OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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October 30, 2008

AGENCIES NEED IMPROVED FINANCIAL DATA 

REPORTING FOR PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS 

 

What SIGIR Found 

DoD, DoS, and USAID have not been required to systematically identify 

financial data for private security contractors (PSCs) providing physical 

security services such as guarding sites, escorting individuals and equipment 

convoys, and providing security advice and planning. Consequently, financial 

management systems do not routinely capture data that would show how much 

has been obligated and spent for these individual services. Obtaining data 

from multiple government sources, SIGIR identified 77 PSCs with associated 

obligations of about $5.3 billion in direct contracts and subcontracts to provide 

security services to U.S. funded projects and programs since 2003. SIGIR also 

identified an additional 233 contractors with about $662 million in associated 

obligations for contracts to provide security services that could be for 

providing guards or escorts, but the descriptions of work were so general that 

they could be for other services such as providing information technology 

security. This is the best information available because agencies were not 

required to specifically identify and aggregate this data. It likely means that 

the obligations identified from various government sources are understated. 

For example: 

• There was no financial information on obligations for 191 companies 

identified in various data bases as having contracts for some type of 

security services. 

• Financial data on subcontracts to prime contractors implementing 

reconstruction programs is limited. DoD, DoS, and USAID are not 

required to routinely track these costs in general and do not do so for 

security costs. However, from various data bases and other sources, 

SIGIR identified $1.2 billion in subcontract costs for security. This 

number is likely low given the limited data available on subcontracts. 

Having more complete financial data would provide managers with better 

information in two key areas to support future decisions to invest resources. 

First, as the reconstruction effort evolves from large-scale infrastructure 

projects to capacity building, physical security could become a larger portion 

of total contract cost. Such an increase could make it more important to weigh 

the potential value of a project outcome against the potentially larger security 

costs. Second, to the extent U.S. forces are withdrawn, and assuming that 

significant civilian technical assistance missions remain, requirements for

private security services for DoS and USAID would likely increase to 

compensate for support previously provided by the military. PSC 

requirements could also increase because the recent reduction in violence 

enables more frequent personnel movements within Iraq but with private 

security contractor support still being needed for all trips outside of U.S. 

secured areas. Financial information for these contracts and subcontracts

would allow U.S agencies to assess their security costs relative to expected 

project benefits and costs and it can also be useful in planning for other 

contingency operations. This information should also include supporting costs 

for purchasing such items as armored vehicles, hardening offices, and 

overhead costs. 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

For more information, contact SIGIR Public Affairs 

at (703) 428-1100 or HPublicAffairs@sigir.mil

Summary of Report: SIGIR-09-005 

Why SIGIR Did This Study 

Section 842 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-

181), required SIGIR to, among other things, 

develop a plan to evaluate various 

characteristics of contracting for private 

security contractor services in Iraq. 

The objective of this report was to determine 

the extent to which federal agencies have 

systematically captured financial data for 

private security services in Iraq since 2003, 

and to identify private security contractors and 

costs. SIGIR reviewed available data from the 

Departments of Defense (DoD), State (DoS) 

and the U.S Agency for International 

Development (USAID). 

What SIGIR Recommends 

SIGIR recommends that the Secretaries of 

Defense and State and the Administrator, 

USAID, take the following actions: (1) 

Develop processes for routinely capturing 

financial information for all contracts and 

subcontracts for private security services and 

all other security related costs . (2) Direct 

program managers to consider the costs of 

security relative to the expected benefits for 

all new projects. (3) Identify security costs at 

the subcontractor level for all new projects. 

SIGIR also identifies a lesson learned 

applicable to other contingencies. 

The Department of Defense provided written 

comments and did not fully concur with the 

recommendations. The comments are 

addressed in the report where applicable, and 

a copy of their response is included in the

report’s Management Comments and Agency 

Response section. USAID and the Multi 

National Force- Iraq provided technical 

comments that are addressed where applicable 

in the report. The Department of State did not 

provide comments on this report.

SIGIR 

Special Inspector General for IRAQ Reconstruction 
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

October 30, 2008 

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF STATE 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL 

DEVELOPMENT 

U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

DIRECTOR, IRAQ TRANSITION ASSISTANCE OFFICE 

 COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

 COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ 

SUBJECT: Agencies Need Improved Financial Data Reporting for Private Security 

Contractors (SIGIR-09-005) 

We are providing this report for your information and use. We performed this audit under the 

authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also incorporates the duties and 

responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspectors General Act of 1978, as amended. 

This review was also performed to address provisions of Section 842 of the Public Law 110-181, 

which requires SIGIR develop, in consultation with other audit agencies, a comprehensive plan 

of audits of private secur5ity functions in Iraq. This is the first in a series of reviews to be 

completed by SIGIR regarding contracting for private security services in Iraq. This report was 

conducted as SIGIR Project 8016. 

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and Defense, the U.S. Agency for 

International Development and the Multinational Force-Iraq. The U.S. Agency for International 

Development and the Multinational Force-Iraq provided technical comments, which we 

incorporated where appropriate. The Department of State did not provide comments on this 

report. The Department of Defense provided written comments which are incorporated in the 

Management Comments section of this report. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. For additional information on the report, 

please contact Glenn Furbish, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audits (703) 428-1058/ 

glenn.furbish@sigir.mil. 

 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary i 

Introduction 1 

Scope of Private Security Costs Is Large But Totals Remain Elusive 3 

Conclusions, Recommendations, and Lessons Learned 9 

Management Comments and Audit Response 9 

Appendices 

A. Scope and Methodology 11 

B. Security Contractors and Identified Obligations 16 

C. Acronyms 25 

D. Audit Team Members 26 

Management Comments 

Department of Defense 27 
Agencies Need Improved Financial Reporting for Private 

Security Contractors 

SIGIR-09-005 October 30, 2008

Executive Summary

Introduction 

Since April 2003, private sector companies and individuals, commonly known as private security 

contractors (PSCs), have provided physical security services to protect the personnel, facilities, 

and property of the U.S. government and its contractors, subcontractors, and other parties 

supporting the U.S. mission and military in Iraq. The National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year (FY) 20081

 requires SIGIR to develop a “comprehensive plan for a series of audits 

of contracts, subcontracts, and task and delivery orders...” relating to the performance of 

security and reconstruction functions in Iraq. As part of this mandate, SIGIR reviewed available 

data from the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) and other government sources on U.S.-funded private 

security services provided to the U.S. government and its contractors and grant recipients in Iraq. 

These services are defined in this report as guarding sites (static security), escorting individuals 

and equipment convoys, and providing security advice and planning. 

The objective for this report was to determine the extent to which federal agencies have 

systematically captured financial data for private security services in Iraq since 2003, and to 

attempt to identify the number of contracts and costs for private security services in Iraq from 

available data sources. 

Results 

DoD, DoS, and USAID have not been required to systematically identify financial data for 

private security contractor (PSC) services. Consequently, financial management systems do not 

routinely capture data that would show how much has been obligated and spent for these 

individual services. Obtaining data from multiple government sources2

, SIGIR identified: 

• 77 PSC’s with associated obligations of about $5.3 billion in direct contracts and 

subcontracts to provide security services to U.S. funded projects and programs since 

2003.3

 

• an additional 233 contractors with about $662 million in associated obligations for 

contracts to provide security services that could be for providing guards or escorts, but 

 

1

 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, Section 842 2

Included in these sources of funds was a very small amount from the Development Fund for Iraq --$71.9 million. 

3

 Ten of these PSCs account for approximately 75 percent of $5.3 billion in obligations 

i
the descriptions of work were so general that they could be for other services such as 

providing network security. 

This is the best information available because agencies were not required to specifically identify 

and aggregate this data. It likely means that the obligations identified from various government 

sources are understated. For example: 

• There was no financial information on obligations for 191 companies identified in 

various data bases as having contracts for security services. 

• Financial data on subcontracts to prime contractors implementing reconstruction 

programs is limited. DoD, DoS, and USAID are not required to routinely track these 

costs in general and do not do so for security costs. However, from various data bases 

and other sources, SIGIR identified $1.2 billion in subcontract costs for security. This 

number is likely low given the limited data available on subcontracts. 

