1 NOTI CE Decisi on fi led 05 /19/ 08. The textof this dec ision m ay be changed or
corrected prior to the filing of a Petit ion for Re hea ri ng o r th e dispos it ion of

the s ame. NO. 5-06-0621 IN T HE AP PEL LA TE C OU RT OF ILLIN OIS

FIF TH DIST RICT

______________

_____________________________________________________________ LINNIE K ATH RYN BERR Y, on Her ) 

### Appeal from the Own 

### Behalf and as Personal Representati ve ) Circui

t Court of of the Est ate of Howard L. Berry , Deceased, ) C ra w fo rd C ou nt y. ) Plaintiff-A ppella nt, 

### ) ) v. ) No. 04-L-1 ) AMERIC AN STA NDARD , INC., ) AMERICAN WATER WORKS SERVI CE ) COM PANY, INC., ARKLA INDUSTR IES, ) INC ., GARLOCK S EALING ) TE CH NO LO GI ES , LL C, G .W
. ) BE RK HE IM ER CO M PA NY , IN C., ) INDUS TRI AL CONTRACTORS , I NC. , J OHN ) CRAN E, INC. , LENNOX IND USTRIES, ) INC ., MARATHON OI L COMPANY, ) SEALING EQ UIPMENT PR ODUC TS ) COMPAN Y, UNION CARBIDE ) CORPORA TI ON, an d THE WHIRL POOL ) CORPORA TI ON, ) Honorable Kimbara G. Harrelland ) Hon orable Step hen G . Sawyer, Defendan ts-Appellees. ) Judges, presi ding.

__________________________________________________________________________ JUS TIC E W EL CH delive red the opin ion o f the c ourt: On January

2, 2004, Howard and Linni e Kathryn Berry file d in the c ircuit court of Craw ford County a c omplaint against 47 defend ants, seeking damages resul ting from How ard B er ry's exposu re to asbestos o n various job sites. How ard Be rryhad been diagnos ed with termina l mesothel ioma on September 23, 20 03, w ith a lif

e expectanc y of bet

ween 8 and 18 m ont hs. On January

21, 2004, t

he plai ntiff

s' c ounsel se rved upon the defe ndan ts a notic e that H ow ar d's evid enc e de pos ition wo uld be ta ken on F ebr uar y 25, 2 004

. The defe ndan ts2

object ed and requ ested that a discov ery depo sition tak e plac e first. A cc or di ng ly, H ow ar d's discovery deposit ion was scheduled for March 16, 2004. Due to Howard's l ong employment history and the number of defe ndants se eking to que sti on him, the discovery deposit ion was extendedby agr eement to March 22, 2004. Again, questi oning could not be completed, and the parti es could not

agree t o another e xtensi on. Ac cord ingly, in M ay 2004 , the de fend ants file d motions w ith the court to exte nd the dis covery deposit ion. These motions w ere heard
on May 12, 2004, and the court grant ed the de fe nd an ts 4 ad di tio na l d ays within t he foll owing 30 days in which to take Howard's di scovery deposit ion. Howard' s evidence deposit ion was to be take n w ithin sev en da ys of the r eceip t of ex pedite d trans cripts o f the c om plete d discover y depos iti on. On May 21, 2004, the pla inti ffs fil ed a motion for a protec tive order and/or an order limi ting th e t ime allotted for the con tinuation of H owa rd's discovery deposit ion. Att ached to the moti on was the affi davit of Howard's phy sici an stating that How ard could e ndure no
more than th ree hours a day of testi mony for a total of no more than seve n hours, which
wo uld inc lud e the ev ide nce d epos it ion . Th e e vidence depos iti on was expected t o take no
more than 31⁄2 hours. The motion came on for a he aring onMay 28, 2004. The motion was deniedand the pre vious orde r all owing additi onal time for the di scovery deposit ion st ood. We note that at t

his hearing, t

he plaintiff asked i f the vi deotapeddiscover y depos iti on might be used as an evide nce d epos ition in the even t Howard Berry did not s urvive l ong enough to complete an e vidence depos iti on. The defe ndant s objected to tha t use of the d iscovery deposit ion, and the ci rcuit court r uled that it

would not all ow the discover y depos iti on to be used as an evi dence deposi tion. How ard appe ared for fu rther d iscov ery depo sition o n Jun e 9 an d 10 , 2004 . Wh ile all of the attorney s present

completed t

heir ques tioning of H oward, so me attor neys who had cho sen to participate via tele phone conference were unable t o questi on Howard due t o3

pr obl ems with the co nfere nce c all. Ho wa rd's evid ence depo sitio n had b een schedul ed for July 6, 2004. Becaus e some of the defendants had not completed t

