go back and see 

whether they do, and in fact, that was the genesis of our followup report on the foreign language translation. We did our report 

in July 2004. We made a series of recommendations, and we wanted to see whether they had actually implemented those recommendations. They had some. They have more progress to go on 

others as well. 

Chairman SPECTER. Congressman Hamilton, your leadership on 

the 9/11 Commission, along with the Chairman was certainly exemplary, and you are pursuing the Government, notwithstanding— 

you filed your report. I do not know that your Commission is over. 

And you have articulated a sense of urgency which I think is right 

on the button. What are the plans for the 9/11 Commission to raise 

hell with the intelligence agencies to see that they follow your advice? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, the Commission, Senator, of course if out 

of business. It was a statutory commission and our time expired 

last year. We did move ahead, Tom Kean and I, and raised some 

money privately for a public discourse project in order to try to 

push forward some of the recommendations not adopted. 

Chairman SPECTER. But are you not still in the wings, fronting 

the Federal agencies? 

Mr. HAMILTON. We are. We took very seriously the recommendations we made, and we want to push them forward. We have been 

really pleased really that many of them have been adopted by the 

President and by the Congress, but we feel the number is still dangling out there, including the one that Judge Webster mentioned 

a moment ago on Congress. Congress has not done what it ought 

to do with regard to getting its oversight function more robust, and 

that is a serious problem I think, and there are other recommendations we are going to push forward. We are pushing forward the 

idea that Homeland Security funds need to be distributed on a risk 

assessment basis and not on the basis of politics. We are pushing 

forward the idea that a part of the radial spectrum should be dedicated to first responders. That is a no-brainer from my standpoint. 

I cannot understand why it takes so long to get it done. 

We are pushing forward the idea that much, much more emphasis has to be put on the weapons of mass destruction coming into 

the hands of terrorists. We have a lot of things we are pushing on, 

but none really any more important than what we are talking 

about this morning, trying to get the FBI to make the kind of 

changes that are necessary. 

I sit here this morning and I listen to all of these things that are 

being said, and I think they are almost all on the mark, and yet 

47 

it sounds to me very much like business as usual. And business as 

usual is not satisfactory. 

Chairman SPECTER. How do we change that? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Maybe London will change it. Maybe Madrid 

changes it. I do not know. But I think there does need to be a much 

greater sense of urgency. When I hear about some of these reforms 

not coming into effect till 2009, I say to myself, you are just giving 

the terrorist activities an opening, and the risk goes up for the 

American people the longer you extend these deadlines, the more 

time you take to make these changes. 

I agree with everything that has been said about the remarkable 

that Director Mueller has made, but he needs a lot of support from 

many of us in order to get this job done with greater sense of urgency. 

Chairman SPECTER. I am going to go over a little on time. I want 

to ask a question of both Judge Webster and Mr. Russack and the 

hour is growing late, so I will try to be brief. 

Judge Webster, you have the unique background of having been 

the Director of both the FBI and the CIA, and you cite the Fawaz 

Younis case which is a fascinating case. I recall that. About 1983— 

I would have to go back and look at the record—but I believe that 

I posed in one of the hearings where you testified an idea that I 

had about kidnaping terrorists. There was a U.S. Supreme Court 

decision in 1886, where a man accused of fraud in Illinois went to 

Peru, and the Supreme Court was very blunt in identifying his return to Illinois to face criminal charges as having been kidnaped. 

Fawaz Younis was not technically kidnaped because he was on the 

Mediterranean, but you cite that as an illustration of cooperation 

between the FBI and the CIA. 

What insights do you have as a result of your being Director of 

both of those agencies to find some way to have them do a better 

job in talking to each other, or do you think that problem has now 

been solved? 

Mr. WEBSTER. Well, I recited at perhaps too great length the consequences of the Church-Pike Committee reports that drove it in 

the other direction, and the sudden change that occurred with the 

PATRIOT Act. I have watched and believe that the two organizations sincerely desire to work together. They have different missions, like the nature of the intelligence that they gather and 

whether it can be used in a criminal court under the Brady rule 

if it is offered in evidence and they have to tell where it came from. 