Having more complete financial data would provide managers with better information in two key 

areas to support future decisions to invest resources. First, as the reconstruction effort evolves 

from large-scale infrastructure projects to capacity building, physical security could become a 

larger portion of total contract cost. Such an increase could make it more important to weigh the 

potential value of a project outcome against the potentially larger security costs. Second, to the 

extent U.S. forces are withdrawn, and assuming that significant civilian technical assistance 

missions remain, requirements for private security services for DoS and USAID would likely 

increase to compensate for support previously provided by the military. PSC requirements could 

also increase because the recent reduction in violence enables more frequent personnel 

movements within Iraq but with private security contractor support still being needed for all trips 

outside of U.S. secured areas. Finally, there are additional costs associated with providing 

security that are also relevant including procuring armored vehicles, hardening of office and 

employee residences, and prime contractor overhead expenses that are charged for security 

subcontracting . Financial information for these contracts and subcontracts would allow U.S 

agencies to assess their security costs relative to expected project benefits and costs, and it can 

also be useful in planning for other contingency operations. 

Recommendations 

SIGIR recommends that the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and USAID Administrator 

take the following actions: 

1. Develop processes for routinely capturing financial information for all contracts and 

subcontracts for private security services. This should also include such ancillary costs as 

government furnished equipment and hardening of offices. 

2. Direct program managers to consider the costs of security relative to the expected benefits for 

all new projects. 

3. Identify security costs at the subcontractor level for all new projects. 

ii
iii

Lessons Learned 

At the beginning of reconstruction activities in 2003, the high costs associated with providing 

security for U.S. personnel in Iraq were not readily apparent. Further, because there was no 

requirement to track these costs, it was not completely clear for several years that security costs 

were consuming large portions of reconstruction budgets. However, it is now clear that these 

costs were extremely high. As a result, SIGIR believes that an important lesson learned from the 

experience in Iraq is the need to include security costs in decision-making when engaging in and 

contracting for reconstruction activities in any contingency operation including Afghanistan. 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and Defense, the U.S. Agency for 

International Development and the Multinational Force-Iraq. The U.S. Agency for International 

Development and the Multinational Force-Iraq provided technical comments, which we 

incorporated where appropriate. The Department of State did not provide comments on this 

report. The Department of Defense provided written comments that are addressed in the report 

where applicable, and a copy of their response is included in the Management Comments section 

of this report. 

DoD agreed with SIGIR’s recommendation to direct program managers to consider the costs of 

security relative to the expected costs and benefits associated with all new projects. 

However, DoD did not agree with SIGIR’s recommendation to develop processes for routinely 

capturing financial information for all contracts and subcontracts for private security services, 

citing FAR 15.403-1(b)(2) as prohibiting it (in a subsequent communication, DoD stated that the 

proper cite should be FAR 15.403-1(b)(1) rather than the initial one cited in their written 

response.) DoD also did not agree with SIGIR’s recommendation to identify security costs at the 

subcontractor level for all new projects for the same reasons. In support of its argument, DoD 

cited the FAR which states that contracting officers shall not require submission of cost or 

pricing data to support any action when prices are agreed to based on adequate competition. 

Nevertheless, DoD did indicate that it would assess the legality and feasibility of adding a 

requirement in the Defense Acquisition Register Supplement for price of security to be included 

in a separate contractor line item number with the understanding that this would place an 

additional burden on DoD’s already limited acquisition resources. 

SIGIR does not agree that the FAR precludes DoD from obtaining the financial information 

needed to implement the SIGIR recommendations. The FAR requirements regarding cost and 

pricing data are designed to assure that a contracting officer is obtaining a fair and reasonable 

price when negotiating with a prospective contractor. SIGIR’s recommendation is not directed at 

the price negotiation process and therefore this section of the FAR does not apply. 

The SIGIR recommendation suggests that DoD include in its solicitations a requirement that 

contractors provide security cost estimates in their proposals and that expenditure data be 

maintained and provided to DoD contracting and program management officials upon request. 

This is permissible under the FAR. SIGIR agrees that there may be some cost associated with 

implementing this recommendation, but believes the usefulness of this information given the 

magnitude of the security costs is a reasonable investment.
Introduction

Since April 2003, private sector companies and individuals, commonly known as private security 

contractors (PSCs), have provided physical security services to protect the personnel, facilities, 

and property of the U.S. government and its contractors, subcontractors, and other parties 

supporting the U.S. mission and military in Iraq. The National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 20084 requires the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) to 

develop a “comprehensive plan for a series of audits of contracts, subcontracts, and task and 

delivery orders...” relating to the performance of security and reconstruction functions in Iraq. 

SIGIR’s plan, entitled Comprehensive Plan for Audits of Private security Contractors to Meet the 

Requirements of Section 842 of Public Law 110-181, was issued on October XX, 2008. As part 

of this mandate, SIGIR reviewed available government data from seven contract and financial 

management data bases used by DoD, DoS, and USAID and other information on U.S.-funded 

PSCs providing security services to the U.S. government and its contractors and grant recipients 

in Iraq. This report presents the results of our review. 

Background 

The U.S. makes extensive use of private security contractors in Iraq. This represents a 

continuation of a trend that has seen the increasing growth of the use of private contractors to 

provide security as well as a variety of other functions in support of stabilization and 

reconstruction efforts. DoD and DoS, along with USAID, have primarily employed PSCs in Iraq 

through various types of direct contract actions and indirectly to PSCs engaged as subcontractors 

to organizations implementing reconstruction programs with U.S. government funds (including 

grants).5 DoD has used PSCs to provide security for movements of senior military officials, 

protection of military facilities, and protection of supply convoys traveling throughout Iraq. DoS 

PSCs provide security for the ambassador, other U.S. government officials working in Iraq under 

the authority of the ambassador, DoS facilities, and visiting Members of Congress and executive 

branch officials. USAID had its own contract to protect its personnel from 2003 to 2005, but 

since then DoS has provided security for USAID. All three agencies have also employed PSCs 

indirectly through reconstruction and support contracts. The Central Intelligence Agency, and 

the National Security Agency have also had direct contracts with PSCs. 

The mission of PSCs includes providing physical security to protect the personnel, facilities, or 

property of the U.S. government, contractors, subcontractors, or third parties in Iraq. This is 

done by providing several types of services defined as: 

• guard forces for fixed sites such as military bases, facilities, housing areas, and work sites 

(static) 

 

4

 Public Law No. 110-181, Section 842 

5

 The Federal Acquisition Regulation currently defines a contract as all types of written commitments that obligate 

the government to an expenditure of appropriated funds. In addition to bilateral instruments, contracts include 

delivery, task, job, or purchase orders; letter contracts; and contract modifications. For the purposes of this report, 

SIGIR is treating contracts and grants as equivalent obligating actions by the government. 

1
• personal security details (PSD) for movements of high-ranking U.S., Iraqi, contractor, or 

other officials 

• escorts for other personnel moving through Iraq (escort) 

• escorts for vehicle convoys moving equipment and supplies through Iraq (convoy) 

• security advice and planning (advice and planning) 

Since the September 16, 2007, shooting incident in Baghdad involving Blackwater Worldwide, 

which resulted in the deaths of 17 Iraqi civilians, DoD and DoS have taken actions to improve 

oversight of PSCs in Iraq. These actions include signing a Memorandum of Agreement in 2007 

to define the authority and responsibilities for the accountability and operations of U.S. PSCs in 

Iraq and publishing guidance implementing this agreement. The two agencies and USAID also 

signed a Memorandum of Understanding in July 2008 regarding oversight of all contractors, 

including PSCs, operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. This agreement extended the oversight 

responsibilities of DoD, DoS, and USAID for any subcontract at any tier on a contract lasting 

longer than 14 days and requires these agencies to populate a DoD-managed common database 

with information on contracts—and eventually grants—valued at more than $100,000. 

Section 842 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 required SIGIR to 

develop, in consultation with other cognizant inspector general agencies, a comprehensive plan 

for a series of audits of Federal agency contracts, subcontracts, and task and delivery orders for 

the performance of security and reconstruction functions in Iraq. This report is the first to be 

produced by SIGR under that mandate. 

