NIST Technical Note 1910

A Case Study of a Community Affected by the 

Waldo Fire – Event Timeline and Defensive 

Actions 

Alexander Maranghides

Derek McNamara

Robert Vihnanek

Joseph Restaino

Carrie Leland

This publication is available free of charge from: 

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.TN.1910
NIST Technical Note 1910

A Case Study of a Community Affected by the 

Waldo Fire – Event Timeline and Defensive 

Actions

Alexander Maranghides

Fire Research Division

Engineering Laboratory 

Derek McNamara

Geospatial Measurement Solutions, LLC 

Hood River, OR 

Robert Vihnanek 

Pacific Wildland Fire Sciences Lab 

Seattle, WA

Joseph Restaino

University of Washington 

Seattle, WA

Carrie Leland

Excet, Inc.

Springfield, VA

This publication is available free of charge from: 

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.TN.1910

November 2015 

U.S. Department of Commerce 

Penny Pritzker, Secretary

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

Willie May, Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and Director
Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this

document in order to describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such

identification is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by the

National Institute of Standards and Technology, nor is it intended to imply that the

entities, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose. 

National Institute of Standards and Technology Technical Note 1910

Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Technical Note 1910, 213 pages (November 2015)

CODEN: NTNOEF

This publication was a joint effort between the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology, the United States Forest Service (USFS), and the Joint Fire Science Program (JFSP)

Cover Page Photo: Photo Courtesy of Mike Galvin, Colorado Springs Fire Department, Used by Permission

This publication is available free of charge from: 

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.TN.1910
ii

Table of Contents

Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................ 2

1.0 Background ....................................................................................................................... 10

2.0 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 11

3.0 WUI Post Fire Assessments .............................................................................................. 12

4.0 Report Objectives.............................................................................................................. 15

5.0 Weather Overview ............................................................................................................ 16

6.0 Communities Affected ...................................................................................................... 17

6.1 Cedar Heights Summary ..................................................................................................... 17

6.2 Peregrine to Wolfe Ranch Summary .................................................................................. 18

7.0 Methodology ..................................................................................................................... 19

8.0 Data ......................................................................................................................................... 24

8.1 Data Integration .................................................................................................................. 24

8.2 Data Categories ................................................................................................................... 25

8.3 Data Quantity, Quality and Uncertainty ............................................................................. 26

8.3.1 Damage Information .................................................................................................... 29

8.3.1.1 Local Damage Data................................................................................................... 30

8.3.1.2 TD Damage Data ...................................................................................................... 31

8.3.1.3 Remote Sensing Damage Data.................................................................................. 36

8.3.1.4 Media Sources ........................................................................................................... 38

8.3.2 Burning Feature and Defensive Action Timeline Data................................................ 39

8.3.2.1 Images and Videos Spatial Data ............................................................................... 39

8.3.2.2 Technical Discussion Spatial Data ............................................................................ 41

8.3.2.3 Images and Video Time Data ................................................................................... 45

8.3.2.4 Technical Discussion Timeline Data ........................................................................ 51

9.0 Data Quality Summary, Resultant Rules, and Assumptions ................................................... 61

10.0 Mountain Shadows Case Study ........................................................................................ 67

10.1 General Description .......................................................................................................... 68

10.2 Damage and Destruction ................................................................................................... 69

10.3 Fire Behavior Timeline and Observations (Main Fire) .................................................... 70

10.4 Fire Behavior Timeline and Observations (Wind Change) .............................................. 73

10.5 Fire Extent and Spotting ................................................................................................... 75

10.6 Summary of Structures Burning ....................................................................................... 76

11.0 Defensive Actions ............................................................................................................. 89

11.1 Residential Parcels ............................................................................................................ 89

11.2 Residential Structures ....................................................................................................... 90

11.2.1 Undamaged Structures Defended to Prevent Ignition ............................................... 91

11.2.2 Damaged Structures Successfully Extinguished ........................................................ 93

11.2.3 Damaged Structures – Undefended ........................................................................... 95

11.2.4 Destroyed Structures Unsuccessfully Extinguished and Successfully Contained ..... 96

11.2.5 Destroyed Structures Unsuccessfully Extinguished and Unsuccessfully Contained . 96

11.2.6 Destroyed Structures Successfully Contained ........................................................... 97

11.2.7 Containing or “Boxing in” the Fire ............................................................................ 98

11.2.8 Destroyed Structures Unsuccessfully Contained ....................................................... 98

11.2.9 Mop-up (cooling down foundations) ......................................................................... 99
iii

11.3 Defensive Actions Summary ............................................................................................ 99

11.4 Defensible Space and High Density Primary Structures .......................................... 102

11.5 Defending High Density Primary Structures ............................................................ 106

12.0 First Responder Deployment Timeline and Structure Ignitions ..................................... 110

13.0 National Incident Management System and Incident Command System ....................... 112

14.0 Structure Construction and Parcel Vulnerabilities .......................................................... 114

14.1 Decks............................................................................................................................... 115

14.2 Roofs/Eaves/Attics .......................................................................................................... 115

14.3 Garage Door and Utility Door Trim and Vinyl Window Frames ................................... 115

14.4 Fences ............................................................................................................................. 115

14.5 Railroad TFies ................................................................................................................. 116

15.0 Summary of Technical Findings ..................................................................................... 116

15.1 Primary Technical Findings ............................................................................................ 116

16.0 Recommendations ........................................................................................................... 119

17.0 Summary and Conclusions ............................................................................................. 120

18.0 Acknowledgments........................................................................................................... 122

19.0 Map Figures .................................................................................................................... 124

20.0 References ....................................................................................................................... 160

Appendix A – WUI 0 (Rapid) and WUI 1 (Complete) Data Collection Forms ......................... 163

Appendix B – Fire Progression and Weather Data ..................................................................... 168

Appendix C – Cedar Heights Timeline ....................................................................................... 176

Appendix D – Peregrine Timeline .............................................................................................. 180

Appendix E – Additional Image and Video Sources from Used for Fire Timeline Creation and 

Fire Behavior Assessment........................................................................................................... 182

Appendix F – Apparatus in Mountain Shadows between 15:40 Tuesday June 26, 2012 and 04:00 

Wednesday June 2, 2012............................................................................................................. 185

Appendix G – WUI Data Collection Improvements ................................................................... 188

Appendix H – Example of Technical Discussion Cross-Correlation ......................................... 191

Appendix I – Independent Picture Time Stamp Calibration ....................................................... 194

Appendix J – Tools Used to Prevent Structure Ignitions ............................................................ 196

Appendix K – Tools Used To Extinguish Damaged Structures ................................................. 202

Appendix L – Examples of Missed Defensive Actions in Post-Fire Assessments ..................... 206

Appendix M – Revised List of Damaged Structures .................................................................. 208

Appendix N - Additional Technical Issues Identified During TDs ............................................ 214
iv

List of Figures

Figure 1 The NIST/USFS WUI Assessment Methodology with populations that will attempt to be 

assessed in future reports on the Waldo Canyon Fire. ................................................ 14

Figure 2 Example of locating during-fire images in space using Google Streetview. ................. 23

Figure 3 Using Bing Maps to geolocate burning features. The above image was compared to 

Bing Maps to help geolocated feature of interest. ....................................................... 24

Figure 4 Ground image taken by local damage inspectors of a destroyed primary structure 

barely showing fire blistered paint on an adjacent primary structure in the 

background. .................................................................................................................. 30

Figure 5 Image of a burned fence piece that appeared to have broken a deck post, which had no 

sign of fire damage. ...................................................................................................... 31

Figure 6 Damage on Charing Court used to geolocate first responder defensive action locations.

 ...................................................................................................................................... 32

Figure 7 Post-fire aerial images of damaged wood roofs. A). Aerial image recorded on 

6/28/2012 showing black marks on wood shake roofs. B). Aerial image recorded on 

7/12/2012 showing initial repairs to roofs. .................................................................. 33

Figure 8 Two potentially fire damaged roofs. The primary structure circled in blue had 

anecdotal accounts of damage from the homeowner while the structure in red has 

clear visible evidence of damage. ................................................................................ 34

Figure 9 Examples of remote sensing identified defensive action signs not identified during the 

TD process. .................................................................................................................. 37

Figure 10 Image of primary structure burning in the back yard that required ground assessment 

to geolocate. ................................................................................................................. 39

Figure 11 Evidence of early ignitions on Yankton Place and Western Courtney Drive through 

possible identification of primary structures as foundations. ...................................... 40

Figure 12 Image showing first responder hand work associated with containment of a burning 

primary structure. ........................................................................................................ 41

Figure 13 Image showing significant engine work required to contain fire spread from burning 

primary structure. ........................................................................................................ 42

Figure 14 Counts of observations from TDs that could not be geolocated beyond the street. ..... 43

Figure 15 Ignition in a re-entrant corner area with precise ignition location not determined in 

this case. ....................................................................................................................... 44

Figure 16 Counts of burning primary structure observations from images by range (+) 

associated with time stamp........................................................................................... 45

Figure 17 Counts of primary structure burning observations by source. .................................... 46

Figure 18 Counts of primary structure burning observations from images by time range. ......... 47

Figure 19 Structure burning observation counts by burning category. ....................................... 48

Figure 20 Counts of primary structures by number of image observations in each burn condition 

category. ....................................................................................................................... 49

Figure 21 Counts of properties with images of burning features or lack thereof. ....................... 50

Figure 22 Image taken at 18:29 on Wilson Road to the east of Vantage Vista Drive showing an 

unconfirmed defensive action. ...................................................................................... 51

Figure 23 Counts of observations of burning primary structures by TD number for those 

discussions that contained greater than 20 observations. ........................................... 52
v 

Figure 24 Counts of TD observations of burning primary structures by time source listed in the 

TD spreadsheet. ........................................................................................................... 53

Figure 25 Counts of burning primary structure observations from TD by time on June 26-27, 

2012 associated with each time stamp for each time source. ...................................... 54

Figure 26 Counts of burning primary structure observations from TDs by range in minutes ( ± ) 

associated with time stamp for each time source. ........................................................ 55

Figure 27 Counts of burning primary structure observations from TD by time ranges on June 26 

-27, 2012 for each time source with a time range less than or equal to ± 20 min. ...... 55

Figure 28 Counts of burning primary structure observations from TDs by time intervals on June 

26-27, 2012 displayed by time range estimates associated with burning primary 

structure observation. .................................................................................................. 56

Figure 29 Counts of burning primary structure observations from TDs by observation category.

 ...................................................................................................................................... 57

Figure 30 Counts of TD parcel burning observations. ................................................................. 57

Figure 31 Counts of defensive action observations from TDs by time for each primary structure 

observation category from June 26-27, 2012. ............................................................. 58

Figure 32 Counts of defensive action observations from TDs by time for each detached 

combustible observation category from June 26-27, 2012. ......................................... 60

Figure 33 Counts of defensive action observations from TDs by time for each parcel or 

vegetation observation category from June 26-27, 2012. ............................................ 60

Figure 34 Counts of defensive action observations from TDs by time for each mop-up, prepositioning of equipment and prior defensive action observation category from June 

26-27, 2012. ................................................................................................................. 61

Figure 35 Image of primary structure on Talleson Court taken at 19:11 on June 26, which 

allowed time stamp observations for other primary structures not shown to be 

obtained. ....................................................................................................................... 66

Figure 36 Pyrocumulus cloud as it approaches MSC from the west. Observed from south of 

Cedar Heights Community on June 26 at approximately 17:00. ................................. 70

Figure 37 Time lapse imagery portraying change in wind direction on Courtney Drive. Images 

are looking south. ......................................................................................................... 74

Figure 38 Image showing structure to structure fire spread on primary structures ignited by 

18:38. ........................................................................................................................... 78

Figure 39 Time lapse images of burning on the northern side of Courtney Drive. White text 

boxes with black outlines portray burning times. White text portrays addresses of 

continuously adjacent primary structures from 2250 and 2320. All images are 

oriented to the south. .................................................................................................... 79

Figure 40 Evidence of limited number of early ignitions on Courtney Drive. a) Image looking to 

the west showing high flame heights on the east side of Courtney Drive, near the bend 

in the street. b) Image looking to the south showing flames either on 2280 Courtney 

Drive or behind it. C) Image looking to the south showing primary structures 

involved on the south side of Courtney Drive. D) Image looking to west showing 

foundations on the west and east side of Courtney Drive and Yankton Place. ............ 82

Figure 41 Image looking west into Majestic Drive from its northern entrance showing significant 

burning in the second cul de sac on the north side at 19:23. ...................................... 83

Figure 42 Destruction on the north end of Majestic Drive observed between 20:45 and 21:15. 84

Figure 43 Selected images of burning primary structures around Majestic Drive. ..................... 85
vi

Figure 44 Additional selected images of burning primary structures around Majestic Drive. ... 86

Figure 45 Ignitions on Majestic Drive providing evidence for majority of primary structures on 

east side ignited or destroyed by 23:00. ...................................................................... 87

Figure 46 Counts of properties by parcel level action. Individual properties might have seen 

multiple actions. ........................................................................................................... 91

Figure 47 Counts of undamaged structures based on distance to the nearest destroyed structure.

 ...................................................................................................................................... 93

Figure 48 Counts of undamaged structures defended with various suppression tools. ............... 93

Figure 49 Counts of extinguished primary structures per suppression tool. Each tool is counted 

once per property and might have been used multiple times. ...................................... 94

Figure 50 Counts of damaged structures based on distance to the nearest destroyed structure. 94

Figure 51 Damage to wooden window well. Note the damage was not from continuous fire 

spread as evidenced by the green vegetation. .............................................................. 95

Figure 52 Possible ignitions at 2470 Jenner Ct in relation to burning at 2450 Jenner Ct. ......... 97

Figure 53 Counts of select properties with primary structures by hazard rating and structure 

response. .................................................................................................................... 102

Figure 54 Percent primary structures with no damage by defensible space rating for select 

properties with a primary structure and a rating. ..................................................... 103

Figure 55 Percent primary structures with no damage from the Waldo Canyon Fire by defensible 

space rating for all properties with a primary structure, a rating and no defensive 

actions as identified in this report. ............................................................................. 103

Figure 56 Percent primary structures with no damage from the Waldo Canyon Fire by defensible 

space rating for all properties with a primary structure, a rating and a defensive 

action. ......................................................................................................................... 105

Figure 57 Changes in exposure conditions evident through changes in scorching to vegetation 

corresponding to areas across from a canyon and burning structures. Looking east to 

northeast. NIST Photos .............................................................................................. 108

Figure 58 Apparatus in Mountain Shadows Community from 15:40 June 26 to 04:00 June 27 112

List of Map Figures

Map Figure 1 Fire progression of the 2012 Colorado Waldo Canyon Fire overlaid on structure 

response to the fire for primary structures in and around the fire. ........................... 125

Map Figure 2 Overview of destruction to MSC by 2012 Waldo Canyon Fire. .......................... 126

Map Figure 3 Location of two destroyed primary structures including images showing burning 

of western structure and locations of Engine from AVL clustered around primary 

structure with lack of white ash indicating lack of complete combustion of features.

 .................................................................................................................................... 127

Map Figure 4 Destroyed and damaged structures with some video or image recorded of it in 

some state of burning, including complete destruction between 6/26/2012 17:59 to 

6/27/2012 01:30. ........................................................................................................ 128

Map Figure 5 Primary structures with only "Done Burning" observations from images or videos 

overlaid on other primary structure damage categories. .......................................... 129

Map Figure 6 Parcels with some video or image recorded of vegetation or detached items such 

as fences or decks in some state of burning, including complete destruction between 

6/26/2012 17:59 to 6/27/2012 01:30.......................................................................... 130
vii

Map Figure 7 Primary structures with burning observation(s) from TDs overlaid on destroyed 

and damaged primary structures with no burning observations from TDs. .............. 131

Map Figure 8 Primary structures with burn observations from TDs with time range estimates 

less than + 20 min. ..................................................................................................... 132

Map Figure 9 Primary structures identified as defended to “prevent structure ignition” between 

19:30 and 22:30 overlaid on damage and destruction. ............................................. 133

Map Figure 10 Primary structures identified as defended to “prevent structure ignition”, 

“extinguish structure” or “contain structure” between 23:30 on June 26 and 05:30 on 

June 27 overlaid on damage and destruction. ........................................................... 134

Map Figure 11 Properties with identified defensive action locations of extinguishing detached 

combustibles before 20:30 and properties with identified defensive actions of remove 

fences, burning or not, after 19:30, both on June 26. ................................................ 135

Map Figure 12 WUI area in and around MSC. .......................................................................... 136

Map Figure 13 Structure density in and around Mountain Shadows. Derived using the 

ArcGISTM Point Density Tool with a circle window having a radius of 200 m (660 ft) 

and an output cell size of 3 m (10ft). .......................................................................... 137

Map Figure 14 Distance to nearest primary structure in MSC. ................................................. 138

Map Figure 15 Spotting and possible continuous fire spread over the ridge above MSC 

occurring around 16:30 on June 26. ......................................................................... 139

Map Figure 16 Burning times of wildlands around MSC........................................................... 140

Map Figure 17 Additional burning times of wildlands around MSC. ........................................ 141

Map Figure 18 Time lapse images of vegetation along Flying W Ranch Road. The vegetation 

did not burn as part of the main fire front, as is evidenced in the image taken at 19:23. 

Later images show burning of vegetation and the destroyed primary structures as 

early as 20:42. The burning might have been a result of ember spread from primary 

structures burning on Hot Springs Court, corresponding to a change in wind 

direction. .................................................................................................................... 142

Map Figure 19 Ignitions occurring after the change in wind direction. .................................... 143

Map Figure 20 Ignitions occurring after 20:00. ........................................................................ 144

Map Figure 21 Structure ignitions on Jenner Court corresponding to changes in wind direction 

around 20:00. ............................................................................................................. 145

Map Figure 22 Spotting locations to wildland vegetation with potential farthest spotting 

locations highlighted. ................................................................................................. 146

Map Figure 23 Potential spotting to structure locations, relatively early in the fire. ................ 147

Map Figure 24 Ignition status of destroyed and damaged primary structures around 18:30 on 

June 26. ...................................................................................................................... 148

Map Figure 25 Ignition status of destroyed and damaged primary structures before ≈20:30 on 

June 26. ...................................................................................................................... 149

Map Figure 26 Ignition status of destroyed and damaged primary structures before ≈23:00 on 

June 26. ...................................................................................................................... 150

Map Figure 27 Images of structures as foundations or fully involved before 23:55. Image B and 

Image D show some of the last structures to burn in the area along with defensive 

actions. Defensive actions and burn order can also be deduced from areas with lack 

of white ash as shown in image C that indicates structures as foundations before 

successful containment actions occurred coinciding with structures containing white 

ash. ............................................................................................................................. 151
viii

Map Figure 28 Properties that had parcel level defensive actions. Some properties had multiple 

defensive actions. The size of the parcel is not related to the quantity or quality of the 

defensive actions and defensive actions might not have occurred across the entire 

parcel.......................................................................................................................... 152

Map Figure 29 Structures with no damage, shown as purple hexagon with black dot, which were 

specifically identified by first responders as being defended to prevent structure 

ignition. ...................................................................................................................... 153

Map Figure 30 Structures with confirmed and possible damage, shown as purple hexagon with 

black dot, which were specifically identified by first responders as being extinguished 

(94/104 total or 93%). ................................................................................................ 154

Map Figure 31 Destroyed structures, shown as purple hexagon with black dot, which were 

specifically identified by first responders as being attempted to be extinguished but 

were ultimately destroyed and also identified as first responders containing fire 

spread. ........................................................................................................................ 155

Map Figure 32 Destroyed structures, shown as purple hexagon with black dot, which were 

specifically identified by first responders as being attempted to be contained and fire 

spread did not continue to adjacent primary structures. ........................................... 156

Map Figure 33 Destroyed structures, shown as purple hexagon with black dot, which were 

specifically identified by first responders as being attempted to be contained and fire 

spread did continue to adjacent primary structure(s), which were ultimately destroyed.

 .................................................................................................................................... 157

Map Figure 34 Defensible space ratings for select properties with primary structures in MSC 

overlaid with structure response to the Waldo Canyon Fire. .................................... 158

Map Figure 35 Hazard rating overlaid on slope for select areas of MSC. ................................ 159

List of Tables

Table 1 US Air Force Academy Mesonet (HWAS) and Colorado Springs Airport (KCOS) wind 

gusts between 17:00 and 18:00, June 26, 2012 ........................................................... 16

Table 2 Field Data used for this report. ....................................................................................... 20

Table 3 Remote Sensing data used for this report. ....................................................................... 20

Table 4 Other spatial data used for this report. ........................................................................... 21

Table 5 Types of burning feature observations............................................................................ 26

Table 6 Defensive action categories for objectives and tools/tactics. .......................................... 26

Table 7 Sources of error present in the TD data collection process. ........................................... 43

Table 8 Data sources required to reconstruct the fire timeline. ................................................... 62

Table 9 Advantages and disadvantages of various damage assessment data sources. ............... 63

Table 10 Advantages and disadvantages of methods used in this report to document burning 

feature observations and defensive actions in space and time. ................................... 65

Table 11 Highlights of defensive action timeline reconstruction in MSC. ................................... 67

Table 12 Observations near Wilson Road Water Tower from 17:15 to 17:28, June 26, 2012. ... 72

Table 13 Locations of far field spotting to vegetation at the Waldo Canyon Fire along with 

distance downwind from burning features and defensive action status. ...................... 76

Table 14 Locations of far field spotting to structures at the Waldo Canyon Fire along with 

distance downwind from burning features and defensive action status. ...................... 76
ix

Table 15 Estimates of the minimum and maximum number of primary structures ignited on 

streets with unknown primary structures ignitions after the passage of the main Waldo 

Canyon Fire Front. ...................................................................................................... 88

Table 16 Estimates of the minimum and maximum number of primary structures ignited on 

streets with unknown primary structures ignitions after 20:30. .................................. 88

Table 17 Bulldozer line summaries............................................................................................... 92

Table 18 Potentially damaged structures with no specific defensive action identified. ............... 95

Table 19 Destroyed structures unsuccessfully extinguished and unsuccessfully contained. ........ 98

Table 20 Defended and undefended structures by damage status. ............................................. 100

Table 21 Examples of studies and training materials where defensive actions were missed. .... 102

Table 22 Command posts, staging and IC posts. ........................................................................ 110

Table 23 Primary structures burning and apparatus in MSC as a function of time. ................. 111
1 

A Case Study of a Community Affected by the Waldo Fire – Event 

Timeline and Defensive Actions

by

Alexander Maranghides, Derek McNamara, Robert Vihnanek, Joseph Restaino, 

and Carrie Leland

Abstract

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has a suite of research projects 

addressing risk reduction in Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) communities. The NIST WUI 

Team and the United States Forest Service, Fire and Environmental Research Applications Team 

(USFS FERA) were invited by the Colorado Springs Fire Department (CSFD) to collect post 

incident data from the 2012 Colorado Waldo Canyon Fire (Waldo Canyon Fire). This case study 

is focused on the Mountain Shadows Community (MSC) in Colorado Springs. There were 1455 

primary structures (refers to residences) in MSC, as classified in this report. Of these, 344 

primary structures, as classified in this report, were completely destroyed and 85 had confirmed 

damaged, 14 had unconfirmed damage, and two had confirmed partial damage. This report on 

the Waldo Canyon Fire addresses the event timeline reconstruction and defensive actions. 

Additionally, the report documents identified science and engineering issues related to the WUI. 

Recommendations are also made on improving WUI data collection. 

This work attempts to reconstruct the fire timeline in MSC with special focus on burning 

structures. The extent and type of defensive actions that were undertaken during the first ten 

hours after the Waldo Canyon Fire reached MSC are presented. An assessment of the quality, 

quantity and uncertainty related to data used to reconstruct the fire timeline and defensive actions 

is also conducted. The data collected and synthesized demonstrated the effectiveness of 

defensive actions as well as examined the extent of ignitions due to the wildland fire front. New 

concepts of defensible space are highlighted. The information presented in this report represents 

the first steps required for further examination of structure response to the fire exposure. 

The information generated from this case study can provide input, together with additional 

research, to improve WUI building and landscaping (construction) codes and standards, and 

best practices. Extensive research is also needed to provide first responders with effective 

pre-fire, during-fire and post-fire tools and standard operating protocols to efficiently tackle 

WUI fires such as the Waldo Canyon Fire. Only then will hazard mitigation technologies 

for new and existing constructions together with improvements in firefighting response 

significantly reduce structural losses from WUI fires. 

KEY WORDS: Wildland Urban Interface, WUI, fire behavior, community, Waldo Canyon 

Fire, Waldo Fire, fire and ember exposure, WUI response, NIMS, ICS
2 

Executive Summary

Destruction of homes and businesses from Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) fires has been 

steadily escalating, as have the fire suppression costs associated with them. Since 2000, in the 

U.S., over 3000 homes on average per year have been lost to WUI fires. This is compared to 

about 900 homes per year in the 1990s, and 400 homes per year in the 1970s. In 2011, in Texas 

alone, over 2000 homes were destroyed during WUI fires. In Colorado, from June 2012 to June 

2013, three fires, the Waldo Canyon, the High Park and the Black Forest destroyed a total of 

1103 homes and burned a total of 119 811 acres. 

The WUI fire problem affects both existing communities and new construction. WUI fire 

construction codes and standards, test methods and best practices are in their technical infancy. 

While some codes address radiant heat flux, the science necessary to harden structures against 

ember assault is very limited, in part because quantifiable ember exposure data from wildfires 

and WUI fires is almost non-existent. Additionally, guidance on the efficient deployment of 

firefighting resources in the WUI is limited, and there is limited information on the effectiveness 

of defensive actions during WUI fires. Lastly, there is limited information on the effectiveness of 

WUI mitigation strategies from science based studies. 

While the WUI structure fire problem is similar in principle to the urban structure fire problem of 

the US in the 1970s in that they both involve building fires, it is also significantly more complex 

because of the range of physical scales involved, the contributions of topography and local 

weather, the range of fuels involved, and the interdisciplinary nature of the problem. A 

significant body of research is necessary to improve construction codes, standards and best 

practices as well as provide first responders with effective tools and safe and efficient standard 

operating procedures (SOP) to address the WUI fire problem. 

Smoke from the Waldo Canyon Fire was first observed on Friday, June 22, 2012 and the fire first 

reached the Cedar Heights Community in Colorado Springs, Colorado at approximately 22:00 

SMT Fon Saturday, June 23. The fire crossed the topographic divide above Mountain Shadows 

Community (MSC) on Tuesday, June 26, sometime before 17:00. The fire progressed to the east 

up to and through MSC and to the north towards the Peregrine Community and the US Air Force 

Academy. The fire continued to impinge on Peregrine and the southern end of the Air Force 

Academy into Wednesday, June 27. 

This work attempts to reconstruct the fire timeline and show where the fire was in MSC as a 

function of time, with an emphasis on structures. Additionally, the effectiveness and extent of 

defensive actions are documented in order to characterize effectiveness of extinguishment and 

containment at a parcel and structure level. Also included in this report are an overview of the 

WUI fire data collection conducted, the methods utilized in this case study to characterize fire 

behavior and first responder effectiveness, and assessments of data quality. Engineering and 

science issues related to the WUI are also identified and documented, and recommendations are 
3 

made on improving WUI data collection. This report focuses on the following four primary 

objectives:

1. Reconstructing the fire timeline and showing where the fire was in MSC as a function of time 

while identifying locations with limited data.

2. Documenting the spatiotemporal extent and type of defensive actions that were undertaken 

during the first ten hours after the Waldo Canyon Fire reached MSC.

3. Assessing the quality, quantity and uncertainty associated with data collected for this study to 

guide further analysis and identify improvements to WUI pre-fire, during-fire and post-fire 

data collection efforts.

4. Documenting any discernible issues related to WUI mitigation strategies and first responder 

tactics and safety.

The four primary findings from the Waldo Fire case study are: 

1. Defensive actions were effective in suppressing burning structures and containing the Waldo 

Canyon fire.

2. Pre-fire planning is essential to enabling safe, effective, and rapid deployment of firefighting 

resources in WUI fires. Effective pre-fire planning requires a better understanding of 

exposure and vulnerabilities. This is necessary because of the very rapid development of 

WUI fires.

3. Current concepts of defensible space do not account for hazards of burning primary 

structures, hazards presented by embers and the hazards outside of the home ignition zone. 

4. During and/or shortly after an incident, with limited damage assessment resources available, 

the collection of structure damage data will enable the identification of structure ignition 

vulnerabilities. 

This case study identified a total of 37 technical findings, including 12 associated with field data 

collection and codes and standards, and 25 associated with fire behavior and defensive actions. 

As a result, 13 recommendations aimed at improving the fire resilience of WUI communities

were developed. 

Field Data Collection and Codes and Standards 

1. Extensive data is required to create a detailed fire timeline and defensive action 

reconstruction, which is necessary to obtain a clear understanding of the incident fire 

behavior and structural response to the exposure conditions. This finding reaffirms what 

was found at the Witch/Guejito and Amarillo fires.

2. Clear identification of damage/destruction was a key mechanism for linking eyewitness 

accounts of defensive actions describing damage/destruction to a location on the ground. 

3. WUI post-fire rapid assessments that focus on recording all damage and destruction to 

the WUI area would aid in identifying construction vulnerabilities. 

4. Reliable technical data on WUI mitigation strategies and first responder tactics from postfire assessments must account for the timeline of burning features, the human actions 
4 

used to alter fire behavior (pre-fire and during-fire) and the exposure conditions 

experienced in the area from which the technical data is being collected. 

5. During-fire observations might be very limited spatially (due to smoke or line of sight) 

and have a temporal limitation that makes them of limited value unless integrated both in 

space and time. This finding reaffirms what was found at the Witch/Guejito and 

Amarillo fires.

6. Fuel treatment effectiveness standards are needed; otherwise, the effectiveness of fuel 

treatments cannot be reliably assessed. 

7. Collecting, organizing, analyzing, documenting and distributing post-fire WUI 

assessment data, particularly for a large incident, can be complex, involving the use of 

relational databases, remote sensing, Global Positioning Systems (GPS), document 

management and many other geospatial and information technology applications to fully 

integrate all available data. 

8. The reconstruction of the fire timeline and defensive actions could not have been 

accomplished without the following key activities:

a. Imaging of large numbers of burning structures in MSC. 

b. Documentation of practically all of the first responders’ recollections of events in 

space and time.

c. Imaging of MSC by Google Streetview, Bing Maps and the City of Colorado 

Springs prior to the fire. 

d. Imaging of MSC two days after the Waldo Canyon Fire affected the community.

e. Integrating all data in a Geographic Information Systems (GIS).

9. Documentation of first responder actions, in small groups, by the individuals conducting 

those actions in an electronic format, and allowing for incorporation of pertinent images, 

would increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the technical discussion (TD) data 

collection process.

10. Post-fire aerial imagery can provide indications of defensive actions, but not all defensive 

actions can be identified from aerial imagery, and first responder’s recording their 

activities in space and time is required.

11. Lack of judicious protocols for post-fire data collection can lead to loss of data and 

reduces the quality of scientific post-fire studies.

12. Post-fire assessors should not come to conclusions about fire behavior, tactics, or 

structure response based on field assessments or discussions with first responders alone. 

A full integration of all available data must first be conducted and then determinations 

made regarding the adequacy of the data before any conclusions are made. 

Fire Behavior and Defensive Actions

13. Over 95% of the destroyed or damaged structures were ignited within five and a half 

hours after the fire reached the community, resulting in a structure ignition rate of 79 

structures per hour or 1.3 structures/min, considering this entire time period. 
5 

14. One hour after the fire reached the MSC, there were 37 first responder apparatus in the 

community, and 2 h after the fire reached the community, there were 63 apparatus 

present. 

15. The wildland fire front had passed and conditions were clear in the vicinity of the water 

tower at Wilson Road 60 min after the front reached the area. i

16. Large numbers of burning structures shortly after the passage of the main wildland fire 

front caused a second evacuation and slowed response to the fire due to the belief that a 

second fire front might be moving through the area. 

17. There were 154 structures successfully defended to prevent structure ignition and 

defensive actions were documented on 245 parcels, with significantly more parcels likely 

defended. 

18. There were 94 structures ignited that were saved by first responders. 

19. First responders were effective in extinguishing ignited structures 75 % of the time. 

20. Out of the 445 total ignited structures, there were 55 to 119 (12 % to 27 %) identified as 

burning within 60 min of the passage of the main wildland fire front. 

21. First responders were effective in containing fully involved structures 79 % of the time.

22. Ninety-three percent of damaged structures were identified as defended.

23. The effects of structure spacing, with regard to burning of adjacent structures, are 

dependent on exposure and can vary considerably within a small spatiotemporal extent. 

24. The effective and successful response to the Peregrine blowup on Wednesday, June 27 

demonstrated the advantages of pre-fire mitigation and pre-positioning of resources for 

WUI fires of a small geographic extent. 

25. Fire observations have to be interpreted in the context of the overall fire timeline. A 

structure can be observed to be “not on fire” when in fact it had ignited, was suppressed, 

and latter re-ignited, or was ignited in an unobserved location. 

26. Features such as combustible decks, fences, railroad ties, secondary buildings, re-entrant 

corners, and readily ignitable roof coverings represent significant hazards to the structure 

and surrounding parcels. This finding reaffirms what was found at the Witch/Guejito and 

Amarillo fires.

27. There are currently no National Standard Operating Procedures for WUI firefighting 

response or resource deployment. SOPs for deploying resources in the WUI need to 

account for the extremely fast and safe response that might be required to stop fires in

communities with high density and low structure separation distances before the fire 

becomes embedded in the neighborhood. 

28. Fire can rapidly ignite multiple structures in high density, low structure separation 

distance communities even when first responders are at peak deployment of resources.

29. Rapid resource deployment strategies should be designed and rehearsed with mutual aid. 

 

i

This information was collected from video footage. Conditions could have been clear even before the first 

responder captured the video footage.
6 

30. Rapid and safe deployments of firefighting resources would require an increased 

understanding of exposure and structure vulnerabilities. 

31. Data to enhance rapid situational assessment is needed to enable rapid and effective 

deployment of resources. 

32. Methodologies are needed to further define and map high and low exposure WUI areas.

33. Mapping of hazards to identify key community vulnerabilities in the context of fuels, 

topography and local weather is necessary in order to design effective response strategies.

34. Mapping of hazards within and around a community, together with preplanning for rapid 

and targeted deployment within the community, can improve firefighter safety and reduce 

structural loses. 

35. Due to the limitations of the current state of knowledge, defensible space definitions do 

not consider defensibility from structure to structure fire spread or defensibility from 

dangerous topographic configurations. 

36. Structure spacing and density affected exposure between adjacent structures and made 

certain locations untenable for first responders, therefore, reducing their effectiveness and 

possibly their ability to respond quickly to stop early fire spread. 

37. Smoke inhalation was identified as a key health concern by first responders. 

The data collected and analyzed indicates that first responders were effective and extinguished 

94 homes that had caught on fire, while only seven homes were potentially identified as damaged 

without any known defensive actions. Thirty two homes were unsuccessfully extinguished, 

yielding an extinguishment success rate of 75 %. Additionally, 154 structures were defended 

specifically to prevent structure ignition. Sixty burning homes were successfully contained, and 

sixteen were not, yielding a containment effectiveness rate of 79 %.

Overall, the first responders, when they arrived at the scene, were effective in saving structures 

and together with relatively favorable ii fire and ember exposure conditions, were able to “box 

in” and control the fire. 

The extent of defensive actions executed directly on structures and parcels highlights the fact that 

the post-fire environment is the result of the complex interactions between local exposure, 

ignition potential and defensive actions. The extent of the identified defensive actions coupled 

with the almost ubiquitous lack of accounting for these actions in previous post-fire assessments 

calls into question almost all previous knowledge about the effectiveness of current hazard 

mitigation guidance and practices, particularly when defensive actions and local exposure 

conditions are not rigorously and extensively documented. 

The Waldo Canyon Fire posed a significant challenge to first responders on June 26. The fire 

moved rapidly through the community. In the first hour after the wildland fire reached MSC, 

 

ii Favorable in this context is only used in context of other locations such as Courtney Drive and the north end of 

Majestic Drive, where exposure was likely such that it was not possible for first responders to be on the street 

relatively early in the incident.
7 

there were between 55 and 119 primary structures identified as ignited by the passage of the 

wildland fire front. Three hours after the wildfire reached MSC, there were between 248 and 

286 primary structures identified as having been ignited. The existing tactics, while effective for 

wildland firefighting might have significant limitations for WUI fires with close structure 

spacing where very rapid deployment might be necessary to limit fire spread and structural 

losses, if possible at all, for situations found at the Waldo Canyon Fire. 

The data shows the apparatus response to MSC using current standard operating procedures 

(SOPs) as peaking at 20:30, almost three hours after the main fire front first reached the 

community and when there were between 248 to 286 primary structures ignited (i.e., 83 to 95 

structures per hour). A paradigm shift might be required to enable very rapid deployment of 

agile resources coupled with equipment with significant water to safely and effectively fight 

WUI fires. Additionally, there is a need for identification and possibly increased treatment 

extending beyond the Home Ignition Zone (HIZ) of these high density and/or low structure to 

structure separation distance locations found near or adjacent to wildlands. 

Mapping of hazards within and around a community, together with preplanning for rapid and 

targeted deployment within the community, can improve firefighter safety and reduce structural 

losses. The effective property protection and limited damage successes associated with the 

containment of the Peregrine area blowup on Wednesday, June 27 illustrate the potential benefits 

of rapid deployment of firefighting and hazard mitigation resources for fires of small geographic 

area. Larger fires, such as the Waldo Canyon Fire that affected MSC, require a better 

understanding of fire behavior and associated hazards to facilitate a safe and efficient during-fire 

situational response. 

Rapid resource deployment to areas with established defensible space adequate for the exposure 

conditions are also illustrated in the Peregrine area blowup. The Peregrine area blowup was 

significantly smaller compared to that of MSC. Nonetheless, the importance of rapid 

deployment of resources for relatively less intense/smaller fires, is also demonstrated in MSC on 

Vanreen Drive, Darien Way, Huffman Court and other locations throughout MSC where fire 

spread was quickly contained. 

Characterizing fire behavior, quantifying structure response, assessing exposure conditions and 

developing efficient and effective WUI mitigation strategies are processes that are in their 

infancy. It is thought that post-fire assessments alone, particularly given the current state of the 

art of the measurement science, will never be able to individually successfully perform the above 

characterizations, quantifications, and assessments. Integrated laboratory and field experiments, 

coupled with physics-based fire modeling and other new innovations are needed. 

The following are the primary recommendations made. The recommendations made here are 

aimed at creating an overall paradigm shift in responding to WUI fires: 

1. Develop, plan, train and practice SOPs, based on better understanding of exposure and 

structure vulnerabilities, to enable rapid fire department response to WUI fires. SOPs 
8 

need to account for responding, in the event of a specific WUI scenario, to both high and 

low exposure areas. 

2. A response time threshold for WUI fire situations needs to be developed based on 

increased understanding of exposure and structure vulnerabilities, the same way city fire 

departments have response thresholds for responding to building fires. 

3. Structure spatial arrangements in WUI areas where defensive actions are ineffective or 

unsafe need to be identified.

4. Response plans for high density WUI areas, with the objective of fire not reaching these 

areas, need to be designed. 

5. Defensible space definitions need to be updated to emphasize that the main desired result 

is the ability for first responders to defend locations and recognize hazards of primary 

structures and dangerous configurations of topography and fuels outside the home 

ignition zone (HIZ). 

6. Additional research is needed to fully characterize the relationships between the spatial 

arrangement of houses and defensive action 

7. Hazards at the WUI, factoring in fuels, topography, and local weather need to be 

quantified. Fuels need to include wildland fuels and structural/residential fuels such as 

wood roofs, fences and combustible decks. 

8. A better understanding of exposure and structure vulnerabilities needs to be developed, 

including definitions for high and low fire and ember exposure areas 

9. Wildland fuel treatment standards to quantify exposure reduction for different 

topographical and weather conditions need to be developed. 

10. Construction standards and test methods need to be updated to capture representative fire 

and ember exposures from fuel treatments. 

11. Due to complexities associated with timeline reconstruction, exposure characterization 

and defensive actions, rapid post fire need to identify/count destroyed homes, and focus 

on documenting damage and destruction to the WUI environment, using current 

technology and comprehensive methods for documentation. 

12. Protocols for collection of ground and aerial imagery for pre-fire, during-fire and postfire situations need to be developed. 

13. Consistent protocols for collection of damage information in a WUI environment need to 

be developed. 

The above activities would require integration of post-fire assessment data in the WUI and 

wildlands with lab and field experiments, coupled with validated computational fluid dynamics 

(CFD) fire models to gain a better understanding of exposure, structure vulnerabilities and fire 

behavior. 

In summary, the information generated from this case study can provide input, together with 

additional research, to improve WUI building and landscaping (construction) codes and 
9 

standards, and best practices. Extensive research is also needed to provide first responders 

with effective tools and SOPs, and continued advancements are also necessary in the field of 

data collection. Subsequent improvements to constructions and retrofitting techniques 

together with improvements in firefighting tactics should then reduce WUI fire structural 

losses and improve community resilience. 
10

1.0 Background 

Destruction of homes and businesses from Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) fires have been 

steadily escalating as have the fire suppression costs associated with them. 1 Since 2000, in the 

U.S., over 3000 homes on average per year are lost to WUI fire. 2 This is compared to about 900 

homes per year in the 1990’s and 400 homes per year in the 1970’s.3 In 2011, in Texas alone, 

over 2000 homes were destroyed from WUI fires. 4 The WUI fire problem affects both existing

and new communities. 5 In Colorado, from June 2012 to June 2013, three fires, the Waldo

Canyon, the High Park and the Black Forest destroyed 1103 homes and burned 119 811 acres.

6

In the U.S, the problem is most acute in the western and southern states; however, WUI fires 

recently have destroyed homes in the Mid-Atlantic States and the Pacific Northwest . 1

WUI fires present a unique challenge to the firefighting, science and engineering

communities. The scale of the events can be vast, spanning in many cases over 40 000 ha 

(100 000 acres). The moving fire perimeter can be tens of kilometers long with potentially 

thousands of structures at risk. The severity of the fire is dependent on vegetative (wildland 

and ornamental) and structural fuels, topography, and weather. 

Complicating the above challenges is the interdisciplinary nature of a comprehensive WUI 

fire study. Collecting, organizing, analyzing, documenting and distributing WUI assessment 

data, particularly for a large incident, involves the use of relational databases, Geographic 

Information Systems (GIS), remote sensing, Global Positioning Systems (GPS), document 

management and many other geospatial science and technology applications. Knowledge 

and skills required to utilize the above technologies are not acquired through standard 

education and training in the firefighting, fire protection engineering or forestry fields. 

Conversely, those familiar with the above technologies are not typically trained in fire

science. 

Further complications arise from the fact that there are many WUI definitions based on 

different attributes, including vegetative fuels and population density. The Federal Registrar 

states that “the urban wildland interface community exists where humans and their

development meet or intermix with wildland fuel.” 7

 Further WUI sub-characterizations 

include interface, intermix and occluded type communities. Attempts have been made to 

characterize the hazard as well as the risk. 2, 8, 9 Results have been mixed due primarily to 

the diverse nature of the objectives driving the definitions.

