F PB2000-917003

NTSB/SR-00/01

NATIONAL

TRANSPORTATION

SAFETY

BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594

SAFETY REPORT

ACTIONS TO REDUCE FATALITIES,

INJURIES, AND CRASHES INVOLVING

THE HARD CORE DRINKING DRIVER

7256
SAFETY REPORT

Actions to Reduce Fatalities, Injuries, and Crashes

Involving the Hard Core Drinking Driver

NTSB/SR-00/01 (PB2000-917003)

Cover and title page: The originally printed NTSB notation number was incorrect; the actual

number is 7256. (14 Nov 00)

THESE CORRECTIONS ARE INCLUDED

IN THIS VERSION OF THE PUBLISHED REPORT:
Safety Report

Actions to Reduce Fatalities, 

Injuries, and Crashes Involving 

the Hard Core Drinking Driver

NTSB/SR-00/01

PB2000-917003 National Transportation Safety Board

Notation 7256 490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W.

Adopted June 27, 2000 Washington, D.C. 20594

E P L U R IB U S U N U M

N AT I O N A L T R A S PO R TA T IO N

B O A R D

SA F E T Y

N
National Transportation Safety Board. 2000. Actions to Reduce Fatalities, Injuries, and Crashes

Involving the Hard Core Drinking Driver. Safety Report NTSB/SR-00/01. Washington, DC.

Abstract: From 1983 through 1998, at least 137,338 people died and 99,812 people were injured in fatal

crashes involving hard core drinking drivers, a term used in this report to include repeat offender drinking

drivers as well as offenders with high blood-alcohol concentrations. In 1998 alone, hard core drinking

drivers were involved in a minimum of 6,370 highway fatalities, the estimated cost of which was at least

$5.3 billion. 

The safety issue discussed in this report is the roadway risk presented by hard core drinking drivers. The

report discusses research on control measures used in one or more of the States and proposes solutions. It

also discusses steps taken by the United States Congress to address the hard core drinking driver problem

by enacting certain provisions in the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), and

suggests ways to make this legislation even more effective.

As a result of its study, the National Transportation Safety Board issued recommendations to the

Governors and Legislative Leaders of the 50 States and the Mayor and Council of the District of Columbia,

and to the Department of Transportation.

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to promoting aviation,

railroad, highway, marine, pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967, the agency is mandated by

Congress through the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 to investigate transportation accidents, determine the

probable causes of the accidents, issue safety recommendations, study transportation safety issues, and evaluate the

safety effectiveness of government agencies involved in transportation. The Safety Board makes public its actions

and decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations, and

statistical reviews.

Recent publications are available in their entirety on the Web at <http://www.ntsb.gov>. Other information about

available publications also may be obtained from the Web site or by contacting:

National Transportation Safety Board

Public Inquiries Section, RE-51

490 L'Enfant Plaza, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20594

(800) 877-6799 or (202) 314-6551

Safety Board publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from the National Technical

Information Service. To purchase this publication, order report number PB2000-917003 from:

National Technical Information Service

5285 Port Royal Road

Springfield, Virginia 22161

(800) 553-6847 or (703) 605-6000
iii Safety Report

Contents

List of Acronyms .................................................................................................................................... v

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................ vii

Chapter 1: Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1

Trends ............................................................................................................................................................. 3

Exposure and Probability-of-Arrest Data .............................................................................................. 3

Alcohol-Related Crash Fatalities in the United States .......................................................................... 4

Alcohol-Related Crash Injuries in the United States ............................................................................ 5

Chapter 2: The Hard Core 

Drinking Driver ...................................................................................................................................... 6

Groups Included in The NTSB Definition ..................................................................................................... 6

Repeat Offender Drinking Drivers ........................................................................................................ 6

High-BAC Offenders ............................................................................................................................ 8

Scope Of The Hard Core Drinking Driver Problem .................................................................................... 10

Chapter 3: Countermeasures To Reduce 

Hard Core Drinking Driving .......................................................................................................... 12

High-BAC and Repeat Offender Low-BAC Laws ...................................................................................... 12

High-BAC Laws .................................................................................................................................. 12

Repeat Offender Low-BAC Laws ....................................................................................................... 13

Law Enforcement Strategies ........................................................................................................................ 14

Checkpoints ......................................................................................................................................... 14

Administrative License Revocation .................................................................................................... 15

License Suspension Enforcement ........................................................................................................ 16

Vehicle Sanctions ......................................................................................................................................... 19

License Plate Impoundment ................................................................................................................ 20

Vehicle Immobilization ....................................................................................................................... 20

Vehicle Impoundment ......................................................................................................................... 21

Vehicle Forfeiture ................................................................................................................................ 23

Ignition Interlocks ............................................................................................................................... 24

Limits To Plea Bargaining And Diversion Programs .................................................................................. 26

Plea Bargaining Limits ........................................................................................................................ 26

DWI Offender Diversion Programs .................................................................................................... 26

Confinement ................................................................................................................................................. 28

Jail and Jail/Treatment Facilities ......................................................................................................... 28

Alternatives To Confinement ....................................................................................................................... 29

Home Detention with Electronic Monitoring ...................................................................................... 29

Intensive Supervision Probation .......................................................................................................... 30

Court-ordered Individualized Sanctions for Repeat Offenders ........................................................... 31
Contents iv Safety Report

Chapter 4: A Model Program To Reduce Crashes Involving 

Hard Core Drinking Drivers ........................................................................................................... 32

Chapter 5: Congressional Action On Drinking And Driving ............................................ 35

The TEA-21 Provisions ............................................................................................................................... 35

Section 410: Incentive Grants to States ............................................................................................... 35

Section 164: Minimum Penalties for Repeat Offenders ...................................................................... 36

TEA-21 Improvements ................................................................................................................................ 36

Definition of Repeat Offender ............................................................................................................. 36

Minimum Look-back Period for Repeat Offenses .............................................................................. 37

Pre-adjudication Alcohol Assessment and Treatment ......................................................................... 37

Vehicle Sanctions Administratively Imposed at the Time of Arrest ................................................... 38

Community Service as an Alternative to Confinement ....................................................................... 39

Chapter 6: Conclusions ..................................................................................................................... 41

Chapter 7: Recommendations ........................................................................................................ 43

Appendixes ............................................................................................................................................. 45

A: Progress of Prior Recommendations .............................................................................................. 45

B: State Laws Governing Alcohol-Highway Safety ........................................................................... 53

C: Hard Core Drinking Driver Definitions ......................................................................................... 59

D: Statistics ......................................................................................................................................... 61

E: TEA-21 ........................................................................................................................................... 65

F: Accident Investigations .................................................................................................................. 71

G: Works Cited ................................................................................................................................... 77
v Safety Report

List of Acronyms

ALR Administrative License Revocation

BAC Blood Alcohol Concentration

BAIID Breath Alcohol Ignition Interlock Device

DDMP Drunk Driver Monitoring Program (State of Maryland)

DOT U.S. Department of Transportation

DUI Driving Under the Influence (of Alcohol)

DWI Driving While Impaired (by Alcohol)

DWS Driving While (License) Suspended

DWU Driving While Unlicensed

FARS Fatality Analysis Reporting System

FY Fiscal Year

IID Ignition Interlock Device

ISP Intensive Supervision Probation

ISTEA Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991

MADD Mothers Against Drunk Driving

NCADD National Commission Against Drunk Driving

NDR National Driver Register

NHTSA National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

NTSB National Transportation Safety Board

PDPS Problem Driver Pointer System (of the NDR)

SOBER Supervising Offenders by Enforcement Response

TEA-21 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century 

TIRF Traffic Injury Research Foundation of Canada

TRB Transportation Research Board, National Academy of Science

vii Safety Report

Executive Summary

In 1984, the National Transportation Safety Board published a safety study titled

Deficiencies in Enforcement, Judicial, and Treatment Programs Related to Repeat

Offender Drunk Drivers (NTSB/SS-84/04) (the Repeat Offender Study). That study

identified repeat offender drinking drivers (included in this report under the category of

“hard core drinking drivers”) as a serious traffic safety problem. 

In the more than 15 years that have passed since that investigation was concluded,

efforts have been made by all the States to address this major safety problem. However,

despite significant progress, the measures taken and the degree of implementation have

not been uniform, and 15,794 people still died in 1999 from alcohol-related crashes. This

number is far above the target set by the Secretary of Transportation in 1995 to reduce the

number of alcohol-related fatalities to no more than 11,000 by 2005.

For purposes of this report, the NTSB uses the term “hard core drinking drivers” to

include repeat offender drinking drivers (that is, offenders who have prior convictions or

arrests for a Driving While Impaired [DWI] by alcohol offense) and high-BAC offenders

(that is, all offenders with a blood alcohol concentration [BAC] of 0.15 percent or greater).

From 1983 through 1998, at least 137,338 people died in crashes involving hard

core drinking drivers.1

 NHTSA’s data also indicate that 99,812 people were injured in fatal

crashes involving hard core drinking drivers (as defined by the Safety Board) during that

same time period. In 1998 alone, hard core drinking drivers were involved in a minimum

of 6,370 highway fatalities, the estimated cost of which was at least $5.3 billion. 

In preparing this report, the Safety Board reviewed the literature on

countermeasures that have been found effective in reducing recidivism, crashes, fatalities,

and injuries. This report identifies the highway safety problem involving hard core

drinking drivers, discusses research on control measures, and proposes solutions. It also

discusses steps taken by the United States Congress to address the hard core drinking

driver problem by enacting certain provisions in the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st

Century (TEA-21), and suggests ways to make this legislation even more effective.

TEA-21 would better assist the States to reduce the hard core drinking driver

problem if it were modified to (a) include a revised definition of “repeat offender” that

included administrative actions on DWI offenses, (b) require mandatory treatment for

offenders, (c) establish an extended period for records retention and DWI offense lookback; (d) require administratively imposed vehicle sanctions; (e) eliminate provisions for

community service; and (f) provide for the inclusion of home detention with electronic

monitoring. 

1 Nineteen ninety-eight is the most recent year for which complete data are available from the National

Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
Executive Summary viii Safety Report

The Safety Board believes that a model program to reduce hard core drinking

driving would incorporate the following elements: 

• Frequent and well-publicized statewide sobriety checkpoints that include

checking for valid driver’s licenses. Checkpoints should not be limited to

holiday periods.

• Vehicle sanctions to restrict or separate hard core drinking drivers from their

vehicles, including license plate actions (impoundment, confiscation, or other

actions); vehicle immobilization, impoundment, and forfeiture; and ignition

interlocks for high-BAC first offenders and repeat offenders.

• State and community cooperative programs involving driver licensing

agencies, law enforcement officers, judges, and probation officers to enforce

DWI suspension and revocation.

• Legislation to require that DWI offenders who have been convicted or

administratively adjudicated maintain a zero blood alcohol concentration while

operating a motor vehicle.

• Legislation that defines a high blood alcohol concentration (0.15 percent or

greater) as an “aggravated” DWI offense that requires strong intervention

similar to that ordinarily prescribed for repeat DWI offenders. 

• As alternatives to confinement, programs to reduce hard core drinking driver

recidivism that include home detention with electronic monitoring and/or

intensive probation supervision programs.

• Legislation that restricts the plea bargaining of a DWI offense to a lesser, nonalcohol-related offense, and that requires the reasons for DWI charge

reductions be entered into the public record. 

• Elimination of the use of diversion programs that permit erasing, deferring, or

otherwise purging the DWI offense record or that allow the offender to avoid

license suspension.

• Administrative license revocation for BAC test failure and refusal.

• A DWI record retention and DWI offense enhancement look-back period of at

least 10 years.

• Individualized sanction programs for hard core DWI offenders that rely on

effective countermeasures for use by courts that hear DWI cases.

As a result of this review, the Safety Board issued a recommendation to the

Governors and Legislative Leaders of the 50 States and to the Mayor and Council of the

District of Columbia, to establish a hard core drinking driver program that is designed to

reduce the incidence of alcohol-related crashes and fatalities, and that includes highly

visible enforcement, administrative license revocation, vehicle sanctions, special laws for

aggravated driving while impaired offenses and zero BAC for repeat offenders, limits on

plea-bargaining, alternatives to confinement, and improved record-keeping, as described

in the model program. The Board also issued a recommendation to the U.S. Department of

Transportation, regarding improvements to the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st

Century.
1 Safety Report

Chapter 1

Introduction

In 1984, the National Transportation Safety Board (Safety Board) published a

safety study titled Deficiencies in Enforcement, Judicial, and Treatment Programs Related

to Repeat Offender Drunk Drivers (NTSB/SS-84/04) (the Repeat Offender Study). That

study was based on Safety Board investigations of more than 50 alcohol-related crashes in

which the driver had prior arrests for driving while impaired (DWI).1 The Repeat Offender

Study identified repeat offender drinking drivers (included in this report under the

category of “hard core drinking drivers”) as a serious traffic safety problem. By studying

the circumstances of these crashes, the Safety Board was able to identify the problems,

loopholes, and deficiencies in the States’ systems for detecting, arresting, and adjudicating

drinking drivers. The study examined why the systems already in place in the States were

unable to prevent the drivers in the investigated crashes from continuing to drive after

drinking. Based on its analysis of those cases, the Safety Board issued

14 recommendations, including 10 to the States, 2 to the National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration (NHTSA), 1 to the Veterans Administration, and 1 to legal associations

and judicial organizations.2

In the more than 15 years that have passed since the recommendations were issued,

efforts have been made by all States to address the alcohol-related highway safety

problem, and considerable progress has been made in detecting, arresting, and

adjudicating drinking drivers. Efforts by public and private entities3 have contributed to

substantial reductions between 1983 and 1999 in the number (23,646 to 15, 794) 4 and

proportion (56 percent to 38 percent) of alcohol-related fatalities. However, the measures

taken and the degree of implementation of the Safety Board’s 1984 recommendations by

States and localities have not been uniform, and alcohol-related crashes continue to claim

too many lives on the Nation’s roads and highways. The 15,794 people killed in such

crashes in 1999 far exceed the target of no more than 11,000 alcohol-related driving

fatalities by 2005 that was set by the Secretary of Transportation in 1995.5 

1 In this report, the term “driving while impaired” and its acronym “DWI” are used to refer to the act of

driving with a blood alcohol concentration that exceeds the State’s standard. States use different terms, such

as “driving under the influence (DUI),” “operating under the influence (OUI),” “driving while alcohol

impaired (DWAI),” and other terms to describe essentially the same offense.

2 A description of the recommendations and their current status are fully discussed in Appendix A.

3 These include the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the States, Mothers Against Drunk

Driving (MADD), and others.

4 Preliminary estimate by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in a press release dated 3

Apr. 2000, entitled “U.S. Transportation Secretary Slater Says Nation’s Traffic Death Rates Reach Historic

Low in 1999.” The final 1999 fatality report, pending completion of data collection and quality control

verification, will be available in August 2000. Data for 1998 are the most recent complete data available and

are used throughout this report except as noted. 
Chapter 1 2 Safety Report

In light of the thousands of deaths still resulting from these crashes, the National

Transportation Safety Board is again focusing efforts on the groups it categorizes as “hard

core drinking drivers.” For purposes of this report, the term includes the following two

groups:

• repeat offender drinking drivers (that is, offenders who have prior convictions

or arrests for DWI offenses within the past 10 years) and 

• offenders with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.15 percent or greater

(simply called “high BAC”).6

These two groups are involved in almost 40 percent of the alcohol-related fatalities

and present traffic safety challenges that States can address by implementing the laws,

policies, and strategies described in this report.7

Six accident investigations for which the Safety Board obtained information were

used in preparing this report (see appendix F for briefs of the investigations). These six

investigations illustrate some types of crashes in which repeat offenders and high-BAC

drivers are involved. While the Board’s 1984 study investigated over 50 crashes, this

safety report is based on the extensive crash analysis and research currently available that

was not available for the 1984 study. These data, despite the limitations of NHTSA’s Fatal

Accident Reporting System (FARS) and the General Estimates System (GES), provide

sufficient information to determine that the involvement of hard core drinking drivers in

alcohol-related crashes and fatalities is substantial.8

 The bulk of available data and

research on the hard core drinking driver problem made the study of large numbers of

Safety Board investigations unnecessary, as no new information would likely be gained

regarding the nature or cause of these crashes.

This report examines alcohol-related fatality crash trends in the United States;

identifies repeat offenders and high-BAC drinking drivers as highway safety problems;

summarizes research on countermeasures; and proposes actions to decrease fatalities

caused by hard core drinking drivers. This report also discusses steps taken by the United

States Congress to address the problem by enacting certain provisions in the

5 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Partners in Progress: Impaired Driving Goals and

Strategies for 2005 Summary of Proceedings, DOT HS 808 246 (Washington: National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration, 1995) 5.

6 The amount of alcohol consumption necessary to reach a BAC of 0.15 percent is substantial. Various

BAC estimators have been developed, including the “Blood Alcohol Educator,” which was used to develop

the following estimates. These estimates assume that the person has not eaten, and drinks quickly. For a

180-pound male, six drinks (each drink equals 12 ounces of beer, a 1-ounce shot of 80 proof distilled liquor,

or 5 ounces of wine) in 1 hour will result in a BAC of approximately 0.15 percent. For a 130-pound female,

four drinks in 1 hour will result in an estimated BAC of 0.15 percent. Conditions that affect blood alcohol

concentration include gender, weight, food intake, alcohol content of the drink, rate of consumption

(sipping, drinking, or “chugging” or “slamming”), and time elapsed since consumption. University of

Illinois and The Century Council, Blood Alcohol Educator, CD-ROM (Urbana-Champaign: University of

Illinois and The Century Council, 1999).

7 A more detailed description of each group and case illustrations are provided in the next chapter.
Chapter 1 3 Safety Report

Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21),9 and suggests ways to make this

legislation more effective.

Trends

Exposure and Probability-of-Arrest Data

Marked decreases have occurred both in hard core drinking driving exposure and

in the probability of hard core drinking drivers’ arrest, according to NHTSA. The agency’s

1997 survey of driver behavior revealed that there were an estimated 968 million drinking

and driving trips in 1997 (based on this self-reported data).10 This was a decrease from an

estimated 1.3 billion trips (also self-reported) in 1993.11 Also, in 1997, the FBI reported

1.477 million DWI arrests.12 NHTSA’s 1984 review of alcohol-impaired driving in the

United States indicated that the risk of DWI arrest is low: it was estimated to be 1 in 300 in

a heavily patrolled area and 1 in 2,000 in other areas.13 NHTSA further reported that “on

average, a driver can drive [impaired] 5,000 miles before being arrested for a DUI

offense.”14

NHTSA’s Drinking and Driving in the United States: The 1996 National Roadside

Survey further indicates that on Friday and Saturday nights between the hours of 10 p.m.

and 3 a.m., 19.6 percent of 6,400 drivers surveyed had been drinking, 3.2 percent had an

illegal BAC of 0.10 percent or greater, and 0.8 percent had a BAC of 0.15 percent or

greater. Based on those results, on Friday and Saturday nights in 1996 approximately 1 in

5 cars was driven by a driver who had been drinking, approximately 1 in 31 cars was

8 These two systems are crash databases that provide statistics on traffic crashes of all severities.

NHTSA states that “care should be taken when comparing nonfatal crash and injury statistics from one year

to the next. Since the statistics derived from General Estimates System (GES) data are estimates, year-toyear differences may be the result of the sampling process, not the result of an actual trend. The variability or

sampling errors associated with the estimates must be considered when making any year-to-year

comparisons using GES data.” National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Traffic Safety Facts 1998:

A Compilation of Motor Vehicle Crash Data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System and the General

Estimates System DOT HS 808 983 (Washington: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1999)

13. One shortcoming of FARS involves the lack of information involving the role that alcohol impairment

plays in the causation of highway crashes. Currently, FARS does not allow an analyst to determine with

confidence whether an individual driver’s alcohol impairment was a determining factor in causing a crash.

While it is clear that degraded driver performance caused by alcohol impairment is a leading cause of death

and serious injury, statistical summaries of alcohol-related injuries or fatalities may lead to a tendency to

overstate the relationship between alcohol and highway crashes. This happens because all injuries caused by

crashes involving at least one drinking driver are labeled “alcohol-related”; this practice leads to the

mistaken assumption that alcohol impairment is causal in every crash where alcohol is present.

9 Pub. L. 105-178. 9 Jun. 1998. Stat. 112.107.

10 Dawn Balmforth, National Survey of Drinking and Driving Attitudes and Behavior: 1997

(Washington: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1998) 81.