Objective 

The objective for this report was to determine the extent to which federal agencies have 

systematically captured financial data for private security services in Iraq since 2003, and to 

attempt to identify the number of contracts and costs for private security services in Iraq from 

available data sources. 

For a discussion of the audit scope and methodology, see Appendix A. For a list of Security 

Contractors and Identified Obligations, see Appendix B. For a list of acronyms used in this 

report, see Appendix C. For a list of the audit team members, see Appendix D. 

2
Scope of Private Security Costs Is Large But Exact 

Data Remains Elusive

U.S. government agencies have not been required to identify security contract and subcontract 

related financial information, consequently this information is not readily available. SIGIR, 

working with the respective agencies and using other data sources, identified large numbers of 

contracts for private security services and associated financial data from available government 

information. As would be expected, SIGIR found gaps in the information which limited our 

ability to be able to confirm we had identified all providers of private security services and 

associated obligations and expenditures. These gaps make it difficult for U.S. agencies to 

determine security requirements and costs as the U.S. reconstruction effort develops from 

construction to capacity-building projects. This lack of information could become more 

problematic for decision-makers if the need for private security services were to increase for 

agencies such as DoS and USAID as U.S. forces continue withdrawing from Iraq. 

Large Numbers of Contractors and High Costs for Private Security 

Services Identified from Available Data 

As of September 26, 2008, SIGIR had identified 310 companies with direct contracts and 

subcontracts to provide security services to U.S. agencies, contractors supporting the military, or 

organizations implementing reconstruction programs for these agencies since 2003. SIGIR also 

identified almost $6.0 billion in obligations associated with these contracts. This includes about 

$4.8 billion in obligations for direct contracts with DoD, DoS, and USAID and also an additional 

$1.2 billion in obligations for private security subcontractors to companies implementing 

reconstruction programs with U.S. government funds. 

Seventy seven of these companies are private security contractors (PSC) providing physical 

security services such as guarding sites, escorting individuals and equipment convoys, and 

providing security advice and planning. These 77 companies accounted for almost 90 percent of 

the obligations. Of these, the top ten PSCs accounted for about 75 percent of the obligations. 

The remaining 233 had contracts to provide security services that could be for providing guards 

or escorts, but the descriptions of work were so general that they could be for other services such 

as providing network security. See appendix B for a listing of all 310 companies. 

DoD, DoS, and USAID have obligated these funds from several appropriations accounts used for 

reconstruction activities in Iraq. The funds have been obligated primarily from the Iraq Relief 

and Reconstruction Fund, the Diplomatic and Consular Programs Fund, the Iraqi Security Forces 

Fund, the Economic Support Fund, and the military services’ Operations and Maintenance 

accounts. However, agencies obligated money from multiple funds for many individual 

contracts for private security services. Funds have also been obligated from the Development 

Fund for Iraq (This fund was the primary financial vehicle to channel revenue from ongoing 

Iraqi oil sales, unencumbered Oil for food deposits, and repatriated Iraqi assets to the relief and 

reconstruction efforts for Iraq), Seized Assets, the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, 

supplemental funding for Provincial Reconstruction Teams for Fiscal Year 2007, and the Iraq 

3
Freedom Fund. Several contracts were funded from multiple accounts. Table 1 shows the 

breakout of obligations from these accounts by U.S. agency. 

Table 1—Obligations of Reconstruction Funds for Private Security Contracts by 

Agency ($ Millions) 

No. Fund Source DoDa DoSb USAIDc Total

1 Multiple Funds Used for Contract $712.0 $1,443.3 $493.8 $2,649.1

2 Operations and Maintenance Account 1,150.1 0.0 0.0 1,150.1

3 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 310.7 422.4 127.1 860.2

4 Iraqi Security Forces Fund 244.1 254.5 0.0 498.6

5 Diplomatic and Consular Programs Fund 0.0 97.7 0.0 97.7

6 Economic Support Fund 67.6 0.0 14.7 82.3

7 Development Fund for Iraq (Iraqi funds) 71.9 0.0 0.0 71.9

8 Fiscal Year 2007 Supplemental 0.0 71.6 0.0 71.6

9 Seized Assets 16.8 0.0 0.0 16.8

10 Commander's Emergency Response Program 11.0 0.0 0.0 11.0

11 Iraq Freedom Fund 7.9 0.0 0.0 7.9

- Fund Source Not Identified 331.2 0.0 105.1 436.3

Total $2,923.3 $2,289.5 $740.7 $5,953.5

Source: SIGIR analysis of prior audit reports, current audits, and available agency data. Agency data was not audited. 

Notes: 

a DoD data is as of September 26, 2008. 

b Dos data is as of July 31, 2008. 

c USAID data is as of March 31, 2008. 

DoD, DoS, and USAID have obligated these funds for several types of security services. The 

agencies largest costs are for multi-service contracts, which generally may include personal 

security details, static security, and other services. DoD’s second largest cost is for static 

security, about half of which is for protection of forward operating bases under a theater-wide 

internal security services contract. DoS primarily obligated funds through the Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security’s Worldwide Personal Protection Services contract and for security for an 

Iraqi police training program managed by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs. Most of USAID’s obligations for an indentified service were for contracts 

with multiple services under subcontracts for organizations implementing USAID reconstruction 

programs through contracts and grants as USAID personnel have been protected under DoS’ 

Worldwide Personal Protection Services contract since 2005. Table 2 shows the breakout of 

obligations for these services by U.S. agency. 

 

4
Table 2—Obligations for Private Security Services by Agency ($ Millions) 

No. Security Service DoDa DoSb USAIDc Total

1 Multiple Services Provided $962.9 $1,875.4 $314.7 $3,153.0

2 Static 893.4 414.1 108.5 1,416.0

3 Convoy 185.9 0.0 0.0 185.9

4 Personal Security Detail 163.3 0.0 7.4 170.7

5 A & P Advice and Planning 17.7 0.0 0.0 17.7

6 Escort 1.8 0.0 0.3 2.1

- Security Service Not Identified 698.2 N/A 309.8 1,008.0

Total $2,923.3 $2,289.5 $740.7 $5,953.5

Source: SIGIR analysis of prior audit reports, current audits, and available agency data. Agency data was not audited.

Notes: 

N/A = The amount obligated for security services under a contract associated with the company was not available a DoD data is as of September 26, 2008. 

b Dos data is as of July 17, 2008. 

c USAID data is as of March 31, 2008. 

Need For Comprehensive Financial Data on Private Security Costs 

Since there has been no requirement to track financial information for private security services, 

no federal procurement database comprehensively identifies contractors and the current financial 

data for their contracts. There are significant gaps in the agencies’ financial information on 

PSCs as a result. Therefore, SIGIR compiled the information cited above from data provided by 

the agencies, current and prior audits, and other federal databases. As would be expected from 

this broader review of data sources, SIGIR was able to identify significant gaps in the agencies’ 

data. Because of these gaps, SIGIR believes that the number of contractors and their associated 

costs are likely greater than we have identified thus far. The following information shows 

examples of the gaps SIGIR found: 

• Of the 310 companies identified, 191 did not have obligations associated with their 

contracts in available databases for some type of security service. These include 183 

companies with contracts with DoD, 7 with contracts with DoS, and one company with a 

contract with USAID. Therefore, financial information for these companies is not 

reflected in the total obligations above. 

• The obligations data for 434 contract actions (427 with DoD, seven with DoS) represent 

the original amount awarded for the contract rather than the current obligations and 

disbursements because current data was not available. Consequently, 18 percent of the 

total obligations cited above are based on the original award amount rather current 

obligations. While the award value may equal the current amount obligated on recently 

awarded contracts, the value of a contract can increase significantly over time. 

• The private security service was not identified for 582 contract actions. 

• SIGIR did not receive data on the security costs for the construction of DoS’ New 

Embassy Compound in Baghdad. 

5
Information on PSC subcontracts to organizations implementing reconstruction programs is also 

not required to be captured by U.S agencies in financial or other databases. Neither the Federal 

Procurement Data System Next Generation6

 nor U.S. agencies explicitly track the costs of those 

subcontracts because those costs are not direct government obligations. Finally, there are 

additional costs associated with providing security that are also relevant including procuring 

armored vehicles, hardening of office and employee residences, and prime contractor overhead 

expenses that are charged for security subcontracting. In addition, subcontract arrangements for 

reconstruction contracts can be very complex, with several tiers of subcontracts between the 

prime contractor and all of its subcontractors,7

 and these arrangements cannot currently be 

tracked by U.S. contract and financial databases. Therefore, some prime contractors which may 

actually have subcontracts for security, could be listed as direct providers of security services. 