WUI community construction codes and standards, test methods and best practices are in

their technical infancy. While some codes address radiant heat fluxes, the science necessary 

to harden structures against ember assaults is very limited 10, 11, in part because quantifiable 

ember exposure data from wildfires and WUI fires is almost non-existent. Guidance on the 

effective deployment of firefighting resources in the WUI, as well as the effectiveness of 

fuel treatments, is also limited. Additionally, there is limited information on the 
11

effectiveness of defensive actions during WUI fires. Finally, the effectiveness of WUI 

mitigation strategies in varying exposure conditions is not well understood. 

2.0 Introduction 

Smoke from the Waldo Canyon Fire was first observed on Friday, June 22, 2012. The fire first 

reached the Cedar Heights Community in Colorado Springs, Colorado at approximately 22:00 on 

Saturday, June 23. Fire progression for the Waldo Canyon Fire is shown in Map Figure 1. The 

fire crossed the topographic divide above MSC on Tuesday, June 26, before 17:00, resulting in 

destruction shown in Map Figure 2. The fire progressed to the east up to and through MSC and 

to the north towards the Peregrine Community and the US Air Force Academy. The fire 

impinged on Peregrine and the Air Force Academy on Wednesday, June 27. 

The Waldo Canyon Fire affected three Colorado Springs communities shown in Map Figure

1. All of the destroyed structures were in Mountain Shadows Community (MSC). The main 

focus of this report is on MSC. Short narratives describing the overall fire event for Cedar 

Heights and Peregrine, the other two communities affected are also provided. 

In Section 3, an overview of WUI Post Fire assessments is presented and is followed by the 

report objectives. The weather overview just prior and during the time the Waldo Canyon 

Fire reached MSC is described in Section 5. Sections 7 to 8 describe the data collection and 

analysis methodologies together with material on data integration and data categories. 

Assessments of data quantity, quality and uncertainty are presented and the resultant rules 

and assumptions used for this study are also detailed in Section 8. Section 9 of the report 

focuses on the MSC case study and starts with a general description of the community. 

Damage and destruction are then presented together with a fire behavior timeline. Details 

associated with a wind shift that occurred while the community was burning are also 

presented. Sections 10-13 of the report focus on timeline of burning structures. Analysis is 

presented starting with parcels defended and the tools used and then data on residential 

structures is presented. The analysis includes data on undamaged structures, structures 

damaged and successfully defended, and structures damaged and undefended. The 

effectiveness of defensive actions is then evaluated by examining sample populations of 

successfully or unsuccessfully extinguished and successfully or unsuccessfully contained 

structures. Defensive action tools used are also presented. Initial findings regarding 

defensible space concepts and locations with high densities of low separation distance 

structures are detailed. The first responders’ deployment timeline is presented and ignition 

vulnerabilities are identified. Finally, in Sections 14-16, the technical findings are 

summarized, and the report concludes with a series of recommendations. Unless otherwise 

specified all tables and figures in this report are generated by NIST.

Appendix A contains data collection forms and Appendix B contains weather data. 

Appendices C and D list timelines for Cedar Heights and Peregrine respectively, while 

Appendix E contains sources of additional imagery used in this report. Appendix F lists the 
12

apparatus that was present in Mountain Shadows and when they arrived at the community. 

Lessons learned on WUI data collection are listed in Appendix G and an example of a 

technical discussion cross correlation can be found in Appendix H. Appendices J and K list 

the firefighting tools used to both prevent structure ignition and to extinguish damaged 

homes. Appendix L lists missed defensive actions in post fire assessments. Appendix M 

contains a list of damaged structures documented in this report. Lastly Appendix lists 

additional technical issues identified during technical discussions. 

3.0 WUI Post-Fire Assessments

Post-fire WUI assessments are an important identified requirement in a recent National Fire 

Research Foundation (NFRF) funded study on fire prevention at the WUI. 1

 WUI post fire 

assessments increase knowledge of WUI environments and thereby provide better protection 

of life and property in these environments. Assessments of post-fire WUI environments can

be broken into the following four categories:

• WUI 0/1: These assessments occur at WUI incidents where structures are damaged 

or destroyed. The goal of these assessments is to respond to the incident both during, 

to facilitate allocation of resources, and after, to allow for safe re-entry into the 

community. Many protocols are used to perform WUI 0/1 assessments. A 

recommended scalable protocol is presented in Appendix A. An example of a WUI 

0/1 type assessment would be the Colorado Springs Fire Department (CSFD) 

assessment of damage and destruction from the Waldo Canyon Fire. 

• WUI 2: These types of assessments attempt to characterize fire behavior in the WUI,

qualify/quantify exposure and assess structure response given the early nature of the 

study of the WUI and the state of the art of the measurement science. These 

assessments are data and labor intensive and suffer from a lack of available 

information to characterize the entire Fire Disturbance Continuum. 12 An example of 

a WUI 2 type assessment is described by Maranghides et al. 10

• Black Swan Assessment: This type of assessment is introduced in this report and

follows the belief put forth by Popper 12

 which held that science cannot be founded 

on universal statements such as “all swans are white” (or “no additional research [to 

address the problem of wildland fire in the interface] was needed” ). 5 Rather a 

falsification solution is proposed by Popper where a single universal observation 

such as “all swans are white” can be disproven by the identification of one swan that 

is not white as it would be impossible to observe every swan in nature. iii This type 

of assessment holds value in the WUI given the impossible task of proving the 

effectiveness of current mitigation strategies. WUI post-fire assessments that take a 

 

iii Falsification as applied to WUI mitigation advice needs to be assessed in the context of exposure for an 

understanding of the conditions under which the respective mitigation advice failed and to ultimately understand the 

relative probability of such exposure conditions to exist in other WUI environments.
13

critical approach to potential shortcomings and can lead research and development in 

relevant directions applicable to the identified problem hold value for improving 

knowledge of the WUI. The examination of the Waldo Canyon Fire by the Colorado 

Springs Independent 14 is an example of a Black Swan Assessment. 

• Rapid Assessments: These types of assessments typically require limited resources 

and are a result of larger scale (in terms of life and property) WUI disasters, which 

receive public attention or locally large disasters. These assessments attempt to go 

beyond identification of damage and destruction conducted in a WUI 0/1 assessment. 

Identification of selected information showing effectiveness of WUI mitigation 

strategies is conducted. Due to limited resources only a subset of data, typically not 

including during-fire and post-fire imagery, fire witness observations and signs of 

defensive actionsiv, is used. The limited resources also do not allow for gathering a 

statistically representative sample for assessment. An example of a rapid assessment 

is the Insurance Institute for Business and Home Safety (IBHS) report on the Waldo 

Canyon Fire. 15

The assessment presented herein represents a Black Swan/WUI 2 Assessment, and will be 

referred to as a WUI 2 assessment in this report. This assessment identified previously 

unidentified issues in the WUI, as detailed below. Consequently, this Black Swan 

Assessment report was developed as a building block to a future WUI 2 assessment and to 

provide identification of well-defined issues associated with WUI mitigation and suppression 

tactics. 

All of the above WUI assessments have their advantages and disadvantages. WUI 0/1 

assessments are necessary to safely contain the incident, inform the public of the results of 

the incident and facilitate safe re-entry. A paradigm shift, however, is required in these 

assessments, particularly after the incident is contained, to fully exploit the potential for WUI 

2 assessments and improve understanding of WUI fires. WUI 2 assessments v are the only 

assessments from which an understanding of fire behavior, structure response and exposure 

might be determined. These WUI 2 assessments are time and cost intensive, and typically 

suffer from a lack of available information. 

Black Swan Assessments can help to lead WUI 2 type assessments in appropriate directions 

and are a natural consequence of a WUI 2 assessment. They are unlikely to provide 

solutions, except for obvious issues, without further research. It is important, as WUI hazard 

mitigation strategies are developed, to provide incentives for the public to implement the 

current recommended practices and rapid assessments are quick and efficient methods of 

 

iv The identification of signs of defensive action is new and it is understandable that historic assessments would miss 

these signs. Some signs are presented in this report.

v There are many protocols and measurement techniques that might be employed and a WUI 2 assessment does not 

imply in this case any specific protocol. WUI 2 assessments should make attempts to employ the scientific method 

to assessment of the WUI but must be careful of the “best available science” approach due to incomplete 

information leading to incorrect conclusions.
14

taking selected information to highlight potential successes. Rapid Assessments, however, 

have no possibility of moving WUI fire science forward except by coincidence or 

happenstance, and run the risk of perpetuating WUI mitigation strategies that are not 

effective for all conditions. 

It is important to note that in this context, WUI 2 assessments do not imply any particular 

protocol implemented in previous NIST/USFS WUI Assessments. 2, 10 The measurement 

art/science is too young to propose a one size meets all assessment process. Rather it means 

the application of a process where information is collected relevant to the pertinent factors 

driving the Fire Disturbance Continuum. 12

The idealized WUI 2 Post-Fire Assessment process is presented in Figure 1. At its core, the 

process is simple and involves assessment of the available data sets for the respective 

incident(s) to determine if enough information is available to draw conclusions based on 

information required to characterize well founded case studies. Conclusions are critically 

examined to ensure the first conclusions(s), and possibly desired conclusion(s), identified are 

well founded or if further analysis or information is required. An evaluation of 

improvements to the measurement science is conducted and recommendations for more 

efficient and effective future assessments are provided. Finally, the entire set of data is 

documented and made available for distribution. 

A key component of the WUI Post-Fire Assessment methodology portrayed in Figure 1 is the 

level of data 

required in order 

to come to 

justifiable 

conclusions. 

Post-fire 

assessments that 

assume no 

defensive 

actions, 10, 16

provide no details 

on how exposure 

is calculated 17

and make no attempt to characterize burn times of features present, at best, questionable 

conclusions. 18 

The specifics of the methodology shown in Figure 1 can be implemented differently and 

improved as the measurement science progresses. As discussed and demonstrated in this 

report, post-fire assessments, both historic and future, should be viewed with caution. Future 

post-fire assessments should be guided by the collection of data sets listed in Figure 1 and 

Figure 1 The NIST/USFS WUI Assessment Methodology with populations that 

will attempt to be assessed in future reports on the Waldo Canyon Fire.
15

detailed below. Fires where these data sets do not exist should not be attempted to be 

assessed by a WUI 2 assessment. 

There can be a significant amount of time between the initiation of a WUI 2 assessment and 

the distribution of data. The amount of data being collected for quantification of fire 

environments, from prescribed burns 19, 20 to WUI post-fire assessments, is vast and involves 

numerous disciplines. Pre-fire collection, analysis, documenting and archiving this data to 

provide value to the discipline takes time. Without full documentation of post-fire WUI 

assessments the efforts will not conform to the scientific process as the repeatability of the 

efforts would not be possible because no one could assess the data and determine if the same 

conclusions might be drawn. 

It is important to note that in many instances the WUI 2 process will determine that no 

conclusions can be drawn regarding structure response, exposure or improvements to WUI 

mitigation strategies or WUI firefighting tactics. Implementation of the process shown in 

Figure 1 provides identification of areas that do not contain adequate information from which 

conclusions might be drawn. The identification of well-founded case studies in post-fire 

WUI environments will also provide information for experiments and model development. 

Regardless of the WUI assessment method utilized, the assessment of the WUI is in its infancy. 

Implementation of the WUI 2 Assessment Methodology, as generally shown in Figure 1, 

consequently allows for the building of the measurement science to help provide future direction 

to assess structure response, exposure, or improvements to WUI mitigation strategies or 

firefighting tactics. 

It is thought that post-fire assessments alone, particularly given the current state of the art of the 

measurement sciences, will never be able to individually successfully quantify exposure and 

structure response. Integrated laboratory and field experiments coupled with physics based fire 

modeling and other new innovations are needed. That is not to say existing WUI mitigation 

strategies are not effective, only to hypothesize that WUI mitigation advice might not be 

effective enough in certain situations to prevent catastrophic WUI disasters. It is possible those 

situations might be identified as hazards and mitigated, given appropriate scientific 

advancement. The adoption of existing WUI mitigation strategies can lead to decreased

destruction in the WUI. 

4.0 Report Objectives

This report focuses on achieving the following four primary objectives:

1. Assessing the quality, quantity and uncertainty associated with data collected for this 

study to guide further analysis and identify improvements to WUI pre-fire, during-fire 

and post-fire data collection efforts.

2. Reconstructing the fire timeline in MSC while identifying locations with limited data.
16

3. Documenting the spatiotemporal extent and type of defensive actions that were 

undertaken during the first ten hours after the Waldo Canyon Fire reached MSC, 

during which 99 % of the destruction occurred. 

4. Documenting any discernible issues related to WUI mitigation strategies and first 

responder tactics and safety identified through objectives one through three above. 

5.0 Weather Overview 

Recorded wind data was collected from the United States Air Force Academy sensors and the 

Colorado Springs Airport. The US Air Force Academy Mesonet (HWAS) and the Colorado 

Springs Airport (KCOS) recorded maximum gust values between 17:00 and 18:00 on June 26, as

listed in Table 1. The winds were predominately from the west then the northwest, then moved 

briefly to the northeast and eventually around midnight moved back to the north. The US Air 

Force Academy is to the north of MSC and Colorado Springs Airport to the south and east. 

Distances from the water tower at Wilson Road and Alabaster Way (see Map Figure 2) are listed 

in Table 1.

Appendix B contains hourly weather data from the US Air Force Academy Airfield weather 

station (KAFF) for Tuesday, June 26 and Wednesday, June 27 and from the Colorado Springs 

Airport for Tuesday, June 26. Table 1 lists recorded wind gusts at seven locations in the Air 

Force Academy and gusts at Colorado Springs Airport. The distances of the different weather 

stations from the Wilson Road water tower are also listed. On Tuesday, June 26, the winds were 

sustained above 32 km/h (20 mph) nominally from 14:00 to 21:00. 

Table 1 US Air Force Academy Mesonet (HWAS) and Colorado Springs Airport (KCOS) wind gusts 

between 17:00 and 18:00, June 26, 2012

Location Maximum 

Gusts (km/h)

Distance from Water Tower at Wilson Road 

and Alabaster Way - km (miles)

USAFA Rampart 94 7.9 (4.9)

USAFA Cadet Area 94 9.5 (5.9)

USAFA North Gate 78 10.9 (6.8)

USAFA South Gate 72 7.4 (4.6)

USAFA Airfield 78 7.7 (4.8)

USAFA Community Center 87 7.2 (4.5)

USAFA Stadium 65 9.0 (5.6)

Colorado Springs Airport 46 16.7 (10.4)

The weather conditions that resulted in the fire plume lean or collapse are beyond the scope of 

this report and are discussed in more detail in Johnson et al. 21 In general, the fire plume 

leaned/collapsed between 17:20 and 17:25. The fire front and plume contacted MSC in the 

vicinity of the water tower near Wilson Road. The extent of the plume, once it leaned over, is 

not precisely known, as the smoke and embers did not cease abruptly at a specific location. 

Technical discussions with firefighters indicate that initially, visibility was restricted to less than 

10 m (30 ft) near the Wilson Road water tower. Visibility was less restricted as one got closer to 

Chuckwagon Road. With time, as the plume continued to lean/collapse and the fire front moved 
17

to the east, visibility was compromised to the south of Chuckwagon Road, along Flying W

Ranch Road, all the way to Chipeta Elementary School and eventually to North 30th Street and 

Garden of the Gods Road. Smoke at ground level reached all the way to Centennial Boulevard. 

Visibility did not impair evacuation and vehicle movement on Centennial Boulevard. 

A wind shift was observed from west to north at around 20:00 (also identified during a technical 

discussion) on Majestic Drive, which coincides with the weather data from the US Air Force 

Academy showing a wind direction shift between 19:00 and 21:00. A wind shift (also reported 

in the technical discussion), from the north to northeast on Darien Way between 22:00 and 

midnight together with an abatement of the wind. This is consistent with the wind 

measurements. 

The wind shift identified from the technical discussion is also consistent with the weather data 

taken at the Colorado Springs Airport, which show a gradual veering of the wind from the west 

to the north and the wind abating, without any gusts being recorded at 20:00. This wind shift is 

also evident in numerous images of burning buildings, originally seen going to the east, changing

direction and moving to the south (See Section 9.4 Fire Behavior Timeline and Observations 

[Wind Change]). 

On Wednesday, June 27, at approximately 15:30, a westerly wind, possibly precipitated by a 

thunderstorm to the west, resulted in a down slope wind that, together with a spot fire, caused a 

fire front to reach the Peregrine area around Blodgett Drive. Sustained winds reached 66 km/h 

(41 mph), and gusts were recorded as high as 95 km/h (59 mph) at the US Air Force Academy. 

A short narrative of the impact of this weather event on the Peregrine Community can be found 

below. The June 27 wind event did not result in significant fire behavior in MSC or Cedar 

Heights. 

6.0 Communities Affected 

The section provides a brief overview of communities affected by the Waldo Fire. Maps 

illustrating the general progression of the Waldo fire can be found in Appendix B. Destruction 

to primary structures was limited to MSC. The sections below provide brief descriptions of the 

fire in the Cedar Heights Community and the Peregrine Community. Descriptions of MSC are 

provided in Section 10.0. 

6.1 Cedar Heights Summary

The primary fire activity reached the community from the west on the night of Saturday, June 23 

into the morning of Sunday, June 24. Exposure of structures to fire and embers was limited to 

low ember exposure on only one structure. The home at 3725 Outback Vista and its 

surroundings were actively defended during the ember assault. There were no reported ignitions 

on the structure or on that parcel and no structures were destroyed or identified as damaged in 

this community. 
18

The Cedar Heights Community did receive exposure from the Waldo Canyon Fire but the fire at 

that time, in that area, was moving towards the northeast. The community was defended by a 

combination of hand crews, a double wide bulldozer, 1300 m (4200 ft) long fire break and fire 

retardant air drops. The existing fuel break was widened with bulldozers from 5m (16 ft) to 10 

m (33 ft). The fire did jump the 10 m (33 ft) wide fuel break and spread on the other side (slopover). The slop-over occurred between Saturday 22:00 and Sunday at 03:00. 

The suppression of the slop-over was in the fuel treated area and was controlled and suppressed 

by hand crews. Suppression activities limited the slop-over to an area of less than 4000 m2 (1 

acre). Additionally, there were a number of small spot fires from ember showers that jumped the 

fuel break and were quickly suppressed. Fire and embers exposures did not result in the 

evacuation of any of the firefighting resources. Appendix C contains an abbreviated timeline 

reconstruction for Cedar Heights. The effectiveness of this fuel treatment was not studied in this 

report. 

Between 22:00, June 23 and 03:00, June 24, wind speed ranged from 5km/h to 14 km/h at the US 

Air Force Academy. Temperature ranged from 15 °C to 21 °C. Relative humidity ranged from 

21 % to 31 %. The weather conditions were measured at approximately 11.2 km from Outback 

Vista Point. While local conditions can significantly affect local weather, the US Air Force data 

is provided as a common weather source for general comparison with the event the next day, 

when the fire reached MSC.

6.2 Peregrine to Wolfe Ranch Summary

The Waldo Canyon Fire reached the area between Wolf Ranch Road and the Peregrine

Community starting on Tuesday, June 26 in the evening. The neighborhoods between Wolf 

Ranch and Peregrine did not experience any structural ignitions. Bulldozer lines were created in 

several locations to create fuel discontinuities and at least two back burns were conducted to 

prevent or limit fire and ember exposure to structures in this area. One back burn occurred 

between Heartland Way and Ruststone Court in the evening of June 26, and one occurred 

between Blodgett Drive and Angelstone Point on June 27. Additional defensive actions, such as 

cutting down trees and fire suppression with water, in certain areas between Wolf Ranch Road 

and Peregrine were evident in the post-fire aerial imagery collected on June 28, 2012. 

Peregrine received direct fire exposure on Wednesday, June 27 in the early morning on the north 

and northwest sides. Significant structure preparations had taken place in the previous 12 hours. 

No structures were lost, damaged or ignited from this fire activity. Ground and aerial fire 

suppression resources provided the necessary structure protection to control the approaching fire 

front. The pre-fire mitigation included moving propane cylinders to the curb and removal of 

combustibles from the structure vicinity. It was estimated that between 20 and 30 apparatus 

were available to provide the preparations prior to the local fire blowup on Wednesday 

afternoon. 
19

A significant fire and ember exposure event occurred on Wednesday afternoon, June 27 as a 

result of wildland vegetation burning on the hill above and to the west of Blodgett Drive in the 

early morning hours of Wednesday. There was fire activity over an undetermined wildland area 

to the west of the Peregrine community. The area was monitored throughout the night and a 

request was placed for helicopter air drops at dawn. The helicopter air drops contained the fire 

but the fire was not completely extinguished. 

At approximately 15:30 a developing thunder cell to the west started generating a significant 

down slope wind. The subsequent flare-up resulted in a rapidly descending fire front 

approximately 120 m (400 ft) wide. Flame lengths reached over 30 m (100 ft) in height. While 

the total front width was significantly smaller than what was experienced in MSC the previous 

day, the severe winds were possibly as strong, if not strongervi. When the front arrived, first 

responders evacuated by going down Blodgett Drive then turning around and immediately reengaging. The time for the process could not be determined from data available in this report as 

no Automatic Vehicle Locator (AVL ) data was obtained for this event. 

No structures were destroyed in Peregrine and structural damage was limited to deck and soffit 

ignitions on two primary structuresvii. The pre-fire mitigation, the relative small width of the fire 

front, the limited number of structures ignited and the rapid response through the prepositioning 

of resources, illustrate the effectiveness of this combined approach to a fire of small to moderate 

size. Appendix D contains an abbreviated reconstruction.

7.0 Methodology

The data collection for this post-fire assessment was initiated in early July 2012, two weeks after 

the fire reached MSC and the fire was considered contained. A team was deployed to Colorado 

Springs and collected preliminary information on the fire. The focus of this effort was on testing 

of the electronic data collection systems. At the time, it was not anticipated that the effort would 

lead to a full study. 

As time progressed it became apparent that the Waldo Canyon Fire, provided a unique set of prefire, during-fire and post-fire data that may be useful for understanding WUI fires and ultimately,

help reduce the impact of these disasters. Consequently, a full study was initiated. Due to 

limited personnel availability, the majority of the field data collection could not begin until early 

2013. 

The focus of the Waldo Canyon Fire data collection effort was on recoding information obtained 

during discussions with first responders. A smaller, though still significant, effort was also 

initiated to gather other spatial, tabular and remote sensing data, representing pre-fire, duringfire, or post-fire conditions in and around MSC, to the extent practical. The data gathered for 

 

vi This is based on weather data collected at the US Air Force Academy, see section 6. It is important to note that 

local weather in MSC might have been significantly more intense then what was seen at nearby weather stations.

vii No extensive structural damage has been identified. Since Peregrine was not the main focus of this report, it is 

possible that additional structural damage occurred.
20

assessment of the Waldo Canyon Fire and used in this report can be classified into the following 

categories:

• Field Data: This type of data represents information gathered in the field before, during 

or after the Waldo Canyon Fire. Field data used in this report are shown in Table 2. 

• Remote Sensing Data: This type of data represents information acquired remotely from 

a sensor before, during or after the Waldo Canyon Fire. Remote sensing data used in this 

report are shown in Table 3

• Other Spatial Data: This type of data represents information stored as GIS datasets, 

either raster or vector data. Other spatial data used in this report are shown in Table 4.

The data listed in Table 2 through Table 4 were integrated in an Environmental Systems 

Research Institute (ESRI) File Geodatabase for the assessment of the Waldo Canyon Fire. 

Additional images used for the fire timeline reconstruction are shown in Appendix E. 

 Table 2 Field Data used for this report.

Data Type Source

Technical Discussions (TD) First Responders

Location of CSFD Apparatus Automatic Vehicle Location (AVL) system – CSFD

Radio Logs Radio Logs – CSFD

Duty Reports and Damage Reports CSFD

Post-Fire Damage Assessments CSFD

911 Calls CS Police Department (CSPD) Dispatch

Pre-Fire Defensible Space Ratings CSFD

Table 3 Remote Sensing data used for this report.

Data Type Source Date Characteristics

Oblique Imagery Bing Maps ≈2007 Unknown

Multispectral Color Imagery City of Colorado Summer 

2011

3-Band; 0.31 m spatial 

resolution

Multispectral Color Imagery City of Colorado Winter 

2012

3-Band; 0.31 m spatial 

resolution

Light Detection and Ranging 

(LiDAR)

City of Colorado Springs Summer 

2011

~1m post-spacing; 

minimal information 

Post-Fire Color-Infrared Imagery The Sanborn Map Co, 

Inc.

6/28/2012, 

7/13/2012

4-Band; 0.1 m spatial 

resolution

Pre-Fire Multispectral Imagery Google Earth Fall 2011 Unknown

Streetview Imagery Google Earth Streetview Sumer 

2011

Unknown

Pre-Fire, During-Fire and Post-Fire 

Imagery

Fire Witnesses (First 

Responders, Public 

Citizens, etc...). 

2/26/2012 Various videos and 

images representing 

conditions before, 

during and after the fire.

Post-Fire Oblique Imagery USGS HDDS Colorado 

Civil Air Patrol

Summer, 

2012

Oblique imagery of 

selected areas of MSC

Post-Fire Streetside Microsoft Bing Maps 2014 After fire street level 

imagery.
21

Table 4 Other spatial data used for this report.

Data Type Source

Parcels (Polygon) City of Colorado Springs

Address Center Points CSFD

Road Centerlines CSFD

Waldo Canyon Fire Progression Rocky Mountain Geographic Science Center 

A major effort of the Waldo Canyon Fire data collection was the manual recording of 

information obtained from technical discussions (TD) with over 200 fire witnesses, largely first 

responders. The TD process took approximately eight months and 4500 person-hours to 

complete. In total, the process resulted in the tracking of 101 firefighting apparatus and 

command vehicles in MSC from 16:00 Tuesday, June 26, to 03:00 Wednesday, June 27. 

Appendix F lists the apparatus that were present, as well as when they engaged and when they 

disengaged from MSC. 

TDs were the only data that identified shift changes. In many cases, TDs took place with more 

than one person on an apparatus. This effort was required to obtain a simple estimate of time to 

deployment, as discussed below, and to collect data to track 124 apparatus in order to identify 

that 101 were in MSC during the time of interest. Ultimately, all individuals on every apparatus 

were identified. The inability to quickly identify all apparatus and personnel at the fire was due 

to the complexity of the incident. Also, very little documentation existed on the staffing of the 

apparatuses. This was exasperated by selectiveviii personnel shift changes. 

TDs, therefore, started with the Incident Commander and proceeded down the incident command 

chain to the apparatus level. The procedures conducted in the TD effort were as follows:

1. Met with the first responder (s) of interest, if there was a representative group (e.g. 

Brush Truck or Fire Engine) then discussed the incident with the first responder of 

interest.

2. Provided an open format for the first responders to describe what they saw at the 

incident in a chronological order, to the extent possible, with few questions actually 

asked.

3. Recorded the information spoken by the first responder using written notes with 

associated locations, if not representing an addressable structure, marked on a hard-copy 

map. 

4. Two data recorders were often utilized. The first data recorder captured the overall 

narrative and the second recorder only documented defensive actions and observations. 

5. Utilized geospatial technologies such as AVL, Bing Maps Birds Eye View, Google 

Street View and other geospatial technologies during TDs. 

Key skills required for this effort were the ability to record written notes quickly and legibly, 

along with basic use of geospatial technologies (Web Map Services, Google Earth, Google 

Streetview, Bing Maps) to orient first responders . It should also be noted that the use of AVL, 

 

viii Some apparatus had complete shift changes, some partial and some did not change crews at all.
22

Bing Maps Birds Eye View, Google Street View and other geospatial technologies did not occur 

until about one-third of the way through the TD process when it became apparent this was 

necessary.

Development of the fire timeline required the use of images and videos taken during the fire by 

witnesses and was not possible from the TDs alone. This was also shown in the 2011 Texas 

Tanglewood Fire Assessment 22. Burning times of vegetation, residential and wildland, proved 

to be the most problematic features to develop a timeline. This report focuses on the ignition 

timeline for primary structures and the associated timeline of defensive actions. Burning times 

of combustibles, detached and attached, were also tracked when data was available. 

As discussed in section 8.3.2.3 below, even with the use of AVL data, the TDs did not result in 

precise time estimates of burning features to allow adequate reconstruction of the fire timeline. 

Images taken during the fire were required to identify burning primary structures. Defensive 

actions did help in many cases and the defensive action discussions were the only way to 

associate defensive actions with specific properties or primary structures as few, if any, images 

portrayed the full extent of defensive actions taken. Lessons learned and improvements to the 

data collection methodology can be found in Appendix G. 

Nonetheless, geolocating defensive actions often still required the use of images. It has not been 

uncommon in NIST/USFS post-fire assessments for first responders to be slightly off in the 

spatial location of actions. Consequently, pre-fire, during-fire and post-fire ground and aerial 

imagery were essential for proper location of many defensive actions both in space and time. 

Integration of certain data, when images and videos were lacking, did allow for location of 

certain first responder actions in space and time in a few selected locations, with some 

uncertainty. An example of this integration is shown in Appendix H. The process shown in 

Appendix H requires the witness to accurately remember the chronology of events, which might 

not always occur. Cross-correlation was consequently a time consuming and, in many instances, 

ineffective means to assign time stamps to actions and observations. 

Assigning during-fire images to a location in space also required the use of Google Streetview

and a GIS. During-fire images were geolocated by comparing with pre-fire images shown in 

Google StreetView, as portrayed in Figure 2. Bing Maps Bird’s Eye imagery was also useful in 

initial identification of locations of burning features with an example shown in Figure 3.

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used 

with permission, overlays from 

NIST
23

Additionally, orthorectified pre-fire and post-fire imagery covering MSC was instrumental in 

geolocating during fire images. Finally, it should be noted that in one case the respective image 

was of a backyard and the 

location could not be 

identified in a GIS. This 

case required a ground 

assessment, which could 

later be verified in the GIS, 

for proper location. 

Nonetheless, assigning 

locations of during fire 

images was generally very 

successful, even with images 

taken in the dark, if the 

features were burning. 

Though geolocation was a 

time consuming process, 

assigning during-fire 

imagery to a location in time 

was also challenging. Time 

stamps on imaging devices 

are sometimes not correct, have changes as a result of changes in time (e.g. daylight savings 

time) or otherwise might be in error. The protocol identified in the 2011 Tanglewood Study 22

was recommended to examine the time of images during the discussions to determine if, how, 

and why the images did not contain the correct time. This protocol was not followed during 

most TDs at this incident as in most cases the images were not collected during the TDs. In this 

study first responders were instructed to send their images and videos to the CSFD videographer. 

This did not happen in all cases. ix 

 

ix It should be noted that this is no reflection on cooperation of any first responders. First responders had conflicting 

information regarding during-fire images and it is not their job to record images. This emphasizes the need for data 

collectors to obtain the images using the established protocol.

Figure 2 Example of locating during-fire images in space using Google 

Streetview.

Photo Goo 

NIST

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used 

with permission, overlays from 

NIST

Photo Google Streetview, 

overlays from NIST
24

Figure 3 Using Bing Maps to geolocate burning features. The above image was compared to Bing Maps to 

help geolocated feature of interest.

In addition to ground images, post-fire imagery was also used to identify defensive actions and 

damage. The post-fire imagery also provided information on damage and was a key source for 

identification of damage and destruction to vegetation at this incident. The full integration of 

remote sensing with field data is not included in this report. 

This collection of TDs and during-fire images were unprecedented efforts for a WUI fire 

investigation. Coupled with integration in a GIS, a comprehensive examination of a WUI fire is 

facilitated, initial results of which are described in this report. Also, many items identified in the 

2011 Tanglewood Fire 22 to improve the collection of the defensive action information were 

implemented here for the Waldo Canyon Fire. Additional improvements have been identified for 

future WUI data collection efforts and are described in Appendix G. 

It was determined that documenting of first responder actions privately by the individuals 

conducting those actions in an electronic format, and allowing for incorporation of pertinent 

images, would increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the technical discussion (TD) data 

collection processes.

8.0 Data

8.1 Data Integration

There is a critical and necessary synergy among TDs, radio logs, during-fire images, GPS track 

logs, pre-fire and post-fire aerial imagery, and other pertinent data sets. It is only by integrating 

these different data sets that a precise and accurate reconstruction of the event might be 

developed. The integration of data also allows for assessment of the data quality as well. Each 

data set on its own can provide limited and potentially very misleading information. 

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with

permission, overlays from NIST
25

This is the first effort of its kind that uses many data streamsx to attempt to recreate the fire 

timeline and defensive actions for a large incident. It is expected that continued development of 

measurement science will improve this endeavor. Many skills are required for a WUI 2 PostFire Assessment. Recording of information obtained during TDs requires exceptional note 

taking skills and use of simple Geospatial Technologies, such as Google Streetview. 

Interpretation of integrated data requires skilled personnel with knowledge in fire sciences, fire 

protection engineering, landscape scale analysis, statistics, and other scientific and engineering 

disciplines. 

In this project, data produced and gathered from TDs were initially integrated separately from 

the geospatial data gathering effort (i.e., post-fire imagery, all acquired during-fire images and 

landscape scale data). The partial integration was performed in an attempt to assess the WUI 2 

methodology shown in Figure 1 and to determine if information could be derived using only 

partial data, as is common in a Rapid Post-Fire WUI Assessment. The combined data was then 

provided to the project GIS Analyst for review. 

The partial integration in a spreadsheet was demonstrably less efficient compared to using a GIS 

coupled with relational database technology for data entry, data correction and data analysis. 

Additionally, integration of all data in a number of locations changed the interpretation of fire 

behavior and defensive action locations. Consequently, it was concluded that a GIS was the 

appropriate tool, given current technology, to use for integration of large spatial data sets such as 

those obtained and created for the Waldo Canyon Fire as opposed to a spreadsheet. 

8.2 Data Categories

Regardless of how the data is integrated, it was required to develop categories for the various 

data subsets. This allowed for normalization of the data and provided a consistent integration of 

information. This section describes the data categories used. 

The extent of damage to structures varied extensively and ranged from structures requiring 

complete rebuilds to minor cosmetic fixes. Additionally, it is possible that some structures 

identified as damaged in this report required rebuild. This report does not include a 

comprehensive list of damage to properties because no comprehensive list exists. Interior 

damage, specifically smoke damage, has not been systematically captured here. 

The complete list of damaged structures contained in this report was compiled through TDs with 

first responders, post-fire damage assessments and aerial images. Corroboration was achieved 

though discussions with homeowners when possible. This task was undertaken by the Colorado 

Springs Office of the Fire Marshal. This information proved valuable; however, the lack of 

photographic documentation was an issue with these secondary assessments. Photographic 

documentation during initial local damage assessments was a critical step to capturing extent, 

type and location of damage in a WUI fire. 

 

x Data streams are outlined in Section 8.3.1
26

Field observations in Table 5 were binned in the following two categories: structures and 

attached combustibles, and parcel and detached combustibles. Defensive actions were binned by 

action intent and tool used, as shown in Table 6. The data collected was binned in the categories 

listed in Table 5 and Table 6. 

Table 5 Types of burning feature observations.

Observation Type of Observation

Structure and 

attached 

combustibles

• structure not on fire 

• structure on fire

• structure ignition roof

• structure ignition deck

• structure ignition flame impingement

• structure ignition garage

• structure ignition other

• structure standing fire extinguished

• structure standing fully 

involved

• structure past peak

• structure foundation

• deck on fire

• eaves on fire

• no defensive action

• prior defensive action

Parcel and detached 

combustibles

• parcel not on fire (veg)

• parcel ignition (veg)

• parcel ignition (detached combustible)

• parcel on fire (veg)

• detached combustibles on fire

• detached combustibles not on fire

• railroad ties (RR) on fire

• play sets on fire

• fences on fire

• smoking/melting/preignition

• no specific fire observation

• no defensive action

• prior defensive action

Table 6 Defensive actionxi categories for objectives and tools/tactics.

Defensive 

Action Item

Type of Observation

Defensive 

Action 

Objective

• prevent parcel ignition

• prevent structure ignition

• prevent detached combustible ignition

• extinguish parcel

• extinguish structure

• extinguish detached combustible

• contain parcel

• contain structure

• pre-positioning of equipment

• remove fences

• vegetation removal

• mop up

Defensive 

action 

tools/tactic 

used

• hand tools

• garden hose

• sprinklers

• fire hose

• foam

• deckgun

• interior (going inside)

• structure prep

• back fire

• bulldozer line

• thermal imager

• water curtain

8.3 Data Quantity, Quality and Uncertainty

This section discusses data quantity, quality and uncertainty associated with various data 

products produced or used for this report. Data quality is of particular concern in this study 

related to the following activities occurring on the wildland and built environments: 

• Identifying damage and destruction. 

 

xi Defensive actions refer to activities taken by first responders to prevent ignition, extinguish or contain the fire.
27

• Deriving the spatiotemporal extent of defensive actions.

• Constructing timeline information for burning features.

• Assessing exposure for pertinent populations of structures in time and space. 

Quantification of exposure is outside of the state of the art of the measurement science related to 

post-fire assessments. Nonetheless, even for qualitative assessment of exposure, the quality and 

quantity of the data produced, along with resulting uncertainty, will provide guidance on 

assessing a WUI post-fire environment in a scientific manner.

Additionally, implementation of the NIST/USFS WUI Assessment Methodology outlined in 

Figure 1 provides potential to improve scientific understanding of the WUI. Implementation of 

the methodology shown in Figure 1 also provides the possibility of identifying enhanced 

exposure qualification and quantification techniques. Ultimately, sound observations regarding 

fire behavior, developed from fire assessments that attempt to quantify all aspects of the Fire 

Disturbance Continuum 12 are required to develop the measurement science such that standard 

test methods for WUI constructions are implemented and experiments representing conditions 

found in the WUI and the next-generation fire models are developed and tested. 

Therefore, the assessment of data quality is an important process. The quality of fire timeline 

and defensive action data presented in this section also provides the foundation for qualitative 

assessments of exposure, and structure response. For example, if the initial structures ignited 

from the passage of the main wildland fire front cannot be determined, even qualitative 

assessment of exposure would be difficult and potentially misleading. The assessment of 

structure response would be almost impossible, except in individual case studies for select 

locations. 

The rules and assumptions listed below were used for this study:

1. Categories of structure burning conditions portrayed by first responders, or viewed in 

the ground imagery were: structure condition unknown, structure not on fire, structure 

on fire. It should be noted that when images are available, a more definite progression 

in time might be reached, specifically in the context of primary structures burning 

adjacent to each other. Additionally, a primary structure observed not to be on fire does 

not imply that there was no fire anywhere on the structure. For analysis purposes, 

however, an observation of a primary structure not on fire is treated similarly to a 

definite statement that the structure is not on fire. 

2. Structure or item (deck, roof, other) ignition observations are associated with statements 

or images where either ignition is actually observed or (relatively) small amounts of fire 

are present, and nothing else is on fire in the immediate surroundings. An example 

would be a small fire on the steps going to a deck without any other part of the structure

on fire. If there were no confirmations (i.e., pictures, TDs) of the observation, then no 

ignition was recorded. 
28

3. Damage and destruction were determined from a combination of local government field 

assessments, TDs, and aerial and ground imagery. All damaged structures independent 

of the extent of damage were documented as “damaged”. The specific damage was 

recorded, when possible. The compiled list of damage is not a complete assessment of 

damage across the study area.

4. At a parcel level, numerous actions were taken to suppress fires or pre-wet vegetation. 

The term “contain parcel” was specifically reserved for defensive actions specific to the 

containment or redirecting of parcel fires, independent of any action directed at a 

structure itself. “Scratching fire line” is one example of an action taken specifically to 

contain or redirect a vegetative fire. A parcel can be initially defended to extinguish and 

subsequently to contain as the parcel fire becomes a direct threat to adjacent parcels or 

structures. A parcel is labeled as having both if both actions occurred. 

5. On some streets in the study area, (i.e., Green Valley Circle, Regal View Road, Via 

Verona View ), first responders activated watering devices (e.g. garden hose and 

sprinklers) on a row of primary structures with some primary structures not being 

activated for various reasons. First responders could not identify the specific primary 

structures, and all primary structures were marked as defended in the areas. 

6. A first responder may have identified a specific fire observation and in the database no 

defensive action may have been associated with his observation. This does not 

necessarily indicate that no defensive action was taken, as frequently another first 

responder (also identified) would have taken the defensive action. 

7. Time estimates with greater than ± 20 min of uncertainty were not used in reconstructing 

the event timeline of burning primary structures. 

8. A structure ignited and suppressed represents a successful extinguishment effort. The 

extent of damage is not considered here. 

9. Structure containment is defined as successful if a containment objective is explicitly 

identified in the defensive action(s) taken and the (identified) structure is saved. This 

rule applies even if the containment objective is not for an immediately adjacent 

structure. Successful containment does not apply to long range ember spotting (tens of 

meters, hundreds of feet). If there is failure in one direction and success in another, the 

actions for the structure will be assumed to have failed. This occurred very infrequently 

(less than five times). “Structure containment” only applies if containment or 

extinguishment actions were taken. Provided there was additional evidence of an 

exposure concern (i.e., pictures), containment includes mop-up as containment, as 

foundations were a concern for many hours after the majority of the fire activity ceased. 

Over the course of protecting a particular structure, defensive actions can transition from 

extinguishment to containment as the structure fire grows and the structure becomes unsavable. A failed extinguishment becomes a failed containment if fire spread continues 

beyond the defended structure. 
29

10. All structures were deemed to be not on fire before 17:23 on Tuesday June 26, the first 

known structure ignition. 

11. All decks are treated as attached combustibles. A deck on fire is therefore treated as a 

structure on fire. 

12. The data analysis time intervals are finite in time. If a picture showed a house fully 

involved or destroyed at the first half of the time data analysis time interval (the first 30 

min), the assumption was made that the primary structure was on fire in the previous 

time interval. 

8.3.1 Damage Information 

Damage information for the Waldo Canyon Fire came from the following five sources: 

1. Local damage assessments from CSFD and cooperators consisting of spreadsheets with 

address and damage information as well as images of damage and destruction. 

2. Project damage assessment from NIST/USFS consisting of field assessments of damage 

locations, not contained in the CSFD assessments, but identified during the TD process 

or the result of the first field assessment on 21 primary structures. 

3. Post-fire aerial imagery collected by The Sanborn Mapping Co, Inc. 

4. Various reports on the Waldo Canyon Fire. 15, 23

5. Media sources: For example, http://gazette.com/waldo-canyon-fire-two-years-later-aneighborhood-is-reborn/article/1521839. 24

The identification of damage and destruction to the built and wildland environment is 

instrumental in locating defensive actions and fire behavior observations in space and time. 

Damage information also provides the first building block for scientific assessment of a post-fire 

WUI environment. Any catastrophic incident such as the Waldo Canyon Fire results in a need to 

prioritize resources to finalize the response to the incident in the affected community. 

During and/or shortly after an incident, the most effective use of limited damage assessment 

resources lays in the collection of structure damage data and not in the evaluation of hazard 

mitigation technologies as the latter requires a time commitment and resources that do not 

coincide with the rapid needs associated with post-fire after action reporting or damage 

assessment for public information. Additionally such efforts across multiple WUI fires would 

provide valuable information of structure ignition vulnerabilities. 

 Many post-fire assessments focus on documenting major damage and destruction to primary 

structures. The blistering of paint barely visible in Figure 4 demonstrates the missing of minorscale damage prevalent in damage assessments of major WUI incidents. In many cases, this type 

of minor-scale damage was used to help geolocate first responder observations. 
30

Figure 4 Ground image taken by local damage inspectors of a destroyed primary structure barely showing 

fire blistered paint on an adjacent primary structure in the background.