So some of these problems still need to be addressed, and Congress can play a role in that. But I think the toughest problem— 

and I know that I am making more of it than I should in terms 

of the time I take—is getting the FBI to the point where it is capable of supplying the vast amount of information that the CIA and 

other agencies legitimately want to know. Their old mainframe was 

designed to chase criminals, and it was organized on an investigative structure that only permitted you to ask one or two questions 

in order to get answers. It is really archaic, and although Congress 

has generously given many millions of dollars to fix it, I do not believe it is going to be fixed until people are brought in who understand it. I would say get Bill Gates and tell him to take 6 months 

and help us solve our problem. 

48 

In the past I the construct of this, we were anxious to get in the 

computers. I started the computerization of fingerprints 100 years 

ago, but we tried to do it too much with our own people, thinking 

we could do anything that we set our minds to do, and we did not 

identify and bring in the kind of expertise that was necessary. It 

is badly needed now. It is indispensable now. When I hear talk 

about providing more agents, that is great, and it has a great deal 

of appeal to be able to tell constituents that I got 1,000 more 

agents for the FBI, but there is no sex appeal in getting a new computer. But my point I tried to make in my remarks was you have 

to—if you are going to have the best trained people in the world, 

you have to equip them appropriately rather just add to their numbers, and that is where we need it. 

Chairman SPECTER. I have another question or two for you, 

Judge Webster, and for Mr. Russack. But I am going to yield now 

to Senator Leahy. 

Senator LEAHY. I was struck by the comments made by several 

on oversight and other things. Congressman Hamilton is an old 

friend, whom I respect greatly, and I would note on one thing, we 

talk about the number of committees that might have oversight, 

there has been precious little oversight. Except for Senator Specter 

and a couple of others, there really has not been. There have been 

many requests for oversight and for years after 9/11 we were told 

that it might be embarrassing to the administration to have real 

oversight, so we should not have any. And a complacent and compliant Congress went along with that. 

We do not look at some of these problems that Inspector General 

Fine has pointed out, and he incidentally, is one of the finest public 

servants I have ever known, and has done great, great service to 

all of us, to the FBI and to the Department of Justice, to the Congress, and we do not take advantage of that adequately. We do not 

follow up on a number of things. We can spend 4 months in the 

Senate talking about nuclear options, and the American public is 

not fooled that we are not talking about somebody setting off a nuclear bomb, but we are talking arcane procedural matters within 

the Senate. 

We can certainly ramp up and go fast and tell the Schiavo family, irrespective of the tragedy of their family, irrespective of the 

fact that courts have done that, by golly, the Congress can step in 

and we can make the decision for them because it happens to be 

the headline that day. We have fallen down on the job. The 9/11 

Commission was helpful. I do not know how many people were paying attention to it. 

The question I have of Mr. Russack is—and I am trying to do 

this without going into classified areas so I will be somewhat general—we talk about the weaknesses of threat assessments. I do not 

find an awful lot of products that look across the intelligence community and all the various aspects as you have, the nature, range, 

likelihood and target of long-term terrorist threats. One of the 

greatest terrorist events in the United States was Oklahoma City, 

and I like to think that a white, American, former military, devout 

religious person and all that, that that is not a fair assessment to 

jump up, and let us hope it is unique. But I find when I talk to 

State and local authorities, who are oftentimes the ones who are 

49 

going to see these people first, that there is confusion about the 

roles of the FBI, DHS, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, 

how that works. 

Are there impediments here? Can we improve the area of threat 

assessments? I realize we do a lot of the symbolism things. We 

have a 90-year-old women going through the airport being told to 

take her shoes off, and has to explain with some desperation the 

nurse at the nursing home usually does that, she cannot do it. That 

may make us feel safer, but are there impediments to improvement 

in the area of threat assessments? 