For example well known defense contractors such as General Dynamics and Raytheon are listed 

as PSCs in some DoD databases. 

Despite this gap in capability, DoD published guidance in October 2005 to identify all PSCs at 

all tiers and DoS published guidance for prime contractors to identify costs for private security 

goods and services at all tiers on their invoices. Although SIGIR found that DoS and USAID 

can capture this information on an ad hoc basis by querying organizations implementing 

reconstruction activities, the three agencies have not maintained data on PSC subcontractors. 

However, SIGIR identified $1.2 billion in subcontract costs for security from various data bases 

and other sources. This number is likely low given the limited data available on subcontracts. 

While not every contract action for reconstruction has a security component, SIGIR believes the 

total obligations for PSC subcontracts are likely much greater than those identified in this report. 

Additionally, SIGIR believes the potential exists for security costs as a percentage of total 

contract costs to increase significantly as we continue to look more closely at contracts, 

subcontracts, and task orders. In 2006, SIGIR found that security costs ran between 7.6% and 

16.7% for large-scale infrastructure construction projects.8

 However, SIGIR’s current analysis 

shows that security costs for capacity-building projects comprise a larger percentage of total 

contract costs than for construction contracts. For example, SIGIR found that USAID’s security 

costs for 7 of 11 capacity-building contracts and grants ranged from 24% to 53%. 

The absence of information on private security costs limits the basis for management decisionmaking to support future contracting decisions related to PSC’s or for contracts that may require 

PSC support. With more accurate information, U.S. agencies could better plan and budget for 

non-construction projects and programs. They could also better determine whether the potential 

outcome and costs of a project warrants moving forward given the relative cost of security. As 

SIGIR has previously reported,9

 U.S. agencies adopted a high-risk strategy with little emphasis 

 

6

 The Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, as amended, 41 USC 401 et seq. requires the Administrator for 

Federal Procurement Policy to establish a computer-based Federal Procurement Data System for collecting, 

developing, and disseminating procurement data to the Congress, Executive Branch, and private sector. 

7

 On one contract, Bechtel had 168 known subcontractors at different tiers. Of these, three provided security and 

another eight provided security through additional subcontracts. See Review of Bechtel’s Spending Under Its Phase 

II Iraq Reconstruction Contract (SIGIR-07-009, July 24, 2007). 8 Fact Sheet on Major U.S. Contractor’s Security Costs Related to Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Contracting 

Activities (SIGIR-06-044, January 30, 2007). 9 Key Recurring Management Issues Identified in audits of Iraq Reconstruction Efforts (SIGIR-08-020, July 27, 

2008) 

6
on determining whether a project’s rewards were worth the risk or whether proper oversight of a 

project could be maintained. As a result, agencies pushed forward with reconstruction activities 

and experienced project failure and waste in some cases because security conditions were not 

properly analyzed and accounted for. 

Better Information on PSCs Is Needed to Manage Costs and 

Requirements as the Role of U.S. Forces Changes 

The withdrawal of U.S. forces could affect PSC requirements and costs. The administration has 

already withdrawn the majority of the forces used during the surge and plans to withdraw 

another 8,000 troops from Iraq by February 2009. To the extent additional U.S. forces are 

withdrawn, and depending on the level of continued U.S. civilian technical assistance missions 

that remain, PSCs may have to be called on to increase their services to offset the loss of 

capability normally provided by the military as part of its ongoing presence, according to PSC 

officials. PSCs currently rely on U.S. military forces for quick reaction forces as backup 

protection and medical evacuation in emergencies. In some cases, these U.S. military backup 

responsibilities are a part of the PSC contract. For example, in one contract with Aegis World

the U.S. military is required to provide a means to request both a quick reaction force and 

medical evacuation capabilities. In commenting on a draft of this report, DoD states that it does 

not expect that PSCs will assume any responsibility for a broader role when military forces are 

withdrawn. The mission of DoD PSCs is, and will remain, strictly defensive in protecting 

persons, facilities, places, or supplies. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume that increased 

threat levels could require an increase in the level of defensive security services provided by 

DoD PSCs. 

Without the benefit of these capabilities, PSCs may be called on to provide additional personnel, 

equipment, medical personnel, and additional weapons that the military now provides in daily 

operations in Iraq. Although the military funds these efforts through procurement and operations 

and maintenance accounts, the cost of the security the military provides to civilian agencies and 

contractors is not easily quantifiable. While any increase in PSC requirements will be based on 

several factors, including the location of the security work and the future security environment, 

PSC officials agreed that acquiring these types of capabilities will increase the costs of future 

contracts. 

This could be of great concern for Provincial Reconstruction Teams, whose security has been a 

significant concern. These teams have been important because they provide grassroots support 

in the development of local provincial governments’ abilities to govern, increase security and 

rule of law, and promote political and economic development among other objectives. SIGIR 

found that because of security concerns, face-to-face meetings between provincial government 

officials and team personnel were often limited and, in some cases did not occur at all. The 

security challenges have limited the teaching, coaching, and mentoring that form the core of the 

teams’ capacity-development mission. Security officials with the U.S. Embassy expressed 

concern for the overall physical safety of unarmed civilians and cautioned that the security 

situation could deteriorate as coalition forces withdraw and turn over areas to the Iraqi 

government. To the extent such teams or other technical assistance teams remain requirements 

for private security services could increase. Moreover, understanding these costs is also 

important in planning for other ongoing or future contingency operations. 

7
Consistent with our current concern over rising security costs, DoS and USAID officials stated 

that these costs have increased for several reasons. First, with reduced violence has come an 

increase in mobility for their personnel into areas where travel had been previously prohibited 

and they are spending more time working with Iraqis in their villages and cities. Second, 

concurrent with the military surge, DoS and USAID officials said the agency also placed more 

resources and personnel into Iraq including their grant partners. However, even with the 

reduced level of violence, U.S. civilians continue to require private security contractor support 

for all trips outside of U.S. military secured areas. Third and finally, USAID officials pointed 

out that protection of these teams cost inordinately more as a percentage of the total costs of their 

grants than would be the case for providing static security around their large construction project 

sites that have now been largely completed. DoD officials told us that as troop levels are 

reduced their overall need for private security services would decrease. Multinational Force Iraq 

(MNF-I) stated that costs for private security services have generally declined over the past year. 

8
Conclusions, Recommendations, and Lesson Learned 

Conclusions 

Given the significant cost of security services for reconstruction activities and the overall number 

of PSCs used in Iraq, it is critical that U.S agencies engaged in reconstruction activities have 

accurate financial information and a complete understanding of how funds are spent on security 

services. In particular, a better understanding of how security costs impact total contract costs is 

essential to plan for other ongoing and future contingency operations involving reconstruction 

projects. In addition, and more importantly, to the extent the United States continues drawing 

down its forces in Iraq, but maintains a large contingent of civilians working in Iraq on 

reconstruction and capacity building activities, costs for private security contractors in Iraq could 

increase. 

Recommendations 

SIGIR recommends that the Secretaries of Defense and State and the Administrator, USAID, 

take the following actions: 

1. Develop processes for routinely capturing financial information for all contracts and 

subcontracts for private security services. This should also include such ancillary costs as 

government furnished equipment and hardening of offices. 

2. Direct program managers to consider the costs of security relative to the expected benefits for 

all new projects. 

3. Identify security costs at the subcontractor level for all new projects. 

Lesson Learned 

The high costs associated with providing security for U.S. personnel in Iraq were not readily 

apparent at the beginning of reconstruction activities in 2003. Further, because there was no 

requirement to track these costs, it was not completely clear for several years that security costs 

were consuming large portions of reconstruction budgets. However, it is now clear that these 

costs were extremely high. As a result, SIGIR believes that an important lesson learned from the 

Iraq experience is the need to include security costs in decision-making when engaging in and 

contracting for reconstruction activities in any contingency operation including Afghanistan. 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and Defense, the U.S. Agency for 

International Development and the Multinational Force-Iraq. The U.S. Agency for International 

Development and the Multinational Force-Iraq provided technical comments, which we 

incorporated where appropriate. The Department of State did not provide comments on this 

report. The Department of Defense provided written comments that are addressed in the report 

where applicable, and a copy of their response is included in the Management Comments section 

of this report. 