The focus on documentation of major damage and destruction is understandable in many postfire environments due to the immediate needs resulting from the incident and the low priority of 

documenting minor damage such as fire blistered paint. Some assessments, however, skip 

documentation of minor-scale damage and move to selective gathering of partial incident data to 

highlight the effectiveness of current WUI mitigation strategies and data that supports previous 

findings of WUI post-fire assessments.

The information presented in the rest of Section 8 demonstrates the importance of not skipping 

steps when performing scientific post-fire assessments. If further post-fire analysis steps are 

taken beyond initial assessments of “major” and “visible” damage, complete documentation of 

damage should be conducted before moving onto other assessment steps. Scientifically based 

damage assessments will provide information to improve current WUI mitigation advice. 

8.3.1.1 Local Damage Data

Local damage information was provided by CSFD and contained a list of 1100 properties in and 

around communities affected by the Waldo Canyon Fire. This list contained 341 destroyed 

primary structures. Additionally, there were 47 records in the spreadsheet with an inspection 

status of “Visible Damage”, with one of these records having no address. 

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
31

The 46 primary structures with addresses identified as damaged in the spreadsheet differs from 

the data identified by NIST, as discussed below. This is due to missing relatively minor damage 

such as that shown in Figure 4. Additionally, damage on property with locations not evident 

from the street might also be missed in rapid assessments. Furthermore, the convention used to 

record damage information might vary among damage collection protocols. 

For example, Figure 5 portrays a primary structure with a damaged fence that might have been 

attached to the structure. The local 

damage collection protocol might 

include this type of damage as 

associated with the primary 

structure. The NIST data collection 

protocol used in this study considers 

fences as not attached, even if 

attached, to account for the common 

occurrence of the burning being 

relatively far from the structure. 

Data was not available to determine 

this distance. Additionally, the deck 

attached to the primary structure was 

damaged but with no evidence of the 

damage being from the fire directly. 

The NIST protocol is used in this report, and while the distinctions are arbitrary, they do point 

out the need for consistent protocols. 

8.3.1.2 TD Damage Data

The damage information collected from TDs was also provided in the initial spreadsheet and 

built from the local damage list described above. New damaged properties were identified 

through the TDs based on observations from first responders of properties with extinguished 

features. Though the specific amount of instances was not tracked, it was not uncommon for 

first responders to specify the area of the defensive action in an incorrect location (e.g. an 

adjacent primary structure). This was observed in the study of the 2011 Tanglewood Fire 22

as 

well. Correlation of damage information identified through TDs with confirmed damaged 

sources was used to confirm and adjust the spatial location of defensive action observations. 

In most cases, initial incorrect geolocation of first responder actions was corrected through 

identification of damage information in the field. This sometimes required remote sensing data. 

For example, initial discussions with first responders identified defensive actions at 2225 

Charing Court of defending a roof spot with a garden hose, putting out railroad ties and placing 

sprinklers at a gazebo. The first responders identified all of these actions occurring at 2225 

Charing Court. 

Figure 5 Image of a burned fence piece that appeared to have 

broken a deck post, which had no sign of fire damage.

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with permission
32

Examination of the post-fire imagery, however, identified roof damage at 2220 Charing Court as 

shown in Figure 6. 

Also shown in Figure 6

are a gazebo at 2225 

Charing Court and the 

lack of a gazebo at 

2220 Charing Court 

along with various 

unidentified burned 

and damaged features. 

Furthermore, 

discussions with 

homeowners at 2220 

Charing Court 

confirming roof 

damage and damage to 

railroad ties along with 

identifying a heat 

damaged sliding glass 

door that required 

replacement. Finally, 

analysis of 2225 

Charing Court in Bing 

Maps Streetside showed that 2225 Charing Court still had a wood roof as of 2014. 

Based on the above described field and remote sensing data the defensive action for 

extinguishing the roof spot was moved to 2220 Charing Court. The above re-assignment of the 

spatial location of a defensive action from the initial spreadsheet occurred in a number of 

instances, resulting in moving certain defensive actions identified during the TDs to primary 

structures containing the damage, though all were not tracked. It was expected that first 

responders could not precisely geolocate all actions and observations based on memory alone, 

particularly given the long time span between the event and recording of the recollection. It is 

not the job of first responders to remember correctly all the events in space and time. This 

highlights the need to integrate all data before drawing conclusions from field assessments or 

discussions with first responders alone. Also highlighted is the need to have a means for first 

responders to record their recollection of events with associated images in an electronic format 

quickly after the incident. 

Figure 6 Damage on Charing Court used to geolocate first responder defensive 

action locations.

Courtesy: The Sanborn Map 

Co, Inc. used with permission, 

overlays from NIST
33

In addition to post-fire ground imagery providing damage confirmation such as the image shown 

in Figure 4, xii post-fire aerial imagery also provided confirmation and/or identification of some 

damage such as that shown in Figure 7. This damage was not observable from the ground 

assessments conducted by CSFD due to damage on the roof and interior of the primary 

structures. However, aerial imagery could not directly identify damage to structure interiors. 

Consequently, field visits were often required due to aerial imagery not identifying damaged 

features obscured by buildings or trees, or on the sides or insides of objects. Field visits also 

sometimes resulted in identification of damage not identified through other sources, including 

the TDs. Ultimately, the TD process resulted in 39 more confirmed damaged sources on primary 

structures compared to local field assessments. 

Figure 7 Post-fire aerial images of damaged wood roofs. A). Aerial image recorded on 6/28/2012 showing 

black marks on wood shake roofs. B). Aerial image recorded on 7/12/2012 showing initial repairs to roofs.

Discussions with homeowners alone regarding damage, however, were not used as a means to 

confirm damage. For example, Figure 8 highlights two primary structures, both of which were 

not identified as damaged in the local damage assessment. The two primary structures shown in 

Figure 8 were identified as a result of first responder accounts of roof extinguishment actions in 

the area. The first responders commonly could only identify the general location of actions in 

the area shown in Figure 8. Field visits identified spots on each roof through homeowner 

discussions. Additionally, imagery, as shown in Figure 8, clearly portrayed large damaged 

sections to the wood roof of the confirmed damaged primary structure, while damage to the 

asphalt shingle roof was not visible in the aerial imagery or any other imagery and consequently 

this primary structure damage was marked as unconfirmed damage. 

 

xii The image shown in this figure was taken when documenting destruction to the neighboring house and was only 

coincidently recorded by damage assessors.

Courtesy: The Sanborn Map 

Co, Inc. used with permission, 

overlays from NIST
34

It is therefore important to note that unconfirmed damage does not mean there was no damage, 

and not all damage can be identified in aerial imagery. It also highlights the need for more 

science-based post-fire damage 

assessments in the future that 

attempt to record all damage 

with retrievable forensic 

evidence. 

The above described 

conservative approach to 

damage classification was used 

to highlight unknown damage 

such as the “spots” described 

for the asphalt shingle roof 

shown in Figure 8. This 

damage information, while 

potentially important, as 

asphalt roofs are not thought to 

ignite 25, needs to be quantified 

further to understand if these 

spots are results of debris on 

the roof or the roof covering 

being ignited due to some 

other factor. Again, the need 

for scientific documentation of 

data using ground and aerial imagery is highlighted. The need to provide homeowners the ability 

to document damage and provide this documentation to authorities having jurisdiction is also 

highlighted. 

Some primary structures also had only partial confirmation of damage. For example, 2610 

Rossmere Street was identified by first responders as being extinguished with a fire hose. First 

responders discussed the primary structure starting to smoke, the gutter melting and some 

“melting by the deck” from exposure caused by the primary structure to the northeast burning. 

The IBHS report 15 listed damage to two cracked windows at 2610 Rossmere Street. Field visits 

and discussions with homeowners indicated one cracked window and a damaged deck, but no 

visual evidence of either at 2610 Rossmere Street. Consequently, there is only partial 

confirmation, as defined in this report, of damage for this primary structure. The conflicting 

information described above highlights the need for established protocols to assess damage in the 

WUI that include the use of ground and aerial imagery. 

It is also important to identify all apparatus at a particular incident, as illustrated in the two 

examples below. The first case that clearly illustrates the importance of tracking all apparatus is 

Figure 8 Two potentially fire damaged roofs. The primary structure 

circled in blue had anecdotal accounts of damage from the homeowner 

while the structure in red has clear visible evidence of damage.

Courtesy: The Sanborn Map 

Co, Inc. used with permission, 

overlays from NIST
35

found in the examination of the structures that survived in Mirror Lake Court. For the first 150 

TDs no first responder was aware that these structures had been defended. It was not until TD

151 that the first responders that successfully defended these structures were identified. 

Examination of the CSFD video, however, revealed this as a location with first responders 

present very quickly. Full videos and images obtained for this project clearly show first 

responders in the area. Three important concepts are highlighted by the above example: 

1. Provision of all images taken by first responders during the incident would result in 

quicker identification of actions and burning features and greatly reduce the time taken 

for the TD process.

2. Examination of images available for the incident should be conducted before the TD 

process.

3. First responders require a mechanism to upload images and describe actions in an 

objective manner.

There are many current logistical constraints that might present problems to the seemingly 

simple concept presented above. The technology, however, is readily available. It is also 

important to note that the above is not suggested as a mechanism to replace the TD process, only 

to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the process. 

The second case is found in examination of the structures that did not burn on the southern end 

of Majestic Drive, between Lions Gate Lane and Champagne Drive. Many believed that these 

structures received little exposure. It was not until TD 154 that the first responders who 

suppressed embers in this location were actually identified. Also, there was no identified 

damage in these locations. Two important concepts are highlighted by the above example:

1. Images will not capture all information due to shortage of devices on all first responders. 

2. Accounts of actions are limited in determining structure response without associated 

damage information. 

The above points confirm the need for efficient and effective TDs. Also, in some circumstances, 

without sensors on first responders, the information collected from descriptive accounts will be 

of limited value in directly assessing structure response and exposure conditions. Nonetheless, 

the information provided from more difficult to quantify exposure can help guide laboratory and 

field experiments and fire model development. 

Regardless, it must be pointed out that in order to track the apparatus of interest, all apparatus 

involved must be identified. While this case study primarily focuses on MSC, all apparatus have

to be tracked, including those that remained in Cedar Heights and Peregrine. This highlights the 

need, at the incident level, to have in place a mechanism to track all apparatus involved. This 

enhances safety and will enable post incident evaluations and after action reports. Furthermore, 

a crowd sourcing application that allows first responders to enter information about activities in 

an incident would, if ubiquitously used, result in tracking of all apparatus. 
36

8.3.1.3 Remote Sensing Damage Data 

Remote sensing, in terms of this report, includes both ground and aerial imagery. As discussed 

above, two sets of post-fire high resolution orthorectified image acquisitions occurred from 

flights conducted by The Sanborn Map Co., Inc. as listed in Table 3. Additionally, ground 

images taken by local authorities were provided with an example shown in Figure 4. The ground 

imagery was used in this study to search for primary structures identified as damaged during the 

TD process but not listed as damaged in the local spreadsheet. Further assessment of this 

imagery might yield additional information regarding damage and defensive actions. 

Post-fire aerial imagery was the means used to identify destruction to primary structures in this 

study. The TD Damage Data did not have the observations for many destroyed structures. The 

CSFD Damage Data had 341 primary structures recorded as a “Total Loss”. Additionally, the 

local damage assessment was updated to 346 23 and the discrepancy between the 344 identified 

in this report has not been resolved. xiii The TD Damage Data used in this report is not intended 

to be the method to identify damage ubiquitously across a WUI incident. 

Nonetheless, it is not uncommon for the homeowners to learn of the status of their primary 

structures through imagery provided by various sources after a fire. Full documentation of 

damage and destruction requires a synergistic approach between field data collection and remote 

sensing. This highlights the need for aerial assessments to be part of SOPs for moderate to large

incidents, at least. These aerial assessments do not always have to produce industry standard 

orthorectified imagery but need to identify destruction, as would be common in many images 

taken by media sources after an incident, for example.

The remote sensing identified destruction in this report does not exclude primary structures that 

were completely replaced, such as 6465 Sandray Court where destruction was not evident from 

the aerial imagery. There was, however, a clear distinction between primary structures 

completely destroyed and those that were not completely destroyed in the post-fire imagery, even 

if demolition was eventually required due to extensive damage. 

Post-fire aerial imagery was also used as a means to corroborate damage information to primary 

structures or other combustible features such as fences. In some instances, corroboration of 

damage from the homeowner was not possible due to difficulties in making contact. In other 

instances, discussions with homeowners identified a larger extent of damage compared to what 

was identified from other methods. Finally, in some cases, post-fire aerial imagery identified 

damage not identified through other methods. 

Post-fire aerial imagery was also the major means to identify damage to vegetation, which is not 

studied in this report. Additionally, remote sensing was used to geolocate certain defensive 

actions as described in Section 8.3.2.2. Full integration of remote sensing with other Waldo 

 

xiii One possible reason for the difference of 344 destroyed primary structures in this report and the 346 ultimately 

reported by CSFD might be the structures at Flying W Ranch. This report only counted one primary structure in this 

location, but many structures, which were considered as secondary in this report, were destroyed. 
37

Canyon Fire Data is not conducted in this report. Evidence of defensive actions exists in the 

post-fire aerial imagery. These defensive actions are not included in this study. 

For example, Figure 9 shows the locations where there were signs of defensive actions not 

recorded through the TD process but visible in the remote sensing data. Shown in Figure 9 are 

the locations where fences were on the ground and debris was in the yard that was not present in 

pre-fire imagery or in post-fire imagery recorded on 7/12/2012, after homeowners had returned. 

Also, shown in Figure 9, not captured in the TD process, is a location with possible evidence of 

containment actions through lack of white ash on destroyed primary structures compared to 

adjacent destroyed structures. It should be noted, however, that the presence of white ash does 

not indicate that no defensive actions had occurred. Some containment actions, such as those on 

Hearthstone Lane, focused on spraying water on primary structures adjacent to the burning 

structure and did not result in a blackened appearance, yet fire spread was still contained. 

Figure 9 Examples of remote sensing identified defensive action signs not identified during the TD process. 

Other examples of potentially missed defensive actions include defensive actions taken by video 

specialists on 2540 Rossmere Street and sprinklers on properties shown in the videos. 

Additionally, missed defensive actions are evident through examination of separate discussions 

by first responders on the same apparatus. This examination shows that sometimes one first 

responder would identify an action not identified by another responder on the same team. This 

in many cases is the result of the crew on the apparatus being split up and highlights the need for 

Courtesy: The Sanborn Map 

Co, Inc. used with permission, 

overlays from NIST
38

extensive data collection (TDs) at an apparatus level. Finally, mop-up actions were captured to a 

lesser extent compared to those occurring relatively shortly after the passage of the main 

wildland fire front (i.e. ≈ 10 hours after 17:30 on 6/26/2012). 

The above highlights how it is impossible to capture all defensive actions through the TD 

process. This, coupled with the extensive time required to capture the first responder 

observations, emphasizes the need for a more efficient and effective method to record defensive 

action information. For example, not every first responder at the incident had a discussion due to 

time constraints. A crowd sourcing application might be more efficient, allowing for the capture 

of information from missed responders. Even with the above method it is likely that actions will 

still be missed and some discussions will always be required. 

Regardless, it is believed that missing some defensive actions, as described above, has no 

repercussions on the findings in this report, where a conservative approach to geolocation of 

defensive actions was taken. This conservative approach was not to overextend defensive action 

locations. It is believed the defensive actions captured represent the general spatial location of 

actions occurring during the main burning of features in MSC. Future examination of exposure 

should attempt to account for missed defensive actions or at least potential locations where 

actions might have been missed. 

In the context of exposure and structure response, remote sensing is used to categorize locations 

such as those shown in Figure 9, where there is evidence of containment actions, though these 

could be due to mop-up actions. These areas would need to be removed from the analysis of 

exposure and structure response, even if only qualitative analyses are employed. For example, 

the image shown in Figure 9 portraying varying levels of white ash present in destroyed primary 

structures provides evidence of defensive actions. Coupled with other signs of water usage in the 

area, the location should not be an area to assess structure response as it is possible the area was 

defended and simply not identified through the TD process presented in this report. 

8.3.1.4 Media Sources 

Handy 24 identified one damaged component on a primary structure. This damage consisted of a 

tile roof that had “piles of burned pine needles that had burned the roofing paper (beneath the 

tile).” It is important to note that there were also anecdotal observations collected during 

technical discussions of an additional unknown amount of primary structures with light 

scorching of objects but no ignitions recorded. There are no images or forensic evidence of these 

failed ignitions provided for this report. Again, this highlights the need for applications such as 

crowd sourcing applications to provide homeowners a means to document information not 

identified in local damage assessments. 
39

8.3.2 Burning Feature and Defensive Action Timeline Data 

Each data source used in the reconstruction of the fire timeline had uncertainties, with data 

quality varying over space and time. The data used to allocate time can be grouped into the 

following sources: 

• Images/Videos (Images).

• Automatic Vehicle Locator (AVL) 

• Radio Logs

• First Responders 

Each observation must first be located in space to be of value for reconstructing the event 

timeline. Consequently, this section first examines the data quality aspects related to the 

geolocation of feature burning and defensive action observations. Next, this section assesses 

data quality related to burning and defensive action times, also across different spatial locations. 

8.3.2.1 Images and Videos Spatial Data

Identification of the location of burning features and defensive actions is of paramount 

importance. Without proper geolocation of the observation, the account is of limited value for 

increasing scientific understanding of the incident. Burning features from images and videos 

were geolocated as described above using Microsoft Bing Maps and Google StreetView. 

Geolocation of burning vegetation and primary structures from videos and images with the 

burning feature in the foreground were 

almost ubiquitously geolocated 

successfully. 

There was one image, shown in Figure 

10, which required ground assessments 

to identify the location. Although even 

in this case, further confirmation was 

provided with Bing Maps and visual 

topographic analysis with the LidAR

data (i.e., Line of Sight Analysis using 

the LP360 Extension to ArcGIS). Even 

in the dark, images of burning features 

were able to be geolocated if not blurry 

or over exposed. Nonetheless, the image 

shown in Figure 10 does highlight 

potential shortcomings of remote sensing technologies like Microsoft Bing Maps and Google 

StreetView for missing occluded features and features not viewable from the street. 

The process of geolocating images in a GIS database also had potential for data entry errors. The 

main possible data entry error for image geolocation was that of incorrectly transcribing the 

Figure 10 Image of primary structure burning in the back 

yard that required ground assessment to geolocate.

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with permission
40

location of the burning feature to a location in the GIS database. The high density of structures 

in many locations results in this data entry error being possible. There was no systematic 

assessment of this type of data entry error. Nonetheless, the image and video data has been 

examined extensively through the data integration conducted for this report. Consequently, this 

type of error is expected to occur in a small number of instances and, if present, is likely to result 

in only being off one or two primary structures. 

There were, however, many images with burning features in the background, which could not 

always be precisely geolocated. In these cases, further evidence was required to confirm the 

location of the burning feature or the information was only generally used in this assessment. 

For example, there are a number of images that provide evidence of significant primary structure 

ignitions and burning on both the western side of Courtney Drive and Yankton Place before 

20:00 as shown in Figure 11. These are not conclusive, and these areas remain as unknowns in 

this study with regards to burning time but there is some evidence of limited early ignitions in 

these locations based on the distant images showing primary structures as possibly foundations 

(this refers to structures totally destroyed and walls collapsed). 

Figure 11 Evidence of early ignitions on Yankton Place and Western Courtney Drive through possible 

identification of primary structures as foundations.

Finally, it is important to note that images of all burning features were not captured. Images of 

burning features were obtained in locations where there were first responders or other fire 

observers (e.g., first responder video specialists, media and private citizens)who had safe vantage 

points. This is evidenced by the three different image sources available showing burning on the 

Photo courtesy of 2012 The Denver Post 

News Media Group used with permission, 

overlays from NIST

Photo Courtesy of 2012 The Denver Post 

News Media Group used with permission, 

overlays from NIST

Photo courtesy of 

CSFD, used with 

permission, overlays 

from NIST
41

northern side of Courtney Drive and only distant views in the background of burning on the 

southeastern side of Courtney Drive and the western portion of Yankton Place, as shown in 

Figure 11. 

8.3.2.2 Technical Discussion Spatial Data 

The ability to locate defensive actions and first responder observations of burning features in 

space and time varied among the different TDs, the type of observation and the role played by 

the responder. In general, due to the correlation of defensive action observations with damaged 

features in the field, the geolocation of these defensive actions is believed to have occurred with 

a high degree of accuracy when damage was confirmed. These extinguishment defensive actions 

often occurred in areas where structure-to-structure fire spread was being contained and

sometimes required multiple attempts at 

adjacent primary structures before 

containment was achieved, thereby allowing 

the geolocation of containment defensive 

actions to be simple and accurate.

Automatic Vehicle Locator (AVL) 

information also provided a means to 

geolocate first responder burning observations 

and defensive actions. AVL allowed for 

identification of first responder’s arrival on 

scene, thereby facilitating general geolocation 

of burning features through using ground 

images to identify the precise location of the 

actions, such as shown in Figure 12. Next, in 

conjunction with identified damage, defensive 

action locations of less obvious significance, 

though still essential to complete containment, 

compared to the engine work shown in Figure 

13, could sometimes be geolocated. 

Post-fire aerial imagery was not fully 

integrated into this assessment, but was used 

to more precisely geolocate some actions of 

importance to this study (e.g. containment actions). One example is shown in Map Figure 3

portraying AVL locations for a CSFD Engine Crew overlaid on post-fire aerial imagery. One 

observation available from several members of the Engine Crew defending this area originally 

placed the containment action on the western primary structure. In this case, subsequent TDs 

resulted in correct geolocation of the action to the eastern primary structure. Nonetheless, not all 

such errors were corrected through TDs alone.

Figure 12 Image showing first responder hand work 

associated with containment of a burning primary 

structure.

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with permission
42

This same primary structure was 

identified by the image data team as a 

likely primary structure where fire 

spread was contained due to some type 

of suppression, despite initial results 

from the TD team indicating 

containment on the western structure. 

As shown in Map Figure 3, the eastern

primary structure shows lack of white 

ash evidenced through blackened 

appearance, indicating lack of complete 

combustion of features. The exact cause of the blackened appearance ascertained from the postfire imagery requires ground validation and, in this case, appeared to be contained by first 

responders with significant water application identified through the TDs. 

The location of the containment action to the eastern primary structure is further confirmed by 

AVL locations clustered around 6045 Wilson Road, as shown in Map Figure 3. The AVL time

stamp also indicates the action occurring around 21:00, over two hours after the white ash 

primary structure is shown as fully involved, as shown in the image contained in Map Figure 3

from a video taken by first responders. This image indicates the ignition order of the two 

primary structures as west to east, evidenced by the state of involvement of the structures. 

Structure-to-structure fire spread is not confirmed in this case as evidenced by burning of mulch 

in the foreground of the image shown in Map Figure 3, which might have ignited the structure on 

6045 Wilson Road. Though there is some evidence of structure-to-structure fire spread through 

the presence of more white ash on the western side of 6045 compared to the eastern side. 

Not all observations contained as much data as the example above. It was also not uncommon 

for the locations portrayed in the observations spreadsheet to be initially geolocated improperly, 

as described in Section 8.3.1.2. There are also additional reasons for the potential imprecise 

geolocation of observations as shown in Table 7. The procedure used, before integration in a 

GIS environment, had four sources of error compared to one source of error in the image 

geolocation process. When examined in the context of expected data entry errors per operation 

(i.e., ≤10 %) it can be seen that the end result could be significant (i.e., ≤40 % of ultimate data if 

potential combined sources of error are identified). 

In fact, the initial integration in a GIS environment discovered many errors, some of which could 

not be corrected despite multiple attempts outside a GIS, potentially due to difficulty in 

understanding the scene based on only discussions with first responders. Nonetheless, the GIS 

review and integration process is believed to have corrected major errors, but it is likely errors 

still exist. Again, the need for a less error prone process for the collection of first responder 

observations is highlighted. 

Figure 13 Image showing significant engine work required to 

contain fire spread from burning primary structure.

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with permission
43

Table 7 Sources of error present in the TD data collection process.

Technical Discussion Error 

Source

Potential Error Cause

First Responder Account First responder incorrectly remembers some aspect of the burning feature 

or defensive action observation.

Transfer of First Responder 

Account

Data recorder incorrectly records information portrayed by the first 

responder (e.g. wrong address, wrong action, etc.).

Transfer of Recorded First 

Responder to Digital Media

Errors in transcription of information from handwritten notes to electronic 

media.

GIS Review Process Cleanup between the image data collection team and the TD data collection 

team occurred with the TD data collection team attempting to make 

corrections in the spreadsheet resulting in potential for data entry errors.

There were also a number of observations that could not be located in space or time and were 

removed from the dataset. Additionally, there were 1036 observations that could only be 

located at the street level. Many of these observations, 916, are of logistical operations such as 

refueling, obtaining water or simply moving between locations. There were an additional 32 

observations, which were related to general exposure conditions. The remaining 97 observations 

were related to features as shown in Figure 14. 

As can be seen, the greatest percentage of burning feature observations at the street level belongs 

to observations of structures not on fire. The next greatest percentage of observations geolocated 

at the street level was of vegetation on fire, which was an important observation, but only 12 

were recorded. It can also be seen that there were observations of decks on fire and igniting, 

railroad ties on fire and ignitions of garages and roofs. 

Figure 14 Counts of observations from TDs that could not be geolocated beyond the street.

3 

0 1 1 1 

12

1 1 

7 

2 

5 

39

5 3 3 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Number of Observations
44

It is sometimes difficult, even for eyewitness observers, to be able to precisely describe the 

ignition of a feature. For 

example, Figure 15 shows an 

ignition location in a re-entrant 

corner of a primary structure by a 

deck. The exact cause of ignition 

cannot be determined from the 

image in Figure 15, although 

closer inspection could indicate 

the ignition source. This shows 

that a fire observer’s 

identification of an ignition 

location could be imprecise. 

Due to the GIS data integration 

that was conducted for this 

report, it is believed that the 

majority of incorrectly 

geolocated observations were 

identified and corrected. It is 

likely, however, that some errors 

still remain. Consequently, a conservative approach was taken for data analysis resulting in a 

classification of unknown for burning times when there was any reason to believe errors might 

exist for the particular data record. 

Despite some shortcomings, geolocation of many of the primary types of actions described 

above, while difficult to independently assess, are believed to be accurate and adequately capture 

the spatial representations of actions for conclusions and findings derived from this report. It is 

known that not all defensive actions have been documented with examples described above. 

Additionally, as described above, some defensive actions likely occurred in other locations. 

This was the first effort of its kind conducted for a large incident. Collection of observations 

from fire witnesses is the most difficult and error prone data collection procedures described in 

this report. Capturing of the general and often times precise location of defensive actions is 

possible within an integrated environment, particularly for major actions such as extinguishment 

and containment actions. There is no evidence that capturing this information accurately is 

possible in a non-integrated environment (e.g. tabular spreadsheet). 

The number of error sources for recording of fire witness observations can be reduced. Solutions 

to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of recording first responder observations are 

possible. If any large error exists regarding the location of defensive actions described in this 

report, the evidence indicates that the error would be in underrepresenting the extent of defensive 

actions. Additionally, important spatial patterns are captured, as discussed below. 

Figure 15 Ignition in a re-entrant corner area with precise ignition 

location not determined in this case.

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with permission
45

8.3.2.3 Images and Video Time Data 

In total, there were 266 distinct images and videos xiv portraying burning conditions of primary 

structures. These images provided 681 observations on the ignition status of 290 primary 

structures. Of these observations, 33 did not have a time stamp beyond identification of day or 

night. This resulted in 284 primary structures with images portraying a time stamp of primary 

structure burning condition. 

Figure 16 shows image counts by time stamp ranges. As can be seen, the majority of images 

were estimated to be within a narrow time range, as most devices had time stamps with the times 

occasionally being systematically in error due to seasonal time changes or time zone changes. 

These were adjusted accordingly based on cross correlation with other images and AVL. Time 

ranges of 0 min to 10 min or 10 min to 20 min were used to allocate ranges based on 

observations of burning structures from beginning to end as described in sections below. 

The relatively small numbers of image observations with time ranges of 10 min to 20 min were 

largely from the Fox News Video and the YouTube Videos entitled “Mountain Shadows is 

Burning”, both shown in Appendix E. Additionally, a few other images and videos were missing 

time stamps and were assigned times and ranges based on co-occurrence of burning objects and 

observed burning time of objects in other time stamped images. These images were essential to 

the determination of burn times and were in some cases the only information available, as was 

the case for Trevor Lane. This highlights the importance of having imaging devices correctly 

enabled and configured to record 

time of images for during-fire 

photography. 

The observations of burning primary 

structures came from image sets 

from 31 distinct sources as shown in 

Figure 17. The two largest sources 

of observations came from the CSFD 

videographer and a scout truck, 

which had a first responder who 

collected time lapse images of many 

locations, when safe to do so. TD 41 

and TD 165 both had GoPro 

cameras, allowing recording of many burning condition observations. This highlights how a 

small number of individuals can provide a great deal of information through photographing WUI 

 

xiv There were over 4010 images provided representing pre-fire, during-fire and post-fire conditions. Of these at 

least 565 contained images of structure burning, 266 were used to prescribe locations to burning structures. Many of 

the 565 images were duplicates of the 266 used and were not recorded if no new information was discerned. This 

data will reside in a database at NIST. 

Figure 16 Counts of burning primary structure observations 

from images by range (+) associated with time stamp.

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

0-10 10-20

Burning Primary Structure 

Observations

Time Range Associated with Images (Minutes)
46

incidents during the fire, when it is safe to do so, and how imaging devices like GoPro cameras 

can collect a great deal of information in a unobtrusive manner. 

The availability of images also varied in both space and time. Map Figure 4 shows the locations 

of the 290 primary structures of which images exist to portray some form of burning features

between the time of the incident reaching MSC and June 27, 2012 01:30. Sixty-five percent of 

the damaged or destroyed primary structures had images of burning or complete destruction. 

There were, consequently, 157 destroyed or damaged primary structures for which time 

estimates from images were not available. 

Of the 157 primary structures with no images of burning, 73 had confirmed damage, 14 had 

unconfirmed damage, and two had partial damage confirmation. Information from TDs was 

available on the remaining 68 destroyed primary structures for most areas except for Flying W 

Ranch. The group of primary structures shown in Map Figure 4 in the interior of Majestic Drive 

also has no specific observations from images, other than on Hot Springs Court, but primary 

structure burn times can be inferred from these images, videos, and TDs as described below.

Figure 17 Counts of primary structure burning observations by source.

The number of images available during one hour time periods increased with each time interval 

until 20:30 when they began to decrease. This pattern is shown in Figure 18, which also portrays 

a slight increase on June 27 at about 0:30. This increase is due to one video from a first 

responder showing burning foundations or completely destroyed primary structures along the 

eastern side of Majestic Drive, almost from Lions Gate Lane to the northern part of Majestic 

Drive, where the road begins to curve to the west, representing a total of 37 primary structures. 

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

TD 144

CSFD Videographer

TD 165

TD 41

Denver Post

TD 181TD 100TD 168

TD 34

MountainShadowsBurning

TD 155TD 194TD 162TD 164

TD 15

TD 185TD 153TD 159TD 157TD 160

Other

Fox News

TD 167TD 166TD 150TD 158

Unknown Video

TD 9

FR 1

TD 29TD 15

Primary Structure Burning Observations

Image Source
47

This video comprises almost all information, other than anecdotal, for the northeastern area of

Majestic Drive, available for this report. 

The peak image acquisition at 20:30 is likely due to several factors. First, the steady increase in 

images available is partly due to an increased number of witnesses as the incident progressed. 

As discussed in the 

sections below, this 

peak also roughly 

coincides with 

deployment of 

resources. Many 

images were taken as 

first responders first 

deployed and those not 

driving were assessing 

the situation and 

imaging features. The 

imaging did not 

continue once first 

responders were 

deployed, except 

during breaks or by 

those tasked with 

documenting the 

incident. 

The spike of images at 20:30 is also likely due to the increased visibility, which appeared to have 

coincided with the wind change and also allowed the imaging of the scene by observers on the 

periphery of the fire and in topographically convenient areas safe from the incident. These areas 

facilitated imaging of burning primary structures and vegetation for the southern portion of 

Wilson Road and areas east such as Trevor Lane, Courtney Drive and Jenner Court. Finally, the 

setting of the sun around 20:30 reduced some imaging. Many later images were also 

instrumental in determining the fire timeline on southern Majestic Drive and Lions Gate Lane as 

well as Ashton Park Place and other locations. 

Regardless of the cause, the general increase and spike around 20:30 of burning observations 

from images also represented a peak of understanding of the fire timeline related to structures 

burning, and, possibly, a convergence with defensive action peak deployment of resources. This 

time also appeared to coincide with the beginning of the large majority of successful 

containments of structure-to-structure fire spread and other flare-ups. Additionally, given the 

time for apparatus deployment coupled with burn time and defensive action integration presented 

below, the fact that it took time for resources to reach effectiveness is highlighted. 

Figure 18 Counts of primary structure burning observations from images by 

time range. 

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

18:30 19:30 20:30 21:30 22:30 23:30 0:30 1:30

Burning Primary Structure Observations

Time Ranges on June 26 and 27, 2012
48

Images portrayed varying degree of information regarding burning times. For example, some 

images only portrayed structures in a complete state of destruction with minimal flames present 

in images taken at night. Other images portrayed structure ignitions or early burning clearly seen 

during the day or full involvement at night, thereby illuminating surrounding features. Figure 19

provides counts of primary 

structure observations showing 

burning structures grouped by 

burning categories. 

The images were initially 

grouped into the categories 

shown in Figure 19 but 

normalized to “burning” or “not 

burning” to coincide with 

burning descriptions from TDs, 

which could not generally be 

precisely classified based on 

lack of a quantitative measure. 

It should also be noted that 50 

structures were identified in the 

images as in the process of 

igniting and placed in the 

“structure ignition” category. 

In most cases this delineation 

was conducted to identify fire progression and possible structure-to-structure fire spread. The 

ignition categorization was not used in tabulations for the Waldo Canon Fire studies beyond 

those shown in Figure 19, unless ignition was also confirmed by eyewitness observers and a field 

assessment or image of damage. 

All images showing some state of burning, or lack thereof, provide some information for 

timeline development. The locations of primary structures with image observations only 

coinciding with the “Done” category also identify certain gaps in image information regarding 

burning primary structures, such as the east side of Majestic Drive. Map Figure 5 shows the 

location of these images, which in some cases portray a general lack of information. 

Nonetheless, in some cases, even images portraying “Done” burning primary structures such as 

on Trevor Lane, Courtney Drive and Hot Springs Court, when available in the context of other 

burning images, might also portray valuable information. 

For example, the videos shown in Appendix E titled, “Mountain Shadows is Burning” show 

primary structures “Done” burning in conjunction with other neighboring structures in a more 

involved state of burning. This provides information on the extent of fire spread in the area of 

Trevor Lane. Map Figure 5 also highlights the lack of images on the eastern side of Majestic 

Figure 19 Structure burning observation counts by burning category.

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Structure

Ignition

Fully

Involved

Past Peak Done No Smoke

or Flames

Visible

Burning Primary Structure Observations

Primary Structure Burning Observation Categories
49

Drive. This, coupled with the areas shown in Map Figure 4 not having any images, portray the 

general areas where limited information from images regarding burning times of primary 

structures are located (i.e., east side of Northern Majestic Drive, Brogan’s Bluff between Wilson 

and Rossmere Road, Karamy Court and interior portions of Yankton Place). 

Counts of primary structures by number of image observations in each burn condition category 

available for respective structures 

summarized in Figure 19, are 

portrayed in Figure 20. Primary 

structures counted as having one 

observation category in Figure 20

might have had multiple images in 

the same category. As can be seen 

in Figure 20, the number decreases 

dramatically with an increase in the 

number of burning observation 

types. Also shown in Figure 20 are 

191 primary structures having image 

observations portraying only one 

state of burning conditions of the 

284 (67 %) structures with images 

showing burn condition from a time 

stamped image. 

There were only 44 distinct images 

that provided 108 observations on the ignition status of vegetation and detached combustibles on 

64 parcels, as shown in Map Figure 6. Time patterns generally follow those described above, 

with the peak amount of images occurring between 19:30 and 20:30 on June 26, and only three 

images not having time stamps. Figure 21 shows the number of images per combustible feature 

category. 

Images of burning features on the parcel covered less features compared to those of burning 

primary structures. For example, of the 840 mapped parcels within MSC containing a mapped 

fire perimeter, only 64 (i.e. ≈ 8 %), as shown in Map Figure 6, had images of parcel burning 

features. This is compared to 65 % of the damaged and destroyed primary structures having 

images showing some state of burning. 

There might be several reasons for this, including that some significant percentage of the 

wildlands burned shortly after the passage of the main fire front while first responders were 

evacuated. Also, images might have focused on burning structures as they were a more 

significant phenomenon. Nonetheless, there were locations with multiple images portraying 

different states of burning vegetation and detached combustibles, which provided valuable 

Figure 20 Counts of primary structures by number of image 

observations in each burn condition category.

0

50

100

150

200

250

1 2 3 4 5

Number of Primary Structures

Number of Image Observations in Each Category
50

information, particularly regarding consequences of a wind change after the passage of the main 

wildland fire front. These specific cases are discussed in more detail below.

Images portrayed relatively little information on specifics of defensive actions. The above 

described images, however, were useful in determining time of defensive actions. Specific 

details of defensive actions were obtained from TDs. It should be noted that images did contain 

evidence of defensive actions, which were not recorded by the TD process, with an example 

shown in Figure 22. 

Figure 22 provides evidence of a possible defensive action around Wilson Road by a CSFD 

apparatus at 18:29. Although it 

is not conclusive that any action 

took place in this location, there 

is evidence that a defensive 

action might have occurred at 

this location based on the image 

of the first responder with 

equipment at the ready and the 

deployed hose. Ultimately, no 

defensive action was recorded at 

this location and time by the 

apparatus shown in Figure 22. 

The potentially missed 

defensive action described 

above demonstrates the 

importance of integrating all 

data. Also, highlighted is the 

need to improve techniques for 

recording defensive action information. For example, if a crowd sourcing method was available 

to gather information from first responders, the image shown in Figure 22 could have been used 

before the TDs began. This would have allowed data recorders the opportunity to present the 

image to first responders on the apparatus, which might have refreshed the memory of the 

responder to the action that took place. 

The area shown in Figure 22, which was geolocated due to Google Streetview imagery of the 

same location, is important to overall analysis of the Waldo Canyon Fire. Ideally, it is important 

to know what locations, built and wildland, received spotting potentially from the main wildland 

fire front. Aside from the image shown in Figure 22, there was no evidence of ignitions in this 

area after the passage of the main wildland fire front, though there was evidence of ignitions in 

areas to the south of this location. Consequently, uncertainty of ignitions is present based on the 

image shown in Figure 22, and the lack of a recorded defensive action in this location at the 

respective time. 

Figure 21 Counts of properties with images of burning features or lack 

thereof. 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Vegeation Linear Feature Other Unknown

Property Burning Observations

Feature with Image Portraying Burning Condition
51

8.3.2.4 Technical Discussion Timeline Data

The 208 TDs provided timeline information on burning features and defensive actions. TDs 

occurred with varying members of particular fire suppression resources (e.g., Engines, Brush 

Trucks, Hot Shot Crews, etc...) 

with an effort made to have 

discussions with at least one 

member of each apparatus or 

hand crew. Additionally, TDs 

occurred with individuals who 

directed defensive actions and 

made observations of burning 

features and other defensive 

actions, but might not have 

conducted the defensive 

actions. These actions were in 

theory marked in the 

spreadsheet as “prior defensive 

action”, and are considered 

anecdotal information in this report. 

It should also be noted that the TD spreadsheet essentially has two records for some 

observations. For example, a first responder extinguishing a deck would result in two records. 

One record would contain information related to the primary structure burning condition (e.g., 

“deck on fire”) and the second record would contain information related to the defensive action 

(e.g. “extinguish structure”). For this and other reasons, care must be taken when “counting” 

observations of burning features or defensive actions in the TD spreadsheet. 

Also, the defensive action data and burning feature observations, whether from images or other 

sources are biased because they required human presence. Some areas, including many wildland 

areas, did burn with no documented accounts in this study. The assessments presented in this 

section aim at identifying those locations of known activity, based on post-fire information, but 

no observations of burning features or defensive actions in addition to assessing other items of 

data quality.

Many records of primary structures burning (950) had coincidental observations of defensive 

actions. Consequently, the population of TD burning primary structure observations with time 

stamps (1872 as described below), was used to assess distributions of observations in the TD 

data without the double counting that would have occurred if both defensive action and burning 

feature observations were included. 

Figure 23 shows the number of burning primary structure observations by TD number. Only 

those observations with greater than 20 observations are examined to look at those discussions 

with a larger than average number of observations. The average number of burning primary 

Figure 22 Image taken at 18:29 on Wilson Road to the east of Vantage 

Vista Drive showing an unconfirmed defensive action.

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with permission
52

structure observations per discussion was about eleven with a standard deviation of about ten. 

For this population, there were 28 discussions that accounted for 742 of the 1872 observations or 

27 % of the discussions accounted for 40 % of the observations of burning primary structures. 

There might be many reasons for the relatively small number of discussion numbers having a 

disproportionate amount of observations of burning primary structures. First, the majority of 

apparatus were local CSFD apparatus, which were on the fire scene for the entire time period 

being studied, requiring duplicate discussions to cover the extent of the incident. Observers with 

images sometimes resulted in numerous observations, as evidenced by TD 41 having the most 

observations, many of which were a result of a GoPro video early in the incident. There might 

be other reasons. 

Figure 23 Counts of observations of burning primary structures by TD number for those discussions that 

contained greater than 20 observations.

There were 1996 observations from TDs related to burning conditions of primary structures of 

which 124 had no time estimate. The remaining 1872 observations all had time sources, either 

from images, AVL or radio logs, often correlated in the context of related first responder events. 

Additionally, the above sources were often used to bound observation times. Ultimately, the 

TDs provided time stamped information on 365 of the 455 (82 %) destroyed or damaged primary 

structures as shown in Map Figure 7. Only small areas on the northeastern side of Majestic 

Drive and Yankton Park Place had no observations. 

Some locations had contradicting information regarding burning conditions from uncorroborated 

accounts. For example, one first responder stated that he, “could see all the framing” of all the 

primary structures on the southern side of the interior of Brogans Bluff Road early on June 27. 

Discussions with a homeowner on Karamy Street provide descriptions of the primary structures, 

“going up like dominoes” on Brogans Bluff Road before sunset on June 26. The above 

discrepancies highlight the difficulties of obtaining primary structure burning observations from 

anecdotal accounts with no imagery. 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

4188

162

50

168

24

126105

1

7154

119157106100167

11

129

92

116

72

107152194

5597

164

Primary Structure Burning 

Observations

TD Number
53

Figure 24 shows the counts of TD observations of burning primary structures by time source 

listed in the TD spreadsheet. It should be noted that some of these estimates had multiple 

confirmations of time from AVLs, images and/or radio logs, which are not reflected in Figure 24

as only one source was listed. And, as discussed above, observations from a particular team (e.g. 

engine) might be counted twice and represent only one burning feature or defensive action. 