he discover

y depos iti on
on June 10, t

hey fi ledmotions to quash the evidence deposition an d continue the discove ry deposit ion for the a dditi onal time already allowed by the court. These motions w ere heard
on July 16, 2004, and th e circu it court al lowed addit ional time for the discover y depos iti on. The discover

y depos iti on resumed and was complet ed on Ju ly 28, 200 4. Sh ortly thereafter, Howard Berry was hospi tali zed and he died on Aug ust 23, 2004. His evidence deposit ion was never take n. On October 6, 20 04 , H ow ar d’ s w ife , L in ni e K ath ryn B er ry, was substi tuted a s the per sonal r epresent ative of the est ate of Howard Berry , deceas ed. Anticipating that t

he plai ntiff

might seek to use Howard's vi deot aped discovery deposit ion as evidenc e, the defendants file d motions t o bar the us e of the di scov e ry deposit ion on the ground t hat Supreme Court

Rule 212(a)(5 ) bars t hat use where t

he deponentis a par ty to th e a cti on . 21 0 I ll. 2 d R . 21 2( a) (5 ). S ub se qu en tly, the pla inti ff moved to use th e disco very dep osition as ev idenc e at the trial, and she res ponded to the defendants' motions to bar i ts use. The matter was heard before t

he court on M ay 18, 2005, an d the cou rt found that Supr eme Court Rule 212(a) (5) bar s the use of a party's disco veryde posit ion as evidence ata tri al and thata dec eased plaintiff /depo nent re main s a pa rty throug h his e state for purposes of t

his rul e. In an order ente red June 1, 20 05, th e court ruled tha t How ard B er ry's deposit ion had beentaken for the purpos e of discove ryand that pur suantto Supreme Cou rt Ru le 212 (a)(5), if a depo nent o r the es tate of a dec eased depo nent is a party to the proceedi ng, the dis covery deposit ion of that deponent cannot be used as an evi dence deposit ion. The circu it court barred the p laintiff from u sing Ho ward B erry 's dis covery depo sition as an ev idenc e dep osition at the trial. Therea fter, the de fend ants file d m otions for a s um mary jud gm ent in their favoron the basis that wit

hout Howard Berry 's t esti mony, t he plai ntiff

would be unab le to prove her ca se.4

These mo tions w ere gra nted b y the circu itcourt. The plaintiff now ap pe als th e c irc ui t co ur t's rulin g ba rring the u se o f H ow ard Be rry's disc ove ry dep ositio n as evid enc e at a trial. To the ext ent the resol ution of t he issue s present ed depe nds on our const ructi on of Supreme Court Rule 212, we apply a de novo stan dar d of rev iew

. In re Estate of Renni ck , 181 Ill. 2d 395 , 401 (199 8). When int er pr et in g a s upr eme c ourt r ul e, court s appl yth e s ame principles of constr

uction t hatapp ly to a st atute
. In re Estate of Renni ck , 181 Ill . 2d at 404. Thus, the goal of this co urt in interpreting a sup reme co urt rule i s to asc ertain and give effec t to the int ent of the draft ers of t he rule

. In re Estate of Renni ck , 181 Il l. 2d at 404. The most reliable indica tor of in tent is the lan guag e use d, w hich s hou ld be given its plain and ordina ry meaning. In re Estate of Renni ck , 181 Il l. 2d at 405. Where l anguage is clear and unambiguous, this court must apply the language use d without fur ther aids t o constr

uction. In re Estate of Renni ck , 181 Il l. 2d at 405. Illinois has long r ecogn ized a sharp distincti on between deposi tions taken for the purpose of discover

y and t hose taken f

or use as evide nce a t a tri al. The purpose of a discovery deposit ion is to explor e the fact s of the ca se, and for this reas on w i de latitud e is given in the s cope and ma nne r of que stion ing

. In re Estate of Rennick, 181 Il l. 2d 395, 401 (1998). Discovery

deposit ions ar e used to obt ain inf ormation, to c om mit w itnesse s to parti cular

stori es, a nd t o ob tain a dm issio ns f rom opp osin g pa rties. Slatt en v. City of

Chicago , 12 Ill. App . 3d 808, 81 3 (1973 ). Th eir ad mis sibility in evid enc e is lim ited. Slatt en , 12 Ill. App. 3d at 813. " 'Knowing in a dvance that a deposit ion is for dis covery only and hence of limi tedavail ability , counselordinarily do not urge techni cal obj ecti ons, and t he taki ng of the deposit ion proceeds informally and expediti ously. ' " Slatt en , 12 Ill . App. 3d at