Mr. RUSSACK. Senator I think there are some impediments. Some 

of what you ask me goes well beyond the realm of my job as the 

Program Manager for Information Sharing, but what I see from my 

vantage point is a real effort on the part of—let us just take NCTC, 

the National Counterterrorism Center, as an example. I see a real 

concerted effort on the part of organizations like NCTC to do a better job in threat assessments. 

Even if you have a better threat assessment, you also bring up 

the problem of impediments to sharing that information, and you 

cited an example from State and local government. I think there 

are impediments to sharing. I think what we will do on the Program Manager’s staff for information sharing and then the Information Sharing Council is try and codify or make better, develop 

the business rules for information sharing, and provide State and 

local government a clearer point of contact. In other words, make 

unmurky the presently at least somewhat murky waters. Try and 

make it clearer what they need to worry about, and in fact, try and 

share information, all forms of information with them, you know, 

keeping a balance, as Judge Webster said, between need to share 

and need to protect sources and methods. 

I think we can share more and still protect sources and methods, 

and at the same time, give State, local, tribal and the private sector better information with which not only to act upon and hopefully prevent terrorist activities, but also in the case of the private 

sector, State, local and tribal, to also protect what they need to protect. 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

We have gone over time. I want to thank both Lee Hamilton and 

Bill Webster. They have given enormous pro bono time, and I appreciate this. It is sort of like you leave Government and you think 

you have left, but nobody lets you leave. I appreciate the time you 

spend on that. And within Government, superb people like Mr. 

Russack and Mr. Fine. I think a lot of us forget how fortunate we 

are in this country, people not only in Government, but people who 

have left Government and are willing to come back. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Senator, I thank you for that. I want to emphasize here the importance of this job of Program Manager. The 

whole thrust of the 9/11 Commission report was you got to share 

information better. The impediments are not hard to find. The impediments are stovepiping within agencies. They do not want to 

share information across agencies. The impediments are so much 

emphasis on the need to know that you ignore the need to share. 

Bill Webster is absolutely correct, you have to get the right balance 

in there, but for years and years in the intelligence community, the 

50 

whole emphasis was on need to know, need to know, need to know. 

That excluded a lot of people, and it brought about in fairly direct 

terms, 9/11. We simply did not— 

Senator LEAHY. Look at the people from Oklahoma who were 

out— 

Mr. HAMILTON. We simply did not share the information we 

needed. Okay. Now you come along with a new structure, and the 

place where it all comes together is in Mr. Russack’s position. He 

is the Program Manager. He is the fellow that has to see that we 

get all of this information shared. And if you do not get that information shared across agencies, if you do not get the information 

shared vertically within the FBI, as well as horizontally across various intelligence agencies, you are not going to have the most effective means of fighting terrorism. 

So the Program Manager’s position has to be empowered. He has 

to have the resources. He has to have the people. He has to have 

the political support in order to get the job done. 

Senator LEAHY. I agree. That is why my first question was to Mr. 

Russack. We are counting on people like him pulling these things 

together. I think of those people who are trained to be pilots, and 

the area FBI call in with their concerns to headquarters and being 

basically told, no, there is nothing for you to worry about, and we 

do not want you to keep bothering us. Go about, I guess, catching 

bank robbers or car thieves or something, and of course, these are 

the pilots that flew airplanes in 9/11. 

Inspector General Fine, if I might, I have one more question. I 

keep going to this linguist area. I have the frustration of many of 

us, how few Americans actually learn other languages or can speak 

other languages and how it hampers us in dealing now with some 

very, very serious problems. You conducted an investigation, you 

did the audit of the translation program. I have that from July of 

2004. But you conducted an investigation into the allegations of lax 

security and possible espionage as made by a former contract linguist. And you made some recommendations regrading security in 

the translation program. How do you feel about the security of the 

program? How has the FBI responded to the recommendations you 

have made? 