9
DoD agreed with SIGIR’s recommendation to direct program managers to consider the costs of 

security relative to the expected costs and benefits associated with all new projects. 

However, DoD did not agree with SIGIR’s recommendation to develop processes for routinely 

capturing financial information for all contracts and subcontracts for private security services, 

citing FAR 15.403-1(b)(2) as prohibiting it (in a subsequent communication, DoD stated that the 

proper cite should be FAR 15.403-1(a)) rather than the initial one cited in their written response. 

DoD also did not agree with SIGIR’s recommendation to identify security costs at the 

subcontractor level for all new projects for the same reasons. In support of its argument, DoD 

states that the FAR states that contracting officers shall not require submission of cost or pricing 

data to support any action when prices are agreed to based on adequate competition. 

Nevertheless, DoD did indicate that it would assess the legality and feasibility of adding a 

requirement in the Defense Acquisition Register Supplement for price of security to be included 

in a separate contractor line item number with the understanding that this would place an 

additional burden on DoD’s already limited acquisition resources. 

SIGIR does not agree that the FAR precludes DoD from obtaining the financial information 

needed to implement the SIGIR recommendations. The FAR requirements regarding cost and 

pricing data are designed to assure that a contracting officer is obtaining a fair and reasonable 

price when negotiating with a prospective contractor. SIGIR’s recommendation is not directed 

at the price negotiation process and therefore this section of the FAR does not apply. 

The SIGIR recommendation suggests that DoD include in its solicitations, a requirement that 

contractors provide security cost estimates in their proposals and that expenditure data be 

maintained and provided to DoD contracting and program management officials upon request. 

This is permissible under the FAR. SIGIR agrees that there may be some cost associated with 

implementing this recommendation, but believes the usefulness of this information given the 

magnitude of the security costs is a reasonable investment. 

10
Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 

SIGIR initiated this project in February 2008 (Project 8016) to address a mandate in Section 842 

of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2008 requiring SIGIR to develop and carry out, in 

consultation with other audit agencies, a comprehensive plan of audits of private security 

functions in Iraq. 

To determine the extent to which federal agencies have systematically captured the costs for 

private security services in Iraq since 2003, SIGIR met with officials from DoD, DoS, and 

USAID to identify and understand potential sources of data on PSC contract actions. SIGIR 

noted that agencies were not required to capture PSC financial data and that no single 

government source of information contained complete data on PSC contracts. Therefore, SIGIR 

requested and obtained all available information on private security services contained in several 

databases from several DoD and DoS components and USAID. We also collected additional 

information from DoS and USAID, which they collected from contractors and grant recipients to 

address our data request. 

To identify contracts and financial information, agency-provided data and data from current and 

prior audits were compiled by providers of security services. Costs in terms of the original 

award, current obligations, and expenditures were also identified for each contract. DoD 

information included data on the original award, whereas DoS and USAID information included 

current obligations and expenditures. Where available, cost data was updated from SIGIR’s July 

2008 Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the Congress. 

 Given the differences in how data are captured by the agencies, and because a contract award 

creates an obligation, we chose to identify and discuss obligations in the report. The security 

service provided under each contract was also identified in the process if this information was 

available. With the exception of information included in prior audits and ongoing audits of 

Blackwater Worldwide, Aegis Defence Services Ltd. and RTI International SIGIR did not 

independently verify the financial data provided. 

There were limitations in the available data. Because the agencies have not been required to and 

do not track and aggregate current financial data for security contracts, SIGIR could not identify 

costs for 191 companies with contracts to provide security services. Additionally, 18 percent of 

the total obligations SIGIR identified for DoD are for the original award amount rather the 

current obligation amount. This is particularly important because contracts are frequently 

amended and the actual amounts obligated and expended can differ from the original award. 

Also, financial data on subcontracts to prime contractors implementing reconstruction programs 

is limited. DoD, DoS, and USAID are not required to track subcontractor costs in general and do 

not do so for security. As a result, data for subcontracts for private security was limited. 

To understand the impact of the drawdown of U.S. forces on security costs and requirements, 

SIGIR met with several officials from two of the larger PSC firms. We obtained their views on 

current and future cost drivers and the future security environment in Iraq. We also discussed 

this issue with agency officials. 

11
We performed our work in Arlington, Virginia, and Baghdad, Iraq. We performed the audit for 

this report under authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also incorporates the 

duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as 

amended. We conducted this performance audit from February through October 2008 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that 

we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our results based on our audit objectives. Based on those objectives, we believe that the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our results. 

Internal Controls 

To achieve the assignment’s objective we identified agency processes for tracking and managing 

financial information on private security contractors but did not specifically evaluate those 

processes. To test the accuracy of the agency data provided, we identified different sources of 

agency information and other federal procurement data to verify the information for accuracy 

and completeness where possible. Our assessment focused on the opportunity to enhance 

financial reporting to support decision-making. 

Reliability of Data from Computer-Based Systems 

To perform this audit, SIGIR extensively used financial and other information from seven U.S. 

government contract databases, financial management systems, and other management 

information systems. These systems are: 

• DoD – U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Financial Management System, Synchronized 

Predeployment and Operational Tracker, Joint Contingency Contracting System, Civilian 

Arming Database 

• DoS – Integrated Logistics Management System, Global Financial Management System 

• USAID – Phoenix System 

• FPDS-NG – Federal Procurement Data system – Next Generation 

We did not independently verify the internal controls of the data contained in these systems. 

Instead we relied on prior audit reports and agency official's process for verifying data in the 

system and compiling data for SIGIR use. Although our review indicated limitations in the 

data’s completeness, officials from DoD, DoS, and USAID stated that these systems contained 

the data on PSC contracts and obligations and expenditures. Therefore SIGIR determined the 

data contained in these systems are the best available for purposes of our review. 

Compliance with Laws and Regulations 

A review of agency compliance with laws and regulations was not applicable to this review and 

therefore was not performed. 

12
Prior Coverage 

To identify PSCs and security costs, we reviewed the following reports and relied on them in 

conducting our review: 

• Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues

(Congressional Research Service, August 25, 2008) 

• Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq (Congressional Budget Office, August 

2008) 

• Quarterly Reports to Congress (SIGIR, July 30, 2003 through July 30, 2008) 

• Key Recurring Management Issues Indentified in Audits of Iraq Reconstruction Efforts

(SIGIR-08-020, July 27, 2008) 

• Rebuilding Iraq: DoD and State Department Have Improved Oversight and Coordination 

of Private Security Contractors in Iraq, but Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain 

Improvements (GAO-08-966, July 2008) 

• Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Electricity-Sector Reconstruction Contract with Perini 

Corporation (SIGIR-08-011, April 29, 2008) 

• Defense Management: DoD Needs to Reexamine Its Extensive Reliance on Contractors 

and Continue to Improve Management and Oversight (GAO-08-572T, March 2008) 

• Independent Auditor’s Report on the Fiscal Year 2007 and U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, Civil Works, Financial Statements (Department of Defense: Office of the 

Inspector General, March 31, 2008) 

• Military Operations: Implementation of Existing Guidance and Other Actions Needed to 

Improve DoD’s Oversight and Management of Contractors in Future Operations (GAO08-436T, January 24, 2008) 

• Differences in Services and Fees for Management and Administration of Iraq 

Reconstruction Contracts (SIGIR-08-005, January 29, 2008) 

• Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Iraq Reconstruction Contract W91NS-04-D-0006

(SIGIR-08-010, January 29, 2008) 

• Efforts to Implement a Financial Management Information System in Iraq (SIGIR-08-

007, January 25, 2008) 

• Federal Acquisition: Oversight Plan Needed to Help Implement Acquisition Advisory 

Panel Recommendations (GAO-08-160, December 2007) 

13
• Independent Auditor’s Report on the U.S. Department of State’s 2007 and 2006 

Financial Statements (Department of State: Office of the Inspector General Report 