813 (quoti ng C lea ry's Ha ndb ook of Illino is Evidence §1.5, at 8 (2d ed. 1963)). Discovery deposit ions are not permitted to be used at a trial e ven if the deponent is unavailable, because that use wo uld inhibit free di scovery

byrequiring ti me-consuming evidentiary objections at ev ery discovery5

deposit ion. See In re Estate of Renni ck , 181 Ill. 2d at 40 3. In co ntras t, an evidence deposit ion is gen erally used for t he purpose of pr eservi ng test imony for tri al, and questi oning is the refo re lim ited b y the ru les o f ev iden ce. In re Estate of Renni ck , 181 Il l. 2d at 401. On lyrare lymay an y porti on of a discovery depositi on be used at a trial. Those inst ances are set

forth i n Suprem e Cou rt Rule 212 (a), which g overns the use of d iscovery depositions: "(a) *** Discovery deposit ions t aken underthe pro vision s of th is rule may be
us ed on ly: (1) for the pur po se of im peaching the testimony of t he deponent as a witness ***; (2) as an admissi on made by a par ty or byan officer

or agent of

a party ***; (3) i f otherwis e admissible as an e xcepti on to the he arsay rule; (4) for any pur pose for which an af

fidavi t may be used; or (5) upon reasonabl e notic e to al l parties, as evidenc e attri al or hearing againsta p art y who appeared at the de posit ion or was gi ven proper notice thereof , if t he c ou rt finds that the deponent is neither a controlled expert witness nor a party , the deponent' s evidence deposit ion has not been taken, and the deponentis unabl e to attendor testify be caus e of d eath o r infirm ity, and if the cour t, based on it s sound discr etion, further finds suc h evidence at

tri al or hearing will do s ubstant ial j usti ce between or among the parties." ( Em phas is added .) 210 Ill. 2d R. 212 (a). The circuit court in the case at bar f ound that Howard Berry's di scovery deposit ion was not adm issible as evidenc e unde r section 212 (a)( 5) because Howard Berry and hi s estate as repres ented by

Linnie Kathr

yn Berr y were par

ties to the a ction.6

The plaintiff argue s that the ci rcuit

court er red in det ermining t

hat, despit e his deat

h, the deponent Howard B erry was stil l a part y t o the proce eding through the pers onal repres entat ive of

his estate. The plaintiff argu es that H ow ard B erry wa s no lo nger a party to the litigation a fter his d eath and th at there fore th e pro scription of R ule 212(a)( 5) agains t the evidentiary use of a part y' s discove rydeposit ion does no t app ly. Relying on Powers v. Kelley , 83 Il l. App. 2d 289 (1967), the pla inti ff argues t hat the stat

us of a deponent

is t o be determi ned as of the ti me of th e tri al andnot

atth e t ime the deposi tion was t aken. We find Powers to be in appo site to the case a t bar, in th at the sta tus to which i t refe rs is the
av a ilability of the deponent to tes tify

at a trial , not hi s stat

us as a party , and i t involves an evidence deposit ion, not a discover

y depos iti on. In any

even t, the plain tiff cites n o cas e in support of

her arg um ent tha t Ho wa rd B erry is no lo nger a party to the l iti gation t hrough the personalrepresentative of his estate. How ard wa s clearly a party at the time his discovery dep ositio n w as ta ken

. Wh ile no case dir ectl y addr esses t he preci se quest ion present ed here, we hol d that t he circuit court did n ot err in d eterm ining th at Ho wa rd B erry, the de pon ent, rem ains a p arty to this litigati on, through the pers onal repr esentative of hi s es tate , f orpur pos es of S upr eme Co urt R ule 212 , and th at a disc over y depos ition m ay not be used in place of l ive te sti mony upo n the d eath o f a pa rty/depon ent. We note initi ally

that Supreme Court Rule 212 (d) explicitly provi des th at a substi tuti on of parti es does not affect t he right to use depos iti ons previ ously taken. 210 Ill. 2d R. 212(d). From this we concl u de that where the di scovery

deposit ion could not

have been used as ev idenc e prior to a su bstitution of p artie s, it cann ot be so use d after a substi tuti on of parti es. That is the case her e. Further more, in In re Estate of Renni ck , 1 81 I ll . 2 d 39 5 ( 199 8) , t he I ll in oi s Supr eme Cou rt held th at a de cease d par ty/depon ent rem ains a p arty to the ac tion th roug h the7

substi tuted

perso nal r epres entativ e of h is estate for pu rpose s of S upre me C ourt R ule 212(a)(2), which all ows the use of a di scovery deposit ion at a trial"as an admis sion made bya party" (1 34 Ill. 2d R. 21 2(a)(2 )). The supre me c ourt r uled that a dmissi ons of the deceasedparty

