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S. Hrg. 110–636 

SECURITY CLEARANCE REFORM: THE WAY 

FORWARD 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, 

THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 22, 2008 

Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL 

WORKFORCE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

EVAN W. CASH, Professional Staff Member 

JENNIFER A. HEMINGWAY, Minority Staff Director 

TARA L. SHAW, Minority Counsel 

JESSICA NAGASAKO, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 1 

Senator Voinovich ............................................................................................. 2 

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, MAY 22, 2008 

Brenda S. Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office ............................................................................. 6 

Hon. Clay Johnson, III, Deputy Director for Management, U.S. Office of 

Management and Budget .................................................................................... 7 

Elizabeth McGrath, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business Transformation, U.S. Department of Defense ........................................... 9 

John P. Fitzpatrick, Director, Special Security Center, Office of the Director 

of National Intelligence ....................................................................................... 10 

Kathy L. Dillaman, Associate Director, Federal Investigative Services Division, U.S. Office of Personnel Management ....................................................... 12 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Dillaman, Kathy L.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 55 

Farrell, Brenda S.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 33 

Fitzpatrick, John P.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10 

Joint prepared statement with Ms. McGrath ................................................ 49 

Johnson, Hon. Clay III: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 48 

McGrath, Elizabeth: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 9 

Joint prepared statement with Mr. Fitzpatrick ............................................. 49 

APPENDIX 

Background .............................................................................................................. 59 

Questions and Responses for the Record from: 

Ms. Farrell ........................................................................................................ 64 

Mr. Johnson ...................................................................................................... 67 

Ms. McGrath ..................................................................................................... 73 

Mr. Fitzpatrick with an attachment ............................................................... 78 

Ms. Dillaman .................................................................................................... 93 

(1) 

SECURITY CLEARANCE REFORM: THE WAY 

FORWARD 

THURSDAY, MAY 22, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT

MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m., in Room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Akaka, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Akaka and Voinovich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Good afternoon, everyone. This hearing of the 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia is called to order. 

This is our fifth hearing on security clearance reform and testifies to the difficulty of solving this important problem. 

Three years ago, Senator Voinovich and I began this series after 

the Department of Defense’s personnel security clearance program 

was placed on the Government Accountability Office’s high-risk 

list. Since that time, we have uncovered several systemic problems 

which demonstrate that the current security clearance process is 

outdated and needs fundamental reform. 

After last year’s hearing, the Administration took steps to begin 

that reform. All of the Federal Government stakeholders in security clearances from the military, intelligence, and civilian communities came together, forming what we now know as the Joint Security and Suitability Reform Team, which is represented here today 

by many members of our panel. The team crafted a plan to finally 

bring the security clearance process into the 21st Century. I look 

forward to hearing more about this plan and how these reforms 

will move forward. 

I want to applaud the hard work that has been put in over the 

past year to reduce the clearance backlogs and speed up processing. 

The Office of Personnel Management, who is in charge of most investigations, has made a huge investment in manpower to attack 

the backlog. The backlog finally seems to be under control and 

waiting times have come down. However, I still think that the processes and technology now in use do not allow for very much more 

improvement. 

2 

There is far too much manual activity going on in the clearance 

process today. Literally caves full of hundreds of thousands of file 

folders along with a dozen computer programs bolted together 

make up the backbone of the investigation process at OPM. Though 

some may consider this system the Cadillac of IT solutions, unfortunately, it is a 25-year-old model, probably suited for a car museum. 

More of the security clearance process should be automated and 

electronic. That data must then be portable so that it can be efficiently sent to agencies for adjudication. The current process of 

shipping or printing off investigation files to adjudicators rather 

than sending data to agencies is very burdensome. The information 

must also be easily accessible for reinvestigations and readjudications. 

Reforming clearances is a national security issue and increasingly a fiscal issue. Delays in the clearance process, especially for 

‘‘Top Secret’’ clearances, cost taxpayers millions of dollars. Cleared 

individuals are in such high demand that they are paid inflated 

signing bonuses or given expensive cars just to work for a contracting firm hired to support Federal agencies. Those costs are 

eventually borne by the Federal Government in the form of more 

expensive contracts. 

More importantly, however, getting people cleared is essential for 

national security. Rightly or not, it is a fact that the government 

relies on contractors to support critical national security functions, 

from the tanker drivers in Iraq to the intelligence analysts here at 

home. Whether an individual works for the Federal Government or 

works as a contractor, it is essential that we can fill positions that 

support our national security. 

I have great hope that what has been outlined by the Joint Security and Suitability Reform Team are all steps in the right direction. Their recommendations go to what we have been pushing for 

over the course of these hearings. I will be interested in what GAO 

has to say about the report, as they are the ones that initially 

placed this issue on the high-risk list. 

However, I note that the report is still short on much detail. I 

will be asking for some of those details today, and as recommendations are implemented over time, I will continue to ask those questions. 

I am pleased that in looking at our panel, who will all play a role 

in implementing these reforms, that most are career civil servants 

who will still be here after January 20. I can assure you that this 

Subcommittee will still be here after January and that we will 

make sure that the progress made does not get lost in the shuffle 

of transitioning to a new Administration. 

I now call on Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Senator Voinovich. 

I appreciate your continued dedication to this issue and look forward to continuing to work with you on moving this along. Senator 

Voinovich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Senator Akaka. I first of all 

want to say that one of the joys of being on this Subcommittee with 

you is that the two of us have shared the same agenda for a long 

3 

period of time. There were some who were concerned that perhaps 

after the leadership change and I became Ranking and you became 

Chairman that some of the things that we worked on might disappear, but the fact of the matter is that you have stayed on top 

of them and have been very aggressive and hopefully the hard 

work that we do will bear some fruition. 

While I commend the Joint Security and Suitability Reform 

Team for producing its April 30 reform document, I do have a hard 

time understanding why it took the Federal Government 4 years 

to get to this point, a 10-page outline on how to transform our current process, and I am hopeful that this effort will find result and 

sustained reform. 

Since 2004, we have been attempting to bring a performancebased approach to how government manages access to sensitive national security information. In June 2005, following our first hearing on this matter after the Department of Defense security clearance process was added to the GAO’s 2005 High-Risk List, I believed significant progress could be made in the short-term and this 

management challenge would be removed from GAO’s 2007 HighRisk List. At the rate we are going, I am afraid the process will 

remain on the list in 2009. 

Thus far, the most meaningful reform effort appears to be the 

hiring of additional investigative staff by OPM to support a cumbersome process reliant on antiquated computer systems. More investigative staff has helped. For our first hearing on this matter in 

June 2005, GAO estimated a backlog of about 270,000 clearance investigations for DOD alone. In February 2008, OPM has reduced 

that number to about 42,000 pending investigations over 180 days 

old for all agencies it conducts investigations for. 

However, additional reforms are needed, including the use of 

21st Century technology, as Senator Akaka made reference to. 

OPM highlights its success in transferring virtual files among 

agencies, but those files are printed prior to adjudication. The automated system, which is essentially a computerized fax machine 

that does not allow for online manipulation of case files, isn’t really 

the type of system I envisioned when Senator Akaka and I began 

working on this management challenge. 

Senator Akaka and I held hearings earlier this month to examine 

the Federal Government’s outdated hiring process. At that hearing, 

witnesses tried to tout the ability of individuals to apply for Federal jobs using an online process, but many of those individuals, 

after wading through the Federal Government’s hiring process and 

receiving a job offer, are being told that they have to apply on 

paper for a security clearance and that process could take months. 

As Senator Akaka and I discussed at that hearing, Generation X 

and Y job seekers get frustrated with the lack of response from our 

agencies when applying for jobs. Imagine their level of frustration 

when they are told that clearances for such jobs could take months, 

reinforcing their impression of an inflexible bureaucracy. The delay 

in clearing individuals simply adds to the overall hiring delay and 

gives the wrong impression of those seeking to work for the Federal 

Government. 

We need to create a seamless hiring and clearing process. Until 

we do, our human capital crisis will be exacerbated. The Federal 

4 

Government is trying to find the best and brightest people in an 

increasingly competitive era when we are losing high-skilled potential employees to a private sector that offers higher salaries and 

better benefits. This is a national problem. The government is competing now with the rest of the world and in this country with the 

private sector big time because of the baby boomer retirement. 

We need to move expeditiously to hire individuals with the skill 

sets we need, but even when we find qualified individuals who are 

willing to be public servants, we subject them to a cumbersome hiring process and outdated security clearance system. It is no wonder 

that we lose qualified potential employees. 

The February 2008 report by OMB and the Security Clearance 

Oversight Group identified several obstacles which impede the current security process. First, agencies had an April 2006 deadline to 

transmit all their security clearance applications to OPM electronically. After failing to meet the deadline, the 2007 Security Clearance Oversight Group Report indicated that all agencies had plans 

in place to transmit 100 percent of their applications electronically 

in fiscal year 2007. However, the 2008 report shows we failed to 

meet this goal, meeting 83 percent compliance government-wide. 

The Department of Defense bears most of the burden for this 

failure. For the first quarter of fiscal year 2008, it submitted only 

77 percent of its applications electronically to OPM. Electronic 

transmission of applications can cut weeks out of the investigation 

process and agencies need to fully utilize this tool. 

I was also disheartened to see that the issue of security clearance 

reciprocity seems to be getting less and less attention, when we are 

going into a new Administration. I expect some of the people that 

work for this Administration may work for the other Administration and take on some new security responsibilities, but reciprocity 

was not listed as a priority challenge in the February 2008 report. 