Consequently, it is difficult to provide exact “counts” of observations from TDs and the data 

contained below is presented to assess basic trends in the data regarding quality and uncertainty. 

As can be seen in Figure 24, the largest number of time stamped TD observations came from 

AVLs, followed by cross-correlation, images and radio logs. It is also important to note that 

while there is some overlap with the images listed in section 8.3.2.3, many of the fire behavior 

observations found in the images described above are not included in Figure 24. That is to say 

that not all images were integrated with observations from TDs.

The contribution of each time source to providing observations on burning primary structures 

across time ranges 

on the evening of 

June 26 into June 

27 are shown in 

Figure 25. AVLs, 

images, and radio 

logs mostly surpass 

cross-correlation in 

regards to amount 

of time stamped 

observations 

obtained for the 

first three hours of 

the incident. Crosscorrelation as a time source then begins to become more prevalent between 20:30 and 21:30 on 

June 26 and eventually surpasses or equals the number of observations from other time sources,

between 23:30 to 1:30. Then AVL proceeds to have the most observations, relatively, as this 

became the main time source and no more images were available.

The increased number of observations from the cross-correlation time source around 21:30, 

shown in Figure 25, is also, in part a consequence of the large time ranges associated with this 

time source method. There were a number of observations of burning primary structures with 

time ranges greater than 20 min with significant numbers greater than ± 60 min, as shown in 

Figure 26. 

Figure 24 Counts of TD observations of burning primary structures by time source 

listed in the TD spreadsheet.

0

200

400

600

800

1000

Images Cross

Correlation

AVL Radio Log

Primary Structure Burning 

Observations

Time Source Listed for TD Observation
54

These observations often had a time estimate assigned later during the incident to account for the 

large uncertainty in the time. The increase is also due to the occurrence of a number of defensive 

actions, which began during the 21:30 time period, or shortly before. The spike of primary 

structure burning observations shown in Figure 25 around 0:30 on June 27 is also due in part to 

increases in deployment of mutual aid resources at this time along with mop-up actions and 

defensive actions at the southern end of Majestic Drive and Lions Gate Lane. 

Figure 25 Counts of burning primary structure observations from TD by time on June 26-27, 2012 associated 

with each time stamp for each time source. 

Consequences of large time ranges associated with TD observations can also be seen when 

comparing the distribution of burning primary structure observations from TDs shown in Figure 

25 to the distribution of burning primary structure observations from images shown in Figure 18. 

This comparison of the time ranges for the two observation sources indicates that observations 

from TDs peak about one hour later than observations from images (21:30 versus 20:30). In 

part, this is due to the increased time range associated with observations from TDs, as shown in 

Figure 26, compared to time ranges associated with observations from images, as shown in Figure 

16, resulting in TD observations with greater than about ± 20 min time ranges sometimes being

binned an hour different than when the burning actually occurred. Also, this is a consequence of 

the time it took from initial deployment to actions. 

Figure 27 shows the contribution of each time source to the dataset on observations of burning 

primary structures across time ranges on the evening of June 26 into June 27 for those 

observations with uncertainty in the time range of ± 20 min. The contribution of images 

becomes more prevalent for observations between 19:00 and 21:00, but AVLs are equally as 

important for TD observations. The effect of large time range in the peak of AVL time stamped 

observations at 21:30 is reduced and there is a more even distribution of images. Also, 

comparison with Figure 18 highlights the missing contribution of primary structure burning 

observations from images. 

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

18:3019:3020:3021:3022:3023:30

0:301:302:303:304:305:306:30

23:50

Primary Structure Burning 

Observations

June26 June27

Images

Cross-Correlation

AVL

Radio Log
55

The number of primary structure burning observations by time range estimates is shown in 

Figure 28. The effect of those observations with large time range estimates around the single 

estimate is seen in Figure 28 with the majority of the time ranges with estimates greater than 60 

min occurring during the 21:30 time interval or later. The distribution from time ranges of 0 

min to 20 min likely represents the population of TD burning primary structure observations with 

time estimates useful for this study. These 859 observations represent time stamp observations 

with uncertainty in the time range of ± 20 min on 290 primary structures in some state of 

burning, or lack thereof, as shown in Map Figure 8.

 

Figure 27 Counts of burning primary structure observations from TD by time ranges on June 26 -27, 2012

for each time source with a time range less than or equal to + 20 min.

Figure 26 Counts of burning primary structure observations from TDs by range in minutes ( + ) 

associated with time stamp for each time source. 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Primary Structure Burning 

Observations

June 26 June 27

Time associated with TD observations (min)

Images

Cross-Correlation

AVL

Radio Log

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

Primary Structure Burning 

Observations

Time Ranges ± associated with TD Observations (min)

Images

Cross-Correlation

AVL

Radio Log
56

Figure 28 Counts of burning primary structure observations from TDs by time intervals on June 26-27, 2012

displayed by time range estimates associated with burning primary structure observation. 

This shows that about 35 % of the primary structure burning observations from TDs with a time 

range between 0 min and 20 min occurred late in the incident (i.e., after 21:30 on June 26) and 

had low time ranges because of the late state of burning as described above. It should also be 

noted that observations of burning features might be from different observers viewing the same 

burning object. Therefore the observations of decks, garages, roofs and other items burning or 

ignited, in Figure 31, can only be used to indicate that these items were burning and not to 

quantify the amount of burning of each feature type at the Waldo Canyon Fire. 

There were only 201 observations of detached combustibles or vegetation on parcels in some 

state of burning. These had similar patterns to those described above for primary structure 

burning observations. There were, however, more observations from cross-correlation (84), and 

then AVL (71) followed by radio log (24) and images (22). There were 62 or about 31 % of the 

observations with uncertainty in time stamps of less than + 20 min. There were 117 observations 

occurring before 21:30 on June 26, or about 58 %. The distribution of observations among the 

various burn condition categories assigned as shown in Figure 30. 

TDs were the primary source used for determination of the time of defensive actions. There 

were 1921 observations related to some specific defensive action, of these 51 had no time stamp. 

Consequently, there were 1870 time stamped defensive action observations on 487 properties. 

Many of these 1870 coincided with observations regarding time estimates of burning features 

described above. Similar time range issues, as described above, for burning features occur with 

defensive actions. The images could not be used to fill in the missing information of defensive 

actions with large time ranges in this report. Consequently, all defensive action records are 

assessed below. 

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

Primary Structure Burning Observations

June 26 June 27 

0-20

20-60

>60

Not

Determined

Time Ranges (±) 

Minutes
57

Figure 29 Counts of burning primary structure observations from TDs by observation category.

Figure 30 Counts of TD parcel burning observations.

Defensive action observations from TDs across one hour time intervals for various defensive 

action observation categories are shown in Figure 31 through Figure 34. Figure 31 shows 

defensive actions observations related to primary structures. Figure 31 indicates “preventing 

70

1 

93

298

2 8 7 

61 55

270

600

85

16

306

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

Primary Structure Burning Observations

TD Primary Structure Burning Observation Category

4 

20

36

3 

129

1 8 

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Property Burning Observations

TD Parcel Burning Observation
58

structure ignitions” had the most occurrences followed by “extinguishing structures” and then 

“contain structures”. There is an increase of actions to “prevent structure ignitions” coinciding 

with an increase in time up until 22:30. 

This increase is in part due to the increased number of burning structures during this time period 

and the consequential containing or “boxing in” of burning structures. Map Figure 9 portrays 

this “boxing in” of burning areas by preventing structure ignitions and shows defensive actions 

conducted to “prevent structure ignitions” between 19:30 and 22:30 and the spatial relationship 

of these structures to other primary structures, many of which have burned or are burning during 

the specified time. Also shown in Map Figure 9 are a large number of defensive actions to 

“prevent structure ignitions” around Chase Point Circle and Regal View Drive, which are a result 

of first responders turning sprinklers on in this area to prevent ember ignitions. 

Figure 31 Counts of defensive action observations from TDs by time for each primary structure observation 

category from June 26-27, 2012.

The turning on of sprinklers also accounts for some of the spike in defensive actions to “prevent 

structure ignitions” at the 22:30 time interval on June 26. Additionally, Figure 31 indicates a 

second spike in actions related to primary structures occurring at the 00:30 June 27 time interval 

and a gradual decrease until about 06:30. This again, represents a “boxing-in” of the fire as also

portrayed in Map Figure 10. 

It should also be noted that the spike in structure related defensive actions occurring at 00:30 and 

continuing until 06:30 consists of records where only 148 of 388 (38%) have uncertainty in the 

time range of than + 20 min. Consequently, some of these observations do represent burning and 

ignitions likely occurring sometime earlier than what are portrayed in Figure 31, or observations 

of primary structures largely done burning, but with embers still being produced and actions 

required. The deployment of mutual aid resources likely contributed to the second spike of 

“prevent structure ignition” actions at 00:30 on June 27. 

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

Defesnive Action Observations

June 26 June 27 

contain

structure

extinguish

structure

prevent

structure

ignition
59

Figure 31 also indicates a significant number of actions to “extinguish structures” peaking at 

21:30 but continuing into June 27. These extinguishment actions recorded as occurring later in 

the incident is a result of, in part, the large time range associated with some TD observations. 

The “extinguish structure” actions are also a result of certain features reigniting. Also, a 

significant portion of these “extinguish structure” actions are to the south of Majestic Drive, 

Lions Gate Lane and Courtney Drive, and represent final containment actions in these areas. 

The containment of structures peaks at 22:30, coinciding with major containment actions at the 

south of Majestic Drive, Lions Gate Lane and Courtney Drive. Increases in action shown in 

Figure 31 are, in part, due to the large time range associated with many of these defensive action 

observations. Also, actions did continue until June 27 in many areas on Majestic Drive, Lions 

Gate Lane and Courtney Drive. Some of these actions might have transitioned to mop-up and it 

was difficult to discern between containment and mop-up actions. 

Figure 32 shows defensive actions related to detached combustibles. Again, defensive actions on 

properties increased until the 20:30 time interval. The most frequent actions were “extinguish 

detached combustibles” followed by “remove fences” and “prevent detached combustible”. 

Extinguishing detached combustibles consisted largely of extinguishing fences relatively early 

(< 20:30), primarily to the south of Stoneridge Drive, on Moorfield Avenue, and on the southern 

end of Ashton Park Place, both along Flying W Ranch Road as shown in Map Figure 11. 

Removing fences started to peak at 20:30, coinciding with structure to structure fire spread 

around Courtney Drive and Ashton Park Place and was a consequence of fire spreading to fences 

and igniting, causing more embers in locations shown in Map Figure 11. The demarcation 

between fence removal as a preventative measure or as extinguishment action is difficult to 

discern. Some locations, such as Moorfield Avenue, saw both extinguishment of fences and the 

removal of fences.

It is known that the extent of fence removal is underestimated in Map Figure 11, as the TDs did 

not use the post-fire imagery to identify locations of downed fences. Nonetheless, the removal 

of fences emphasizes the use of a combination of suppression resources to stop structure fire

spread. Engines with water were required to contain burning primary structures from spreading 

to adjacent structures, and hand tools and low water applications were necessary to prevent 

ignition of and extinguish exposed features from the structures burning further away. 

Figure 33 shows similar patterns as described above for defensive actions related to parcel 

features. Figure 34 shows other defensive actions such as pre-positioning of equipment, mop-up 

actions, and anecdotal defensive actions. As seen in Figure 34, pre-positioning of some 

equipment occurred early before the passage of the main wildland fire front resulting in the later

boxing-in of the fire around Courtney and Majestic Drives. 
60

Figure 32 Counts of defensive action observations from TDs by time for each detached combustible

observation category from June 26-27, 2012.

Figure 33 Counts of defensive action observations from TDs by time for each parcel or vegetation observation 

category from June 26-27, 2012.

Mop-up actions occurred later during the event, peaking on June 27. It should be noted that 

extensive mop-up actions were required for days after the incident. The decline in recorded 

mop-up actions on the 27 is a reflection of not focusing on documenting these actions. It is 

likely Figure 34 does not represent the true amount of mop-up actions occurring on or after June 

27. 

The tracking of the apparatus deployment times was also achieved by integrating multiple data 

sources. AVL was used when available and AVL dropout (associated with AVL GPS signal loss 

or loss of communication link) was addressed by integrating apparatus location information with 

images, video, radio communications and first responder TDs. Dispatch information was used 

for mutual aid when it was available. TD times were often the least accurate with images and 

AVL providing the most accurate apparatus deployment time information. Partial information 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Defensive Action Observations

June 26 June 27

extinguish

detached

combustibles

prevent

detached

combustible

ignition

remove

fences

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Defesnive Action Observations

June 26 June 27

contain

parcel

extinguish

parcel

prevent

parcel

ignition

vegetation

removal
61

was available when an apparatus went to refuel. Data was also collected from TDs on crew 

changes. Both refueling and crew changes were not utilized in documenting the apparatus 

engaged at any one time in MSC, as both activities removed the apparatus from the scene for 

only a brief period of time. 

Figure 34 Counts of defensive action observations from TDs by time for each mop-up, pre-positioning of 

equipment and prior defensive action observation category from June 26-27, 2012. 

9.0 Data Quality Summary, Resultant Rules, and Assumptions 

All data gathered and compiled for this study has not been integrated in this report across all

locations. This report focuses on integration of information related to damage and destruction, 

defensive actions, and the timeline of events for burning in and around MSC, with an emphasis 

on TD information. Described above are quantity, quality and uncertainty related to integration 

of damage and destruction, defensive actions and timeline data. 

Even with the integration effort described herein, it is expected that new damage, defensive 

actions and burning observations might be identified. Consequently, the examination of data 

quality conducted in this report is required to understand where well-founded case studies exist 

to derive pertinent information. A finding of this report is that data should be collected with an 

eye towards complete integration from the start. This includes data collected from various 

organizations or studies that might occur, even if independent from each other. 

The integration of data also provides potential for introducing error, which is why the number of 

steps for the TD process shown in Table 7 should be reduced. It is difficult to quantify errors 

resulting from the full data integration process. Although versions of the spreadsheet provided 

during each cleanup step were retained and could be compared, this step was not conducted as it 

was shown that integration in a spreadsheet was inefficient and ineffective, and resulted in a 

large effort to cleanup discrepancies as a result of partial data integration. 

0

5

10

15

20

25

Defensive Action Observations

June 26 June 27

mop up

prepositioning

of

equipment

prior

defensive

action
62

Data has been checked for gross errors when transferring spreadsheet data to a GIS database 

using automated techniques. Comparisons were made against the GIS database and the original 

spreadsheet and numbers of records and data were retained for random checks. No errors were

found in the final transfer. Potential errors with the full integration process lie largely with 

incorrect assumptions or interpretations. Again, the process described above was employed to 

provide an understanding of data quality in space and time so that appropriate assumptions could 

be made, resulting in defensible conclusions from the data. 

It was not uncommon for the understanding of fire behavior in certain locations to be changed 

once all available data was integrated. In most cases, the result was a greater appreciation of the 

unknown areas regarding burning features and defensive actions in space and time, and the cause 

of the unknowns. Additionally, the process conducted above highlights key information required 

for well-founded case studies that might be used to assess exposure, vulnerabilities, and tactics.

Table 8 lists the specific data sources used in this report to produce the necessary building blocks 

to assess exposure, vulnerabilities, and tactics at the Waldo Canyon Fire. It is important to note 

that other specific technologies could also be used, and that Table 8 reflects the technologies 

used in this report. Also, for smaller incidents the geolocation of features might be simpler and 

not require as significant a number of pre-fire aerial image sources as used in this study.

Table 8 Data sources required to reconstruct the fire timeline.

Data Sourcexv Purpose

Google Streetview Pre-fire ground view of area for moderate to large incidents was 

used to geolocate burning features.

Microsoft Bing Maps Pre-fire oblique aerial view of area for moderate to large 

incidents is required to geolocate burning features.

Colorado Springs 

Orthorectified Imagery

Pre-fire orthorectified aerial view of area for moderate to large 

incidents is required to geolocate burning features.

During Fire Imagery Images are required to reconstruct the burning of features. 

First Responder 

Recollection of Actions

First responder accounts of actions taken during the incident are 

required to document defensive actions.

Post-Fire Aerial 

Imagery

Post-fire aerial imagery, ideally orthorectified for full scientific 

post-fire assessments to provide situational awareness.

Post-Fire Ground 

Assessment 

A detailed post-fire ground assessment, guided by assessment of 

the imagery should be conducted after the incident before 

collection of other data not pertinent to incident response.

Integrated Damage 

Assessment

All damage assessments conducted by various organizations 

should be made available and integrated.

An important point regarding Table 8 is the need to base conclusions on integration of all 

available data, also considering possible missing information. Conclusions based on limited 

data, aerial assessments alone, only field assessments, or just technical discussions often 

overlook key information and could be questionable. It is only through the characterization of 

well-founded case studies attempting to measure all aspects of the fire disturbance continuum 12

 

xv These were the data sources used. Other sources may be available.
63

that proper guidance for field and laboratory experiments might be determined, and standard test 

methods developed for WUI constructions. Current methods of post-fire assessments focus 

largely on one aspect (e.g. field assessments or discussions with first responders) and not the full 

integration of all available data.

Table 9 describes the advantages and disadvantages of each of the above data sources for 

documenting damage information. For scientific assessments, a new approach to damage 

assessments is required to integrate aerial and ground images. Damage assessors should use 

standard technology in documenting damage, which involves image documentation of all 

damage in a linked electronic environment for distribution. Image documentation is required to 

provide an understanding of damage information, as is evidenced by the lack of images for 

potentially damaged asphalt roofs, and the inability to quantify that damage in this study. 

Table 9 Advantages and disadvantages of various damage assessment data sources.

Data 

Type

Advantages Disadvantages

1. Local 

Damage

1. Consistent data across large areas.

2. Ground imagery available after the fire for 

damage and destroyed primary structures.

3. Some damage locations tied to actions.

1. Only visible damage was documented.

2. Limited documentation of vegetation.

3. Not all damage linked to defensive actions.

4. Interior and roof damage missed.

2. TD 

Damage 

Data

1. Damage locations tied to defensive actions. 1. Partial assessment of damage.

2. No images of damage.

3. Some damage has only anecdotal accounts 

as identified damage was fixed.

3. Postfire 

aerial 

imagery

1. Only method available that portrayed all 

primary structure destruction after fire.

2. Only method available for consistent 

vegetation damage information. 

3.Identifies relatively significant damage to 

visible features from the air (e.g., roofs).

4. One data source for destruction assessment.

1. Does not identify damage to occluded 

features and sides of features or underneath 

features (e.g., deck and vegetation).

2. Not always easy to obtain though some 

aerial documentation is likely possible.

3. Interpretation might require knowledge and 

skills in aerial photo interpretation.

4. Other 

Reports

1. Selected in-depth damage assessments.

2. Selected images from reports. 

1. Only partial assessment of damage.

2. No data available to all assessors.

3. Limited images of damage.

4. No attempt to assess all aspects of fire 

disturbance continuum.

5. Media 1. Highlights potential missing damage. 1. Information only available on one primary 

structure.

During-fire images of burning features and defensive actions would be an efficient and effective 

means to document a WUI event. Even though the technology exists for each first responder to 

have a camera mounted on them, there are logistical constraints which need to be overcome. 

Moreover, the mounting of cameras on first responders is not generally accepted among the fire 

response profession. Video devices mounted on apparatus with simple GPS devices would, and 

do, go far in providing documentation of an incident such as the Waldo Canyon Fire. 

It should also be noted that unknown areas, during at least early time periods in the event 

(i.e., < 20:00) remained because no observers went to these locations until later. There were 
64

many reasons, not the least of which is safety. For example, radio logs record first responders 

commenting around 18:30 on Majestic Drive as follows:

“We’re picking up our lines, that area is really hot” 

There was one AVL of an apparatus heading to the north side of Majestic Drive around 18:26. 

The TD for this apparatus identified burning on both sides of the street, as evidenced in other 

images. The apparatus turned around after traveling 90 m into the north side of Majestic Drive 

because of uncertain exit conditions. 

Other AVL time-stamped observations showed an apparatus driving through the north side of 

Majestic Drive and stopping south of Hot Springs Court around 16:55. A first responder on this 

apparatus identified burning primarily on the west side of Majestic Drive. Yet, less than one hour 

later, the north end of Majestic Drive was reported as impassable due to heat, flames, smoke and 

embers by the same first responder. Limited early observations also existed for Brogans Bluff 

Drive, Trevor Lane, Talleson Court and Courtney Drive because no first responders entered 

these areas until later, or the entry was limited. These limited entries, if documented with 

vehicle mounted cameras, would have provided more information in these unknown areas. 

Some periphery areas were obscured by smoke, primary structures and topographic locations on 

Trevor Lane, Talleson Court and Courtney Drive. For example, a Colorado Springs Police 

Officer was recorded on the south side of Courtney Drive as early as 18:35 observing no 

structures on fire as described in Appendix H, yet at the same time saying the smoke was so thick 

the responder’s eyes hurt. Images from locations upwind show significant burning in the interior 

of Courtney Drive earlier than 18:35, but some of the precise locations were observed as not 

burning by a responder to the south. 

The above example demonstrates the uncertainty associated with cross-correlation of discussions 

to develop timelines. It is somewhat difficult to reconcile the two observations, though smoke 

obscuration is a possible reason. It is also possible the cross-correlation conducted in Appendix 

H was wrong because the first responder had the sequence of events wrong. Regardless, this 

highlights the uncertainties in areas lacking photo images. Even with available images, in 

numerous occasions it was necessary to calibrate thme to get the correct time stamp as 

demonstrated in Appendix I. 

Trevor Lane and Talleson Court were also areas with no exits for first responders. Interior 

Brogans Bluff Road is the most interior road in the incident, with the earliest AVL recorded

location at 19:28. This, along with information below, shows how the common parameter of 

response time used in WUI Mitigation assessments is more complicated than drive time from 

point A to point B. Limited ingress/egress is also an issue, but variables like distance from 

“major” road or visibility are possibly more important factors for determining response time for 

WUI disasters such as the Waldo Canyon Fire.

The assessment described above highlights advantages and disadvantages associated with the 

two general methods used in this report to obtain observations of burning features and defensive 
65

actions: 1) During-fire image acquisition and 2) Technical Discussions. Measuring phenomena 

in space and time are activities required for a scientific post-fire assessment. Table 10 lists the 

identified advantages and disadvantages associated with the two methods. 

Table 10 Advantages and disadvantages of methods used in this report to document burning feature 

observations and defensive actions in space and time. 

Method Advantages Disadvantages

During-Fire 

Video and 

Images.

1.Precise estimate of burn condition.

2.Most sensors explicitly have time information.

3.Time can be correlated relatively precisely 

based on other images if significant images 

exist such as at the Waldo Canyon Fire. 

4.Lacking GPS information, location can 

typically be discerned from other methods. 

5. In high density structure locations of moderate 

geographic extent, where adequate imagery 

exists, the geolocation process, while tedious, 

becomes readily achievable due to familiarity 

obtained of the area through repetitive viewing.

1. Not available for entire incident.

2. Requires (for some incidents) pre-fire 

ground and aerial imagery (e.g. Bing 

MapsTM and StreetviewTM).

3. Requires proficiency of use in basic 

geospatial science and technology.

4. Time stamps not always accurate.

5. Images recorded from the street only 

portray partial defensive action 

information, which could be easily 

misinterpreted.

6. Miss occluded areas.

Technical 

Discussions 

1. Provides detailed accounts of first responder 

activities.

2. Discussions are believed to have allowed for an 

increased transfer of knowledge compared to 

manually recording activities by first responder.

3. Provides a real-life accounting of events for 

post-fire assessors as compared to electronic 

media.

4.Involves first responders in the process, which 

is a key step to educating responders and 

homeowners, and improving mitigation advice.

1. Labor and time consuming to obtain.

2. Several sources of error.

3. Large time lag between first responder 

recollection of event and event.

4. Difficult to discern between anecdotal 

and direct observations.

5. Not possible to have discussions with 

all fire observers at large incidents.

6. Recording activities and observations 

in space and time is error prone 

without pre-fire, during-fire and postfire geolocated images and damage.

The TD process implemented at this incident was also implemented at the 2007 California Witch 

Fire and the 2011 Texas Tanglewood Fire. The amount of information collected from the Waldo 

Canyon Fire TDs was much larger than the 2011 Texas Tanglewood Fire, which had 203 

defensive action records. For these smaller incidents, integration of data sources did not result in 

as significant an effort. Similar errors in integration have been present and corrected though. 

In all cases, the relative amounts of records are trivial from a data management perspective. 

From a data uncertainty perspective, the increased records and lack of initial full data integration 

at the Waldo Canyon Fire produced significantly more discrepancies, which took significant time 

to resolve. The integration issues were not foreseen until after partial integration occurred. 

A key improvement regarding the collection of information from fire witnesses was identified. 

Crowd sourcing technology should be examined due to its potential to rapidly provide post-fire 

assessors with an overview of the incident. A crowd sourcing application is not intended to 

replace the TD process, only enhance it. This type of application would also help first 

responders to evaluate and improve their activities.
66

An initial integration of all data will provide assessors with a basic awareness of the incident. If 

this information is contained in technology applications, such as a GIS, it can be readily retrieved 

during the TD process. This would reduce the time required to obtain information from first 

responders, and the data integration process, dramatically. Additionally, anecdotal accounts, 

which were sometimes in error, would 

be more readily identified during the 

TD process. 

Also, full integration of observations 

with images during the discussion is 

ideal, as observations beyond the area 

of the image can be time-stamped. For 

example, Figure 35 shows a primary 

structure burning on Talleson Court. 

First responders also observed other 

primary structures involved in this 

location at the same time but there 

were no images. The one image 

allowed prescribing a time stamp to the 

other observations. Having this image geolocated before discussion would save resources for all 

parties involved. 

Finally, the TD process can have the number of steps shown in Table 7 reduced by not initially 

entering data into a spreadsheet and taking the information recorded on hard copy notes from the 

TD process directly into a GIS database. A crowd sourcing application would also directly enter 

data into a GIS database. Additionally, for TDs, more appropriate data structures can be 

employed that will facilitate data integration and analysis and remove issues with duplicate 

records and difficulties with maintaining integrity of data in tools such as a spreadsheet. As this 

was the first effort of its kind at such a large incident, improvements to the process are expected, 

and detailed in Appendix G. 

In addition to the above, important new concepts regarding WUI post-fire data collection and 

integration are:

• During-fire imaging, obtained in a safe and effective manner, is necessary to reconstruct 

the timeline of events to an extent necessary to assess exposure and vulnerabilities.

• First responder recording of actions, taken along with images recorded during the event, 

should occur shortly after the event in a standardized electronic manner. 

• Damage assessment should involve ground and aerial techniques with complete data 

integration before assessing WUI mitigation effectiveness or other items.

Additional information, such as in-situ sensors, would likely be required to quantify exposure 

during an event such as the Waldo Canyon Fire. 

Figure 35 Image of primary structure on Talleson Court taken 

at 19:11 on June 26, which allowed time stamp observations 

for other primary structures not shown to be obtained.

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with permission
67

The assessment described above also highlights locations with unknown burn times as follows: 

• Northeastern Majestic Drive: this area had limited observations of burning and it was 

primarily unknown what was burning in this area before 20:00. 

• Interior Brogans Bluff Drive: this area had limited observations of burning before 

20:00. Other limited observations present some contradictory information. 

• Trevor Lane: this area had limited observations of burning before about 20:20 (± 20 

min). 

• Midwestern Courtney Drive: this general area had an image observation of burning of 

unknown features at 18:23, but exact locations and magnitude of burning were unknown. 

Other smaller areas have some individual primary structure unknowns or uncertainties, which are 

addressed as appropriate, below. 

10.0 Mountain Shadows Case Study

This section provides a general description of MSC. Next, an overview of damage and 

destruction to primary structures is presented. After that, fire observations and timelines 

associated with the passage of the main fire front are described. This is followed by descriptions 

of fire observations and timelines occurring around the time a change in wind direction was 

observed (≈20:00, June 26). Finally, this section provides an overview of burning structures. 

Highlights of the defensive action timeline reconstruction are listed in Table 11. 

Table 11 Highlights of defensive action timeline reconstruction in MSC.

 

xvi Not all CSFD evacuated Mountain Shadows the second time.

Time Activity or Observation Source

6/26 Evacuated MSC residents requesting to go into primary structures 

to collect information and medications

AAR

15:00 All call issued to all CSFD firefighters TD

17:08 CSFD personnel located near Wilson Water Tank moved to hard 

pavement on Spector Way and Wilson Road.

AAR, Radio Log

17:19 Air Attack reported that the column had collapsed Radio Log

17:20 Power tripped to Wilson Water Pump Station CSFD duty report 1C1A

17:23 Evacuation of CSFD to Chipeta Elementary 

First CSFD observed structure on fire at Brogans Bluff Road

TD 41, AAR Radio Log 

Command 6, 

17:58 First recon sent back into MSC Radio Log Command 6

18:16 First CSFD apparatus enters MSC AVL

Visibility improves around Wilson Road. There is visible blue sky TD, Video

Numerous primary structures observed ignited within 15 min TD, Video, Radio Log

17:40-18:16 USFS task forces enter MSC TD, Picture

18:37 Second evacuation of CSFD to MCI building xvi TD 41, Radio Log 

Command 6

18:56 Utilities shut off gas and electric west of Centennial between 

Flying W and 30th Street.

PIO, Twitter

20:00 Local evacuation for wind shift and anticipated second flame front Radio Log TAC 7

19:54 Power restored to Wilson Pump Station CSFD Duty report 1C1A

Mutual aid task forces starts entering MSC TD, Radio Log

20:28 Sunset
68

10.1 General Description

The MSC, as described in this report and shown in Map Figure 2, is a neighborhood extending 

from North 30

xviii

th Street at the southern end to a drainage ditch on the northern end. The 

neighborhood starts at Centennial Boulevard on the eastern side and directly abuts the wildlands 

extending into the Rocky Mountains to the west. There are occluded wildland areas and 

recreational parks within MSC. The majority of primary structures are residential structures, but 

within the community are three schools, commercial buildings, a well-known tourist ranch, as 

well as other types of primary structures. 

MSC is bordered by a canyon to the north where elevations at the water tower are approximately 

2166 meters (7105 ft) and elevations at the bottom of the northern canyon at 2109 meters (6920 

ft). A significant canyon is also found to the south of the water tower, extending down into a 

high structure density portion of the community to the east of Flying W Ranch Road (i.e. 

Majestic Drive). Throughout the community are smaller canyons and other topographic features 

of various configurations. 

The 2001 Colorado Springs Community Wildfire Protection Plan (CWPP) 26 lists the wildland 

vegetation around MSC as consisting of predominantly Ponderosa Pine (Pinus ponderosa 

Lawson & C. Lawson), Gambel Oak (Quercus gambelii Nutt.), pinyon-juniper (Pinus 

monophylla Torr. & Frém, Juniperus osteosperma (Torr.) Little) stands and other mixed conifer 

stands. The Colorado Springs CWPP 26 also lists other vegetation types in and around Colorado 

Springs as shortgrass prairie with Yucca spp. L. and prickly pear-cactus (Opuntia spp. Mill.). 

Additionally, the Colorado Springs CWPP 26 describes isolated pockets of beetle-kill and 

mistletoe (Arceuthobium spp. M. Bieb) in Colorado Springs, though this was not evident in prefire imagery around MSC. High stand densities of 300 stems per acre compared to traditional

densities of 75 to 150 stems per acre are also found in Colorado Springs. 26 

In this report, wildland vegetation was mapped as those vegetation species believed to consist of 

Ponderosa Pine (Pinus ponderosa Lawson & C. Lawson), Gambel Oak (Quercus gambelii 

Nutt.), pinyon-juniper (Pinus monophylla Torr. & Frém, Juniperus osteosperma (Torr.) Little), 

shortgrass prairie with Yucca spp. L. and prickly pear-cactus (Opuntia spp. Mill.). Unknown 

grass vegetation species found along walking paths and road edges were also delineated as 

wildlands. These vegetative species had the characteristic of not being watered. 

 

xvii Crews were not replaced on all apparatus.

xviii There were many structures located on the Flying W Ranch. Only one structure was marked as a primary 

structure in this report, but most structures on the property were destroyed. 

21:00 County resources leave MSC and move north to Peregrine TD, Radio Log

21:00-22:00 Wind abated KAFF Weather Station

CSFD personnel begin shift change on apparatus xvii TD, ALV

6/27 08:30 Last observed structure ignition – structure saved TD
69

Vegetation was delineated into wildlands versus residential vegetation as shown in Map Figure 

12, based on aerial photo interpretation of the various remote sensing data sets listed. The 

various wildland vegetation species listed above were all observed in and around MSC both 

during field visits and in ground images. The area was delineated as wildland versus residential 

vegetation based on various geolocated ground images available. Wildlands were labeled as 

occluded if surrounded by residential vegetation. 

Generally, areas mapped as residential vegetation represent vegetated locations comprised of 

many different vegetation species, but characterized by well-watered vegetation and actively 

maintained landscapes or the presence of other non-combustible landscapes (e.g. rock). There 

were, however, clear distinctions between watering levels based on photo interpretations of 

vegetation greenness and the assumption that these differences were due to watering. 

Primary structure density across MSC is shown in Map Figure 13. Primary structure separation 

distance across MSC is shown in Map Figure 14. Both primary structure density and separation 

distance are portrayed in 5 classes using the Jenks natural breaks classification method as 

implemented in ArcGIS 10.2. Highest density structure locations are found in the interior of 

neighborhoods with many structures with relatively low separation distance. The hazard of a 

high primary structure density with low structure separation distance is highlighted in Map 

Figure 13 and Map Figure 14. 

Majestic Drive highlights this potential hazard of high density and low separation distance, 

particularly when adjacent to wildlands and dangerous topographic configurations. Lower 

primary structure density areas with low structure separation distance, such as Trevor Lane, 

interior Brogans Bluff Drive to the north of Karamy Court and southern Ashton Park Place, are 

also hazardous areas with high potential for conflagrations due to topographic and vegetative 

characteristics. This, coupled with the evident structure-to-structure fire spread described below, 

provides evidence that it is not solely structure density which effects structure response but the 

spatial arrangement of structures both within the community and to nearby flammable 

vegetation, topographic features, geology and the prevailing weather characteristics at the time of 

the fire. Additionally, structure density may impact defensive actions as discussed below. 

10.2 Damage and Destruction

This report identified 344 structures with known addresses destroyed. One of these addressable 

structures, the Flying W Ranch, had numerous destroyed structures, some of which were 

certainly outbuildings, and these set of structures were counted as one destroyed primary 

structure. Other primary structures also had destroyed outbuildings. Of the 344 structures with 

known addresses, 12 represented multi-family residences with two units per structure. 

Consequently, there were technically 338 (what are termed in this report as) primary structures, 

destroyed by the Waldo Canyon Fire. However, since 344 is the number of primary 

structures/residences displaced due to destruction from the Waldo Canyon Fire, it is the number 

used in this report. 
70

Additionally, there were 85 primary structures with confirmed damage through ground or aerial 

assessments, and 14 structures with damage identified through TDs but not confirmed by ground 

assessment. There were also 2 primary structures identified as having damage, only some of 

which was confirmed by field or aerial assessments. All of the damage and destruction took 

place on June 26, or early in the morning of June 27, with the exception of two primary 

structures in the Peregrine Community which were damaged on June 28. 

Map Figure 1 shows damage and destruction to primary structures across the entire Waldo 

Canyon Fire. Map Figure 2 shows damage and destruction to primary structures in MSC. This 

report does not represent a complete assessment of damage across the entire Waldo Canyon Fire 

as no complete assessment of damage was ever conducted. 

10.3 Fire Behavior Timeline and Observations (Main Fire)

The Waldo Canyon Fire crossed the mountain ridge to the west of MSC sometime in the 

afternoon of June 26, 2012. Images taken in and around MSC indicate spotting over the ridge 

produced fires to the west of MSC as shown in Map Figure 15. These spot fires then had main 

fire fronts that traveled uphill or in a north to north west direction as portrayed in images in Map 

Figure 15. 

Additionally, there appeared to be intense fire behavior in the canyon area to the west of MSC 

with a pyrocumulus cloud moving along this canyon generally from west to east, as shown in

Figure 36. The images in Figure 36 were recorded by first responders assessing the fire as it was 

approaching Cedar Heights and show the smoke plume as the fire travels down the canyon to the 

west of MSC. There are no images, available for this report, of fire in the canyon to the west of 

MSC.

Figure 36 Pyrocumulus cloud as it approaches MSC from the west. Observed from south of Cedar Heights 

Community on June 26 at approximately 17:00. 

Photos courtesy of CSFD, used 

with permission, overlays from 

NIST
71

The plume approached MSC from the west, then started leaning or collapsing in the vicinity of 

the Wilson Road water tower between 17:20 and 17:25. First responders were evacuated from 

MSC at 17:23 when the fire was approaching various locations along the MSC wildland 

interface. Visibility near the water tower was reduced to less than 10 m (33 ft) with strong winds 

and heavy ember showers. Table 12 summarizes the first responder observations from just prior 

to right after the evacuation to Chipeta Elementary. Embers reported from TDs were up to “fist” 

size from the Water Tower off Wilson Road all the Way to Chipeta Elementary. During the first 

stage of the evacuation to Chipeta Elementary, visibility improved near Flying W Ranch Road. 

At Chipeta Elementary, while resources were arriving, the visibility decreased and ash started 

falling. There was a significant range in the observations and local conditions, depending on the 

exact location of the first responder, with respect to the elementary school structure. First 

responders on Flying W Ranch Road reported significantly reduced visibility compared to first 

responders located to the south and east of the elementary school building. The visibility near 

the school continued to decrease and the evacuation continued to North 30th Street and Garden of 

the Gods Road, where smoke and ash were also present. 

Within less than 15 min of arriving at the new staging location at North 30th Street and Garden of 

the Gods Road, a CSFD scout was dispatched to assess re-entry into MSC. Flying W Ranch 

Road, just to the north of Lanagan Street and to the south of Majestic Drive was impassable due 

to very high heat. The fire exposure (convective and radiative) was so severe that face shields 

were necessary inside the command vehicle, and the heat melted the window gasket on the driver 

side (the vehicle was stopped on Flying W and facing north between Lanagan Street and 

Champagne Drive). Embers varied in size; many being of “fist” size that bounced off the 

vehicle. The extensive exposure lasted approximately 10 min to 15 min. 
72

Table 12 Observations near Wilson Road Water Tower from 17:15 to 17:28, June 26, 2012.

Time

(±2 min)

TD Observation

17:15 -17:23 6 Wind 10 to 15 km/h (5 to 10 mph) from the west. Within 10 min winds go from 10 to 

15 km/h (5 to10 mph) to 80-100 km/h (50 to 60 mph) from the same direction. Wind 

picks up, then extensive ember showers. Smoke starts getting very thick.

17:15 - 17:23 6 Fire front flames estimated at 2 to 3 times tree height, 25 m to 30 m (80 ft to 90 ft).

17:23 4 Visual contact with helicopter pilots signaling to leave.

17:23 4 Visibility drops to 10 m (30 ft). Dark smoke noted down by Flying W Ranch. 

51 Flame front about 250 m (750 ft) observed north and south of water tower. Wall of 

flames above tower. Embers raining down. Extreme winds. Residents leaving 

Wilson Road /Sceptor Way north of Rossmere Street. Then traffic clears.

17:23 20 300' wide wall of fire observed, wind direction is down Alabaster.

17:23 14 Wind breezy 10 to 15 km/h (5 to 10 mph) -- suddenly goes to (50 to 60) km/h (30 to 

40 mph). Wind is initially not hot then starts heating up -- fire is crowning. Wind 

peeled door back on truck, like being in a tornado 100 km/h (60 mph gusts).

17:23 14 Citizens still present in Wilson area. CSPD still are coming up the street (Wilson).

17:23 6 Visibility down to 2.5 m (8 ft). 

17:23 6 Visibility improving as they drive out (west of Karamy Court cul-de-sac).

17:24 34 Hot air blast before CSFD leaves the water tower area (personnel couldn't breathe). 

17:24 34 Evacuation call due to wall of flames behind water tower.

17:25 34 Major traffic jam at Wilson Road /Rossmere Street. Wind, dry air, then smoke and 

embers, worse than thick fog. Had to use AVL to navigate out.

17:28 34 Drive out by Linger Way, nothing on fire, visibility had improved.

17:24-17:29 105 Wall of flames visible in rear view mirror. Visibility 67 m (225 ft) at 2945 Brogans 

Bluff. Strong winds from west to east. Within 3 to 4 min, visibility down to 15 m (50 

ft) on Rossmere Street near Linger Way/Chuckwagon Road. 

Eighteen minutes after the reconnaissance team was dispatched, the first CSFD engine arrived at 

MSC. The dashboard video showed that the plume had cleared and that blue sky was visible. A 

limited number of primary structures were on fire. The number of structures increased with time. 

As more primary structures were ignited and burned, a second plume was formed and MSC

became, in part, blanketed by smoke. A second evacuation was triggered. The plume was 

interpreted as the arrival of a second fire front. The second evacuation, triggered 21 min after 

the first CSFD apparatus re-entered MSC, was partial and some engines remained in areas of 

MSC that were not in heavy smoke. Some parts of MSC were still under a blue sky, highlighting 

the limited situational awareness frequently associated with large and complex WUI fire scenes. 

The wildland area to the east of Wilson Road and south of Flying W Ranch Road is shown to be 

partly burned before 20:00. A new fire in the interior of these wildlands to the east of Wilson 

Road, thought to be a result of a change in wind direction, was observed, as shown in Map 

Figure 16. The consequence of this fire is discussed below. Other wildland areas east of Wilson 

Road, visible in the image, had burned at this time, though various small fires were observed 
73

burning in these areas after 20:00. At least one structure ignition (5345 Chambrey Ct) was 

identified as igniting in the general location of the middle image shown in Map Figure 16, 

shortly after the middle image shown in Map Figure 16 was taken. 

At 18:31, after first responders re-entered the community, the fire could be seen at one of its 

most eastern extents along Centennial Boulevard, with flanking fires traveling to the south and 

north, as shown in Map Figure 17. Fire spotting in this location was first observed and defended 

by first responders at around 18:44, based on AVL locations. The southern end of the fire was 

defended by first responders after they re-entered MSC at approximately 18:44, as shown in Map 

Figure 16. This southern defense occurred off Alpine Meadows Lane in the wildlands to the 

south where most of the primary structures in MSC (4975 Braeburn Way) were destroyed. 

First responders could also be seen containing the northern edge of the fire along Wolfe Ranch 

Road, at around 20:00 on June 26, as shown in Map Figure 17. Fire was shown in this location 

as early as 17:30. Fire witness observations corroborated that defensive actions occurred in these 

locations. The main Waldo Canyon Fire front had already passed through MSC at this time and 

this was a flanking or backing fire along the northern edge of MSC. 

10.4 Fire Behavior Timeline and Observations (Wind Change)

There is evidence that the main fire front traveled relatively quickly through major portions of 

MSC as shown in Map Figure 17. There are also anecdotal accounts of first responders 

identifying flare-ups and possible small fire fronts in various locations after the main fire front 

moved through MSC. Additionally, identified in various time lapse images is at least one area of 

wildland vegetation not burning after the passage of the main fire front, but burning later as 

shown in Map Figure 18. 