/deponent

could be used a s evidence at a trialagainst that de ponen t' s substi tuted

estate. B y doing so, the s upre me c ourt im plicitly held th at a deceased party /depone nt remains a party to the a ction e ven after his deat h, through the pers onal repres entat ive of hi s estate. We see no reasonthe same rule should n ot apply with equ al force to Su preme C ourt Ru le 212(a)( 5), which bar s the use of a par ty's disco very dep osit ion as evide nce a t a trial. A deceased par

ty/deponent

remains a party

to the a ction t

h rough the s ubsti tuted pe rsonal repres entativ e of h is estate s o that R ule 212(a)( 5) bars t he use of a dis covery

deposit ion of the dece ased party /deponent as evidenc e at a t

rial . We recently so he ld in Longstreet v. Co ttrell, Inc. , 374 Il l. App. 3d 549, 553 (200 7), where we h eld that Rule 2 12(a)(5) "ve ry cle ar ly, and without qua lifi cati on, excludes the us e of a dec eased pa rty' s discovery deposition." Our constr

uction of

Rule 212(a)( 5) is c onsist ent with t h e dist incti on between discovery and evidence de posit ions under ly ing Rule 212 an d the al most complet e prohibi tion againstthe us e of a party's disco very dep osition as ev idenc e at a trial. T o all ow the evidentiary use o f a pa rty's discove ry depo sition u pon that pa rty's death wou ld effective ly abro gate the pro vis ions of R ule 212(a)(5 ), which b ars the use of a party's discovery deposit ion at a trial . A differ ent const ructi on w ou ld tur

n every discover y depos iti on of a party into an e vidence depos iti on because the parti es wou ldkno w that, in the e vent of the par ty/depon ent' s death, the deposi tion mi ght be admiss ible a s evidence at the tri al. That result would be contraryto the intent of the draf ters of the rule, which was to mainta in a sharp di st in ct io n be twe en di sc ove ry an d e vi de nc e d ep os itio ns . A cc or di ngly , w e findthat t he8

circuit court did not er

r in hol ding that

Howard Berry re mained a part y t o the acti on through the personalrepres entat ive of his es tate for purposes of Supr eme Court Rule 212(a) (5) and that und erRu le 212(a)(5) the dis covery deposit ion of Howard Berry may not be used as evid enc e at a trial. The plaintiff al so argues on appeal t hat the prejudi ce to the plai ntiff in not admi tting H ow ar d's depo sition testim ony ou tweig hs an y prejudic e to the defe ndan ts in allowing its use
a nd thattheref

ore the c ircui t court

erred i n barri ng the use of t he discover

y depos iti on as evidence. We note, how ever, that Sup reme C ourt Rule 212(a)( 5) vest s no discr etionin the circuit court t o allow the use of a discover y depos iti on as evidenc e where the deponent was
a controlled exp ert witness or a p arty to the action. If the de pon ent is nota party or control ledexpert wit

ness, then the circuit court may, upon proper not ice andin it s discr etion, allow the use of adiscover y depos iti on as evidence i f the deponent cannottest ify

because of death or infi rmity

and if the court determi nes that its use willdo substantial j usti ce between
or a mo ng t he p artie s. Stri ctcom plian ce w ith su pre me cou rt rule s is g ene rally req uire d. Village of Lake V illa

v. Stokovi ch , 211 Il l. 2d 106, 116 (2004)

. The rules a re no t me re suggestions but have the force of law, and t

he presumpti on is that the y wil l be obey ed and enforc ed a s w ritten

. Bright

v. Dicke , 166 Il l. 2d 204 , 210 (199 5). The p lain and ord inary language o f Supre me C ourt Ru le 212 (a)(5) g ives n o disc retion to the circ uit cou rt to allow the ev id entiary use of the discovery deposit ion of a party . Becaus e the circuit court correc tly concluded that H owa rd Berry rema ined a party to the a ction, it di d not err in fai ling to exerc ise di scret ion it did not have to allow the us e of H ow ard B erry's discov ery depo sition as evide nce a t a trial. Nevertheless, the pla intiff p oints to two Ill inois cases i n which discover y depos iti ons of a party were all owed into evi dence atthe trial. In re Estate of Ragen , 96 Il l. App. 3d 1035 (1981), was anact ionfor the admi ssi on i nto pro bat e of awil l c odi ci l. Th e circu it court9

allowedinto evi dence the di scovery deposit ion of V irginia Rag en, a c oexe cutor o f the e state and a party

to the l iti ga tion. Her deposit ion had been t aken in Florida aft er the c ourt was advisedthat he r heal th prevent ed h er from tr aveli ng to Il linoi s for the tri al. The appellant complainedthat