The word ‘‘reciprocity’’ appears only five times in that April 30 reform outline, and that outline makes no real recommendations on 

how we are going to achieve reciprocity. Gordon England has a 

great story about how often he had to get security clearances as he 

moved from one agency to another agency. Reciprocity is still a 

problem. It is a problem, and I think that we need to address that. 

The other thing that the February 2008 report highlighted is a 

new shortcoming in our current piecemeal approach to security 

clearance reform. Completing investigations in a more timely manner has simply shifted the security backlog from the investigation 

to the adjudication phase. At the time of that report, DOD had 

more than 76,000 adjudications that were over 45 days old. I am 

anxious to hear how our witnesses intend to deal with that problem. 

And last, the Security Clearance Oversight Group’s February 

2008 report shows that our clearance system is not utilizing readily 

available technology. As important as technological growth has 

been in the last century, it is likely to be even more important in 

the coming years. However, making full use of new capabilities will 

only be possible in a system that values the need for investment 

in new technology over adding band-aids to antiquated systems, 

such as PIPS. Technology provides us the opportunity to expedite 

5 

the security clearance process while minimizing time, cost, and effort. 

Automation, as described in some of the testimony today, does 

not mean the ability to e-mail a PDF file. It means using a 

paperless system at each step to process and allow for continuous 

reinvestigation based on risk. I think we have to address all of 

these issues and find a way to achieve meaningful and lasting reform of the current security clearance process. I think failure to do 

so is going to cost us in many ways. 

Senator Akaka, I think you know that it costs the taxpayers $684 

per day in lost salary and benefits because of the delays on these 

cases. Over 208 days’ failure to complete a ‘‘secret’’ clearance for 

one person costs more than $140,000, almost three times the 2006 

median U.S. household income of $48,200. 

I have a lot more here and I am taking the witnesses’ time, so 

I am just going to wrap it up and say I had really hoped that this 

would be off the high-risk list and it is not. It is very frustrating 

that after all this time and all this effort that we still have major 

problems issuing timely security clearance. I am glad to know that 

so many of you are going to be around, and as Senator Akaka has 

indicated, we are going to continue to monitor this process so that 

we can have a big celebration when this goes off the high-risk list. 

Thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich. You 

have been a great champion in human capital and we will continue 

to pursue this. 

It is my pleasure now to welcome our witnesses here today: 

Brenda Farrell, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management 

for the Government Accountability Office; welcome back to the 

Hon. Clay Johnson, Deputy Director for Management for the Office 

of Management and Budget; Elizabeth McGrath, Principal Deputy 

Under Secretary for Business Transformation at the Department of 

Defense; John Fitzpatrick, Director of the Special Security Center 

for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and welcoming back Kathy Dillaman, Associate Director of Investigations 

for the Office of Personnel Management, Federal Investigative 

Services Division. 

It is the custom of this Subcommittee to swear in our witnesses. 

Will you please stand and raise your right hand. 

Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give to this 

Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 

truth, so help you, God? 

Ms. FARRELL. I do. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I do. 

Ms. MCGRATH. I do. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. I do. 

Ms. DILLAMAN. I do. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Let the record show that the witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

Although statements are limited to 5 minutes, I want all of our 

witnesses to know that their entire statement will be included in 

the record. 

Ms. Farrell, will you please proceed with your statement. 

6 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Farrell appears in the Appendix on page 33. 

TESTIMONY OF BRENDA S. FARRELL,1 DIRECTOR, DEFENSE 

CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. FARRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Senator 

Voinovich, thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss reforming the Federal Government’s personnel security clearance process. My remarks today are based on GAO’s numerous reports that give us a historical view of key factors that should be 

considered in clearance reform. Our reviews have identified delays 

and other impediments in DOD’s program, which represents 80 

percent of the Federal Government’s clearances. These longstanding delays resulted in our adding DOD’s clearance program to 

our high-risk list in January 2005, as you noted. 

In the past few years, several positive changes have been made 

to the security clearance process because of increased Congressional oversight, such as a number of clearance-related hearings 

that this Subcommittee has held, recommendations from our body 

of work, and new legislative and executive requirements, most notable the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. 

One important change is the formation of the Interagency Team, 

of which members of that team are present on the panel today. 

This team was established to develop a reform clearance process 

that would be applicable not only to DOD, but across the Federal 

Government, including the intelligence community. As directed by 

the President, the Joint Reform Team submitted its proposed design for the reform effort on April 30, 2008. 

As the Joint Team moves forward, we encourage them to consider the four factors highlighted in my statement today. Two of 

the four key factors in my written statement essential to the Joint 

Reform Team achieving positive outcomes, such as greater security 

clearance reciprocity, involve, one, incorporating quality control 

steps, and two, establishing metrics for assessing all aspects of the 

process. 

First, government agencies have paid little attention to quality, 

despite GAO’s repeated suggestions to place more emphasis on it. 

For example, the government has documented quality with a single 

metric on only one of the six phases of the clearance process by 

using the percentage of investigative reports returned for insufficiency during the adjudicative phase. Further, GAO has identified 

this metric as being inadequate by itself. 

Prior GAO work examined a different aspect of quality, the completeness of the documentation in investigative and adjudicative reports. We found that OPM provided incomplete investigative reports to DOD adjudicators, which the adjudicators then used to determine top secret eligibility. Almost all, 47 of 50, of the sampled 

investigative reports we reviewed were incomplete based on requirements in the Federal investigative standards. In addition, 

DOD adjudicators granted clearance eligibility without requesting 

additional information for any of the incomplete investigative reports and did not document that they considered some adjudicative 

guidelines when adverse information was present in some reports. 

7 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson appears in the Appendix on page 48. 

Further, our October 2007 report documented the reluctance of 

some agencies, particularly DHS and FBI, to accept clearances 

used by other agencies. To achieve greater reciprocity, clearancegranting agencies need to have confidence in the quality of the 

clearance process. 

The second key factor I wish to discuss is establishing metrics for 

assessing all aspects of the clearance process. Many efforts to monitor the clearance process emphasize measuring timeliness, but additional metrics could provide a fuller picture of the process. GAO 

reports, as well as Inspector General reports, have highlighted a 

variety of metrics that have been used to examine clearance programs, such as completeness of investigative and adjudicative reports, investigators’ training, staff and customers’ perceptions, and 

the adequacy of internal controls. Including these and other types 

of metrics could add value in monitoring clearance processes and 

provide better information to allow greater Congressional oversight. 

In summary, the current Joint Reform Team to develop a new 

government-wide security clearance process represents a positive 

step to address past impediments and manage security reform efforts. However, past experience has shown that Congress has every 

reason to remain vigilant. Much remains to be done and GAO 

stands ready to assist the Congress. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening statement. I will be 

happy to take questions when the members are ready. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Ms. Farrell. Now we will 

hear from Director Johnson. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. CLAY JOHNSON III,1 DEPUTY DIRECTOR 

FOR MANAGEMENT, U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND 

BUDGET 

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, Senator Voinovich, thank you very 

much for having me. A couple of comments. 

One, the intelligence bill in December 2004 called for security 

clearance reform and the issue to be addressed in this reform was 

timeliness, and that has been our focus of this reform effort, was 

to improve timeliness. In 2005, it took approximately 162 days to 

make a security clearance determination for all clearances, the 

fastest 80 percent of all clearances. Today, it takes 112 days. Our 

most recent time, it takes 112 days. 

The goal as defined by the intelligence bill was 60 days, so the 

intelligence bill called for us to go from 160 to 60 days. We are 50 

days toward that 100 days. We are halfway there on timeliness. I 

am personally very proud of the work that the reform effort has 

done, has accomplished, and what we have accomplished to reduce 

timeliness by almost 2 months in 2006-2007, 21⁄2 years that we 

have been working on this. 

The reason there is not more, a new-fangled 21st Century technology reform in place is because of a decision that I made with 

the consent of the reform group, which was to initially focus almost 

exclusively on the lack of capacity and the lack of accountability in 

the process. We would not have achieved the 50-day improvement 

8 

in the process that has been achieved to date if we had focused on 

developing an altogether new system, if we had not focused before 

that on expanding investigative and adjudicative capacity and adding accountability across the government for conducting these 

clearances in a timely fashion. 

So we have, as all have said, there is much to be accomplished 

still, but I am very proud, and when I leave here, I am going to 

be extremely proud for the accomplishments that have been realized and the increases in timeliness with continued emphasis on 

quality in the 3-plus years that we will have been working on this. 

A couple of additional comments. You talk about reciprocity and 

Gordon England’s concern, and Mike McConnell has a similar 

story, and I have a similar story, and so forth. That is a very different process. That is the White House clearance process for Senate-confirmed positions. That is more broken than the system that 

we are trying to reform, but we are working with the White House 

Counsel and the investigative units that they use to fix that system, as well. But that is a totally different process than the security clearance suitability determination process that we are trying 

to reform. 

On terms of reciprocity, our belief is that there is not a security 

clearance reciprocity problem. We have checks and balances on 

whether reciprocity is granted or not. What does not exist is suitability determination reciprocity, and that is one of the reasons 

why we have decided and have pointed out in this April 30 report 

that we can’t reform clearance determinations and not reform suitability determinations. Those have to be thought of as similar systems with similar levels of accountability and that we don’t collect 

a piece of information to make a suitability determination and then 

collect the same piece of information according to a different schedule to make a security clearance determination. We need to collect 

data one time and use it for both, and then we need to have a high 

level of capacity and a high level of accountability for both of those, 

which is why we proposed the governance structure that we proposed in the April 30 report. 