Some of the anecdotal accounts and the images had burn times corresponding to a shift in wind 

direction occurring around 20:00. The wind shift was observed in during-fire images and video. 

Not all images and videos portrayed wind direction but some clearly showed wind direction and 

were useful when a confident time stamp was included. The series of images taken by CSFD 

videographer, shown in Figure 37, demonstrate a wind shift from generally coming from the east 

to northeast (for a short time around 19:52), then from the north around 20:00. Identification or 

comparison of wind magnitude was not possible from the images and videos. 

Changes in wind direction also corresponded to ignition of the primary structures shown in Map 

Figure 19. These primary structures were ignited around the time of the wind change and 

coincident with the image shown in Map Figure 16 around Chambrey Court. The ignition 

locations of 5350 and 5410 Chambrey Court were unknown, but both had wood roofs. If ignited 

from the wildland fire shown in the middle image in Map Figure 16, these structures would have 

had to have been ignited from embers. This is due to the presence of roads and green vegetation 

around the residences. It is, however, possible that these two primary structures were ignited 

earlier, before the change in wind direction, from vegetation or primary structures burning 

between these primary structures and Wilson Road to the west. 
74

The approximate ignition location for 5345 Chambrey Court is seen in the image contained 

within Map Figure 19 and also in the Fox News video referenced in Appendix E. The general 

location of the ignition was identified but the exact ignition source (deck, re-entrant corner, 

debris under deck or other item) could not be determined. Also, note the deposition of white ash 

in areas to the north/northeast, and upwind from the re-entrant corner of 5345 Chambrey Court, 

compared to lack of white ash and more green vegetation to the north/northeast of 5345 

Chambrey Court. Finally, the Fox News video shows active burning in the area to the 

north/northwest of 5345 Chambrey Court. 

 At around 20:00, at the time of the wind change, ignitions on Vantage Vista Road and Huffman 

Court were observed. The ignitions on Vantage Vista 

Road occurred around the same time as the wind 

change. The ignition on 5775 Huffman Court, 

however, appeared to have occurred before the wind 

change and coincided with burning vegetation behind 

the house. The destroyed Huffman Court primary 

structure was extinguished by first responders and 

then reignited, shortly after being extinguished. First 

responders contained the burning residence after reignition. 

Coinciding with changes in wind were also ignitions 

on Jenner Court, as shown in Map Figure 21. Images 

from the Denver Post clearly show 2450 Jenner Court 

fully involved around the time of the wind shift and 

2470 Jenner Court with fire around it and possibly 

ignited. The video screen shot of 2485 Jenner Court 

fully involved, as shown in Map Figure 21, was not 

time stamped, but it was after the wind change as can 

be seen from smoke direction seen in the video. 2460 

Jenner Court could not be seen burning in any of the 

images, but was also in a topographic depression 

relative to other primary structures.

There were other primary structures ignited sometime 

after the change in wind direction, which were not 

clearly identified as structure to structure fire spread. 

These primary structures still might have been ignited 

from far afield structure-to-structure fire spread, or from structure-to-structure to vegetation fire 

spread. Finally, changes in structure to structure fire spread were also observed to coincide with 

changes in wind direction, as discussed in detail in the sections below. 

Figure 37 Time lapse imagery portraying 

change in wind direction on Courtney 

Drive. Images are looking south.

Photos courtesy of CSFD, used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
75

Most of the primary structures discussed and shown in Map Figure 18 through Map Figure 21

were defended by first responders. 2470 Jenner Court showed clear evidence of containment 

action through the lack of white ash (i.e., black ash) present in the building debris. The primary 

structure at 5548 Vantage Vista Drive was not defended, but 5542 and 5560 Vantage Vista Dr 

were defended to contain further fire spread. The primary structure at 5560 Vantage Vista Dr 

also showed clear evidence of containment action seen through the identification of black ash. 

Numerous other structures were also ignited on Majestic Drive, Lions Gate and Ashton Park 

Place after the wind change, as a result of structure to structure fire spread, and discussed in 

more detail below. 

10.5 Fire Extent and Spotting

Ember or fire brands caused spot fires throughout large sections of the MSC. Spotting was 

continuous across a range of distances and was a function of the type of embers (size, density, 

shape, and material), the local conditions (plume dynamics, updraft, local weather and 

topography), and the ignition potential of the area where the ember(s) landed. Spotting, in the 

presence of wind, is a process that occurs across a range of physical scales. Consequently, it is 

important to assess the distribution of embers and therefore their potential hazard as a function of 

distance from the source. 

Spotting distance varied throughout the Waldo Canyon Fire, including some spotting and 

potential spotting which traveled across many fuel breaks (e.g. roads and bulldozer lines), other 

combustible items (e.g. wood roofs), and occluded wildland areas (e.g. Ute Valley Park). This 

far field spotting was limited at the Waldo to a handful of locations listed in Table 13. Minimum 

distances are determined by identifying what was burning upwind of the spotting location at the 

time the spot fires were identified. The locations of these potential far field spotting are shown 

in Map Figure 22. 

It should be noted, however, that there was also a potential spotting location at Woodman Court. 

It was undetermined if it was spotting from the Waldo Canyon Fire. This study did not assess 

the Woodman Court location. The spotting was questionable, in part, because the ignition time 

was so much later than the passage of the main wildland fire front and after the change in wind 

direction. It was possible, however, that the spotting might have smoldered for some time before 

ignition. Eventually, the spotting location was extinguished by first responders. 
76

Table 13 Locations of far field spotting to vegetation at the Waldo Canyon Fire along with distance 

downwind from burning features and defensive action status.

Spotting Location Fuel Type Date/Time Minimum Distance 

(downwind) form closest 

possible burning feature 

Defended

Utte Valley Park 

(west of ridge)

Wildland 

Vegetation

6/26/2012 18:58 ~515 m (1700 ft) Yes

Utte Valley Park 

(east of ridge)

Wildland 

Vegetation

6/26/2012 19:00xix ~360 m (1200 ft) Yes

Mule Deer Drive Wildland 

Vegetation

6/26/2012 17:44 Unknown Yes 

The spotting on Mule Deer Drive was also uncertain as to the distance of the spotting. There is 

evidence that defensive actions occurred at the Mule Deer Drive location based on AVL timestamped observations. It is less clear if the defensive action at Mule Deer Drive shown in Map 

Figure 22, is a consequence of the fire having traveled through the wildlands to the east of this 

area or if it is a consequence of spotting over this entire occluded wildland area. 

It was possible the Mule Deer spotting might have been a result of the fire spotting over Flying 

W Ranch Road, burning through the occluded wildland area between Vantage Ridge Court and 

Majestic Drive, and then jumping Wilson Road and traveling down to the spotting location 

shown at Mule Deer Drive in Map Figure 22. It was also possible the embers were produced 

from the wildlands west of Flying W Ranch Road and traveled to the Mule Deer Drive spotting 

location. The specific scenario was not clear from first responder accounts. 

Spotting also occurred over shorter distances and resulted in early ignitions of some structures, 

including those listed in Table 14. The locations of these structures are shown in Map Figure 23. 

Other closer spotting also occurred throughout the Waldo Canyon Fire, some of which is 

discussed in sections below. 

Table 14 Locations of far field spotting to structures at the Waldo Canyon Fire along with distance downwind 

from burning features and defensive action status.

Spotting Location Fuel Type Date/Time Distance (downwind) 

form closest burning 

feature

Defended

5445 Wilson Road Structure (wood roof) 6/26/2012 18:15 325 m (1100 ft) Yes

5140 Champagne Drive Structure (wood roof) 6/26/2012 19:33 Unknown Yes 

5765 Huffman Court Structure (eave) or 

Vegetation

Unknown Unknown Yes

5745 Regal View Road Structure or vegetation Unknown Unknown Yes

6030 Moorfield Avenue Fence (wood) 6/26/2012 18:29 Unknown Yes

6020 Moorfield Avenue Fence (wood) 6/26/2012 18:29 Unknown Yes

2185 Wickes Road Structure (wood roof) Unknown Unknown Yes

1605 Manning Way Structure or vegetation 6/26/2012 18:13 Unknown Yes

10.6 Summary of Structures Burning 

As shown in Map Figure 2, a potential population for analysis of the Waldo Canyon Fire 

regarding exposure includes the primary structures ignited from the passage of the main wildland 

 

xix Time is estimated from TD. Defensive actions took place between 17:50 and 19:00.
77

fire front (not from structure to structure fire spread) west of Wilson Road, southeast of Flying 

W Ranch Road. Additionally, the time of peak observations of burning primary structures 

(≈20:30), which coincides with peak first responder resource deployment, is another key time 

period to identify ignited structures and examine structure to structure and structure to vegetation 

fire spread. 

Consequently, this section attempts to identify the structures ignited from the passage of the 

main fire front around 18:30 and those structures ignited around 20:30 on June 26, 2012, and the 

identified time of peak information available on burning primary structures. Then, somewhat 

arbitrarily, the 23:00 and the June 27 00:30 times are examined for ignited primary structures. 

From this point forward in this report all text, figures, tables and map figures referenced will 

assume times on June 26, unless otherwise specified. 

Map Figure 24 displays estimated ignition status of primary structures at or shortly before 18:30 

on June 26. Three sets of known ignitions are shown in Map Figure 24: 1) The first set includes

those primary structures known to be ignited, mostly through images, by about 18:30. 2) The 

second set includes those primary structure known to be ignited, again mostly through images, 

by about 18:30 but with some evidence the ignition might have been from structure to structure 

fire spread. 3) The third set includes those primary structures known not to be ignited based on 

observations of burning later. It should be noted that there is likely some percentage in the third 

set displaying those primary structures known not to be ignited, which could have ultimately 

ignited from embers, flames or radiant heat produced from the passage of the main wildland fire 

front, but smoldering resulted in the structures igniting later. It is believed this percentage is 

relatively small based on evidence of structure-to-structure fire spread or other ignition sources. 

4) The last set of ignition categories are those structures with an unknown ignition status around 

18:30. 

As described above, most of these primary structures have an unknown ignition status at 18:30 

because of limited first responder activity in the areas. As described above and below, there is 

little evidence that all 103 of these structures were ignited by the passage of the main wildland 

fire front. 

It is sometimes difficult to determine if the ignition was caused by passage of the main wildland 

fire front or from structure-to-structure fire spread. For example, Figure 38 shows an image 

taken at 18:38 of four primary structures on fire on Vantage Vista Drive. Figure 38, in 

conjunction with other imagery and observations described below, provides evidence that 

structure to structure fire spread occurred in this area. 
78

Figure 38 Image showing structure to structure fire spread on primary structures ignited by 18:38.

Figure 38 shows the primary structure at 5610 Vantage Vista Drive as partially involved on the 

side closest to 5620 Vantage Vista Drive. The primary structure at 5620 Vantage Vista Drive is 

shown as completely involved as evidenced by the outline of the building material, which also 

provides evidence of collapse of some parts of the material on the side next to 5630. The flame 

heights of 5620 are also higher on the side closest to 5610. Finally, it is clear 5640 and 5630 

Vantage Visa Drive are on fire at 18:38, as shown in the image in Figure 38, as little vegetation 

was present in front of these structures to account for the flame heights portrayed in the image. 

It is, however, less conclusive to compare flame heights and state of involvement to determine 

burn times for 5630 and 5640 Vantage Vista Drive in relation to other primary structures shown 

in Figure 38 as it is possible 5630 and 5640 had collapsed and no building material outlines are 

visible in the image. This would indicate 5630 and/or 5640 ignited before 5610 and 5620. The 

smoke might have obscured the view of 5630 and 5640 building components, which might not 

have been ignited yet. This would indicate that 5620 ignited before 5630 and 5640. In this case, 

the state of burning in relation to other structures shown in Figure 38 for 5630 and 5640 is 

unknown. There is evidence of other structure to structure fire spread from 5620 to 5610. 

In the above case, one primary structure is marked as a known ignition on Vantage Vista Drive 

from the passage of the main wildland fire front with the other three marked as possible structure 

to structure fire spread. Similar logic was used in the other locations shown in Map Figure 24 to 

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
79

classify structures as possible structure-to-structure fire spread. In some cases, such as the 

primary structure on northern Wilson Road, there are both images such as those shown in Figure 

38 and eyewitness accounts of structure to structure fire spread.

The burn pattern portrayed in Figure 38 and described above, possibly indicating structure to 

structure fire spread, was verified as a burn pattern where structure to structure fire spread was 

confirmed to have occurred through both eyewitness observation and multiple time lapse images 

on Courtney Drive. Figure 39 demonstrates this validation process through a series of time lapse 

images taken mostly by the CSFD videographer. The first image of the area shown in Figure 39

is obscured by smoke but shows a possible ignition at 2280 Courtney Drive. 

Figure 39 Time lapse images of burning on the northern side of Courtney Drive. White text boxes with black 

outlines portray burning times. White text portrays addresses of continuously adjacent primary structures 

from 2250 and 2320. All images are oriented to the south.

It is, however, believed the flames observed in the image were from a primary structure on 

Courtney Drive to the south of 2280 Courtney Drive, though it is not conclusive. Also, if 2280 

Courtney Drive was ignited at 18:23, it seems unlikely it would have taken an hour to spread to 

the adjacent primary structures based on fire progression observed between 19:21 and 20:08 

shown in Figure 39 and assuming no large change in wind direction and magnitude during 18:23 

and 19:21. There were no images or observations between 18:23 and 19:21 of this area. 

Photos courtesy of CSFD, used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
80

It should also be noted that the careful examination of this area of Figure 39 provides additional 

data points for analysis, beyond other burning structures not discussed here. These other 

structures, shown in Figure 41, were used for the development of the timeline For example, the 

image with a time stamp of 19:53, which also provides evidence of a wind shift to the northeast 

as shown in Figure 37, portrays no flames or smoke visible on 2320 Courtney Drive. The 

subsequent image at 19:59 in Figure 39 also shows no flames or smoke visible on 2320 with 

wind direction being undetermined. Finally, the background image in Figure 39 at 20:08 shows 

flames coming out of the eaves of 2320 and wind direction to the south. 

This provides evidence for the dynamic nature of exposure in relation to structure to structure 

fire spread. Figure 39 clearly demonstrates the difference in spread distance in the downwind 

direction compared to the upwind. This information shows how the effects of structure spacing, 

in regards to burning of adjacent structures, are dependent on exposure and can vary 

considerably within a small spatiotemporal extent. Also demonstrated is the fact that burn time 

of structures is dependent on wind magnitude and direction, among other factors. 

Also, shown in the background image displayed in Figure 39 is the one undestroyed primary 

structure found in the northwest corner of Courtney Drive, along with the adjacent primary 

structure to the north, fully involved. Fire was believed to have spread from one of the unknown 

ignitions shown on the western side of Courtney Drive in Map Figure 24 to the north and south, 

resulting in this most northwestern primary structure on Courtney Drive (2340) being one of the 

last structures to burn on the western side of Courtney Drive and contained by first responders. 

Using images with patterns similar to those validated above and eyewitness observations of 

structure-to-structure fire spread there is evidence that 26 of the primary structures shown as 

ignited in Map Figure 24 might have been a result of structure to structure fire spread and not 

passage of the main wildland fire front. It should also be noted that the evidence indicates a 

relatively minor number of ignitions were probable to have occurred in the unknown locations 

compared to the overall amount of unknown ignitions portrayed in Map Figure 24. 

For example, observations of first responders confirmed in the radio log describe 8 to 10 

ignitions on Majestic Drive at 18:15. Other TD observations stated few ignitions on the east side 

of Majestic Drive. Also, a homeowner on Karamy Court who was present and defending 

properties during the incident described the primary structures burning on Brogans Bluff as 

burning west to east like torches after the fire was burning, possibly indicating a limited number 

of early ignitions and structure-to-structure fire spread, though there is also some contradictory 

accounts in this area. Though not conclusive, accounts indicated that most destroyed and 

damaged primary structures burning on Karamy Court and Tamora Way also burned later, 

indicating the possibility of structure to structure, or structure to vegetation fire spread from 

Brogans Bluff Drive.

Furthermore, while there is limited information on early burning on Trevor Lane, “Mountain 

Shadows is Burning” videos, referenced in Appendix E, indicate burn patterns representing 

possible structure to structure fire spread, providing evidence for a limited number of ignitions in 
81

this area. It is believed at least three ignitions must have occurred on Trevor Lane from the 

passage of the main wildland fire front based on analysis of the “Mountain Shadows is Burning” 

videos. There was also a smoke obscured image associated with an eyewitness account of only 

one structure on fire in the general vicinity of Trevor Lane at 18:00. 

The image documentation for primary structures burning on and around Courtney Drive indicate 

a limited number of ignitions, likely less than the total number of primary structures with an 

unknown ignition status portrayed in Map Figure 24 for this area. One first responder was 

shown defending the most southern property, with a damaged primary structure, on the west side 

of Courtney Drive, by extinguishing a burning wheel barrow. Visibility was obscured, but this 

first responder did not see any primary structures burning as early as 18:35, though there was 

some uncertainty associated with this time estimate. It is assumed this observation extended to 

the six most southern primary structures, on the east and west sides of Courtney Drive based on 

observations of these primary structures burning later. These six primary structures were also 

observed as being defended and ignited as early as 20:00 for the most northern of these primary 

structures, providing evidence of no early ignitions in this area. 

Another first responder also took images of the Courtney Area shown in Figure 40. Figure 40a 

shows large flame heights in the general vicinity of the primary structures with an unknown 

ignition status shown in Map Figure 24. Figure 40b also shows evidence of primary structures 

burning on Courtney Drive. This burning is only seen on the east side of Courtney Drive in the 

section of the street that goes north to south, but it is possible primary structures were ignited on 

the west side of Courtney Drive also at this time. 

Some of the evidence that the initial burning did not extend to the east of the primary structures 

with an unknown ignition status on and around Courtney Drive shown in Map Figure 24, is also 

demonstrated in Figure 40c. Figure 40c shows burning behind the northern side of Majestic 

Drive at 19:42 again providing evidence these primary structures were likely not ignited early, 

but from structure to structure fire spread. Additionally, Figure 40d shows primary structures as 

foundations in the vicinity of the structures portrayed with an ignition status of unknown in Map 

Figure 24, at 20:14, indicating the possibility of earlier ignitions of structures in this vicinity. 

Furthermore, there was one account of a first responder observing the fire spreading from 

Courtney Drive to Yankton Place between 19:00 and 20:00, where the fire spread was described 

as going from Courtney Drive to the north side of Yankton Place and then to the south side of 

Yankton Place. Finally, the two primary structures shown in Map Figure 24 with an unknown 

ignition status, one on Vanreen Drive and the other on Regal View Road, while inconclusive, do 

have some burning time information (images and observation) that indicates later ignitions, 

possibly from burning structures in and around Linger Way. These observations are not 

conclusive. 

Primary structures shown with an ignition status of not burning in Map Figure 24 were classified 

as such due to observations and/or images of the structures burning later. It is possible a certain 

percentage of these were the results of ignitions from the main wildland fire front and subsequent 
82

smoldering of combustibles on or near the respective primary structure, for a relatively long 

period, and ignited at a later time. It is, however, believed this number of smoldering ignitions 

would be relatively small based on the analysis of images, videos and observations obtained for 

burning at most of these locations. 

Figure 40 Evidence of limited number of early ignitions on Courtney Drive. a) Image looking to the west 

showing high flame heights on the east side of Courtney Drive, near the bend in the street. b) Image looking 

to the south showing flames either on 2280 Courtney Drive or behind it. C) Image looking to the south 

showing primary structures involved on the south side of Courtney Drive. D) Image looking to west showing 

foundations on the west and east side of Courtney Drive and Yankton Place.

Map Figure 25 displays the ignition status of primary structures on or approximately before 

20:30. The structures listed with an ignition status of unknown, shown in Map Figure 25, on 

Courtney Drive and Yankton Place are believed to have mostly been destroyed or ignited by 

20:30, based on known burning primary structures surrounding these structures and the 

information described in Figure 11 and Figure 40. The structures listed with an unknown 

ignition status, shown in Map Figure 25 on Rossmere Street south of Courtney Drive were not 

known to have ignited by 20:30, but were shown to be defended from the burning structures on 

Courtney Drive by at least 21:30. 

The destroyed primary structures classified as not ignited in Map Figure 25 east of Yankton 

Place and on Ashton Park Place were shown to have ignited by 20:50, except 6455 Ashton Park 

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with 

permission, overlays from NIST

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with 

permission, overlays from NIST

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with 

permission, overlays from NIST

Photo courtesy of 20102 The Denver 

Post, Media News Group, overlays 

from NIST
83

Place, which had either ignited or was close to ignition based on upwind burning of structures. 

The damaged primary structures in this area, including the one damaged primary structure on 

Savannah Way were ignited sometime after 20:30 from embers, radiant heat or flames from 

these ignited structures on Ashton Park Place. All damaged primary structures were identified as 

being defended, and containment locations are portrayed in the sections below. 

As shown in Map Figure 25, there are a number of unknown ignitions at 20:30 in interior 

Brogans Bluff Drive. This is due to lack of time stamped observations and some contradictory 

information. The other primary 

structures west of Wilson Road, 

southeast of Flying W Ranch Road, 

were all damaged and defended from 

structure to structure fire spread 

sometime after the adjacent primary 

structures were ignited, based on 

observations of first responders 

defending these structures.

The primary structures with an 

unknown ignitions status in Map 

Figure 25 north of the four ignited 

primary structures on the east side of 

Majestic Drive (directly north of the 

two most northern primary structures 

identified as not ignited in Map 

Figure 25) are believed to have 

mostly been destroyed or ignited by 

20:30. There is evidence for this in the image shown in Figure 41 portraying significant burning 

on the northern end of Majestic Drive at 19:23. This burning could not be precisely geolocated 

beyond the second cul de sac on the north side from the northern Majestic Drive entrance.

Figure 42 portrays a single screen shot from a video showing the structures on the north end of 

Majestic Drive as foundations sometime between 20:45 and 21:15. This is further evidence that 

the primary structures on the northern end of Majestic Drive were destroyed or ignited before 

20:30. Additional evidence is also provided in Figure 43, which highlights various burning and 

non-burning areas. Also shown in Figure 43 are multiple ignitions in the northwestern area of 

Vantage Vista Drive, labeled as unknown ignition status in Map Figure 25. 

The image labeled 20:20, and shown in Figure 43, does not provide sufficient detail to identify 

individual primary structures ignited, but general locations of burning structures can be seen

given the topographic configuration of streets, such as Vantage Ridge Road and Majestic Drive. 

Images of foundations and ignitions, shown later than 20:20 on both the east and west sides of 

Vantage Ridge Road, also support the locations portrayed in Figure 43. Finally, Figure 43 shows 

Figure 41 Image looking west into Majestic Drive from its

northern entrance showing significant burning in the second cul 

de sac on the north side at 19:23.

Photo Courtesy of CSFD, used with

permission
84

little burning between the area of full involvement on the north side of Hot Springs Court and the 

northern end of Majestic Drive, close to Harbor Pine Point. This provides evidence that most of 

the structures on northern Majestic Drive area were ignited or destroyed by 20:30. Both Figure 

43 and Figure 44 portray 3D representations of the earth’s surface from Light Detection and 

Ranging (LiDAR), overlaid on pre-fire 2011 City of Colorado Springs orthoimagery. 

The southern end of Majestic Drive shows a number of primary structures identified as not 

ignited in Map Figure 25, based on images and videos of the area between 20:00 and 22:00. As 

seen in Map Figure 25, the 

two southernmost ignited 

primary structures are 

separated by structures with 

an ignition status of 

unknown or not ignited. 

As shown in Figure 44,

there is evidence that 2539 

Hot Springs Court, the one 

primary structure off 

Majestic Drive and backing 

to Flying W Ranch Road

ignited at 20:20. 

The location of the ignition 

portrayed in Figure 44 was identified through assessment of Bing Maps, as shown in Figure 3. 

In conjunction with this initial image of ignition at 2539 Hot Springs Court, there is a subsequent 

image showing a structure to structure burn pattern at 21:01, as shown in Figure 44, indicating 

2539 Hot Springs Court burning first. The above two pieces of information provide evidence of 

an ignition at 2539, which appeared to be caused by embers from burning structures on the north 

side of Hot Springs Court. 

Also shown in Figure 44 is an image of burning on, or to the south of, 5450 Majestic Drive 

sometime after 20:00. Both this image in Figure 44, and other images, show burning on the most 

southwestern part of Majestic Drive, separated by primary structures which were not burning. 

This indicates another ember jump location, again presumably from burning primary structures 

on Majestic Drive to the north. Finally, Figure 44 shows an unidentified ignition somewhere 

around Majestic Drive, separated by areas of no burning. 

This unidentified ember jump location could be on the east or west side of Majestic Drive. A 

video taken at 21:47 shows the most southeastern primary structures on Hot Springs Court in 

various stages of involvement, and the most southeastern destroyed primary structure on Lions 

Gate Lane is shown as ignited by 21:17, indicating both locations were possibilities for the 

general area of the unknown ember ignition, showing that there were multiple paths of fire 

Figure 42 Destruction on the north end of Majestic Drive observed between 

20:45 and 21:15.

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with

permission
85

spread from the structures on the northern side of Hot Springs Court to primary structures on the 

southern and western side of Majestic Drive. The primary structures portrayed with an ignition 

status of unknown in Map Figure 25, off Lions Gate Lane, were defended after the burning of the 

southernmost destroyed primary structures on Lions Gate Lane occurred (i.e., < 21:30). 

Figure 43 Selected images of burning primary structures around Majestic Drive. 

Map Figure 26 shows ignition status of primary structures around 23:00. There are no primary 

structures classified as not burning at this time, with 316 known primary structures burning, and 

129 primary structures with an unknown ignition status. Of these 129 unknown structures, 73 

were found off Majestic Drive and Lion Gate Lane. Images taken by a first responder of this 

area at 11:55 are shown in Map Figure 27. 

As seen in Map Figure 27, the entire southern section of destroyed primary structures on 

Majestic Drive and Lions Gate Lane are shown as ignited within 55 min after 23:00, with many 

being foundations. Also shown in shown in Map Figure 27 is the correlation between white ash, 

or lack thereof, and ignition status at the time of the images. The primary structures shown in 

Map Figure 27 that are foundations have higher presence of white ash relative to structures 

shown in a more involved state of burning and contained at 23:55. This, coupled with the 

images of first responders defending these areas, provides evidence for the lack of white ash on 

primary structures being correlated with defensive actions or some form of suppression. 

Photo courtesy of CSFD, 

used with permission

Photo courtesy of 

CSFD, used with 

permission

Photo courtesy of 

CSFD, used with 

permission

Photo courtesy of 

CSFD, used with 

permission

Image courtesy of CSFD, used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
86

Figure 44 Additional selected images of burning primary structures around Majestic Drive. 

There were about 40 primary structures with unknown ignition status off Majestic Drive located

north of Hot Springs Court and the intersection of Lanagan Street and Flying W Ranch Road that 

were assumed to mostly have been destroyed by 23:00 with some additional evidence shown in 

Figure 45. As shown in Figure 45, at 23:01 several primary structures along the eastern side of 

Majestic Drive were fully involved. A latter image shown in Figure 45, taken at 01:07 on June 

27 shows the same primary structure in a state of involvement more than those to the east, 

providing evidence that the primary structures to the east of 5535 Majestic Drive were ignited. 

The remaining 56 primary structures with unknown ignition statuses around 23:00 were found in 

various locations, with 36 of them damaged primary structures. These damaged primary 

structures had large time ranges associated with the defensive actions and, consequently, are 

listed as unknowns. Assuming these occurred around the time of associated burning of adjacent 

primary structures, these damaged primary structures were also ignited, or close to being ignited, 

by 23:00. The 20 destroyed primary structures found on Yankton Park Place and Brogans Bluff 

Drive (north of Karamy Court) were assumed to be destroyed by 23:00, but represented

unknown locations. Two of the 20 destroyed were found on Linger Way, with images of full 

involvement at 23:44. In short, by 23:00 there were only a handful of structures with unknown 

ignition statuses on the southern end of Majestic Drive, which likely did not ignite by 23:00, as 

identified in Map Figure 27. Additionally, there was one ignition extinguished on the morning 

of June 27 on Lions Gate Lane, and one on Lanagan Street around the same time. 

Photo courtesy of 

CSFD, used with 

permission, 

overlays from NIST

Image courtesy of CSFD, used by 

permission, overlays from NIST

Photo courtesy of 

CSFD, used with 

permission, 

overlays from NIST

Photo courtesy of 

CSFD, used with 

permission, 

overlays from NIST
87

As mentioned above, there were also numerous other mop-up actions occurring for days after the 

incident. It is difficult to exactly quantify the defensive actions and burning conditions during 

the mop-up stage. 

The rate of burning of structures appeared to vary considerably, even on the same street, as 

shown in Figure 39. This makes a rate of structure burning between time intervals shown in Map 

Figure 24 through Map Figure 

26 potentially misleading. 

Nonetheless, it is useful as a 

coarse measure, particularly 

when viewed in conjunction 

with apparatus deployment, as 

discussed below. 

Examination of Map Figure 24

shows that there were at least 

48 ignitions of primary 

structures by 18:30. Table 15

provides minimum and 

maximum estimates for the 

various streets with unknown 

primary structure ignitions

after the passage of the main 

Waldo Canyon Fire Front. 

The number of primary 

structures ignited from the 

passage of the wildland fire 

front ranged from 55 (48 as 

shown in Map Figure 24 plus 

the minimum shown in Table 

5) to 113 (48 + 26, as shown in 

Map Figure 24, plus the maximum shown in Table 5). 

Examination of Map Figure 25 shows that there were 217 primary structures ignited by 20:30. 

Additionally, there were 198 structures with an unknown ignition status. Table 16 provides 

minimum and maximum estimates for the various streets with unknown primary structure

ignitions around 20:30. The number of primary structures ignited at 20:30 ranged from 248 (217 

as shown in Map Figure 25 plus the minimum shown in Table 15) to 286 (217 as shown in Map 

Figure 25 plus the maximum shown in Table 15). Finally, the number of primary structures 

ignited at 01:00 on June 27 ranged from 435 to 445.

Figure 45 Ignitions on Majestic Drive providing evidence for majority 

of primary structures on east side ignited or destroyed by 23:00.

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used by 

permission, overlays from NIST

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used by 

permission, overlays from NIST
88

Table 15 Estimates of the minimum and maximum number of primary structures ignited on streets with 

unknown primary structures ignitions after the passage of the main Waldo Canyon Fire Front.

Street Maximum Minimum

Majestic Drive 7 0

Tamora Way 1 0

Ravina Court 1 0

Brogans Bluff Drive 4 0

Trevor Lane 6 3

Talleson Court 5 1

Courtney Drive 6 1

Yankton Place 2 0

Ashton Park Place 1 1

Regal View Road 1 0

Huffman Court 1 0

Linger Way 2 1

Harbor Pines Point 2 0

Sandray Court 1 0

TOTALS 39 7

The data has shown that because burning (non-savable) structures can generate embers for 

several hours, early structure ignitions enhance and accelerate fire spread. Ignited structures not 

only affect nearby structures by radiation and convection, but also create a significant ember 

exposure hazard downwind for tens of meters (hundreds of feet). If fuels are present, this ember 

exposure is then responsible for the potential ignition of vegetation and structures downwind. It 

is this fire spread potential, or multiplier effect, that makes it advantageous to limit early 

structure ignitions. 

Table 16 Estimates of the minimum and maximum number of primary structures ignited on streets with 

unknown primary structures ignitions after 20:30. 

Street Maximum Minimum

Majestic Drive 36 18

Aubrey Way 1 1

Stoneridge 2 0

Hearthstone 1 0

Darien Way 1 0

Harbor Pines Point 2 0

Linger Way 1 1

Ravina Way 1 0

Brogans Bluff Road 8 4

Trevor Lane 1 0

Courtney Drive 6 3

Yankton Place 7 3

Ashton Park Place 2 1

TOTALS 69 31
89

It should also be noted that the ember jump locations shown in Figure 44 also occurred after the 

change in wind direction. There were no known ignitions south of the general canyon area to the 

west of Majestic Drive before the wind change. This highlights that even at peak apparatus 

deployment, which first responders were at by 20:20, as discussed in sections below, fire can 

easily become embedded in high density/low structure separation distance neighborhoods, and 

first responders are not aware of this due to situational awareness limitations in a dark, smokefilled environment. This also highlights the need for prevention of ignitions through effective 

pre-fire actions taken on WUI constructions and surrounding vegetation. 

11.0 Defensive Actions 

By documenting defensive actions in both space and time, critical information can be collected 

on structural vulnerabilities and fire and ember exposure data. The spatiotemporal extent of 

defensive actions is required for any scientific assessment of WUI fires. Collecting defensive 

actions in large multijurisdictional events requires significant resources. It is important to 

identify all apparatus at a particular incident, as demonstrated in Section 8.3.1.2 of this report. 

Efficient and effective defensive action information collection, however, is in its infancy. 

Defensive actions were attributed to two primary categories, parcel and structure actions. 

Defensive actions were further divided into pre-fire, fire extinguishment and fire containment 

actions. At the parcel level, actions were taken to prevent ignition, extinguish the fire, or contain 

the fire. Structures were defended in the following possible scenarios: 

• Successfully before ignition (structure undamaged) 

• Unsuccessfully defended before ignition (structure ignites – structure damaged)

• Successfully extinguished after ignition (structure saved ) 

• Unsuccessfully extinguished after ignition (structure destroyed) 

• Successfully contained (fire did not spread beyond structure of origin) 

• Unsuccessfully contained (fire spread beyond structure of origin to adjacent structure) 

It should be noted that not all types of defensive actions were taken on every structure. In some 

cases, structures were too far along to extinguish, and defensive actions were immediately aimed 

at containing the fire. Re-ignitions represent a scenario where extinguishment was originally 

thought to be effective by first responders, but ultimately required additional actions to 

extinguish or contain. 

11.1 Residential Parcels

Residential parcels, as described in this report, include wildland and ornamental vegetation, as 

well as other detached combustibles such as railroad ties and fences. In both cases, due to 

limited resources, no attempt was made to identify if fences or railroad ties were connected to the 

main structure and were by default treated as detached combustibles. Defensive actions on 

parcels included pre-fire parcel prepping, which might include pre-wetting or fuel removal. 

When fire was present, defensive actions included fire extinguishment and fire containment. In 
90

the latter case, this term was used when a fire line was scratched specifically to contain or 

redirect a vegetative fire. Defensive actions on other detached combustibles are also included in 

this section. Map Figure 28 displays parcels for which defensive actions were identified. 

Figure 46 shows counts of parcels by action type. It should be noted that the TDs only identified 

some of the total parcels which had fire behavior in vegetation. Over 500 parcels that were 

identified as having fire affected vegetation in the post-fire imagery and were not identified as 

burning through the TD process. Identification of defensive actions on vegetation has proven 

one of the most difficult tasks to identify, possibly due to the fact that the vegetation does not 

make as distinct an impression on first responders memory as burning primary structures. 

Additionally, if a parcel was on fire and did not directly threaten a structure, when resources 

were limited, it received lower attention than vegetative fires directly threatening structures.

Nonetheless, in a number of cases, fire suppression actions at a parcel level reduced fire and 

ember exposure to the structure on that parcel. The response of individual structures to variation 

in fire and ember exposures is beyond the scope of this report. Additionally, the limited amount 

of information regarding building characteristics available for structures in MSC will likely limit 

the analysis of structure response to roof cover and siding type. 

As shown in Figure 46, the majority of the actions taken were aimed at extinguishing the fire on 

the parcel, followed by entinguishment of detached combustibles. It is likely the number of 

fences removed were underestimated, as there were known areas with knocked down fences 

observed in pre-fire imagery not tabulated in Figure 46. This highlights the difficulty in 

identifying every single action and the need to integrate all data. 

Table 17 contains a summary of the bulldozer lines that where placed to protect the MSC. Both 

the lines from the Wilson Road water tower to the quarry and the line from the Autism Center to 

the Flying W Ranch were breached. It is estimated that one third to one half of all 

parcels/structures affected by fire were defended. The uncertainty in this value is related to the 

fact that a large fraction of parcel level defensive actions were not captured during technical 

discussions. 

11.2 Residential Structures

Defensive actions on structures, like on parcels, include pre-fire mitigation and post ignition 

defensive actions. In some cases structures were pre-wetted; water was applied prior to any 

ignition, whereas in other cases, water application took place after the structure was on fire. If

the water or foam application was successful, the structure was just damaged. If the fire was not 

successfully extinguished, then in many cases, defensive actions were transitioned to 

containment. 

At the structure level, containment was intended to prevent the burning structure from igniting

other structures on fire. Successful containment was achieved if a containment objective was 

explicitly identified in the defensive action(s) taken and the (identified) structure is saved. This 

rule applies even if the containment objective is not for an immediately adjacent structure. 
91

Successful containment does not apply to long range ember spotting tens of meters (hundreds of 

feet). If there is failure in one direction and success in another (e.g. North or South), the 

containment actions for the structure have failed. It is critical to analyze defensive actions both 

in space and time, as successful containment may have been achieved and the adjacent 

structure(s) may have been destroyed as a result of a different exposure.

Figure 46 Counts of properties by parcel level action. Individual properties might have seen multiple actions.

11.2.1 Undamaged Structures Defended to Prevent Ignition 

Map Figure 29 portrays the locations of 154 primary structures that were identified as being 

defended to prevent structure ignitions and were not identified as being damaged. Figure 48

shows the number of properties where each identified suppression tool was used. It is difficult to 

exactly quantify the magnitude of each action across the entire incident. It can, however, be 

observed that in a majority of cases where containment occurred, both a combination of 

significant water suppression, coupled with low water and hand tool applications were required

to prevent/extinguish spotting down wind. 

The majority of recorded defensive actions on undamaged properties were taken with fire hoses. 

Deck guns, structure preparation, and garden hoses were recorded as being equally used. Each 

tool was only counted once per structure but might have been used multiple times. Additionally, 

a structure might have received multiple types of defensive actions, such as a combination of fuel 

removal and cooling by fire hose. For this reason, the number of defensive actions listed in 

Figure 48 exceeds 154, the identified number of structures defended to prevent ignition. 

Appendix J contains the list of tools used to prevent structure ignitions by address. 

Finally, Figure 47 shows a histogram displaying the count of undamaged and defended 

structures, based on distance to the nearest destroyed structure. It is important to note that some 

10

180

26 30 35

54

15

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

Contain

Parcel

Extinguish

Parcel

Prevent

Parcel

Ignition

Vegetation

Removal

Remove

Fences

Extinguish

Detached

Combustible

Prevent

Detached

Combustible

Ignition

Number of Properties

Parcel Level Defensive Actions
92

of the defended structures were not defended from fire produced by burning structures, but rather 

from fire produced from burning vegetation or detached combustibles. The utilization of 

sprinklers was likely exaggerated, as in multiple cases first responders were not absolutely 

certain on which properties they had activated the sprinklers. For recording purposes, all the 

potential primary structures at Chase Point Circle and Regal View Court received sprinklers as 

defensive actions. 

Table 17 Bulldozer line summaries.

Name Distance 

(km)

Approximate 

time constructed

Description

Cedar 

Heights

1.6 6/24/2012 

morning

TDs 36-38, 90. Bulldozer line in Cedar Heights constructed from 

Outback Vista Point (near Monitor Rock Lane/Cedar Heights Dr) to 

near Silver Spruce Way/Cedar Heights Dr. Bulldozer line length was 

approximately 1.6 km. Hand crews dug line down into the canyon 

from the bulldozer line. At 14:00, a large increase in downslope wind 

velocity caused a flare up around the south side of the bulldozer line.

The 

Navigators 

to the 

Flying W 

Ranch

3.2 6/25/2012

all day

TD 36. Monday (all day). Created a bulldozer line from The 

Navigators (3820 N 30th St, Colorado Springs CO) to the Flying W 

Ranch (approximately 1.6 to 3.2 km). Two, 20 person hand crews 

connected a hand line to the Autism Center from the bulldozer line. 

Bulldozer boss TD 90, with USFS and CSU. 2 bulldozers, 1 water 

tender. Instructed to build it “wide enough to light with fusees, and 

hold with a hand pump.” TD 90, Tuesday AM. Re-engage with 

bulldozer line, finish bulldozer line by 12:00 in front of the Flying W 

Ranch. Flame spotted on hillside, resources fall back. Observed fire

coming over the ridge at the Flying W Ranch. Vorteces dump over 

the ridge, dropping into the grass, column collapses, and pulls 

surface fire to canopies. Column spinning over the Flying W Ranch. 

Bulldozers parked in green patch. Burned over. Survived.

The 

Flying W 

Ranch to 

Wilson 

Tower

0.4 6/26/2012 

morning

Created a bulldozer line from the Flying W Ranch to the Wilson 

water tower (approximately 0.4 km). TD 36. Tuesday AM. Used the 

bulldozer to knock down trees on the NW side of the Wilson water 

tower and then built bulldozer lines by Wilson water tower Monday 

afternoon (2 blade-widths, 4.9 m (16 ft) total width). Patrol bulldozer

line into Tuesday.

Wilson 

Tower to 

Wolfe 

Ranch

0.8 6/26/2012 

morning

Created a bulldozer line from the Wilson water tower to the east, 

downhill to Wolfe Ranch (approximately 0.8 km). 

Wolfe 

Ranch to 

Pikeview 

Quarry

1.6 6/26/2012 

afternoon

TD 36-38. Tuesday (12:00 – 16:00). Created a bulldozer line from 

Wolfe Ranch to Pikeview Quarry (4.3 m (14 ft) wide) 

(approximately 1.6 km). From TD 90. CSU Brush and bulldozer rode 

out fire (collumn collapse) at Pikeview Quarry, never evacuated. 

Pikeview 

Quarry to 

Peregrine

0.8 6/26/2012 

evening

TD 38, Tuesday 22:30. Created a bulldozer line from the Pikeview 

Quarry to Hollandale St. (Peregrine) (approximately 0.8 km).
93

11.2.2 Damaged Structures Successfully Extinguished 

This section summarizes the successful defensive actions on structures that were damaged. The 

definition of damaged includes structures or attached combustibles, excluding fences, that 

ignited as well as structures that were in pre-ignition mode with documented damage. Not 

included in this category are structures listed as smoking/melting/pre-ignition, if no confirmed 

damage was identified. As mentioned above, the damage list provided in this report cannot be 

viewed as complete 

because a 

systematic 

assessment of all 

structures within

and around the fire 

perimeter was not 

conducted. 

Also, as discussed 

above, many of the 

categorizations 

presented below are somewhat arbitrary due to the lack of complete documentation. 

Classifications of “structure ignition deck”, as shown in Figure 15, do not necessarily correctly 

identify the ignition source. This highlights the importance of assessments on damage to 

primary structures such as partial damage assessments conducted for the IBHS report on the 

Waldo Canyon Fire. Also highlighted is the need for complete photographic documentation of 

the respective scene to capture all damage. 

Map Figure 30 portrays damaged structures that were known to be defended. In total, there were 

94 damaged structures known to be defended out of a total of 101 identified potentially damaged 

primary structures. Consequently, 93 % of the damaged primary structures were identified as 

being extinguished 

or having radiant 

heat and flames 

reduced from

adjacent burning 

objects as a 

consequence of 

first responder 

actions. 

Figure 47 Counts of undamaged structures based on distance to the nearest 

destroyed structure.

Figure 48 Counts of undamaged structures defended with various suppression tools.