he had no t rece ived proper notice that t

he deposition would be used for evidence, in that it

had been noticed as a discover y depos iti on. The appell ate court held t hat the parti es and the c ourt were aware t hat the deponentwould not be traveli ng to Il linoi s for the tri al, and the trialjudge had informed t he parti es pri or to the taking of the deposition that he would consider the possibilit y of it s use at the trial. In re Estate of Ragen , 96 Il l. App. 3d at104 6. A t the be ginn ing o f the d epos ition, the re spon dents ' couns el s tated th at it was intende d to be e viden tiary. The c ourt fo und that the appe llant ha d actu al no tice that t he deposit ion could be a dm itted as e vid ence at t he tri al and that it s use as evi dence did not prejudi ce the app ellan t. I n re Estate of Ragen , 96 Il l. App. 3d at 1046. Accordingly , the appe llate court hel d that t he circ uit cour

t had not c ircumvent ed the supr eme court r ules on disc ove ry. In re Estate of Ragen , 96 Il l. App. 3d at 1046. In Flack v. McC lure , 206 Ill. App. 3d 976, 981 (1990), an a ction for s peci fic performance on a house sal e, the defendant di ed just four days before the tri al was to begin. His cod efe ndant and wife was appoi nted the specialadminist rator of his es tate for the purpose of the trial. The appellant objected to use of the decedent 's de posit ion as evi dence at the tri al, clai ming she had not received notice prior to it havin g bee n take n that it w ould be so used. The notice of the deposi tion had indicat ed tha t it w ould be us ed fo r both discovery and evidence, and this dual purpos e was stat ed atthe begi nning of the deposit ion. The tri al court found t

hat proper

notice of the dualpurpose had been given and that the appell anthad not obje cted. The appellant had known of the dualpurpose and pr oceeded on the depo sition according ly. The court found that the supr eme court r

ules on di scovery

had been complied wit

h. The appell ate court affi rmed.10

The plaintiff

now argu es on appe al that, just as in In re E state of Ragen and Flack , the defe ndan ts in the case at ba r were o n actual no tice that How ard's discovery deposit ion could be used as evi dence at a trialin the e ventof H ow ard's de ath. Sh e argu es that th e defenda nts
were all aware of Howard's medica l conditi on, that his expectedlife span was short , and that he migh t not su rvive u ntil a tria l. Neverthel ess, she argues , the defendants dragged on H ow ar d's disco very dep osition , taxing his stren gth an d m aking it impo ssible for him to give
an evide nce d epos ition. Sh e also a rgue s that the defe ndan ts we re in controlof the disco very deposit ion and asked only the questi ons they

wanted to ask. Accordingly , she cont ends, any prejudi ce to the de fe ndants f rom using Ho wa rd's disco very dep osition as ev idenc e is minimized. C on traryto the pl ainti ff's argument, the rec ord on appeal demonstrat es that the defe ndan ts were not on notice that Howard' s discove rydeposit ion might be used as evi dence ata tri al. Throughout the proceedi ngs below, t he plai ntiff

always insi sted t

hatan evidence depo sitio n would b e take n at the conc lusion of the disco very dep osition . On the so le occasionwhen the plai ntiff mentioned t

he possibi lit

y of us ing the di scovery depos iti on as evidence, the defendant s object ed and the ci rcuit court indicat ed that

it would not

allow that
use of the di scovery

deposit ion. Accordingly , unlike In re Estate of Ragen and Flack , H ow ar d's discover

y depos iti on was never int ended oru nderst ood to be a dual -purpose or evidence de po sit io n. T he de po sit io n w as un de rst oo d a nd in ten de d t o b e f or di sc ov er y on ly, and all t he parti es proceeded wit h that unde rstanding. The plaintiff cannot now claim that it was i ntended for

a dual purpos e or for evi dence. Fi na lly, the pla inti ff argues t hat Howard's discover

y depos iti on should be allowed i nto evidence und erSupreme Court Rule 212(a )(3) ( 210 Ill . 2d R. 212(a )(3)) as an except ion to the hearsay rul e, because it was a "dying declaration." This argument was present ed to the circuit court in a motion t o reconsi der the c ourt' s previ ous o rder bar ring t he use of the11

discovery dep ositio n. The circuit court denied the m ot io n t o r ec on sid er . T he cir cu it c ou rt's determi nationof w hethe r a partic ular sta tement con sti tutes a dying declar ation wil l not be
rev ersed on appeal unl ess it s findi ngs are palpably contrar y t o the manifes t weight of the evid enc e. People v. Webb , 125 Ill. App. 3d 924, 934 (1984). We affirm t

he circ uit cour

t' s deter minati on that

Howard Berry' s discove rydeposit ion is not admiss ible a s an except ion to t he hearsay

rule for dying d eclara tions. E ven if we w ere to fin d that the dying-declaration exception to the hearsay rule w ould allow a part y' s discovery deposit ion to be us ed as evide nce ata tr ial , H ow ar d B er ry's discover y depos iti on does not quali fy as a dyi ng declar ation f or two reas ons: the excepti on has never bee n recogniz ed in a civ il case, an d H ow ard B erry wa s not, atth e t ime his deposition was gi ven, und er th e be lief th at his dea th w as "im min ent." A dyi ng declar ation i s a statement of fa ct made by a vict im relating t o the cause and circumst ances of a hom icide