One final comment. The reason that there is not more specifics 

in the April 30 report about specifically what change in the process 

we are going to implement by what specific date and what impact 

it is going to have on the timeliness is the President’s charge to us 

was you come tell me what you know, what you can validate, what 

you can support by April 30, and then when you know more, you 

can come and tell me as soon as you know it. So this April 30 is 

what we know by that date, which is here is the process design, 

here is the kinds of concepts we want to develop that will be our 

guiding feature, the guiding light for all future specific developments, but our challenge is and what we will deliver is by the end 

of this year, there will be the detail that you look for in terms of 

the specific implementations that are to be made and by when according to this process design, who is accountable, and there will 

be a governance structure in place to ensure that it happens as 

promised. 

So I know both of you have talked about, are we going to have 

to start all over when the new Administration comes, and the answer is no. There will be a clear path forward. There will be a govVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:13 Apr 27, 2009 Jkt 047095 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\47095.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
9 

1The joint prepared statement of Ms. McGrath and Mr. Fitzpatrick appears in the Appendix 

on page 49. 

ernance structure to make sure that we proceed down that path 

with dates and implementation schedules and so forth. 

And so we don’t know all those details by April 30. That is why 

it is not included in the report. But we will know all of that and 

we will divulge all of that in a series of reports between now and 

the end of the year. We will have all of that by the end of the year. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Director Johnson. 

Now I will call on Ms. McGrath. I understand that you and Mr. 

Fitzpatrick are giving a joint statement, but Ms. McGrath, you may 

begin. 

TESTIMONY OF ELIZABETH McGRATH,1 PRINCIPAL DEPUTY 

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Ms. MCGRATH. Yes, sir. Thank you and good afternoon, Mr. 

Chairman and Senator Voinovich. I appreciate the opportunity to 

discuss security clearance reform and in particular the initial report that we provided from the Joint Team. 

As the largest industrial organization in the world, the size, complexity, and mission of the Department of Defense presents unique 

challenges not faced by other entities undergoing transformational 

change. As in other parts of its operations, this contributes to the 

challenges and opportunities presented to DOD in clearance reform. For the past few years, the Department has built a strong 

foundation of agile business practices and management that supports the warfighter and provides accountability to the taxpayer. 

Deputy Secretary of Defense, Gordon England, has devoted extensive time and energy to this effort and the senior leadership of 

the Department has been engaged and accountable for the performance of its business operations. Under Secretary England’s leadership, we successfully established the Business Transformation 

Agency (BTA) in 2005 as the accountable entity for DOD-wide business and system improvement efforts. The BTA has brought the 

best and brightest career civil servants together with highly qualified experts hired from private industry to apply best practices to 

the business of government which we have applied to this reform 

effort. 

As part of the larger business transformation efforts, the Deputy 

Secretary identified clearance reform as one of the Department’s 

top 25 transformation priorities. Championed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the Office of Business Transformation, my office, which also oversees the implementation, enterprise implementation of continuous process improvement and 

Lean Six Sigma was asked to apply this methodology to the clearance reform challenge. 

While recent progress has been made in reducing the security 

clearance backlog, it is clear that larger reforms remain necessary, 

leveraging modern methods and tools which are standards based 

and data driven. For example, the Defense Industrial Security 

Clearance Office is now meeting the adjudication timelines estabVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:13 Apr 27, 2009 Jkt 047095 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\47095.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
10 

1The joint prepared statement of Mr. Fitzpatrick and Ms. McGrath appears in the Appendix 

on page 49. 

lished by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. 

Adjudications of those clearances are now down to 17 days. They 

have also achieved a 20 percent overall reduction in adjudication 

timelines for the first 6 months of this fiscal year. This improvement was achieved, however, through increased capacity, accountability, and local process improvements, not the broader transformation effort that we are discussing in our report. 

Opportunities exist for further improvements across the defense 

enterprise through the implementation of standard processes and 

information technology. The Department is taking a holistic view 

of its operations to include processes and the co-location of the 10 

adjudicative facilities at Fort Meade as part of their Base Realignment and Closure Commission. This effort is also being led through 

the Office of Business Transformation in concert with the joint reform efforts also applying the Lean Six Sigma methodologies. The 

goal of our collective effort is to eliminate arcane and arbitrary 

processes and procedures that hinder progress. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today. That concludes my statement. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Ms. McGrath. Mr. 

Fitzpatrick. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN P. FITZPATRICK,1 DIRECTOR, SPECIAL 

SECURITY CENTER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Good afternoon, Chairman Akaka, Senator 

Voinovich. Thank you for this opportunity. I am pleased to offer additional information to this Subcommittee regarding ongoing efforts 

to meet the goal of making hiring and clearing decisions more 

quickly, effectively, and efficiently. 

As you are aware, the Joint Security and Suitability Reform 

Team is composed of representatives of the Office of the Director 

of National Intelligence (ODNI), the Department of Defense (DOD), 

the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Office of 

Personnel Management, all represented before you today. I make 

particular note of the defense and intelligence partnership in this 

enterprise. Our leaders and organizations greatly desire the outcome of a reformed process, putting people to work in support of 

our missions. Our commitment is reflected in the joint manner in 

which we pursue reform, as well as in our presentation of a joint 

statement for the record today. 

As this Subcommittee is well aware, the Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 established the firstever legislated measures of success with regard to the timeliness 

of security clearance processing, with goals for 2006 and more ambitious goals for 2009. While progress has been made across the 

Executive Branch, and we note the intelligence community (IC) 

agencies that conduct their own investigations and adjudications 

are compliant with the current IRTPA goals, the existing process 

is not in our estimation likely to allow the U.S. Government to 

achieve the additional efficiencies needed to meet the 2009 objecVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:13 Apr 27, 2009 Jkt 047095 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\47095.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
11 

tives. Further, improvements in terms of timeliness, consistency, 

and quality require adoption of a standard process across government using end-to-end automation and modern technologies. 

The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) recognized the need 

for transformational change to meet such future needs and identified security clearance reform as a top priority in his 100- and 500- 

day plans. To that end, the DNI along with the Under Secretary 

of Defense, Intelligence, and the Deputy Director for Management 

at OMB commissioned a Joint Security Clearance Process Reform 

Team to systematically examine and improve the way we process 

and manage security clearances as an enterprise. Recognizing the 

need to align suitability and security clearance processes where appropriate, this effort combined forces with the Office of Personnel 

Management to form the Joint Security and Suitability Reform 

Team, thereafter accelerating and expanding efforts to develop 

transformed, modernized, fair, and reciprocal security clearance 

and suitability processes applicable across the Executive Branch. 

On April 30, 2008, the Joint Team submitted its initial plan to 

the President, announcing its intent to adopt and pursue implementation of a transformed process that manages the hiring and 

clearing process from an enterprise end-to-end perspective. This 

plan proposes a governance structure to drive implementation and 

near-term actions to develop and put into use modern investigative 

tools, end-to-end information technology, a risk management philosophy, and efficient, standardized business practices. 

Also of note, modifications to intelligence community policies are 

being made to allow for the clearing of more first- and second-generation American candidates. This effort includes careful consideration of ways to balance risk while increasing opportunity for such 

citizens to be considered by the clearance process. We have studied 

existing programs within the intelligence community that may 

offer a model for other IC agencies to build upon. We fully expect 

the near-term outcome of this DNI-level policy change to result in 

more applications from first- and second-generation Americans and 

ultimately a more robust mission capability within the IC. 

While we do not underestimate the challenge that a reform effort 

of this magnitude represents, we are resolute in our determination 

and dedication to achieve the change necessary to ensure effectively and timely hiring and clearing decisions. With the continued 

interest and commitment from the President, the Congress, and 

senior executive leadership, we are confident that this effort will 

ultimately succeed. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity. This concludes my 

remarks. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Fitzpatrick. 

And now we will hear from Ms. Dillaman. 

12 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Dillaman in the Appendix on page 55. 

TESTIMONY OF KATHY L. DILLAMAN,1 ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, 

FEDERAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES DIVISION, U.S. OFFICE 

OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 

Ms. DILLAMAN. Chairman Akaka, Senator Voinovich, thank you 

for inviting me back to talk to you about our progress in improving 

the timeliness of security clearance process and OPM’s support of 

continuing reform efforts. 

As you know and as you said, OPM conducts over 90 percent of 

the background investigations required by agencies to support their 

security clearance and suitability decisions for civilian, military, 

and contractor personnel. The extent of the investigations conducted is based on the subject’s level of clearance or access and the 

type of work or position they are assigned. Investigations are completed for over 100 Federal agencies and their security offices 

across the country and around the world. 

With a vast network of field investigators and our current automated processing system, we have sufficient capacity to handle the 

government’s high-volume demand for background investigations. 

Last fiscal year, we conducted over two million investigations of 

varying types, including 850,000 for national security positions. 

Since May 17, 2007, when I last spoke before your Subcommittee, 

we have continued to improve the overall timeliness for the security clearances process. We are not only meeting the initial goals 

for 2006, outlined in the Intelligence Reform Act, we also are exceeding these goals for investigations and have substantially reduced our pending inventory. 

