United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit 

No. 20-40580 

James Chad York, Individually; Sandy Lynn Winfrey York, 

Individually; Loreal Fultz, as Independent Administrator of, and on behalf 

of, The Estate of Chaz Logan York and his heirs-in law, 

Plaintiffs—Appellants, 

versus

Chase Aaron Welch; The City of Beaumont, 

Defendants—Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Texas 

USDC No. 1:18-CV-522 

Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Davis and Dennis, Circuit Judges.

Priscilla Richman, Chief Judge:

*

After an off-duty police officer shot and killed Chaz York, his family 

and estate (collectively the Yorks) brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against 

the officer and the City of Beaumont, the municipality that employed that 

officer. The district court dismissed the case based on a Rule 12(c) motion 

for judgment on the pleadings. Because the Yorks have not plausibly pleaded 

*

 This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. 

United States Court of Appeals 

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

February 26, 2024 

Lyle W. Cayce 

Clerk 

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No. 20-40580 

2 

a theory of Monell1 liability against the municipality, we affirm the district 

court’s dismissal. 

I 

This case presents tragic and unsettling facts. In October 2016, offduty Beaumont Police Officer Chase Welch shot and killed Chaz York in the 

parking lot of Madison’s, a restaurant and bar. The Yorks allege the 

following: An individual named Levi Severson assaulted Chaz without 

provocation on the patio area of the bar at Madison’s. Madison’s employees 

then expelled both Chaz and Severson from the premises, with Severson 

exiting the front entrance and Chaz being escorted through the back. While 

passing through the patio, Chaz encountered and began exchanging words 

with his ex-girlfriend. Madison’s employees separated the two, then 

continued to escort Chaz from the premises, with one of the employees 

pushing and verbally arguing with Chaz along the way. Meanwhile, another 

individual appeared at the back of the bar, saying “Beaumont PD, Beaumont 

PD,” but provided no further identification. That individual was Chase 

Welch. 

After Chaz abandoned the confrontation at Madison’s and left the 

premises accompanied by a friend, Welch and Madison’s employees 

continued to follow Chaz around the building and to his vehicle. During that 

time, both Madison’s employees and Welch engaged in verbal confrontations 

and threats with Chaz. When Chaz and his friend reached the vehicle, his 

friend helped Chaz into the backseat on the driver’s side before seating 

herself behind the wheel. Once Chaz was inside, Welch continued to 

1 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 

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3 

threaten and harass Chaz, yelling at Chaz to “get out you pussy” and banging 

on Chaz’s car with his hands while taunting Chaz. 

As Chaz’s friend prepared to drive away, she noticed Chaz had exited 

and was standing outside the vehicle. Chaz’s friend followed Chaz out, 

grabbed him, and attempted to pull him back inside. As she did so, Welch 

discharged his firearm three times. Chaz turned and ran away from Welch as 

Welch continued to fire in Chaz’s direction. Welch discharged eight to ten 

bullets in total, five of which struck Chaz—one in each arm, one in his right 

thigh, one in his chest, and one in his back. The fatal shots struck Chaz after 

he turned away from Welch. Welch then fled the scene. In contrast to the 

Yorks’ allegation, Welch contends that he shot Chaz in self-defense after 

Chaz opened his car trunk, grabbed a baseball bat, and charged Welch. 

The Yorks’ First Amended Complaint alleges that Beaumont 

misrepresented to the public the events of the shooting by supporting 

Welch’s version of events, and by describing the incident as a barroom fight 

that spilled into the parking lot. Further, the Yorks aver, Beaumont engaged 

in a cover-up of the shooting by failing to produce certain records requested 

during discovery—instead launching objections to those requests—and by 

accusing witnesses who claimed that Chaz was unarmed of “lying and 

‘tampering with evidence.’” Critically, however, the Yorks did not follow 

up on the discovery requests, failing to obtain rulings despite having ample 

time to do so. 

Additionally, the Yorks highlight that Beaumont disciplined Welch for 

certain acts of prior misconduct, suspending him for multiple episodes, but 

did not discipline Welch for certain acts of misconduct involving allegedly 

unreasonable or excessive force, including the shooting and killing of Chaz. 