11 Balmforth 81.

12 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States (Washington: Federal Bureau of

Investigation, 1997) 222.
Chapter 1 4 Safety Report

driven by a legally impaired driver, and approximately 1 in 119 cars was driven by a hard

core drinking driver.15

Alcohol-Related Crash Fatalities 

in the United States

NHTSA defines a fatal traffic crash as alcohol-involved or alcohol-related if either

a driver or pedestrian/bicyclist had a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .01 g/dl

(.01 percent) or greater.16 In 1983, of the 42,589 people who died in traffic crashes, 23,646

(nearly 56 percent) died in alcohol-related crashes.17 In 1999, an estimated 41,345 people

died in all motor vehicle crashes; 15,794 (38 percent) of the deaths resulted from alcoholrelated crashes.18 This percentage represents the lowest proportion of alcohol-related

fatalities in the history of reliable national statistics; it also represents a 33.2-percent

reduction in alcohol-related fatalities reported since 1983 (see figure 1).

Reductions in alcohol-related crash fatalities have occurred among all drinking

drivers, including those whom the Safety Board defines as hard core. For example, in

those States with good BAC testing rates (greater than 80 percent) of fatally injured

drivers, the proportion of these drivers with a BAC of 0.15 percent or greater declined

from 29 percent in 1983 to 20 percent in 1997.19

Safety Board staff analyzed FARS data for the same time period as that of

NHTSA’s Roadside Survey (Friday and Saturday nights, 10 p.m. to 3 a.m., 1996). This

analysis determined that 5,203 drivers were involved in fatal crashes during those hours,

of which 1,421 were hard core drinking drivers, using the Safety Board’s definition. While

hard core drinking drivers constituted only 0.8 percent (1 of 119) of all drivers on the road

in the National Roadside Survey, they constituted 27 percent of drivers in fatal crashes

during the same time period in 1996. These data clearly suggest that hard core drinking

drivers are overrepresented in fatal crashes. 

13 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Alcohol and Highway Safety 1984: A Review of the

State of the Knowledge (Washington: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, n.d.) 56.

14 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Alcohol and Highway Safety 1984, 56.

15 Robert B. Voas, et.al., Drinking and Driving in the United States: The 1996 National Roadside Survey,

DOT HS 809 019. (Washington: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2000) 8, B-26-30. 

16 Since BAC tests are not given to all active participants in fatal crashes (i.e., drivers, pedestrians or

bicyclists), an estimation procedure using discriminant function analyses is used in NHTSA’s Fatal Accident

Reporting System (FARS) to determine these percentages (Terry M. Klein, A Method for Estimating

Posterior BAC Distributions for Persons Involved in Fatal Traffic Accidents, DOT HS 807 094

[Washington: U.S. Department of Transportation, 1986]). Unless otherwise noted, statistics used in this

report were provided by NHTSA.

17 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT HS 808 983, 32.

18 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, “U.S. Transportation Secretary Slater Says Nation’s

Traffic Death Rates Reach Historic Low in 1999,” 1. In 1998, 15, 935 people died in all alcohol-related

crashes combined.

19 These states include CA, CO, DE, HI, IL, MD, MN, NV, NJ, NM, OR, SD, WA, WI, and WY. Personal

communication with Allan Williams, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Mar. 2000.
Chapter 1 5 Safety Report

Alcohol-Related Crash Injuries 

in the United States

The proportion of injuries involving all drinking drivers is difficult to estimate

because driver blood alcohol concentration is not routinely taken on surviving drivers and

thus is not available for inclusion in NHTSA’s General Estimates System. However,

according to NHTSA’s Traffic Safety Facts 1998: A Compilation of Motor Vehicle Crash

Data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System and the General Estimates System,20 an

estimated 305,000 persons were injured in alcohol-related crashes in 1998 alone, a decline

from an estimated 340,000 persons in 1992.21 NHTSA’s data also indicate that 99,812

people were injured in fatal crashes involving hard core drinking drivers (as defined by the

Safety Board) between 1983 and 1998. The number of injuries resulting from all crashes

(both fatal and non-fatal) involving hard core drinking drivers was probably far greater

than 100,000 over 16 years.22

Figure 1. Alcohol-related fatalities in the United States, 1983–1999

20 See footnote 9, page 13.

21 See footnote 9, page 13.

22 See footnote 9, page 13. 

7 Safety Report

Chapter 2

The Hard Core 

Drinking Driver

This chapter describes the drivers that the

Safety Board defines as hard core, who present

particular challenges that can be addressed through

proven, effective measures. Following are descriptions

and justifications for inclusion of these two groups in

the Board’s definition of this term.23 Also included in

this chapter are the details of two cases illustrating

typical fatal crashes involving repeat DWI offender

drivers and high-BAC drivers. Information concerning these and four additional cases are

provided in appendix F.

Groups Included in The 

NTSB Definition

Repeat Offender Drinking Drivers

Repeat offenders, as the term is used in this report, are individuals who are

convicted of or arrested for a DWI offense within 10 years of a prior DWI conviction or

arrest. In 1995, NHTSA identified this group as high-risk, problem drinking drivers.24 The

agency recognizes that “the relative risk of crashes leading to death—both their own and

other people’s—is greater for drivers with prior DWI [convictions].”25 NHTSA reports

that 17 percent of fatally injured drivers in 1998 with a positive BAC had a previous DWI

conviction, and that fatally injured drivers with BAC levels of 0.10 percent or greater were

six times as likely to have a prior DWI conviction compared to fatally injured sober

drivers.26 A North Carolina study also found that 26.2 percent of case drivers who died in

alcohol-related motor vehicle crashes had prior DWI arrests while only 3.1 percent of

those who died in non-alcohol-related crashes (control group) had one or more DWI arrest

23 Definitions used by other agencies and organizations are provided in appendix C.

24 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, “Repeat DWI Offenders in the United States,”

Traffic Tech 85 (Feb. 1995) 1.

25 James C. Fell, “Persistent Killers,” Recovery, 7:3 (Fall 1996) 2 <http://www.icbc.com/oldrecover/

volume7/number3/persistentkillers>.

26 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Traffic Safety Facts 1998: Alcohol, DOT HS 808 950

(Washington: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1998) 3.

The Hard Core Drinking Driver

• Repeat offender drinking drivers 

(DWI Arrest or conviction in past 

10 years)

• Drivers having high BAC (0.15 

percent or greater)
Chapter 2 8 Safety Report

in the preceding 5 years. The same study found that the risk of death increases

dramatically in relation to the number of prior DWI arrests.27

In March 2000, NHTSA published a summary of the attributes of repeat offenders.

The report characterizes the typical repeat offender as follows:

In analyzing the extent of the problem, NHTSA reviewed repeat offense drinking

driver data provided by 12 States (CA, CO, IA, LA, MN, NC, NE, NM, OH, SD, TX, and

WI) and reported that approximately one-third of all drivers convicted or arrested for DWI

each year are repeat DWI offenders. Eight of these States indicated proportions between

21 and 47 percent for repeat offenders previously convicted of DWI. Repeat offense

drinking driver data from the four other States, which measure repeat offense in terms of

arrests rather than convictions, were similar; that is, re-arrests ranged between 24 and

46 percent of total DWI arrests.28 In addition, NHTSA reported that repeat offenders

account for 10 to 20 percent of all drinking drivers in fatal crashes, and one out of eight

drinking drivers in fatal crashes have had a prior DWI conviction within the past 3 years.29

The following case30 is an example of a recent fatal crash involving a repeat offender. 

Case 1.—On October 7, 1999, at 4:32 p.m., a pickup truck traveling on the

shoulder of the road in excess of 50 mph in a 35 mph zone in Bristol Township,

Pennsylvania, struck two pedestrians standing behind a truck parked on the shoulder. The

impact threw one pedestrian into a nearby yard, causing him serious injury. The second

pedestrian was killed when he was pinned between the two trucks. 

At the time of this crash, the pickup truck driver, a 42-year-old female, was driving

despite the fact that her license had been suspended until 2003 for DUI-related offenses.

27 Robert D. Brewer, et. al., “The Risk of Dying in Alcohol-Related Automobile Crashes Among

Habitual Drunk Drivers,” New England Journal of Medicine 331:8 (25 Aug. 1994) 513-17.

Mean Age 35

Education High school or less

Occupation Non-white collar

Income Low

Preferred Beverage Beer, some distilled liquor

Other Offenses Traffic and Criminal

Gender Male (over 90 percent)

Race White

Marital Status Unmarried

BAC >0.18 percent at arrest; higher in fatal crashes

Prior DWIs 2-3

Alcohol Problems Alcohol dependency commona

a John H. Lacey and Ralph K. Jones, State of Knowledge of Alcohol-Impaired Driving Research on Repeat 

Offenders ( Washington: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2000) 19.

28 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, “Repeat DWI Offenders in the United States” 2.

29 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, “Repeat DWI Offenders in the United States” 1.

30 Both cases included in this chapter, along with additional illustrative cases, are provided in appendix F.
Chapter 2 9 Safety Report

A blood test taken 1 hour after the crash revealed her BAC to be 0.079 percent.31 Her

driver’s record indicated that she had been sentenced to a diversion program known as

DUI Accelerated Rehabilitation Disposition32 (a DWI-offender diversion program

designed for first-time offenders) in 1985. Although she had not been arrested for another

drinking and driving offense for 13 years, she had been re-arrested in both July and

August of 1998 for DUI. Following these two arrests in 1998, she received two separate

sentences in 1999 of 2 to 364 days in county jail. She served only the minimum 2 days on

each count before she was released on probation.33

High-BAC Offenders

The precise definition of what constitutes a “high-BAC” offender is subject to

debate. 34 In the 15 States that have established laws imposing increased penalties against

drivers with a high BAC, the definition of the term differs: four States define high BAC as

0.15 percent; three States, as 0.16 percent; three States, as 0.18 percent, and five States, as

0.20 percent (see appendix B).35 The National Commission Against Drunk Driving, the

Century Council, and Mothers Against Drunk Driving have all developed policies or

programs to deal with hard core drinking and driving; all include high-BAC drivers as a

part of the problem. These groups all define the term as either 0.15 or 0.16 percent

(see appendix C). 

The Safety Board selected 0.15 percent or greater in defining high BAC for the

following reasons: At this level, offenders are from 1 1/2 to nearly 2 times above the legal

BAC limit established in any of the 50 States. Drivers who reach this high level of BAC

have consumed large amounts of alcohol, much more than is considered to be social or

responsible drinking.36 Moreover, research has found that drivers with a high BAC are at a

substantially greater risk of being involved in a fatal crash: using NHTSA Fatality

Analysis Reporting System (FARS) data, the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety

estimated the relative fatality risk for drivers in single-vehicle crashes with a high BAC

(0.15 percent or greater) to be 385 times that of a zero-BAC driver (see figure 2).37

Similarly, The Traffic Injury Research Foundation (TIRF), also using FARS data,

31 The driver also tested positive for cocaine and benzoylecgonine, a cocaine metabolite.

32 Under the Pennsylvania DUI Accelerated Rehabilitation Disposition, a violator loses his or her driver’s

license for 1 year and serves 1 year of probation. If the violator successfully completes probation, the

violator may request to have his or her record expunged after 7 years.

33 National Transportation Safety Board Accident No.: HWY-00-IH-20

34 The Safety Board specifically notes, as it did in its 1990 Safety Study NTSB/SS-90-01, Fatigue,

Alcohol, Other Drugs, and Medical Factors in Fatal-to-the-Driver Heavy Truck Crashes, that any BAC may

be impairing and that the only safe BAC is zero.

35 Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, and Washington use 0.15 percent. Connecticut, New Hampshire, and New

Mexico use 0.16 percent. Arizona, Arkansas, and Kentucky use 0.18 percent. Colorado, Florida, Idaho,

Minnesota, and Tennessee use 0.20 percent.

36 The American Psychiatric Association accepts a single DWI conviction as evidence of alcohol abuse.

DWI convictions can be obtained at 0.08 percent BAC or greater in 18 States and the District of Columbia

and at 0.10 percent BAC or greater in 33 States. In addition, the U.S. Department of Health and Human

Services in the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse defines “binge drinking” as drinking 5 or more

drinks on the same occasion. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of

Mental Disorders, 4th Edition (Washington: American Psychiatric Association, 1994) 196.
Chapter 2 10 Safety Report

estimated that high-BAC drivers (0.15 percent or greater) are more than 200 times more

likely to be involved in a fatal crash than a non-drinking driver.38 TIRF also indicated that

on weekend nights, less than 1 percent of all drivers on the road have a BAC of 0.15 or

greater, but they “represent nearly half of all the fatal crashes at that time.” 39

In 1998, NHTSA sponsored a critical literature review of the alcohol highway

safety problem and concluded that “recent research adds little new knowledge about the

role of high BAC in alcohol-related crashes, but reinforces the findings of prior studies

indicating that a high BAC is strongly related to both high alcohol-crash incidence and

high alcohol-crash risk.”40 One study by Simpson and Mayhew,41 included in the 1998

literature review, showed that 80 percent of all fatally injured drivers with measurable

BAC had a level in excess of 0.10 percent, 64 percent had a level in excess of

0.15 percent, and about 40 percent had a level of 0.20 percent or greater.42 The Simpson

and Mayhew study also showed that, among drivers who had a BAC above 0.10 percent,

37 Paul Zador, “Alcohol-related Relative Risk of Fatal Driver Injuries in Relation to Driver Age and Sex,”

Journal of Studies on Alcohol 52 (1991) 302-310.

Figure 2. Relative single vehicle crash risk at a high-BAC level

38 Herbert M. Simpson, Daniel R. Mayhew, and Douglas J. Beirness, Dealing with the Hard Core

Drinking Driver (Ottawa: The Traffic Injury Research Foundation of Canada, 1996) 40.

39 Simpson, Mayhew, and Beirness, Dealing with the Hard Core Drinking Driver 21.

40 Ralph K. Jones and John H. Lacey, Alcohol Highway Safety: Problem Update, DOT HS 808 743

(Washington: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1998) 34.

41 Herbert M. Simpson and Douglas R. Mayhew, The Hard Core Drinking Driver Update (Ottawa: The

Traffic Injury Research Foundation of Canada, 1992) 3.

42 Jones and Lacey DOT HS 808 743, 13
Chapter 2 11 Safety Report

almost 8 out of 10 had a BAC of 0.15 percent or more.43 An examination of 1997 data by

NHTSA showed that these proportions had changed very little since 1991, indicating the

large role played by high-BAC drivers in fatal crashes.44

The following case is an example of a recent fatal crash involving a high-BAC

driver.

Case 2.— On November 25, 1999, about 1:20 a.m., a 1993 Pontiac Grand Am had

been traveling for more than 5 miles in the wrong direction (east) on Interstate 76 (I-76) in

Upper Merion, Pennsylvania, when it collided head-on with a 1993 Nissan Altima

transporting the driver and four passengers. The impact caused the Altima to spin, strike a

concrete barrier, and catch fire. One passenger was trapped in the Altima and died of

burns, multiple injuries, and smoke inhalation. The three remaining passengers and the

driver of the Altima sustained minor to serious injuries. A third vehicle that was also

traveling west on I-76 struck the Pontiac. Both the driver of the Pontiac and the driver of

the third vehicle also suffered minor to serious injuries. The driver of the Pontiac was

found to have a BAC of 0.24 percent.45 This driver had been arrested for DUI on June 30,

1996. The court ordered his license suspended, but the suspension did not take effect until

Aug. 21, 1997.46

Scope Of The Hard Core Drinking 

Driver Problem

NHTSA’s data show that, since 1983, at least

137,338 people have died in crashes involving hard

core drinking drivers. In 1998, 6,370 died in such

crashes; this number represents nearly 40 percent of

all alcohol-related fatalities for that year (6,370 of

15,935).

According to Traffic Safety Facts 1998,47 an

estimated 305,000 persons were injured in alcoholrelated crashes in 1998, and of that number, 60,000

43 Jones and Lacey DOT HS 808 743, 13

44 The 1997 Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) data also indicated that there was a sizable

number (3,507) of fatal crashes at lower BACs (.01 to .09 percent), but there were no comparable data from

non-crashes to get a good estimate of relative risk. Combining the data from FARS and from roadside

surveys, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration believes that there is a significant relative

crash risk at BAC levels between 0.05 and 0.10 percent, and a lower but not insignificant crash risk for BAC

levels between 0.02 and 0.05 percent (Jones and Lacey, DOT HS 808 743, 34).

45 Traces of marijuana (cannabinoids) were also detected in the driver’s system.

46 Like many DUI offenders, this driver had not taken the necessary measures to have his driver’s license

reinstated following the period of suspension. National Transportation Safety Board Accident No.:

HWY-00-IH-12.

47 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT HS 808 983, 111.

Cost to Society

• 137, 338 Hard core drinking 

driver related fatalities, 1983–

1998

• 6,370 Hard core drinking driver 

related fatalities, 1998

• $5.3 Billion estimated economic 

cost of these fatalities, 1998
Chapter 2 12 Safety Report

persons received incapacitating injuries. The proportion of injuries involving hard core

drinking drivers, however, is difficult to estimate because of the lack of alcohol test results

in the GES. 

In addition to the cost of human lives, hard core drinking drivers exact a

substantial monetary cost. In 1994, NHTSA estimated that all motor vehicle crashes

combined cost American society over $150 billion dollars per year.48 Using NHTSA’s

formula, the economic cost to society for hard core drinking driver-related fatalities in

1998 would be at least $5.3 billion dollars (6,370 x $830,000).49

Hard core drinking drivers (repeat offender drinking drivers with a prior DWI

arrest or conviction within the past 10 years and offenders with a blood alcohol

concentration of 0.15 percent or greater) pose an increased risk of crashes, injuries, and

fatalities. Therefore, the States should take measures that would further reduce the

significant loss of human life and immense societal costs caused by hard core drinking

drivers. The following chapter discusses countermeasures that have been shown

successful in achieving this goal.

48 Lawrence J. Blincoe, The Economic Cost of Motor Vehicle Crashes, DOT HS 807 876 (Washington:

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1995) 5.

49 Computation rendered in 1994 dollars as defined in The Economic Cost of Motor Vehicle Crashes. In

this report, the economic cost of a human life was estimated at $830,000 for a fatality, $706,000 for

a critically injured survivor, and $230,000 for a seriously injured survivor. 
13 Safety Report

Chapter 3

Countermeasures To Reduce 

Hard Core Drinking Driving

Since the Safety Board issued its recommendations to the States in the Repeat

Offender Study, a variety of countermeasures have been implemented by States and

localities to address the problems caused by hard core drinking drivers, and alcoholrelated crashes and fatalities have declined. In order for additional gains to be made in

addressing this problem on a National level, it is necessary to examine which of these

actions have been found effective in the specific States that have utilized them. The

experiences of such jurisdictions can serve as examples to other States that have not yet

put these countermeasures to use. 

This chapter, therefore, examines specific countermeasures to combat the hard

core drinking driver problem. The Safety Board identified these specific countermeasures

through a review of approximately 200 research studies of the effectiveness of drinking

driving countermeasures. The examples used in this report were chosen based on their

statistically significant results. The following sections of the chapter examine BAC laws,

law enforcement strategies, licensing sanctions, vehicle sanctions, limits on pleabargaining and diversion programs, assessment and treatment, confinement, and

alternatives to confinement.

High-BAC and Repeat Offender 

Low-BAC Laws

This section discusses two types of State laws that set alcohol limits for licensed

drivers who are operating a motor vehicle: laws that address drivers with high BACs and

laws that set lower BAC limits for repeat offenders.

High-BAC Laws

As discussed previously, research has indicated that high-BAC offenders

(0.15 percent or greater) have a greatly elevated crash risk and that the amount of alcohol

that must be consumed to reach 0.15 percent may indicate that these offenders have an

alcohol abuse problem.50 High-BAC first offenders with other traffic violations are also

very likely to repeat the offense.51 As stated in Chapter 2, 15 States have enacted laws

50 Herbert M. Simpson and Daniel R. Mayhew, The Hardcore Drinking Driver (Ottawa: The Traffic

Injury Research Foundation of Canada, 1991) 28-29, 32.