. People v. Georgakapoul os , 3 03 Ill . App. 3d 1001, 1008 (1999). A dying decl arati on is admis sibl e as an exception to t he hearsay

rule bec au s e it possesse s a guarant ee of trustw orthine ss in the assum ption th at the b elief o f imp endin g dea th excludes the p oss ibility of fab ricat ion by the dec laran t. Geo rgakap oulos , 303 Il l. App. 3d at1008. T he requirem ents for adm itting a dying declaration into ev idence are as foll ows: (1) the declar ation pe rtains to the c ause or circumstance s of the homic ide, (2) the declarant must belie ve that de ath is imminent, and (3) t he declar antmust posses s mental f acult ies suf

fici ent to give a n acc urate state me nt ab out the c ircu ms tanc es o f the hom icide

. Georgakapoulos , 303 Ill . App. 3d at

1009. In Ill inois , the excepti on has never bee n applie d in a ci vil ca se. I n Marsha ll v

. Chicago & Great Eastern Ry. Co. , 48 Il l. 475, 480 (1868), the supr eme court stated, "[I]n no case, save that

of a public prosecut ion for a fe lonious homicide, can dying declar ations of the party kill ed be recei ved in evi dence," an d "I n c iv ilca se s t he yar e n otad mi ss ib le ." No12

report ed Illinois case has applie d the e xcep tion in a civil cas e, and we will no t be the first to do so here. In any eve nt, t

he plaintiff has fa iled to show thatHoward Berry bel ieved hi s death was "imm inent" at the time he g ave his d isco ver y dep ositio n. Belief in the im mine nce o f dea th may be shown by the decl arant' s own state ments or fr om circumst antia l evide nce, suchas the nature of the wounds or st atements made in h is pre sen ce. Georgakapoulos , 303 Ill . App. 3d at1009. The part

y se eking to a dmit a dying decl arati on into evi dence must show that , at the ti me it was made, the decl arantposs essed " 'the fixe d belie f and mo ral con viction that de ath is impending and cer

tain to follow al most immediat ely , without opportuni ty

for repent ance and in the a

bsence of all hope of avoidance, when he has despair ed of li fe and looks to dea th
as inevit able and at

ha nd.' " People v. Webb , 125 Il l. App. 3d 924, 934 (1984) (quoting People v. Ti lley , 406 Ill. 398, 403 (1 950)). "The principle upon which dy ing decl arati ons are admit ted is [] that

they are made in
a co nditi on so solemn and awful a s to pre clude the supposition that the p arty

coul d have been influenced by mali ce, re venge[,] or any conceivabl e motive t o misrepr esent and when every inducement was to spe ak the truth. Itis not enough that

he shallhave thoughthe would nev er recover, but the declaration must be made underthe bel ief of almost immediate dissoluti on." People v. Cassesse , 251 Ill. 422, 425-2 6 (1911 ). Wh ile at the time Howard Berry gave his di scovery

deposit ion he knew that he had been diagnosed wit

h a termi nal il lness, he did not be lieve that hi s death was "imm inent" in the sense that it was "impendi ng and certain to follow alm ost imme diately." While Ho ward knew that hi s death was i nevita ble, as do we all, he did not know that it

was "athand." The assumpti ons regar ding verac ity that support t

he dyi ng-declarati on excepti on to the he arsay rule simply

do not apply

to Howard's di scov ery depo sition. T he circ uit cou rt's refusa l to recogniz e Howard's deposi tion as a dyi ng declar ation a dmissi ble as evidence under Supreme13

Cou rt Ru le 212 (a)(3) a s an e xcep tio n t o the hearsay rul e was not contrary to t he manifest weight of the evidence. Fi na lly, the plaintiff argue s that if we rev erse the circuit court's order ba rr ing th e evidentiary use of Howard's di scovery depos i tion, we m ust also reverse the summ ary judg men ts entere d in favor of t he defendants . In l ight of ou r a ff irm an ce of

th e c irc ui t co ur t's orderbarri ng the evi dentiaryuse of Howard's di scovery deposit ion, we need not ad dress th is issu e. One of the defendant s, I ndustri al Contra ctors , Inc. , has chal lenged our juri sdict ion to hearthis appeal wit

h respect to it , arguing that t

he plaintiff' s noti ce of

appe al wa s untim ely with r espe ct to the s ummary judgment entere d in it s favor. A summary judgment in favor of Indust rial Contract ors, Inc ., was e ntered on A pril 19, 2 006 . This d efen dant s oug ht a finding under Supreme Court Rul e 304(a) ( 210 Ill . 2d R. 304(a )) that the re was no just reason for delayi ng the enfor cement or appea l of the judgment, but the judgment recit ed only

that there was "no just

reason for

delay ." In a

previous order entered Aug ust 28, 200 6, this court fou nd that this language was insu fficient to confer appellate jurisdiction un der Suprem e Cou rt Rule 304(a). Accordingly , we held t hat any appeal from the summary judgmentwas pre ma ture
. Nevertheless, this defendant argues that t he plai ntiff