In November 2005, the Performance Improvement Plan that was 

provided to Congress identified critical areas that had to be addressed. First, agency workload projections had to be reasonably 

accurate to ensure that there were sufficient resources available to 

meet the investigation and adjudication staffing needs. We are noting improved accuracy in agencies’ projections, which has helped to 

ensure that enough resources are in place to get the job done. 

Next, we focused on the timeliness and quality of agencies’ requests for investigations. The increased use of OPM’s electronic 

questionnaires for investigations processing (e-QIP), which is a 

web-based system that allows applicants to submit their background information electronically, has reduced handling and transmission time, while improving the quality of subject-provided information. In the second quarter of Fiscal Year 2008, 86 percent of all 

submissions for security clearance investigations were made online. 

The Intelligence Reform Act established a specific goal that 80 

percent of the background investigations for initial security clearances be completed within an average of 90 days or less by the end 

of 2006. We have exceeded that goal. There is a chart in my written testimony that reports the processing time for all initial clearance investigations and further breaks that data down by the level 

of clearance. As you will note, we are currently completing 80 percent in an average of 60 days, 84 days at the top secret level, which 

are much more extensive, and 56 days at the secret-confidential 

level. 

13 

With a current staff of over 9,300 Federal and contractor employees, there is no longer a backlog of initial clearance investigations 

due to insufficient resources and we have seen a substantial decrease in the time it takes to complete all types of background investigations. 

In addition to maintaining an adequate staff level, we are working closely with Federal, State, and local record agencies so that 

their records required as part of the investigations are provided to 

OPM more rapidly. We also are working with the State Department and the international community to improve the process of 

obtaining required international coverage. In 2007, we had 360 

agents who were stationed abroad complete more than 24,000 

international leads. 

While improving the timeliness of investigations, we have 

worked equally hard to retain the quality of these investigations. 

The quality control processes we have in place ensure that the investigations we conduct meet the national standards and the needs 

of the adjudicating communities. I should note that many of the 

metrics that Ms. Farrell described we are now incorporating into 

our quality measurement process. 

Once the investigation is completed, we also are tracking the 

time agencies take to adjudicate and record their adjudication actions in our record system. To speed up and streamline that process, we developed the capacity to transmit completed investigations 

to adjudication facilities electronically rather than hard copy 

through the mail, and this does allow for adjudication online, onscreen. 

In October 2007, we piloted this capability with the Department 

of Army. To date, over 190,000 investigations have been sent electronically to Army for adjudication, making the process between 

OPM and Army virtually paperless. Based on the success of this 

pilot, the Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation 

Administration have converted to receiving completed investigations online and we are in the final stages of implementation with 

the Department of Energy and Department of Commerce. This capability will be made available to all agencies this fiscal year. 

The initiatives I have outlined have substantially improved the 

timeliness of the clearance process. However, we have taken it just 

about as far as we can take it. In order to achieve the aggressive 

goals outlined in the Intelligence Reform Act for 2009, additional 

reform is necessary. As a partner with OMB, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Department of Defense, we 

are optimistic that the additional reform opportunities that have 

been identified for the overall security clearance process will allow 

us to meet these goals. 

This concludes my remarks and I would be happy to answer any 

questions you have. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Ms. Dillaman. 

Ms. Farrell, this Subcommittee took on the security clearance 

issue in large part because of faults found with it by GAO. You and 

your predecessors have testified about ongoing problems with the 

process and outcomes since 2005. Could you tell me what milestones generally would need to be met in order for GAO to move 

the security clearance process off the high-risk list? 

14 

Ms. FARRELL. We would like to see that happen. There are a 

number of criteria that we use to determine whether or not we 

move a program off of the high-risk list. One is we look at leadership. Often these issues need sustained top management attention 

and we have seen that leadership since 2005 from OMB and OPM 

in focusing top-level attention on this very important issue. 

Other criteria that we look at include an action plan that is results oriented, that clearly identifies the roots of the problem, what 

the goals are in order to correct it, and how you are going to get 

there, in other words, a road map of how to fix the problem. 

Another criteria we look for is resources in terms of often additional resources. It may be people. Ms. Dillaman talked about the 

advances that have been made at OPM in terms of building up the 

human capacity to handle the backlog. We look for not only the 

human resources, but funding that may be necessary, such as in 

the case of using the advanced technology, what is it going to cost, 

visibility and transparency over that, as well. 

We currently have work underway—it has been underway for 

about 6 weeks or so—looking at timeliness and quality and what 

progress has been made in these areas. We will be positioned later 

this year to make a determination whether or not the Personnel 

Security Clearance Program remains on our January 2009 HighRisk List. 

Senator AKAKA. Yes. Do you think that if the Joint Team’s recommendations move forward that you may be able to get the issue 

off the high-risk list in the near future? 

Ms. FARRELL. We look forward to looking at the plan and the accompanying documents that Mr. Johnson mentioned in order to 

make that determination. Again, we are pleased with the leadership that has been shown and focused on this area and we are 

pleased to see the concept paper that came out in April. But we are 

in the process of looking at this paper and seeing what are the details behind it to actually make these actions happen, to show that 

there really is clear progress being made. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Ms. Farrell. 

Director Johnson, one of the cornerpieces of the new reform proposal, and you have told us the forthcoming Executive Order, will 

be the creation of the Performance Accountability Council. Can you 

tell me more about its make-up, such as who will be on it, who will 

oversee the security side, and what, if any, input there will be from 

non-government stakeholders? 

Mr. JOHNSON. You have asked several questions. One, as you 

know, there are two so-called Executive Agents designated, a Suitability Executive Agent and a Security Executive Agent. OPM now 

is the suitability entity and so OPM will remain the keeper of all 

things related to suitability. The term ‘‘Executive Agent’’ is a new 

term, but their responsibilities remain largely the same in terms 

of the keeper of the policy and being one who is officially responsible for suitability performance. 

There is no Security Executive Agent today. The National Security Council, if there is one, is the closest to being that. There are 

some policy clearance processes with the National Security Council. 

Some recommendations have been made about who that Security 

Executive Agent should be. That decision will be included in the 

15 

Executive Order that will be produced by the end of June and it 

would be premature to talk about what has been recommended and 

what is under discussion, but that will be finalized by the time that 

Executive Order comes out by the end of June. 

The industry is one of our most important customers on this 

process because it costs them money, which means it costs us 

money, and they are generally—when security clearances are involved, they are working on really important things for our national security, homeland security, and nobody benefits from them 

taking a long time to get their people on the job. And so we have 

mechanisms in place to stay in touch with them, to compare what 

they perceive the situation to be to what the reality is, and they 

perceive the situation to be not what our numbers indicate, which 

means that there is a gap between what they perceive to be the 

timeliness and what our numbers suggest the timeliness. 

But we reach out to them a lot, particularly DOD, because that 

is where the industry people are. There are meetings with all their 

associations. I met with a group of industry folks the first week in 

May after the April 30 report came out. We are constantly getting 

information from them, looking for ways to even better communicate what the average timeliness is and the range of timeliness 

is to get the clearances for the people that they are trying to put 

on jobs that we are hiring them to do. 

In terms of who else is on the council, that hasn’t been determined yet. Right now, I suspect it will be very similar to—from the 

security clearance standpoint, to the people that are on our oversight group right now, which is the large customers, DOD, Commerce, State, Transportation, Energy, Department of Homeland Security. It will be the primary people that are involved in the process, OPM, FBI. There will also have to be the large suitability customers, so-called. They are people that make a lot of hiring decisions that don’t have much need for a security clearance determination, but now that suitability is being folded into this overall 

process, we have to look at the suitability process just like we are 

looking at the clearance process. 

But all that determination will be made in the latter part of June 

and the early part of July and our first meeting is already scheduled. Our first meeting, I think, is July 22, which would be the first 

meeting of this Performance Accountability Council. And the name 

is important because it is defining what the performance level 

should be and then holding everybody accountable for doing it, 

being develop and implement the new processes, new ways of making these determinations, but then also using those processes to 

perform as they are designed to be adhered to. 

Senator AKAKA. The Joint Team’s report also says that the new 

Security Executive Agent created in that council will consolidate 

clearance responsibilities that are now spread out among the members of the security community. Can you elaborate on exactly what 

responsibilities you hope will be consolidated and from who? 

Mr. JOHNSON. No, I can’t, and I don’t know the answer to that 

question. I don’t know what is disseminated throughout the community. So Mr. Fitzpatrick. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Fitzpatrick. 

16 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If you will note 

in the report in the area where it describes the functions of the 

council, there are policy, process, information technology, and 

training considerations that apply to these processes. In the realm 

of the current national security clearance policy development and 

oversight process, that happens in different communities and it is 

rolled up to some extent with the Security Clearance Oversight 

Group and the performance measures that are in that report but 

are not to date driven to operational impact in the areas of training 

and technology and touching the process as it is executed in the 

agencies. So I expect that in the area of the Security Executive 

Agent, the council will look to that entity for input, performance 

measures, an organizational approach to achieving the training 

needs of that process, the information technology needs, to ensure 

that they are driving towards implementation. 

In the present day, policy development happens in a series of disconnected working groups that eventually drive a single recommendation up to the Policy Coordinating Committee. That could 

be better leveraged in the Executive Branch and singly coordinated 

with the Suitability Executive Agent. One of the keys here is to 

identify a single point of contact for the security side so that when 

things need to be brought into alignment with suitability operational needs, that there is a person accountable for leading that 

charge. 