51 Leonard A. Marowitz, “Predicting DWI Recidivism,” Blood Alcohol Concentration and Driving

Record Factors I (Sacramento: California Department of Motor Vehicles, 1998) 2.
Chapter 3 14 Safety Report

providing for an “extreme” or “aggravated” DWI offense defined by the arrest BAC. In

these States, a first offender committing an aggravated alcohol offense can be subject to

sanctions similar to those that may be applied to repeat offenders (for example, assessment

and treatment referral may be mandatory and a longer license suspension and jail terms

may be imposed). Seven of the 15 States use either 0.15 or 0.16 percent as the per se

extreme offense level; 3 States use 0.18 percent, and 5 States use 0.20 percent. Many

foreign countries have tiered BAC laws in which sanctions are graduated as the offense

BAC increases. These countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,

Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden.52

Repeat Offender Low-BAC Laws

Much debate has occurred at both national

and State levels about the merits of lowering BAC

limits for all drivers. This report does not address that

issue, because this report focuses on hard core

drinking drivers, not all drinking drivers. However,

this report does suggest that BAC limits be lowered

for repeat offenders. 

In some States, courts may impose lowerBAC or zero-alcohol probation conditions for drivers

convicted of DWI to facilitate compliance with court

mandates, such as treatment. For example, in

Georgia, a judge in Rockdale County requires repeat

offenders to be alcohol free and requires some to

submit to daily breath-alcohol testing.53 Some courts may also require sobriety without

incorporating a means of testing except for possible traffic enforcement. 

Both Maine and North Carolina have lowered their BAC limit for drivers who

have been convicted or similarly administratively adjudicated on a first DWI offense.

Only the Maine law has been evaluated for effectiveness (Hingson, Heeren, and Winter).

This State law, passed in 1988, mandated a BAC of 0.05 (the BAC for drivers without

prior offenses is 0.08) for a subsequent offense occurring within 1 year for first offenders

and within 10 years for subsequent offenders. A repeat offender with a BAC of 0.05

percent or greater would receive a 1-year administrative license suspension under the

Maine low-BAC law for a first low-BAC offense, and a 10-year suspension for

a subsequent offense.54

A 1998 evaluation of the effect of Maine’s law on repeat offenders, using FARS

data for 1982 through 1994 (N [sample size] = 874 for Maine; 5,808 for comparison

52 Kathryn Stewart, Literature Review on DWI Laws in Other Countries (Washington: National Highway

Traffic Safety Administration, 2000) 13-28.

53 Ralph K. Jones and John H. Lacey, Evaluation of An Individualized Sanctioning Program for DWI

Offenders (Washington: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1998) 1-3.

54 The law also mandated a 2-year license suspension for those who refuse to submit to a breath test.

Countermeasures–Laws

• High-BAC

• Zero-BAC for convicted DWI 

offenders

• Administrative License 

Revocation

• Limits on plea bargaining of DWI 

offenses to non-alcohol-related 

charges

• 10-year minimum look-back 

period for DWI offenses
Chapter 3 15 Safety Report

States), determined that the Maine law had resulted in a 25-percent decline in the

proportion of repeat offender drivers in fatal crashes, and a 31-percent decline in fatally

injured repeat offenders with a 0.05-percent or greater BAC. The number of fatally injured

repeat offenders with prior DWIs and a high BAC (0.15 percent or greater) declined

35 percent.55 In other words, the measure had a greater effect at the higher BAC levels.

The authors (Hingson, Heeren, and Winter) reported that for other States in New England,

these proportions increased during the same period. In 1995, the Maine legislature

changed the 0.05-percent BAC law for convicted offenders to a zero-BAC law. The 1995

change has not been evaluated. 

Since it is applied administratively, the zero-BAC law for repeat offenders relieves

the courts of the burden of trying to enforce sobriety as a condition of probation. It also

sets a clear standard—no alcohol when driving—for convicted DWI offenders. 

Law Enforcement Strategies

This section discusses the role of law enforcement in deterrence, focusing on the

use of checkpoints, administrative license revocation, and license suspension enforcement

as effective countermeasures against hard core drinking driving.

Checkpoints

Sobriety checkpoints are an important

enforcement strategy for detecting impaired drivers,

but more importantly, for deterring individuals from

drinking and driving.56 The Safety Board recognized

checkpoint effectiveness in its 1984 Repeat Offender

Study. In another 1984 safety study, Deterrence of

Drunk Driving: The Role of Sobriety Checkpoints and

Administrative License Revocations, the Safety Board strongly supported the use of

sobriety checkpoints, and the Safety Board continues to believe that checkpoints are one

of the most effective, highly visible measures in deterring individuals from drinking and

driving. Despite the success of checkpoints, only 39 States currently use them, and many

of those States conduct checkpoints only at holidays and do not conduct them Statewide.

55 These declines were statistically significant. Ralph Hingson, Timothy Heeren, and Michael Winter,

“Effects of Maine’s 0.05% Legal Blood Alcohol Level for Drivers with DWI Convictions,” Public Health

Reports 113 (Sep.-Oct. 1998) 443.

56 To be operated in a constitutionally permissible manner, sobriety checkpoints must be conducted in

accordance with conditions specified in two U.S. Supreme Court cases: Michigan Dept. of State Police v.

Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) and Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). Generally, this means that

checkpoints must be planned and approved by police command levels, public notice (including warning

devices and visible police authority) must be given, provisions for safety must be included in the plan, and

vehicles must be stopped on a non-discriminatory basis. Public support for sobriety checkpoints appears to

be strong. A 1993 Gallup poll indicates that 74 to 79 percent of respondents favored the use of checkpoints

to combat impaired driving. Gallup/Mothers Against Drunk Driving Survey (1994). 

Countermeasures–Enforcement

• Frequent sobriety checkpoints in 

all states

• Driving while suspended or 

unlicensed enforcement
Chapter 3 16 Safety Report

Starting in 1993, North Carolina conducted a multi-year program that consisted of

alternating checkpoints for sobriety and safety belt use. Publicity in the media announced

the checkpoint in use during any given 3-month period. Through 1998, North Carolina

conducted more than 22,000 checkpoints, identifying over 35,000 DWI violators and

nearly 50,000 drivers without licenses.57 The State reported that it reduced the percentage

of drivers with illegal BAC levels (0.08 percent or greater) stopped at checkpoints during

the course of the program by more than half (from 1.98 percent of those tested to

0.90 percent.) 

In 1994, the Tennessee Highway Patrol and local agencies also provided personnel

for Statewide checkpoints there. Checkpoints were conducted every weekend for a year

and were accompanied by extensive media coverage. The program achieved a statistically

significant reduction equivalent to nine alcohol-related fatal crashes per month. Fatal

crashes linked to impaired driving were reduced by 20.4 percent.58

Administrative License Revocation

Administrative license revocation (ALR) authorizes the arresting police officer, as

an agent of the driver licensing agency, to confiscate the license of a driver who refuses or

who takes and fails a chemical test for alcohol. The license is typically confiscated on the

spot, and a temporary license document is issued to the driver. This temporary permit

usually has a 14- to 30-day time limit in which the offender may request an administrative

hearing. Appeals are usually authorized, but typically do not stay the suspension. 

The Safety Board has previously recommended enactment of administrative

license revocation laws (H-84-13, H-84-17, and H-89-2),59 as it believes that

administrative license revocation is an effective countermeasure against drinking and

driving in general, including hard core drinking driving. With NHTSA and others, the

Safety Board started the ALR Coalition to promote State action on these

recommendations. In January 1983, only 6 States had ALR laws. By January 2000,

40 States and the District of Columbia had ALR laws.

Studies by NHTSA and the Department of Justice indicate that ALR laws are

effective in reducing alcohol-related crashes (e.g., they have brought about a 13- to

19-percent reduction in adult drivers in fatal crashes).60 A 1999 NHTSA study estimated

57 Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, “North Carolina Belt Use Peaks at 84 Percent; Future Gains

Sought,” Status Report 33:2 (7 Mar. 1998) 5 <http://www.highwaysafety.org/srpdfs/sr3302.pdf>. 

58 John H. Lacey, Ralph K. Jones, and Randolph G. Smith, An Evaluation of Checkpoint Tennessee:

Tennessee’s Statewide Sobriety Checkpoint Program (Washington: National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration, 1998) 20 <http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/search97cgi/s97_cgi.exe>.

59 National Transportation Safety Board, Deterrence of Drunk Driving: The Role of Sobriety Checkpoints

and Administrative License Revocations. NTSB/SS-84-01 (Washington: National Transportation Safety

Board, 1984); National Transportation Safety Board, Highway Accident Report, Pickup Truck/Church

Activity Bus Head-on Collision and Fire near Carrollton, Kentucky, May 14, 1988. NTSB/HAR-89-01

(Washington: National Transportation Safety Board, 1989). 

60 Robert B. Voas and A. Scott Tippetts, The Relationship of Alcohol Safety Laws to Drinking Drivers in

Fatal Crashes DOT HS 808 980 (Washington: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1999)

11-13. 
Chapter 3 17 Safety Report

that 1,359 lives were saved in 1997 in States with ALR laws.61 ALR also has been shown

to have a specific deterrence effect, delaying or deterring repeat offenses even after the

period of suspension has ended.62

License Suspension Enforcement

Hard core drinking drivers who drive while their driver’s licenses are either

suspended or revoked for a prior DWI offense are a serious problem because these drivers

pose a substantial risk of harm to the general driving public. A Safety Board analysis of

1998 FARS data showed that, if involved in a fatal crash, drivers with suspended or

revoked licenses and a prior DWI are 4.43 times more likely to be drinking at the time of

the crash than drivers with a valid license and no prior DWI. This analysis also determined

that, based on 1998 FARS data, 70 percent of drivers in fatal crashes with suspension or

revocation and prior DWI were drinking at the time of the crash. Only 16 percent of legal

drivers with no DWI conviction history who were also involved in fatal crashes were

drinking. The success of license suspension and revocation in combating recidivism and

crashes has been well documented for over 20 years. Research from California and other

States has shown that license suspension effectively reduces DWI recidivism and

crashes.63

Despite the value of this sanction, NHTSA summarized several California studies

showing that up to 75 percent of drivers who have their licenses suspended for any reason,

including DWI-based suspensions and revocations, continue to drive during suspension or

revocation periods.64 One California study found that California drivers with suspended or

revoked licenses have 3.7 times the fatal crash rate of the average driver (N=1,043),65 and

a second study determined that the relative risk of fatal crash is substantially higher than

average among drivers suspended or revoked for drinking and driving offenses.66

In an analysis of national accident fatality data, NHTSA found that 43 percent of

the fatally injured drivers in 1998 with a positive BAC had a record of license suspension

or revocation.67 Canada has also reported substantial numbers of people driving on

suspended licenses. Transport Canada (the Canadian federal Ministry of Transport) notes

61 Voas and Tippetts, DOT HS 808 980, 14. 

62 Kathryn Stewart, Paul Gruenewald, and Theresa Roth, An Evaluation of Administrative Per Se Laws

(Washington: U.S. Department of Justice, 1989) 25.

63 James L. Nichols and H. Laurence Ross, “The Effectiveness of Legal Sanctions in Dealing with

Drinking Drivers,” Alcohol, Drugs and Driving 6: 2 (Los Angeles: University of California at Los Angeles,

Apr.-Jun. 1990) 33-60; David F. Preusser, Richard D. Blomberg, and Robert G. Ulmer, “Evaluation of the

1982 Wisconsin Drinking and Driving Law,” Journal of Safety Research 19 (1988) 24-40.

64 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, “California Impounds the Vehicles of Motorists

Caught Driving Without a Valid License,” Traffic Tech 180 (May 1998) 1.

65 David J. DeYoung, Raymond C. Peck, and Clifford J. Helander, “Estimating the Exposure and Fatal

Crash Rates of Suspended/Revoked and Unlicensed Drivers in California,” Accident Analysis and

Prevention 29:1 (1997) 21.

66 Raymond C. Peck, “Unlicensed Driving a Major California Safety Problem,” Research Notes (Summer

1997) 3.

67 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT HS 808 950, 3.
Chapter 3 18 Safety Report

that “if the system provides little in the way of additional sanctions for those who are

caught driving while suspended, their behaviour is unlikely to change.”68

Detecting Driving While Suspended (DWS) and Driving While Unlicensed

(DWU) offenders is difficult, because police require probable cause to stop drivers.69 State

and local agencies in California, Ohio, Florida, New York, West Virginia, Utah, and other

States have developed DWS enforcement-surveillance programs, which they report have

had positive results in reducing recidivism. The following programs provide a few

examples of State and local cooperation in enforcing driver license suspension and

revocation laws. 

In 1991, the State of Ohio instituted a “Habitual Offenders Tally” or “HOT sheet”

as part of its habitual offender program. The program targets five-time offenders with

currently suspended licenses. HOT sheets are tabulated for each county in the State and

provided to police agencies and sheriffs to target those who continue driving while

suspended. The State also publishes a monthly newsletter that reviews cases of multiple

offenders who are apprehended and recognizes officers who arrest multiple offenders. The

newsletter is provided to enforcement agencies, courts, and other agencies. From August

1, 1991, through May 1, 1994, police arrested approximately 1,400 of these habitual

offenders. Ohio reported that the program contributed to a 30-percent reduction in

alcohol-related fatalities over this period.70

Salt Lake County, Utah, also developed a HOT sheet program to increase

enforcement of license suspension and revocation laws. NHTSA reported that Salt Lake

County, with over 550,000 licensed drivers, has “an average of 50,000 drivers on

suspension at any given time.”71 To focus the program, the county identified 3,000 drivers

who had been suspended for impaired driving.72 In developing the HOT sheets, the police

and driver licensing agency identified one driver who had been suspended 50 times. Salt

Lake County developed 131 separate sheets for police agencies. These sheets were

distributed to patrol officers every 3 to 4 weeks. NHTSA reported that the program

resulted in a 14-percent increase in arrests for driving while suspended or revoked.73

The Merced County, California, Supervising Offenders by Enforcement Response

(SOBER) program incorporated a law enforcement link with probation for felony DUI

probationers (probation officers usually supervise court-ordered probations without police

68 Douglas J. Beirness, Herbert M. Simpson, and Daniel R. Mayhew, Evaluation of the Vehicle

Impoundment and Administrative License Suspension Programs in Manitoba TP13096 E (Ottawa: Traffic

Injury Research Foundation of Canada, 1997) 11. 

69 Beirness, Simpson, and Mayhew 11.

70 Ohio Department of Public Safety, Hot Sheet News (June 1994).

71 A.N. Moser, Jr. Guidelines for a Suspended or Revoked Operator Enforcement Program, National

Highway Traffic Safety Administration DOT HS 808 653 (Washington: National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration, n.d.) 2.

72 Moser 2.

73 Moser 2.
Sample Driving on Alcohol Suspension HOT Sheet

Lic # L. Name F. Name M. Name DOB State City Status Ht Wt Hair E

ROBIN 08/17/1949 KEARNS REVA 505 095 BDAVID J 03/25/1964 KEARNS REVA 511 190 BRO BTONY STEVE 06/06/1968 KEARNS REVA 507 130 BRO BEDVARDO RUDOLFO 01/14/1962 KEARNS REVA 507 150 BROBERT ELLIS 12/30/1961 KEARNS REVA 509 175 BLD HALLAN M 03/07/1956 KEARNS REVA 508 150 BROBERT ANTHONY 09/20/1948 KEARNS REVA 508 210 BLK BDARRIN DEE 05/05/1962 KEARNS REVA 600 180 RED BMARK D 03/13/1958 KEARNS REVA 602 188 BKENNETH JACOBSEN 07/02/1942 KEARNS REVA 506 145 BRO BGLEN ALFRED 02/07/1952 KEARNS REVA 600 160 BWILFORD 07/18/1968 KEARNS REVA 507 200 BLK BJOEL A 12/10/1961 KEARNS REVA 511 135 BLD BROBERT D 05/23/1963 KEARNS REVA 510 175 BRO BRICKY 04/21/1965 KEARNS REVA 504 195 BLK B
Chapter 3 20 Safety Report

support).74 A deputy probation officer and a California Highway Patrol officer were

teamed to supervise all felony DUI probationers in the county. Merced County indicated

that it had 172 felony DUI probationers, representing over 372 DUI convictions. Prior to

the SOBER program, Merced County reportedly mingled DUI probationers’ cases with

other offenders on conventional (limited supervision) probation or placed DUI cases on

the unsupervised caseload. That caseload group reportedly had no probation officer

contact unless they were re-arrested. In 3 months of operations, the SOBER program

reported a “ten percent return to custody on violations.” The SOBER program also

reported that it cleared more than 3 percent of outstanding warrants and enforced

probation conditions of treatment.75

For those drivers who persist in driving on a license that was suspended for a DWI

offense, the next step is to limit vehicle use or separate them from the vehicle they were

driving when they were arrested, and possibly from any other vehicle to which they may

have access. The next section of this chapter discusses various ways to accomplish that

objective.

Vehicle Sanctions 

Vehicle sanctions include license plate

impoundment, vehicle immobilization, vehicle

impoundment, and vehicle forfeiture, as well as

ignition interlock devices. These sanctions may be

used in combination with administrative license

suspension or revocation to punish and deter hard

core drinking drivers. According to the

Transportation Research Board, “the most hopeful

approach to controlling these individuals is not so

much reform as incapacitation, rendering the crime difficult or impossible for those who

would otherwise be motivated to commit it.”76 Vehicle sanctions substantially decrease the

opportunity for hard core drinking drivers to operate vehicles illegally. These sanctions

“add to the incapacitation effects of license sanctions by removing at least one vehicle

from potential use by the offender ...and ...serve as general deterrents for others who

might drink and drive or who might drive while suspended or revoked.”77

74 Generally, a non-injury DUI offense is a misdemeanor. A fourth or subsequent non-injury DUI offense

is a felony. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Digest of State Alcohol-Highway Safety

Related Legislation, 18th Edition DOT HS 809 008 (Washington: National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration, 1999).

75 California Office of Traffic Safety, Tracks, 12:2 (Sacramento: California Office of Traffic Safety,

1997).

76 H. Laurence Ross, Kathryn Stewart, and Anthony C. Stein, “Vehicle-Based Sanctions: An Overview,”

Strategies for Dealing with the Persistent Drinking Driver, ed. Barry Sweedler, Transportation Research

Board Circular 437 (1995) 49.

Countermeasures–Vehicle Actions

• License plate impoundment

• Ignition interlock devices

• Vehicle immobilization

• Vehicle impoundment

• Vehicle forfeiture
Chapter 3 21 Safety Report

License Plate Impoundment

Minnesota includes license plate impoundment as one sanction for drinking and

driving and authorizes its use against offenders with three DWIs in 5 years or four or more

DWIs in 10 years. Minnesota initially required judges to order this sanction, but despite

this directive, the sanction was rarely imposed.78 The law was subsequently amended to

permit police to impound and destroy license plates upon arrest, even when the offender

does not own the vehicle. Use of the sanction dramatically increased once police received

the authority to impound the plates themselves.79 A Minnesota study determined that

administrative impoundment is less hindered than judicial enforcement, and results in

swifter punishment that appears to be applied more uniformly.80 In cases involving thirdtime offenders subject to administrative impoundment, the recidivism rate was half that of

offenders who qualified for but were not subjected to the sanction. In this study, Rodgers

found that after 12 months, the test group had a recidivism rate of 8 percent and the control

group had a recidivism rate of 16 percent. After 24 months, the recidivism rates were

13 percent and 26 percent, respectively.

The study concluded that plate impoundment is extremely efficient, avoiding

many of the logistical difficulties that might be encountered with other vehicle sanctions

such as vehicle immobilization and impoundment. The license plates can be removed and

disposed of easily, rendering the vehicle virtually unable to be driven.

Vehicle Immobilization

Vehicles can be immobilized through the use of a device that either locks the

steering wheel (a “club”) or one that locks the vehicle’s wheel (a “boot”). Because the

vehicle can remain on the offender’s premises, this vehicle sanction eliminates the storage

problems and potential costs associated with vehicle impoundment; the vehicle’s presence

may also serve as a constant reminder to the offender.81

Ohio amended its immobilization statute in 1993, extending the application of

immobilization from DWS only to include repeat DWI offenders as well. Under Ohio’s

law, vehicles are seized at the time of the driver’s arrest and are held until the hearing.