's notice of ap peal w as un timely because it w as no t fi led w ith in 30 da ys of the en try of the summ ary judgmen t in its favor. Withouta Rule 304(a) finding, a finalorder di sposing of f ewer than all t

he clai ms is not

an appe alable order anddoes not b ecom e app ealab le unt il all o f the claim s are reso lved

. Marsh

v. Eva ngelic al Co vena nt Ch urch of H in s dale , 138 Il l. 2d 458, 464 (1990). Because the pl ain tif f's notice of appeal was fi le d wi th in30 d ay s of th e finalor der

re solvi ng a llth e cl ai ms of a ll the defend ants , this a ppe al is tim ely. For the fore going reas ons, t he order of t

he circ uit cour

t of Crawford County bar

ring14

the evidentiary

use of How ard Berry' s discovery deposition is a ff irmed, and the summ ary jud gm ents ente red in fa vor of th e de fen dan ts are also aff irme d.

Affirmed.

JUSTICE C HAPM AN, specially concur ring: I write s epara tely to say that w hile I beli eve that the resu lt is co rrec t un der the la w, I als o belie ve that

the jus tice sys tem fail ed. Mr. Berr y had a ve rylimi ted li fe expectanc y as
a resul t of

his mesot

helioma–a fa ct te sti fied t o by hi s phys ician and known by all , due t o the very natu re o f this dise ase . This case r equired an expedit ed and equit ably enforceddiscovery sche dule ora du al -p urpos e de pos itio n as pr ovi dedbySupreme Court Rule 202 (166 Il l. 2d R. 202) so that t

he plai ntiff

's t esti mony could have been prese rved. That did not occ ur. The plaintiff first notice d his evi dence deposi tion onFebruary 25, 2004. At t

he time of hi s death, si x mon ths later, his evidence d eposition had still not taken place. Th rough a seri es o f motion-r elat ed delay s and rul ings of t he tri al court , Mr. Berry was denied his "dayin co urt." I find t hat regr etta

ble.

JUSTICE W EXSTT EN joins in t his spec ial c oncurrence .NO. 5-06-0621 IN T HE AP PEL LA TE C OU RT OF ILLIN OIS

FIF TH DIST RICT

___________________________________________________________________________________ LINNIE K ATH RYN BERR Y, on Her ) 

### Appeal from the Own 

### Behalf and as Personal Representati ve ) Circui

t Court of of the Est ate of Howard L. Berry , Deceased, ) C ra w fo rd C ou nt y. ) Plaintiff-A ppella nt, 

### ) ) v. ) No. 04-L-1 ) AMERIC AN STA NDARD , INC., ) AMERICAN WATER WORKS SERVI CE ) COM PANY, INC., ARKLA INDUSTR IES, ) INC ., GARLOCK S EALING ) TE CH NO LO GI ES , LL C, G .W
. ) BE RK HE IM ER CO M PA NY , IN C., ) INDUS TRI AL CONTRACTORS , I NC. , J OHN ) CRAN E, INC. , LENNOX IND USTRIES, ) INC ., MARATHON OI L COMPANY, ) SEALING EQ UIPMENT PR ODUC TS ) COMPAN Y, UNION CARBIDE ) CORPORA TI ON, an d THE WHIRL POOL ) CORPORA TI ON, ) Honorable Kimbara G. Harrelland ) Hon orable Step hen G . Sawyer, Defendan ts-Appellees. ) Judges, presi ding.

___________________________________________________________________________________ Opinion Filed : May 19, 2008

___________________________________________________________________________________ Justice s : Honorable Th omas M . Welch, J.