Senator AKAKA. Senator Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. I, first of all, want to thank all 

of you for the good work that you have done. I know we are up here 

complaining about the fact that things aren’t exactly the way we 

would like them to be, but I know all of you have conscientiously 

undertaken the responsibilities that you have had and I want you 

to know that I appreciate it. 

Mr. Johnson, I want to say to you, thank you very much for all 

of your hard work staying on top of this. I don’t know whether you 

are going to stick around until the end—I hope you do—and I know 

that between now and then you are going to put the frosting on as 

much of the cake as you can so you can look back and say, we got 

something done. So thank you very much. 

I need some clarification here, and that is this. I think we hired 

somebody from the CIA about 3 years ago after we had the gigantic 

foul-up over money. We ran out of money and we had to find the 

money to do the adjudication or whatever it was. I was kind of optimistic about it, that we were going to really take off with that hire. 

I am not sure whether that person was looking at the big picture 

or if she was just looking at the DNI aspect of security clearance 

reform, but it is my understanding that McConnell had said that 

in his first 100 days and his first 500 days that modernizing the 

security clearance process was a core initiative and that DNI had 

come in, they looked at it and said, you know what, this system 

that we have is from the dark ages and we have to get together 

and change the system, and that system is different than the system that we are talking about here where the investigations go to 

OPM and then you send it back for adjudication. 

Is that all—Mr. Fitzpatrick, why don’t you share that with me. 

17 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Thank you, sir. You could see me getting ready 

to speak. I think it is important to note that Mr. McConnell, along 

with Mr. Johnson, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, 

Jim Clapper, and the Director of OPM, Linda Springer, are the 

four champions of this effort that is represented by the April 30 report, and so while your description of Mr. McConnell’s initiative in 

his first 100 days is entirely accurate, that interest and initiative 

to do something about the security clearance process led him about 

1 year ago into Mr. Johnson’s office with General Clapper and 

launched the security clearance reform effort that I made reference 

to in my statement that quickly then joined up with suitability and 

said, if we are going to tackle this, we are going to tackle it at the 

Federal enterprise level and with security and suitability together. 

So what you may have discussed with Mr. McConnell in the past 

is this self-same effort to affect the Federal enterprise process. 

It is also important to know from the intelligence community perspective that the standards that drive investigations and secret and 

top secret clearances in all of the Federal space are the same 

standards used in the intelligence community for secret and top secret clearances—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK, but do they do the investigations for everybody, including the DNI? 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Within the intelligence community, there are 

six agencies that handle their own investigations and adjudications. Statistically, it is about 5 percent of the total that Ms. 

Dillaman discussed in her workload, and so some portion of the intelligence community is serviced by the OPM model, a good portion, 

and the Department of Defense being the largest customer in both 

the Federal stake and in the intelligence community. 

Senator VOINOVICH. But the part of it, that 5 percent or whatever, that is the thing that they were going to try and—it looks like 

they are trying to put a new personnel system into DNI. In fact, 

one of my former staffers, Andy Rickardson, is over there working 

on that. But that is internal within the intelligence community. 

They have their own investigation and own adjudication procedure. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. They operate their own, but to the same Federal standards that we are affecting by this reform. 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. So the point is they are doing it on their 

own, but you are trying to assimilate the standards that they have 

set within this big picture that came out in this report, is that 

right? 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Yes. 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. And—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator, can I take a shot at this? 

Senator VOINOVICH. Sure. Go ahead. 

Mr. JOHNSON. The intelligence agencies not part of DOD do their 

own investigations and adjudications and they do it within the 

standards that were called for—timeliness standards that were 

called for by the intelligence reform bill. The intelligence agencies 

that are part of DOD, their investigations are done by OPM and 

then they do their own adjudications. 

When General McConnell came in, it was a very rare opportunity 

because the head of the DNI and the Under Secretary for Security 

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18 

fense all grew up together in this in the government and they all 

shared a huge dissatisfaction with the security clearance process. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Now you are getting at it. 

Mr. JOHNSON. OK. There was this coming together, a crescendo—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. Yes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. So they came together and they said, we need to 

fix this system. Tell us what you are already working on. And so 

we gathered and we say, here is the concept. Here is the process. 

And they said, well, when are you going to have this done and that 

done and they said, July, and they said that is not fast enough. It 

needs to be April. And then what are you thinking about this and 

doing—well, that is not—so what they have done is taken on the 

concept. 

It is not what they have aspired to do and put in their top five 

goals or 10 goals or whatever it is. It is not a different process than 

the one that was laid out in concept in the April 30 report. They 

have come in and, because of their influence, caused us to emphasize this, speed this up, do this faster, do this coincident with this, 

and so forth, and they have helped us bring government-wide attention to this, particularly within DOD, which is 80 percent of 

overall. 

So that short-term, for instance, one of the big problems we laid 

out and challenges for this year was that industry adjudications be 

conducted as quickly as employee adjudications. It was taking 20 

or 25 days longer because there were a lot of extra steps or they 

had to go over here or something and nobody could figure out why. 

Well, I think it is true that as of April, the industry adjudications 

are being performed as quickly as employee adjudications. That 

would never have happened if the priority hadn’t been placed on 

it by the Secretary and the Under Secretary. 

So what they have done is add impetus to it. They were the one 

that argued strongly for let us get the President to endorse this formally with his letter of February 5. So there was a lot of attention 

being paid, but when the President issues a letter and those three 

people say it is going to be done, mountains start moving. And so 

they have been tremendously helpful to us to provide even a greater force and speed and timeliness, attention to this, which gives us 

even greater assurance that when I am talking about where we 

will be at the end of this year, in fact, we will be there. 

You asked what the CIA—I think that was DOD. I think they 

were talking about when they—there were adjudications—DOD a 

couple of years ago stopped accepting applications for security 

clearances from industry because they ran out of money. It was 

like in June, I think. Nobody could understand why and there was 

a hearing and it was not their most comfortable—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. So they got somebody over there to go over 

and—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. So then they went and got the money and they got 

it started again and then they got smarter about what they needed 

to budget and so forth. 

Senator VOINOVICH. The fact of the matter is that the statistics 

are that right now, in terms of the adjudication, they are still kind 

of—there is a logjam there. 

19 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, as you talked about earlier, a lot of the jam 

that was in the investigative world, they got through that. It 

moved through there. So it is working its way through the snake. 

There are—you said seventy-some-odd-thousand, whatever the 

backlog was, their goal is to get it down to—and then we talk about 

it in the February report what their goal is, and they are on track 

to achieve that. But for a good bit of this fiscal year, they were 

going to be working down that backlog. And then we will be, starting in fiscal year 2009, we anticipate virtually no backlogs anywhere in this process. 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. I just want to stay with this. They came 

together and said the system has to be changed. My assumption is 

that within the intelligence agencies that do their own investigations and adjudications, there was some frustration about the way 

that the system worked and the process of doing their work within 

that framework. That whole business, I would suspect, is in better 

shape because it is a smaller number of people than the overall 

problem that you are talking about here today. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I will make a general comment, and then Ms. 

McGrath and Mr. Fitzpatrick—who work firsthand with that—but 

there were not timeliness problems with the intelligence community the way we looked at it. What we were trying to address was 

the other 95 percent of the system, because the feeling, the feedback that was coming from the data we were getting from the intelligence community was, by and large, the timeliness of those clearance determinations was satisfactory. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. That is also entirely true, and the IRTPA laid 

out the need to measure performance. The intelligence community 

did not measure its performance before the rest of government did 

and joined right along with Mr. Johnson’s oversight group when we 

did, and we discovered at that time what we thought to be true, 

which seems like the intelligence community agencies get this done 

faster, turned out to be measurably true, in part because they own 

both the investigative and adjudicative stages and are able to integrate those better, and that is—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. Right, and the point is that in terms of industrial people that need clearance within that, probably there 

aren’t that many of those people who are going to work for the Department of Defense or do a special contract or whatever it is. 

There probably aren’t that many private sector people that you are 

going to have to clear to do stuff within the DNI and all the agencies. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. I am not sure what your perception of not that 

many is, because it includes the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Officers, and the CIA, there are significant 

industry partnerships there—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK, but those people that they are hiring 

are not in the system you are talking about here. Those are within 

the internal system of those other agencies. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. But they get cleared to the same investigative 

standard and adjudicative standard as—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. Does Ms. Dillman do the work on the investigation? 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. For some. 

20 

Senator VOINOVICH. Yes. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. For some agencies. The CIA, for example, handles its workload entirely. NSA, a portion of the NSA industrial 

program goes to OPM. The priority cases, they keep at home. So 

it is a little different. These are small in scale. We sometimes refer 

to them as boutique operations—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. I am going to finish, Senator Akaka, because 

I have taken too much time already, but the complaints that I continue to get from the industry people are not people that are within 

the DNI group. They are working for the Department of Defense 

or somebody else and say, we got the contract and we can’t get the 

clearance. We are going to put them on the payroll and they can’t 

do intelligence work. If we don’t do that, they are going to do something else. They are still not happy with the process because I continue to get complaints about it. But they are the ones that are involved in this big system that we are talking about right now. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Ms. Dillaman. 

Ms. DILLAMAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator AKAKA. As you know, following our hearing last year, 

and from what I said here this afternoon, I believe that the systems in use by OPM are outdated and antiquated. I do not think 

that many outside experts believe that OPM is truly leveraging 

more modern systems. What is OPM doing to modernize or replace 

or improve its aging systems? 