Upon conviction of an offender, courts can order 30 days of immobilization for the first

DWS offense, 60 days for the second DWS offense, 90 days for the second DWI offense,

and 180 days for the third DWI offense. Upon the third DWS or the fourth DWI offense,

an offender’s vehicle is forfeited.82

77 Kathryn Stewart, “Streamlined Vehicle-Based Sanctions: Specific and General Deterrence Effects,”

Strategies for Dealing with the Persistent Drinking Driver, ed. Barry Sweedler, Transportation Research

Board Circular 437 (1995) 51.

78 Alan Rodgers, “Effect of Minnesota’s License Plate Impoundment Law on Recidivism of Multiple

DWI Violators,” Alcohol, Drugs and Driving 10: 2 (1994) 128.

79 Rodgers 133.

80 Rodgers 133.

81 Simpson, Mayhew, and Beirness, Dealing with the Hard Core Drinking Driver 96.

82 Robert B. Voas, A. Scott Tippetts, and Eileen Taylor, “Temporary Vehicle Immobilization: Evaluation

of a Program in Ohio,” Accident Analysis and Prevention 29: 5 (1997) 635-36.
Chapter 3 22 Safety Report

A study of Franklin County’s use of Ohio’s immobilization provisions found that

brief impoundment followed by immobilization significantly reduced DWS and DUI

offenses. The effects appeared to last beyond the sanction period, suggesting that

temporary loss of a vehicle may promote specific deterrence against drinking and driving

even after return of the vehicle.83

Vehicle Impoundment

Impounding the vehicle of a suspended driver has also been found effective in

reducing recidivism. The effects of vehicle impoundment in four jurisdictions have been

evaluated. A discussion of these evaluations follows.

In 1994, California passed two bills creating an impoundment and forfeiture

program. Senate Bill 1758 authorized police to arrest DWS and DWU offenders and have

their vehicles towed to an impound lot. Registered owners could reclaim their vehicles at

the conclusion of the impoundment period (generally 30 days), by showing a valid

driver’s license and by paying the administrative charge, tow costs, and impound costs.

Assembly Bill 3148 provided for forfeiture of vehicles when the offender was the

registered owner and had had a previous DWS or DWU conviction, although a family

member with a community property interest could take the vehicle.

A review of both the specific and general deterrent effects of the California

impoundment provisions determined that there were statistically significant differences

between the test and control groups in their subsequent DWS or DWU conviction rates,

subsequent traffic conviction rates, and subsequent crash rates. 84 According to these

findings, reductions ranged from 18 to 34 percent for subsequent convictions and from

25 to 38 percent for subsequent crashes.85

While California’s impoundment program was successful in specific deterrence, it

was not so successful in general deterrence. Upon implementation of the impoundment

legislation, California experienced a drop in crashes among all suspended and revoked

drivers, whether or not they received the impoundment sanction. However, the crash level

returned to the pre-legislation levels relatively quickly, and drivers from the control group

(those individuals who faced no threat of receiving this sanction) experienced the same

reduction in crash levels.86 Had this legislation created general deterrence, the crash levels

among suspended and revoked drivers should have remained lower than pre-legislation

levels.87

83 Voas, Tippetts, and Taylor, “Temporary Vehicle Immobilization” 641.

84 David J. DeYoung, An Evaluation of the General Deterrent Effect of Vehicle Impoundment on

Suspended, Revoked and Unlicensed Drivers in California RSS-98-180 (Sacramento: California Department

of Motor Vehicles, 1998) 5.

85 David J. DeYoung, An Evaluation of the Specific Deterrent Effect of Vehicle Impoundment on

Suspended, Revoked and Unlicensed Drivers in California RSS-97-171 (Sacramento: California Department

of Motor Vehicles, 1997) 38-42.

86 DeYoung, RSS-98-180, 35.

87 DeYoung, RSS-98-180, 36-38.
Chapter 3 23 Safety Report

DeYoung hypothesized that perhaps suspended and revoked drivers had learned

about the selective use of impoundment throughout the State and, therefore, did not fear

the sanction sufficiently for it to succeed as a general deterrent.88 Sanctions need to be

frequent and visible to achieve general deterrence. Because the research shows that

California’s impoundment program did produce a significant specific deterrent,

impoundment remains a viable sanction.89 Furthermore, the reviewer hypothesized that

“the longer that these measures are used, and the more consistently and widely they are

applied, the more likely it is that they will eventually exert a significant general deterrent

impact as well as a specific deterrent one.” 90

A local program in San Francisco demonstrates the potential for impoundment’s

success in reducing crashes, as well as the potential for an impoundment program to be

economically self-sufficient when it has been carefully conceived and implemented. San

Francisco passed an ordinance imposing a $150 administrative fee on impounded cars. In

1995, the first year of the program, 7,066 vehicles were impounded. In that year, San

Francisco experienced a 26-percent reduction in crashes causing fatalities and injuries,

and a 25-percent reduction in hit-and-run crashes. DWI enforcement increased as well,

and a significant reduction in crime was also reported. The administrative fees associated

with the impoundment program generated $721,000 in revenue; an additional $1 million

was collected from offenders for unpaid traffic citations, vehicle registration, and towing

fees. The funds recovered were sufficient to pay the costs of the program. San Francisco’s

undertaking illustrates the positive effects that can be derived from such an impoundment

program.91 This countermeasure appears to be especially effective with repeat DWI

offenders and other high-risk drivers whom the State has had difficulty reaching through

other means.

Other studies have also supported the effectiveness of impoundment programs. In

their 1997 evaluation, Beirness, Simpson, and Mayhew analyzed the administrative

impoundment program established in Manitoba, Canada, to specifically support its

administrative license suspension program; they studied the re-arrest rate for DWS

offenders in the first 3 months following the initial violation and discovered that once the

impoundment program was begun, the re-arrest rate dropped significantly. 92

In Hamilton County, Ohio, an impoundment program led to a 40-percent reduction

in repeat offenses for DWS and DWI; analysis also found a 44- to 84-percent reduction in

offense recurrence compared to offenders whose vehicles were not impounded.

Reductions in offenses continued even after impounded vehicles were returned. Continued

reductions ranged between 9 and 53 percent for DWS offenses and between 28 and 58

percent for DWI offenses.93

88 DeYoung, RSS-98-180, 37.

89 DeYoung, RSS-98-180, 38.

90 DeYoung, RSS-98-180, 38.

91 California Office of Traffic Safety, Tracks 12: 2 (1997).

92 Douglas J. Beirness, Herbert M. Simpson, and Daniel R. Mayhew 57.
Chapter 3 24 Safety Report

The researchers (DeYoung, Beirness, Simpson, Mayhew, Voas, Tippetts, and

Taylor) found that all of the programs described had to overcome a variety of logistical

and legal barriers, including considerations for vehicles not owned by offenders, concerns

about employment and family needs, and costs associated with towing and storage. The

studies also determined, however, that all of the jurisdictions described above have been

able to deal with these issues sufficiently well to demonstrate significant impacts on

recidivism and crashes.

Vehicle Forfeiture

Vehicle forfeiture is the strongest and least-applied vehicle sanction. It is, in most

jurisdictions, a discretionary sanction imposed by the courts. Vehicle forfeiture may

involve high administrative and legal processing costs because of the property rights of

the owners. Forfeiture may be costly in staff time, and localities may have difficulty in

recovering costs through vehicle sales.94 Portland, Oregon, operates a vehicle forfeiture

program, and has seen the recidivism rate of offenders whose vehicles were seized drop to

about half that of offenders who were not subjected to the sanction.95 However, there was

no difference experienced between offenders whose vehicles were merely impounded and

offenders whose vehicles were forfeited.96

In an attempt to deter drinking drivers, New York City implemented a vehicle

confiscation program for DWI offenders in February 1999 based upon the city’s authority

to confiscate money and property that are the instrumentality of a crime. New York’s

impoundment and confiscation program applies to all offenders, even first offenders,

because in New York State, first-time offenders are responsible for 87 percent of

DWI-related fatalities.97

While the results of the program have not yet been subjected to scientific

evaluation, early indications imply that vehicle confiscation may be effective. Between

February 22 and December 31, 1999, New York City seized 1,458 vehicles and demanded

forfeiture of 827 vehicles. According to the New York City Police Department, who

compared the first 10.5 months of the program in 1999 to a similar period in 1998, the city

achieved a 14.4-percent decrease in alcohol-related crashes (from 1,660 in 1998 to 1,421

in 1999) and a 32.2-percent decrease in alcohol-related fatalities (from 31 in 1998 to 21 in

1999). Alcohol-related arrests declined 18.3 percent (from 4,170 to 3,407) in the same

period.98 The program has been highly publicized and duplicated in a number of other

93 Robert B. Voas, A. Scott Tippetts, and Eileen Taylor, Effectiveness of the Ohio Vehicle Action and

Administrative License Suspension Laws DOT HS 809 000 (Washington: National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration, 1999) 31-37.

94 Robert B. Voas, Assessment of Impoundment and Forfeiture Laws for Drivers Convicted of DWI Phase

I Report: Review of State Laws and their Application DOT HS 807 870 (Washington: National Highway

Traffic Safety Administration, 1992) 57.

95 DeYoung, RSS-98-180, 4.

96 DeYoung, RSS-98-180, 4.

97 George A. Grasso, “New York City Drunk Driving Forfeiture Initiative,” Impaired Driving Update III:

3 (Kingston: Civic Research Institute, Summer 1999) 51.
Chapter 3 25 Safety Report

New York State jurisdictions. In an important review, the Supreme Court of the State of

New York, New York Division, has upheld the vehicle confiscation program.

Ignition Interlocks

Ignition interlocks, sometimes called breath alcohol ignition interlock devices (IID

or BAIID), are designed to prevent an impaired driver from operating a vehicle. These

devices are designed with a variety of safeguards such as temperature sensors and “rolling

re-tests” (followup tests while the car is being driven) to reduce the chance that impaired

drivers or other persons may defeat the IID. While IIDs can be used at any point in the

sanction process, a “hard” license suspension period (no hardship license is granted) is an

effective sanction that has been required by Congress in several DWI grant programs for

the States (23 USC 408, 410, 164). IIDs can function as a means of providing mobility to

offenders after a period of license suspension. Studies of IID effectiveness have been

conducted in Alberta, Canada; Ohio; Maryland; and West Virginia.99

IIDs are authorized for use in 36 States (see appendix B). In these States, the courts

may choose to impose IIDs on certain offenders. Use of the sanction is limited by the

interest of the courts and an offender’s financial status (offenders pay the costs associated

with the device), although provisions can be made for indigent offenders in most States.

However, a reported 90 percent of offenders given the option (by the court) choose license

suspension over the IID.100

IIDs have been found effective in preventing alcohol-impaired driving to the

extent that they are used on cars owned or operated by the offender while the IIDs are

installed. An Alberta, Canada, evaluation found IIDs to be effective for first offenders as

well as for hard core drinking drivers. During the IID program, offenders assigned IIDs

were only half as likely to incur a repeat DWI offense as were offenders who received

a license sanction alone. Also, IID participants were only one-fourth as likely to receive a

serious traffic violation or be involved in an injury crash as offenders who received

a license sanction alone. However, the effect of the IID on driving behavior gradually

decreased after the IIDs were removed.101 

98 Howard Safir, George A. Grasso, and Robert F. Messner, “The New York City Police Department DWI

Forfeiture Initiative,” presented May 2000 at T2000 Conference of the International Council on Alcohol,

Drugs, and Traffic Safety, Stockholm, Sweden.

99 Kenneth H. Beck et. al., “Effects of Ignition Interlock License Restrictions on Drivers with Multiple

Alcohol Offenses: A Randomized Trial in Maryland,” American Journal of Public Health 89: 11 (Nov.

1999) 1698; Barbara J. Morse and Delbert S. Elliott, “Effects of Ignition Interlock Devices on DUI

Recidivism: Findings from a Longitudinal Study in Hamilton County, Ohio,” Crime and Delinquency 38: 2

(1992) 152-153; A. Scott Tippetts and Robert B. Voas, The Effectiveness of the West Virginia Interlock

Program (Bethesda, Maryland: The Pacific Institute, 1996); Michael Weinrath, “The Ignition Interlock

Program for Drunk Drivers: A Multivariate Test,” Crime and Delinquency 43: 1 (1997) 56-57. 

100 Robert B. Voas, et. al. “The Alberta Interlock Program: The Evaluation of a Provincewide Program on

DUI Recidivism,” Addiction 94: 12 (1999) 1849.

101 Weinrath 56-57.
Chapter 3 26 Safety Report

In Hamilton County, Ohio, the IID group was slightly more than one-third as likely

to receive a repeat DWI offense compared to the license suspension group over a

30-month period (3.4-percent failure rate, compared to 9-percent).102

In the Maryland Drunk Driver Monitoring Program (DDMP), multiple offenders

were randomly assigned to IID and control groups. The DDMP participants all received

assessment and long-term tracking and follow-up. Some also received license sanctions

and were required to participate in treatment, including Alcoholics Anonymous. In the

first year, the IID group had a recidivism rate 65 percent lower than the control group.103

An update of the Maryland DDMP study found, however, “no evidence that the first-year

benefits extended into the second year” when IIDs were no longer required.104 The

implication is that chronic or hard core DWI offenders may require long-term IID

installation. 

West Virginia also used IIDs for DWI offenders. The West Virginia evaluation

showed a 6.4-percent recidivism rate over 12 months for the comparison group, while the

recidivism rate for the IID group over the same period was only 1.6 percent.105

The above studies indicate that IIDs reduce recidivism with all DWI offenders as

long as the devices remain on the vehicle. According to these studies, the major problem

with IIDs is their low use rate and the apparent judicial disinclination to assign them to

hard core drinking drivers. One California study found that courts ordered fewer than 15

percent of repeat offenders to install IIDs.106 It may be that the devices should be

administratively imposed by the licensing agency as a condition for restricted license

reinstatement, subsequent to a period of plate confiscation, impoundment, or

immobilization. IIDs could be used in conjunction with restoration of the offender’s

vehicle registration and license plates. The positive evaluation results and the Maryland

experience indicate that IIDs could be useful over a long period (1-3 years) as part of a

comprehensive program to reduce hard core drinking driver recidivism.

Most State laws authorize IID use for repeat DWI offenders. The above-cited

studies of IID programs suggest that high-BAC first offenders could benefit from IIDs,

while repeat DWI offenders (based on research in Maryland) may require a longer period

of IID installation than first offenders.107 IID installation could also be used in conjunction

with or subsequent to other driver license (hard suspension) and vehicle sanctions. IIDs

could be part of a State’s effort to control hard core drinking drivers and could be

administratively assigned to offenders that meet the NTSB hard core drinking driver

102 Morse and Elliott 152-153.

103 Beck et. al. 1698.

104 Beck et. al. 1698-99. 

105 Tippetts and Voas.

106 Leonard A. Marowitz, “Evaluation of the Efficacy of Ignition Interlock in California,” Research Notes

(Fall 1999).

107 Beck et.al. 1698-99.
Chapter 3 27 Safety Report

definition. IID installation could also be used in conjunction with or subsequent to other

vehicle sanctions. 

Limits To Plea Bargaining And 

Diversion Programs

This section discusses laws that prohibit plea bargaining of alcohol-related

offenses to other types of offenses and diversion programs.

Plea Bargaining Limits

A State law that limits plea bargaining can be effective in dealing with impaired

drinking drivers. In 1984, the Safety Board recommended eliminating the option of plea

bargaining a DWI offense to a non-alcohol-related offense (see appendix A). Sixteen

States currently restrict plea bargaining DWI offenses (see appendix B). Such restrictions

provide for an alcohol-related charge to be brought (filed) and a conviction record to be

retained for possible future enhancement.108 Such a law also means that adequately

supported cases are brought before the court. Plea bargaining limits do not mean that

charges cannot be reduced. Laws that limit plea bargaining typically require that the

reason for a plea bargain be entered into the public record. NHTSA research indicates that

these laws can reduce alcohol-related crashes.109 A NHTSA evaluation of plea-bargaining

limits in two States found reductions in DWI re-arrest recidivism. In Fort Smith,

Arkansas, the recidivism rate before the implementation of the law limiting plea

bargaining was 33 percent compared to 21 percent for the post-implementation period.

Louisville, Kentucky, reduced recidivism over a 3-year period from 23 percent to

19 percent in the post-implementation period. Lexington, Kentucky, achieved a greater

reduction than Louisville: recidivism was reduced in Lexington from 19 percent to

8 percent. 110 If no record of the original charge is maintained, plea bargaining a DWI

offense to a lesser, non-alcohol-related offense reduces the State’s ability to track prior

alcohol-related offenses.

DWI Offender Diversion Programs

The Century Council’s Hard Core Drinking Driver State review found 16 States

and the District of Columbia with some form of diversion programs provided for by State

108 The term “enhancement,” as used in this report, refers to treating subsequent DWI arrests as repeat

offenses, for which punishment is usually more severe than for first-time offenders. Some plea-bargaining

practices and diversion programs cause repeat offenses to appear as first-time offenses because the original

offense has been purged from the record or was never retained.

109 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, An Evaluation of the Elimination of Plea Bargaining

for DWI Offenders (Washington: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1989) 1, 9-10. A study of

the Fort Smith, Arkansas, policy limiting plea bargaining revealed that despite a gradual increase in

population, Fort Smith experienced a dramatic decrease in DWI citations and alcohol-related crashes.

110 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, An Evaluation of the Elimination of Plea Bargaining,

2-3.
Chapter 3 28 Safety Report

law or statewide practice.111 Some local courts and judges in other States also offer their

own diversion programs, although comprehensive data on community or individual courtbased programs in the other 34 States is not available. A diversion program may include

assessment and treatment in exchange for judicial consideration of a lesser charge or less

severe sanctions. Such reduced charges may be non-alcohol-related charges, such as

reckless driving. In some cases, charges may be dropped altogether. This diversion results

in less severe sanctions that may include voiding the license suspension in exchange for

treatment participation.

Diversion programs defer sentencing while offenders participate in assessment,

education, or treatment activities. DWI offenders may enter diversion programs with

judicial system approval. Courts have usually used diversion in a pre-sentence mode to

promote treatment participation. For example, Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and

Oregon have developed institutionalized programs. In Maryland, the DWI offender can

enter the Drunk Driver Monitoring Program under a judicial grant of “probation before

judgment.” If the offender successfully completes the program, the judgment (of guilt for

DWI) is vacated, and no record exists of the offense. Other States use a similar deferred

judgment technique that vacates the record if the offender participates in treatment and is

not rearrested (usually within a short period, such as 1 year). 

There is no evidence that diversion programs reduce recidivism. NHTSA reviewed

programs in Rochester and Syracuse, New York, and in Fresno, California, and found no

studies indicating its effectiveness.112 In its Guide to Sentencing DUI Offenders, NHTSA

also reported that “Programs allowing charge dismissal after completion of treatment

generally do not appear to reduce recidivism.”113

Diversion programs may weaken efforts to reduce DWI recidivism to the extent

that they allow offenders to avoid license suspension and an alcohol-related offense record

that can be used for subsequent offense enhancement. Further, there is no reliable

evidence that diversion reduces recidivism.

111 The Century Council, Combating Hardcore Drunk Driving (Washington: The Century Council, n.d.)

23-24. 

112 Wayne A. Harding, Robert Apsler, and Wendi A. Walsh, Assessment of Multiple DWI Offender

Restrictions DOT HS 807 605 (Washington: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1989) 34. In

the Board’s review of the literature, no studies were identified between 1989 and 1999 that indicated the

effectiveness of diversion programs. At the time this report was going to press, a study of the Maryland

diversion (indicating adverse effects of diversion) program was also published: W.J. Rauch et. al.,

“A Survival Analysis of Traffic Alcohol Recidivists in Maryland,” presented at 23rd Annual Scientific

Meeting of the Research Society on Alcoholism, Denver, Jun. 2000.

113 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, A Guide to Sentencing DUI Offenders DOT HS 808

365 (Washington: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1996) 11.
Chapter 3 29 Safety Report

Confinement

Confinement has long been held to be an effective measure of reducing DWI

recidivism for the simple reason that, for at least the term of imprisonment, jailed

offenders are not free to drive. However, time actually served by offenders may be very

brief. While 19 States mandate imprisonment for a first DWI offense conviction, 47 States

for a second conviction, and 46 States for a third conviction, minimum sentences range

between 24 and 72 hours for a first conviction, between 2 days and 6 months for a second

conviction, and between 2 days and 1 year for a third conviction.114 States also provide for

alternatives to imprisonment. Three common alternatives are community service,

treatment facility confinement, and home detention with electronic monitoring. Some

communities have experimented with special techniques such as intensive supervision

probation or “day reporting centers.” Several of these alternatives hold promise for

reducing recidivism.