Mr. FINE. I think they have generally responded well. We followed up on that and tried to provide an assessment of where they 

are now in our follow-up report. They do now have written guidelines for risk assessments and how to judge whether there are risks 

involved with the hiring of certain contractors. There were no written guidelines in the past. They now have instituted a procedure 

whereby the supervisors assign who is going to be translating 

which materials, rather than the linguists themselves, which created problems in that case. They are trying to train the linguists 

better, and they are also providing better tracking of which linguists translate which material so there can be an audit trail. 

So they have made some changes. Their policy manuals are not 

complete, and they are still making further changes, but I think 

they are generally receptive to it. 

I do believe in the importance of oversight, the importance of 

Congressional oversight and Inspector General oversight, and we 

see that when we come back and try and follow up, that often 

51 

spurs them into a sense of urgency to get it done, and I think that 

is what is happening here. I do think they are receptive to it, but 

needs more that should happen. 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I have any other questions, I will 

submit them later. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Leahy, for your service 

in 3 hours plus, Ranking Member. Where are all of our colleagues 

now? 

Senator LEAHY. I think what they are doing is frantically trying 

to rearrange the schedule now that the Republican leadership is 

overriding you and saying we want to have the Roberts hearing in 

August. So I am hoping you are able to override the override. 

Chairman SPECTER. If we go back to that, there will be no more 

questions for anybody except Judge Roberts. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Russack, you said you have a 2-year appointment and at the end of 2 years your office expires? 

Mr. RUSSACK. Yes, sir. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act required that the President designate me, and it 

says in the law that I shall be designated for a period of 2 years. 

In fact, there is a caveat in there that says— 

Chairman SPECTER. Does the whole office sunset at 2 years? 

Mr. RUSSACK. Excuse me, sir? 

Chairman SPECTER. Does the whole office sunset? FBI Director 

Mueller should have heard about a 2-year sunset for the entire office. He would have been appalled. 

Mr. RUSSACK. Yes, it does. 

Chairman SPECTER. He does not want— 

Mr. RUSSACK. As a matter of fact, there is a caveat that says it 

could actually expire sooner if I do not do a good job, so I am committed to do a very good job. 

Chairman SPECTER. Are you doing a good job? To ask you a leading question? 

Mr. RUSSACK. I think the answer to that question is we are just 

getting started. 

Chairman SPECTER. I asked you the leading question for a purpose. I am advised by counsel that you do not have any employees. 

Mr. RUSSACK. Well, I have one. I have one and I have two contractors, so there are four of us right now. So we are making 

progress, Mr. Chairman. In fact— 

Chairman SPECTER. Progress? 

Mr. RUSSACK. Yes, sir. 

Chairman SPECTER. Sufficient progress, Congressman Hamilton? 

Mr. HAMILTON. It is not even close. 

Chairman SPECTER. Your office has been in existence for a year, 

Mr. Russack, and to have one employee and two contractors, that 

sounds very nebulous to me. 

Mr. RUSSACK. Mr. Chairman, the office has not been in existence 

for a year. In fact, I was designated in April, and in June it was 

decided that I would work for the President through the DNI. So 

we have— 

Chairman SPECTER. Was the Program Manager for Information 

Sharing, was that position created a year ago? 

52 

Mr. RUSSACK. It was created with a law, and the law said that— 

Chairman SPECTER. When was the law signed? 

Mr. RUSSACK. I am not exactly sure. I know it was signed in 

2004. 

Chairman SPECTER. Could it have been a year ago? 

Mr. HAMILTON. It was December. It was December last year. 

Chairman SPECTER. Is that sufficient progress, Inspector General? We are going to take a vote here, Mr. Russack. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman SPECTER. You may lose your office sooner. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman SPECTER. How do we get the sense of urgency? I am 

overriding the question, Mr. Fine. I am withdrawing the question. 