33 34

23 24

16

21

3 

0

10

20

30

40

20 40 60 80 100 200 300

Number of Undamaged 

Structures

Distance to Nearest Destroyed Structure (m)

40 44

2 

107

38

3 4 

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Number of Properties

Suppression Tool Used
94

Figure 49 shows the count of suppression tools used by property and represents suppression tools 

used on 63 of the 94 properties found to be defended. Fire hose, garden hose and hand tools 

were the three primary tools used with interior access ranking fourth. The remaining 31 

properties did not have any specific suppression tool identified as some were a result of 

containment of an adjacent structure. Appendix K describes the tools used to extinguish the 

structures. 

Figure 49 highlights the fact that structure extinguishment required both significant water 

application and implementation of low water and hand tool applications. Also, some damaged 

primary structures were extinguished with more than one tool. Multiple types of apparatus, 

required for 

successful 

containment/extingu

ishment, is further 

demonstrated in 

Figure 50, showing 

the distance to the 

nearest destroyed 

primary structure 

from each damaged 

and extinguished 

primary structure. 

The spike of 

extinguished 

primary structures greater than 100 m from a destroyed structure is in part due to primary 

structures in low density and high separation distance areas, typically damaged by the passage of 

a wildland fire front. 

These primary structures potentially damaged by the wildland fire were found on Langan Street, 

Wilson Road and Sandray Court. Primary structures found on Moorfield Avenue and Rossmere 

Street south of 

Courtney Drive might 

also have been 

damaged from 

wildland fire fronts or 

structure-to-structure 

ignitions. The 

majority of the other 

extinguished primary 

structures were the

Figure 49 Counts of extinguished primary structures per suppression tool. Each tool 

is counted once per property and might have been used multiple times. 

Figure 50 Counts of damaged structures based on distance to the nearest 

destroyed structure.

4 6 

45

23 23

1 

15

1 1 

20

0

10

20

30

40

50

Number of Primary Structures

Suppression Tool Used

17 18

6 6 

4 

19

9 

14

0

5

10

15

20

6 12 18 24 30 61 91 366

Number of Damaged 

Structures Extinguished

Distance to Nearest Destroyed Structure (m)
95

result of structure-to-structure fire spread, often requiring hand tools or low water applications to 

extinguish. Consequently, there was some evidence structure to structure fire spread might have 

occurred from structures greater than 300 m apart. There was video evidence of structure to 

structure fire spread occurring between 

structures greater than 80 m apart. 

11.2.3 Damaged Structures – 

Undefended 

The seven structures identified as damaged 

with no identified defensive actions are 

shown in Table 18. It is important to 

remember that lack of identifying a 

defensive action does not indicate a 

defensive action did not occur. The fact that 

93 % of the damaged primary structures 

were defended leads to the conclusion that it 

is more prudent to assume a defense action 

occurred when considering damage to 

structures compared to not assuming this, if 

one is to assume anything. There are, 

however, cases of no defensive actions, such 

as at 2580 Brogans Bluff Drive, but no 

documentation of damage, beyond anecdotal. 

This highlights the need for homeowners to have the ability to provide authorities with 

documentation of damage. 

Figure 51 Damage to wooden window well. Note the 

damage was not from continuous fire spread as 

evidenced by the green vegetation.

Table 18 Potentially damaged structures with no specific defensive action identified.

Address Damage Location

5265 CHAMPAGNE DR This primary structure was identified in the field as having possible roof 

damage but was not confirmed. 

5430 WILSON RD Minor roof damage identified in the damage assessment by CSFD. There 

were defensive actions in the area.

5530 DARIEN WAY

This primary structure was identified in the field as having possible roof 

damage and confirmed as roof damage by a field visit and post-fire 

imagery. There were defensive actions in the area. 

5760 LINGER WAY Damage to wooden window well as shown in Figure 51 identified in 

NIST/USFS assessment.

5020 LANAGAN ST

Anecdotally seen as defended early in the morning of June 27 but actual 

responder not identified. The damage was confirmed in a subsequent field 

visit. 

2580 BROGANS BLUFF 

DR

Burned tar paper under a tile roof was identified in 

(http://gazette.com/waldo-canyon-fire-two-years-later-a-neighborhood-isreborn/article/1521839). There was no defensive action identified on this 

structure. 

2340 ROSSMERE ST Field visit identified the deck was replaced. Numerous defensive actions 

occurred around this area.

Burned wood in window well from 

ember spread/accumulation.

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used by 

permission, overlays from NIST
96

11.2.4 Destroyed Structures Unsuccessfully Extinguished and Successfully 

Contained 

There were 24 primary structures for which fire extinguishment actions were unsuccessful and 

tactics were transitioned to containment which were successful. These primary structures are 

portrayed in Map Figure 31. Out of 24 primary structures that were unsuccessfully extinguished 

and successfully contained, 18 were adjacent to destroyed primary structures and 6 were not: 

2380 Rossmere Street, 2645 Stoneridge Drive, 2320 Vanreen Drive, 4975 Braeburn Way, 1605 

Manning Way and 5775 Huffman Court. The primary structure at 2320 Vanreen Drive was

ignited around 20:00, sometime after the passage of the main fire front coinciding with the 

change in wind direction. The primary structure, likely on Huffman Court, ignited before the 

wind shift. The remainder of the primary structures were ignited shortly after the passage of the 

main fire front (< 18:30, with 2680 Rossmere Street being no later than 19:00). All six of these 

primary structures had defensive actions occurring relatively shortly after identified ignition.

The majority of the other primary structure destructions were the result of structure-to-structure 

fire spread as evidenced in imagery and/or fire witness observations. It should be noted, 

however, that 5175 Lanagan Street and 2470 Jenner Court might have been ignited by the 

wildland fire. The primary structure at 5175 Lanagan Street had a deck ignition identified and 

suppressed, which might have been a result of the fire at 5155 Lanagan Street, or the result of the 

passage of the main wildland fire. 

The primary structure at 2470 Jenner Court has images from the CSFD videographer of ignitions 

shortly before the wind shift (19:30 to 19:50). Unidentified features attached or near to 2470 

Jenner Court are also shown in Figure 52 as possibly ignited at about 20:00. The relationship 

between the burning condition at 2470 Jenner Ct and 2450 Jenner Ct also indicates the 

possibility of structure to structure fire spread that occurred after the wind shift. The destroyed 

primary structure at 2460 Jenner Court between the above two primary structures is not shown 

burning in Figure 52, but 2460 Jenner Ct is also in a topographic depression compared to 2470 

and 2450 Jenner Ct. 

When containment occurred, as specified in this section and the sections below, water (e.g. fire 

hose or deckgun) was used to contain the fire. In many cases, containment also involved actions 

in the down wind direction to other primary structures and combustibles. Quantification of the 

containment tools used is, consequently, not presented in this section and sections below. 

11.2.5 Destroyed Structures Unsuccessfully Extinguished and 

Unsuccessfully Contained 

Table 19 displays the structures that were unsuccessfully defended to extinguish the fire, 

subsequent containment attempts failed and an adjacent primary structure(s) was destroyed from 

the resulting exposure. The information was provided by first responders. Unless otherwise 
97

stated, defensive actions on an ignited structure were assumed to be for fire extinguishment and 

not containment. The cases shown in Table 19 are for structures where fire spread was of 

concern, and specific containment actions were taken and reported. 

Table 19 also describes the specific defensive action related to unsuccessful extinguishment, 

unsuccessful containment, and the tool used. Six out of the eight containment failures were 

attributable to high exposures during structure-to-structure fire spread in high density and low 

structure separation distance areas. 

11.2.6 Destroyed Structures Successfully Contained

Map Figure 32 portrays the locations of the 60 structures where defensive actions were directly 

aimed at containing the structure of origin. There were no attempts to extinguish the structure on 

fire, but instead the focus was directly on containment. These containment actions, when viewed 

across the incident, demonstrate the first responder effectiveness in “boxing in” the fire. 

Structures on fire that were not savable could consume significant personnel and water resources 

to cool down or suppress. First responder observations identified that in some cases, resources 

could be effectively used to contain ember exposure and limit fire and ember spread by cooling 

adjacent combustibles and not putting water on the burning structure.xx As evident by the 

extensive lack of white ash on most successfully contained primary structures, water application 

to structures was also required in certain locations. 

 

xx Direct high flow water application on fully involved structures can enhance ember generation as the pressure from 

the water can dislodge burning materials that are then lofted by the fire plume and help propagate fire downwind. 

Figure 52 Possible ignitions at 2470 Jenner Ct in relation to burning at 2450 Jenner Ct.

Photo courtesy of 2012 The Denver Post Media 

News Group use by permission, overlays, NIST
98

Table 19 Destroyed structures unsuccessfully extinguished and unsuccessfully contained.

11.2.7 Containing or “Boxing in” the Fire 

The defensive actions identified were very successful in containing or “boxing in” the fire 

around identified boundaries. Smoke inhalation by first responders from burning of urban fuels, 

particularly primary structures and their contents, was identified as an issue. In the northern end 

of MSC, the fire was prevented from spreading to the east of Flying W Ranch Road between 

Manning Way and Moorfield Avenue. In that area, fence ignitions were contained, and ignited 

structures contained or extinguished. 

Similarly, the fire was prevented from spreading to the neighborhood south of Chipeta 

Elementary. The fire was also contained to the west of Centennial Boulevard through 

extinguishment of at least two known spotting locations. Additionally, the fire was also 

contained at Courtney Drive, Rossmere Street, Kirby Court, and Flying W Ranch Road. The 

“boxing in” through first responder actions can also be seen in examination of Map Figure 28

through Map Figure 33. 

11.2.8 Destroyed Structures Unsuccessfully Contained 

This category of defensive actions refers to structures where containment efforts were 

unsuccessful and fire spread and destroyed adjacent primary structures. A total of 16 primary 

structures were identified in this sub-category and are portrayed in Map Figure 33. These 16 

Address Failure of Containment Defensive Action Description

5448 Majestic Dr. Structure-to-structure fire 

spread with high exposure

Fire hoses were used to attempt extinguishment/ 

containment by two different engines. 

5450 Majestic Dr. Structure-to-structure fire 

spread with high exposure 

Fire hose used by single engine late on June 26.

5683 Majestic Dr. Evacuation of resources Fire hose used by a single brush truck around 18:23 

before the second evacuation. 

5432 Majestic Dr. Structure-to-structure fire 

spread with high exposure

Actions were taken to prevent ignition and 

extinguish/contain structure with a fire hose.

5430 Majestic Dr. Structure-to-structure fire 

spread with high exposure

Actions were taken to prevent ignition and 

extinguish/contain structure with a fire hose.

5445 Wilson Rd.

Unknown An engine on ember patrol observed the shake roof on 

fire at this address at a time when nothing else in the 

immediate vicinity (lower Wilson) was burning. The 

engine extinguished the roof fire, but upon doing so, 

observed that fire was already inside the house.

5554 Vantage Vista 

Dr.

Structure-to-structure fire 

spread with high exposure

The neighboring primary structure immediately to the 

east, 5548 Vantage Vista Drive, had ignited prior to 

5554 Vantage Vista Dr and was an exposure concern for 

5554 Vantage Drive. First responders tried to defend 

and contain the exposure, but were unsuccessful. 5554 

Vantage Vista Drive was “too far gone,” as 5548 

Vantage Vista Drive was in the process of collapsing.

6445 Ashton Park 

Pl.

Structure-to-structure fire 

spread with high exposure

The exposure from 6455 Ashton Park Place caused 

smoking on the north side of the house. First responders 

attached to a hydrant, attempting to defend 6445 Ashton 

Park Place with fire hoses but were unsuccessful. 
99

primary structures include the eight outlined in Table 19. Out of the 16 primary structures that 

were unsuccessfully contained, failures in 12 cases were associated with structure-to-structure 

fire spread and high exposures associated with high structure densities. 

11.2.9 Mop-up (cooling down foundations) 

Mop-up operations started in the late hours of Tuesday, June 26, and continued for several days 

after the fire moved through MSC. It is difficult to discern between containment and mop-up as 

the two defensive actions have similar objectives in preventing fire spread. It should be noted, 

however, that two primary structures were identified as being on fire in the morning of June 27. 

At 08:30 on June 27, 5437 Lions Gate Lane had an attic fire that was successfully extinguished. 

Similarly, at 08:00 on June 27, the deck posts on the back deck of 5020 Lanagan Street were 

observed to be on fire. The observation was made by a mutual aid engine leaving the incident 

and was reported to the CSFD structural task force. It is not known when these two structures 

ignited. These two incidents illustrated that structures remained vulnerable to ignition in the 

WUI over twelve hours after the initial wildland fire front had moved through the community. 

11.3 Defensive Actions Summary

The data collected and analyzed from MSC has identified the spatial representations of defensive 

actions at a parcel and structure level. Table 20 summarizes the defensive actions in MSC. In 

total, from the TDs, defensive actions were identified on 324 structures in this report. 

It is impossible to give an exact estimate of the percentage of defensive actions captured through 

this effort, compared to the total actions conducted. Nonetheless, the spatial representations 

present in Map Figure 28 through Map Figure 33 are believed to portray the general extent of 

actions and efforts required to stop structure-to-structure fire spread at the Waldo Canyon Fire. 

The list of defended structures will increase as additional analysis of images and video are 

conducted in the future. It should also be emphasized that the data discussed in this report does 

not emphasize mop-up activities.

At a parcel level, 245 parcels were identified as defended, with 180 of them specifically 

identified as having received parcel level fire suppression activities. The uncertainty associated 

with parcel level defensive actions are expected to be significantly larger, due to issues identified 

above, and cannot be quantified given the data available. This is based on the amount of cross 

correlated data provided and the known gaps in the information provided. 
100

Table 20 Defended and undefended structures by damage status.

Status and Defensive Action Structures

Undamaged and Defended 154

Damaged and Defended 94 (93 %)

Damaged and Undefended 7 (7 %)

Extinguished Successfully 94 (75%)

Extinguished Unsuccessfully 32 (8 UE&SC + 24 UE&UC) (25 %)

Contained Successfully 60 (79 %)

Contained Unsuccessfully 16 (21 %)

Defensive actions on damaged primary structures were identified with 93 of them identified as 

defended. There were 24 unsuccessful extinguishments of structures that occurred where the fire 

was successfully contained yielding an extinguishment success rate of 75 % (94/126). 

Additionally, 154 structures were defended to prevent structure ignition. 

Containment of a structural fire is a function of resources available, exposure, ignition potential 

of the surrounding structures, structure separation, vegetative and other fuels, and environmental 

conditions. Sixty structure fires were successfully contained and 16 were not, yielding a 

containment success rate of 79 % (60/76). The first responders, therefore, stopped the fire from 

spreading beyond fully involved structures at 60 different locations, at least. 

Without the above information, evaluation of hazard mitigation effectiveness at a structure level 

would be unreliable if the assumption was made that structures were undefended. Assessment of 

hazard mitigation effectiveness at the parcel level is difficult due to the lack of burning time 

information for vegetation, compared to primary structures. Two structures were identified as 

being on fire in the early morning of June 27, and hotspots remained an issue well past that time. 

In order to address the re-ignition/flaring up potential across MSC, patrolling and cooling of 

foundations lasted for several days after the last structural ignitions. 

The data collected demonstrated that the overall containment objectives were achieved, and fire 

was “boxed in” both around Courtney Drive and Ashton Park Place and around Majestic Drive. 

Changes in wind both helped and hindered the containment actions in these areas. Wind 

negatively impacted fire containment in two ways. First, it enhanced the burning of the 

structures on fire and enhanced ember transport and possibly ember generation and secondly it 

impacted fire suppression by affecting hose stream reach. First responders observed that against 

the wind, fire hoses and deck guns had much reduced reach, thereby affecting what could 

effectively be defended. 

Changes in wind speed also reduced structure to structure fire spread. This is evident in many 

locations including northern Courtney Drive, as shown in Figure 39. On this northern side of 

Courtney Drive structure-to-structure fire spread occurred very rapidly before the wind change. 

After the wind change, only two structures were ignited in over 1.5 h. Also, fire became 

embedded in Southern Majestic Drive a second time, as shown in Figure 44, in three separate 

locations after the wind change. Additionally, it took over an hour before any defensive actions 
101

were initiated on southern Majestic Drive, even when the apparatus were at peak deployment. 

The above highlights three important concepts: 

1. It is extremely difficult to respond rapidly and safely to moderate to large fires such as 

the Waldo Canyon Fire. 

2. Even at full deployment, fire can become embedded in a high density, low structure 

separation distance community before first responders are aware and capable of 

mounting a safe defense.

3. Methods to increase situational awareness are required to improve the response time to 

initial ignitions in WUI communities.

It should be noted that for all three concepts above, additional research is needed to safely 

implement any changes in existing defensive action and tactics.

The extent of defensive actions directly on structures and parcels highlights the fact that the postfire environment, as also seen during the Witch/Guejito 27 and Amarillo 20 fires case studies, is 

the result of the interactions between local exposure, ignition potential, and defensive actions. 

The fact that defensive actions are almost ubiquitously ignored or assumed to not happen in 

historic post-fire assessments puts into question almost all previous knowledge about the 

effectiveness of current hazard mitigation guidance derived from post fire assessments. This is 

particularly the case when extensive documentation of defensive actions and local exposure 

conditions are not rigorously and extensively documented as seen in Table 21. 

The absence of indicators, such as of white or burn patterns, and confirmed containment actions 

is evidence that post-fire assessors may not be capturing certain defensive actions. Table 21

shows reports and post-fire examination recommendations that demonstrate post-fire assessors 

missing defensive actions. Most of these missing defensive actions appear to be in post-fire

assessments that are based on conclusions of field assessments or discussions with first 

responders alone. It is strongly recommended that scientific post-fire assessments focus on 

integration of all available data and assess the available data in context of its ability to produce 

conclusions based on well-founded case studies with adequate data. 
102

Table 21 Examples of studies and training materials where defensive actions were missed.

Study or Training Material Description of Missed Defensive Actions

Lessons Learned from Waldo 

Canyon: Fire Adapted 

Communities Mitigation 

Assessment Team Findings15 

In cases examined, it was assumed no defensive actions 

occurred. Defensive actions are identified at every 

location as shown in Map Figure 28 through Map Figure 

33. 

MEGA FIRES: The Case for 

Mitigation 28

Defensive actions are not mentioned in this report. Postfire imagery shows clear evidence of lack of white ash in 

locations where the fire stopped, as shown in Appendix L. 

Examining Home Destruction 

by Wildfire in The Wildland 

Urban Interface 29

Though not conclusive, there is potential evidence of 

defensive actions being missed in this video as shown in 

Appendix L. 

11.4 Defensible Space and High Density Primary Structures

The basics of defensible space and the primary structure ignition zone outline structure 

protection using the Home Ignition Zone (HIZ) concept, with the first zone encircling the 

structure and all its attachments for at least 9 m (30 ft). 30 The Firewise community fire hazard 

mitigation program states that the 9 m (30 ft ) 30 number comes from the minimum distance, on 

flat ground, that a wood wall can be separated from the radiant heat of large flames without 

igniting. In California, the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) 

recommends a 30.5 m (100 ft) defensible space, “Creating and maintaining defensible space 

around your home can dramatically increase your home’s chance of surviving a wildfire and 

improves the safety of firefighters defending your property.” 31 

According to CSFD, 

“Defensible space refers to 

that area between a house 

and an oncoming wildfire 

where the vegetation has 

been modified to reduce the 

wildfire threat and to 

provide an opportunity for 

firefighters to effectively 

defend the house. 

Sometimes, defensible space 

is simply a homeowner's 

properly maintained 

yard.” 32

Figure 53 Counts of select properties with primary structures by hazard 

rating and structure response.

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

>30.5 9.1-30.5 6.1 - 9.1 <6.1

Number of Properties

Defensible Space Hazard Rating (m)

No Damage

Damaged/Destroyed
103

In all three cases, the defensible 

space approach attempts to reduce

fuels and enable first responders to 

safely access areas around 

structures. Additionally, it should 

be noted that reducing fuels reduces 

the fire intensity and can alter fire 

behavior, under certain conditions, 

from a crown fire to a slow 

creeping fire that is easier to 

defend. Map Figure 34 portrays 

defensible space pre-fire ratings 

from the Colorado Springs WUI 

Mitigation Advice. 33 xxi Figure 53

shows the distribution of pre-fire defensible space hazard ratings of primary structures in 

response to the Waldo Canyon Fire. Figure 54 shows the percentage of primary structures not 

damaged or destroyed by the Waldo Canyon Fire by hazard rating category. 

Examination of Map Figure 34, Figure 53 and Figure 54 demonstrates the failure of current 

concepts of defensible space at certain areas affected by the Waldo Canyon Fire and the failure 

of the HIZ concept. The figures and tables referenced above do show an expected relationship 

for primary structures with “No Damage”, in that, as the defensible space goes down, the number 

with “No Damage” also goes down. The relationship between hazard rating and 

damaged/destroyed primary structures is not anticipated, as the number of damaged/destroyed 

primary structures would be expected to increase as the defensible space was reduced. Viewed 

in combination, as would be 

appropriate, Figure 54 shows a 

general pattern of decreased 

survivability as defensible space 

becomes less, except at the “> 30.5 m 

(100 ft”) category, though the 

relationship is not strong. 

 

xxi Not all properties had hazard data provided.

Figure 54 Percent primary structures with no damage by 

defensible space rating for select properties with a primary 

structure and a rating. 

Figure 55 Percent primary structures with no damage from the 

Waldo Canyon Fire by defensible space rating for all 

properties with a primary structure, a rating and no defensive 

actions as identified in this report.

y = -2.0362x + 61.643

R2 = 0.1033

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

>30.5 9.1-30.5 6.1 - 9.1 <6.1

Percent (%) of Primary 

Structures with No Damage 

Defensible Space Hazard Rating (m)

y = 1.9465x + 43.587

R2 = 0.1475

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

>30.5 9.1-30.5 6.1 - 9.1 <6.1

Percent (%) of Primary 

Structures with No Damage 

Defensible Space Hazard Rating (m)
104

The reason for the decreased percentage of primary structures with no damage in the “best” 

defensible space rating category is the destruction on Majestic Drive and Courtney Drive. These 

areas did not have defensible space evaluations that considered the hazard and consequences of 

the fire becoming embedded in the community. The information presented in Map Figure 34, 

Figure 53 and Figure 54, however, does not account for defensive actions or exposure, which 

might change the results shown in Figure 54, possibly resulting in an inverse or flat relationship 

between defensible space, as rated pre-fire using the CSFD protocol, and structure response to 

the Waldo Canyon Fire. This type analysis will be conducted in a follow on report, similar to the 

second Witch/Guejito report. 10

This is demonstrated through a simple exercise where those properties with defensive actions are 

removed from the populations, shown in Map Figure 34, Figure 53 and Figure 54. The percent 

of primary structures with no damage are then plotted by defensible space rating, as shown in 

Figure 55. Next, the set of properties with defensive actions is examined and the percent of 

primary structures with no damage from the Waldo Canyon Fire are plotted by defensible space 

rating, as shown in Figure 56. 

As can be seen in Figure 55 and Figure 56, the relationship between increased defensible space 

and primary structure response to the Waldo Canyon Fire when only considering those primary 

structures that were not defended or only those defended, is the opposite of what would be 

expected. Again, there is not a strong relationship, but even a flat relationship is not anticipated 

given current beliefs in the HIZ and defensible space concepts. Further analysis is required, but 

certain points are evident from examination of Map Figure 34 and Figure 53 through Figure 56. 

To begin, as mentioned above, there is an obvious limitation of the defensible space concept in 

accounting for the hazard to primary structures of other burning primary structure(s). There was

video evidence of burning structures igniting other burning primary structures over 80 m (262 ft)

away, though in a down slope direction, and some evidence of burning primary structures 

igniting other structures up to 300 m (984 ft) away. The inability of first responders to defend 

large conflagrations in high density areas is also clearly not recognized in current definitions of 

defensible space. 
105

As described above, the ability to defend high density primary structure areas is dependent on 

wind direction and magnitude, among other things (i.e., exposure). Also highlighted above is 

how rapid the fire could become embedded in high density primary structure areas, such as 

southern Majestic Drive, even at peak deployment of resources, thereby resulting in new 

concepts of defensible space with

focus on defense of structural fuels. 

Less obvious from the above 

information is the failure of current 

definitions of defensible space to 

account for hazards beyond the 

traditional 9.1 m (30 ft) to 30.5 m 

(100 ft). 

For example, Map Figure 35 shows 

pre-fire defensible space ratings 

overlaid on slope for northwestern 

MSC. In this area many of the 

defensible space ratings reflected 

the fact that steep slopes (>20°, as 

shown in Map Figure 35) 

approached close to the primary structure, thereby resulting in a small area for defense. Early 

ignitions could be seen in some of these locations, with steep slopes and low amounts of 

defensible space, such as on Wilson Road, Jenner Court. Conditions were also similar on Trevor 

Lane and Talleson Court, where at least one early ignition was known. In these locations 

defensible space was difficult to create due to steeper slopes beyond a relatively short distance 

around the primary structure. 

Locations on Wilson Road, Trevor Lane, Talleson Court, and Jenner Court demonstrate areas of 

poor defensible space due to higher potential fire and ember exposures. These high exposures 

were in part due to the arrangement of fuels and slopes. While a number of these factors and 

conditions were identified by CSFD pre-fire mitigation assessment, early ignitions in these areas 

made these areas more difficult to defend.

As shown in Map Figure 35, the lack of accounting for hazards beyond 9.1 m (30 ft) or 30.5 m 

(100 ft) from the primary structures is evident on Majestic Drive. Northern Majestic Drive, 

particularly those areas adjacent to Flying W Ranch Road, had defensible space ratings greater 

than 30.5 m (100 ft), (i.e., the “best” rating possible). The slopes to the west of this Majestic 

Drive area were relatively small, within 150 m (500 ft) of the closest primary structures on 

Majestic Drive. The topographic and fuel configuration coupled with the prevailing winds at the 

time of the fire resulted in the changes in exposure (higher exposures in northern Majestic 

compared to the area north of it) as seen in scorched vegetation as shown in Figure 57. 

Figure 56 Percent primary structures with no damage from the 

Waldo Canyon Fire by defensible space rating for all properties 

with a primary structure, a rating and a defensive action.

y = 0.6012x + 60.807

R2 = 0.0015

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

>30.5 9.1-30.5 6.1 - 9.1 <6.1

Percent (%) of Primary 

Structures with No Damage 

Defensible Space Hazard Rating (m)
106

In areas directly downwind of the canyon, the vegetation along the east side of Flying W Ranch 

Road was scorched while adjacent areas on either side of the canyon were not scorched, except 

those downwind of the destroyed structures. The severe exposure shown in Figure 57 was 

witnessed by a first responder parked somewhere south of Lanagan Street at the approximate 

time the fire moved through the canyon and described as a “gigantic gas torch coming across the 

road (Flying W Ranch Road)”. This highlights how conditions greater than 45.7 m (150 ft) 

from the primary structure can have consequences for structure response to wildland fire and the 

ability of first responders to defend the primary structure. 

Furthermore, the above provides evidence on how fire behavior can be affected by topographic 

conditions other than steep slopes. In high structure density settings such as those found on 

Majestic Drive, adjacent to wildlands, with topographic configurations that can generate high 

exposures, the Fire Adapted Communities 34, 35 use of fuel breaks external to the community 

might be necessary to prevent the fire from reaching the community. This may be necessary as 

the approach of allowing the fire to enter the community might yield unacceptable losses. 

There are many types of defensible space. A location might be defensible from far field ember 

spotting but not adjacent wildland burning. This was evident in locations off of Regal View 

Road that had a defensible space of less than 6.1 m (20 ft). These areas had steep slopes to the 

south, which would have resulted in space that was not defensible if fire spread came from this 

direction. These areas were defensible from ember attack as evidenced by the numerous 

defensive actions in this location as shown in Map Figure 29. Finally, it must be pointed out that 

ultimately, that TDs with first responders confirmed that not all of MSC was defendable from the 

passage of the main Waldo Canyon Fire front due to severe fire, ember and smoke exposures.

11.5 Defending High Density Primary Structures

High densities of low separation distance primary structures located adjacent to wildlands with 

dangerous topographic configurations posed significant threats at the Waldo Canyon Fire. As 

evidenced by ignitions in some locations on Majestic Drive, these areas were prone to higher 

densities of early ignitions from the passage of the main fire front. Also, these areas basically 

had no defensible space during the passage of the main fire front allowing no possible defense by 

first responders. Subsequently, these high density areas of low separation distance primary 

structures also presented significant challenges to first responders. 

In the Waldo Canyon Fire, containment failures occurred primarily in two areas, Majestic Drive 

and Courtney Drive/Ashton Park Place. These two general areas contained the highest densities 

of primary structures with the lowest separation distance of any of the areas in MSC affected by 

the Waldo Canyon Fire. The difficulty of containing fire spread once it became embedded in 

these areas is evident in Map Figure 33, showing 11 (69 %) of the failed containment actions 

occurred in these two areas. Eight failed containment actions occurred in the southern end of 

Majestic Drive, where the high density of low separation distance primary structures was 

evident. 
107

The initial failed containment in these two neighborhoods resulted in success in adjacent 

properties only when additional resources were added. In all cases, the containment actions 

occurred after the change in wind direction, which caused the fire direction to begin moving in 

the direction where containment actions ultimately occurred. Without the change in wind 

direction, the fire would likely have not spread as quickly. 

The change in wind direction also appeared to be accompanied by a reduction in wind 

magnitude. It was possible this reduction in wind magnitude resulted in the ability of first 

responders to contain the event in areas such as southern Courtney Drive and Ashton Park Place 

adjacent to Yankton Place, compared to inability to contain the event on eastern Courtney Drive 

when wind direction was from the west and wind speeds were thought to be higher. This cannot 

be directly compared, however, because no containment actions on Courtney/Ashton Park Place 

occurred before the change in wind direction. Furthermore, there was evidence that the change 

in wind direction caused significantly more destruction on Majestic Drive than would have 

occurred without the change in wind direction, even with a reduction in wind magnitude. 

Successful operations in high density housing also occurred at Via Verona, Regal View Court, 

Chase Point Circle, Moorfield Avenue, Savannah Way, Manning Way, and other locations. At 

least in Via Verona, some of the ember exposure occurred late in the night, and first responder 

resources were on the scene successfully preventing any ignitions of structures. 
108

Figure 57 Changes in exposure conditions evident through changes in scorching to vegetation corresponding 

to areas across from a canyon and burning structures. Looking east to northeast. NIST Photos
109

Though ember exposures could not be directly compared, it should be noted that the Flying W 

Ranch Road side of the Via Verona structures had a metal fence resting on a masonry wall

limiting the potential impacts of embers from the west side of Flying W Ranch Road, as 

compared to the combustible fences along the structures between Moorefield Avenue and 

Manning Way. Nonetheless, these high density locations of low separation distance between 

primary structures, where limited numbers of primary structures were damaged/destroyed, all 

saw early suppression of ignitions with a combination of high water applications and low water 

or hand tools applications. 

There are two primary reasons ignited structures are not defended in a WUI scenario. Structures 

are not extinguished because insufficient resources are available, or structures are not 

extinguished because of the very high fire and/or ember exposure they receive. A possible 

solution to the first issue is more rapid and effective safe response (see section 12.0 of this 

report). It was not clear this was possible at the Waldo Canyon Fire, except maybe in hindsight, 

knowing what the fire would do. A second solution is reduction of hazards and removal of 

vulnerabilities. Understanding WUI hazards and vulnerabilities is in its infancy. 

The very high exposure can be associated with three primary and possibly interrelated 

components. Local high exposure can be a result of extensive exposure from a combination of 

fuels, topography, and local weather. When looking at the fuel component of high exposure, 

vegetative fuels burn relatively quickly compared to residential structures that can generate high 

exposures (particularly in a high wind environment) for a long duration. In high wind scenarios, 

defensive actions in high exposure environments become ineffective and in some cases 

dangerous for first responders. The two potential approaches to limit high exposure conditions 

are to: 

1. Prevent fire from getting into environments that will yield high exposures by either 

creating fuel breaks or fuel treatments around high structure density areas, coupled with 

reduction of vulnerabilities. 

2. Prevent fire from starting structure to structure fire spread when it is safe to do so. 

Obviously, a combined approach that has correct information on exposure risks and 

vulnerabilities would be ideal. 

Effective fuel treatments xxii, when implementable, around these high structure density areas, can 

address the above needs by: 

1. Reducing fire and ember exposures to the community. 

2. Making the environment tenable for first responders. This can enable first responders to 

remain (not evacuate) and rapidly suppress any ignitions (both structural and vegetative)

early, therefore preventing fire from becoming deep seated and eliminating/limiting the 

hazards associated with multiple structures burning in close proximity. 

 

xxii Performance standards are needed for the quantification of effectiveness of fuel treatments. 
110

This approach represents a paradigm shift from the approach of accepting that fire will burn 

through the community. xxiii Research is needed to further define the above described exposure 

scenarios and create safe, reliable and implementable WUI mitigation strategies and firefighting 

SOPs to reduce structural loses.

12.0 First Responder Deployment Timeline and Structure Ignitions 

It was identified that seven separate staging areas were assembled as the fire approached and 

entered MSC. These staging areas, along with other event coordination centers, are listed in

Table 22. CSFD activated Fire Department Operations Center (FDOC), whose primary mission 

was to back fill the City’s fire stations. Additionally, the City activated the Emergency 

Operation Center, whose primary mission, along with Colorado Springs Police Department, was 

to develop evacuation zones and management action points, based on fire behavior. 

Mutual Aid was coordinated both through the CSFD and El Paso County. County resources and 

County activated Mutual Aid were staged at the County Fire Station on Cimarron Street, while 

mutual aid responding to the City’s request staged at the other staging areas. Communications 

between CSFD and mutual aid about needing or accepting mutual aid resources were hindered 

by situational awareness. Table 23 summarizes the number of primary structures known to be on 

fire and the number of apparatus in MSC at 18:30, 20:30,and 23:00; one, three hours and four 

and a half hours after the arrival of the wildland fire front. 

Table 22 Command posts, staging and IC posts.

Location Date Started Date Ended

Safeway Colorado Blvd and 31st Street 6/23/12 6/24/2012

Verizon(MCI) Garden of the Gods and 30th Street 6/26/12 7/1/2012

Fire Station 9 622 W Garden of the Gods 6/26/12 7/1/2012

Fire Station 18 6830 Hadler View 6/26/12 7/1/2012

Tiffany Square I-25 and Woodmen Road 6/26/12 6/27/2012

Holmes Middle School mobile command 6/23/12 7/1/2012

Coronado High School staging and accountability 6/24/12 6/29/2012

University of Colorado, Colorado Springs (UCCS) 6/24/12 6/25/2012

Cheyenne Mountain High School Cedar Heights shelter 6/23/12 7/1/2012

At 18:30, 74 structures were identified as ignited or burning, 268 identified as not burning and an 

additional 104 with an unknown burn status. The number of burning structures ranged from 55 

to 119 (see Table 23), and given all the available data, it was estimated that the actual number of 

burning primary structures at 18:30 was close to or less than 91. In contrast, 120 min later, there 

were 217 confirmed structures on fire, 30 not burning and an additional 167 of unknown status. 

Similarly, given all the data available, it was estimated that the number of burning primary 

 

xxiii Preparing structures using Firewise or similar principles may not yield all the benefits necessary to limit fire 

spread in high structure density areas. 
111

structures at 20:30 was above 277. By 23:00, the number of ignited and/or burning structures 

ranged from 435 to 445. The above structure ignition values indicate that in this case, there was a 

4.9:1 (91/445) multiplier between the estimated structures ignited in the first hour and the total 

number of known structure ignitions. If the high density structural losses of Majestic Drive and 

Ashton Park Place/Courtney Drive are removed, the multiplier between early ignitions and total

ignitions was reduced to 2.7:1. xxiv 

Figure 58 depicts 

the number of 

first responder 

apparatus in MSC 

from 15:40 June 

26 to 04:00 June 

27. The lines represent the total apparatus that entered the community (in red) and the net 

apparatus (in blue) that was in the community at any time. The difference between total and net 

apparatus is in part associated with equipment moving to the north towards the Peregrine area 

and equipment that was dispatched to scout, in order to enhance situational awareness. The dip in 

the blue line at 17:20 represents the evacuation of first responders when the fire reached the 

community and the plume leaned/collapsed. The figure illustrates that it took until 19:20, or two 

hours for the apparatus count to reach 60. The apparatus peaked at 78 early in the morning of 

June 27, with the arrival of the last mutual aid task force. One hour after the fire reached MSC, 

there were 37 first responder apparatus in the community, and two hours after the fire reached 

the community, there were 63.

Figure 58, as constructed, does not account for departures of apparatus from the community for 

refueling and crew swapping purposes. Additionally, the values presented included all 

apparatus, such as trucks and command vehicles, and were not limited to firefighting engines and 

brush trucks. Appendix F contains the apparatus identifiers, and when each specific apparatus 

arrived and left Mountain Shadows. The partial second evaluation only affected two apparatus 

and is identifiable in the appendix. 

 

xxiv 445 total number of ignited primary structures, 195 destroyed in the two listed areas resulting in 91/250 

multiplier. 

Table 23 Primary structures burning and apparatus in MSC as a function of time.

Time 18:30 20:30 23:00

Ignited/burning 55-119 248-286 435-445

Not burning 267 30 0-10

Ignition Unknown 64-96 129-167 0-10

Apparatus in MSC 37 63 64
112

13.0 National Incident Management System and Incident 

Command System

The infrastructure framework for the response to the Waldo Canyon Fire at a Federal, State and 

Local level was NIMS (National Incident Management System) and Incident Command System 

(ICS). ICS has its origins in the “1970 California Fire Siege” when, during a course of 13 days, 

773 wildfires destroyed over 700 primary structures and killed 16 people. xxv Three fires, the 

Clampitt, Wright, and Agua Dulce fires burned a combined total of 157 058 acres and destroyed 

183 out of the 700 total primary structures. The Laguna fire, which started the next day, 

destroyed another 382 primary structures, killing eight civilians and burning 175 425 acres. 

 

xxv The concept of ICS was developed more than fourty years ago, in the aftermath of a devastating wildfire in 

California. Although all of the responding agencies cooperated to the best of their ability, numerous problems with 

communication and coordination hampered their effectiveness. As a result, the Congress mandated that the U.S. 

Forest Service design a system that would "make a quantum jump in the capabilities of Southern California wildland 

fire protection agencies to effectively coordinate interagency action and to allocate suppression resources in 

dynamic, multiple-fire situations." - Source http://www.fema.gov/txt/nims/nims_ics_position_paper.txt

Figure 58 Apparatus in Mountain Shadows Community from 15:40 June 26 to 04:00 June 27
113

NIFC xxvi reports that the Laguna fire burned 366 primary structures in 6 h. In comparison, the 

Waldo Canyon Fire burned at least 435 primary structures in 5.5 h. 

The Laguna Fire Analysis demonstrates the first component of fire resources, namely 

availability. The Laguna report states that “manpower and equipment orders to meet predicted 

needs were slow in being filled due to the manpower and equipment drain caused by other fires 

in Southern California. Adequate resources were not fully mobilized until the morning of 

September 28th xxvii. This type of resource limitation can occur during fire sieges such as the 

1970, 2003 and 2007 California Fire Sieges or the 2011 Texas Fires. 

The second component of effective and efficient response is the utilization of resources, once the 

resources become available. The analysis of the Waldo Canyon Fire data suggests potential 

discontinuities of current National SOPs such as the lack of adequate preplanning and staging of 

resources and the identifications and prioritization of hazards. NIMS is designed to be able to 

respond to escalating events in terms of incident and response size but operates on a timescale 

that is commensurate with the behavior of wildland fires that can burn over days or weeks. 

The data from the Waldo Canyon Fire show that while the wildland fire burned for many days, 

the urban losses occurred over a course of a few hours. This is also consistent with the data 

collected during the Witch/Guejito fires. 27 The data also shows that by following current SOPs 

critical time may have been lost, and that significant resources, while available at staging, did not 

get to the fire in a timely manner. The data demonstrates that because of the rapid spread of fire 

in the WUI, planning of resource deployment should be in place beforehand, as time spent 

planning during the incident can negatively impact the ability to rapidly contain the fire. 

The Waldo data also illustrates the benefits of utilizing structural response Type 1 engines (see 

Section 11.2.2) , together with mobile readily deployable forces such as those brought to the 

incident by the USFS. Additionally, the data show that early ignitions (the first hour after the 

exposure was seen) can have a significant impact on fire behavior and can cause many other 

structures to burn through structure to structure fire spread. It is this multiplier effect that makes 

rapid response critical. 

Quantifying fire and ember exposure, in absolute terms, from post-fire data, is very unreliable 

due to the lack of quantitative measurements during wildfire and WUI events. However, a 

simple two tiered approach is devised here to illustrate effectiveness of defensive actions. xxviii

High exposure (both in terms of fire and embers) can be defined here as any flame impingement 

 

xxvi http://www.nifc.gov/fireInfo/fireInfo_stats_histSigFires.html

xxvii Regional Fire Analysis, Laguna Fire, September 26, 1970, Cleveland National Forest. 

http://www.wildfirelessons.net/Communities/Resources/ViewIncident/?DocumentKey=7eecfa9e-69d4-4bc3-91efef613976a2e4

xxviii This two tiered exposure characterization is being used here to illustrate the effectiveness of first responders. 

Examples of high exposure are areas near burning wildlands and areas surrounding burning structures. 

Intentionally, no exact distances or flux values are provided here as they are scenario specific. Additional research 

is needed to quantify both fire and ember exposures. The high and low exposure approach presented here is a 

simplification of the NIST WUI exposure Scale.
114

or convective energy exposure that would cause thermal harm to first responders wearing 

wildland PPE (fire resistant pants and shirt; not bunker gear). Using the same approach, low 

exposure can then be defined as any exposure that would not cause any thermal harm.xxix It 

should be pointed out that exposure varies, not only with space, but also with time, and that the 

high/low definition provided above cannot be used at this time for building construction or any 

actual mapping of exposure. 

Given these limited definitions of exposure, the data illustrates that there are cases, though not 

quantified in this report, in low exposure environments where small structure ignitions (typically 

caused by embers) were addressed by first responders with hand tools and/or limited water such 

as in lower Majestic Drive by the USFS. This finding indicates that in low exposure (as defined 

here); nimble and readily mobile resources can provide extinguishment of features. In contrast, 

high exposure environments (as defined here), while potentially more hazardous for first 

responders require significant resources, both in terms of personnel and water, necessary to 

control the fire such as on Ashton Park Place or Majestic Drive. 

Situational awareness is essential to safely respond to large and multi-jurisdictional WUI 

incidents. Assessment of the first responder data illustrates that situational awareness was a 

significant factor in the redeployment of resources. A paradigm shift may be necessary to 

enable very rapid deployment of resources to safely and effectively fight interface fires, 

provided the appropriate situational awareness is available. 

Data to enhance rapid situational awareness could be needed in order to accelerate the

effective deployment of resources. Currently, data is often collected by the deployment of 

scouts and from lookouts. Remote sensing technologies such as unmanned sensors might

provide additional valuable input in certain environments, and could potentially accelerate 

situational awareness. Communication between local and mutual aid resources was 

identified as limited, including the finite battery life of handheld radios. Mapping of hazards 

within and around a community, together with pre-planning for rapid and targeted 

deployment within the community can improve firefighter safety and provide homeowners 

with identification of these hazards and ability to possibly mitigate. 