Jail and Jail/Treatment Facilities

Jails and prisons are relatively finite resources

that are strained if required to incarcerate hard core

drinking drivers. While incarceration provides

punishment, and temporarily removes from the

community the threat the drinking driver poses, it

results in substantial community expense.115 On the

other hand, the real possibility of a long jail term may

provide sufficient incentive to offenders to motivate

their active participation in other programs that may be even more effective in reducing

recidivism.

Research on the effectiveness of jail has been equivocal. Three studies116 in the

1980s found that 2-day jail sentences had a general deterrent effect for first-time DWI

offenders, but Nichols and Ross concluded in 1990 that jail was ineffective.117 The high

cost of jail per offender per day may be a burden. State mandatory jail laws for DWI may

increase local government costs and adversely affect DWI adjudication with increased

jury trials and court crowding.

114 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Digest of State Alcohol-Highway Safety Related

Legislation 2-5−2-7.

115 James L. Nichols and Kevin Quinlan, “Prosecution, Adjudication, and Sanctioning: A Process

Evaluation of Post-1980 Activities,” Surgeon General’s Workshop on Drunk Driving: Background Papers

(1989) 124.

116 Cheryl L. Falkowski, The Impact of Two-Day Jail Sentences for Drunk Drivers in Hennepin County,

Minnesota (Springfield: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1984); Ralph K. Jones, et. al.,

Field Evaluation of Jail Sanctions for DWI DOT HS 807 325 (Springfield: National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration, 1988); and Paul L. Zador, et. al., Fatal Crash Involvement and Laws Against AlcoholImpaired Driving (Arlington: Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, 1988).

117 Nichols and Ross 43.

Countermeasures–Confinement

and Alternatives

• Jail–special DWI facilities

• Home detention with electronic 

monitoring

• Intensive supervision probation
Chapter 3 30 Safety Report

Alternatives to incarceration have also received attention. Special DWI facilities

have been developed in five States to provide structured incarceration and treatment for

DWI offenders. Some of these facilities permit work release so that the offender may

remain employed, but the facilities also may require periodic testing for alcohol use. On

average, incarceration in these facilities can last from 2 weeks to 90 days.118 This type of

incarceration is usually followed by an aftercare program or some form of monitored

probation. Maryland, Ohio, New York, and Massachusetts have developed facilities that

have been evaluated for their effectiveness.119 These evaluations found a significantly

reduced risk of recidivism for offenders who participated in the programs when compared

to offenders who received more conventional sanctions. In some cases, the documented

reductions in recidivism have been dramatic. For example, Baltimore County, Maryland,

has a 28-day residential treatment program with 24-hour supervision and a 1-year

aftercare program. This program is funded by court-imposed restitution fees and grants.

A study found that the program’s participants had a 4-percent recidivism rate compared to

a 35-percent recidivism rate for a comparison group of convicted drinking drivers.120

Alternatives To Confinement

Home Detention with Electronic Monitoring

Home detention with electronic monitoring was originally developed as a low-cost

alternative to imprisonment. Electronic monitoring involves the use of a base station

installed in the offender’s residence and connected to telephone lines, with a waterproof,

shock-resistant transmitter and a tamper alarm. The transmitter is attached to the offender,

usually on the ankle, and secured by a tamper-resistant strap. The transmitter has a limited

range for the purpose of controlling the offender’s movement. Monitoring can be

accomplished through telephone contact, but some devices also use video cameras or

portable breath testers. According to BI Incorporated, a community corrections and

monitoring firm, home detention with electronic monitoring is used in all 50 States, in

Puerto Rico, and in Canada.121 Using information provided by this company, the Safety

Board estimates that 75,000 persons are monitored with these systems each day. 

118 Robert Voas and A. Scott Tippetts, “Evaluation of Treatment and Monitoring Programs for Drunken

Drivers,” Journal of Traffic Medicine 18.

119 Harvey A. Siegel, Impact of a Driver Intervention Program on DWI Recidivism and Problem Drinking

DOT HS 807 203 (Washington: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1985); Harvey A. Siegel

et. al., Hardcore DUI Offender Research Initiative Findings and Recommendations (Wright State University

School of Medicine, 1999); Robert B. Voas and A. Scott Tippetts, The Impact of Treatment and Monitoring

on Prince George’s County DWI’s DOT HS 807 649 (Washington: National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration, 1989); and D.P. LeClair, Use of Prison Confinement for the Treatment of Multiple Drunk

Driving Offenders: An Evaluation of the Longwood Treatment Center (Massachusetts Department of

Corrections, National Institute of Justice Report, 1987).

120 Voas and Tippetts, “Evaluation of Treatment.”

121 Personal communication with Anita Pedersen-Smith, Director of Public Affairs, BI Inc., 28 Jun. 2000.
Chapter 3 31 Safety Report

One long-term (26 months) study determined that electronic monitoring is a safe,

low-cost, and cost-effective alternative to jail for DWI and DWS offenders. A 1996

evaluation of the Los Angeles County electronic monitoring program found that this

sanction was able to reduce recidivism from a rate of 6 percent (traditional sanctions) to

4 percent. The evaluation reported that “one year after entering the electronic monitoring

program, the recidivism of this group was about one-third less than that of the comparison

group.”122 The evaluator described the program as one designed to be self-sufficient, with

offenders paying monitoring fees based on their ability to do so. Average costs were

$15 per day. According to the study, electronic monitoring saved Los Angeles County an

estimated $1 million during the evaluation period compared to the cost of jailing these

offenders.123 In addition, the study found that home detention with electronic monitoring

can be an effective tool in reducing hard core drinking driver recidivism. To be effective,

however, this countermeasure requires a longer sanction period than a jail sentence (the

mean electronic monitoring period in Los Angeles was 83 days). 

Another alternative to imprisonment that is being used in some States is a day

reporting center that may require electronic monitoring and breath testing in addition to

education, counseling, and assistance. A limited evaluation of the Maricopa County,

Arizona, day reporting center found similar rates of recidivism between those assigned to

the center and those incarcerated; however, using the center cut costs nearly in half.124

Intensive Supervision Probation

Intensive supervision probation (ISP) is an infrequently used alternative that is

usually imposed post-conviction. ISP provides offenders with frequent and often

unscheduled contacts with probation officers. A typical probation officer caseload could

include as many as 200 or more probationers, while an ISP caseload is more likely to be

between 25 and 50. The lighter caseload enables ISP officers to maintain more frequent

contact with offenders assigned to them. 

Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, developed an unusual pre-trial ISP program for

repeat offenders. ISP participants received lighter sanctions than repeat offenders in a

comparison group, in exchange for more frequent monitoring. ISP usually lasted from 4 to

5 months for participating offenders. Evaluation of the program showed that recidivism

was significantly lower for the ISP group than for the comparison group. According to this

evaluation, after 1 year, the re-arrest recidivism for the ISP group (6 percent) was about

half that of the comparison group (11 percent).125

122 Ralph K. Jones, C.H. Wiliszowski, and John H. Lacey, Evaluation of Alternative Programs for Repeat

DWI Offenders DOT HS 808 493 (Washington,: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1996) 62.

123 Jones, Wiliszowski, and Lacey 58.

124 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, “Alternative Sentences for DWI Evaluation of a Day

Reporting Center,” Traffic Tech 210 (Washington: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Nov.

1999).

125 Jones, Wiliszowski, and Lacey 34.
Chapter 3 32 Safety Report

IIDs, intensive supervision probation, home detention with electronic monitoring,

and day reporting centers all share some common characteristics that may be important.

These programs all provide relatively frequent contact between offenders and those who

monitor their progress (for example, probation officers) and, to an extent, provide

structure for the offender. Some programs also provide guidance, education, treatment,

and support.

Court-ordered Individualized Sanctions 

for Repeat Offenders

Starting in 1992, the Rockdale County, Georgia, State Court developed a

customized sentencing program for DWI offenders. Sentences were imposed according to

the offense, history, and degree of the offender’s drinking problem. For example, a first

offender with no evidence of an alcohol problem could be sentenced to 2 days in jail, a

fine, and DWI-school participation. A repeat offender with an alcohol dependency or

related problem would receive a longer jail sentence, a larger fine, mandatory participation

in treatment, daily breath alcohol testing, and frequent supervision by a probation officer.

The court also developed its own pre-sentence investigation database to track offenders

and to develop the most appropriate and effective sanctions. All offenders received jail

time, 44 percent were required to participate in Alcoholics Anonymous, 48 percent were

required to provide periodic breath tests, and 20 percent were sentenced to home

detention, half of which also had electronic monitoring. 

The Rockdale County program participants had a 6-percent recidivism rate after

1 year and a 13.8-percent rate after 4 years, compared to an 11-percent recidivism rate

after 1 year and a 24.7-percent rate after 4 years for a neighboring jurisdiction.126 A key

element to the success of the Rockdale Court program may be its provision for frequent

contact with the offender, as in ISPs, ignition interlock programs, and programs of home

detention with electronic monitoring. 

126 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, “Individualized Sanctions for DWI Offenders

Reduce Recidivism” Traffic Tech 193 (Washington: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Feb.

1999) 2. 
33 Safety Report

Chapter 4

A Model Program To 

Reduce Crashes Involving 

Hard Core Drinking Drivers

The Safety Board’s review in Chapter 3 of countermeasures that reduce hard core

drinking driving identified a number of measures that appear to be effective in reducing

alcohol-related crashes by hard core drinking drivers. The societal cost of crashes

involving hard core drinking drivers, both in human and economic terms, demands that

additional action be taken by the States. Although all States have some components of a

program to reduce hard core drinking driving, the variations in countermeasures used

among the States are numerous, and no State uses all of the countermeasures that can

reduce hard core drinking driver crashes (see appendix B for tables of State laws). 

For example, 40 States and the District of Columbia have administrative license

revocation laws for DWI test refusal or failure. The Safety Board recommended this

countermeasure in 1984 and 1989 because administrative license revocation is an effective

measure to reduce alcohol-related crashes and fatalities, and studies by NHTSA and others

support this view. However, the States of Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, New

York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee currently

do not have laws authorizing administrative license revocation for BAC test failure or

refusal. 

Sobriety checkpoints are conducted in 39 States. Publicized DWI enforcement

including sobriety checkpoints can be very effective in identifying the hard core drinking

driver and in reducing alcohol-involved driving and alcohol-related crashes. The

Tennessee experience with weekly checkpoints indicates that this strategy is effective

when conducted frequently, regularly, and statewide. In addition to deterring drinking and

driving, checkpoints can be used to promote several other highway safety measures at the

same time, including checking for valid driver’s licenses, and safety belt use.127 Sobriety

checkpoints provide an opportunity to apprehend not only alcohol-impaired drivers but

also unlicensed drivers and those who are driving on suspended or revoked licenses.

Often, when licenses are checked at sobriety checkpoints, more unlicensed than impaired

drivers are found.128

127 The Tennessee and North Carolina checkpoint programs also reported thousands of arrests for other

offenses including stolen vehicles, illegal gun possession, drug offenses, and escaped felons. North Carolina

reported 6,173 drug violators, 788 firearms violations, 403 stolen vehicles, and 273 fugitive arrests from

1993 through 1997. Lacey, Jones, and Smith 20; Insurance Institute for Highway Safety 5.

128 Susan E. Martin and David F. Preusser, “Enforcement Strategies for the Persistent Drinking Driver,”

Strategies for Dealing with the Persistent Drinking Driver, ed. Barry Sweedler, Transportation Research

Board Circular 437 (1995) 41.
Chapter 4 34 Safety Report

Measures that separate hard core drinking drivers from their vehicles are used in

38 States and the District of Columbia. These measures include license plate action

(impoundment, confiscation, or other actions) (8 States), vehicle immobilization

(6 States), vehicle impoundment (12 States and the District of Columbia), and vehicle

forfeiture (28 States). To the extent permitted by the Constitution and applicable State law,

vehicle-based sanctions can be administratively ordered at the time of arrest. When taken,

this action ensures swift and certain punishment for the DWI offense and prevents

offenders from avoiding such sanctions by transferring possession of their vehicles to

family members or friends. Another vehicle sanction is the use of ignition interlocks,

which are devices that prevent an impaired driver from operating a vehicle. Thirty-eight

States permit the use of these devices in some manner, and at least five States have

statewide ignition interlock programs; statewide programs are being developed in other

States. Vehicle sanctions to separate the hard core drinking driver from his or her vehicle

or to prevent him/her from drinking while impaired appear to be effective tools in

reducing hard core drinking driver recidivism. 

Sixteen States have laws prohibiting plea-bargaining DWI cases, but eight of those

States limit the ban to specific conditions, such as when the DWI has caused an injury or

fatality. The Safety Board continues to support its 1984 recommendation to eliminate the

option of plea bargaining a DWI offense to a lesser, non-alcohol-related offense. This type

of plea bargaining reduces the State’s ability to track prior alcohol-related offenses when

no record is kept of the original charges brought. Laws restricting plea bargaining have

been found to reduce the number of DWI repeat offenses as well as the number of alcoholrelated crashes. 

Diversion programs that may include assessment and treatment in exchange for

judicial consideration of a lesser charge or less severe sanctions are used in many States.129

Diversion, like plea bargaining, interferes with the retention of accurate records for the

hard core drinking driver. Diversion programs that allow license retention or erasure of

offenses from the driver’s record may prevent the State from prosecuting hard core

drinking drivers as repeat offenders in the future. 

Fifteen States have a high-BAC “aggravated” or “extreme” DWI offense, but the

BAC that defines the offense varies from 0.15 percent to 0.20 percent. The elevated crash

risk and potential for recidivism of high-BAC (0.15 percent or greater) drivers constitute a

safety problem that warrants State legislation creating a high-BAC “aggravated” alcohol

offense. Two States have a low- or zero-BAC law for repeat DWI offenders; of these, only

Maine also has a high-BAC law (0.15 percent). 

No single countermeasure appears to be sufficient to address the hard core

drinking driver problem. The Safety Board does not believe that every State must have

identical countermeasures in place; however, the Board believes that a model program to

reduce hard core drinking driving would incorporate the following elements: 

129 The total number of States in which diversion programs are used was unavailable. As stated earlier,

16 States and the District of Columbia specifically provide for diversion by State law or Statewide practice.

Some local courts and judges in other States also offer diversion programs.
Chapter 4 35 Safety Report

• Frequent and well-publicized statewide sobriety checkpoints that include

checking for valid driver’s licenses. Checkpoints should not be limited to

holiday periods.

• Vehicle sanctions to restrict or separate hard core drinking drivers from their

vehicles, including license plate actions (impoundment, confiscation, or other

actions); vehicle immobilization, impoundment, and forfeiture; and ignition

interlocks for high-BAC first offenders and repeat offenders.

• State and community cooperative programs involving driver licensing

agencies, law enforcement officers, judges, and probation officers to enforce

DWI suspension and revocation.

• Legislation to require that DWI offenders who have been convicted or

administratively adjudicated maintain a zero BAC while operating a motor

vehicle.

• Legislation that defines a high BAC (0.15 percent or greater) as an

“aggravated” DWI offense that requires strong intervention similar to that

ordinarily prescribed for repeat DWI offenders. 

• As alternatives to confinement, programs to reduce hard core drinking driver

recidivism that include home detention with electronic monitoring and/or

intensive supervision probation programs.

• Legislation that restricts the plea bargaining of a DWI offense to a lesser, nonalcohol-related offense, and that requires the reasons for DWI charge

reductions be entered into the public record. 

• Elimination of diversion programs that permit erasing, deferring, or otherwise

purging the DWI offense record or that allow the offender to avoid license

suspension.

• Administrative license revocation for BAC test failure and refusal.

• A DWI record retention and DWI offense enhancement look-back period of at

least 10 years.

• Individualized sanction programs for hard core DWI offenders that rely on

effective countermeasures for use by courts that hear DWI cases.

The problem of hard core drinking drivers is complex. The optimal way to target

these drivers to reduce the crashes, injuries, and fatalities they cause is with a

comprehensive program that includes elements such as those suggested in the National

Transportation Safety Board’s Model Program. Therefore, the National Transportation

Safety Board believes that the Governors and Legislatures of the 50 States and the Mayor

and Council of the District of Columbia should establish a comprehensive program that is

designed to reduce the incidence of alcohol-related crashes, injuries, and fatalities caused

by hard core drinking drivers and that includes elements such as those suggested in the

National Transportation Safety Board’s Model Program. 

37 Safety Report

Chapter 5

Congressional Action On 

Drinking And Driving

This chapter includes a description of congressional efforts to address the drinking

and driving problem (including the hard core drinking driver) on the Nation’s roadways in

the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21). It then discusses several

ways to further enhance the overall effectiveness of TEA-21 to combat the hard core

drinking driver problem.

The TEA-21 Provisions 

The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) was enacted June 9,

1998, as Public Law 105-178. TEA-21 authorizes the Federal surface transportation

programs for highways, for highway safety, and for transit and other surface transportation

programs for a 6-year period, 1998-2003. A total of $2.7 billion is authorized for

nonconstruction highway safety programs; approximately $2.3 billion of these funds are

authorized for grant programs. TEA-21 builds on the initiatives established in the

Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA),130 which was the last

major authorizing legislation for Federal surface transportation programs. 

The new act combines the continuation and improvement of ongoing programs

with new initiatives. One new incentive program (Section 164) encourages States to

strengthen their repeat intoxicated driver laws.131 TEA-21 addresses impaired driving in

three sections, two of which include the topic of hard core drinking drivers: Section 410

provides for incentive grants to those States that meet the designated criteria and Section

164 authorizes penalties for States that do not meet certain requirements. 

Section 410: Incentive Grants to States

Section 410 provides $219.5 million over 6 years to the States, available through

three types of grants: Basic Grants A and B, and Supplemental Grants. States may apply

for one or more grants, which are awarded based on the State’s implementation of

programs to reduce traffic safety problems resulting from individuals driving while

intoxicated. 

130 Pub. L. 102-240. 18 Dec. 1991. Stat. 105.1914.

131 A State that does not have a law that meets the minimum standards described in the act by October 1,

2000, will have Federal-aid funds transferred from highway construction programs to the State’s highway

safety or hazard elimination programs.
Chapter 5 38 Safety Report

Under Basic Grant A, a State must satisfy five of seven criteria, which include

addressing administrative license revocation, underage drinking, intensive enforcement,

sobriety checkpoints, and high-BAC drinking drivers, among other issues (see appendix E

for a detailed list of criteria).

A State may also qualify for a Basic Grant B by demonstrating a reduction in its

percentage of fatally injured drivers with a BAC of 0.10 percent or greater during each of

the 3 most recent calendar years for which such statistics are available. The percentage of

these drivers must be lower than the national averages for the same 3 calendar years. 

States eligible for a basic grant may qualify for a Supplemental Grant by

implementing at least one of six programs; the options include a program to reduce

driving with a suspended license as well as an effective DWI tracking system

(see appendix E for a detailed list of the six options and a chart of funds authorized).

Section 164: Minimum Penalties 

for Repeat Offenders

Section 164 requires the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) to penalize any

State that fails to enact and enforce a repeat intoxicated driver law. If a State has not met

the requirements of Section 164 by the start of fiscal year (FY) 2001, the DOT must

transfer 1.5 percent of the State’s highway construction money provided under 23 U.S.C.

Section 104(b)(1), (3), and (4) to highway safety programs authorized by Federal law. The

amount of the penalty will increase to 3 percent in FY 2003. 

Section 164 requires mandatory minimum sanctions to be imposed against repeat

offenders who are convicted of a second or subsequent DWI offense within 5 years. These

mandatory minimum sanctions include license suspension; either vehicle impoundment,

immobilization, or installation of ignition interlock devices; assessment and treatment;

and either confinement or community service (see appendix E for a complete description).

TEA-21 Improvements

TEA-21 includes a substantial effort by Congress to address the hard core drinking

driver problem. By providing incentive grants to States that implement specified

countermeasures and penalizing those States that fail to enact certain life-saving alcohol

safety legislation, Congress has enlisted States in a national effort to combat hard core

drinking driving. The preceding chapter identified countermeasures that have proven

effective in the fight against hard core drinking driving. Based upon that discussion of

proven effective countermeasures, this section discusses several ways to further enhance

the overall effectiveness of TEA-21.