Ms. DILLAMAN. Up until the point where we joined with this reform effort, there certainly were plans and continue to be plans to 

keep our systems up to date and viable. Now partnering with this 

reform effort, of course, we are going to keep any modernization 

consistent with the National Enterprise Plan for an end-to-end system. 

The core system that you described as an antique Cadillac, and 

I am thrilled that you at least described it as a Cadillac and not 

a Pinto, but that system alone is an in-house internal management 

system that much more modern systems are, in fact, bolted to. Our 

electronic questionnaire is a relatively newer system designed by 

industry. Our fingerprint transmission system is actually quite a 

state-of-the-art system designed by industry to support automated 

fingerprint processing. Our current imaging system, which allows 

for transmission of data and images and conversion of paper that 

we are forced to receive from information suppliers, is a brand new 

system deployed last year. 

We are in various stages of antique to modern configuration. But 

from this point forward, all investments—and there are planned investments—will be made in conjunction with where the national 

reform effort is taking us all. 

Senator AKAKA. Let me ask Ms. McGrath and Mr. Fitzpatrick, 

has DOD or DNI commented or consulted with OPM on any of 

these proposed improvements? Ms. McGrath. 

Ms. MCGRATH. Every week, Office of Personnel Management 

(OPM) is part of the overall joint reform effort and we meet on a 

weekly basis and have detailed project plans where we go over 

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21 

nology being one of them. If you will note in the report, we are proposing in the near term—as a near-term opportunity some of the 

next-generation application capability in addition to automated 

records checks capability. Some of that technology currently exists 

within the Office of Personnel Management and we are looking to 

leverage those systems, if you will, and the platforms that are currently in use to see if they can be adopted to fit into the overall 

strategy. We still are not—we have not finalized the IT strategy. 

We will not be in position to do that until definitely the end of the 

fiscal year, but it might be closer to the fall. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Fitzpatrick. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. I would only add that that is a very complete 

answer. 

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Dillaman. 

Ms. DILLAMAN. And if I may, sir, not only have I been involved 

personally with the reform effort with Mr. Johnson and the team 

from the very beginning, I have assigned a career senior executive 

to work with the reform team virtually full time on this effort. So, 

OPM has a very dedicated staff that has been partnered with this 

from the beginning. 

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Dillaman, to follow up on an IT-related 

issue, I wanted to mention an article that was in this morning’s 

Washington Post about the Investigative Services Division. 

Ms. DILLAMAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator AKAKA. The article focused on a billing error—— 

Ms. DILLAMAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator AKAKA [continuing]. Attributed to your case processing 

and your billing systems. What role did your investigation processing system, PIPS, play in this error, and are we likely to see 

such problems with these linked-together systems in the future? 

Ms. DILLAMAN. I believe any automated system is capable of having logic errors in programs that are isolated and hard to detect. 

The billing error in question—the automated processing system, 

PIPS, tracked it accurately. What failed to happen was an electronic signaling. It was an odd error because it affected certain adjustments. There were no errors in case billing. All cases were 

billed accurately. But there were adjustments that had to be made 

and they were not predictable adjustments. They were ad hoc-type 

adjustments that an automated signal did not relay properly into 

OPM’s billing system. Because it was infrequent and it happened 

sporadically, it was not detected quickly. It was a manual audit 

that identified it. 

Can it ever happen in an automated program? Of course, it can. 

The resolution of it is to have good, solid auditing programs to 

identify it and fix it quickly. 

Senator AKAKA. Ms. McGrath, last week, the Army announced 

that they would pilot a more automated investigation system using 

elements found in the Joint Team’s recommendations, such as 

automated records check. The system is known as the Automated 

Continuing Evaluation System (ACES). If the pilot is successful, 

would this mean that a significant part of OPM’s investigation 

work could be bypassed by using this system? 

Ms. MCGRATH. The Army pilot is actually being driven by the 

Joint Team effort, so we are using the Army’s case management 

22 

system, which is called Central Adjudication Tracking System 

(CATS)—don’t ask me for all of the DOD acronyms. But in addition 

to the Army case management system, because they can receive 

files electronically from OPM today, we use their receipt of electronic files from OPM into their adjudication system tied to the 

ACES capability, which I referred to as the automated records 

checks. ACES is the capability that DOD has today in a very—we 

use it in a very limited capacity, much more for research than fullblown implementation. We are trying to demonstrate what we 

would have from an end-to-end perspective because there is no endto-end solution that exists today. 

So we expect to obtain—the Joint Team expects to obtain—to 

identify performance gaps, capability gaps, so that at the end of the 

calendar year we would be able to put together a comprehensive IT 

strategy that would be applicable broader than the Department of 

the Army. As you well know, they have most of the casework within the Department of Defense, but it is not tied to the elimination 

of the investigative piece. It is the automated receipt of the investigative material to then much more quickly screen and make adjudicative decisions. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Let me ask Ms. Dillaman for any 

comment on this question. 

Ms. DILLAMAN. I think the implementation of electronic searches 

in any capacity certainly could have the benefit of reducing the 

amount of labor necessary to apply to background investigations. 

We have seen this for the past couple of years as we have converted other types of record checks from a labor-intensive, feet on 

the street, sending an agent, knocking on a door to get a record, 

to an electronic records system. We have converted over one million 

law checks annually from agents going and visiting police departments to having individuals who have online keyboard access to 

State records systems and saving a tremendous amount of investigative resources. 

The types of searches envisioned in ACES or in the automated 

record check system means that we will have more electronic information available early in the process. It is possible that some of the 

investigations may be able to be cleared with electronic information 

up front rather than having labor-intensive field work associated 

with it. But it also is entirely possible that we will identify issues 

in these electronic checks that will require an agent to go out and 

do further probing and resolution. 

The impact has yet to be determined. At the end of the day, we 

do end up, though, with a better investigation and much earlier in 

the process a clear identification of whether or not the individual 

will be a risk or not. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. Senator Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. To get back to just the process, I am the Defense Department. I decide that this individual that I have hired 

and qualified for the job has to get a security clearance. I suspect 

the Defense Department may have that application up on a computer screen. When they make the request to you, do they do it by 

computer or do they fax something to you and then you get the 

piece of paper and you start to investigate it? 

Ms. DILLAMAN. No. It comes to us electronically, sir, today. 

23 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. You get it electronically. 

Ms. DILLAMAN. Yes. 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. Now you do the research investigation. 

Ms. DILLAMAN. Yes. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Is the information that you do on the investigation inputted on that screen? 

Ms. DILLAMAN. Yes. 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. And then you have done your job and 

then electronically you get the information back to the Department 

of Defense, is that right? 

Ms. DILLAMAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. At that stage of the game, they have all 

this information in front of them, and one of the things that Ms. 

Farrell said was that in many of those cases, the information is not 

complete and rather than go back to you to get the information, 

they just go ahead and take what they have got and make a decision and adjudicate it based on that. Ms. Farrell, maybe you could 

comment on that at this stage of the game. 

OPM is talking about some new things that you are doing electronically, but if it was all electronic, it seems to me that if there 

is something wrong with it, all you have got to do is look at the 

form and say, you know what? I don’t have this information, so I 

will send it back to OPM, saying ‘‘this is not complete. Give us 

more information so I can do a better job of adjudicating.’’ It is all 

seamless, all up there. 

Ms. DILLAMAN. If I could first address this, sir, I think the quality of the investigation is absolutely of primary concern to everyone. No sense doing it fast if you are not doing it right. Ms. 

Farrell’s study citing the investigations they looked at were from 

the process during the heart of the transition when merging DSS 

and OPM. When we had recognized that there were serious problems in how OPM versus the Department of Defense had interpreted the investigative standards, reporting style, etc., we were 

quite anxious for GAO to come in and take another look. 

I think there also is a dissatisfaction in some areas of the community. Not with the quality of the investigation, but the investigative standards themselves. There are different levels of investigations for different positions. Certainly what you do at the secret 

level does not come anywhere near close to what you do at the top 

secret level, nor should it, because the impact is not the same. 

And so, measuring the quality of the investigations, agencies do 

have an option to reject an investigation that they receive that they 

believe is deficient. That is, in fact, one measure of the quality of 

our work. We go out annually and ask for quality feedback from 

all the major clearance-granting agencies, suitability and security. 

Last year, we surveyed 622 offices. Those were agency offices that 

had submitted at least, I believe, 200 or 500 investigations for the 

year. We had about a 50 percent response rate on the survey with 

a 91 percent satisfaction rate in quality and content of the investigation. 

And so I do not believe that the quality of the investigations compared to the standards that they are conducted is a problem today. 

Can we have an agent fail to do what he or she should? Yes, we 

can. But I believe we have built a very strong structure with tiered 

24 

review systems and allowed agencies immediate feedback opportunities to correct any deficiencies that are found. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Ms. Farrell, you have had a chance to sit 

here and listen to all this. Would you share with us what is going 

on in your head in terms of some of the things that have been said 

here today? 

Ms. FARRELL. I am pleased to hear Ms. Dillaman acknowledge 

that there are plans to build in quality metrics other than the single metric that has been referred to in the past, which we have 

said that is inadequate. Regarding the number of investigative reports that are returned by the adjudicators, as a metric, one reason 

why we have said it is inadequate is because the adjudicators have 

told us they are reluctant to return those reports because that will 

just add to the time. Thus, in some cases, they will go ahead and 

determine the eligibility without it. 