AUD/FM-08-15, November 15, 2007) 

• Audit of the USAID’s Financial Statements for Fiscal Years 2007 and 2006 (USAID 

Office of the Inspector General, Audit Report Number 0-000-08-001-C, November 14, 

2007) 

• Controls Over Unliquidated Obligations in the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund

(SIGIR-07-011, October 23, 2007) 

• Review of the Effectiveness of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq

(SIGIR-07-015, October 18, 2007) 

• Review of Bechtel’s Spending Under Its Phase II Iraq Reconstruction Contract (SIGIR07-009, July 24, 2007) 

• Rebuilding Iraq: Reconstruction Progress Hindered by Contracting, Security, and 

Capacity Challenges (GAO-07-0426T, February 2007) 

• Follow-Up of USAID/Iraq’s Education Activities (USAID Office of the Inspector General 

E-267-07-003-P, February 4, 2007) 

• Review of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Unmatched Disbursements (SIGIR-06-

043, January 30, 2007) 

• Fact Sheet on Major U.S. Contractors’ Security Costs Related to Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund Contracting Activities (SIGIR-06-042, SIGIR-06-044, January 30, 

2007) 

• Military Operations: High Level DoD Action is Needed to Address Long-standing 

Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces

(GAO-07-145, December 2006) 

• Report on the Audit of USAID’s Financial Statements for Fiscal Years 2006 and 2005 

(USAID Office of the Inspector General, Audit Report Number 0-000-07-001-C, 

November 15, 2006) 

• Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Civil Society Activities (USAID Office of the Inspector General 

Audit Report Number E-267-07-001-P, November 5, 2006) 

• Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Competition for Iraq Reconstruction Contracts (GAO-07-40, 

October 2006) 

• Review of Advanced First Responder Network (SIGIR-06-020, July 28, 2006) 

14
• Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Still Needed to Improve the Use of Private Security Providers 

(GAO-06-865T, June 13, 2006) 

• Review of Task Shield Programs (SIGIR-06-009, April 28, 2006) 

• Challenges Faced In Carrying Out Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Activities

(SIGIR-05-029, January 26, 2006) 

• Management of the Mansuria Electrical Reconstruction Project (SIGIR-05-024, January 

23, 2006) 

• Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Basic Education Activities (USAID Office of the Inspector 

General E-267-06-001-P, December 20, 2005) 

• Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve the Use of Private Security Providers 

(GAO-05-737, July 2005) 

• Agreed-Upon Procedures Review of Daily Direct Labor, Aerial Support Equipment and 

Indirect Expense Rates Proposed by Blackwater Security Consultants, Incorporated, 

Contractor's Accounting System & Timekeeping Procedures (Department of State Office 

of the Inspector General AUD/IQO-05, January 2005) 

• Audit of USAID’s Compliance with Federal Regulations in Awarding the Contract for 

Security Services in Iraq to Kroll Government Services International, Inc. (USAID 

Office of the Inspector General A-267-05-005-P, January 6, 2005) 

• Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Economic Reform Program (USAID Office of the Inspector 

General E-266-04-004-P September 20, 2004) 

• Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management 

Challenges, (GAO-04-605, June 1, 2004) 

15
Appendix B—Security Contractors and Identified 

Obligations 

Tables 3 and 4 list the 310 contractors we identified from multiple data sources that provided or 

are providing private security services. Table 3 shows direct contract actions (Direct), 

subcontracts (Sub), and total obligations for PSCs by U.S. agencies since 2003. Table 4 shows 

direct contract actions (Direct), subcontracts (Sub), and total obligations for contractors 

providing all private security services by U.S. agencies since 2003. These services could be for 

providing guards or escort, but the descriptions of work were so general that they could be for 

other services such as providing network security. 

As many contractors have merged or changes their names over time, SIGIR used a naming 

convention to reflect the current name of the company where this information was available. For 

example, any contract for Blackwater Lodge & Training or Blackwater USA is included in the 

total obligations for Blackwater Worldwide. Similarly, any contract for PWC Logistics is 

counted in the total for Agility Logistics. However, subsidiaries of parent corporations that are 

listed in U.S. agency databases with distinct contracts from their parent organizations are listed 

separately. For example, L-3 Communications owns Military Professional Resources Inc. 

(MPRI), but these companies are identified in DoD databases individually with different 

contracts actions. Therefore, they are listed as separate companies in Tables 4 and 5. 

Table 3—Total Obligations for Contractors with Direct Contracts or Subcontracts 

for Private Security Contractors (PSCs) by U.S. Agency since 2003 ($ Millions) 

No. Contractor Name Direct Sub DoD DoS USAID Total

1 Blackwater Worldwide 7 2 $27.740 $1,147.020 $31.290 $1,206.050

2 Aegis Defence Services LTD. 19 2 798.621 0 0 798.621

3 DynCorp International LLC 10 3 31.428 659.220 0 690.647

4 Triple Canopy, Inc. 35 0 106.932 422.233 0.291 529.455

5 EOD Technology, Inc. (EODT) 295 0 328.665 0 0 328.665

6 Sabre International Security 25 3 225.816 0 58.666 284.482

7 Special Operations ConsultingSecurity Management Group 

(SOC-SMG) 

35 2 271.856 0 0 271.856

8 Agility Logistics 23 0 183.030 0 0 183.030

9 Unity Resources Group 0 2 0 50.000 92.951 142.951

10 ArmorGroup 22 7 91.558 0 46.088 137.646

11 Erinys International 3 8 108.159 0 0 108.159

12 Sallyport Global Holdings 0 3 0 0 101.526 101.526

13 Global Strategies Group 7 1 83.797 0 0 83.797

14 Garda World 0 4 0 0 74.701 74.701

15 Kroll Associates, Inc. 2 2 8.969 0 38.386 47.355

16 MVM 21 0 38.382 0 0 38.382

17 US Investigations Services 

(USIS) 

10 0 35.511 0 0 35.511

18 Vance Global 0 1 0 0 31.255 31.255

16
No. Contractor Name Direct Sub DoD DoS USAID Total

19 Falcon Group 8 0 29.289 0 0 29.289

20 Hart Group 4 1 26.264 0 0 26.264

21 Olive Group FZ LLC 13 8 17.603 0 0 17.603

22 Control Risks Group 8 3 17.213 0 0 17.213

23 Custer Battles 1 0 16.840 0 0 16.840

24 CSS Global, Inc. 112 0 15.016 0 0 15.016

25 Total Defense Logistics 13 0 12.710 0 0 12.710

26 Iraqi Contractor #4 0 1 0 10.800 0 10.800

27 Reed Incorporated 8 0 9.235 0 0 9.235

28 Universal Security 86 0 8.523 0 0 8.523

29 Edinburgh International 2 2 4.989 0 0 4.989

30 Raymond Associates 5 0 4.944 0 0 4.944

31 BLP 1 0 4.185 0 0 4.185

32 Rover Global Services. Ltd 

(RGS Logistics) 

46 0 3.883 0 0 3.883

33 ISI Group 1 3 3.838 0 0 3.838

34 Securiforce International 73 0 3.408 0 0 3.408

35 SAL Risk Group Ltd. 63 0 1.861 0 0 1.861

36 American-Iraqi Life Support 

Solutions 

1 0 1.614 0 0 1.614

37 Sandi Security Company 1 0 1.575 0 0 1.575

38 Panalpina 0 1 0 0 1.137 1.137

39 Blue Hackle Middle East 3 25 0.904 0 0 0.904

40 Overseas Security & Strategic 

Information 

2 0 0.781 0 0 0.781

41 Threat Management Group 2 0 0.500 0 0 0.500

42 BH Defence 1 0 0.179 0 0 0.179

43 Iraqi Contractor #1 0 1 0 0.119 0 0.119

44 Iraqi Contractor #3 0 1 0 0.054 0 0.054

45 Tetra International LLC 3 1 0.053 0 0 0.053

46 Iraqi Contractor #6 0 1 0 0.047 0 0.047

47 Iraqi Contractor #2 0 1 0 0.034 0 0.034

48 Danubia Global 1 0 0.010 0 0 0.010

49 Iraqi Contractor #5 0 1 0 0.008 0 0.008

50 Peak Group Inc. 1 0 0.005 0 0 0.005

51 Cochise Consultancy Inc. 1 0 0 0 0 0

52 ECC International (ECCI) 1 1 N/A 0 0 0

53 Operations Support 

Technologies 

1 0 N/A 0 0 0

54 OSSI-Safenet Security Services 2 9 N/A 0 0 0

55 Janusian Security Risk 

Management Ltd. 