How do we get the sense of urgency? Congressman Hamilton, do 

you—that is right on the head. Now, how do you do it? If you have 

some ideas and bring them to this Committee, we can have oversight, except that I am not sure Judge Webster likes it because we 

are one of 70 some committees exercising oversight, and they all 

have long hearings. This is a short hearing for oversight. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman SPECTER. How do we get the sense of urgency, Congressman Hamilton? 

Mr. HAMILTON. I think oversight is a very tough problem for the 

Congress. I do not know of any way to do it, Senator, except the 

way you are doing it. You have got a marvelous staff in back of 

you, and your job, it seems to me, is to be both a critic and a partner with regard to the FBI. You want to help them as much as you 

can, but at the same time you want to point out areas where you 

think better performance can be made. One of those things is to 

convey that sense of urgency. 

All of us on the 9/11 Commission are very worried about this. 

There was a real sense of urgency in this country after 9/11. And 

we have been very fortunate not to have had an attack here. But 

so many things intervene, that we tend to lose it. I think one of 

the responsibilities of a Congressional Committee that exercises 

oversight is to try to impress upon the Director and his staff that 

sense of urgency. 

Chairman SPECTER. Judge Webster, you are currently the Vice 

Chairman of the Homeland Security Advisory Council. So are you 

still on the payroll? 

Mr. WEBSTER. No, I am not. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman SPECTER. No payroll for that, but at least you have an 

official position. Unlike the 9/11 Commission, your Advisory Council is in business. 

Mr. WEBSTER. We are in business. 

Chairman SPECTER. Are you raising hell with the Homeland Security folks to give them a sense of urgency? 

Mr. WEBSTER. We are trying to do that, and we are actively inspecting sites to see what progress has been made in beefing up 

the various agencies. We have undertaken task forces, one of which 

addresses the whole issue of public source information and how it 

could be marshaled to help our joint effort. It is a Committee of 

53 

some very good people, I might say, and they have taken on individual task force assignments. 

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Russack, we want to help you. If I were 

to write a scathing letter, whom would I address it to to give you 

some help? 

Mr. RUSSACK. Well, first of all, before I answer that question, let 

me just tell you, sir, that we have been working hard on this, even 

though we have a very small staff. 

Chairman SPECTER. Do not need any help? 

Mr. RUSSACK. Yes, sir. I mean I am not saying id o not need any 

help. In fact, what we just did is write a letter to the deputies of 

the departments and agencies within the Federal Government and 

define the positions that we are trying to fill, and I can assure you 

that there is a sense of urgency to get those positions filled. Yes, 

I do need help. 

As Congressman Hamilton said, I accept your criticism. I would 

like to point out that we are very small, we are working very hard. 

Filling the positions that we have defined is going to be critically 

important, and I think you write your letter, since I work for the 

President through the DNI, to the Director of National Intelligence, 

and express your concerns. 

But I can also tell you that the Director of National Intelligence 

cares very deeply about this office and he is committed to helping. 

So I accept your help in addition, sir. 

Chairman SPECTER. I know the Director, and I am going to write 

to him. 

They just brought me another bottle of Gatorade which is indispensable to sustain me, so we can go another 40 minutes. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, gentleman, for coming in, and 

thank you for your patience in waiting through two preliminary 

hours, and we are more than an hour into this panel. You bring 

a great deal of experience and a great deal of expertise to these 

issues. 

And this Committee is going to be undertaking oversight on a 

very extensive basis, and it is not too gratifying sometimes because 

the same problems seem to recur, and the sense of urgency really 

is hard to transmit. 

You, Mr. Russack, have a really critical position by the way the 

title sounds, and your background in the Navy and CIA and DCI, 

you are really in a position to do something. So consider yourself 

a quasi-adjunct to the Judiciary Committee, and we are going to 

write to the Director, and let us know if you need more help. 

Mr. RUSSACK. I will, sir. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you all. That concludes our hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

[Questions and answers and submissions for the record follow.] 

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