We believe that not only do they need to establish metrics for 

that phase of the investigation, which Ms. Dillaman oversees, but 

also for the other phases. There are six phases, as I said, from the 

requirement-setting phase to the application-submitting phase to 

the investigation to the adjudication to the appeals and then the 

renewal of the clearances. There is very little attention that has 

been focused on any of these phases. Just one phase, again, had 

one metric that we had some indication of what was going on. 

What you were referring to about the adjudicators, with the 

timeliness issue, we are looking at this right now as we are with 

the quality, and as I said, we are pleased to hear that there are 

quality metrics being considered and we are going to be looking at 

those very carefully to see what they are, and if they do give a 

fuller picture of the timeliness, as well. In the past, we have had 

concerns about how the data is presented in terms of the timeliness. It may look like the numbers are going in the right direction, 

but perhaps they aren’t. 

We have had concerns in the past, for example, regarding the 

time that is spent sending back a report to the investigators being 

counted against the adjudicators instead of the investigators. Another concern is the time that is needed to do additional investigative work when it is sent back by the adjudicators, it often takes 

less time to redo the investigation to satisfy the requirement, but 

that second time around with the investigation is what is counted 

instead of the first time. Maybe these issues have been resolved, 

hopefully so, but we are going to be looking very carefully at the 

timeliness to see what is behind those numbers. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Let us go to reciprocity. And one thing I 

want to make sure I clear up for the record, Mr. Johnson, you indicated that your metric was timeliness and I don’t want anyone to 

think that you aren’t interested in quality, too. I think that—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. 

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. Timeliness plus you want to 

make sure it is done right. Why haven’t we made the progress in 

terms of reciprocity that we all would like to have? What is holding 

it up? Why aren’t we doing more there? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Again, our belief is that we do not have a security 

clearance reciprocity problem and that problems that did exist have 

been largely eliminated. Why do we know that? Why do we think 

25 

that? If somebody requests an investigation for a security clearance 

in the 90 percent done by OPM, if they already have a clearance 

at that level, she doesn’t initiate an investigation. So—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. What you are saying is that the system 

that was in place where you had to get another investigation, or 

the system that was in place where Mr. England had one clearance 

and then he was told, we are moving you from here to there 

and—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. That is the White House. That is a another whole 

world. 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. So the point is that it would seem to me 

that within that framework, are the folks at DNI interested in having that—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. For PAS-es? For Senate-confirmed people? 

Senator VOINOVICH. Yes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. We are separately from this reform effort, separately, I am working with Ms. Dillman and working with Presidential personnel presently and with Fred Fielding to fix that process. But that is separate from this effort and that—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. So that is the White House process—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. That is the White House. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I am worried about the fact that we are 

going to have a new Administration—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Right. Oh, yes. 

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. And I suspect there are some 

really good people out there that may not be of the same party, but 

they are qualified people. You want to bring them on board and 

you want to get them through, get them approved, but you have 

to get a security clearance on them, and you are saying that you 

think that—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. That process needs to be fixed, and there are a 

number of things we are looking at and if we want to change that 

process, we have to do that with the Senate because they give their 

consent and they review people, their backgrounds, prior to a confirmation hearing and they are used to getting certain kinds of information at certain parts of the process. And if we want to make 

that process faster and maybe give them this information instead 

of that information, we have to do that with the Senate. 

Senator VOINOVICH. The Senate is not—the law doesn’t require 

the White House to come up with a separate investigation on somebody. You look at the thing and they have had a security clearance 

and—are you telling me that we are the ones responsible—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. No, never. I would not suggest that, sir. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, sometimes we are. [Laughter.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I have heard rumors, but I personally 

haven’t experienced that, sir. We have to both agree, the White 

House and the Senate have to agree on what constitutes a background check for a PAS. So if any changes are going to be made, 

we are going to do it with each other, not to each other, and I am 

confident that nobody likes that process, either. It takes too long 

to get a new team on the field, and so there will be a lot of interest, 

I would suspect, in the Senate. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Is there any work being done on it right 

now? 

26 

Mr. JOHNSON. Not in the Senate. What we want to do is we want 

to get what we think is a smart way forward and then sit down 

with Senate leadership, and I would hope that you and Senator 

Akaka would help us bring attention to that and get the right people to sit down and look at this. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, the sooner you get it to us, I will get 

a hold of Senator McConnell and talk to Majority Leader Reid 

and—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Right. 

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. See if we can facilitate that. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Great. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Senator. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Yes? 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Could I add on the topic of reciprocity, you 

made reference earlier to perhaps it is a scarce mention in the report and I wanted to highlight a couple of aspects of the transformed process that will serve reciprocity. Mr. Johnson is right in 

that the security clearance reciprocity issue has been addressed by 

standards and policy issued out of OMB subsequent to the IRTPA. 

It is, however, a key component of the automation proposed in this 

report that will serve the information needed to enable reciprocal 

decisions. Often, agencies don’t have the ability to reach to where 

the answer is to see that an individual is already cleared and so 

they revert to their local habits and put someone into the process. 

Senator VOINOVICH. In other words, if it is automated, you get 

the full picture of the individual. They can look at it, see what kind 

of clearance they have, and say, ah, that is fine. But if you don’t 

have that, then they might say, gee, we better have him checked 

out or her checked out. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Yes. The transparency of that data, the accessibility of that data. Also, the alignment of security and suitability 

in this vision are critical, because sometimes an individual is first 

investigated for one of those purposes and later put into process for 

the other. Mobility across government, you can go from contractor 

to government or back and forth, and our goal is to allow the investigative package, if you will, that was used in one decision to serve 

the other one to reduce or eliminate the need to do re-work, and 

that, I think, would also fit into the goal of reciprocity. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Senator, when we were talking about the 

REAL ID Act recently when we had the hearings on that, one of 

the things that we were concerned about is the quality of the databases. And the better they are and the more confidence you have 

in them, it seems to me that, if you just accessed those databases, 

that should give you a pretty good idea. In fact, I think Admiral 

McConnell talked about that, that a lot of this could be done that 

way. That is the way a lot of businesses look at clearances. How 

is that coming along? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Let me make a comment on that. Admiral McConnell talks about Wall Street firms, in particular, it takes 5 days, 

and it takes us multiples of 5 days to get this done. If you lay out 

what Wall Street looks at versus what the Federal Government 

looks at, it is multiple times longer and there are things we would 

all agree are important for us to look at for suitability determinations and security clearances that are not concerns of Wall Street. 

27 

What Wall Street does, they conduct something that is probably 

not even equivalent to a secret clearance here. They do it very 

quickly and relatively automated plus—are there lie detectors? 

Anyway, but it is all automated, but it is not the same thing. It 

is not the same information. 

But it does point out very clearly what we have all talked about 

here is a lot of very relevant data can be gathered electronically. 

We are doing a good bit of that now. We can do a good bit more 

of that and save manpower and so forth, and check that data and 

review it and adjudicate it and make some assessment of it electronically, and we do some of that now. We can do a lot more of 

it going forward. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Senator Voinovich. 

Senator Voinovich raised a concern that I have, as well. Mr. 

Fitzpatrick, as you know, some of the computer systems that the 

intelligence community uses to track investigations and store clearance information makes our oversight more difficult due to the 

classified information scattered throughout the process. I think this 

is a concern. 

One concern I have is that any combining of intelligence systems 

with Defense and civilian systems could make it harder for us to 

conduct oversight of the process. Do you believe that it will be necessary to keep the intelligence IT system separate from the rest of 

the systems in order for this Subcommittee and GAO to continue 

their oversight? 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Very familiar with the concerns regarding 

the—what is known as the Scattered Castles database. That is the 

intelligence community repository for clearance and eligibility decisions, which exists on a classified network. We have an initiative 

underway now—let me back up and say there are three primary 

such repositories that are relevant to the security clearance reform 

effort. They are the CVS database operated by OPM, a Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) database that is operated by 

the Department of Defense, and Scattered Castles. 

OPM and DOD’s databases are available at an unclassified level. 

The intelligence community’s Scattered Castles database is on a secure network. There are several—this impairs access to the information and impairs reciprocity that we just discussed, so there are 

several initiatives underway to improve the accessibility of this 

data. 

Today, JPAS data is combined in Scattered Castles so that users 

of Scattered Castles have access to a wider amount of data to make 

the reciprocal decisions. So that puts more information where the 

classified users can get to it, but it does not address the opposite 

issue. 

So what initiative we have ongoing now in the Special Security 

Center where I am the Director is an effort to identify the unclassified records in the intelligence community’s database for secure 

transmission down to the unclassified level, to make them more 

broadly available to where the greater number of users are searching for them and can leverage them. 

That raises some concerns in the intelligence community. Aggregating data, even though it is unclassified, can lead to conclusions 

28 

that we don’t want to put out there. But the intent is to study and 

overcome those problems. There are technologies that can permit 

databases to exchange information in more secure ways, even at 

the unclassified level, and we are pursuing those. 

So I share your concern with that, but I hope to assure you that 

there is attention on that and that this reform effort lays out a 

standard that the intelligence community is intended to meet to 

the best of its ability while still protecting those sources and methods. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Fitzpatrick, just to follow up on that, how 

could you open up more of the intelligence community clearance 

process for additional oversight through changes in your IT system? 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. To ensure that I understand the question, the 

emphasis is on access to the classified systems as a means of oversight? 

Senator AKAKA. Yes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator, can I make a comment, I think in answer 

to that question? 

Senator AKAKA. Yes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. The whole security clearance community needs to 

be held accountable, and for performance and quality. We, being 

the community, which means Congress, can get the information it 

needs from the intelligence community to track timeliness, quality. 