1 0 N/A 0 0 0

56 Paratus World Wide Protection 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

57 Pesh - Kurdistan Army 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

58 Pilgrims Group Ltd 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

59 Iraqi Contractor #28 0 0 N/A 0 0 0

60 Askar Security Svcs 2 14 N/A 0 0 0

61 Ronco Consulting Corporation 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

62 Innovative Technical Solutions, 

Inc. (ITSI) 

2 0 N/A 0 0 0

17
No. Contractor Name Direct Sub DoD DoS USAID Total

63 Rubicon International Services 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

64 Safe Security Limited (SSL) 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

65 Babylon Gates 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

66 TOIFOR 12 1 N/A 0 0 0

67 Ellis World Alliance Corp. 

(EWAC) 

1 0 N/A 0 0 0

68 Britam Defence, Ltd. 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

69 Burhan Security Services 2 0 N/A 0 0 0

70 Wamar International, Inc 0 0 N/A 0 0 0

71 Whitestone Group, Inc. 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

72 Greystone Ltd 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

73 Centurion Risk Assessment Ltd 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

74 Lakeshore Engineering Svc, 

Inc. 

1 0 N/A 0 0 0

75 Iraqi Contractor #7 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

76 Unity Logistics And Security 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

77 DS Vance Iraq 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

Total $2,525.890 $2,289.530 $476.290 $5,291.710

Source: SIGIR analysis of prior audit reports, current audits, and available agency data. Agency data was not audited. 

Notes: 

N/A = The amount obligated for security services under a contract associated with the company was not available a DoD data is as of September 4, 2008. 

b Dos data is as of July 31, 2008. 

c USAID data is as of March 31, 2008.

 

18
Table 4—Total Obligations for Contractors with Direct Contracts or Subcontracts 

for Private Security Services by U.S. Agency since 2003 ($ Millions) 

No. Contractor Name Direct Sub DoD DoS USAID Total

1 Parsons Brinckerhoff, Inc. 1 0 79.635 0 0 79.635

2 ASRC Airfield and Range 

Services (ASARS) 

1 0 42.800 0 0 42.800

3 Iraqi Contractor #10 0 0 15.411 0 0 15.411

4 Science Applications 

International Corporation (SAIC) 

20 15 5.246 0 9.980 15.226

5 General Electric International 0 1 0 0 9.980 9.980

6 Kuehne and Nagel 0 1 0 0 9.980 9.980

7 Al-Bahar and Bardawil 

Specialties 

0 1 0 0 9.980 9.980

8 General Electric Company (GE) 0 1 0 0 9.980 9.980

9 Weir Engineering Services 0 1 0 0 9.980 9.980

10 MID-Contracting 0 1 0 0 9.980 9.980

11 Asea Brown Boveri 0 1 0 0 9.980 9.980

12 Iraqi Contractor #11 0 0 8.383 0 0 8.383

13 Golden Company 19 0 7.898 0 0 7.898

14 American Science and 

Engineering 

1 0 7.550 0 0 7.550

15 Apptis Inc 1 0 7.041 0 0 7.041

16 GW Consulting 0 3 6.368 0 0 6.368

17 Iraqi Contractor #9 1 0 4.999 0 0 4.999

18 Iraqi Contractor #12 0 0 4.745 N/A 0 4.745

19 Iratrac 1 0 3.006 0 0 3.006

20 ALMCO 4 0 2.818 0 0 2.818

21 LINC International 1 0 2.804 0 0 2.804

22 Motorola Joint Venture (AIEE) 5 0 2.513 0 0 2.513

23 Dobeshtic International 0 1 2.360 0 0 2.360

24 SoS International, Ltd. 1 1 2.336 0 0 2.336

25 Proactive Communications Inc. 2 0 2.278 0 0 2.278

26 Armor Holdings, Inc. 2 0 1.934 0 0 1.934

27 Iraqi Contractor #13 0 0 0 0 1.884 1.884

28 Mercury Development 1 0 1.880 0 0 1.880

29 Iraqi Contractor #14 0 0 1.684 0 0 1.684

30 Minetech International 4 0 1.590 0 0 1.590

31 Iraqi Contractor #15 0 0 0.991 0 0 0.991

32 Iraqi Contractor #16 0 0 0.887 0 0 0.887

33 Banah Group 1 0 0.816 0 0 0.816

34 Winter Travel Company 2 0 0.650 0 0 0.650

35 Iraqi Contractor #17 0 0 0.627 0 0 0.627

36 Iraqi Contractor #18 0 0 0.575 0 0 0.575

37 Northrop Grumman 1 0 0.438 0 0 0.438

38 Iraqi Contractor #19 0 0 0.409 0 0 0.409

39 Great American Networks, Inc 1 0 0.398 0 0 0.398

40 77 Construction & Trading 5 0 0.395 0 0 0.395

41 Military Professional Resources 

Inc. (MPRI) 

4 1 0.291 0 0 0.291

19
No. Contractor Name Direct Sub DoD DoS USAID Total

42 Makeen Tech Corporation 1 0 0.288 0 0 0.288

43 Water Wheel Construction 

Company 

1 0 0.287 0 0 0.287

44 Iraqi Contractor #20 0 0 0.240 0 0 0.240

45 HSS Engineering Aps 1 0 0.236 0 0 0.236

46 Spectrum Worldwide LLC 1 1 0.234 0 0 0.234

47 Comtech Mobile Datacom 

Corporation 

1 0 0.165 0 0 0.165

48 Treasure Trust Company Ltd. 1 0 0.149 0 0 0.149

49 Iraqi Contractor #21 0 0 0.147 0 0 0.147

50 Iraqi Contractor #8 1 0 0.143 0 0 0.143

51 E.C.C. Engineering Consultant 

Co., Ltd 

2 0 0.138 0 0 0.138

52 Horizon Light Co 1 0 0.137 0 0 0.137

53 Rose Company 1 0 0.112 0 0 0.112

54 Babylonia Company 1 0 0.108 0 0 0.108

55 Aardvark Tactical, Inc. 1 0 0.087 0 0 0.087

56 Super Star Army Company 1 0 0.079 0 0 0.079

57 Gulf Company 1 0 0.073 0 0 0.073

58 Iraqi Contractor #22 0 0 0.065 0 0 0.065

59 Iraqi Contractor #23 0 0 0.047 0 0 0.047

60 Iraqi Contractor #24 0 0 0.036 0 0 0.036

61 Armament Systems and 

Procedures 

1 0 0.032 0 0 0.032

62 Iraqi Contractor #25 0 0 0.027 0 0 0.027

63 Said Contracting 1 0 0.026 0 0 0.026

64 ADS Inc 1 0 0.021 0 0 0.021

65 SkyLink (Arabia) 2 0 0.018 0 0 0.018

66 Arkel International 1 0 0.016 0 0 0.016

67 Securimetrics 1 0 0.010 0 0 0.010

68 Iraqi Contractor #26 0 0 0.006 0 0 0.006

69 Night Galaxy 1 0 0.003 0 0 0.003

70 Taylor Security & Loc Co., Inc 1 0 0.001 0 0 0.001

71 NAE 0 1 0 0 0 0

72 COP 0 2 0 0 0 0

73 NCL 1 0 0 0 0 0

74 ILEX Systems, Inc. 0 2 0 0 0 0

75 NEK Advanced Securities 

Group 

1 0 N/A 0 0 0

76 Telesis Corp. 0 2 N/A 0 0 0

77 API Industries 0 3 N/A 0 0 0

78 Iraqi Contractor #33 0 0 N/A 0 0 0

79 Espial Services, Inc. 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

80 Exponent Inc. 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

81 Iraqi Contractor #39 0 0 N/A 0 0 0

82 OIWI 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

83 Raman International, Inc. 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

84 US Falcon, Inc 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

85 Iraqi Contractor #38 0 0 N/A 0 0 0

20
No. Contractor Name Direct Sub DoD DoS USAID Total

86 Burj Al Emaar Co 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

87 FOB Shank ASG 2 0 N/A 0 0 0

88 Dynetics, Inc. 0 2 N/A 0 0 0

89 GMECI 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

90 Arrowhead Global Solutions 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

91 Jacobs 3 0 N/A 0 0 0

92 Parsons Infrastructure & 

Technology 

1 0 N/A 0 0 0

93 LSI 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

94 Passman Company 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

95 Oberon Associates, Inc. 0 1 0 N/A 0 0

96 Air Cargo Carriers 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

97 Stanley Associates, Inc. 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

98 Toccoa Ins. 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

99 Iraqi Contractor #40 0 0 N/A 0 0 0

100 Praemittias 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

101 L-3 Communications 1 8 N/A 0 0 0

102 Emerge International 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

103 PSS 1 1 0 N/A 0 0

104 Bennett & Fouch Associate 0 3 N/A 0 0 0

105 QIT Co. 3 1 N/A 0 0 0

106 Centurum 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

107 AECOM Government Services 

(AGS) 