Honorable Meliss a A. Chapman, J., and Ho nor able Jam es M . W exs tten, J ., Special ly Concurring

___________________________________________________________________________________ Atto rneys W. Russel l Si pes, Todd Barne s, Linda Georg e, Kat hlee n A. Musgrave, J ames S. for Bolen, Vincent Green, George & Sipes, 151 N. Delaware, Sui te 1700, Appell ant Indianapolis, IN 4620 4 (attorney s pro hac vice )

Pa ul E. Wi eck , Be nne tt , S chr oed er& Wiec k, 517 Locu st Stre et , P .O. Bo x 98, Marshall , IL 62441-0098

___________________________________________________________________________________Atto rneys C ar ol yn M. Husmann, Brenda G. Baum, Anne B. S chmi dt , Eric D. Ro ss er , J ames R. for Gra bow ski, Sean Sheehan, Hep ler, Br oom, MacDon al d, Hebr ank , Tr ue & Noc e, LLC, Appellees 103 W. Vandalia Str eet, Suite 300, P.O. Box 510, Edwardsvi lle, IL 62025-0510;

Peter J . Sacopul os, MichaelJ. Sacopul os, Gus Sacopul os (admit ted pro hac vice ), Sacopulos, Jo hn so n & Sa co pu lo s, 6 76 O hi o S tre et, Te rre H au te, IN 47 80 7 ( att or ne ys for M arath on O il Co .) Douglas B. King (admitted pro hac vice ), Dayna L . Switzer, Jamie Young, Wooden & McLaughlin, LLP, 211 North Penns yl vania Str eet, One Indiana S qu are, Sui te 1800, Ind iana pol is, IN 462 04- 420 8 (a ttorn eys fo r Ind ustri al C ont racto rs, In c.) C. R aymo nd B ell, D anie l G. D ona hue , Ca rla C . Sto rm, F oley & M ans field , PL LP , 1001 Hig hland s Plaz a D rive W ., Suite 4 00, S t. Lou is, M O 6 311 0; Susan E. Me hri nger, Lew is & W agne r, LL P, 50 1 Ind iana A ve., Su ite 200 , Indian apolis, IN 462 04; Grego ry C. Ray, Craig & Craig, 180 7 Broa dwa y Ave., P.O. B ox 689 , Mattoon , IL 61938-0689 (attorney s for The Whirlpool Corporation) Craig L. Unrat

h, Heyl , Roys ter, Voelker & Allen, Bank One Building, Suit e 600, 124 S. W. Ad ams Stre et , P eo ri a, IL 616 02; Rob ert H. Shultz, K ent L. Plotner, Peter M agino t, Rob ert M arcus , Do uglas He ise, Ph ilip M . Eisele, T imoth y Grah am, H eyl, Royster, Vo elker & Allen , Ma rk Tw ain Plaza II, Suite 100 , 103 W . Van dalia S treet, P.O . Bo x 46 7, E dw ard sville , IL 6 202 5-0 467 (atto rne ys for Le nno x In dus tries, I nc., an d Un io n Carb id e Co rp . - NO BRI EFS FI LED) D en ni s F . C an tre ll, K ath er in e L . S he lb y, D en ise W ad e C ha vi s, K ar l L . M ul va ne y, Jessi ca K.T. Ohlson , Daniel G erritzen, Bingha m M cHale L LP, 27 00 M arket Tow er, 10 We st Mark et Street, Indianapo lis, IN 46204-4900 (att orney s admitt ed pro hac vice fo r G. W. Be rkhe im er

Co. , Inc . - NO BRI EF F IL ED) Paul W. Doerschel n, Jeffr ey Rogers , Undray Wilks, McGuire Woods, LLP, 77 W. W ack er D rive , Su ite 41 00, C hica go, I L 6 060 1-1 815 ; Lo nni e Jo hns on, M allor , Clendening, Grodner & Bohrer, 511 Woodscrest Drive, Bl oomington, IN 47407 (attorne y s f

orAmeric an St an da rd , Inc . - NO BRI EF F IL ED) Matthew J. Fis cher, Schi ff, Hardi n, LLP, 6600 Sears Tower, 233 South Wacker Dri ve , C hi ca go, IL 606 06 ( atto rn ey fo r Ar kl a I ndu st

ri es , Inc . - NO BRI EF F IL ED) Michael A. Pollard, Baker& M cKenzie, LLP, 130 East Randolph Drive, Sui te 3500, Chicago, IL 60601; DanielO'Connell, Jackie Mil ler, Edward M. Burns, Sean Fergus, O 'C on ne ll & A ss oc iat es , 64 5 T ol lg ate R oa d, S ui te 2 20 , E lg in , IL 60 12 3 ( att or ne ys for J ohn Crane , I nc. and Seal ing Equipment Pr oduct s Company - NO BRIEFS FI LED) W ill iam Ma honey, Paul E . Wojcick i, Jason L. K enned y, Jonathan Live ly, Edward McCam bridge, James Will iams, Kei th Hays , Alli son Scott , Segal , McCambridge, Singer & M ah on ey, Ltd., One IBM Plaza, 330 North Wabash Avenue, Suit e 200, Chicago, IL 60611 (attorney s for AmericanWater Works Service Company , Inc. and Gar lo ck S eal in g Tec hno lo gi es , LL C)

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