Definition of Repeat Offender

It should be noted that the TEA-21 definition of repeat offender applies only to

convictions and does not include offenders who have received only administrative
Chapter 5 39 Safety Report

sanctions such as those received under ALR laws. Administratively granted permits, such

as driver’s licenses, that are administratively withdrawn for DWI offenses should be

included in the TEA-21 repeat offender definition. 

Minimum Look-back Period 

for Repeat Offenses

Under TEA-21, mandatory minimum sanctions are imposed against repeat

offenders who are convicted of a second or subsequent offense for DWI or DUI within

5 years of a previous conviction for that offense. All States have enacted laws that define a

look-back period for enhancement of a DWI offense to a repeat offense.132 These periods

range from 3 years (Arkansas, Maryland, and Ohio) in length to the lifetime of the

offender (Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, and Vermont). The

NHTSA-operated National Driver Register (NDR) at one time had a records retention

period of 3 years. The NDR does not now retain records itself, but refers inquirers to State

databases.133 NHTSA has recommended that States retain records of major offenses,

including driving while impaired by alcohol or other drugs, for 10 years.134 The Safety

Board supports this recommendation.

Given the low likelihood of arrest and the need for long-term measures to change

the behavior of hard core drinking drivers, record-retention and look-back periods of

longer than 5 years are needed. 

Pre-adjudication Alcohol Assessment 

and Treatment

Section 164 of TEA-21 requires States to provide appropriate assessment and

treatment for repeat offenders. Pre-adjudication screening may be helpful in assigning

offenders effective sanctions, including ignition interlock, impoundment, and intensive

supervision probation (all of which are described in Chapter 3).135 Referral to treatment—

where an intake assessment, classification, and assignment to treatment modalities may be

132 Personal communication with Bill Holden, Chief, Driver Register and Traffic Records Division,

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 4 Feb. 2000.

133 The National Driver Register is a central repository of information, provided by the States, on

individuals whose licenses to operate a motor vehicle have been revoked, suspended, canceled, or denied, or

who have been convicted of certain serious traffic offenses such as driving while impaired by alcohol or

other drugs. As of 1998, all States and the District of Columbia converted to the Problem Driver Pointer

System (PDPS). Under PDPS, the NDR contains only identifying information to check whether an adverse

action has been taken against an individual. NDR no longer contains specific information regarding the

reason for the adverse action. When a match occurs with a record on the NDR file, the NDR electronically

points to the State of record for the adverse action. The State of record retrieves the information and relays it

to the State initiating the inquiry for verification and licensing decision.

134 The following States do not have a 10-year look-back period: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,

Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New

Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah,

Washington, and West Virginia.

135 Some States (Florida, Kansas, Nebraska, and West Virginia) conduct pre-adjudication screening. Most

States conduct assessment after adjudication. Accurate assessment is essential to effective adjudication and

treatment. Generally, States that require assessment do so only for second offenders.
Chapter 5 40 Safety Report

performed—is also effective if used in conjunction with other sanctions in an

individualized sanction process.

Intensive supervision probation, electronic monitoring, and jail-treatment (special

DWI) facilities appear to be effective in reducing hard core drinking driver recidivism and

share a common approach of frequent contact and long-term aftercare with the hard core

drinking driver. 

Substance abuse treatment for DWI offenders in the past has resulted overall in a

7- to 9-percent reduction in DWI recidivism.136 However, California has found treatment

in combination with license suspension and interlocks to be the most effective in

preventing DWI recidivism.137

The California Department of Motor Vehicles noted in its 1999 annual report that a

treatment and ignition interlock combination program had a “significantly lower 1-year

DUI incident rate” than license suspension. Over a 7-year period, treatment and license

suspension showed “the lowest re-offense rates...the jail sanction group accumulat[ed]

significantly higher rates than the other two [treatment and license suspension groups].”138

These findings reinforce the need for assigning DWI offenders not to treatment alone but

to a combination of sanctions that include treatment. 

The Safety Board believes that treatment of both high-BAC first offenders and

repeat offenders should be mandatory and should be imposed in conjunction with

sanctions that include vehicle immobilization and ignition interlock. Allowing treatment

to be a voluntary option invites its use by defense attorneys as a bargaining tactic.139 States

must use multiple avenues, including treatment, to reduce hard core drinking driving.

TEA-21 provisions may need revisions so that all hard core DWI offenders receive

appropriate sanctions.

Vehicle Sanctions Administratively 

Imposed at the Time of Arrest

TEA-21 requires that States impound, immobilize, or install IIDs on each of the

repeat offender’s vehicles. The immobilization requirement of Section 164 is linked to the

conviction of the offender. Based on a review of existing immobilization programs,

immobilization should occur at the time of arrest, not conviction, thereby both ensuring

that the immobilization will take place and preventing the repeat offender from

transferring vehicle ownership. As noted in Chapter 4, vehicle sanctions including

immobilization and impoundment should be imposed administratively when possible. 

136 House of Representatives, U.S. Congress, “A Factsheet on Alcohol-Impaired Driving from the Center

for Disease Control” Extension of Remarks E952 (Washington: House of Representatives, May 19, 1997).

137 Helen N. Tashima and Clifford J. Helander, 1999 Annual Report of the California DUI Management

Information System CAL-DMV-RSS-99-179 (Sacramento: California Department of Motor Vehicles,

Jan. 1999) 30, 38. 

138 Tashima and Helander 30.

139 Tashima and Helander 30. 
Chapter 5 41 Safety Report

TEA-21 mandates a 1-year license suspension period; Section 164 and the

NHTSA rule permit the installation of the IID device upon conclusion of this suspension

period. However, there is some question whether license reinstatement (after a 1-year

suspension) is sufficient motivation for offenders to elect IID installation. Voluntary use

and even court-mandated IID installation are limited to 15 percent or fewer of the eligible

offenders. Further, even when eligible for license reinstatement, only a small proportion of

DWI offenders choose to have their licenses reinstated. Accordingly, IID installation

permitted after a shorter period of license suspension might serve as an inducement to the

hard core drinking driver to install an IID. 

Community Service as an 

Alternative to Confinement

Among the other countermeasures of Section 164 of TEA-21, the repeat offender

provision requires that State laws mandate either community service or imprisonment for

repeat DWI offenders. Community service for DWI offenders was developed in the 1980s

as an alternative to jail because of high jail costs and limited available space. As of

January 2000, 10 States have laws providing for community service as an alternative to

jail for a first DWI conviction, 16 States for a second conviction, and 7 States for a third

conviction.140 While community service may help relieve the problem of limited jail

space, existing research has not identified any significant effects of community service on

recidivism or crashes.141 Since community service has no proven effect, the option in

TEA-21 permitting its substitution for imprisonment is of concern.

As an alternative, house arrest with electronic monitoring is an effective

countermeasure for reducing DWI recidivism. In its rule implementing section 164 of

TEA-21, NHTSA includes house arrest in its definition of imprisonment. The rule allows

States to give repeat offenders the option of a day-for-day substitution of house arrest for

jail.142 This substitution may not be prudent, in that jail terms for DWI offenders are

already usually short, and even mandatory minimums are not routinely imposed. House

arrest with electronic monitoring requires a longer sanction period (as has been stated, the

mean electronic monitoring period in Los Angeles was 83 days). States should consider

periods of house arrest with electronic monitoring that last sufficiently longer than a jail

sentence to reduce recidivism. 

The Safety Board concludes that TEA-21 may be more effective in assisting the

States to reduce the hard core drinking driver problem if it were modified to (a) include a

revised definition of “repeat offender” that included administrative actions, (b) require

mandatory treatment for hard core offenders, (c) establish an extended period (10 years

minimum) for records retention and DWI offense look-back; (d) require administratively

imposed vehicle sanctions including interlocks; (e) eliminate provisions for community

service as an alternative to incarceration; and (f) provide for the inclusion of house arrest

140 Jones, Wiliszowski, and Lacey 34.

141 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT HS 808 365, 8.

142 Robert B. Voas, “The NHTSA Rules on Repeat Intoxicated Driver Laws: An Important First Step to

Control High-Risk Drivers,” Impaired Driving Update (Spring 1999) 30.
Chapter 5 42 Safety Report

with electronic monitoring. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the U. S.

Department of Transportation should evaluate modifications to the provisions of TEA-21

so that it can be more effective in assisting the States to reduce the hard core drinking

driver problem, and recommend changes to Congress as appropriate. Considerations

should include (a) a revised definition of “repeat offender” to include administrative

actions on DWI offenses; (b) mandatory treatment for hard core offenders; (c) a minimum

period of 10 years for records retention and DWI offense enhancement; (d)

administratively imposed vehicle sanctions for hard core drinking drivers; (e) elimination

of community service as an alternative to incarceration; and (f) inclusion of house arrest

with electronic monitoring as an alternative to incarceration. 
43 Safety Report

Chapter 6

Conclusions

1. Efforts by public and private entities have contributed to substantial reductions since

1983 in the number of fatalities (23,646 to 15,794) and proportion (56 percent to

38 percent) of alcohol-related crashes. 

2. While hard core drinking drivers constituted only 0.8 percent (1 of 119) of all drivers

on the road in the National Roadside Survey, they constituted 27 percent of drivers in

fatal crashes during the same time period in 1996. These data clearly suggest that hard

core drinking drivers are overrepresented in fatal crashes.

3. Hard core drinking drivers (repeat offender drinking drivers with a prior DWI arrest

or conviction within the past 10 years and offenders with a blood alcohol

concentration of 0.15 percent or greater) pose an increased risk of crashes, injuries,

and fatalities. Therefore, the States should take measures to further reduce the

significant loss of human life and immense societal costs caused by hard core

drinking drivers. 

4. Administrative license revocation is an effective measure to reduce alcohol-related

crashes and fatalities. 

5. Publicized DWI enforcement including sobriety checkpoints can be very effective in

identifying the hard core drinking driver and in reducing alcohol-involved driving and

alcohol-related crashes. 

6. Sobriety checkpoints provide an opportunity to apprehend not only alcohol-impaired

drivers but also unlicensed drivers and those who are driving on suspended or

revoked licenses. 

7. Vehicle sanctions to separate the hard core drinking driver from his or her vehicle or

to prevent him or her from drinking while impaired appear to be effective tools in

reducing hard core drinking driver recidivism.

8. Laws restricting plea bargaining have been found to reduce the number of DWI repeat

offenses as well as the number of alcohol-related crashes. 

9. Diversion programs that allow license retention or erasure of DWI offenses from the

driver’s record may prevent the State from prosecuting hard core drinking drivers as

repeat offenders in the future. 
Chapter 6 44 Safety Report

10. The elevated crash risk and potential for recidivism of high-BAC (0.15 percent or

greater) drivers constitute a safety problem that warrants State legislation creating a

high-BAC “aggravated” alcohol offense. 

11. The optimal way to target hard core drinking drivers to reduce the crashes, injuries,

and fatalities they cause is with a comprehensive program that includes elements such

as those suggested in the National Transportation Safety Board’s Model Program. 

12. TEA-21 might be more effective in assisting the States to reduce the hard core

drinking driver problem if it were modified to (a) include a revised definition of

“repeat offender” that included administrative actions, (b) require mandatory

treatment for hard core offenders, (c) establish an extended period (10 years

minimum) for records retention and DWI offense look-back; (d) require

administratively imposed vehicle sanctions including interlocks; (e) eliminate

provisions for community service as an alternative to incarceration; and (f) provide

for the inclusion of home detention with electronic monitoring as an alternative to

incarceration. 
45 Safety Report

Chapter 7

Recommendations 

As a result of this review, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the

following safety recommendations:

The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Governors and 

Legislatures of the 50 States and the Mayor and Council of the District of 

Columbia—

Establish a comprehensive program that is designed to reduce the

incidence of alcohol-related crashes, injuries, and fatalities caused by hard

core drinking drivers and that includes elements such as those suggested in

the National Transportation Safety Board’s Model Program. (H-00-26)

The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the U.S. Department of 

Transportation

Evaluate modifications to the provisions of the Transportation Equity Act

for the 21st Century so that it can be more effective in assisting the States to

reduce the hard core drinking driver problem. Recommend changes to

Congress as appropriate. Considerations should include (a) a revised

definition of “repeat offender” to include administrative actions on drivingwhile-impaired offenses; (b) mandatory treatment for hard core offenders;

(c) a minimum period of 10 years for records retention and driving-whileimpaired offense enhancement; (d) administratively imposed vehicle

sanctions for hard core drinking drivers; (e) elimination of community

service as an alternative to incarceration; and (f) inclusion of home

detention with electronic monitoring as an alternative to incarceration.

(H-00-27)
Chapter 7 46 Safety Report

John A. Hammerschmidt, Member, did not concur with conclusion 12 or

recommendation H-00-27.

On July 5, 2000, Member Hammerschmidt filed the following dissenting opinion

on this report:

Notation 7256

Member HAMMERSCHMIDT, dissenting:

The definition of a “hard core drinking driver” that is used in this report as the

basis for proposed countermeasures is not the optimum definition. To brand a person as a

hard core drinking driver for a first offense at a BAC of .15 is not logical. “Hard core”

should refer to a habitual violator. In any event, the individual States and localities are

closest to the various facets of this safety problem and are in a better position to determine

what definitions would work best in their jurisdictions. Likewise, the States and localities

are also better able to assess what type of countermeasures are, or would be, most

effective, appropriate, and acceptable in their own jurisdictions. 

Because this report is primarily based on research and work conducted by people

outside of the Safety Board, it is difficult to provide a stamp of approval on the validity of

all that is being proposed. Nonetheless, the importance of this report is to focus attention

on the continuing problem of hard core drinking drivers and to highlight possible

approaches that could improve highway safety.

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

JAMES E. HALL

Chairman

JOHN A. HAMMERSCHMIDT

Member

JOHN J. GOGLIA

Member

GEORGE W. BLACK, JR.

Member

CAROL J. CARMODY

Member

Adopted: June 27, 2000
47 Safety Report

Appendix A

Progress of Prior 

Recommendations

Safety Recommendation No. H-84-13

Date Issued: 04/23/84

Recipients: Governors of Alabama, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois,

Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,

South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming

Recommendation: Enact legislation or utilize existing authority to provide for

administrative revocation of the licenses of drivers who refuse a chemical test for alcohol

or who provide a result at or above the state presumptive limit.

Status: With the exception of 6 States (Kentucky, Michigan, Montana,

Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Tennessee), administrative license revocation or

suspension for chemical test failure or refusal to submit to a chemical test for alcohol is

legislatively authorized in all of the States to which Recommendation H-84-13 was issued. 

__________________________________________

Safety Recommendation No. H-84-17

Date Issued: 04/23/84

Recipients: Governors of Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Maryland,

Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, South Dakota, Vermont, and Virginia

Recommendation: Enact legislation or utilize existing authority to provide for

administrative revocation of the licenses of drivers who refuse a chemical test for alcohol

or who provide a result at or above the state presumptive limit. 

Status: With the exception of 3 States (New Jersey, New York, and South Dakota),

administrative license revocation or suspension for chemical test failure or for refusal to

submit to a chemical test for alcohol is legislatively authorized in all of the States to which

Recommendation H-84-17 was issued.
Appendix A 48 Safety Report

Safety Recommendation No. H-84-77

Date Issued: 10/12/84

Recipients: Governors of the 50 States and the Mayor of the District of Columbia

Recommendation: Encourage the use, by all traffic law enforcement agencies in

your state, of preliminary breath test devices and the NHTSA-recommended three-part

field sobriety test, including the horizontal gaze nystagmus test.

Status: Preliminary Breath Tests are legislatively authorized in the District of

Columbia and the following 29 States: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware,

Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,

Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina,

North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, West

Virginia, and Wisconsin.

Preliminary Breath Tests are used absent specific legislative authority, but based

upon case law in Georgia, Maine, and Wyoming.

The NHTSA-recommended three-part field sobriety test, including the horizontal

gaze nystagmus test is a National standard used in training law enforcement officers.

__________________________________________

Safety Recommendation No.H-84-78

Date Issued: 10/12/84

Recipients: Governors of the 50 States and the Mayor of the District of Columbia

Recommendation: Propose legislation, if necessary, and/or take other appropriate

action to facilitate the collection of DWI evidence based on the drawing of blood for BAC

test purposes.

Status: The collection of DWI evidence based on the drawing of blood for BAC

test purposes is legislatively authorized in the District of Columbia and 47 States. Alaska,

Massachusetts, and New Jersey do not authorize blood testing for the determination of

alcohol concentration.
Appendix A 49 Safety Report

Safety Recommendation No.H-84-79

Date Issued: 10/12/84

Recipients: Governors of the 50 States and the Mayor of the District of Columbia

Recommendation: Encourage detention agencies in your state to adopt DWI

holding and release policies that do not permit the release of alcohol offenders until after

their blood alcohol concentration has dropped below the lowest level specified in state law

as indicating alcohol impairment.

Status: Hawaii, Minnesota, and Nebraska have adopted DWI policies that do not

permit the release of alcohol offenders from retention until after their BAC has dropped

below the lowest level specified by state law as indicating alcohol impairment.

__________________________________________

Safety Recommendation No.H-84-80

Date Issued: 10/12/84

Recipients: Governors of the 50 States and the Mayor of the District of Columbia

Recommendation: Take steps to preclude reduction of an alcohol-related charge

to a non-alcohol-related charge and to require in all cases that the defendant’s driving

record reflect the original charge.

Status: The reduction of an alcohol-related charge to a non-alcohol-related charge

is legislatively restricted in the following 11 States: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas,

Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, and Wyoming.

Three other States (California, Florida, and Michigan) also legislatively restrict the

reduction of an alcohol-related charge to a non-alcohol-related charge but only in limited

circumstances, such as in cases involving vehicular homicide, high BAC, under-age-21

DWI offense, and other serious DWI offenses. Oregon also prohibits the reduction of a

DWI charge to a non-alcohol-related charge, but allows the offender to participate in a

diversion program; and Pennsylvania prohibits the presiding judicial officer at an

arraignment of preliminary hearing from reducing or modifying a DWI charge.
Appendix A 50 Safety Report

Safety Recommendation No. H-84-81

Date Issued: 10/12/84

Recipients: Governors of the 50 States and the Mayor of the District of Columbia

Recommendation: Encourage and support initial and recurrent training on

alcohol, problem drinking, and drunk driving case adjudication for all judges hearing DWI

cases.

Status: Judicial training on alcohol, problem drinking and drunk driving is

encouraged in the following 14 States: Alaska, California, Florida, Kentucky, Minnesota,

Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,

Pennsylvania, and Texas.

__________________________________________

Safety Recommendation No. H-84-82

Date Issued: 10/12/84

Recipients: Governors of the 50 States and the Mayor of the District of Columbia

Recommendation: Take steps to develop a records system that preserves records

of alcohol-related traffic offenses committed by a juvenile after the offender reaches

adulthood.

Status: A records system that preserves the records of alcohol-related traffic

offenses committed by a juvenile after the offender reaches adulthood has been

established in the following 13 States: Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida,

Hawaii, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, and

Pennsylvania.

__________________________________________

Safety Recommendation No. H-84-83

Date Issued: 10/12/84

Recipients: Governors of the 50 States and the Mayor of the District of Columbia

Recommendation: Take steps to require that law enforcement and judicial records

systems in your state include complete records of DWI defendants’ previous alcoholrelated traffic offenses, including those committed as a juvenile, and that they are

available to judges prior to sentencing.

Status: Law enforcement and judicial records systems that include complete

records of DWI defendants previous alcohol-related traffic offenses, including those
Appendix A 51 Safety Report

committed as a juvenile, are available to judges prior to sentencing in the following 11

States: Alaska, Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey,

North Carolina, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.

__________________________________________

Safety Recommendation No. H-84-84

Date Issued: 10/12/84

Recipients: Governors of the 50 States and the Mayor of the District of Columbia

Recommendation: Require that appropriate alcohol problem evaluations of

persons charged with alcohol-related traffic offenses be conducted and made available to

judges hearing these cases.

Status: Twenty-seven States (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,

Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,

Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North

Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Washington) require DWI

offender assessment or pre-sentence investigation.

Thirteen States (California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland,

Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin) make

alcohol assessment or pre-sentence investigation optional or require alcohol assessment

for certain offenders, such as subsequent DWI offenders or DWI offenders who cause

serious injury or death.

The District of Columbia and 10 States (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Missouri,

Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia and Wyoming) fail to

require DWI offender assessment or pre-sentence investigation. 