We don’t have that now to the GAO’s satisfaction or to your satisfaction. But when we want timeliness information from the intelligence community, we get it. 

What we can’t get, and I don’t think should get, is what is the 

status about a specific individual who is working on something that 

nobody knows about or—I think we would all agree, we don’t want 

access to that information. That is why getting into that database 

should be highly restricted. But performance and quality information can be pulled from that system and pulled from the managers 

of that system to provide you and the community and the Executive Branch the information it needs to hold the intelligence community accountable for how it is granting these clearances, making 

these determinations, just like it can be with DOD, the Interior, 

and Agriculture. 

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Farrell, would you make any comment on 

that question? 

Ms. FARRELL. We are going to find out what our access is to the 

intelligence community’s security clearance program. We have two 

requests that have been accepted from the House Permanent Committee on Intelligence, one is to look at the timeliness and quality 

of the security clearance process within the Intelligence Committee. 

That is those 16 agencies. That work parallels what we have already begun looking at timeliness and quality with DOD. 

The second request is to look at the joint reform efforts. As you 

know, it is more than just a plan. There have been a series of task 

force and other efforts underway for some time, and our focus will 

be again looking at what is going on in the intelligence community 

as well as with DOD. 

Our people have clearances. There should not be any access problem. We will test that. How reciprocal is it? But we will be getting 

29 

that work underway shortly and then we will see what our access 

issues are, if any. 

Mr. JOHNSON. The difference between what I just said and what 

she said about GAO is I assume that if the intelligence community 

tells me this is their timeliness and their quality and their whatever, I don’t believe I have to collect the data myself to verify that 

it is true and GAO, I think, feels differently. They have to go in 

and collect the data themselves as opposed to receive summaries 

from the intelligence community, so that is the difference. 

Senator AKAKA. Director Johnson, two of the major aspects of the 

Joint Team’s reform proposal is the use of more automated record 

checks from commercial sources and continuous checking of records 

to replace periodic investigations. Are there any privacy concerns 

or safeguards envisioned to protect the privacy of individuals that 

are checked against these commercial sources? 

Mr. JOHNSON. One of the things, and it has been a big priority 

of the reform team that is officed where Mr. Fitzpatrick is officed 

is to look at privacy issues, legal issues. When someone signs an 

application, do they know that they—an SF–86—do we have authorization to do periodic or continuous reinvestigations? Do we 

have the authorization to go look at these databases? And if we 

don’t, what do we do to get that authorization and so forth? So it 

is a big question for us and we make sure that we aren’t going to 

do anything that we don’t have the authority to do and we won’t 

do anything where we put the person’s privacy rights at risk. It is 

a very important part of this process. It is a very relevant question. 

Senator AKAKA. Yes. Well, in a sense, the REAL ID problem is 

one of these, and that is being careful about privacy. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. There are some changes that do need to be 

made in the consent form the person signs and we are in the process of making those changes. 

Senator AKAKA. Senator Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. No. I have done my thing. 

Senator AKAKA. Well, I thank Senator Voinovich for his abiding 

faith in what we are doing. We are all trying to work together to 

take care of these problems. 

I want to thank our witnesses today. I have other questions that 

I will submit for the record. Thank you. This is a critically important issue, without question, and it has been now taking years for 

us to try to set up a system that really cuts the time of the process. 

Getting the clearance processes working is vital to our national security and we must continue to work to get it off of GAO’s highrisk list. We have heard very valuable testimony today from all of 

you and I think that this will be useful as we go forward. 

The hearing record will be open for 2 weeks for additional statements or questions from other Members, and we again thank you 

very much—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. Senator Akaka, can I make just one final 

point? 

Senator AKAKA. Senator Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I am really anxious to get this off the highrisk list. 

Senator AKAKA. So it is unanimous. 

30 

Senator VOINOVICH. Ms. Farrell, does everybody at this table 

know what it is going to take to get it off the list? 

Ms. FARRELL. We have had conversations with OMB and OPM 

since 2005 regarding their strategy to work toward that end, and 

we have continued to have discussions and we are available at any 

time for those discussions. There is a lot going on with these reform efforts and we will have to—it is one of those issues that you 

are going to have to stay tuned to see what happens. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, from my perspective, if I were in their 

shoes, I would like to know what it is going to take to get it off 

the list, and from my perspective in the oversight capacity, I would 

like to know from you what you think—at least I would like to 

know what your standards are, your metrics, to judge whether they 

have done their job or not. 

Ms. FARRELL. Well, first, there are several criteria that I mentioned, but the No. 1 that I think you are going to be interested 

in is the work that we have ongoing looking at the timeliness. 

There has been much discussion about the improvements in the 

numbers. We will be going back and looking at timeliness to see 

if those issues that were there in 2006, about how those numbers 

were derived, are still there or if there actually has been progress 

in the time it takes for the investigation or the adjudication phase 

for the top secret, the secret, and that is a key thing, real progress. 

That is one thing we will be looking for in terms of those numbers. 

Another one that we will be looking for that we have not seen 

are the resources that it is going to take to implement these IT 

plans that we have been discussing to some extent today. We believe, if you are going to use technology, what is it going to take 

in terms of resources so that you can make decisions that are 

transparent and trade-offs, if necessary, with competing demands. 

That is another example of what we will be looking for. 

Senator AKAKA. Before I call on Director Johnson, may I tell the 

rest of the panel that I am going to ask you to make any final comments on what has happened today. Director Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Just one comment about resources. We were, in 

fact, talking about this Tuesday, I think it was. There are two primary resources that we have access to. One, the Defense Department has budgeted in this year and next money to reform their 

database, JPAS, and because that is 80 percent of all the system, 

that money can—in effect, if you reform JPAS or replace JPAS, you 

in effect have a system that is used by the entire community. So 

that is one major source of resources. 

Another source of financial resources is the revolving funds—is 

that what it is called?—a part of the fees that they charge at OPM 

for their investigative work that is set up to make refinements and 

reforms to their system. So those are the two primary sources before we get into the need for additional resources. 

Now, again, we have not spec-ed out if it is going to cost this 

much or that much. We haven’t done that but plan to do that by 

the end of the year. But right now, our belief is that those two primary sources of financial support will be sufficient to do it. But I 

can’t document that. But there are sufficient sources available to 

us today. 

Senator AKAKA. Ms. McGrath. 

31 

Ms. MCGRATH. Yes, sir. Thank you. I would like to thank you for 

the opportunity to address the Subcommittee today and I want to 

ensure, although we have had a lot of discussion around the information technology piece, if we don’t get the process and the policies 

right, it won’t matter what we build, which is why we have focused 

the last almost year that we have been on this joint reform effort 

on those things. So process first, policy, and then information technology informed by those, and that is where we are right now in 

the reform effort. We did, I will say, issue a strategic pause within 

the Department on ongoing modernization efforts to ensure alignment with the overall strategy and the vision to at least get a handle on most of the transactions. So thank you again for the opportunity. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Mr. Fitzpatrick. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Just briefly, a chance to express gratitude for 

the opportunity to come here and also for your leadership and attention to this problem. It is holding us accountable that will get 

this done. It is the goal of the Performance Accountability Council 

and the governance structure to do that, I will say amongst ourselves, but it also is in response to your own attention to this as 

well as the champions of this reform. Thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Ms. Dillaman. 

Ms. DILLAMAN. I think I told you previously that I have spent 32 

years as a civil servant, all of it devoted to the background investigations program, and in those 32 years, I have never seen the 

government come together and be more focused and more dedicated 

to resolving issues than they are today. When I say I am optimistic, that is putting it lightly. I think that we have swallowed 

the frog. The worst of it is behind us now and everything we see 

from this point forward is going to be great improvement. 

Senator AKAKA. Well, I thank you very much. You have the last 

word on the record. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I don’t want to have the last word, but—— 

Senator AKAKA. Senator Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. One thing that bugs me about 

this place, big time, is the issue of continuing resolutions and omnibus appropriation bills. Mr. Johnson, it is your last year. Each of 

you can give stories, I am sure, about what has occurred because 

we don’t pass our budgets on time, or our appropriations on time. 

It looks like this time around, from everything I can ascertain, that 

we may not do the appropriations until after the next President is 

elected and until that next President is sworn in, which means it 

could be February before we finish our appropriations. 

I just think that, Mr. Johnson, it would be wonderful if as a gift 

to the country this Administration would talk about how difficult 

it is to manage a situation where you really don’t know what your 

budget is for 5 months of the fiscal year, because I don’t believe we 

can continue to do this. And from our oversight position, if you 

have this kind of budgeting going on, or procedure, it makes it really—it gives an excuse to some people to say, ‘‘We can’t perform. We 

didn’t know really what the numbers were for 5 months. We have 

got plans. We think money is appropriated, we can go forward with 

it, but it hasn’t been authorized yet, or appropriated yet.’’ 

32 

I know I have been doing some work on it and it is a nightmare. 

It is a nightmare for the Federal Government. It is a nightmare for 

State Government. It is a nightmare for county government. It is 

a nightmare as a mayor because of the Federal budget and the impact that it has. 

I just would really like, Mr. Johnson, to talk to you maybe about 

that, because I think you could do this country a great favor if you 

pointed out to the American people that this system that we have 

been following really doesn’t lend itself to good management and 

delivering the services that the public and the citizens deserve. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I understand. 

Senator AKAKA. Again, thank you very much. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:28 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(33) 

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Æ 


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