Welch received various promotions and salary increases despite this history, 

and Welch was not disciplined for shooting and killing Chaz. More generally, 

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4 

the Yorks also highlight that from 2008 to 2018, Beaumont received 112 

citizen complaints against the police department, thirty of which alleged 

unreasonable or unauthorized use of force. Beaumont sustained only twentyone of the total 112 complaints. During that same period, roughly 8% of 

administrative complaints (eighteen out of 229) concerned the use of force. 

Finally, the Yorks underscore that Beaumont did not authorize its officers to 

carry their tasers while off duty; instead, they could carry only their firearm. 

Chaz’s family and estate brought this § 1983 action against both 

Welch and the City of Beaumont in October 2018, seeking relief for violations 

of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Welch ultimately settled with 

the Yorks out of court, leaving only their theory of Monell liability against 

Beaumont. In January 2019, the district court entered its scheduling order, 

thus beginning discovery, and in April 2019, the Yorks filed their First 

Amended Complaint. In response, Beaumont filed an untimely motion to 

dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6). The district court converted the 

motion into a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted 

it, reasoning that municipal liability under Monell could not attach. 

II 

As an initial matter, the district court did not err when it construed 

Beaumont’s untimely Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a Rule 12(c) motion for 

judgment on the pleadings.2

 In Jones v. Greninger,

3

 this court explained that 

untimely Rule 12(b) motions “will be treated as a motion for judgment on the 

2 See Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Puckett v. 

Comm’r, No. 99-20697, 2000 WL 554440, at *2 (5th Cir. Apr. 12, 2000) (per curiam) 

(unpublished). 

3

 188 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 1999). 

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5 

pleadings based on a failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”4 

Accordingly, the district court committed no error when it treated 

Beaumont’s untimely Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a Rule 12(c) motion. 

This court reviews a district court’s ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion de 

novo.5

 The motion is subject to the same standard as a motion to dismiss 

under Rule 12(b)(6).6

 Under that standard, set out by the Supreme Court in 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

7

 “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint 

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’”8

 “A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”9

 

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.”10

A municipality cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat 

superior.

11 Rather, “[i]t is only when the execution of the government’s 

policies or custom inflicts the injury that the municipality may be held liable 

4 Id. at 324. 

5 Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th 

Cir. 2002). 

6 Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008). 

7

 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 

8 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 

9 Id.

10 Id.

11 City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121-22 (1988) (citing Monell v. Dep’t 

of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). 

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6 

under § 1983.”12 Per Monell, “municipal liability under section 1983 requires 

proof of three elements: [1] a policymaker; [2] an official policy; and [3] a 

violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or 

custom.”13

The second element—an official policy—includes “[a] policy 

statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially adopted and 

promulgated by the municipality’s lawmaking officers or by an official to 

whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority.”14 An official 

policy may also be “[a] persistent, widespread practice of city officials or 

employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and 

promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom 

that fairly represents municipal policy”15 and “practically have the force of 

law.”16

The third, “moving force” element requires that the plaintiff “show 

that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability 

and . . . demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the 

deprivation of federal rights.”17 The culpability prong requires that the 

municipality be at least deliberately indifferent to the known or obvious 

12 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (internal quotation marks and 

ellipsis omitted) (quoting Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 267 (1987) (O’Connor, J., 

dissenting)). 

13 Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Monell, 

436 U.S. at 694). 

14 Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (per 

curiam). 

15 Id. 

16 Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 621-22 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting 

Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011)). 

17 Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). 

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consequences of municipal actions.18 The causation prong requires 

proximate causation.19 “Where a plaintiff claims that the municipality has 

not directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has caused an employee to do 

so, rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied to ensure 

that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its 

employee.”20 

“To proceed beyond the pleading stage, a complaint’s ‘description of 

a policy or custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional 

violation . . . cannot be conclusory; it must contain specific facts.’”21 Here, 

the Yorks allege six Beaumont policies that they argue give rise to Monell 

liability: 

First, Plaintiffs-Appellants identified that the City of Beaumont 

adopted a policy and/or custom in which its off duty officers 

were not allowed to carry tasers was a moving force behind the 

constitutional violations. Second, Plaintiffs-Appellants 

identified that the City of Beaumont adopted a policy and/or 

custom in which its officers (whether off duty or not) were 

taught to shoot to kill, and not to shoot to injure was a moving 

force behind the constitutional violations. Third, PlaintiffsAppellants identified that the City of Beaumont’s widespread 

and persistent use of excessive force by its officers, which 

became so common place as to constitute a custom and/or 

policy, was a moving force behind the constitutional violations. 