__________________________________________

Safety Recommendation No. H-84-85

Date Issued: 10/12/84

Recipients: Governors of the 50 States and the Mayor of the District of Columbia

Recommendation: Take steps to ensure that no diversion or supervision program

in your state is used in place of license revocation/suspension and that court and DMV

records reflect participation in diversion/ supervision programs.

Status: The District of Columbia and 40 States, except Kentucky, Michigan,

Montana, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South

Dakota, Tennessee, have a mandatory minimum period of license suspension under their

administrative license suspension laws. 
Appendix A 52 Safety Report

The District of Columbia and 12 States (Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,

Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Washington, and

Wyoming) permit diversion and expunge or seal the offender’s record after a period of

DWI conviction-free driving. These States keep extensive records on offenders who are

permitted diversions.

__________________________________________

Safety Recommendation No. H-84-86

Date Issued: 10/12/84

Recipients: Governors of the 50 States and the Mayor of the District of Columbia

Recommendation: Take action to increase the availability and quality of alcohol

treatment services designed specifically for juvenile alcohol abusers, especially to provide

services at low cost to the user.

Status: Action to increase the availability and quality of alcohol treatment services

designed specifically for juvenile alcohol abusers has been taken in 13 States: Alaska,

Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska,

Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania.

__________________________________________

Safety Recommendation No. H-84-87

Date Issued: 10/12/84

Recipient: National Highway Transportation Safety Administration

Recommendation: Evaluate the effectiveness of license actions against juveniles

who violate alcohol laws, such as the laws recently enacted in Oregon, Washington, North

Carolina, Maryland, and Maine. 

Status: In a report to Congress dated January 19, 1993, titled, Addressing the

Safety Issues Related to Younger and Older Drivers, DOT HS 808 161, NHTSA included

as part of its planned research agenda, evaluation of provisional licensing in those States

(such as Maryland, California, and Oregon) that have implemented a provisional license

system that contains a majority of the components recommended in a model program

developed by NHTSA and the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators.

The report concerning the effectiveness of such systems has not yet been released.
Appendix A 53 Safety Report

Safety Recommendation No. H-84-88

Date Issued: 10/12/84

Recipient: National Highway Transportation Safety Administration

Recommendation: Incorporate the salient features of such court records systems

as the Court Reporting Network in Pennsylvania and the PROMIS System in Colorado in

the model Case Management Information System; ensure that the model system

incorporates motor vehicle licensing records and court records of drunk driving-related

violations and convictions.

Status: In 1997, NHTSA embarked on several efforts to improve DWI court data

systems and published a three-volume report on the design and operation of DWI tracking

systems that could serve as models for States and localities. The report was titled Driving

While Intoxicated Tracking Systems; the three volumes are numbered DOT HS 808 520,

DOT HS 808 521 and DOT HS 808 522, January 1997.

The National Driver Register (NDR), another resource for tracking, is a central

repository of information provided by the States on individuals whose license to operate a

motor vehicle has been revoked, suspended, canceled, or denied, or who have been

convicted of certain serious traffic offenses such as driving while impaired by alcohol or

other drugs. As of 1998, all States and the District of Columbia converted to the Problem

Driver Pointer System (PDPS). Under PDPS, the NDR contains only identifying

information to check whether an adverse action has been taken against an individual. NDR

no longer contains specific information regarding the reason for the adverse action. When

a match occurs with a record on the NDR file, the NDR electronically points to the State

of record for the adverse action. The State of record retrieves the information and relays it

to the State initiating the inquiry for verification and licensing decision.

__________________________________________

Safety Recommendation No. H-84-89

Date Issued: 10/12/84

Recipient: Veterans Administration

Recommendation: Develop and implement a national policy making VA hospital

alcohol dependence treatment programs more consistently available to local traffic court

rehabilitation programs for convicted DWI offenders who are veterans.

Status: In recent years, the Veterans Administration has attempted to expand its

alcohol/drug rehabilitation program to better meet local needs of veterans and provide

greater access to care.
Appendix A 54 Safety Report

Safety Recommendation No. H-84-90

Date Issued: 10/12/84

Recipients: American Bar Association, the National Association of State Judicial

Educators, and the National Judicial College

Recommendation: Work with State governments, State judicial organizations and

the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to vigorously promote initial and

recurrent training for judges in alcohol issues and DWI case adjudication and to develop

more source funds for financing this training.

Status: The National Judicial College currently works with NHTSA through a

cooperative agreement to encourage training in the adjudication of DWI cases in state

judicial education programs. Scholarships are provided to teams of faculty selected by

participating States to attend faculty development training. The team must include

representatives from the State Judicial Educator’s office and the State Highway Safety

Office, judges, prosecutors, law enforcement officers, defense attorneys, and toxicologists

as well as other professionals that the State selects. Each team develops an action plan for

the DWI educational program(s) that they will conduct in their State.

__________________________________________

Safety Recommendation No. H-89-2

Date Issued: 03/11/93

Recipients: Governors of all States, except Kentucky and the District of Columbia

Recommendation: Convene or reconvene a committee or task force to review

your state’s driving-under-the influence (DUI) legislation and its implementation, in light

of the problems discussed in the accident report on the pickup truck/church activity bus

head-on collision and fire near Carrollton, Kentucky, on May 14, 1988. Particular

attention should be paid to implementation of administrative license revocation programs,

improved evaluations of convicted DUI offenders, and enhanced public awareness and

enforcement programs. Based on this review, take appropriate action to improve your

state’s DUI prevention program.

Status: California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Mississippi, New

Mexico, Ohio, and Rhode Island have established task forces to review DUI legislation

and conduct evaluations of, among other things, administrative license revocation

programs.
55 Safety Report

Appendix B

State Laws Governing 

Alcohol-Highway Safety

Table 1. State Laws Related to BAC, Arrest for Chemical Testing, Refusal and Plea 

Bargaining Restrictions 

State

Second-Tier 

Aggravated 

BAC

Arrest 

Required for 

Chemical 

Testing

Chemical Test Refusal 

Admissible

Plea Bargaining

Restrictions

Alabama No Yes Yes No

Alaska No Yes Yes No

Arizona 0.18 Yes Yes Yes

Arkansas 0.18 Not always Criminal Yes

California No Yes Yes Limited (Serious felony 

and DWI cases only)

Colorado 0.20 No Criminal Yes

Connecticut 0.16 Yes Criminal No

Delaware No Probably Not Yes No

District of 

Columbia

No Yes Yes No

Florida 0.20 Yes Criminal Limited (high BAC, 

property damage, 

vehicular homicide, 

manslaughter)

Georgia No No Yes No

Hawaii No Yes Administrative No

Idaho 0.20 No Criminal No

Illinois No Yes Yes No

Indiana 0.15 (7/1/00) No Yes No

Iowa No No Yes No

Kansas No Yes Criminal Yes

Kentucky 0.18 Yes Criminal Yes

Louisiana 0.15 Yes Criminal and Administrative No

Maine 0.15 No Criminal Yes

Maryland No Yes Criminal No

Massachusetts No Yes No No

Michigan No Yes Criminal Limited (Applies only to 

persons under age 21)

Minnesota 0.20 Not always Yes No

Mississippi No No Criminal Yes

Missouri No Yes Criminal and Possibly Civil No

Montana No Yes Criminal No

Nebraska No Yes Criminal No
Appendix B 56 Safety Report

Nevada No No Criminal Yes

New 

Hampshire 

0.16 Yes Yes No

New Jersey No No Criminal No

New Mexico 0.16 Yes Criminal and Possibly Civil Yes

New York No Not always Yes Yes

North Carolina No Yes Criminal No

North Dakota No Yes Yes No

Ohio No Yes Criminal No

Oklahoma No Yes Criminal No

Oregon No Yes Yes Limited (Diversion 

Program)

Pennsylvania No No Criminal Limited (No reduction of 

original charge at 

arraignment)

Rhode Island No No Unknown No

South Carolina No Yes Criminal No

South Dakota No Yes Criminal No

Tennessee 0.20 Yes Criminal No

Texas No Yes Criminal No

Utah No Yes Yes No

Vermont No No Criminal No

Virginia No Yes Yes (Rebuttal only) No

Washington 0.15 Yes Criminal (Limited) No

West Virginia No Yes Criminal No

Wisconsin No Yes Criminal No

Wyoming No Yes Yes Yes

Total 15 35 18 11

Table 1. State Laws Related to BAC, Arrest for Chemical Testing, Refusal and Plea 

Bargaining Restrictions (cont.)

State

Second-Tier 

Aggravated 

BAC

Arrest 

Required for 

Chemical 

Testing

Chemical Test Refusal 

Admissible

Plea Bargaining

Restrictions
Appendix B 57 Safety Report

Table 2. State Laws Related to Mandatory Sanctions for Driving with a Suspended/Revoked 

License, Home Detention, Administrative License Revocation/Suspension Law 

State

Mandatory Sanctions: Driving w/Suspended 

or Revoked Licensea

Home 

Detention 

with 

Electronic 

Monitoring

Administrative 

License 

Revocation/ 

Suspension Law

Jail Fine

Comm. 

Service

License 

Action

Alabama No No No No No Yes

Alaska Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes

Arizona Yes No No Yes Yes Yes

Arkansas Yes No No Yes No Yes

California Yes No No No Yes Yes

Colorado Yes No No Yes No Yes

Connecticut Yes No No Yes No Yes

Delaware Yes Yes No No Yes Yes

District of Columbia No No No Yes No Yes

Florida No No No No No Yes

Georgia Yes Yes No Yes No Yes

Hawaii Not Certain Not Certain No Yes Yes Yes

Idaho Yes No No Yes Yes Yes

Illinois Yes No No Yes No Yes

Indiana Yes No No Yes Yes Yes

Iowa No Yes No Yes Yes Yes

Kansas Yes Yes No Yes No Yes

Kentucky No No No Yes No No

Louisiana Yes No No Yes Yes Yes

Maine Yes Yes No Yes No Yes

Maryland No No No Yes No Yes

Massachusetts Yes No No Yes No Yes

Michigan No No No Yes No No

Minnesota No Yes No No No Yes

Mississippi No Yes No Yes No Yes

Missouri Yes No No No No Yes

Montana Yes No No No Not certain No

Nebraska No No No Yes No Yes

Nevada Yes Yes No Yes No Yes

New Hampshire Yes No No Yes No Yes

New Jersey Yes Yes No Yes No No

New Mexico Yes Yes No Yes No Yes

New York No No No No No No

North Carolina Yes No No Yes Yes Yes

North Dakota Yes No No Yes No Yes

Ohio Yes Yes No Yes No Yes

Oklahoma No No No Yes Yes Yes

Oregon No Yes No No Not Certain Yes
Appendix B 58 Safety Report

Pennsylvania Yes Yes No Yes No No

Rhode Island Yes Yes No Yes No No

South Carolina Yes No No No No No

South Dakota Not Certain No No Yes No No

Tennessee Yes No No Yes No No

Texas No No No No Yes Yes

Utah No Yes No Yes No Yes

Vermont Yes No No No No Yes

Virginia No No No Yes No Yes

Washington No No No Yes Yes Yes

West Virginia Yes Yes No Yes No Yes

Wisconsin No No No No Yes Yes

Wyoming Yes Yes No Yes No Yes

Total 31 18 1 38 13 41

a Although a State may have sanctions for driving with a suspended or revoked license, these sanctions may not have 

mandatory minimums. The sanctions for driving with a suspended or revoked license may be for the general offense and 

are not necessarily DWI specific.

Table 2. State Laws Related to Mandatory Sanctions for Driving with a Suspended/Revoked 

License, Home Detention, Administrative License Revocation/Suspension Law (cont.)

State

Mandatory Sanctions: Driving w/Suspended 

or Revoked Licensea

Home 

Detention 

with 

Electronic 

Monitoring

Administrative 

License 

Revocation/ 

Suspension Law

Jail Fine

Comm. 

Service

License 

Action
Appendix B 59 Safety Report

Table 3. State Laws Dealing with Vehicle Sanctions for Drinking and Driving 

State

License Plate 

Impoundment

Vehicle 

Immobilization

Vehicle 

Impoundment Vehicle Forfeiture

Ignition 

Interlock

Alabama No No Yes Yes No

Alaska No No No Yes (Discretionary) Yes

Arizona No No No Limited (3rd or subsequent 

offense if vehicle owned 

and used by offender)

Yes

Arkansas Yes No No Limited (4th or subsequent 

DWI off.) and Discretionary

Yes

California No No Yes Yes Yes

Colorado No No No No Yes

Connecticut No No Yes No No

Delaware Yes No Limited (4th or 

subsequent 

DWI offense)

No Yes

District of 

Columbia

No No Yes No No

Florida No No Yes Yes Yes

Georgia Yes No No Limited (4th or subsequent 

DWI offense)

Yes

Hawaii No No No No Yes

Idaho No No No No Yes

Illinois No No Yes Limited (3rd or subsequent 

DWI offense or 2nd DWI 

offense w/ a prior alcohol or 

drug-related reckless 

homicide driving offense)

Yes

Indiana No No No No Yes

Iowa No Yes Yes No Yes

Kansas Limited (4th or 

subsequent 

DWI offense)

No No No Yes

Kentucky No No No No No

Louisiana No No No Limited (3rd or subsequent 

DWI offense)

Yes

Maine No No No No Yes

Maryland No Yes Yes No Yes

Massachusetts No No No No No

Michigan Yes Yes No Yes (Discretionary) Yes

Minnesota Yes No Yes Yes No

Mississippi No No No Limited (3rd or subsequent 

DWI offense if vehicle 

owned and used by 

offender) and Discretionary

No

Missouri No No Yes Yes Yes

Montana No No No Limited (3rd or subsequent 

DWI offense if vehicle 

owned and used by 

offender)

Yes

Nebraska No Yes No No Yes
Appendix B 60 Safety Report

Nevada No No No No Yes

New 

Hampshire 

No No No No No

New Jersey No No No No No

New Mexico No No No No Yes

New York No No No Yes (Discretionary) Yes

North Carolina No No No Limited (4th or subsequent 

DWI offense if the DWI 

offense is committed while 

license is revoked for a 

prior DWI offense)

Yes

North Dakota Yes No No Yes (Discretionary) Yes

Ohio Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Oklahoma No No No Yes (Discretionary) Yes

Oregon No Yes 

(Discretionary)

Yes 

(Discretionary)

Yes (Discretionary) Yes

Pennsylvania No No No Yes (Discretionary) No

Rhode Island No No No Yes (Discretionary) Yes

South Carolina No No No Limited (3rd or subsequent 

DWI offense if the vehicle is 

owned and used by the 

offender)

No

South Dakota No No No No No

Tennessee No No No Yes Yes

Texas No No No Yes (Discretionary) Yes

Utah No No Conditional 

(Owner or has 

a financial 

interest in 

vehicle)

No Yes

Vermont No Yes 

(Discretionary)

No Limited (3rd or subsequent 

DWI offense if the vehicle is 

owned and used by the 

offender) and Discretionary

No

Virginia No No No No Yes

Washington No No No Conditional (Owner or has 

a financial interest in 

vehicle) and Discretionary

Yes

West Virginia No No No No Yes

Wisconsin No Yes 

(Discretionary)

No Yes (Discretionary for a 3rd

offense and mandatory for 

a 4th or subsequent DWI 

offense)

Yes

Wyoming No No No No No

Total 7 7 11 17 37

Table 3. State Laws Dealing with Vehicle Sanctions for Drinking and Driving (cont.)

State

License Plate 

Impoundment

Vehicle 

Immobilization

Vehicle 

Impoundment Vehicle Forfeiture

Ignition 

Interlock
61 Safety Report

Appendix C

Hard Core Drinking 

Driver Definitions

Terms Used To Describe The Hard Core Drinking Driver

Over the last decade, increased attention has focused on a subset of drinking

drivers who seem to be unaffected or at least less affected by the current laws and

programs in place in the States. This subset of habitual drinking drivers has been given a

variety of names, including “chronic drinking drivers,” “repeat offenders,” “problem

drinking drivers,” “persistent drinking drivers,” and “hard core drinking drivers.” They

have been the subject of reports and analyses conducted by a variety of groups including

NHTSA, the National Commission Against Drunk Driving (NCADD), the Transportation

Research Board (TRB), the Traffic Injury Research Foundation of Canada (TIRF), the

Century Council, and most recently, Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD).

Agency, Group, or Organization Definition

National Commission Against Drunk Driving “These individuals drive repeatedly after drinking; they 

often do so at high BACs – .15 or .20 or more – that exceed 

the legal limits by two to almost three times; and they resist 

changing their behavior, for the most part ignoring the antiDWI countermeasures that have worked so well with social 

drinkers.”a

Transportation Research Board The TRB expert panel chose the term “persistent drinking 

driver” to describe the intractability of the problem. Hedlund 

states that such a driver is nearly always male, and refers 

to him as “the person who drinks and drives again and 

again... whose drinking and driving behavior has not been 

changed by information and education, who has not been 

deterred by drinking and driving laws and enforcement, 

perhaps even by arrest and punishment for...violations.”b 

Traffic Injury Research Foundation TIRF has published two reports on the hard core drinking 

driver, one in 1991 and another in 1996.c

 These reports 

describe high-BAC and repeat offenders as “individuals 

who repeatedly drive after drinking, especially with high 

blood alcohol concentrations (BACs) and who seem 

relatively resistant to changing this behavior.” d TIRF notes 

that there was no change in the magnitude of the problem 

caused by this group during the time that elapsed between 

the publication of its two reports.e
Appendix C 62 Safety Report

Hard core drinking drivers, as a group, have been less affected by countermeasures

that have helped reduce alcohol-related fatalities. It may be difficult for society to extract a

behavior change from hard core drinking drivers because they are different from other

drivers. For example, Simpson described hard core drinking drivers as having

“psychosocial and behavioral characteristics that distinguish them from the general

driving population.” 1

Century Council The Century Council, an organization funded by the 

alcohol beverage industry, defines “hard core drunk 

drivers” as the following:

“individuals who drive with a high BAC of .15 or above, who 

do so repeatedly, as demonstrated by having more than 

one drunk driving arrest, and who are highly resistant to 

changing their behavior despite previous sanctions, 

treatment, or education efforts.”f

Mothers Against Drunk Driving MADD refers to these drivers as “higher risk drivers;” the 

organization identifies them as drivers having the following:

§A second DUI/DWI offense within a 5-year period (repeat 

offender)

§A first DUI/DWI offense with a BAC of .16 or higher (highBAC offender)

§A conviction for DWS where the suspension was the 

result of a DUI/DWI offense.g

a National Commission Against Drunk Driving, Chronic Drunk Drivers: Resources Available to Keep Them Off the Road

(Washington: National Commission Against Drunk Driving, 1996) 1.

b James Hedlund, “Who is the Persistent Drinking Driver? Part I: USA,” Strategies for Dealing with the Persistent Drinking 

Driver, ed. Barry Sweedler, Transportation Research Board Circular 437 (1995) 16. 

c Simpson, Mayhew, and Beirness, Dealing With the Hard Core Drinking Driver 1.

d Simpson, Mayhew, and Beirness, Dealing With the Hard Core Drinking Driver 1, 8-10.

e Simpson, Mayhew, and Beirness, Dealing With the Hard Core Drinking Driver 2.

f In a letter to the Safety Board dated June 29, 2000, the Honorable John C. Lawn, chairman and CEO of the Century 

Council, commented upon the organization’s definition as follows: “...under our definition, to qualify as a hardcore drunk 

driver any one of these criterion [those given in the table above] by themselves would suffice....research has demonstrated 

a strong correlation between high blood alcohol concentration (BAC) drivers and the likelihood of having a previous DWI 

conviction....although high BAC drivers may not have been previously apprehended, it is probable that they have 

repeatedly operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated.”

g Robert Voas, “MADD’s Higher Risk Driver Program,” (unpublished paper) 3, presented at press conference Dec. 29, 1999, 

to initiate MADD’s High Risk Driver Campaign.