14.0 Structure Construction and Parcel Vulnerabilities 

The information presented in this section identified recurring structure and parcel level 

vulnerabilities. As discussed in section 7.0, no detailed data collection was conducted at every 

parcel within the fire line, so there can be no statistics generated as to the relative performance of 

vulnerabilities, with the possible exception of roof cover and siding type, which are being 

examined, but are still limited due to lack of information on other confounding building 

treatments. For example, data is not available on how many primary structures (destroyed, 

damaged and undamaged) had wooden decks, so analysis cannot determine what percentage of 

 

xxix Respiratory protection must also be addressed, but is not assessed here as limited data is available.
115

exposed wooden decks ignited, nor whether primary structures with wood roofs also had wood 

decks. 

Additionally, the data presented is not all inclusive, but rather a collection of first responder 

observations and data extracted from images and video footage. The data presented in this report 

can be used to identify potential ignition vulnerabilities both at the parcel and structure level. 

The vulnerabilities presented here point to the need for test methods that utilize realistic 

exposures. A list of identified damage to building components is tabulated in Appendix K. 

14.1 Decks

Three mechanisms of deck ignitions were identified. Decks were ignited by embers and/or fire 

exposure to their footers (at ground level or some distance above) and/or to their top surface (on 

the deck or steps), to their underside (deck or steps) or through accumulation of embers in reentrant corners, for which the deck represents the floor. For most observations of decks on fire, 

there was some ambiguity in determining if the deck was the ignition source or some item on or 

around the deck ignited first. Additionally, it was not known for all decks what material and 

material finishing types were used. Finally, distance of the deck above the ground and 

amount/type of fuels present underneath the deck were also not known. 

14.2 Roofs/Eaves/Attics 

Roof assembly fires pose a significant challenge in terms of timeline analysis. Unless very 

detailed information is available on the fire progression, or only partial damage is present, it is 

very difficult to determine if a “roof fire” is actually an attic fire that has burned through the 

roof, a fire that started at the eves and progressed to the roof and possibly into the attic, or a fire 

caused by ignition of combustibles on the roof (e.g. pine needles). Unless otherwise noted, all 

roof, attic and eaves fires were recorded as structure on fire. 

14.3 Garage Door and Utility Door Trim and Vinyl Window Frames

Some primary structures had confirmed garage door base/trim and utility door trim ignitions. All 

the identified ignitions were the result of embers accumulating in corners of combustible 

construction materials on a fine physical scale of centimeters (inches) not meters (ft). There was 

one reported occurrence of a vinyl window frame melting (the house was not on fire) due to 

exposure from an adjacent, fully involved structure. The melted frame released the window pane 

and exposed the interior of the structure to the exposure from the adjacent burning building. In 

this case the structure was defended and saved.

14.4 Fences

Combustible fences played a significant role in fire spread early in the fire. The area between the 

northern parking lot of the Verizon/MCI building and Cameo Way/Braeburn Way experienced 

very light fire exposure from the relatively limited wildland fuels burned in this location. The 
116

ignited fences posed a threat to the local structures. In this case, the fences on fire were 

suppressed by USFS crews using hand tools and small quantities of water. 

Similar cases of burning fences threatening nearby structures were also observed in Charring 

Court, at the south end of Wilson Road, in the area between Moorefield Avenue and Flying W 

Ranch Road, along with Ashton Park Place. The burning fences not only caused a potential fire 

exposure threat to adjacent structures but also caused a potential ember exposure threat to 

downwind structures and other combustibles. 

14.5 Railroad TFies

Railroad ties that were used as landscaping timbers were also identified as contributors to fire 

spread and retention of energy. xxx The creosote that is frequently used on these large pieces of 

wood makes their cooling down with water an intensive process that occupies firefighting 

resources for a significant amount of time. This was also observed at the Witch/Guejito 10, 27 and 

Amarillo fires. 22

15.0 Summary of Technical Findings

The four primary findings from the Waldo Fire investigation are:

1. Defensive actions were effective in suppressing burning structures and containing the 

Waldo Canyon fire. 

2. Pre-fire planning is essential to enabling safe, effective, and rapid deployment of 

firefighting resources in WUI fires. Effective pre-fire planning requires a better 

understanding of exposure and vulnerabilities. This is necessary because of the very 

rapid development of WUI fires. 

3. Current concepts of defensible space do not account for hazards of burning primary 

structures, hazards presented by embers and the hazards outside of the home ignition 

zone. 

4. During and/or shortly after an incident, with limited damage assessment resources

available, the collection of structure damage data will enable the identification of 

structure ignition vulnerabilities. 

This case study identified a total of 37 technical findings, including 12 associated with field data 

collection and codes and standards, and 25 associated with fire behavior and defensive actions. 

As a result, 13 recommendations aimed at improving the fire resilience of WUI communities 

were developed. Additional issues identified during TDs are presented in Appendix N even 

though they did not affect the data analysis and primary findings of this report. 

15.1 Primary Technical Findings

1. Extensive data is required to create a detailed fire timeline and defensive action 

reconstruction, which is necessary to obtain a clear understanding of the incident fire 

 

xxx In one case railroad ties were found to be smoldering over one week after the Waldo fire reached MSC. 
117

behavior and structural response to the exposure conditions. This finding reaffirms what 

was found at the Witch/Guejito and Amarillo fires.

2. Clear identification of damage/destruction was a key mechanism for linking eyewitness 

accounts of defensive actions describing damage/destruction to a location on the ground. 

3. WUI post-fire rapid assessments that focus on recording all damage and destruction to 

the WUI area would aid in identifying construction vulnerabilities. 

4. Reliable technical data on WUI mitigation strategies and first responder tactics from postfire assessments must account for the timeline of burning features, the human actions 

used to alter fire behavior (pre-fire and during-fire) and the exposure conditions 

experienced in the area from which the technical data is being collected. 

5. During-fire observations might be very limited spatially (due to smoke or line of sight) 

and have a temporal limitation that makes them of limited value unless integrated both in 

space and time. This finding reaffirms what was found at the Witch/Guejito and 

Amarillo fires.

6. Fuel treatment effectiveness standards are needed; otherwise, the effectiveness of fuel 

treatments cannot be reliably assessed. 

7. Collecting, organizing, analyzing, documenting and distributing post-fire WUI 

assessment data, particularly for a large incident, can be complex, involving the use of 

relational databases, remote sensing, Global Positioning Systems (GPS), document 

management and many other geospatial and information technology applications to fully 

integrate all available data. 

8. The reconstruction of the fire timeline and defensive actions could not have been 

accomplished without the following key activities:

8.1 Imaging of large numbers of burning structures in MSC. 

8.2 Documentation of practically all of the first responders’ recollections of events in 

space and time.

8.3 Imaging of MSC by Google Streetview, Bing Maps and the City of Colorado 

Springs prior to the fire. 

8.4 Imaging of MSC two days after the Waldo Canyon Fire affected the community.

8.5 Integrating all data in a Geographic Information Systems (GIS).

9. Documentation of first responder actions, in small groups, by the individuals conducting 

those actions in an electronic format, and allowing for incorporation of pertinent images, 

would increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the technical discussion (TD) data 

collection process.

10. Post-fire aerial imagery can provide indications of defensive actions, but not all defensive 

actions can be identified from aerial imagery, and first responder’s recording their 

activities in space and time is required.

11. Lack of judicious protocols for post-fire data collection can lead to loss of data and 

reduces the quality of scientific post-fire studies.
118

12. Post-fire assessors should not come to conclusions about fire behavior, tactics, or 

structure response based on field assessments or discussions with first responders alone. 

A full integration of all available data must first be conducted and then determinations 

made regarding the adequacy of the data before any conclusions are made.

Fire Behavior and Defensive Actions

13. Over 95% of the destroyed or damaged structures were ignited within five and a half 

hours after the fire reached the community, resulting in a structure ignition rate of 79 

structures per hour or 1.3 structures/min, considering this entire time period. 

14. One hour after the fire reached the MSC, there were 37 first responder apparatus in the 

community, and 2 h after the fire reached the community, there were 63 apparatus 

present. 

15. The wildland fire front had passed and conditions were clear in the vicinity of the water 

tower at Wilson Road 60 min after the front reached the area. xxxi

16. Large numbers of burning structures shortly after the passage of the main wildland fire 

front caused a second evacuation and slowed response to the fire due to the belief that a 

second fire front might be moving through the area. 

17. There were 154 structures successfully defended to prevent structure ignition and 

defensive actions were documented on 245 parcels, with significantly more parcels likely 

defended. 

18. There were 94 structures ignited that were saved by first responders. 

19. First responders were effective in extinguishing ignited structures 75 % of the time. 

20. Out of the 445 total ignited structures, there were 55 to 119 (12 % to 27 %) identified as 

burning within 60 min of the passage of the main wildland fire front. 

21. First responders were effective in containing fully involved structures 79 % of the time.

22. Ninety-three percent of damaged structures were identified as defended.

23. The effects of structure spacing, with regard to burning of adjacent structures, are 

dependent on exposure and can vary considerably within a small spatiotemporal extent. 

24. The effective and successful response to the Peregrine blowup on Wednesday, June 27 

demonstrated the advantages of pre-fire mitigation and pre-positioning of resources for 

WUI fires of a small geographic extent. 

25. Fire observations have to be interpreted in the context of the overall fire timeline. A 

structure can be observed to be “not on fire” when in fact it had ignited, was suppressed, 

and latter re-ignited, or was ignited in an unobserved location. 

26. Features such as combustible decks, fences, railroad ties, secondary buildings, re-entrant 

corners, and readily ignitable roof coverings represent significant hazards to the structure 

and surrounding parcels. This finding reaffirms what was found at the Witch/Guejito and 

Amarillo fires.

 

xxxi This information was collected from video footage. Conditions could have been clear even before the first 

responder captured the video footage.
119

27. There are currently no National Standard Operating Procedures for WUI firefighting 

response or resource deployment. SOPs for deploying resources in the WUI need to 

account for the extremely fast and safe response that might be required to stop fires in

communities with high density and low structure separation distances before the fire 

becomes embedded in the neighborhood. 

28. Fire can rapidly ignite multiple structures in high density, low structure separation 

distance communities even when first responders are at peak deployment of resources.

29. Rapid resource deployment strategies should be designed and rehearsed with mutual aid. 

30. Rapid and safe deployments of firefighting resources would require an increased 

understanding of exposure and structure vulnerabilities. 

31. Data to enhance rapid situational assessment is needed to enable rapid and effective 

deployment of resources. 

32. Methodologies are needed to further define and map high and low exposure WUI areas. 

33. Mapping of hazards to identify key community vulnerabilities in the context of fuels, 

topography and local weather is necessary in order to design effective response strategies.

34. Mapping of hazards within and around a community, together with preplanning for rapid 

and targeted deployment within the community, can improve firefighter safety and reduce 

structural loses. 

35. Due to the limitations of the current state of knowledge, defensible space definitions do 

not consider defensibility from structure to structure fire spread or defensibility from 

dangerous topographic configurations. 

36. Structure spacing and density affected exposure between adjacent structures and made 

certain locations untenable for first responders, therefore, reducing their effectiveness and 

possibly their ability to respond quickly to stop early fire spread. 

37. Smoke inhalation was identified as a key health concern by first responders. 

16.0 Recommendations 

The following are the primary recommendations which are aimed at improving the safety and

effectiveness of WUI fire response. An overall paradigm shift in responding to WUI fires is 

needed: 

1. Develop, plan, train and practice SOPs based on better understanding of exposure and 

structure vulnerabilities, to enable rapid fire department response to WUI fires. SOPs 

need to account for responding, in the event of a specific WUI scenario, to both high and 

low exposure areas.

2. A response time threshold for WUI fire situations needs to be developed based on 

increased understanding of exposure and structure vulnerabilities, the same way city fire 

departments have response thresholds for responding to building fires. 

3. Structure spatial arrangements in WUI areas where defensive actions are ineffective or 

unsafe need to be identified.
120

4. Response plans for high density WUI areas, with the objective of fire not reaching these 

areas, need to be designed. 

5. Defensible space definitions need to be updated to emphasize that the main desired result 

is the ability for first responders to defend locations and recognize hazards of primary 

structures and dangerous configurations of topography and fuels outside the home 

ignition zone. 

6. Additional research is needed to fully characterize the relationships between the spatial 

arrangement of houses and defensive action 

7. Hazards at the WUI, factoring in fuels, topography and local weather need to be 

quantified. Fuels need to include wildland fuels and structural/residential fuels such as 

wood roofs, fences and combustible decks. 

8. A better understanding of exposure and structure vulnerabilities needs to be developed, 

including definitions for high and low fire and ember exposure areas 

9. Wildland fuel treatment standards to quantify exposure reduction for different 

topographical and weather conditions need to be developed. 

10. Construction standards and test methods need to be updated to capture representative fire 

and ember exposures from fuel treatments. 

11. Due to complexities associated with timeline reconstruction, exposure characterization 

and defensive actions, rapid post fire need to identify/count destroyed homes, and focus 

on documenting damage and destruction to the WUI environment, using current

technology and comprehensive methods for documentation. 

12. Protocols for collection of ground and aerial imagery for pre-fire, during-fire and postfire situations need to be developed. 

13. Consistent protocols for collection of damage information in a WUI environment need to 

be developed. 

17.0 Summary and Conclusions 

The primary purpose of this case study is to re-construct the event timeline for burning features 

and defensive actions in MSC from the Waldo Canyon Fire, describing the quality of data used 

to perform the reconstruction. Additionally, challenges with WUI mitigation strategies and 

tactics are highlighted. Improvements to WUI data collection are also highlighted. 

The data collected and analyzed here indicates that first responders were effective and 

extinguished 94 primary structures that had actually caught on fire. Thirty-two primary 

structures were unsuccessfully extinguished, yielding an extinguishment success rate of 75 %. 

Seven primary structures were identified as damaged without any identified defensive actions. 

Additionally, 60 primary structures were successfully contained, and 16 were not, yielding a 

containment effectiveness rate of 79 %. Overall, the first responders were effective in saving 

structures and together with the abated wind, were able to “box in” and control the fire when 

they arrived at the scene. 
121

Over 200 technical discussions with fire fighters captured the spatial extent of the defensive 

actions aimed at protecting structures. Fire spread and behavior during a WUI fire, and the 

subsequent loses, involves the interaction of multiple factors including pre-fire mitigation 

technologies, fire and ember exposure during the fire, and defensive actions. In order to 

adequately assess the effectiveness of hazard mitigation technologies and/or defensive actions, 

post fire assessment need to capture all these interactions. 

Current concepts of defensible space do not consider hazards of nearby burning primary 

structures. Concepts of defensible space and the HIZ that only consider the environment within 

9.1 m (30 ft) to 30.5 m (100 ft) of structures do not account for hazards present in MSC during 

the Waldo Canyon Fire up to 150 m from primary structures. High density primary structure 

areas adjacent to wildlands with topographic features that can increase fire and ember exposure 

are not considered in current concepts of defensible space. A particular location can be 

defensible from ember attack yet not defensible from direct fire spread. 

The Waldo Canyon Fire posed a significant challenge to first responders on June 26. The fire 

moved rapidly through MSC. In the first hour after the wildland fire reached MSC, 55 to 119 

primary structures were identified as ignited. In the first three hours, 248 to 286 primary 

structures were already on fire. The majority of destroyed primary structures were burned or 

ignited by midnight on the June 26. 

Existing tactics, while effective for wildland firefighting, might have significant limitations for 

interface fires such as the Waldo Canyon Fire, where very rapid deployment might be necessary 

to limit fire spread and structural losses. The data captured the apparatus response timeline to 

MSC using current SOPs. A paradigm shift may be necessary to enable very rapid deployment 

of agile resources to safely and effectively fight interface fires. Mapping of hazards within and 

around a community, together with preplanning for rapid and targeted deployment within the 

community, can improve firefighter safety and in many cases reduce structural losses. Improved 

situational awareness is also required during an incident. 

Characterizing fire behavior, quantifying structure response, assessing exposure conditions and 

developing efficient and effective WUI mitigation strategies are in their infancy. It is thought 

that post-fire assessments alone, particularly given the current state of the art will never be able 

to individually successfully perform the above characterizations, quantifications, and 

assessments. Laboratory and field experiments coupled with physics based fire modeling and 

other new innovations would ultimately be required with all activities integrated around 

representative fire and ember exposure values. 

A new approach to post-fire assessments was used that involves integration of all data including 

aerial and ground imagery, radio logs , and AVLs and did not just draw conclusions based on 

field assessments or discussions with first responders. Post-fire assessments should consider 

defensive actions and attempt to map the spatiotemporal extent of these actions. Collection of all 

damage information from the fire before moving to assessment of fire behavior or effectiveness 

of tactics and mitigation would help scientific post-fire assessments in reconstructing the event 
122

timeline. The use of aerial and ground imagery with established post-fire assessment techniques 

would provide forensic evidence to help document post-fire environments in a more 

comprehensive manner. Mechanisms for first responders to document their activities and upload 

images of events are required.

In summary, the information generated from this case study can provide input, together with 

additional research, to improve WUI building and landscaping (construction) codes and 

standards, and best practices. Extensive research is also needed to provide first responders 

with effective tools and SOPs. Continued advancements are also necessary in the field of 

data collection and rapid situational awareness. Only then will hazard mitigation 

improvements for new constructions and retrofits, together with improvements in 

firefighting response, reduce WUI structural losses. 

18.0 Acknowledgments 

The authors would like to acknowledge the Joint Fire Science Program for funding this effort. 

This case study would not have been possible without the full support of the City of Colorado 

Springs. Specifically, the authors would like to acknowledge Colorado Springs Fire Marshall 

Lacey, Colorado Spring Chief Dubay, Colorado Springs Fire Protection Engineer Smith, and 

Colorado Springs Audio Visual Specialist Shopper. 

The authors would specifically like to acknowledge the Colorado Springs Fire and Rescue 

apparatus that defended Mountain Shadows: Engine 19, Brush 19, Brush 18, Engine 18, Brush 5, 

Engine 5, Brush 6, Engine 6, Engine 15, Brush 15, Brush 9 (WL9), Engine 9, Engine 11, Brush 

11, Engine 17, Command Vehicle (TD 1, TD 2), Command Vehicle (TD 7), Command vehicle 

CSFD District 3 (TD 4), Command vehicle (TD 45), Command vehicle (TD 11), Command 

vehicle (TD 117), Command Vehicle (TD 12), Engine 16, Brush 16, CSFD Utility 4, Engine 4, 

Brush 4 (WL4), Engine 2, Engine 3, Truck 8, Engine 7, Brush 7, Engine 20, Brush 20, Engine 

12, Brush 12, Brush 13, Engine 13, Engine 10, Brush 10, Engine 103. 

Additionally this report would not have been possible without the tremendous support from all 

the mutual aid companies (Federal, state and local) that supported the Waldo fire and took the 

time to share their actions and observations with the authors, specifically: Boone Fire 

Department, Broadmoor Fire Protection District, Calhan Fire Department, Cimarron Hills Fire 

Department, Colorado Springs Fire Department, Colorado Springs Police Department, Colorado 

Springs Utilities Wildland Fire Team, Denver Fire Department (Stations 5, 7, 8, 21 and 28), El 

Dorado National Forest (E14, E65, E334, E64), El Paso County Sheriff Department, El Paso 

County Wildfire Suppression Team, Falcon Fire Department, Fountain Fire Department, 

Hanover Fire Department, HWY 115 Fire Department, Manitou Springs Fire Department, NE 

Teller County Fire Protection District - Woodland Park, Pikes Peak Community College Fire 

Science Engine, Plumas National Forest (E21, E330, E32, E24, E11, E35), Pueblo County 

Sheriff Brush Truck, Pueblo Fire Department, Pueblo Rural, Pueblo West Station 3, Redding 

Interagency Hot Shot Crew, Rye Fire Department, Salmon River Interagency Hot Shot Crew, 
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Security Fire Department, Tahoe National Forest (E333, E31, E43, B71, E42, E73), USFS 

Division Supervisor, Ukonom Interagency Hot Shot Crew, West Metro Fire Protection District, 

West Park Fire, and Wheat Ridge Fire Protection District. 

The authors would also like to thank the Mountain Shadows residents that provided images and 

critical firsthand accounts of the fire, as well as those who provided information on structural and 

parcel damage. Lastly, the authors would like to acknowledge Ruddy Mell (USFS FERA), 

Anthony Hamins (NIST) and Nelson Bryner (NIST) for their critical review of this report. 
124

19.0 Map Figures
125

Map Figure 1 Fire progression of the 2012 Colorado Waldo Canyon Fire overlaid on structure response to the fire for primary structures in 

and around the fire.
126

Map Figure 2 Overview of destruction to MSC by 2012 Waldo Canyon Fire.

Aerial Image courtesy Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
127

Map Figure 3 Location of two destroyed primary structures including images showing burning of western structure and locations of Engine 

from AVL clustered around primary structure with lack of white ash indicating lack of complete combustion of features. 

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with permission

Aerial Image courtesy Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
128

Map Figure 4 Destroyed and damaged structures with some video or image recorded of it in some state of burning, including complete 

destruction between 6/26/2012 17:59 to 6/27/2012 01:30.

Aerial Image courtesy Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
129

Map Figure 5 Primary structures with only "Done Burning" observations from images or videos overlaid on other primary structure damage 

categories.

Aerial Image courtesy Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
130

Map Figure 6 Parcels with some video or image recorded of vegetation or detached items such as fences or decks in some state of burning, 

including complete destruction between 6/26/2012 17:59 to 6/27/2012 01:30.

Aerial Image courtesy Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
131

Map Figure 7 Primary structures with burning observation(s) from TDs overlaid on destroyed and damaged primary structures with no 

burning observations from TDs.

Aerial Image courtesy Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
132

Map Figure 8 Primary structures with burn observations from TDs with time range estimates less than + 20 min.

Aerial Image source: Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
133

Map Figure 9 Primary structures identified as defended to “prevent structure ignition” between 19:30 and 22:30 overlaid on damage and 

destruction.

Aerial Image source: Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
134

Map Figure 10 Primary structures identified as defended to “prevent structure ignition”, “extinguish structure” or “contain structure” 

between 23:30 on June 26 and 05:30 on June 27 overlaid on damage and destruction.

Aerial Image source: Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
135

Map Figure 11 Properties with identified defensive action locations of extinguishing detached combustibles before 20:30 and properties with 

identified defensive actions of remove fences, burning or not, after 19:30, both on June 26.

Aerial Image source: Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
136

Map Figure 12 WUI area in and around MSC. 

Aerial Image source: Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
137

Map Figure 13 Structure density in and around Mountain Shadows. Derived using the ArcGISTM Point Density Tool with a circle window 

having a radius of 200 m (660 ft) and an output cell size of 3 m (10ft).

Aerial Image source: Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
138

Map Figure 14 Distance to nearest primary structure in MSC.

Aerial Image source: Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
139

Map Figure 15 Spotting and possible continuous fire spread over the ridge above MSC occurring around 16:30 on June 26. 

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with permission

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with permission

Aerial Image source: Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST

Photo: 2012 The Denver Post Media News 

Group used with permission, overlays from 

NIST
140

Map Figure 16 Burning times of wildlands around MSC.

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with

permission, overlays from NIST

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with

permission, overlays from NIST

Photo: 2012 The Denver Post Media News 

Group used with permission, overlays from 

NIST

Photo: 2012 The Denver Post Media News Group used 

with permission, overlays from NIST

Aerial Image source: Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
141

Map Figure 17 Additional burning times of wildlands around MSC.

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with

permission, overlays from NIST 

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with

permission, overlays from NIST

Photo courtesy of 2012 The Denver Post Media News 

Group used with permission, overlays from NIST

Aerial Image source: Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
142

Map Figure 18 Time lapse images of vegetation along Flying W Ranch Road. The vegetation did not burn as part of the main fire front, as is 

evidenced in the image taken at 19:23. Later images show burning of vegetation and the destroyed primary structures as early as 20:42. The 

burning might have been a result of ember spread from primary structures burning on Hot Springs Court, corresponding to a change in wind 

direction. 

Photos courtesy of CSFD, used with permission, overlays from NIST

Aerial Image source: Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
143

Map Figure 19 Ignitions occurring after the change in wind direction. 

Photo: 2012 The Denver Post Media News Group used with 

permission, overlays from NIST

Aerial Image source: Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
144

Map Figure 20 Ignitions occurring after 20:00.

≈

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with permission

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with permission

Aerial Image source: Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
145

Map Figure 21 Structure ignitions on Jenner Court corresponding to changes in wind direction around 20:00.

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with permission

Photo: 2012 The Denver Post Media News Group used 

with permission, overlays from NIST

Photo: 2012 The Denver Post Media News Group used 

with permission, overlays from NIST

Aerial Image source: Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
146

Map Figure 22 Spotting locations to wildland vegetation with potential farthest spotting locations highlighted.

Aerial Image source: Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
147

Map Figure 23 Potential spotting to structure locations, relatively early in the fire.

Aerial Image source: Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
148

Map Figure 24 Ignition status of destroyed and damaged primary structures around 18:30 on June 26. 

Aerial Image source: Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
149

Map Figure 25 Ignition status of destroyed and damaged primary structures before ≈20:30 on June 26. 

≈

≈

≈

Aerial Image source: Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
150

Map Figure 26 Ignition status of destroyed and damaged primary structures before ≈23:00 on June 26. 

≈

≈

Aerial Image source: Sanborn, Inc,. used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
151

Map Figure 27 Images of structures as foundations or fully involved before 23:55. Image B and Image D show some of the last structures to 

burn in the area along with defensive actions. Defensive actions and burn order can also be deduced from areas with lack of white ash as 

shown in image C that indicates structures as foundations before successful containment actions occurred coinciding with structures containing 

white ash. 

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with

permission, overlays from NIST

Photo courtesy of CSFD, 

used with permission, 

overlays from NIST

Aerial Image source: Sanborn, Inc., used 

with permission, overlays from NIST

Photo courtesy of CSFD, 

used with permission, 

overlays from NIST

Photo courtesy of CSFD, 

used with permission, 

overlays from NIST
152

Map Figure 28 Properties that had parcel level defensive actions. Some properties had multiple defensive actions. The size of the parcel is not 

related to the quantity or quality of the defensive actions and defensive actions might not have occurred across the entire parcel.

Aerial Image source: Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
153

Map Figure 29 Structures with no damage, shown as purple hexagon with black dot, which were specifically identified by first responders as 

being defended to prevent structure ignition.

Aerial Image source: Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
154

Map Figure 30 Structures with confirmed and possible damage, shown as purple hexagon with black dot, which were specifically identified by 

first responders as being extinguished (94/104 total or 93%).

Aerial Image source: Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
155

Map Figure 31 Destroyed structures, shown as purple hexagon with black dot, which were specifically identified by first responders as being

attempted to be extinguished but were ultimately destroyed and also identified as first responders containing fire spread.

Aerial Image source: Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
156

Map Figure 32 Destroyed structures, shown as purple hexagon with black dot, which were specifically identified by first responders as being 

attempted to be contained and fire spread did not continue to adjacent primary structures.

Aerial Image source: Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
157

Map Figure 33 Destroyed structures, shown as purple hexagon with black dot, which were specifically identified by first responders as being

attempted to be contained and fire spread did continue to adjacent primary structure(s), which were ultimately destroyed.

Aerial Image source: Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
158

Map Figure 34 Defensible space ratings for select properties with primary structures in MSC overlaid with structure response to the Waldo 

Canyon Fire.

Aerial Image source: Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
159

Map Figure 35 Hazard rating overlaid on slope for select areas of MSC.

Aerial Image source: Sanborn, Inc., used with 

permission, overlays from NIST
160

20.0 References 1 Gollner M, Hakes R, Canton S, and Kohler K, Pathways for Building Fire Spread at the Wildland Urban 

Interface, National Fire Protection Association, http://www.nfpa.org/research/fire-protection-researchfoundation/projects-reports-and-proceedings/for-emergency-responders/fire-prevention-andadministration/pathways-for-building-fire-spread-at-the-wildland-urban-interface

2

 Maranghides A, Mell W (2012) Framework for Addressing the National Wildland-Urban 

Interface Fire Problem – Determining Fire and Ember Exposure Zones Using a WUI Hazard 

Scale. NIST Technical Note 1748. Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and 

Technology. 

3

 Tidwell J (2006) Wildland Interface Fire Safety. Building Safety Journal. August 

2006. http://www.iccsafe.org/safety/Documents/Tidwell_Aug06.pdf

4 Nielsen-Gammon JW (2012) The 2011 Texas drought. Texas Water Journal, 3(1), 59-95. 

5

 Cohen J (2010) The wildland-urban interface fire problem. Fremontia, 38(2-3), 16-22. 

6

 Litzenberg E (2012) Colorado’s 2012 WUI Fires & Changing WUI Landscape: A review of 

Colorado’s tragic 2012 WUI fire season & the lessons learned. Fire Rescue. February 

2013. http://www.firefighternation.com/article/wildland-urban-interface/colorado-s-2012-wuifires-changing-wui-landscape

7

 Federal Register /Vol. 66, No. 3 /Thursday, January 4, 2001 /Notices 

753, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2001-01-04/pdf/01-52.pdf

8 Haight RG, Cleland DT, Hammer RB, Radeloff VC, Rupp TS (2004) Assessing fire risk in the 

wildland-urban interface. Journal of Forestry, 102(7), 41-48. 

9

 Calkin DE, Cohen JD, Finney MA, Thompson MP (2014) How risk management can prevent 

future wildfire disasters in the wildland-urban interface. Proceedings of the National Academy of 

Sciences, 111(2), 746-751. 

10 Maranghides A, McNamara D, Mell WE, Trook J, Toman B (2013) A Case Study of a 

Community Affected by the Witch and Guejito Fires: Report #2: Evaluating the Effects of 

Hazard Mitigation Actions on Structure Ignitions. NIST Technical Note 1796. Gaithersburg, 

MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology. 

11 Bryner N, Maranghides A (2015) Role of Event-Based Data in Wildland-Urban Interface Fire 

Mitigation – Limitations of Incident-based Data. Fire Research Division, National Institute of 

Standards and Technology (NIST), Gaithersburg, MD. Workshop on Structure Ignition in 

Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) Fires, ASTM Committee E05 Fire Standards, Anaheim, CA, 

June 18, 2015 
161

12 Jain, TB (2004) Confused Meaning for Common Fire Terminology Can Lead to Fuels 

Mismanagement. A New Framework is Needed to Clarify and Communicate the Concepts. 

Wildfire. July/August, 2004. http://leopold.wilderness.net/pubs/526.pdf

13 Popper KR (2002) The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Psychology 

Press. https://books.google.com.au/books/about/The_Logic_of_Scientific_Discovery.html?id=Y

q6xeupNStMC&hl=en:)

14 Zubeck P (2012) Misfire: How city leadership left residents — and their heroes — exposed 

during the Waldo Canyon tragedy. Colorado Springs 

Independent. http://www.csindy.com/coloradosprings/misfire/Content?oid=2598215

15 Quarles S, Leschak P, Cowger R, Worley K, Brown R, Iskowitz C (2013) Lessons Learned 

from Waldo Canyon: Fire Adapted Communities Mitigation Assessment Team Findings. 

Insurance Institute for Business and Home 

Safety. https://disastersafety.org/?s=Waldo+Canyon+report

16 Manzello SL and Foote EID (2014) Characterizing Firebrand Exposure from Wildland–Urban 

Interface (WUI) Fires: Results from the 2007 Angora Fire. Fire Technology, 50, 105–124, 2014 

17 Ridneour K, Rissel S, Powell W, Gray R, Fisher M, Sommerfeld J (2012) Bastrop Complex 

Wildfire Case Study: The Most Destructive Wildland Urban Interface Wildfire in Texas History. 

Texas Forest Service. September 4, 

2011. http://content.austin.ynn.com/auscontent/documents/BastropReport1-42.pdf

18 Graham R, Finney M, McHugh C, Cohen J, Calkin D, Stratton R, Bradshaw L, Nikolov N 

(2012) Fourmile Canyon Fire Findings. Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-289. Fort Collins, CO: U.S. 

Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station. 110 

p. http://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs/rmrs_gtr289.pdf

19 Masters RE, Galley KEM, and Despain DG (eds.) (2009) The ’88 Fires: Yellowstone and 

Beyond, Conference Proceedings. Tall Timbers Miscellaneous Publication No. 16, Tall Timbers 

Research Station, Tallahassee FL, 

USA. http://www.nps.gov/yell/learn/nature/upload/9thconf_88fires.pdf

20 Maranghides A, Mell W, Ridenour K, McNamara D (2014) Initial Reconnaissance of the 2011 

Wildland-Urban Interface Fires in Amarillo, Texas. Fire Technology, 50(1), 93-104 

21 Johnson RH, Schumacher RS, Ruppert JH, Lindsey DT, Ruthford JE, Kriederman L (2014) 

The Role of Convective Outflow in the Waldo Canyon Fire. Monthly Weather Review (142), 

3061–3080. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/MWR-D-13-00361.1

22 Maranghides A, Mell W, Ridenour K, McNamara D (2011) Initial Reconnaissance of the 

2011 Wildland-Urban Interface Fires in Amarillo, Texas, NIST Technical Note 1708. 

Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology. 
162

23 City of Colorado Springs, Waldo Canyon Fire: June 23, 2012 – July 10, 2012, Final After 

Action Report (2013). Colorado Springs, 

CO. https://www.springsgov.com/units/communications/ColoradoSpringsFinalWaldoAAR_3Apr

il2013.pdf

24 Handy RM (2014) Waldo Canyon fire: Two Years Later, a Neighborhood is Reborn. Colorado 

Springs Gazette. http://gazette.com/waldo-canyon-fire-two-years-later-a-neighborhood-isreborn/article/1521839

25 Cohen J (2008) The Wildland-Urban Interface Fire Problem: A Consequence of the Fire 

Exclusion Paradigm. Forest History Today. Fall 

2008. http://www.foresthistory.org/Publications/FHT/FHTFall2008/Cohen.pdf

26 Lacey B, Randall C, Notbohm A, Mounts R, Dustin S (2001) City of Colorado Springs 

Community Wildlfire Protection Plan. Colorado Springs Fire Department. Colorado Springs, 

CO.

27 Maranghides A, Mell W.E, (2009) A Case Study of a Community Affected by the Witch and 

Guejito Fires, NIST Technical Note 1635. Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards 

and Technology. 

28 IBHS, MEGA FIRES: The Case Fore Mitigation, The Witch Creek Wildfire, October 21 – 31, 

2007 (July 2008) https://disastersafety.org/wp-content/uploads/wildfire_megafires_full.pdf

29 NFPA Video, Online Catalog http://catalog.nfpa.org/Examining-Home-Destruction-in-theWildlandUrban-Interface-DVD-P424.aspx

30 National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), The basics of defensible space and the “home 

ignition zone”: Recommendations from the Firewise Communities Program. Accessed: October 

2015. 

http://www.firewise.org/wildfire-preparedness/be-firewise/home-and-landscape/defensiblespace.aspx?sso=0

31 CalFire, Fire Safety Education: 100 feet of defensible space is the law. Accessed October 

2015. http://www.fire.ca.gov/communications/communications_firesafety_100feet.php

32 Colorado Springs Fire Department. Firewise: Improve your hazard rating. Accessed October 

2015. https://eoc.springsgov.com/firewise/newimproverating.htm#defensiblespace

33 Colorado Springs Fire Department. Wildfire Mitigation. Accessed October 

2015. https://csfd.coloradosprings.gov/public-safety/fire/prevention-and-safety/wildfiremitigation

34 Fire Adapted Communities. Accessed October 2015. 

http://www.fireadapted.org

35 Fire Adapted Communities Learning Network, http://facnetwork.org/tag/fuels-reduction/
163

Appendix A – WUI 0 (Rapid) and WUI 1 (Complete) Data Collection Forms
164
165
166
167
168

Appendix B – Fire Progression and Weather Data 
169

Waldo Fire – General Fire Progression

Peregrine 

Cedar Heights 

Mountain Shadows 

N

7 km 

4.2 km 

Aerial Image source: Google, overlays from NIST
170

Northern Mountain Shadows Community

1.6 km 

1.3 km 

Aerial Image source: Google, overlays from NIST
171

Middle Mountain Shadows Community

1.7 km 

1.3 km 

Aerial Image source: Google, overlays from NIST
172

Southern Mountain Shadows Community

1.7 km 

1.3 km 

Aerial Image source: Google, overlays from NIST
173

Waldo Fire Weather Data

Source: KAFF Air Force Academy 

June 26

Time 

(MDT) 

Temp. 

(°C) 

Dew Point 

(°C) Humidity Wind Dir

Wind 

Speed 

(km/h)

Gust 

Speed 

(km/h)

Conditions

12:55 AM 15.00 -6.28 23% North 13.0 - Clear

1:55 AM 14.22 -5.00 26% North 18.5 - Clear

2:55 AM 15.89 -5.00 24% North 20.4 - Clear

3:55 AM 17.72 -3.89 23% NNE 14.8 - Clear

4:55 AM 17.89 -3.28 24% Variable 7.4 - Clear

5:55 AM 20.00 -2.89 21% WSW 13.0 - Clear

6:55 AM 26.22 -2.50 15% NE 13.0 - Haze

7:55 AM 28.72 -2.00 13% East 7.4 - Clear

8:55 AM 31.39 -1.89 12% SSW 16.7 - Clear

9:55 AM 32.89 -5.22 8% SW 14.8 33.3 Clear

10:55 AM 33.11 -5.00 8% South 5.6 - Clear

11:55 AM 34.39 -6.22 7% SE 25.9 35.2 Partly Cloudy

12:55 PM 34.72 -7.61 6% SSE 16.7 38.9 Partly Cloudy

1:55 PM 34.50 -7.72 6% South 35.2 57.5 Scattered 

Clouds

2:55 PM 34.50 -5.72 7% SSE 37.0 55.5 Partly Cloudy

3:55 PM 33.78 -6.28 7% SSE 25.9 42.6 Partly Cloudy

4:55 PM 32.89 -6.89 7% SE 24.1 38.9 Clear

5:13 PM 33.00 -4.00 9% West 44.4 64.9 Clear

5:17 PM 32.00 2.00 15% West 38.9 64.9 Clear

5:55 PM 29.78 2.11 17% West 27.8 57.5 Partly Cloudy

6:55 PM 29.72 1.11 16% NNW 33.3 48.1 Clear

8:55 PM 25.11 2.89 24% NNE 24.1 - Clear

9:55 PM 21.78 2.78 29% NNW 5.6 - Clear

10:55 PM 20.11 2.72 32% NNW 13.0 - Clear

11:55 PM 19.89 1.39 29% Variable 7.4 - Clear

June 27
174

Time 

(MDT) 

Temp. 