Fourth, Plaintiffs-Appellants identified that the City of 

Beaumont’s failure to train its officers in non-lethal weapons 

18 See id. at 407. 

19 Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 305 (5th Cir. 1980). 

20 Brown, 520 U.S. at 405. 

21 Peña, 879 F.3d at 622 (quoting Spiller v. City of Tex. City, Police Dep’t, 130 F.3d 

162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997)). 

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8 

while off duty was a moving force behind the constitutional 

violations. Fifth, Plaintiffs-Appellants identified that the City 

of Beaumont’s policy of a “code of silence” in which a cover 

up of instances of excessive force was a moving force behind 

the constitutional violations. Sixth, Plaintiffs-Appellants 

identified that the City of Beaumont’s failure to 

discipline/ratification of Officer Welch’s excessive use of force 

was a moving force behind the constitutional violations. 

None of the Yorks’ six theories satisfy the Twombly standard for two 

primary reasons: the alleged policies are not policies at all, or the alleged 

policies were not “moving forces” behind the underlying constitutional 

deprivation. 

A 

The Yorks do not plausibly plead that either the off-duty taser-carry 

policy or the shoot-to-kill policy was a moving force behind the underlying 

constitutional violation. The Yorks seek to impose Monell liability based on 

Beaumont Police Chief Singletary’s post-shooting interview in which 

Singletary stated Beaumont police officers do not carry tasers off duty, and 

later commented, “Officers are not taught to shoot at an arm or a leg, because 

it[’]s dangerous if our officers are trained to shoot an arm or a leg in a high 

stress situation then they miss.”22 He explained, “these officers could get 

hurt or killed and innocent bystand[e]r[]s could get hurt or killed.”23

The Yorks’ argument concerning the off-duty taser-carry policy does 

not satisfy the causation prong, for any causal nexus between Beaumont’s 

policies and Chaz’s death is too attenuated to be considered a proximate 

22 Ashley DeVriend, Police Chief supports officer after shooting, KFDM (Oct. 18, 

2016, 10:28 PM), https://kfdm.com/news/local/police-chief-supports-officer-aftershooting. 

23 Id. 

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9 

cause of Chaz’s death. As the district court pointed out, no policy required 

Welch to carry his firearm in lieu of his taser. The Yorks pled no facts tending 

to show that Welch would have carried and used a taser had he been 

permitted to do so. The district court properly dismissed this theory. 

Nor do the Yorks plausibly allege that the shoot-to-kill policy was a 

moving force behind the constitutional violation. Shooting to kill and not 

injure is standard police practice,24 and there is no allegation that the City 

had a policy that authorized or encouraged the use of lethal force in all 

encounters or in encounters like the one that allegedly occurred with Chaz. 

B 

The Yorks have not plausibly pleaded that Beaumont maintained a 

policy of widespread and persistent use of excessive force. “If actions of city 

employees are to be used to prove a custom for which the municipality is 

liable,” our court has reasoned, “those actions must have occurred for so 

long or so frequently that the course of conduct warrants the attribution to 

the governing body of knowledge that the objectionable conduct is the 

expected, accepted practice of city employees.”25

In support of their theory that Beaumont adopted a custom of allowing 

excessive force, the Yorks cite to statistics from 2008 to 2018, “which 

showed 26% of all complaints”—thirty out of 112—“made about the City of 

Beaumont by citizens related to ‘unauthorized use of force’ or ‘unreasonable 

use of force’ claims.” This “substantial number of similar complaints,” the 

Yorks contend, shows “a pattern and practice of excessive force by its 

24 See Experts on Why Police Aren’t Trained to Shoot to Wound, ABC News (July 7, 

2016, 6:46 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/police-trained-shoot-woundexperts/story?id=40402933. 

25 Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 842 (5th Cir. 1984). 

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officers.” Despite discovery beginning as early as January 2019, the Yorks 

failed to obtain factual context and detail concerning the alleged 26% of 

incidents of police misconduct. That failure brings this case within the 

purview of Peterson v. City of Fort Worth.

26 

In Peterson, the plaintiff sought to create a fact question to overcome 

summary judgment by citing “to 27 complaints of excessive force between 

2002 and 2005.”27 Those complaints, he argued, revealed “that the city 

maintained an official policy that was permissive of excessive force.”28 The 

court rejected the plaintiff’s theory due to the lack of factual development 

behind those complaints, noting that “[a] pattern requires similarity and 

specificity; ‘[p]rior indications cannot simply be for any and all “bad” or 

unwise acts, but rather must point to the specific violation in question.’”29 

The plaintiff in Peterson provided no information concerning the size of the 

police department or how many arrests that department made during the 

relevant time period.30 The Yorks’ generic statistics are likewise devoid of 

factual development and context. 

The fact that the court decided Peterson at the summary judgment 

stage does not change our conclusion. At oral argument, counsel for the 

Yorks conceded that the Yorks served Beaumont with requests for 

production concerning those complaints against Beaumont and was met with 

objections to those requests but failed to obtain rulings on those objections. 

26 588 F.3d 838 (5th Cir. 2009). 

27 Id. at 850. 

28 Id. 

29 Id. at 851 (quoting Estate of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of North Richland Hills, 

406 F.3d 375, 383 (5th Cir. 2005)). 

30 Id. at 851-52. 

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As a result of that failure, the Yorks’ theory of widespread use of excessive 

force cannot succeed. The Yorks “failed to provide context that would show 

a pattern of establishing a municipal policy” despite having the opportunity 

to do so.31 Just as “27 incidents of excessive force over a period of four years 

do not reflect a pattern that can be said to represent official policy,” so too 

are thirty citizen complaints over a ten-year period insufficient to establish a 

custom.32

C 

The Yorks have not plausibly pleaded that Beaumont’s allegedly 

inadequate training of Welch was a moving force behind the underlying 

constitutional violation. To establish municipal liability under a failure-totrain theory, the Yorks must prove three elements: “1) [Beaumont] failed to 

train or supervise the officers involved; 2) there is a causal connection 

between the alleged failure to supervise or train and the alleged violation of 

the plaintiff’s rights; and 3) the failure to train or supervise constituted 

deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”33 The Yorks 

argue that Beaumont failed to train its officers on non-lethal force while off 

duty, and that this failure amounted to “deliberate indifference” to the 

health and safety of the citizenry. 

31 Id. at 851. 

32 Id. at 852. 

33 Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001). 

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12 

In Littell v. Houston Independent School District,

34 this court clarified 

the two means of proving municipal liability under a failure-to-train theory 

outlined by the Supreme Court in City of Canton v. Harris:

35

Sometimes . . . municipal employees will violate constitutional 

rights “so often” that the factfinder can infer from the pattern 

of violations that “the need for further training must have been 

plainly obvious to the policymakers.” This proof-by-pattern 

method is “ordinarily necessary.” But even absent proof of 

pattern, deliberate indifference can still be inferred if the 

factfinder determines that the risk of constitutional violations 

was or should have been an “obvious” or “highly predictable 

consequence” of the alleged training inadequacy.36

The Yorks rely on the latter single-incident theory of liability. 

The Yorks’ First Amended Complaint does not plausibly plead that 

Beaumont was deliberately indifferent to the need, if any, for further training. 

This court has explained that “the [single-incident] exception is generally 

reserved for those cases in which the government actor was provided no 

training whatsoever.”37 Moreover, “[a] municipality’s culpability for a 

deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to 

train.”38 The Yorks’ First Amended Complaint concedes that Welch 

“received significant training relating to the physical aspects of being a police 

officer.” The Yorks argue that Welch “did not receive any training that 

34 894 F.3d 616 (5th Cir. 2018). 

35 489 U.S. 378 (1989). 

36 Littell, 894 F.3d at 624 (ellipsis omitted) (first quoting Harris, 489 U.S. at 390 

n.10; then quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997); and then 

quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 409). 

37 Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 624 (5th Cir. 2018). 

38 Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). 

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Plaintiffs[]-Appellants could find relating to using non-lethal weapons while 

off duty by the Beaumont Police Department.” But Welch did receive 

training about the use of non-lethal force, and the Yorks fail to allege how that 

training should have differentiated between on- and off-duty situations. 

The Yorks’ framing of this issue runs afoul of the reasoning of our 

decision in Peña v. City of Rio Grande City39 and therefore fails. That case 

involved a minor suspect, Peña, who sought to hold a municipality liable after 

one of its officers tased her as she fled.40 This court held that Peña could not 

satisfy the Twombly standard, explaining that “the [single-incident] 

exception is generally reserved for those cases in which the government actor 

was provided no training whatsoever.”41 Peña’s complaint “acknowledge[d] 

that [the officers involved in the incident] received taser training from other 

officers, so her allegations [could not] satisfy the exacting test for the narrow 

single-incident exception.”42 Even accepting the Yorks’ factual allegations 

as true—that Welch did not receive training in the use of non-lethal force 

while off duty—recovery on this theory is not plausible. The absence of 

training while off duty constitutes the “sort of nuance [that] simply cannot 

support an inference of deliberate indifference.”43 The district court 

properly dismissed this theory. 

D 

The Yorks have not plausibly pleaded a theory of ratification. They 

argue that both Beaumont and Chief Singletary ratified Welch’s conduct by 

39 879 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 2018). 

40 Id. at 616. 

41 Id. at 624. 

42 Id.; see also Littell v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 616, 624-25 (5th Cir. 2018). 

43 Connick, 563 U.S. at 67. 

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failing to discipline his use of excessive force in both the shooting giving rise 

to this suit and in past incidents. Additionally, the Yorks allege that 

Beaumont itself, through its official policymakers, engaged in misconduct by 

covering-up the details of the shooting through its denial and proffering of an 

alternative version of events. 

However, this court has curtailed the applicability of a ratification 

theory. In Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, the plaintiff argued ratification based 

on the Police Chief’s post-investigation determination that the offending 

officers’ conduct “complied with the department’s policies.”44 The court 

rejected this theory, explaining, “our precedent has limited the theory of 

ratification to ‘extreme factual situations.’”45 Further, “we have also 

explained that a policymaker who defends conduct that is later shown to be 

unlawful does not necessarily incur liability on behalf of the municipality.”46

Whether a case presents an extreme factual situation—as in this 

court’s opinion in Grandstaff v. City of Borger47—such that a theory of 

ratification applies is a question of law.48 We hold that the facts of this case 

do not present such an extreme factual situation. In Grandstaff, “officers and 

a city police force failed, at great cost . . . [then] denied their failures and 

concerned themselves only with unworthy, if not despicable, means to avoid 

44 588 F.3d 838, 848 (5th Cir. 2009). 

45 Id. (quoting Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 798 (5th Cir. 1998)). 

46 Id.; see also Coon v. Ledbetter, 780 F.2d 1158, 1161 (5th Cir. 1986) (explaining that 

precedent “does not stand for the broad proposition that if a policymaker defends his 

subordinates and if those subordinates are later found to have broken the law, then the 

illegal behavior can be assumed to have resulted from an official policy”). 

47 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985). 

48 See Peterson, 588 F.3d at 848 n.2 (“On the contrary, our conclusion rests on a 

legal determination that the facts here, even viewed in the light most favorable to Peterson, 

do not satisfy the legal standard set out in our ratification caselaw.”). 

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legal liability.”49 The officers had pursued a suspect onto the ranch of an 

innocent third party, then recklessly “poured” gunfire on that third party, 

killing him.50 “Following this incompetent and catastrophic performance, 

there were no reprimands, no discharges, and no admissions of error.”51 

Such striking misconduct, coupled with “the subsequent acceptance of 

dangerous recklessness by the policymaker,” sufficed to support the jury’s 

finding that the municipality had a custom of misconduct such that it could 

be held liable under Monell.

52

Here, rather than “several officers in several episodes” engaging in 

police misconduct as in Grandstaff,

53 only a single officer was involved in a 

single shooting. Further, the officers in Grandstaff “were evasive and 

forgetful and self-contradictory,”54 while here, despite having ample time to 

depose Beaumont policymakers and personnel and otherwise conduct 

discovery, the Yorks have offered only vague and conclusory allegations, 

devoid of factual enhancement, concerning Beaumont’s alleged cover-up. 

The Yorks have not pleaded “enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation 

that discovery will reveal evidence of [illegality],”55 in large part because 

discovery has not revealed evidence of illegality.56

49 Grandstaff, 767 F.2d at 166. 

50 Id. at 168. 

51 Id. at 171. 

52 Id. 

53 Id.

54 Id. at 166 & n.1. 

55 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007). 

56 Cf. Netto v. Amtrak, 863 F.2d 1210, 1216 (5th Cir. 1989) (“As this Court has 

previously stated, a plaintiff’s entitlement to discovery before a ruling on a motion for 

summary judgment is not unlimited and may be cut off when the record shows that the 

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16 

Moreover, at its core, in large part, the Yorks’ ratification theory seeks 

to impose Monell liability on Beaumont based on Beaumont’s disagreement 

with the Yorks’ factual allegations. In other words, the Yorks treat a factual 

dispute as evidence of a more nefarious plot to cover up the shooting. For 

example, the Yorks contend that the cover-up “was seen in [Beaumont’s] 

post-shooting reporting of Chaz York, wherein it immediately went on the 

defensive, stating that [Chaz] had a bat, and was a danger to the public.” 

Though we must accept the Yorks’ factual allegations as true, we need not 

accept their attempted bootstrapping of Beaumont’s denial of particular 

factual allegations with evidence of a cover-up sufficient to survive a 

judgment on the pleadings. Instead, the plaintiff must present some factual 

allegations aliunde the defendant’s denial.57 The Yorks attempt to do so, but 

the remainder of the allegations concerning a cover-up are conclusory and 

devoid of factual enhancement and therefore insufficient to survive 

dismissal.58 Under the Yorks’ reasoning, anytime a municipality issued a 

press release, and something in that release turned out to be untrue, the 

plaintiff would necessarily survive Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal and be entitled to 

discovery. We decline to expand Monell liability in so drastic a regard. 

requested discovery will not be likely to produce facts he needs to withstand a summary 

judgment motion.” (citing Paul Kadair, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 694 F.2d 1017, 1029-30 

(5th Cir. 1983))). 

57 Cf. Coon v. Ledbetter, 780 F.2d 1158, 1161 (5th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he statement does 

not necessarily advocate or excuse the use of excessive force. Sheriff Ledbetter denied that 

such a meaning was either intended or in context was so understood. This denial was not 

rebutted by contrary evidence, and it follows that Jackson County could not be held liable 

on the basis of the sheriff’s statement.”). 

58 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

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E 

Finally, the Yorks have not plausibly pleaded that Beaumont 

maintained a code of silence through which the municipality covered up 

instances of excessive force. The Yorks argue that Beaumont adopted a code 

of silence under which Beaumont “cover[ed] up and/or fabricat[ed] stories 

when officers used excessive force.” The Yorks support this theory by again 

offering Beaumont police statistics, which detail that 74% of citizen 

complaints resulted in a lack of disciplinary action being taken against 

Beaumont officers. Only 18.75% of citizen complaints were sustained. The 

Yorks then reallege that Beaumont engaged in a cover-up, fabricating 

evidence and misleading the public about the circumstances of Chaz’s killing. 

On multiple occasions, our circuit has treated a code-of-silence theory 

as identical to a ratification theory.59 For the same reasons the Yorks’ 

ratification theory fails, so too does the Yorks’ code-of-silence theory. 

Additionally, we reiterate that the generic statistics the Yorks proffer lack the 

context necessary to render their claim facially plausible. Moreover, the 

Yorks’ attempted factual enhancements concerning Beaumont’s alleged 

cover-ups of excessive force rely solely on the events surrounding Chaz’s 

death, suggesting that any cover-up was an isolated incident and “not the 

persistent, often repeated constant violations that constitute custom and 

policy.”60 Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed this theory. 

59 See, e.g., Quinn v. Guerrero, 863 F.3d 353, 365 (5th Cir. 2017) (“Quinn argues the 

police engage in a code of silence. . . . A theory of ratification is limited to ‘extreme factual 

situations.’” (quoting Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 848 (5th Cir. 2009))); 

Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 797-98 (5th Cir. 1998) (construing Grandstaff as a code 

of silence case). 

60 Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 977 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Bennett 

v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 768 n.3 (5th Cir. 1984)). 

Case: 20-40580 Document: 49-1 Page: 17 Date Filed: 02/26/2024
No. 20-40580 

18 

* * * 

The circumstances behind Chaz’s death are troubling. But the 

Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished that we distinguish acts of the 

municipality from those of its employees. The Yorks have not plausibly 

pleaded that Beaumont’s conduct was a moving force behind Chaz’s death. 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

Case: 20-40580 Document: 49-1 Page: 18 Date Filed: 02/26/2024