1 Simpson, Mayhew, and Beirness, Dealing with the Hard Core Drinking Driver 28-30.

Agency, Group, or Organization Definition
63 Safety Report

Appendix D

Statistics

Injury Outcomes for Persons Involved in Fatal Crashes 

with Hard Core Drinking Drivers
*The two tables shown below are independent subsets of the table shown above. Table 1. Injury severity by year for all persons involved in fatal crashes with hard core drinking drivers 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 

No_Injury 2079 2327 2309 2540 2569 2377 2346 2347 1925 1868 1742 1620 1668 1550 1427 Injured 6241 6546 6737 7397 7749 7726 7338 7149 6469 5958 5586 5329 5346 5051 4752 Fatal 8461 9183 9155 10352 10290 10236 9973 9903 9026 8045 7642 7370 7406 7189 6737 Died Prior 000000000000000

Unknown 34 52 44 47 37 29 54 69 46 33 48 54 36 25 19 Total 16,815 18,108 18,245 20,336 20,645 20,368 19,711 19,468 17,466 15,904 15,018 14,373 14,456 13,815 12,935 

Table 2. Injury severity by year for hard core drinking drivers involved in fatal crashes 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 

No_Injury 509 559 508 551 538 469 460 494 411 351 366 320 304 294 297 

Injured 1338 1409 1487 1665 1683 1593 1516 1509 1437 1305 1123 1074 1058 1087 954 Fatal 5616 6197 6113 6950 6954 7042 6867 6823 6173 5524 5269 5187 5226 5020 4726 Died Prior 000000000000000

Unknown 556634468976234Total 7,468 8,170 8,114 9,172 9,178 9,108 8,847 8,832 8,029 7,189 6,765 6,587 6,590 6,404 5,981 
Table 3. Injury severity by year for those involved in fatal crashes with hard core drinking drivers (does not include tdrinking drivers) 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 

No Injury 1570 1768 1801 1989 2031 1908 1886 1853 1514 1517 1376 1300 1364 1256 1130 Injured 4903 5137 5250 5732 6066 6133 5822 5640 5032 4653 4463 4255 4288 3964 3798 Fatal 2845 2986 3042 3402 3336 3194 3106 3080 2853 2521 2373 2183 2180 2169 2011 Died Prior 000000000000000

Unknown 29 47 38 41 34 25 50 63 38 24 41 48 34 22 15 Total 9,347 9,938 10,131 11,164 11,467 11,260 10,864 10,636 9,437 8,715 8,253 7,786 7,866 7,411 6,954 
Appendix D 66 Safety Report

Procedures for Tabulating Fatalities Resulting from Crashes Involving Hard 

Core Drinking Drivers:

• The number of persons fatally injured in crashes involving at least one hard

core driver were tabulated from 1998 files of NHTSA’s Fatality Analysis

Reporting System using the following steps.

• A subset of variables from the FARS person and FARS vehicle files for the

years 1983-1998 were joined by year, state case number, and vehicle number

and combined into a single file.

• Drivers were separated from other people in the combined FARS

person/vehicle file.

• Hard core drivers were separated from other drivers based on the following

criteria: reported blood alcohol concentration level of at least 0.15 or policereported drinking and a previous DWI conviction.

• Cases were analyzed by injury severity to produce Table 2.

• All variables were removed from the file except year and state case number,

duplicate cases were removed.

• The resulting file was merged with the combined FARS person/vehicle file

(created in step 1) by year and state case number.

• Cases were analyzed by injury severity to produce Table 1.

• Values in Table 2 were subtracted from values in Table 1 to obtain the values

shown in Table 3.

• SAS program statements for performing the data manipulations necessary to

create the file containing all people in accidents involving at least one hard

core driver follow.
67 Safety Report

Appendix E

TEA-21

Section 410: Incentive Grants

Basic Grant A: To qualify for a Basic Grant A under TEA-21, a State must

establish five of the seven following criteria:

• Implement an administrative license revocation program with a 90-day

suspension for the first offense and at least a 1-year suspension for the second

and subsequent offense occurring within a 5-year period. 

• Implement an underage drinking enforcement program.

• Implement a special enforcement program that includes an education

component and sobriety checkpoints or an equivalent.

• Implement a graduated licensing system in three stages, including driving

restrictions for the first two stages, a mandatory safety belt requirement, and a

zero tolerance requirement.

• Implement a program that addresses the issue of drivers with high BACs. The

program may include graduated penalties or alcohol assessments.1

• Implement a program that addresses the issue of drinking drivers between the

ages of 21 and 34. 

• Implement a BAC testing program for drivers involved in fatal crashes,

including successfully maintaining a testing rate equal to or greater than the

National average by the beginning of FY 2001.

Basic Grant B: A State is eligible for a Basic Grant B upon demonstrating both of

the following:

• A reduction in its percentage of fatally injured drivers with a BAC of

.10 percent or greater, in each of the 3 most recent calendar years for which

such statistics are available, and

• The percentage of fatally injured drivers with a BAC of .10 percent or greater

in the State must be lower than the average percentage for all States in the

same 3 calendar years.

1 Under Federal regulations, the threshold at which sanctions begin must be higher than the BAC level

established by the State as the standard DWI offense and less than or equal to a 0.20 percent BAC.
Appendix E 68 Safety Report

Supplemental Grant: A State that qualifies for either one or both basic grants may

apply for one or more supplemental grants by implementing one or more of the following

six criteria:

• Videotaping of drinking drivers by law enforcement officers.

• A self-sustained drinking driver prevention program.

• Enact and enforce a law to reduce driving with a suspended license.

• Use of passive alcohol sensors by law enforcement officers.

• Adopt an effective DWI tracking system.

• Establish other innovative programs to reduce traffic safety problems resulting

from DWI or controlled substances.

Section 164: Minimum Penalties for Repeat Offenders

Section 164 provides that a repeat intoxicated driver law must, as a minimum,

impose the following sanctions on an individual convicted of a second or subsequent

offense for DWI or DUI within 5 years of a previous conviction for that offense:

• License suspension for not less than 1 year; 

• Impoundment or immobilization of every motor vehicle owned by the repeat

offender, or the installation of an ignition interlock system on each motor

vehicle;2

• Assessment of a repeat offender’s degree of abuse of alcohol and treatment as

appropriate; and

• For a second offense, assignment of not less than 30 days of community

service or not less than 5 days of imprisonment. For a third or subsequent

offense, assignment of not less than 60 days of community service or not less

than 10 days of imprisonment.3

2 The NHTSA rule specifies that impoundment and immobilization would occur during the repeat

offender’s license suspension. Installation of the ignition interlock device would occur at the conclusion of

the license suspension.

3 According to the NHTSA rule, imprisonment includes confinement in one of the following: jail, a

minimum security facility, a community corrections facility, house arrest with electronic monitoring, an

inpatient rehabilitation or treatment center, or other facility, provided that the repeat offender is actually

being detained.
Appendix E 69 Safety Report

NHTSA Rule Implementing TEA-21

23 CFR § 1275.4

To avoid transfer of funds, State must enact and enforce a law that establishes, as a

minimum penalty, that all repeat intoxicated drivers shall:

Receive driver’s license suspension of not less than one year;

Be subject either to: (i) Impoundment of each of driver’s motor vehicles during

one-year license suspension; (ii) Immobilization of each of driver’s motor vehicles during

one-year license suspension; or (iii) Installation of State-approved ignition interlock

system on each of driver’s motor vehicles at conclusion of one-year license suspension;

Receive assessment of degree of alcohol abuse, and treatment as appropriate; and

Receive mandatory sentence of: (i) Not less than 5 days of imprisonment or 30

days of community service for second offense; and (ii) Not less than 10 days of

imprisonment or 60 days of community service for third or subsequent offense.

State may provide limited exceptions to impoundment or immobilization

requirements on an individual basis, to avoid undue hardship to any individual who is

completely dependent on motor vehicle for the necessities of life, including any family

member of the convicted individual, and any co-owner of the motor vehicle, but not the

offender. Such exceptions issued only in accordance with State law, regulation or binding

policy directive establishing the conditions under which vehicles may be released by the

State or under Statewide published guidelines and in exceptional circumstances specific to

the offender’s motor vehicle, and may not result in unrestricted use of vehicle by repeat

intoxicated driver.

23 CFR § 1275.5(b)

(Name of certifying official), (position title), of the (State or Commonwealth) of

______, do hereby certify that the (State or Commonwealth) of _______, has enacted and

is enforcing a repeat intoxicated driver law that conforms to the requirements of 23 U.S.C.

164 and 23 CFR 1275.4, (citations to State law).

23 CFR § 1313.6(c)

State shall submit statement certifying that State meets each element of this

criterion, based on percentages calculated in accordance with provision.

State with percentage of BAC testing among fatally injured drivers of 85% or

greater, as determined under FARS as of the first day of the FY for which grant funds are

being sought, may demonstrate compliance with this criterion by submitting statement

certifying that the State meets each element of this criterion and by submitting its

calculations developed under paragraph (b)(3) of this section. (Any State with percentage

of BAC testing among fatally injured drivers of 85% or greater in each of the 3 most
Appendix E 70 Safety Report

recent calendar years, as determined by FARS as of the first day of the FY for which grant

funds are being sought, may calculate for submission to NHTSA the percentage of fatally

injured drivers with a BAC of .10% or greater in that State for those calendar years, using

State data.)

STATE TEA-21 FUND ALLOCATION and ESTIMATED PENALTY 

State

Section 410 Funds 

(FY 1999)

Section 164 Estimated 

Penalty (FY 2001)

Section 164 Estimated 

Penalty (FY 2003)

Alabama $ 622,009 $ 4,940,000 $10,313,000

Alaska $ 3,467,000 $ 5,208,000

Arizona $ 559,311 $ 4,573,000 $ 9,546,000

Arkansas $ 3,599,000 $ 7,416,000

California $7,109,102 $22,406,000 $46,609,000

Colorado $ 589,905 $ 3,426,000 $ 7,125,000

Connecticut $ 2,776,000 $ 5,814,000

Delaware $ 179, 040 $ 1,355,000 $ 2,614,000

District of Columbia $ 189,995 $ 1,065,000 $ 2,210,000

Florida $3,173,340 $12,283,000 $25,692,000

Georgia $1,080,937 $ 9,299,000 $19,412,000

Hawaii $ 211,903 $ 1,222,000 $ 2,546,000

Idaho $ 278,011 $ 2,014,000 $ 4,206,000

Illinois $1,663,787 $ 8,583,000 $17,839,000

Indiana $ 966,216 $ 6,585,000 $13,737,000

Iowa $ 566,531 $ 3,334,000 $ 6,925,000

Kansas $ 3,326,000 $ 6,906,000

Kentucky $ 4,338,000 $ 9,061,000

Louisiana $ 3,829,000 $ 7,969,000

Maine $ 1,292,000 $ 2,692,000

Maryland $ 559,194 $ 3,674,000 $ 7,649,000

Massachusetts $ 3,538,000 $ 7,345,000

Michigan $1,441,971 $ 8,153,000 $16,997,000

Minnesota $ 873,229 $ 4,324,000 $ 8,992,000

Mississippi $ 3,209,000 $ 6,678,000

Missouri $ 5,959,000 $12,395,000

Montana $ 2,737,000 $ 5,727,000

Nebraska $ 388,728 $ 2,332,000 $ 4,845,000

Nevada $ 263,522 $ 2,013,000 $ 4,204,000

New Hampshire $ 179,040 $ 1,248,000 $ 2,600,000

New Jersey $ 4,907,000 $ 9,988,000

New Mexico $ 362,023 $ 2,937,000 $ 6,123,000
Appendix E 71 Safety Report

New York $2,491,550 $ 9,092,000 $18,926,000

North Carolina $1,061,830 $ 6,865,000 $14,339,000

North Dakota $ 2,081,000 $ 4,332,000

Ohio $1,623,865 $ 8,644,000 $17,990,000

Oklahoma $ 4,298,000 $ 8,943,000

Oregon $ 536,102 $ 3,267,000 $ 6,794,000

Pennsylvania $1,578,949 $ 8,432,000 $17,567,000

Rhode Island $ 1,363,000 $ 2,849,000

South Carolina $ 562,521 $ 4,326,000 $ 9,035,000

South Dakota $ 2,098,000 $ 4,370,000

Tennessee $ 818,519 $ 5,608,000 $11,702,000

Texas $19,718,000 $41,144,000

Utah $ 585,127 $ 2,290,000 $ 4,764,000

Vermont $ 211,903 $ 1,199,000 $ 2,494,000

Virginia $ 790,949 $ 6,577,000 $13,712,000

Washington $ 843,447 $ 4,420,000 $ 9,191,000

West Virginia $ 1,783,000 $ 3,723,000

Wisconsin $ 887,444 $ 5,510,000 $11,502,000

Wyoming $ 2,202,000 $ 4,586,000

Total $33,250,000 $247,226,000 $1,047,370,000

STATE TEA-21 FUND ALLOCATION and ESTIMATED PENALTY (cont.)

State

Section 410 Funds 

(FY 1999)

Section 164 Estimated 

Penalty (FY 2001)

Section 164 Estimated 

Penalty (FY 2003)
72 Safety Report

Appendix F

Accident Investigations

Case No. 1

Description of the Accident:

The driver of a Camaro traveling westbound on SE 424 Street at an estimated

speed of 62 - 68 mph in a 35-mph zone failed to stop at the posted stop sign and struck a

pickup truck traveling southbound on 244 Avenue. Both vehicles continued traveling off

the road and through a fence located at the southwest corner of the intersection before

coming to rest in a field. The weather conditions were clear and the roadway was dry.

The pickup truck driver and passenger were ejected through the driver’s side

window and died at the scene. The Camaro driver, who was not wearing a seatbelt,

sustained serious head injures and was flown to a medical center in Seattle. His blood

alcohol level was 0.15 percent. The Camaro driver had a valid license and no prior traffic

violations, accidents, or criminal convictions within the past 5 years.

Accident No.: HWY-00-IH-012

Location: Enumclaw, Washington

Date and Time: March 16, 1999; 9:50 p.m.

Case Vehicle (V1): 1994 Chevrolet Camaro

Other Vehicle(s) 1979 Chevrolet El Camino pickup truck

Injuries/Fatalities 2 fatalities, 1 serious injury
Appendix F 73 Safety Report

Case No. 2

Description of the Accident:

A driver of a pickup truck traveling at a high rate of speed on the shoulder of

Green Lane struck two pedestrians standing behind a parked pickup truck. One pedestrian

was thrown clear while the fatally injured pedestrian was pinned between the two

vehicles. The striking pickup truck separated from the parked pickup truck and the fatally

injured pedestrian was thrown over the striking vehicle, landing in the roadway 83 feet

from the point of impact. 

One hour after the accident, the pickup truck driver had a blood alcohol level of

0.079 percent, along with a concentration of 0.08 micrograms/L of cocaine, and a

concentration of 0.11 micrograms/L of benzoylecgonine. 

In 1985 the pickup truck driver had her first DUI offense, and her second occurred

in July 1998. Under the Accelerated Rehabilitation Disposition, she lost her license for

1 year and served probation for 1 year. In January 1999 she was sentenced to 2 to 364 days

in the county prison for a DUI arrest in July 1998. She served 2 days and was released on

probation. In June 1999, she pled guilty to DUI and was sentenced to 2 to 364 days in the

county prison for a DUI arrest in August 1998. She again served 2 days and was released

on probation. According to the Bristol Township police department, she was suspended

until 2003 for DUI-related offenses and remains under suspension until 2006. She has also

been convicted as a habitual offender.

Accident No.: HWY-00-IH-020

Location: Bristol Township, Pennsylvania

Date and Time: October 7, 1999; 4:32 p.m.

Case Vehicle (V1): 1985 Chevrolet pickup truck

Other Vehicle(s) Ford pickup truck (parked)

Injuries/Fatalities 1 pedestrian fatality, 1 pedestrian serious injury
Appendix F 74 Safety Report

Case No. 3

Description of the Accident:

The Chevrolet pickup truck driver was proceeding westbound on Spur 482 and

was merging onto State Highway 183 when it veered to the south, crossed over three lanes

and a shoulder, and struck the guardrail. The collision with the guardrail caused it to

become airborne and travel 98 feet before striking the ground in the center median

between the east and westbound lanes of State Highway 183. It then continued to the

southwest an additional 97 feet and collided with a tractor-semitrailer. The striking vehicle

traveled in a southeast direction for 183 feet and came to rest against a tree. The tractorsemitrailer traveled 278 feet southeast , crashed through a guardrail, and collided with a

bridge pillar. A post crash fire ensued destroying the tractor-semitrailer and damaging the

bridge structure. The debris from the initial collision struck a Ford pickup truck and

a Cadillac during the accident sequence. 

The tractor-semitrailer truck driver was fatally injured. The Chevrolet pickup truck

driver was found partially ejected and was fatally injured. He was an unlicensed driver.

A toxicology report on the driver of the Chevrolet pickup disclosed an alcohol

concentration of 0.29 percent. 

Accident No.: HWY-00-IH-009

Location: Irving, Texas

Date and Time: October 23, 1999; 11 a.m.

Case Vehicle (V1): 1999 Chevrolet pickup truck

Other Vehicle(s) 1998 Freightliner tractor-semitrailer, 

Ford pickup truck, Cadillac

Injuries/Fatalities 2 fatalities
Appendix F 75 Safety Report

Case No. 4

Description of the Accident:

The Pontiac driver was traveling eastbound in the westbound lanes of Interstate 76

for over 5 miles when it struck a Nissan head-on. A Dodge traveling behind the Nissan

struck it from the rear. The Nissan caught fire and a trapped passenger died. The other four

occupants in that vehicle and the Dodge driver were injured. 

The Pontiac driver had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.24 percent. He was

driving on a suspended license at the time of the accident. The suspended license was the

result of a DUI arrest on June 30, 1996. He had also been charged with driving while

suspended in December 1997. There was no further information about his past driving

history.

Accident No.: HWY-00-IH-021

Location: Upper Merion, Pennsylvania

Date and Time: November 25, 1999; 1:28 a.m.

Case Vehicle (V1): 1999 Dodge passenger car

Other Vehicle(s) 1993 Pontiac, 1996 Nissan

Injuries/Fatalities 1 fatality, 6 injuries
Appendix F 76 Safety Report

Case No. 5

Description of the Accident:

The Saturn driver was parked in front of his house with his engine off. After a

police officer questioned him and asked him to go inside his house, he started his car,

made a U-turn and started to drive away, but struck the police car. The damage was minor

and no one was injured.

He refused to submit to an alcohol test and was driving on a suspended license.

This suspension was for two DUI arrests, one on October 16, 1997, and the other on

October 5, 1999. 

Accident No.: HWY-00-IH-019

Location: Bristol, Connecticut

Date and Time: December 6, 1999; 1:45 a.m.

Case Vehicle (V1): 1995 Saturn

Other Vehicle(s) 1999 Ford

Injuries/Fatalities None
Appendix F 77 Safety Report

Case No. 6

Description of the Accident:

The truckdriver was traveling westbound on I-64 when he struck the rear of a Ford

pickup truck that had slowed for heavy traffic. The two drivers were in the truck in the

roadway exchanging information when the Oldsmobile driver ran into the rear of the

tractor-semitrailer. The Oldsmobile driver was not wearing a seatbelt and died at the

scene. His 4-year-old passenger, who was lap-belted, sustained minor injuries. The Ford

pickup truck driver was also injured. It was raining lightly and misty at the time of the

accident.

The truckdriver was given a breathalyzer test that showed an alcohol concentration

of 0.19 percent. He had a previous 3-year CDL suspension (1995-1998) as a result of nonpayment of multiple parking tickets. His license was valid at the time of this accident. 

Accident No.: HWY-00-IH-013

Location: Richmond, Virginia

Date and Time: December 13, 1999; 5:33 p.m.

Case Vehicle (V1):

Other Vehicle(s) 1995 International tractor-semitrailer,

1992 Ford pickup truck, 1985 Oldsmobile

Injuries/Fatalities 1 fatality, 2 injuries
78 Safety Report

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807 870. Washington: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1992. 

—. “MADD’s Higher Risk Driver Program.” Unpublished paper presented at press

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—. “The NHTSA Rules on Repeat Intoxicated Driver Laws: An Important First

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Appendix G 84 Safety Report

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—. The Impact of Treatment and Monitoring on Prince George’s County DWI’s.

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DOT HS 808 980. Washington: National Highway Transportation Safety Administration,

1999. 

Voas, Robert B., A. Scott Tippetts, and Eileen Taylor. Effectiveness of the Ohio

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Washington: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1999. 

—. “Temporary Vehicle Immobilization: Evaluation of a Program in Ohio.”

Accident Analysis and Prevention May 1997.

Weinrath, Michael. “The Ignition Interlock Program for Drunk Drivers:

A Multivariate Test.” Crime and Delinquency 1997.

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