1 0 N/A 0 0 0

108 DAMAC 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

109 Eastern Company 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

110 Raytheon 2 3 N/A 0 0 0

111 Global Freight 0 4 N/A 0 0 0

112 HKA 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

113 IGT&C 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

114 Asmar ASG 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

115 JIL IT Consulting and SVC 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

116 Leadstay 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

117 Iraqi Contractor #37 0 0 N/A 0 0 0

118 MED 0 4 N/A 0 0 0

119 Iraqi Contractor #29 0 0 N/A 0 0 0

120 NCI Information Systems, 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

121 PMA Services, Ltd. 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

122 Iraqi Contractor #30 0 0 N/A 0 0 0

123 Serco, Inc. 0 1 0 N/A 0 0

124 Ideas to Solutions 1 0 0 N/A 0 0

125 Sys Products & Solutions 0 2 N/A 0 0 0

126 General Atomics 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

127 Tiger Swan (TSI) 0 2 N/A 0 0 0

128 SATTRUCK 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

129 TRIRINSE 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

130 Iraqi Contractor #27 0 0 N/A 0 0 0

131 VSE Corp. 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

132 CH2M Hill, Inc. 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

21
No. Contractor Name Direct Sub DoD DoS USAID Total

133 Environmental Chemical Co 17 1 N/A 0 0 0

134 Computer Science Corporation 

(CSC) 

2 3 N/A 0 0 0

135 Iraqi Contractor #36 0 0 N/A 0 0 0

136 Cubic Corporation 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

137 SM Consulting, Inc. 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

138 Lockheed Martin 1 0 0 N/A 0 0

139 BAE Systems PLC 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

140 ANHAM Joint Venture 0 4 N/A 0 0 0

141 General Dynamics 1 1 N/A 0 0 0

142 Areebel Co. 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

143 Iraqi Contractor #32 0 0 N/A 0 0 0

144 Bioban 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

145 SSSI 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

146 CARD 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

147 Streit Manufacturing Inc. 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

148 CHS 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

149 AMEC 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

150 Corner Research Group 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

151 TAMSCO, Inc. 1 1 N/A 0 0 0

152 Dataline 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

153 TATE, Inc. 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

154 E2M 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

155 FP 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

156 ESP 0 3 N/A 0 0 0

157 FTI 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

158 GFS 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

159 Fundamentals 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

160 Afghan Security Guards 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

161 Ghaya Group 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

162 TJFIG, Inc. 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

163 Global Operational Resources 

Group (GORGrp) 

0 10 N/A 0 0 0

164 Gutierrez-Palmenberg, Inc 0 2 N/A 0 0 0

165 Toledo Knights Company 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

166 Honeywell Technology 

Solutions Inc. (HTSI) 

0 4 N/A 0 0 0

167 AEGIS Mission Essential 

Personnel, LLC 

1 0 0 N/A 0 0

168 IMG 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

169 Town Care Company 1 0 0 N/A 0 0

170 INTECON, LLC 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

171 Golden State Group 3 0 0 N/A 0 0

172 JB Management, Inc 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

173 Blackbird Technologies Inc. 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

174 JTSI, Inc. 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

175 Iraqi Contractor #31 0 0 N/A 0 0 0

176 Kufan Group 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

177 Louis Berger Group 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

22
No. Contractor Name Direct Sub DoD DoS USAID Total

178 ManTech Intl Corp. 0 4 N/A 0 0 0

179 USA Environmental 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

180 Microsoft Corp 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

181 National Logistics, Est. 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

182 VCE 0 7 0 0 N/A 0

183 Oak Grove 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

184 Wackenhut Corporation 1 1 N/A 0 0 0

185 Perini Corp. 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

186 PPI 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

187 Wave Technologies, Inc. 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

188 SBSI 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

189 CACI International, Inc. 2 0 N/A 0 0 0

190 Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

191 Dynamic Aviation 2 1 N/A 0 0 0

192 Stanley Baker Hill, LLC. 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

193 Wexford Group International 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

194 Techrizon, LLC. 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

195 Thales ATM Inc 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

196 Whitney, Bradley and Brown 

(WBB) 

1 0 N/A 0 0 0

197 Tigris Net LTD 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

198 Wintara-Salihi Group Inc. 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

199 Torres Advanced 0 6 N/A 0 0 0

200 TSG 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

201 Zel Technologies, LLC 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

202 USF 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

203 CCP 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

204 Iraqi Contractor #41 0 0 N/A 0 0 0

205 Triumph Technologies, Inc 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

206 3D Global Solutions 0 9 N/A 0 0 0

207 Chroo Group Ltd 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

208 Aggreko 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

209 SYColeman Corp 1 1 N/A 0 0 0

210 Iraqi Contractor #35 0 0 N/A 0 0 0

211 GSS Inc. 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

212 DI 1 1 N/A 0 0 0

213 CTU Asia 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

214 Lincoln Group LLC 2 0 0 N/A 0 0

215 American Service Center (ASC) 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

216 EOIR Technologies, Inc. 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

217 Washington Group International 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

218 Lee Dynamics International Co. 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

219 Iraqi Contractor #34 0 0 N/A 0 0 0

220 Taos Industries 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

221 ITT Corporation 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

222 All World Language 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

223 AMAR Intl Foundation, The 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

224 Jorge Scientific Corp 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

225 Entourage International Security 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

23
No. Contractor Name Direct Sub DoD DoS USAID Total

226 ALM 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

227 AMS 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

228 ANA Co 0 1 0 N/A 0 0

229 AGI 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

230 Highlighter 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

231 AIM 0 2 N/A 0 0 0

232 Alkafore 0 1 N/A 0 0 0

233 Weston Solutions, Inc. 1 0 N/A 0 0 0

- Contractor Not Identified 21 14 172.706 N/A 182.7 355.406

Total $397.393 $0 $264.424 $661.817

Source: SIGIR analysis of prior audit reports, current audits, and available agency data. Agency data was not audited. 

Notes: 

N/A = The amount obligated for security services under a contract associated with the company was not available a DoD data is as of September 4, 2008. 

b Dos data is as of July 31, 2008. 

c USAID data is as of March 31, 2008.

24
Appendix C—Acronyms 

Acronym Definition 

DoD Department of Defense 

DoS Department of State 

PSC Private Security Contractor 

PSD Personal Security Detail 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

 

25
Appendix D—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the review was conducted under the direction of David R. Warren, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. 

The staff members who conducted the audit and contributed to the report include: 

Michael A. Bianco 

Waheed Nasser 

Richard R. Kusman 

James Shafer 

Jason Venner 

Lovell Q. Walls 

Samson J. Wright 

 

26
Management Comments 

Department of Defense 

27
28
 

29
30

SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, 

and operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction provides independent and 

objective: 

• oversight and review through comprehensive 

audits, inspections, and investigations 

• advice and recommendations on policies to 

promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

• deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention 

and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

• information and analysis to the Secretary of 

State, the Secretary of Defense, the Congress, 

and the American people through Quarterly 

Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go 

to SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, 

and Abuse in Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

• Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

• Phone: 703-602-4063 

• Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

 Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1059 

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Kristine Belisle 

Director of Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0818 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil