### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-03-00350- CV

Ja c k We at he r for d, A ppe lla nt

v. The City of S an Marcos, Texas; David Chiu ; Jane Hughson ; Louis Doiron, Jr.; Earl Mosele y, Jr.; Joe B. Cox, Jr.; P aul Mayhew ; and Martha Caste x Tatum , Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF HAY S COUNTY , 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRI CT NO. 2001- 0406 , HO NORAB LE WILLIAM E. BENDER JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N
I n th is c a us e , w e a re c on fr on te d w itha dis pu te be tw e e n a

pr op e rt y ow ne r, his neig hbors, and a

city over the proper

ty owner ’s attempts to develop his prope rty for c ommercia l purp os e s. Th e pr op e rt

y ow ne r, Jac k We a the rf

or d, his ne ig hb or s, and the City of San M arc os me t,
ne g oti a te d, a nd

a g re e d in pr inc ipl e that so me c omm e rc ia l dev e lop me nt o f We a the rf or d’ s p ro pe rt

y
wa s poss ibl e . Weathe rf

or d’ s subs e qu e nt r e zon ingre qu e sts , h ow e ve r, we re de nie d. He su e d th e City of San M arc os and

the City Counc il ( c oll e c tiv e ly , th e “ City” ), c la imi ngth eir den ials vio la te d h is rig hts to due proc ess and e qual protec tion, violated chapter 245 of the g overnme nt code, c onstitut ed
a re g ulatory

taking , and we re pr oprietar y in nature a

nd thus subject t o estoppel. The City moved for summary judgme nt arguing that the neg otiated land-use plan established only the basic f

rame workT h e pu rp o s e of a co mp re h en s i v e la n d -u s e pl an i s t o p ro v i d e f o rt h e “ l o n g-r an ge 1 development of

the municipality ” and may be “use d to coordinate and g uide the esta blishment of development r eg ulations.” Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 213.002 (West Supp. 2004-05). 2 fo r f utu re de ve lop me nt a

nd did no t f or ma lly ve st i n We a the rf

or d th e ri g ht t o d e ve lop his pr op e rt y
c omm e rc ia lly . T he dis tr ic t c ourt g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt f

or the City , a

nd we a ff ir m.
P r oc e dur al a nd F ac tu al B ac kgr ound Weatherf ord owns about f

ifty acr es i n the C ity of S an Marcos. He bought a larg e tra ct in the ear ly

1960s, and two smaller tra cts in about 1981 and 1995. When Weather ford boug ht the fi rs tt ra ct o f l an d , t h e p ro p er t y wa s n o t wi t h i n t h e C i t y ’s b o u n d ar i es an d wa s n o ts u b j ec tt o z o n i n g. The prope rty

was annexed and broug ht into the Ci ty in the ear ly

1970s, and since be ing a

nnexed has alway s been zoned for

single -fa mily residential use . The prope rty adjoins and is surrounde d by other single -family

trac ts, and nea

rby subdivisions are low-den s i t y d evelopments. F or the pa st severa l y e ars , Weathe rf

or d ha s so ug ht on

nume ro us oc c a sio ns to h a ve po rt ion s o f h is p ro pe rt y re zon e d to allow for the development of multi-family

residential a

nd commerc ial projec ts. H is neig hbors have
c on sis te ntl y

op po se d th e se e ff

or ts. Du ri ng this ti me , th e City

wa s in the pr oc e ss o f u

pd a tin g its
c omp re he ns ive land -u se pla n. Th e up dat e s se t out g uid e lin e s f or the futur e de ve lop me nt o f a ll 1 pr op e rt y loc a te d in

the Ci ty , whi ch was div ide d in to e ig ht s e c tor s. Weathe rf or d’ s p ro pe rt

y lay in Se c tor I I , w hic h e nc omp a sse d ap pr oximate ly 80 0 a c re s. B e c a

us e the us e of

Weathe rf or d’ s p ro pe rt

y neede d to be addre ssed befor e a development plan for Sector I Iwas de signe d, the City hired a neutra l third party

to fac ilitate neg otiations between W eathe rfor d and his neig hbors, and in Nove mber 1997, Weath e r f o r d , th e D ir e c to r

o f th e Ci ty ’ s Pl an n in g an d

Z o n in g Co mm is s io n( “ th e Co mm is s ion”),The Plan does not def ine “Planned D evelopment District,” and ther e is no t hing in the 2 r e c o r d t o s h o w w h e t h e r t h e p h r a s e w a s d e f i n e d a tt h e t i m e t h e P l anw a s e n a c t e d
. W e n o t e g e n e r a l l y, h o we v er , t h at ci t i es u s e p l an n edd ev el o p m en td i s t ri ct s as an al t ern at i v e t o t ra d i t i o n al z o n i n g: PDD proce dures a llow developer s to obtain site-specific approva l for developments that may not f it standard ar ea a

nd use zoning c ateg ories and that require specific neg o t i ation to ensure that community interests ar e prote cted. PDDs conventionally

acc ommo d at e d es i gn at edt y p es o f m aj o r d ev el o p m en t , such a s a pa rtme nt p ro

je c ts, cluste r h ou sin g , o ff ic e de ve lop me nts , s ho pp ingc e nte rs , and ho sp ita l f

a c ili tie s. J ohn Mix on, J ames L . Doug herty , J r. & Br enda N . McDona ld, Texas Municipal Zoning Law , § 7.100 (3d ed. 1999)
. 3 Commi ssion staffer s, urban planne rs, neig hbor h o o d r e s id e nts , a

n d s e v e r a l o th e r

p a r tic ipants attended
a “ me diate d de sig n wo rk sh op .” Th os e op po sin g any futur e de ve lop me nt o f We a the rf or d’ s p ro pe rt

y
wer e conc erne d that the deve lopment would cre ate more traf fi c an d change the cha

rac ter of the neig hborhood. The w orkshop re sulted in a written ag ree ment, the “ M ed iated Resolution,”
c o n t e mp l a t i n g s o m e f

u tu r e m u l t i

- f

a m i l y an d c o m m e r c i a l d e v e l o p m e n to f W e a t h e r f o r d ’ s p r o p e rt y. I n De ce m ber 1997, the City adopted the “ Sector I IPlan” (the “ Plan”), whic h incorpora ted the Mediated Resolution. See City of San Mar cos, Tex., Code of Ordina nces N o. 1997- 74 (1997). The Plan stated sever al objectives, inc luding the development of “a future land use map for the a rea ” and guidelines to e nsure that development would be sensitive to e x isting uses, a nd the streng thening of community relations “by

f o s te r in g a p a rtnership be tween the City and neig hborhood residents, prope rty

owner s, instit utions and businesses.” Id
. On e p ar t of the Plan wa s devoted entirely to Weatherfor d’s prope rty , but all development was to proce ed through the nor mal zoning proce ss and Weather ford wa s require d to submit Planned De v el o p ment District (PDD) zoning applications bef

ore a ny development c ould beg in. Id
. 2The Com mission’s role is to hold public hear ings a nd make a final re port to the g overning 3 municipal body
. See Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 211.007(b) ( West 1999). The g overningbody can r equire that it may only overr ule the Commi ssion’s ne g ative rec ommendation by a vote of three

fourths of the g overningbody ’s member s. Se e id . § 211.006 (West 1999). 4 Over the next few y ear s, Weatherf ord filed se vera l PDD applications with the Commi ssion to develop his pr operty pursuant to the Plan. The fir st PDD application was submitted about twenty

months after the Plan was ena cted a nd reque s t ed the re zoning of 30.66 a cre s from residential to commer cial, multi-famil y , and duplex residential. The Commission’s Assist ant Di re ct o r o f P l an n i n g re co m m en d edap p ro v al o f t h e ap p l i ca t i o n , s t at i n g:
The re quested land use acr eag es and de nsities we re e stablished as a r esult of the m ediated w orkshop settlement duringthe sec tor two planning proce ss. . . . The proposed PDD plan appea rs consistent with the land uses indicated in the me diated sett le me n t w it

h o n e e xc e p ti o n . T h e PD D p la n in d ic a te s 3
. 8 a c r e s o f duplex development. While [dupl ex development ] i s co n s istent with the 7 acre s of 6-12 units per ac re de nsity

allowanc e, duplex was not indicated a s a future u s e o n the settlement plan.
I n September 1999, the Commi ssion consi d er edW ea t h er fo rd ’s fi rs tP DD ap p l i ca t i on. T h e r e w a s p u

b l i c o p p o s i t i o n , an d

t h e C o m m i s s i o n r e c o m m e n d e d d e n i a l o f t h e a p p l i c a t i o n . In

3 Dec ember

1999, the City

Council heard a

rg uments fo r and ag ainst Weatherf ord’s a pplication. Op po ne nts vo ic e d th e same c on c e rn s ra ise d at the wo rk sh op in 1 99 7, that th e de ve lop me nt w ou ld lead to substantial incre ases in tra ffic a nd an undesira

ble cha ng e in t h e ch ar acte r of the neig hborhood, and Weatherfor d’s first PDD application was denied.

I n Fe bruary

2000, Weatherf

ord filed a

standard, non- PDD application see king the rezoning of 18.6 acr es (herea fter “first rezoning application”). After the Commission recommended5

its de nia l, Weathe rf

or d re qu e ste d to wi thd

ra w the a pp lic a tio n. Th e Com mis sio n ho no re d his re qu e st and the application was withdrawn. I n J uly 2000, Weatherf ord filed a second PDD a

pplication, and the Com mis sio n re c omm e nd e d ap pr ov a l. Ho we ve r, Weathe rf or d, thr ou g h c on ve rs a tio ns wi th C ity officia ls, believed that his application would be denied and aga in soug ht to withdraw the a pplication in a letter dated Aug ust 25, 2000.

I n September 2000, W eathe rfor d filed a second non- PDD application to re zone 18.6
a c re s ( he re a ft e r “ se c on d r e zon inga pp lic a tio n” ). I n a let te r da te d Nov e mbe r 7 , 2 00 0, a dd re sse d to May or David Chiu and the City Council, W eathe rfor d urg ed the a doption of his second re zoning application. The next day , howeve r, Weather ford se nt Chiu and the Council another letter in which he sa id h e wa

nte d to wi thd

ra w the pr e vio us da

y ’s le tte r. He a lso sa id, “ I be lie ve that th e City sh ou ld honor what was ag ree d to and passed . . . in the Sec tor I IPlan in connection with the 54 ac res that Iown. I do not believe that I

should have to ac cept a ny thing less than w hat has a lrea dy been ap p ro v ed
. ” He asked that his second re zoning application be “re moved from the N ovember 13, 2000, ag enda a

nd that the City

not vote on the land use pr oposal at this time.” The City remove d Weatherf

ord’s sec ond rezoning application fr om the November 13 ag enda but then pla ced it on the De cembe r 11, 2000 ag enda. Weatherfor d wrote a letter to Chiu, stating, “My letter, dated November 8, 2000, established quite clea rly that my November 7, 2000 reque st to have the amende d land us e proposal reg arding eig hteen acre s of my proper ty adopted wa s with dr aw n in a ll r e s p e c ts
. ” H e a s k e d th a t h is s e c o n d PD D a p p li c a ti o n , w h ic h h e r e qu e s te d to be withdrawn in August 2000, be place d on the ag enda in place of his second re zoning application. HeSe c tio n 5 51 .0 71 a llo ws a govern me nta l bo dy to “ c on du c t a

pr ivate c on su ltatio n w ithits 4 attorney” whe n seeking advice about “pending or contemplated litigation.” Te x . Gov’t Code Ann. § 551.071 (West 2004). 6 closed the letter wit h the statement that if the City Council considere d his second zoning a pplication and not his second PDD a pplication, he would “c onsider all re medies ava ilable to me.” Weatherf ord’s sec ond rezoning application re mained on t h e a g e n d a f o r th e D e cembe r 11, 2000 City

Council meeting , but when it came up for discussion, the Council unanimously voted to table it. The Council the n adjourne d and went into executive session “pursua nt to the Governme nt Cod e , Se c tio n 5 51 .0 71 , to se e k th e City Attor ne y ’s a dv ic e re g ard ing the Weathe rf or d f utu re land us e pla n ame ndme nt. ” Whe n the City Counc il re c on ve ne d a fe w minute s late r, May or Chi u ma de thi s 4 state me nt:
This Frida

y , Dec ember

15, 2000, will be the third anniver sary of the City Council’s adoption of the Sec tor 2 Plan. The City Charter provides for

the Planning a

nd Z on ingCom mis sio n to hold pu bli c he ari ng s a

nd make re c omm e nd a tio ns to t he City Counc il r e g ard ingthe land us e e le me nt o f t

he ma ste r p lan on c e e ve ry thr e e y e ars . The City Council would like for the proc ess for r eview of the land use e lement of the Sector 2 Plan to be un d er t aken and completed a s soon as possible by the Planning and Z oning Commission, with i nvolv ement of all Sector Two Stakeholde rs. The Commi ssion may wish to c onsider any chang ed cir cumstance s it finds withi n Sector 2 itself, and in nea

rby are as of other

sectors, in makingits recommendations. I n light of thi s d ir e c tio n to the Plann ingand Z on ingCom mis sio n, the Counc il w ish e s to withhold final action on [W eathe rfor d’s] pending la nd use ame ndment, L UA-00- 03, and table the amendment until the re commendations of the Planningand Z oning Commi ssion are r ece ived. The City Council then tabled consider ation of Weather ford’ s second r ezoning a pplication. We a t h e r f o r d f i l e d a t h i r d P D D a p p l i c a t i o n“ u n d e r

p r o t e s t ” i ne ar l y

2 0 0 1
. Th is application wa s intended to duplicate his sec ond PDD application th a t t h e Co mm is s ion ha d approve dTex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 551.001-.146 (West 2004), 5 Weathe rf

or d d oe s n ot r a ise thi s is su e on a pp e a l. 6 7 but Weatherfor d withdrew be fore City Council consideration. The Commis sion at t h e t i m e was composed of only

eig ht members due to the rec ent resig nation of its c hairman, and its vote on the third P DD ap p l i ca t i o n ended in a four- to-four tie. A t the urg ing of the City Attorney , the Commi ssion placed the third PDD a pplication on its ag enda for the next meeting . The City Attorney
a lso a dv i s e d

t h e o u t g o i n g c h a i r

m ant h a th e c o u l d

p art i c i p a t e i nC o m m i s s i o nm e e t i n g s an d vo te beca use the c hairman r etained de fac to authority pending the appointment of his re place ment. The Commi ssion tabled considera tion of Weatherf

ord’s a pplication by

a six -to-thre e vote. On J uly 23, 2001, the City

Council passed a r evised Sec to r I I Plan (the “Revise d Plan”). The Revised Plan reduc ed the a cre ag e Weather ford c ould de v e lo p a s mu lt i- family residential and enla rg ed the a cre ag e he c ould devote to sing le-fa m i ly residential. The Council then denied Weatherf ord’s third PDD application, drafted pur suant to the orig inal Sector I IPlan. Wea the rf or d s ue d th e City fo r de c lara tor y and inj un c tiv e re lie f. He c omp la ine d th a t: (1) the City ’s treatment of his various applications viol ated his rig hts to e q u al p rot ection and due proce ss; (2) the City and the individual defe ndants violated t he Open Meeting s Act (“the Act”) by 5 g oing into executive se ssion on Dece mber 11, 2000; (3) it was improper f or a r esig ning Commission member to have voted on his third PDD application; (4) the City should be estopped f

rom denying 6 his applications beca

use the City

acte d in a proprie tary , not gove rnmental , capa city in passing the
or ig ina l and

re vis e d Se c tor

I Ipla ns ; ( 5) he wa s e nti tle d to have his a pp lic a tio ns a

pp ro ve d b e c a

us e8

they wer e actua lly “per

mits” unde r cha

pter 245 of the g overnme nt code; and ( 6) the City ’s fa ilure to approve his applications constituted a re g ulatory taking
. The City filed three m otions for summary judgme nt. The first wa s a traditional
m o t i o nfo r p ar t i al s u m m ary j u d gm en t o n W ea t h er fo rd ’s cl ai m s o f v i o l at i o n s o f t h e O p en M ee t i n gs Act. See Tex. R. C iv. P
. 166a(c ). The se cond wa s a no-e vidence motion for partial summary judgme nt on Weatherfor d ’s cl aims of the equa l protection and due proce ss violations. Se e id
. 16 6a (i ). Th e thi rd

wa s a tr a dit ion a l mo tio n, c on te sti nga ll i ssu e s ra ise d by Weathe rf or d. Th e City
c on te nd e d th a t We a the rf

or d’ s e qu a l pr ote c tio n a

nd du e pr oc e ss r ig hts ha d n ot b e e n v iol a te d b e c a us e the City ’s treatment of his a pplications was rea sonable. I t a lso c halleng ed Weather ford’ s standing to sue under the Act and a rg ued that ther e was no violation of the Act. The City further argued that Weatherf ord had no a

bsolute rig ht to withdraw his second r ezoning a pplication, the City ’s ac tions
wer e not s u b

j ec t to estoppel, Weatherf ord’s a pplications were not permits that must be approved, there was no re g ulatory

taking , and the individual counc il members were entitl ed to gover nmental immun ity . T he tr ia l c ourt g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt w ith ou t sp e c if

y ingthe g ro un ds
. On appe al, Weather ford argues that: ( 1) the City ’s denials of his PDD applica tions
wer e ar bitrary , capr icious, and unre asonable ; (2) the City violated his equal-pr otection rig hts by allowing him to withdraw his first rezoning a pplication, ref

using to consider his second PDD application on g rounds that h e had withdra wn it, and then conside ring his second re zoning application in spite of his reque sts that it be withdrawn; (3) the City violated the Act in its De cembe r 11, 2000 meeting ; (4) the pa ssag e of the sector plans was a proprieta ry function and, ther efor e, the City is not entitl ed to g ov er n m en tal immunit y ; (5) the City violated cha

pter 245 of the local9

g overnme nt code; (6) the denial of his PDD applications constituted an unconstitutional regulatory taking ; ( 7) the City should be enjoined fr om violating the Ac t and from c onsidering Weatherf ord’s PDD applications under

the Revised Plan; and (8) the i ndividual council members wer e not entitled to immuni ty
. Stand ard of Review

The C it y f il e d b o th tr a d it io nal and no- evidenc e summary judgme nt motions
. See T e x. R. C iv. P. 166 a (c ), (i ). We ma ke inf e re nc e s, re so lve do ub ts, and vie w the e vid e nc e in t

he lig ht m os t favor able to the nonmovant. Rhone-P oulenc, I nc. v. Ste el , 997 S.W .2d 217, 222 (Tex. 1999). When
an ord e r g ra

nti ng su mma

ry jud g me nt doe s not spe c if y the g ro un ds on

wh ic h it wa s g ra nte d, we wi ll aff irm the judgme nt if any

of the movant’s the ories ar e supported by the evidenc e. Carr v. Brasher , 776 S.W .2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989).

A par ty moving f or a tra ditional summ ary judgme nt be ars the burden of establishing that there is no ge nuine issue of mate rial fa ct and that it is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of la w. Steel , 997 S.W .2d at 222. A defe ndant see king summar y judgme nt must negate at lea st one essential element of

plaintiff’s theory or establish ever y element of an aff

irmative def

ense. Id . at 22 3; Lear Siegler, Inc . v. Pe rez , 819 S.W .2d 470, 471 (Tex. 1991).

A n o- e v i d e n c e s u

mm a r y j u d g m e nt i s e s s e nt i a l l y

a dir e c te d v e rd ic t g ra

nte d b e fo re tr ia l, and a no- evidenc e motion asserts that no evidence exi sts as t o at l east one essential element of the nonmovant’s claims on which the nonmovant would have the burden of proof at t rial. Jack

son v. Fi esta Ma rt , 979 S.W .2d 68, 70-71 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 1998, no pet.). A no-e vidence motion for
su mma ry jud g me nt i s p ro pe rl y g ra

nte d if the no nmo va

nt fa ils to re sp on d with mor e tha n a sc int ill a10

of probative evidenc e raising a g enuine issue of materia l fac t. Id
. I f the pr of fe re d ev ide nc e wo uld enable rea sonable, fa ir-minded per sons to differ in their c onclusi o ns, more than a scintilla of evidenc e exists. Id . at 71. I f the e vidence does no more than “‘c reate a mere surmise or suspicion’ of fa ct,” less than a

scintilla of evidenc e exists. Id
. Ana lys is E q u a l P r o t e c t i o n a n d D u eP r o c es s C l a i ms We a th e r f o r d a r g u e s that his equal protec tion rights we re violate d and his fundame ntal proper ty rig hts infring ed whe n the City allowed him to withdraw his first re zoning application and second PDD application but de nied a similar re quest to withdraw his sec ond rezoning application. He a lso arg ues that his fundame ntal proper ty rig hts were harme d when the City Attorney advised the Commi ssion that it could reconsider Weatherf ord’s third PDD application afte r the first vote ende d in a tie. Weather ford c ontends that the City had to show that i ts disparate tre atment of the applications wa s “nar

rowly tailored to ser

ve a c ompelling g overnme ntal interest.” Wea the rf or d h a s n ot p le a de d a

tr ue e q u a l pr ote c tio n c la im. An

e qu a l pr ote c tio n c la im “re quires that the g overnme nt treat the c laimant differ ent from other simil arly -situated landowne rs.” Ma y he w v . To wn o

f Su nn y v ale , 964 S.W .2d 922, 939 (Tex. 1998). Weather ford doe s not claim that he wa s treate d any

differ ently than any

other City

landowner , but only

that he himself wa s treate d differ ently

at diffe rent times during his a pplication proce ss. Se e id . Moreove r, Weather ford ha d no vested proper

ty rig ht in any

particula r zoning c lassification. Se e City of Un iv . Par k v . B e nn e rs , 485 S.W. 2d 77 3, 77 8 ( Te x. 19 72 ); City of San Antonio v. Arden Encino Partners, Ltd. , 103 S.W .3d 627,11

63 0 ( Te x. Ap p. —Sa

n A nto nio 20 03 , n o p e t.) ; W ill iam so n Po int e Ve ntu re v . City of Austin , 912 S.W .2d 340, 343 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, no writ).

Th e PDD a

pp lic a tio n p ro c e ss did no t ves t any pr op e rt y ri g hts in We a the rf

or d b e c a us e the PDD a pp ro va l pr oc e ss re ma ine d a leg isl a tiv e a c t subj e c t to the dis c re tio n o f t he City . T he re su lts of the wor

kshop were incorporated into the Sector I IPlan, which was to serve a s a guide for f uture d ev el opment. See Ci ty o f Sa n M ar c o s , T e x. , Co d e o f O r d in an c e s N o . 1 9 9 7
- 7 4 ( 1 9 9 7 )
. I t did not
rezone a ny proper ty but instead s et out a list of permitted uses. Se e id . The Plan expressly stated that a p p li c an ts s ti ll h a d to g o thr o u g h th e zo n in g p r o c e s s f o r a p p r o v a l: “ A ll u s e s p e r

mi tt e d in the table shown above sha ll be implemented throug h the submittal of one or more Planned Deve lopment D is tr ic t ( PD D ) zo n ing case s.” Id . Weatherf ord’s PDD a

pplications were in essence rezoning applications and w ere subject to the leg islative proce ss used b y t h e C i t y in review ing a ny other rezoning reque st. See City of Pha rr v . Ti

pp itt , 616 S.W. 2d 17 3, 17 5- 76 (T e x. 19 81 ); see also J ohn Mix on, J ames L . Doug herty , J r. & Br enda N . McDona ld, Texas Municipal Zoning L aw , § 7.104 (3d.
e d. 19 99 ) (“ [a]d op tio n or re je c tio n of a PDD by or din anc e a me ndme nt is, by c ur re nt Te xas a

nd F if th Cir c uit law, a le g isl a tiv e a c t” ). Z on ingis a g ov ernm enta l f

un c tio n th a t a llo ws “ a

mun ic ipa lity , in the exercise of

its legislative discr etion, to restrict the use of private proper ty .” City of Br o o ksi de V illage v. Comeau , 6 33 S.W. 2d 79 0, 79 2 ( Te x. 19 82 ); see M ayhew , 964 S.W .2d at 933 (“ Z oning decisions ar e veste d in the discretion of municipa l authorities; courts s hould not assume the role of
a su pe r zo nin g bo ard .” ); City

of R ou nd Ro c k v . S mi th , 687 S.W .2d 300, 302-03 (Te x . 1984) (“ plat approva l is a g overnme ntal function”)
.12 Weatherf ord fur ther a rg ues that the City ’s dec ision s t o d en y his applications wer e “ar bitrary , capr icious and unre asonable ” and did not bear a substantial re lationship to publ ic hea lth, safe ty , morals, or g ener al welf are . He c laims that the City ’s denials of his applications wer e ar bitrary and ca pricious bec ause his applica tions complied with the land uses and densities ag ree d to during the workshop in 1997. He also argues t hat t here is no evidenc e that the Ci ty cited conc erns f

or the public health, saf

ety , morals, or g ener al welf are in denying his a

pplications. To c omp ly wi th su

bs tanti ve du e pr oc e ss, zon ingde c isi on s n e e d o nly be “ ratio na lly related to leg itimate gove rnment intere sts.” Mayhe w , 964 S.W .2d at 938. We “should not set aside
a zoning deter

mination f

or a substantive due proce ss violation unless the action ‘has no f oundation in rea son and is a mer e ar

bitrary or irrational exercise of pow er ha ving no substantial r elation to the public health, the public morals, the public saf ety or the public we lfare .’” Id. at 9 3 8 (q u o t i n g Nectow v City of Cambridge , 277 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928)). As the nonmovant in a no-e vidence motion for summary judgme nt, Weatherf

ord had the burden of overcoming the presumption of validi ty of the C i t y ’s conduct in the e x erc ise of its leg islative authority and provingthe City ’s conduc t was
unrea sonable. City

of Pha rr , 616 S.W .2d at 176. I f re asonable minds could differ a s to whether the City ’s zoning ac tion had a substanti al re l ationship to the public health, safe ty , morals or g ener al
we l fare, the a ction must stand as a valid exercise of the City ’s police powe r. See M ayhew , 964 S.W .2d at 938; City of W

axahachiev. W

atkins , 275 S.W .2d 477, 481 (Tex. 1955). Th e mi n u te s f

r o m t h e v ar io u s Ci ty

Co u n c il me e ti n g s s h o w e xte n s iv e d is c u ssions
a bo ut t he e ff e c ts o f u rb anizatio n o n th e surr ound ing ne ig hb or ho od
. Weathe rf

or d c la ims that th e City Coun ci l d id not cite the ill effe cts of urba nization as reasons for

denying his a

pplications, but the13

re c or d in dic a te s th a t su c h o pp os ition to We a the rf or d’ s d e ve lop me nt w a s e xpre sse d e a c h ti me his applications were considered. For example, the minutes of the Dec ember 13, 1999 meeting show that Weath e r f

o r d ’ s n e ig hb o r s v o ic e d

th e ir c o n c e r n s a b o u t i n c r e a s e d

tr a f f ic , in c r e a s e d

p o ll u tion, chang ing the char acte r of the ne ighbor hood, urban spr a

w l, d r a in a g e problems, utiliti es problems, a nd
c ha ng e s in the ir qu a lity of lif e fo r t ho se in t he a ff e c te d a re a . I t is a

pp are nt t hat th e ba sis fo r t

he City C o u n c i l ’ s a c t i o nw a s t h e s i g n i f i c an tp u b l i c o p p o s i t i o nt o W e a t h e r f o r d ’ s r e qu e s t e d d e v e l o p m e n t
. In short, the City ’s dec isions to deny Weatherf

ord’s PDD applications we re r ationally related to the g ener al welf

are ; namely , protec ting res i d ents from the ne g ative impact of urbanization and maintaining qua lity

of life. See M

ayhew , 964 S.W .2d at 938-39. We conc lude t h at Weather ford prese nted no evide n ce t h at the City acte d in an ar

bitrary and ca pricious manner

when it re

jected Weatherf ord’s re zoning applications. Weatherf ord also ar g ues that the City ’s refusal t o withdraw his application to rezone
was a rbitrar y and ca pricious and that the City acte d in a n arbitra ry and capr icious manner in a llowing t h e city attorney to place Weatherfor d’s third PDD application back on the Commission’s ag enda afte r the fir st vote ended in a four- to-four tie. Once the application was placed ba ck on the a g enda and nine membe rs w er e allowe d to vote, the Commiss ion voted to table the application pending
c ha ng e s to t he Plan. Weathe rf

or d a rgue s th a t a s a

re su lt h e wa s d e nie d th e op po rt un ity to h a ve his application eva luated under the orig inal Plan. At best, Weatherf

ord’s c omplaint is t hat the proc edure used by the City was unfa ir. Howeve r, “this i s not the proper inquiry .” Id . at 939. “Z oning is a leg islative act,” and in making zoning deter

minations, a municipality “is entitled to consider a ll the fac ts and circ umstances whic h14

may aff ect the pr operty , the community , and the we lfare of its citiz ens.” Id . at 939-40. To satisfy proce dural due proce ss, the City need “ only

provide notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Id . at 939. Weatherf

ord had both notice and an oppor tunity to be hea rd and ha d no rig ht to have any of h is a p p li c a ti o n s a

p p r o v e d

— w h e th e r u n der the or ig in a l S e c to r I IPl ano r

th e Re v is e d

Pl an . We
ov e rr ule Wea the rf or d’ s f ir st a nd se c on d is su e s.
V iolation s of Open Mee tings Act and In jun ctive Re lief Wea the rf or d a lle g e d that the City Counc il vio la te d the Op e n Me e tin g s Ac t w he n it went into executive session during the City ’s reg ular c ouncil session on Dec ember 11, 2000. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 551.001-.146 (West 2004) (the “Ope n Meeting s Act,” he rea fter “ the Act”)
. The re cord indicates that May or Chiu was “a dvised” to g o into ex ecutive se ssion pursuant to section 55 1. 07 1 o f t

he g ov e rnme nt c od e , wh ic h a llo ws a g ov e rnme nta l bo dy

to c on ve ne a

c los e d s e ssi on

to seek its attorne y ’s advice about “pe nding or contemplated litig ation.” Se e id . § 551.071. Weatherf ord ar g ues that this announce ment was at odds with the meeting ’s notice, whic h stated that

“ the City Counc il may a djo ur

n int o Exe c uti ve Se ssi on to c on sid e r any ite m lis te d on thi s a g e nd a if
a ma tte r i s raised that is appropr iate for the Ex ecutive Session discussion.” (Emphasis added.) He contends that ther e wa s no “pendingor threatened” litigation and , even a ssuming ther e wa s, the matter wa s never

“ra ised” duringthe cour se of the ope n meeting
. Gene rally , meeting s of g overnme ntal bodies m u st be open to the public. See id. § 5 51.002. “Ac tions” taken in violation of the Ac t are voidable. Id
. § 5 5 1
. 1 4 1
. A g overnme ntal body , howeve r, may

meet with its attorney in private to discuss “pe nding or contemplated litig ation.” Id . § 55 1. 07 1. B e fo re c los inga me e tin g , th e pr e sid ingof fi c e r m us t pu bli c ly ann ounc e an in te nt t o15

g o into a closed mee ting and identify the statutory basis for doingso. Id. § 551.101. The Ac t does
no t pr oh ibi t th e e xpre ssi on of op ini on s in a c los e d se ssi on , a s lo nga s th e a c tua l vo te or de c isi on is made in an open session. Tho mp so n v . Ci ty of A us tin , 9 79 S.W. 2d

67 6, 68 5 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 1998, no pet.). The Ac t also require s advanc ed wr itten notice of all meeting s held by a g overnme ntal bo dy
. Te x. Go v’ t Cod e Ann. § 55 1. 04 1. Th e no tic e re qu ir e me nts a lso a pp ly to e xec uti ve se ssi on s, and the notice must be sufficie ntly specific to a lert the g ener al public to the topics to be consider ed. Cox Enters., Inc . v. Board of Trustees , 7 06 S.W. 2d 95 6, 95 8 ( Te x. 19 86 ). “ As lon g a s a re a de r i s aler ted to the topic for c onsideration, it is not necessa ry to state all of the c onsequenc es which ma y flow fr om consideration of the topic.” Id . T he no tic e pr ov isi on is inte nd e d to pro vid e pu bli c a c c e ss t o and increase public knowledg e of g overnme nt decisionmaking
. C i t y o f S a n A n t o n i o v . F

ou rth Cou rt o f A pp e als , 820 S.W .2d 762, 765 (Tex. 1991). “The Open Me eting s Act is not a leg islative scheme for se rvice of proc ess; it ha s no due proce ss implications. Rather, its purpose is to provide ‘openn ess at every

stag e of’ ” g overnme ntal deliberations. Id
. (q u o t i n g Ack er v. Tex as W

ater Comm’n , 790 S.W .2d 299, 300 (Tex. 1990) ). In revie wing a notice unde r the Ac t, we should ensure that th os e purp os e s are se rv e d, bu t th e no tic e ne e d no t be “ ta ilo re d to re a c h tho se sp e c if ic ind ivi du a ls whose private intere sts are most likely to be af fec ted by the proposed g overnme nt a ction. . . . I f a ‘r eade r’ is g iven notice, the r equire ment of the Ac t is satisfied and its purpose ser ved.” Id
. I f

the contents of a

notice ar e undisputed, its adequa cy is a question of law. City of San Angelo v. Texas Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n , 92 S.W .3d 624, 629 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.).

Th e no tic e a t is su e state d th a t th e Counc il i nte nd e d to :This was Weather ford’ s second r ezoning a pplication. 7 16 9
. Rem o v e f

r o m t a b le an d c o n s id e r a d o p ti o no f

Re s o luti o na me n d in g th e F uture L and Us e Plan o f t

he C it y Mast e r P lan f

ro m Mi xed

Us e to M e dium D e ns ity Re sid e nti a l f

or an 8 .1 3 a c re , mo re or

le ss, tr a c t of

pr op e rt y , a nd fr om Mixe d U se to Comm erc ial for a

9.9 acr e, more or less, tra ct of prope rty , both tracts being located ne ar the intersec tion of Ran ch R o ad 12 and Bishop Street ( We ath e r f

o r d )
. [ ] 7 25.
. . . NO TE: The City Co uncil may adjourn into Exec utive Session to consider any item listed on this agenda if a matter is raised that i s appro p r i a t e for Exe cutive Se

ssion discussion. An announcem ent will be madeof the basis for the Ex e c uti v e Se

ssi on dis c us sio n. The City Cou nc il may als o p ub lic ly dis c us s an item listed on the agenda for Exe cutive Se ssion. We note initially that the publ ished notice was sufficie nt to comply with the Act. See Te x. Go v’ t Code Ann. § 5 51 .0 41 ; Cox En te rs. , 7 06 S.W. 2d

a t 95 8. F ur

the r, Chi u’ s p ro no un c e me nt,
ma de pr ior

to the City ’s Counc il’ s c los e d me e tin g , o n it s f a c e satis fi e d th e re qu ir e me nts of the Ac t. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 551.101. Howe ver, e ven if we assume that the City Council violated t h e Ac t ’s closed session and notice provisions, we must stil l decide w hether the City took any

“ a c tio n” that w ou ld b e vo ida ble . We a the rf

or d c omp la ins of

the City Counc il’ s r e fu sa l to a llo w h im to withdraw his sec ond rezoning application. We not e, h o we v er , that befor e g oing into close d session, the City

Council voted to table Weather ford’ s application. Onc e the Council re adjourne d afte r the c losed session, it ag ain voted to “withhold final a ction on the [W eathe rfor d’s] pending la nd
use ame ndment.”

Wea the rf or d’ s O pe n M e e t i n g s c o m

p l a i nt f a ils in s e ve ra l w ay s. F ir st, the City Counc il voted to table the a

pproval of Weatherfor d’s sec ond rezoning application be for e it went into closed session and then simply

voted aga i n to table the application after the closed session. F urther, the17

action take n by

the C i t y C o uncil befor e and a fter the closed session wa s essentially the ac tion Weatherf o rd requested; namely , that the Council not consider his sec ond rezoning application. Finally , even if

opinions were e x presse d by the Council members in the c losed session, such expression is not prohibi ted, as long as the final de cision or vote wa s made in an ope n session. See Thompson , 9 79 S.W. 2d

a t 68 5; see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 551
. 1 0 2
. T h er ef o re, there is no
e vid e nc e that th e City

Counc il t oo k s ome “ fi na l a c tio n” that w ou ld b e vo ida ble un de r t

he Ac t. Th e City e sta bli sh e d th a t th e re wa s no vio la tio n of the Ac t, a nd we the re fo re ov e rr

ule Weatherf ord’s third issue. We also over rule his se venth issue, seeking an injunction to prohibit the City from violatingthe Act in the f uture.
Pr op rie tar

y v e rsu s G ov e rnment

al C ap ac ity Wea the rf or d n e xt ar g ue s th a t the Ci ty act ed in a pr op ri e tary

c a pa c ity and no t it s g ov e rnme nta l c a

pa c ity wh e n it (1 ) p art ic ipate d in

the wo rk sh op in 1 99 7, (2 ) e va luate d h is
a pp lic a tio ns to d e ve lop his pr op e rt y , a nd (3 ) e na c te d th e se c tor

pla ns . A s d isc us se d a

bo ve , th e City acte d in its g overnme ntal capa city in review ing a

nd evaluating Weathe rfor d’s applications. Se e City of Round Rock, 6 87 S.W. 2d a t 30 2- 03 ; City of Brookside Village , 633 S.W .2d at 792; see also T e x. Civ. P rac . & Re m. Code Ann. § 101.0215(29) ( West S upp. 2004) (c lassifying zoning and planning
a s g ov e rnme nta l f

un c tio ns fo r p ur

po se s o f T or

t Cla ims Ac t) ; Truong v. City of Houston , 99 S.W .3d 204, 2 1 0 ( T e x. A p p . — H o u s to n [1 s t D is t. ] 2 0 0 2 , n o p e t. ) ( zo n in g an d la n d

- u s e o r d ina nces a nd enfor ceme nt of ordinanc es ar e g overnme ntal functions). As a g ener al rule, g overnme ntal bodies are not subject to estoppel in the exercise of their g overnme ntal capa city
. City of A us tin v . G ar

za , 12418

S.W. 3d 86 7, 87 4 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 20 03 , n o p e t.) ; Di lla rd v . A us tin In de

p. Sc h. Di st. , 806 S.W .2d 589, 594 (Tex. App.—Austin 1991, writ denied).

We turn, then, to Weatherf ord’s a lternative arg ument—that g overnme ntal bodies are
s u b je c t to e s to p p e l “ w h e r e ju s ti c e r e qu ir e s it s a p p lic ation.” S

ee City of Hutchins v. Prasifka , 450 S.W .2d 829, 836 (Tex. 1970). He asserts t hat he relied on the “c onduct and state ments of some of the ind ivi du a l de fe nd ants , p ri or c ity c ounc il m e mbe rs and e mpl oy e e s of the City in c on ne c tio n w ith the dec is i o n t o p ar t icipate in” the workshop and, a fter pa rticipating in the workshop, spent substantial sums of money on the PDD application proce ss, inc luding time and money spent in filing the a pp lic a tio ns and the n a me nd ingthe m a t th e City ’s dir e c tio n. Con se qu e ntl y , h e argue s, the City sh ou ld b e e sto pp e d f

ro m de nyingor

re je c tin g his PDD a

pp lic a tio ns to the e xten t the y c omp ly wi th the land uses a

nd densities ag ree d upon during the workshop. W eathe rfor d argues in the alter native that if he wa s n ot e nti tle d to the a pp ro va l of

his PDD a

pp lic a tio ns , h e sh ou ld “ re c ov e r e c on omi c damag es incurr ed in conne ction with his detrimental relianc e.”

Wea the rf or d’ s c ir c ums tanc e s d o no t c le arl y de mand a pp lic a tio n o f t

he e xce pti on

“ to preve nt ma

nifest injusti ce” as Texas c ourts have a pplied it. See Prasifka , 450 S.W .2d at 836 (unde r exception, estoppel may be applied if

“ther e is no interfe renc e with the exerc ise of [the
mun ic ipa lity ’s ] g ov e rnme nta l fu nc tio ns ,” and

on ly in e xce pti on a l c a se s w he re c ir c ums tanc e s c le a rl y demand it). Althoug h Weatherf ord m ight say he rece ived t he “run-ar ound” at various levels of the City ’s zon ingand

land -u se re g ulator

y pr oc e ss, he c ann ot, on thi s bas is, bin d the City Cou nc il i n it s exercise of u l t i mate leg islative authority over pla nning a nd zoning dec isions. See City of Round Rock, 6 87 S.W. 2d

a t 30 2- 03 ; City

of Pha rr , 616 S.W. 2d a t 17 5; City of Farmers Branch v. H awnco,19

Inc. , 435 S.W .2d 288, 291-92 (Te x . Civ. App.—Dallas 1968, writ re f’d n.r .e.) ( st at em ents by individual c ouncil members are not binding on g overnme ntal body that can only

act in g overnme ntal
ca p acity ); se e als o S

he ffi e ld D e v . Co . v . Ci ty

of G le nn He igh ts , 1 4 0 S. W. 3 d 6 6 0 , 6 7 8 ( T e x. 2 004) (ac tions or statements by individual city employ ees or officia ls were not considere d to have be en by the city itse l f and he ld not to bind city ). We conc lude that the City acte d in its l eg islative and g o v e r nmen ta l c a

p a c it y an d th a t e s to p p e l i s n o t w ar

r an te d b y an y thr e a t o f ma n if e s t i n ju s ti c e . We
overr ule Weather ford’ s fourth issue. We f urther note that the individual City Council me mbers are entitled to leg islative immunit y to the extent they

wer e ac ting in their le g islative capa city
. Se e In re Pe rry , 60 S.W .3d 857, 859-60 (Te x . 2001). Having c oncluded that the City was a cting in its leg islative capa city at the time,
we c on c lud e that the ind ivi du a l def e nd ants we re e nti tle d to g ov e rnme nta l im mun ity and we ov e rr ule Weatherf ord’s e ighth issue. Se e id
. Chapt er 245 of the Loc al Governm ent Code Appellant soug ht a dec laration that his P DD applications, the fir st filed Aug ust 26, 1999, the sec ond J uly 3, 2000, and the third in De cembe r 2000, ar e “pe rmits” as def ined by the local g overnme nt code. See Tex. L oc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 245.001(1) ( West S upp. 2004-05). He argues on appea l that the City

violated cha

pter 245 o f the local g overnme nt code whe n it tabled his third PDD application until after the Sector Plan w as revised and then denied the application for fa ilure to comply with the Revised Plan. We discussed whethe r an a pplication to re z o n e prope rty is a “pe rmit” within the definitio n o f ch ap ter 481 of the g overnme nt code, the pr edec essor of c hapter 245, in W

illiamsonWeathe rf or d a sse rt s th a t th e c a se law c ite d b y the City , w hic h is ba se d o n c ha pte r 4 81 , is 8 not applicable. Cha

pter 245 wa s enac ted in 1999 beca use its prede cessor, chapter 481, wa s “inadve rtently ” re peale d in 1997. See A c t o f A p r il 2 9 , 1 9 9 9 , 7 6 th

L e g . , R. S. , c h
. 7 3 , § 1 , 1 9 9 9 T e x. Gen. L aws 431, 432. The rele vant porti ons of chapter 245 are larg ely identical to their pre dece ssor statutes in chapter

481, and thus, cases discussingchapte r 481 ar e still valid. Com pa re Act of Ma

y 24, 1995, 74th L eg ., R.S., ch. 794, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. L aws 4147, 4147-48 ( amendingTex. Gov’t Code §§ 481.142 (De finitions), .143 (Uniformity of Require ments)), with Tex. Loc . Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 245.001 (De finitions), .002 (Uniformity of Require ments). 20 Po int e Ve ntu re , in which we held that rezoning was not a “permit” as define d by statute. See 912 S.W .2d at 343 (citing Act of May 24, 1995, 74th L eg ., R.S., ch. 794, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. L aws 4147, 4147-48 (c odified at Te x . Gov’t Code §§ 481.141-.143), “inadver tently ” repea led by Act of J une 1, 19 97 , 7 5th

L e g ., R.S. , c h. 10 41 , § 51 (b ), 19 97 Te x. Ge n. L aws 39 43 , 3 96 6, re e na c te d b y Ac t of Ap ri l 29, 1999, 76th L eg ., R.S., ch. 73, §§ 1, 2 1999 Tex. Gen. L aws 431, 432, a nd rec odified at Te x . L oc. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 245.001- .006 (West Supp. 2004-05)). 8

A “pe rmit” is a “lice nse, ce rtificate , approva l, reg istration, consent, per mit, or other fo rm of a uth or iza tio n r e qu ir e d b y

law, ru le , r e g ulatio n, or o rdi nan c e that a pe rs on mus t ob ta in t o p e r f o r m ana c ti o no r

in it iate , c o n ti n u e , o r

c o mp le te a

p r o je c t f o r w h ic h th e p e r

mi t i s s o u g h t. ” T e x. L oc . G ov ’t

Cod e Ann. § 2 45 .0 01 (1 ); se e W ill iam so n P oin te Ve ntu re , 912 S.W
. 2 d at 343 (quoting Tex. Gov’t Code § 481.142(2)). A n application to r ezone is not a reque st for an “ approva l” or for some “other

form of a uthorization required by law,” and “[t]he proposition t hat the leg islative act of zoning entitles the landowne r to deve lop his or her prope rty fre e fr om all subsequent re g ulatory chang es is so contrar

y to established law that the leg islature, had it wa nted to eff

ect suc h a cha

ng e,
m u s t h av e clearly

so stated.” W

ill iam so n P oin te Ve ntu re , 9 1 2 S
. W
. 2 d a t3 4 3
. A na

p p l i c a t i o nto rezone prope rty

is not the first of a ser ies of re quired pe rmits but rather a preliminary

step in seekingAlthough w e noted in W illiamson Point e Ve nture v. City of Austin that 19 95 a me ndme nts 9 provided that “ preliminary plans and re lated subdivision pl ats, site plans, and a ll other deve lopment pe rm its fo r l and

c ov e re d b y

su c h p re lim ina

ry pla ns of su bd ivi sio n plats are c on sid e re d c oll e c tiv e ly to be one series of permits,” we considere d the statute as it r ead befor e the amendme nts and did not decide whether

zoning constituted a pe rmit under the amended statute. 912 S.W .2d 340, 345 n.7 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, no writ). Howe ver, the definition of per mit was not amended in 1995, and the de fi nit ion

c ur re ntl y e na c te d is vir

tua lly ide nti c a l to t

he de fi nit ion

c on sid e re d b y

the c ourt in W ill iam so n P oin te Ve ntu re . The 1995 amendments did not chang e the fac t that zoning and re zoning are leg islative acts. Se e City of Pha rr v . Ti

pp itt , 616 S.W .2d 173, 176 (Tex. 1981). As we state d, “[r]ez oning is a st ep that must be taken befor e a preliminary plan or subdivision plat can be filed,” and a City ’s de c isi on

to “ pr oc e ss a

n a pp lic a tio n f

or su bd ivi sio n on ly a ft e r the pr op e rt y is p ro pe rl y zoned does not make zoning a ‘per mit.’” W ill iam so n V

e ntu re Po int e , 912 S.W .2d at 343. Wea the rf or d c ite s City of Glen n Heights v. She ffield Deve lopment Co. , 61 S.W .2d 634 10 (T e x. Ap p. —Wa c o 2 00 1) , in su pp or t of his c on te nti on that the City un re a so na bly int e rf e re d w ithhis ri g ht t o u se and e njo y his pr op e rt y . H ow e ve r, that c a se wa s r e c e ntl y re ve rs e d b y

the su pr e me c ourt
. See 140 S.W .3d 660 (Tex. 2004). 21 t o d e v e l o p p r o p e rt y. Id . Amun ic ipal ity may re zon e pr op e rt

y “ to e nti re ly

pr oh ibi t pr e vio us ly permissible uses, eve n establish ed u s es , ” and thus can a mend re g ulations or, in this case, master plans, in way s th at “a ffe ct the prospe ctive deve lopment of the prope rty within the broad zoning cate g ories.” Id
. 9

Be cause Weatherf

ord’s a pplications do not come within the definiti on of “pe rmit,”
we ove rrule his fif

th issue.
Re gul ato ry Ta kin g Weatherf ord ar g ues that the City ’s denials of his applications constit uted a r eg ulatory taking beca

use th ey unrea sonably

interfe red w ith his right to use and e njoy his property , wer e

10

arb itr ary , c a

pr ic iou s and

un re a so na

ble , a nd did no t a dv anc e any

le g iti ma te gover

nme nt i nte re st. Weatherf ord ar g ues that the City ’s zoning ordina nces f ail to advan ce any

leg itimate gove rnment int e r e s t s o n l y

a s t h e y w e r e a p p l i e d t o h i s s i tu a t i o n . I ni t s m o t i o nf o r s u m m ar y j u d g m e n t , t h e CityA t a kin g may a lso oc c ur

if a zon ing de c isi on de nie s a land ow ne r “ a ll e c on omi c a lly via ble 11 use of their

p ro p er t y ,” Ma

y he w v . To wn o

f Su nn y v ale , 964 S.W .2d 922, 935 (Tex. 1998), but W e a t h e r f o r d d o e s n o ta l l e g e t h a t t h e C i t y’ s d e c i s i o n h a s s u c h ani mp a c to nt h e u s e o f h i s p r o p e rt y. S e e a l s o S h e f fie ld , 14 0 S .W. 3d

a t 67 0- 72 (s ug g e sti ngthat r e gulator y takin g s mi g ht b e fo un d in sit ua tio ns oth e r t

ha n p hy sic a l e ff

e c t sh or t of g ov e rnme nta l po sse ssion , d e nia l of a ll e c on omi c a lly benef icial use, or f

ailure to substantially

advanc e leg itimate state interests). 22 argued that the denials of Weather ford’ s applications did not devalue his prope rty and that the City ’s de c isi on s su

bs tanti a lly

a dv anc e d it s le g iti ma te g ov e rnme nta l in te re sts
. The F ifth Amendment of the U nited States Constit ution and article I , section 17 of the Texas Constit ution prohibit t he g overnme nt from taking private proper ty for public use without adequate compensation. Mayhe w , 9 64 S.W. 2d a t 93 3. A re g ulator y takin g may

oc c ur if a land -u se regulation unrea sonably interfe res with a landowner’s right to use and enjoy his proper ty or does not substantially

advanc e a le g itimate gove rnmental intere st. Id . at 934-35. 11

Substantial

advance ment Munic ipa l bo die s h a ve dis c re tio n to make zon ing de c isi on s a s lo nga s th e y c omp ly with constituti onal limitations
. Id . at 933. To satisfy constitutional considerat io n s , a zoning dec ision or other pr operty

regulation must subs tantially advanc e a le g itimate gove rnmental intere st. Id
. In
re vie wi nga

zon ingde c isi on , th e inq uir y is n ot w he the r t

he de c isi on was wi se, but wh e the r i t substantially

advanc ed some leg itimate state interest. Id
. at 934. A m unicipality ’s concern with the “ill effe cts of urba

nization” may

justify i t s action under a taking s analy sis. Id
. a t9 3 5
. T h e C i t y,
a lon g wi th We a the rf

or d’ s n e ig hb or s, wa s c on c e rn e d th a t c omm e rc ia l de ve lop me nt w ou ld i nc re a se
c on g e sti on

and po llu tio n, c ha

ng e the c ha

ra c te r o f the ne ig hb or

ho od , and ne g a tiv e ly

a ff e c t th e ov e ra ll qu a lity of lif e fo r We a the rf

or d’ s n e ig hb or s. Weathe rf or d hop ed to ad d hun dr e ds of liv ingun its ,23

many in the form of duple x es, apa rtments, and townhomes, a nd to const ru ct a c ommercia l infrastruc ture. There is no disputi ng that his proposals could have drastica lly chang ed the c hara cter of the ne ighbor

hood. We there fore conclude that the C ity showed that it s denials of Weathe rfor d’s applications substan t i al ly advanc ed a le g itimate gove rnmental intere st. Se e id . at 935 (propose d development would a dd 3,600 housing units to rura l are a with only 2,000 curr ent re sidents, resulting in population increa se of more th an 10,000 people; zoning de cision held to substantially advanc e municipality ’s leg itimate interests in “pre servingthe rate and c hara cter of community

g rowth”)
. Unreasonable interfere nce with use and enjoy ment The City ’s denials of Weatherfor d’s applications could also constitute a takingif they
unrea sonably interfe red with Weatherf ord’s use and enjoy

ment of his proper

ty
. Se e id
. Deter

mining wh e the r t he City un reas on a

bly int e rf e re d w iththe us e and

e njo y me nt o f We a the rf

or d’ s p ro pe rt

y require s a consider ation of two fa ctors: (i) the e conomic im p ac t of the City ’s dec ision and (ii) the deg ree to which the dec ision int erf ere s with investment-backe d expectations. Id
. Consideration of the e conomic impact of the re g ulation require s a comparison of the value taken from the proper ty with the proper

ty ’s rema ining value. Id
. at 9 3 5 -36. “The loss of anticipated g ains or potential future profits is not usually considere d in analy

zing this factor .” Id
. The s econd fac tor is landowner ’s investment-bac ked expectation. Id . The prope rty ’s cur rent permitted uses c onstitut e the landowner ’s “primary expectation” that may be af fec ted by regulation. Id
. (q u o t i n g Pe nn Ce nt. Tra ns p. v . Ci ty of N e w York, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978))
. “K n o wl ed ge of
e xis t i n g z o n i n g i s t o b e c o n s i d e r e d i n d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r t h e r e g u l a t i o n i n t e r f e r e s w ith inv e stm e nt-backed e xpe c ta tio ns ,” and his tor ic a l us e s o f t

he pr op e rt

y are of c ri tic a l im

po rt anc e in24

deter mining the landowner ’s rea sonable investment expectations. Id . at 936-37. Whether a decision
so unrea sonably

restric ts a landowne r’s property rig hts as t o amount to a taking is a question of law , but we re ly

on the trial cour

t to “resolve disputed f

act s re gar d i n g t he extent of the g overnme ntal intrusion.” Id . at 936.

The City n o te d , a n d We a th e rfor d has not attempted to prove otherwise, that the Sector I I Plan had no ef

fec t on the value of

Weatherf ord’s prope rty

or in the prope rty ’s under ly ing zoning de sig natio n. At

be st, Weathe rf

or d’ s argume nt i s th a t hi s p ro pe rt y wo uld be wo rt h mor e if he c ou ld rezone it. The loss of futur e prof its is not usually

considere d in our ana ly sis. Id
. Fur ther, Weathe rfor d had no “inve stment-backe d expectations” to deve lop the pr op e rt y wh e n he purc ha se d it. I n his af fi davit , Wea the rf

or d sta te d, “ Al tho ug h I

did no t in te nd

to develop the pr operty at t he ti me I purcha sed it during the 1960s, Idid beg in to entertain idea s during the 1990s about selling my proper ty for someone else to deve lop after Istarted g etting inquirie s from
re a l e state pr of

e ssi on a ls. ” Th e pr op e rt

y ha s b e e n zo ne d f

or sin g le -f a mil y re sid e nc e s si nc e the 19 70 s, and Weatherf

ord boug ht most of his la

nd in 1961 not for investment purposes but for his personal use to build his home. W eathe rfor d admitted that his inve stment e x pectations for med well af

ter the pr op e rt y wa s zon e d s ing le -f

a mil y re sid e nti a l. We c on c lud e tha

t th e City de mon str a te d th a t it s d e c isi on s d id n ot u nr e a sona bly int e rf e re wi th t

he us e and

e njo y me nt o f h is p ro pe rt

y and su bs tan ti a lly

a dv anc e d le g iti ma te g overnme ntal interests. See id. at 938 (landow ners boug ht first tract to use f or ra nching when no zoning was y et in place and later , afte r zoning was in place , boug ht other tracts with development in mind; court held t h at t hey lacke d rea sonable e x pectation to pursue development unde r existi ng25

stat e of c omm un ity and zon ingre g ulatio ns ); se e als o S he ffi e ld , 1 4 0 S. W. 3 d a t 6 76-78 (a fter develope r boug ht land, city rezoned to allow fe wer

homes per squa

re f eet, thus deva luing e x pecte d investme n t r e tu

r n ; d e s p it e e v id e n c e th a t c it y “ a tt e mp te d

to ta k e u n f a ir a d v an ta g e o f

” d e v e lo per,
re zon ingdid

no t amou

nt t o ta kin g ). F ur

the r, a s d isc us se d a

bo ve , w e c on c lud e tha

t th e City
e sta bli sh e d th a t it

did no t a c t in

an unr e a so na

ble , a rb itr ary , o r c a

pr ic iou s ma

nn e r i n ma

kin g its deter m i n at i o ns. I nstead, the City took into account the c onsiderable opposition t o Weatherf ord’s
a pp lic a tio ns and

de te rm ine d th a t th e int e re sts of the pu bli c wo uld

be be st s erve d b y

de nyinghis applications. Weatherf

ord has not produc ed evide nce to the c ontrary . We overrule Weatherf ord’s six th issue.
Conclusion

Ha vin g ov e rr

ule d We a the rf

or d’ s issu e s on app e a l, we ho ld that the dis tr ic t c ourt did
no t e rr in g ra nti ng su mma

ry jud g me nt f

or the City . We a ff

ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s su mma ry jud g me nt.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Kidd, Pury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: De cembe r 9, 2004