(°C) 

Dew Point 

(°C) Humidity Wind Dir

Wind 

Speed 

(km/h)

Gust 

Speed 

(km/h)

Conditions

12:55 AM 20.28 1.61 29% North 9.3 - Clear

1:55 AM 18.50 2.50 34% North 5.6 - Clear

2:55 AM 17.61 2.28 36% North 5.6 - Clear

3:55 AM 15.61 2.89 43% NNW 14.8 - Clear

4:50 AM 16.00 3.00 42% North 13.0 - Mostly Cloudy

4:55 AM 15.39 3.28 44% North 14.8 - Mostly Cloudy

5:25 AM 16.00 3.00 42% NNW 14.8 - Scattered 

Clouds

5:55 AM 20.72 2.39 30% NW 9.3 - Clear

6:55 AM 24.28 3.50 26% Variable 9.3 - Clear

7:55 AM 27.11 3.28 22% Calm Calm - Clear

8:55 AM 29.39 3.22 19% SE 11.1 - Clear

9:55 AM 30.50 2.61 17% SE 16.7 - Clear

10:55 AM 30.72 3.28 17% West 24.1 38.9 Partly Cloudy

11:55 AM 32.11 1.22 14% WNW 22.2 48.1 Partly Cloudy

12:55 PM 30.50 0.61 15% West 14.8 29.6 Clear

1:55 PM 30.22 0.22 14% North 11.1 - Partly Cloudy

2:27 PM 29.00 2.00 18% East 13.0 - Clear

2:55 PM 29.78 2.61 18% East 9.3 - Scattered 

Clouds

3:26 PM 28.00 4.00 21% WSW 66.6 94.5 Scattered 

Clouds

3:30 PM 27.00 6.00 26% West 44.4 94.5 Haze

3:31 PM 27.00 7.00 28% West 42.6 94.5 Haze

3:34 PM 26.00 7.00 30% West 66.6 94.5 Haze

3:35 PM 26.00 7.00 30% West 61.2 94.5 Haze

3:39 PM 25.00 7.00 32% West 51.8 85.1 Haze

3:42 PM 25.00 6.00 29% West 59.2 85.1 Haze

3:45 PM 24.00 7.00 34% West 55.5 79.7 Haze

3:55 PM 23.61 6.89 34% West 50.1 74.0 Scattered 

Clouds

4:55 PM 25.11 5.72 29% North 9.3 - Scattered 

Clouds

5:13 PM 24.00 6.00 31% NE 40.7 - Partly Cloudy

5:55 PM 26.78 5.22 25% Calm Calm - Clear

6:55 PM 26.39 5.89 27% North 14.8 - Clear

7:55 PM 26.50 5.78 27% North 13.0 - Partly Cloudy

8:55 PM 24.28 6.61 32% ENE 7.4 - Scattered 

Clouds

9:55 PM 23.00 7.89 38% SSE 16.7 - Partly Cloudy

10:55 PM 24.00 4.72 29% Calm Calm - Clear

11:55 PM 20.61 6.72 40% NNW 14.8 - Clear
175

Time 

(MDT)

Temp 

(°C)

Dew 

Point 

(°C)

Humidity 

(%)

Pressure 

(mm)

Visibility 

(km)

Wind 

Dir

Wind 

Speed 

(km/h)

Gust 

speed 

(km/h)

Precip 

(mm) Conditions

12:54 20.0 -6.0 17 754.4 16.1 NNE 7.4 - - Partly Cloudy

1:54 18.0 -5.0 21 754.1 16.1 NE 11.1 - - Partly Cloudy

2:54 19.0 -4.0 21 754.1 16.1 North 13.0 - - Partly Cloudy

3:54 22.0 -3.0 19 753.9 16.1 North 9.3 - - Partly Cloudy

4:54 19.0 -3.0 23 754.6 16.1 West 5.6 - - Partly Cloudy

5:54 18.9 -2.2 24 754.6 11.3 North 11.1 - - Partly Cloudy

6:54 22.8 0.6 23 754.4 16.1 NNE 7.4 - - Partly Cloudy

7:54 28.9 0.6 16 754.1 12.9 ENE 5.6 - - Partly Cloudy

8:54 31.1 -2.2 12 754.4 12.9 ESE 11.1 - -

Scattered 

Clouds

9:54 32.8 -0.6 12 754.1 16.1 SE 5.6 - -

Scattered 

Clouds

10:54 35.6 -5.6 7 753.9 16.1 SSW 29.6 50.1 -

Scattered 

Clouds

11:54 35.6 -6.7 6 753.6 16.1 South 25.9 44.4 -

Scattered 

Clouds

12:54 36.7 -4.4 7 753.1 16.1 South 35.2 51.8 -

Scattered 

Clouds

1:54 36.7 -4.4 7 753.1 16.1 South 24.1 53.8 -

Scattered 

Clouds

2:54 37.2 -4.4 7 752.3 16.1 South 16.7 33.3 -

Scattered 

Clouds

3:54 37.0 -6.0 6 751.8 16.1 South 24.1 31.5 -

Scattered 

Clouds

4:54 37.0 -9.0 5 751.6 16.1 South 33.3 46.3 -

Scattered 

Clouds

5:54 37.0 -1.0 9 751.6 16.1 WNW 14.8 44.4 -

Scattered 

Clouds

6:54 34.0 1.0 12 751.8 16.1 NW 31.5 44.4 -

Scattered 

Clouds

7:54 31.0 2.0 16 752.1 9.7 NNW 18.5 - - Smoke

8:54 29.0 2.0 18 752.3 4.8 North 29.6 - - Smoke

9:54 28.0 2.0 19 752.9 12.9 NNW 18.5 - -

Scattered 

Clouds

10:54 27.0 2.0 20 752.6 16.1 North 18.5 - -

Scattered 

Clouds

11:54 26.0 3.0 23 753.1 16.1 NW 9.3 - -

Scattered 

Clouds

Source KCOS – Colorado Springs Airport 38°48′21′′N 104°42′03′′W Weather Observations for June 26, 2012
176

Appendix C – Cedar Heights Timeline
177

Event Date Time TD Note

Mobilized Station 13 and Station 5 to recon in 

Cedar Heights

6/23/12 12:15 3

First Task Force on scene 6/23/12 12:35 3 W/L 9 prepped 7 

primary structures

First Responders sent to the Quarry 6/23/12 12:35 3 E5 and W/L 9 

Resident Evacuation order given 6/23/12 12:40 B5 

Structure prepping started 6/23/12 12:40 20 primary structures 

prepped by B5

Water Tender requested to be sent to Cedar 

Heights

6/23/12 12:48 E5

Working on request for reverse 911 to Cedar 

Heights

6/23/12 12:55 Disptach CMD4

CSFD PIO tweets Cedar Heights evacauation 

begins

6/23/12 13:05 Twitter

Air Ops begin with helicopter with buckets 6/23/12 13:10 Disptach CMD4

Eagle Lake campground evacuation 6/23/12 13:18 B13 

ENS sent to Cedar Heights residents 6/23/12 13:39 E911

Fire retardent drop comes into Cedar Heights 6/23/12 14:08 Dispatch on 

Command 4 

Civilians Escorted out (from gun range) 6/23/12 14:33-

14:42

W/L9 escorts out of 

gun range along with 

D1

Geocast for Voluntary Evac from Mountain 

Shadows S/E area 2

6/23/12 14:58 Police Report

All evacuations for Cedar Heights are mandatory 6/23/12 15:00 PIO on Twitter

Voluntary evacuation for 1000 people at Glen 

Eyrie

15:11 WEB EOC post 129

ENS message to Southern Mountain Shadows 6/23/12 15:12 PIO on Twitter

Mandatory evacuation all residents north of 30th 

to Chuckwagon

6/23/12 15:17 PIO on Twitter

Mandatory evacuation of Cedar Heights, 

Mountain Shadows and Glen Eyrie

6/23/12 15:21 WEB EOC post 131

Task Force to Cedar Heights 6/23/12 15:29 E5, B5, E18, B18, E2, 

WL9 CSU 1/2/3 TF1 

Another ENS sent to Mountain Shadows Area 2 6/23/12 15:31

First responders sent to Mountain Shadows 6/23/12 15:33 E7, B7, E13, B13, B9, 

WL4 Task Force 1

Structure prepping started in Mountain Shadows 6/23/12 15:35 E17, B17, E19, B19

Bulldozer line started widen fire break 6/23/12 15:41 15 Dispatch on 

Command 4 

Flying W Ranch evacuation notification 6/23/12 15:51 PD CAD 12251014 

line 49
178

Event Date Time TD Note

Voluntary evacuation for Mountain Shadows area 

west of 30th, north of Chuckwagon, Allegheny 

east to I-25, north to the Air Force Academy

6/23/12 16:02 PIO Twitter

Evacuation of Glen Eyrie 207 people 6/23/12 16:10-

18:23

CSFD Duty report 

D2A

Evacuation of Verizon (MCI) building 6/23/12 16:14 PD CAD 12251110

Evacuation completed quarry down to upper 

Cedar Heights

6/23/12 16:23 PD CAD 12250775

Additional resources from outside city limits 

brought in for city coverage

6/23/16 17:57

Air support finished for the night 6/23/16 20:24 CAD12250775

Structure Prep completed Cedar Heights 6/23/12 23:05 E20 B20 Duty report 

Fire cresting at Cedar Heights 6/23/12 23:41 PD CAD 12250775

Fuel break getting bumped 6/23/12 22:00 3 last until 3:00am

Fire hits slurry lines 6/23/12 23:49 CAD12250775

Fire enters community behind fuel break 6/23/12 0:00 3

Work done on slop over 6/24/12 0:30 41

2nd Bulldozer line Outback Vista to Quarry 6/24/12 1:00 CSFD duty report 

TFL1N

Fire crossed into Cedar Heights near upper 

bulldozer trail

6/24/12 2:30

Slop over contained, less than 1 acre (TD3), 

pulled crews off bulldozer line due to extreme 

fire conditions

6/24/12 4:00 CSFD duty report 

TFL1N

Bulldozer line to quarry started 6/24/12 9:00 CSFD duty report 

TFL5B

Air Tanker drops above bulldozer line in Cedar 

Heights

6/24/12 10:30 CSFD duty report 

TFL1N

Column 4 1/2 miles from Glen Eyrie Water tower 6/24/12 11:01 CAD 12250775

2nd ENS message sent to Cedar Heights 6/24/12 11:37 Web EOC post 174

Safety zone at Twisted Oak circle at north end of 

Cedar Heights

6/24/13 12:34 3 Duty report D1A

Air drops made around cell and repeater towers 6/24/12 12:34 3

Fire reaches community at ridge above Cedar 

Heights

6/24/12 13:57 CAD 12250775

Fire bumps fuel break in fuel treated area( spots 

started between retardant and fuel break as well 

as beyond fuel break) Note: from TD3: summary, 

retardant, road widening, fuel mitigation and 

response resulted in controlled environment

6/25/12 0:00 3

Fire on three sides of Cedar Heights 6/25/12 8:00 ICS 202 6/25
179

Event Date Time TD Note

Burn Ban enacted 6/25/12 18:00 PIO Twitter

Second fire front bumps northern edge of 

community

6/25/12 22:00-

03:00

3

Fire moves to the north (past Cedar Heights) 6/25/12 19:00-

20:00

3

Safety Zone information 6/26/12 6:00 CSFD duty report 

STPIN

First request to reassign from Cedar Heights to 

Mountain Shadows 

6/26/12 18:00 45 CSFD Duty report 

TFL2N

Bulldozer line from water tower to quarry in 

Mountain Shadows

6/26/12 8:30 12 line never cut because 

fire is coming

Escorts begin for evacuees returning to Cedar 

Heights

6/26/12 9:00 CSPD

Escorts stop into Cedar Heights and all are pulled 

out

6/26/12 9:45 CSPD

Mountain Shadows residents allowed in for 30 

min visits 

6/26/12 10:56 Twitter

Voluntary Evacuation for Area 5 requested 6/26/12 11:00 CSPD unit log

Mountain Shadows escorts cancelled due to fire 

activity

6/26/12 11:32 City Press Release

Pre-evacuation notices being sent to areas 3 and 5 6/26/12 12:05

Pre- Evac zone increased to include Centennial, 

Orchard Valley and USAFA up to the northern 

boundary 

6/26/12 12:18 WEB EOC post 259

Pre-evacuation notice for Mountain Shadows and 

Peregrine

6/26/12 13:40 E911

Thunderstorm causes column collapse, fire 

pushed north and east at high rate of speed, 

bulldozer lines abandoned in Flying W ranch and 

Wolfe Ranch 

6/26/12 16:00 CSFD duty report 

1C1A

Fire enters the city limits 6/26/12 16:00

Selected resources reassigned to Mountain 

Shadows

6/26/12 20:30 Task Forces 6 and 7

Request approved to move from Cedar Heights to 

Tiffany Square

6/26/12 20:30 45 13 engines moved, 3 

Task Forces

Task Forces arrives from Cedar Heights to 

Tiffany Square

6/26/12 21:00 Task Forces 6 and 7
180

Appendix D – Peregrine Timeline
181

Peregrine Time Line Date Time TD Notes

EVENT

Pre-evacuation for Peregrine under development Zone 

3 6/26/2012 12:28

City After Action 

timeline

Pre-evacuation notice for Mountain Shadows and

Peregrine 6/26/2012 13:30 E911

E103 assigned for spot fires, none found 6/26/2012 18:00 CSFD duty report

Mandatory evacuation for northern Mtn Shadows and 

Peregrine 6/26/2012 18:21

City After Action 

timeline

CSU shuts off utilities to Peregrine and other areas 6/26/2012 17:11

City After Action 

timeline

USAFA being evacuated 6/26/2012 18:47 WEB EOC post 303

ENS message sent to Rockrimmon loop 6/26/2012 19:40 WEB EOC post 312

Staging at Tiffany Square begins 6/26/2012 20:00 10

Fire in wildlands, no structures involved 6/26/2012 20:00 11

County puts in bulldozer line from water tower to 

Blodgett 6/26/2012 20:00 11

Patrol of Coldwater, Hollandale by PPCC engine 6/26/2012 2:45 141

Denver Task Force assigned to Peregrine 6/27/2012 3:00 11

Bulldozer line from barn to trail some fire in field 6/27/2012 3:00 11

Significant flare up to the northwest of Blodgett Dr. 6/27/2012 5:00

City After Action 

Timeline

Fire off Angelstone Pt, engines shelter in place 6/27/2012 11:30 11

Fire along Woodman Road near Ruststone Ct 

identified. E3 and B6 crews attack and control spread 

prior to helicopter water bucket drops 6/27/2012

11:45

16

City After Action 

Timeline

Flame front blows through area near Blodgett WL 9 

extinguishes small grass/spot fires, cut line and back 

burned hillside along Blodgett. 6/27/2012

14:00 City After Action 

Timeline

Fire making significant downhill run from Blodgett 

Peak. E8 engaged in fire that was in the undergrowth 

and brush, threatening 3 primary structures just below 

Angelstone Point. Stayed engaged 3-4 hours. 6/27/2012

15:00

11

E8 prepped primary structures along Sawbuck. 

Increase in fire activity in Blodgett open space. 6/27/2012

Fire controlled, no longer a threat to property 6/28/2012 17:00 67
182

Appendix E – Additional Image and Video Sources from Used for Fire 

Timeline Creation and Fire Behavior Assessment
183

Appendix E Table 1 Pre-fire property information data sources.

Data Source Link Description

El Paso County 

Parcel Viewer

http://gis2.asr.el

pasoco.com/

Web mapping service that contains pre-fire information about 

property owner, property size, building size, building value and 

property identifier.

Appendix E Table 2 Selected videos of the Waldo Canyon Fire.

Image Video Description Comments

Steve Moraco Five day time lapse 

of the Waldo Canyon taken from 

Monument Colorado.

Video shows buildup of smoke column and black 

smoke produced from destroyed primary 

structures.

Fox 21 News video showing 

primary structures burning in 

Colorado Springs at the most 

eastern area.

Time stamps are not shown. Correlation with the 

video allows for time identification. Video shows 

almost all primary structures in eastern portion.

KKTV news video taken at 8:32 

pm showing most south easterly 

primary structure burning.

This video can be used to correlate time of 

burning primary structures to Fox 21 news 

footage

Mountain Shadows is Burning: 

Six videos showing burning along 

the northern most edge of 

destruction, taken by an 

unidentified camera man

These videos show the structure to structure fire 

spread along Courtney Drive. Additionally, 

general chronologies of burning primary 

structures on Trevor Lane can be ascertained from

some of these videos.
184

Appendix E Table 3 Selected images of the Waldo Canyon Fire.

Image Video Description Comments

Lee Roth photographed, and 

documented with verbal 

descriptions, the fire as it crested 

the ridge and traveled down into 

Mountain Shadows.

The location from which these images were taken is 

only generally known to be east of the fire. The 

narration describes the effects of the so called 

“collapse” of the smoke column.

Image from FLICKR showing last 

four primary structures on Linger 

Way burning, as well as primary 

structures to the west.

This image helps identify the chronological 

progression of burned primary structures for Linger 

Way. The image identifies primary structures that 

are not burning on the west side of Linger Way and 

other burning primary structures. 

A set of 180 photographs and 

videos which show the fire 

traveling down the hill before it 

reached Mountain Shadows.

These images help to confirm and enhance 

interpretations of the images from Lee Roth.

Aerial images of various 

communities.

These images show areas that were defended, as 

interpreted from the lack of white ash, indicating 

water suppression on the structure.

Aerial Image of Water 

Suppression on Linger Way. 

Image shows lack of complete combustion on two 

right most primary structures in the image, which 

were also shown to be the last to burn.
185

Appendix F – Apparatus in Mountain Shadows between 15:40 Tuesday June 

26, 2012 and 04:00 Wednesday June 2, 2012
186

The following figure lists the arrival and departure times of the different apparatus that were 

involved in firefighting activities in MSC. The apparatus is color codes, red for CSFD, dark blue 

for CSPD, Green for USFS and light blue for mutual aid. 
187

Apparatus 15:40 16:00 16:20 16:40 17:00 17:20 17:40 18:00 18:20 18:40 19:00 19:20 19:40 20:00 20:20 20:40 21:00 21:20 21:40 22:00 22:20 22:40 23:00 23:20 23:40 0:00 0:20 0:40 1:00 1:20 1:40 2:00 2:20 2:40 3:00 3:20 3:40 4:00

Engine 19

Engine 18

CSU Brush 3

Brush 19

Brush 18

Command vehicle (TD 6)

Brush 6

Engine 6

Engine 15

Brush 15

Brush 9

Engine 11

Command vehicle (TD 14)

Brush 11

Reserve 3, E56 (different E12)

Engine 17

Brush 17

CSU Command

Command Vehicle (TD 1, TD 2)

CSPD 3

Command vehicle CSFD District 3 (TD 4)

CSFD Utility 1

Tahoe E43

Tahoe E31

Tahoe E42

Tahoe E333

Tahoe E73

Plumas E330

Plumas E32

Plumas E35

Plumas E21

El Dorado E14

El Dorado E64

El Dorado E65

El Dorado E334

Div Sup Truck

Plumas E11

Plumas E24

CSU Brush 1

Engine 9

CSPD (Gold Hill)

Brush 4 (WL4)

CSPD (K9)

Ukonom Hot Shots

CSU Brush 2

Brush 5

Engine 5

Command Vehicle (TD 12)

Engine 16

Command Vehicle (TD 7)

Redding Hot Shots

Brush 16

CSFD Utility 4

Command vehicle (TD 11)

Engine 4

County Brush 1 (3146)

County Brush 2 (3147)

County Brush 3 (3151 Command)

Fort Carson

Engine 2

Engine 3

Fountain E2

Truck 8

Falcon Brush

Hwy 115 E1541

Hwy 115 E1511

Manitou Rosenbauer (Demo)

Command vehicle (TD 45)

Woodland Park

Command vehicle (TD 24)

Manitou E1

Manitou E3

Denver E21

Denver E5

Denver E8

Denver E7

Denver E28

Broadmoor Unit 640

Engine 7

Engine 20

Brush 20

Brush 7

Command vehicle (TD 117)

Engine 10

Brush 10

Engine 103

Engine 13

Engine 12

Brush 12

Brush 13

Pueblo E15

Pueblo Rural E81

West Park E2

Chemical Depot Tender

Pueblo Road and Bridges Tender

Boone Fire

Rye Fire

Beulah Fire Brush

Calhan Tender

Fountain E4

County Lookout

15:40 16:00 16:20 16:40 17:00 17:20 17:40 18:00 18:20 18:40 19:00 19:20 19:40 20:00 20:20 20:40 21:00 21:20 21:40 22:00 22:20 22:40 23:00 23:20 23:40 0:00 0:20 0:40 1:00 1:20 1:40 2:00 2:20 2:40 3:00 3:20 3:40 4:00
188

Appendix G – WUI Data Collection Improvements
189

1. Data integration in GIS is critical in reducing errors associated with the evaluation of limited 

data sources.

2. Images and video taken by first responders are critical in developing the event timeline and in 

reconstructing the defensive actions.

3. First responder recollection of events in space and time is critical in developing the event 

timeline and in reconstructing the defensive actions.

4. Images and video taken by first responders should be collected before or during technical 

discussions (this was also identified during the Tanglewood complex fire case study). 

5. Crowd sourcing applications should be developed to provide a means for first responders to 

initially record activity at an incident.

6. The crowd sourcing application is not intended as a means to replace technical discussions 

but will enhance them such that images can be provided to fire assessors before discussions 

and information is lost to memory over time. Properly developed applications would also 

provide first responders with internal mechanisms to evaluate what happened at the incident 

and improve safety and effectiveness at future incidents. 

7. An effective data collection team would include the PI, a minimum of one note taker and a 

GIS specialist to handle AVLs, Bing Maps, Google Earth, images and other data. 

8. Data collected during the day should be scanned to electronic format each night so that all 

team members have access to all information throughout the project. From there, records 

should objectively be entered into a GIS database. 

9. Aerial imagery should be collected in the first two to four days after the fire. Cleanup and 

weather conditions can result in data loss if weeks go by before aerial imagery is collected 

(this was also identified during the Tanglewood complex fire case study). 

10. The focus of the technical discussion process should be on observations related to actions 

taken by the first responders. Anecdotal accounts and observations of burning features as 

first responders drive between locations produced a lot of uncertainty and should not be the 

focus of data recording efforts.

11. It is necessary to cross correlate technical discussion observations with time sources from 

AVL or images. Cross correlation with other discussions or cross correlations with 

significant time uncertainties are of limited use to post-fire assessments, generally speaking. 

These less accurate sources from cross correlation should only be attempted in areas where 

little information is known or validation is required due to the extreme amounts of time 

required to perform these cross correlations and the resultant uncertainty. 

12. Observations must take into account the point of view of the observer. An image of no 

burning does not mean the feature is not ignited if only viewed from one angle. 

13. AVL drop out must be reconciled with other data, such as pictures, TD timeline, and/or radio 

log information. 

14. Observations might not apply to the location the apparatus is on (e.g.: Apparatus was on 

Ravina Court but observation made was looking at 2505 Karamy Court). 
190

15. Technical discussions must not begin before a solid and open-minded understanding of the 

incident is obtained from other sources, though it is acknowledged understandings might 

change after the technical discussion process. This implies obtaining a majority of the prefire, during-fire and post-fire imagery for the incident along with a complete damage 

assessment. 

16. All project assessments of damage in the field must be recorded electronically with images 

taken of all damaged features.
191

Appendix H – Example of Technical Discussion Cross-Correlation
192

TD 182 Timeline Developments

The information presented below demonstrates how different data sources were used to link or correlate 

TD timeline information.

The timeline for TD 182 was based on three co-located actions/observations with other fire personnel:

• Engine 18 AVL at 1605 Manning

• Engine 16 AVL at the intersection of Rossmere/Moorfield/Flying W 

• TD 165 PIC of 6155 Ashton Park Place on fire

The first observation that TD 182 makes upon entering Mountain Shadows from Station 18 is that 1605 

Manning is on fire and 2 CSFD engines are there. Those 2 engines are Engine/Brush 18, who arrived to 

1605 Manning at 18:19 (Engine 18 AVL). So, the logic is that 18:19 is the earliest possible anchor in time 

we have for TD 182. 

A key time stamp came from TD 100, who mentioned giving a cop an extra firefighting hood near Flying 

W/Rossmere/Moorfield. TD 182 corroborates this statement, expressing gratitude for the gesture. This 

exchange must have occurred sometime between 19:15 and 19:33, while Engine 16 was in the area of the 

intersection (Engine 16 AVL). 

Prior to this exchange, TD 182 briefly worked on putting out fences on Moorfield, walked up Rossmere 

from Flying W to 2420 Courtney (observed detached combustibles on fire), then drove "halfway up 

Rossmere --not much going on," and returned to Flying W/Moorfield. This must have all occurred 

sometime between 18:19 and 19:33 (Engine 16 AVL, Engine 18 AVL). 

TD 182 later observes the ignition at 6155 Ashton Park. We know that 6155 Ashton Park had to have 

ignited before 20:21 (TD 165 PIC), and after 20:10 (TD 194). This is consistent with the timeline 

provided with TD 158/171 and TD 182.

We know from TD 182 that he was working for a total of 60 min during the night. Approximately 30 of 

those minutes were spent at 6155 Ashton Park, immediately following his observation of the 

ignition. There is corroboration from TD 171 that TD 182 worked with them at 6155 Ashton Park and 

also near Kirby/Yankton. 

We know from examining the TDs from all 3 CSPD officers that they were instructed to leave Mountain 

Shadows at approximately 21:30-22:00. 

So, to summarize more succinctly: 

18:19 (no earlier), TD 182 arrives to Mountain Shadows

18:19 - 19:33 (no later), TD 182 works on Moorfield, scouts Rossmere, 2420 Courtney action 

19:15 - 19:33, TD 100 gives TD 182 a fire hood at the corner of Rossmere/Moorfield/Flying W 

19:15 (no earlier) - 20:20, TD 182 works on Moorfield (goes interior at 6020 Moorfield), works on fences 

on the W side of Flying W, breaks into garage to get tools, observes 6155 Ashton roof on fire. 

20:20 - 20:50, TD 182 and TD 158/171 are at 6155 Ashton Park, TD 165 is also briefly present (PIC). 
193

20:50 - end, TD 182 on Kirby/Yankton with TD 158/171. 
194

Appendix I – Independent Picture Time Stamp Calibration
195

Camera clocks were checked for accurate time stamps using various methods described below. One 

method to check time stamps was the method used for TD144. Original images provided by the first 

responder were obtained during the first visit to Colorado Springs in July, 2012. The images provided by 

the first responder came from two cameras. At the time of acquiring the images, the dates and time were 

checked and it was found that both cameras had time as AM when it should have been PM, and that one 

camera had times stamps one hour early. This enabled accurate time stamping of the provided images, 

which were also checked against AVL time-stamped locations of first responders in certain images such 

as the image shown below.

Ideally, if the camera had a reasonable time stamp it was examined against other data to ensure 

correctness. For example, the images below show three images from three separate first responders 

portraying burning of the same primary structure. The center image is from TD144 and has a confirmed 

time stamp. The images to the left and right all fall within reasonable bounds and the time stamp is 

assumed to be correct within + 10 min for both the left and right images. 

AVLs were also a source used to calibrate time stamps for other images and videos. TD41 provided 

several MP4 videos taken from a GoPro. These videos had time stamps that were believed to be one hour 

early, which was confirmed based on examination of the AVL associated with the apparatus.

18:16 18:26 18:34

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with permission

Photos courtesy of CSFD, used with permission
196

Appendix J – Tools Used to Prevent Structure Ignitions
197

Address Tool

1615 MANNING WAY deckgun, fire hose

1975 AVALON CT fire hose

2005 AVALON CT fire hose

2015 AVALON CT fire hose

2050 TABOR CT sprinklers

2210 CHARING CT no data

2215 WOLFE RANCH RD no data

2220 KIRBY CT fire hose, sprinklers, structure prep

2225 CHARING CT structure prep

2225 WOLFE RANCH RD no data 

2256 RAMSGATE TCE structure prep

2285 VANREEN DR structure prep

2315 ROSSMERE ST deckgun, structure prep

2325 VANREEN DR structure prep

2375 ROSSMERE ST deckgun, ,structure prep

2395 ROSSMERE ST deckgun

2405 GREEN VALLEY 

HTS

garden hose, ,sprinklers

2410 REGAL VIEW CT garden hose, sprinklers

2415 REGAL VIEW CT garden hose, sprinklers

2420 REGAL VIEW CT garden hose, sprinklers

2425 GREEN VALLEY 

HTS

garden hose, sprinklers

2430 GREEN VALLEY 

HTS

garden hose, sprinklers

2445 GREEN VALLEY 

HTS

garden hose, sprinklers

2445 JENNER CT deckgun, fire hose, garden hose

2450 BROGANS BLUFF 

DR

fire hose

2450 GREEN VALLEY 

HTS

garden hose, sprinklers

2455 BROGANS BLUFF 

DR

fire hose

2455 JENNER CT fire hose, no data, sprinklers

2465 BROGANS BLUFF 

DR

fire hose

2465 GREEN VALLEY 

HTS

garden hose, sprinklers

2465 JENNER CT fire hose, garden hose, no data, sprinklers

2475 BROGANS BLUFF 

DR

fire hose

2480 JENNER CT fire hose

2485 BROGANS BLUFF 

DR

fire hose

2501 STONERIDGE DR structure prep

2505 TAMORA WAY structure prep
198

Address Tool

2509 STONERIDGE DR fire hose

2515 KARAMY CT fire hose, garden hose, sprinklers, vegetation removal

2520 TALLESON CT sprinklers, structure prep

2525 KARAMY CT garden hose

2535 BROGANS BLUFF 

DR

structure prep

2535 KARAMY CT fire hose, no data

2545 HOT SPRINGS CT fire hose, no data

2550 ROSSMERE ST fire hose

2555 KARAMY CT fire hose

2555 ROSSMERE ST fire hose

2555 TAMORA WAY fire hose

2560 ROSSMERE ST fire hose

2565 ROSSMERE ST deckgun, fire hose

2565 TAMORA WAY fire hose

2575 TAMORA WAY fire hose

2585 ROSSMERE ST fire hose

2585 TAMORA WAY fire hose

2595 TAMORA WAY fire hose

2605 TAMORA WAY fire hose

2610 TAMORA WAY no data

2620 ROSSMERE ST sprinklers

2625 TAMORA WAY fire hose

2630 TAMORA WAY no data

2710 BROGANS BLUFF 

DR

sprinklers, structure prep

2785 ROSSMERE ST sprinklers, structure prep

2795 ROSSMERE ST deckgun, sprinklers, structure prep

2815 ROSSMERE ST deckgun, sprinklers, structure prep

2825 BROGANS BLUFF 

DR

structure prep

2825 ROSSMERE ST sprinklers, ,structure prep

4930 BRAEBURN WAY structure prep

4940 BRAEBURN WAY structure prep

4950 BRAEBURN WAY structure prep

4965 BRAEBURN WAY fire hose, ,garden hose, sprinklers

4970 BRAEBURN WAY structure prep

5085 CHAMPAGNE DR no data, structure prep

5120 ALDERSTONE 

WAY

structure prep

5120 LANAGAN ST fire hose, structure prep

5125 LANAGAN ST garden hose

5130 ALDERSTONE 

WAY

structure prep
199

Address Tool

5180 HEARTHSTONE 

LANE

fire hose

5190 HEARTHSTONE 

LANE

fire hose

5195 HEARTHSTONE 

LANE

deckgun, fire hose

5195 LANAGAN ST deckgun, ,no data

5310 CHAMBREY CT fire hose

5315 AUBREY WAY fire hose, structure prep

5315 CHAMBREY CT fire hose

5320 CHAMBREY CT fire hose, hand tools

5330 CHAMBREY CT fire hose

5335 CHAMBREY CT fire hose, no data

5370 CHAMBREY CT fire hose

5410 MAJESTIC DR deckgun, fire hose

5412 MAJESTIC DR deckgun, fire hose

5414 MAJESTIC DR fire hose, structure prep

5415 MAJESTIC DR deckgun, fire hose

5423 MAJESTIC DR fire hose

5425 MAJESTIC DR fire hose

5429 MAJESTIC DR fire hose

5430 CHAMBREY CT fire hose, no data, structure prep

5439 LIONS GATE LANE fire hose, garden hose

5439 MAJESTIC DR fire hose

5441 LIONS GATE LANE garden hose

5450 CHAMBREY CT no data

5470 CHAMBREY CT no data

5475 CHAMBREY CT no data

5505 VANTAGE VISTA 

DR

structure prep

5506 VANTAGE VISTA 

DR

structure prep

5512 VANTAGE VISTA 

DR

structure prep

5517 VANTAGE VISTA 

DR

structure prep

5518 VANTAGE VISTA 

DR

sprinklers, structure prep

5520 WILSON RD structure prep

5524 VANTAGE VISTA 

DR

structure prep

5530 VANTAGE VISTA 

DR

garden hose, sprinklers, structure prep

5555 DARIEN WAY no data

5555 WILSON RD garden hose, structure prep

5566 VANTAGE VISTA 

DR

fire hose
200

Address Tool

5570 DARIEN WAY deckgun

5575 DARIEN WAY deckgun

5705 CHASE POINT CIR garden hose, sprinklers

5715 CHASE POINT CIR garden hose, sprinklers

5725 CHASE POINT CIR garden hose, sprinklers

5730 REGAL VIEW RD garden hose, sprinklers

5735 CHASE POINT CIR garden hose, sprinklers

5740 REGAL VIEW RD garden hose, sprinklers

5745 CHASE POINT CIR garden hose, sprinklers

5750 REGAL VIEW RD garden hose, sprinklers

5755 CHASE POINT CIR garden hose, sprinklers

5760 REGAL VIEW RD fire hose, garden hose, sprinklers

5765 CHASE POINT CIR garden hose, sprinklers

5770 REGAL VIEW RD fire hose, garden hose, sprinklers

5780 REGAL VIEW RD fire hose, garden hose, sprinklers

5785 HUFFMAN CT fire hose, no data

5785 REGAL VIEW RD structure prep

5790 REGAL VIEW RD structure prep

5795 REGAL VIEW RD structure prep

5820 RAVINA CT deckgun, ,fire hose

5835 RAVINA CT deckgun

5888 VIA VERONA 

VIEW

deckgun, sprinklers

5896 VIA VERONA 

VIEW

deckgun, sprinklers

5904 VIA VERONA 

VIEW

deckgun, sprinklers

5912 VIA VERONA 

VIEW

deckgun, sprinklers

5920 VIA VERONA 

VIEW

deckgun, sprinklers

5928 VIA VERONA 

VIEW

deckgun, sprinklers

5965 WILSON RD deckgun

6010 ASHTON PARK PL garden hose, sprinklers

6010 MOORFIELD AVE Sprinklers

6015 ASHTON PARK PL garden hose, hand tools, sprinklers

6065 ASHTON PARK PL garden hose, sprinklers

6075 ASHTON PARK PL garden hose, sprinklers

6115 ASHTON PARK PL garden hose, sprinklers

6155 WILSON RD deckgun, fire hose

6205 WILSON RD deckgun,, fire hose, no data, structure prep

6250 ASHTON PARK PL deckgun, structure prep

6305 ALABASTER WAY no data
201

Address Tool

6375 ASHTON PARK PL fire hose, hand tools

6535 ASHTON PARK PL deckgun, , fire hose, structure prep, vegetation removal

6545 ASHTON PARK PL no data
202

Appendix K – Tools Used To Extinguish Damaged Structures
203

Address Tool Extinguishment

2185 WICKES RD fire hose, garden hose yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

2210 CAPRA WAY hand tools yes

2210 KIRBY CT fire hose, garden hose, hand tools, thermal 

imager

yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

2215 CAPRA WAY fire hose yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

2220 CHARING CT garden hose yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

2230 CAPRA WAY fire hose yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

2240 KIRBY CT garden hose, hand tools yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

2310 ROSSMERE ST deckgun, garden hose, interior, no data yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

2310 VANREEN DR fire hose, no data yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

2355 ROSSMERE ST fire hose, garden hose yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

2355 VANREEN DR garden hose yes

2380 ROSSMERE ST deckgun, fire hose, hand tools, no data yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

2385 ROSSMERE ST deckgun yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

2420 COURTNEY DR no data yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

2455 ROSSMERE ST fire hose yes

2495 STONERIDGE 

DR

fire hose, hand tools yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

2515 TAMORA WAY fire hose, garden hose, no data yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

2520 TAMORA WAY fire hose, garden hose, no data yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

2540 BROGANS 

BLUFF DR

fire hose, interior yes

2545 ROSSMERE ST garden hose yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

2545 TAMORA WAY no data yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

2549 HOT SPRINGS 

CT

fire hose yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

2555 TALLESON CT garden hose yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

2565 VANTAGE 

RIDGE CT

garden hose, no data yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

2610 ROSSMERE ST fire hose yes

2625 TREVOR LANE fire hose, garden hose, hand tools, interior yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

2635 STONERIDGE 

DR

hand tools yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions
204

Address Tool Extinguishment

2655 STONERIDGE 

DR

fire hose, hand tools yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

2735 BROGANS 

BLUFF DR

fire hose, foam, hand tools, interior yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

2760 BROGANS 

BLUFF DR

fire hose, hand tools, interior, no data yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

5140 CHAMPAGNE 

DR

fire hose, no data yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

5145 

HEARTHSTONE 

LANE

fire hose, hand tools, interior yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

5145 LANAGAN ST fire hose, garden hose, hand tools yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

5325 AUBREY WAY fire hose, hand tools, interior, no data yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

5425 LIONS GATE 

LANE

garden hose yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

5425 WILSON RD fire hose, foam yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

5427 LIONS GATE 

LANE

garden hose yes

5429 LIONS GATE 

LANE

fire hose, hand tools, interior, no data yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

5437 LIONS GATE 

LANE

fire hose, garden hose, hand tools, interior yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

5445 LIONS GATE 

LANE

fire hose, garden hose yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

5447 LIONS GATE 

LANE

fire hose, garden hose yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

5449 LIONS GATE 

LANE

fire hose, garden hose yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

5455 LANAGAN ST fire hose, hand tools yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

5455 WILSON RD fire hose, no data yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

5461 LIONS GATE 

LANE

fire hose yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

5536 VANTAGE 

VISTA DR

fire hose, hand tools, no data, water curtain yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

5550 WILSON RD fire hose yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

5572 VANTAGE 

VISTA DR

fire hose yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

5585 DARIEN WAY no data yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

5765 HUFFMAN CT fire hose yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

5790 LINGER WAY fire hose, hand tools, interior, no data yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

5810 RAVINA CT deckgun yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

5950 WILSON RD fire hose, interior yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions
205

Address Tool Extinguishment

6020 MOORFIELD 

AVE

garden hose, hand tools, interior yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

6045 ASHTON PARK 

PL

fire hose yes

6110 ASHTON PARK 

PL

garden hose, hand tools, sprinklers yes

6155 ASHTON PARK 

PL

garden hose, interior yes

6260 WILSON RD fire hose, interior yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

6265 SAVANNAH 

WAY

no data yes

6335 WILSON RD fire hose, foam, hand tools, no data yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

6365 ASHTON PARK 

PL

deckgun, fire hose, hand tools, interior yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions

6365 SANDRAY CT fire hose, foam, hand tools, no data yes, when combined with other defensive 

actions
206

Appendix L – Examples of Missed Defensive Actions in Post-Fire Assessments
207

Example of destroyed primary structure contained with significant water resources and resultant lack of 

white ash or blackened appearance, along with destroyed primary structure with no containment action 

and white ash present.

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with permission

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with permission
208

Appendix M – Revised List of Damaged Structures
209

Appendix K Table 1 provides a revised list of damaged structures, along with the identified 

damage and the confirmation of that damage. It is important to note that the damage identified 

below is not inclusive, nor is the identified damage necessarily an identification of the first item 

ignited in the location.

For example, the primary structure at 2549 HOT SPRINGS CT had two possible ignition 

mechanisms, which are not clearly identified by the simple list below. A firewood pile appeared 

to have ignited the composite lap siding causing a fire in the garage, which was extinguished by 

first responders, as shown in Appendix K Figure 1. The second ignition mechanism was direct 

flame contact and radiant heat from 2551 HOT SPRINGS CT, which was contained by first 

responders through application of water on 2551 HOT SPRINGS CT, as shown in Appendix K 

Figure 2, and application of water to the exposed side of 2549 HOT SPRINGS CT. 

Appendix K Figure 1 Remnants of firewood pile, which appeared to have ignited and caused ignition of the 

composite lap siding and thereby entry into the garage. TDs identified first responders as breaking into 

garage and suppressing fire.

Another example is seen at 6260 WILSON RD, where TDs identified the damage as an attic 

ignition. The first NIST/USFS field visit, however, identified burned features as shown in 

Appendix K Figure 3. This identified other features than the attic as possible ignition 

mechanisms. 

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with 

permission
210

Appendix K Figure 2 Containment actions which resulted in successful containment of fire spread from 2551 

HOT SPRINGS CT to 2549 HOT SPRINGS CT. Note multiple windows on exposed side of 2551 HOT 

SPRINGS CT, which could have helped spread fire if not contained by first responders.

Appendix K Figure 3 Possible first items ignited at X could have been a Juniper bush, which ignited the deck 

or the deck ignited the primary structure and the bushes. In either case there was green vegetation between 

the burned items shown above and other burned vegetation or features.

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with 

permission

Photo courtesy of CSFD, used with 

permission
211

Appendix K Table 1 Possible damaged features identified on primary structures identified in this study.

Address Damaged Feature(s)

2185 WICKES RD roof

2210 CAPRA WAY deck

2210 COURTNEY DR siding

2210 KIRBY CT siding, deck

2215 CAPRA WAY roof

2220 CHARING CT roof, door

2220 COURTNEY DR siding

2230 CAPRA WAY siding, window

2240 KIRBY CT deck

2310 ROSSMERE ST roof

2310 VANREEN DR siding, eaves

2320 ROSSMERE ST window

2330 COURTNEY DR Window frame, satellite dish, roof

2330 VANREEN DR siding, window

2340 ROSSMERE ST deck, window

2355 ROSSMERE ST roof

2355 VANREEN DR window, deck, siding, roof

2380 ROSSMERE ST door, deck, siding, roof

2385 ROSSMERE ST roof, deck

2420 COURTNEY DR siding, window

2455 ROSSMERE ST garage, roof

2495 STONERIDGE DR roof

2505 VANTAGE RIDGE CT window, deck

2515 TAMORA WAY deck

2520 TAMORA WAY gutter

2525 VANTAGE RIDGE CT deck, window

2533 HOT SPRINGS CT siding

2535 TALLESON CT deck

2540 BROGANS BLUFF DR door

2543 HOT SPRINGS CT window, gutter

2545 ROSSMERE ST roof

2545 TAMORA WAY doorframe

2549 HOT SPRINGS CT garage, siding, window, eave

2555 TALLESON CT deck

2565 VANTAGE RIDGE CT siding, deck, window

2580 BROGANS BLUFF DR roof

2610 ROSSMERE ST window, deck, gutter

2615 TAMORA WAY door, window

2625 TREVOR LANE window, garage
212

Address Damaged Feature(s)

2635 STONERIDGE DR roof, deck

2655 STONERIDGE DR eave, window, roof

2735 BROGANS BLUFF DR deck, bump out

2760 BROGANS BLUFF DR deck, chimney, siding, floor joist

3220 BLODGETT DR unknown

3240 BLODGETT DR unknown

4985 BRAEBURN WAY siding

5010 LANAGAN ST deck, siding

5020 LANAGAN ST roof, deck

5025 LANAGAN ST window

5115 HEARTHSTONE LANE siding, eaves, window

5140 CHAMPAGNE DR roof

5145 HEARTHSTONE LANE window, deck, eave, roof

5145 LANAGAN ST deck

5150 LANAGAN ST window

5165 HEARTHSTONE LANE siding

5265 CHAMPAGNE DR roof

5325 AUBREY WAY siding, deck

5375 CHAMBREY CT roof

5417 LIONS GATE LANE roof

5418 MAJESTIC DR siding, window

5425 LIONS GATE LANE roof, deck

5425 WILSON RD window, roof, deck

5427 LIONS GATE LANE roof

5429 LIONS GATE LANE roof

5430 WILSON RD siding, window, roof

5437 LIONS GATE LANE roof

5445 LIONS GATE LANE roof, deck

5447 LIONS GATE LANE roof

5449 LIONS GATE LANE roof, deck

5455 LANAGAN ST garage, styrofoam pop-outs

5455 LIONS GATE LANE roof

5455 WILSON RD eave, deck

5459 LIONS GATE LANE deck

5461 LIONS GATE LANE siding

5511 VANTAGE VISTA DR deck, window, siding

5530 DARIEN WAY roof, window

5530 WILSON RD siding, window, roof

5536 VANTAGE VISTA DR deck, eave, roof, window, siding

5540 WILSON RD roof, window, door, deck, skylight
213

Address Damaged Feature(s)

5550 WILSON RD roof

5572 VANTAGE VISTA DR window

5585 DARIEN WAY roof

5685 VANTAGE VISTA DR siding, window, eave

5755 HARBOR PINES PT window, eave

5760 LINGER WAY other

5765 HARBOR PINES PT eave, window

5765 HUFFMAN CT siding

5790 LINGER WAY eave

5810 RAVINA CT roof

5950 WILSON RD window

6020 MOORFIELD AVE deck, siding, window

6030 MOORFIELD AVE deck

6045 ASHTON PARK PL roof, window frame

6110 ASHTON PARK PL deck, window, siding

6155 ASHTON PARK PL roof

6260 WILSON RD eave, window, deck

6265 SAVANNAH WAY roof

6305 WILSON RD deck, eave, door frame

6335 WILSON RD garage

6365 ASHTON PARK PL roof

6365 SANDRAY CT front and back deck, siding

6415 ASHTON PARK PL Unknown, observed as catching in attic.
214

Appendix N - Additional Technical Issues Identified During TDs
215

Communications 

1. Portable battery chargers (12V) for handheld radios can enable the charging of radios on 

mutual aid apparatus. 

2. Communication between CSFD and mutual aid about needing or accepting mutual aid 

resources was hindered by situational awareness.

3. There was limited radio communication between air (Federal) and ground (City), 

between City and Mutual aid, and between USFS and all other resources. 

Infrastructure 

4. Reverse opening of hydrants and different fittings compared to what is used by many 

other jurisdictions, as developed by NFPA, 1961 Standard on Fire Hoses, caused 

confusion and delays during response. Multiple mutual aid apparatus experienced 

difficulties connecting to hydrants 

5. Utility grids were not set up the same as street grid maps, slowing down decision making 

during the fire. 

6. Underground power lines in most of MSC facilitated first responder access. The downed 

power lines to The Flying W Ranch temporarily limited local access.

7. The power grid feeding the residences in MSC supplied the CSU water pumps. When 

electricity was turned off, hydrant water pressure was compromised, and some automatic 

sprinkler systems also stopped functioning. 

8. When the water pumps were on, very good water pressure was reported by first 

responders all across the MSC.

9. Multiple staging areas exacerbated communication and accountability challenges.

10. The watershed affected by the Waldo fire may take as many as twenty five years to 

recover.

Defensive Actions

11. Documentation during the event can be facilitated by having scribes for all task force 

leaders to capture personnel accountability, fire behavior observations and situational 

awareness.

12. Maps provided to mutual aid significantly improved situational awareness. 

13. Images and video taken by first responders improved accountability. 

14. Removal of bunker gear liner could reduce thermal stress to structural fire fighters during 

WUI operations. 

15. Getting the engines to staging to swap crews removed them from the fire for significant 

periods of time. 

16. There were preliminary indications that in high building density areas, defensive actions 

to “box in” the fire became more effective as the wind abated. 

17. First responder awareness was limited both in space and time (e.g.: a Task Force Leader 

was unaware that the eastern part of lower Majestic (to the South of Lions gate Lane) had 
216

experienced ember exposures that resulted in structure ignitions that were successfully 

defended by mutual aid). 

18. Firefighting hoses experienced significant failures due to extensive wear both from heat 

and abrasion.