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45–700 PDF 2008

S. HRG. 110–645 

EVALUATING U.S. POLICY OPTIONS 

ON THE HORN OF AFRICA 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 11, 2008 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DELAWARE, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Almquist, Hon. Katherine, Assistant Administrator for Africa, U.S. Agency 

for International Development, Washington, DC .............................................. 13 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 17 

Dempsey, Colonel Thomas, USA (Ret.), Professor, Peacekeeping and Stability 

Operations Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA ............ 61 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 63 

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator From Wisconsin .................................... 1 

Frazer, Hon. Jendayi, Assistant Secretary, African Affairs, Department of 

State, Washington, DC ........................................................................................ 4 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 8 

Fredriksson, Lynn, Advocacy Director for Africa, Amnesty International USA, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 43 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 45 

Shinn, Dr. David, Adjunct Professor of International Affairs, The Elliot School 

of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, DC .... 54 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 56 

Whelan, Theresa, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Department 

of Defense, Washington, DC ................................................................................ 23 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 26 

(III)

(1) 

EVALUATING U.S. POLICY OPTIONS ON THE 

HORN OF AFRICA 

TUESDAY, MARCH 11, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russ Feingold, presiding. 

Present: Senators Feingold, Bill Nelson, Cardin, Lugar, and 

Isakson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN 

Senator FEINGOLD. This hearing will come to order. I want to 

begin by thanking Senator Biden, Chairman Biden, for making this 

a full committee hearing, while allowing me to chair as the Africa 

Subcommittee chairman. Today’s hearing will address U.S. policy 

toward arguably the most worrisome region on the African Continent, the Horn of Africa. Since, I visited that region just over a 

year ago; the situation has gone from bad to worse. 

Today’s hearing is an effort to examine the United States Government’s policy toward the Horn—specifically, Ethiopia, Eritrea, 

and Somalia—and to assess what we’ve done right, what we’ve gotten wrong, and most importantly, what we need to do going forward to reconcile what appears to be, by most accounts, a failing 

policy in a very critical part of the world. 

This committee has sought to understand and address the escalating deterioration of security, political, and humanitarian conditions on the Horn that have been generated and exacerbated by 

more than two decades of instability. This is our third hearing in 

less than 2 years to try to inform and encourage a comprehensive 

U.S. strategy to address the Horn. 

Unfortunately, the problems we will hear about today are quite 

similar to those discussed at previous hearings, while the deterioration on the Horn continues to pose a serious threat to regional and 

international security. We need to address this—the insecurity and 

instability in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, as in other countries 

in Africa—by working to end violence, promote democracy, defend 

human rights, reduce poverty, and improve security. But too often, 

these long-term goals have taken a back seat to more short-term 

and short-sighted priorities. 

I would like to say a word about why this hearing is so timely 

and important. There may be less than 10 months left in this adVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:15 Dec 11, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\45700.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
2 

ministration, but we must nonetheless develop a policy that can 

help reverse the declining trends in the Horn of Africa, both at the 

national level as well as regionally. We have no option but to reassess where we currently stand, given that the political crises in 

Ethiopia and Eritrea are escalating dramatically, the border situation between those two countries remains inflamed, and the bloody 

fighting in Somalia shows little sign of abating, despite the recent 

appointment of a Prime Minister who appears to be saying many 

of the right things. 

The challenges we face on the Horn are not new, but in the post9/11 world, how we deal with them presents new challenges that 

have, in my opinion, yet to be met. We have repeatedly discussed 

the need for a long-term comprehensive and coordinated U.S. Government policy that considers our strategic concerns, political dynamics, humanitarian concerns and, perhaps most critical, our national security interests, and applies our significant diplomatic, 

military, intelligence, and foreign assistance resources toward 

building a secure and stable Horn of Africa. 

Unfortunately, such a policy remains elusive. As we are likely to 

hear today, the problems in Somalia have a ripple effect across the 

Horn; they reflect longstanding clashes between Ethiopia and Eritrea that, in turn, benefit from the turmoil of a country with no 

functioning central government. 

In other parts of the world, we’ve seen what happens when decisions are made and executed without the benefit of a long-term, 

comprehensive strategy. We’ve seen what happens when the administration’s counterterrorism agenda dominates its bilateral relationships, and poor governance and human rights abuses therefore 

get a pass. Such actions undermine our country’s own credibility 

and actually end up contributing to instability. 

This hearing is intended to not only inform the legislative process here in the Senate, but also to continue to emphasize the need 

for a more interconnected and balanced approach to the Horn of Africa that addresses each country specifically while still recognizing 

the transactional challenges and national security implications. 

This part of the world is far too important for us to rely on narrow, 

feeble policies or half-hearted ad-hoc measures. 

And so with that said, let me introduce our two distinguished 

panels so we can begin today’s discussion. On our first panel we 

have three witnesses from the administration who represent the 

top Africa Policy Directors in their respective agencies. We have 

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr. Jendayi Frazer; 

the Assistant Administrator for Africa at the U.S. Agency for International Development, Ms. Katherine Almquist; and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa at the Defense Department, Ms. Theresa 

Whelan. 

All three of these witnesses have testified before the Africa Subcommittee, so it’s my pleasure to welcome you back to full committee. I appreciate your willingness to testify and look forward to, 

what I hope, will be a frank and productive discussion. 

Our second panel features a range of individuals who are wellqualified to speak on the unique challenges related to this complex 

region and the impact that U.S. policy is having throughout the 

3 

volatile Horn of Africa, as well as on the U.S. national security priorities and policies, more generally. 

First, we’ll hear from Ms. Lynn Fredriksson, the Africa Advocacy 

Director for Amnesty International U.S.A. We will look to you, Ms. 

Fredriksson, for a detailed picture of dynamics on the ground, and 

how they have been affected by recent developments. 

We are also privileged to welcome back Dr. David Shinn. Ambassador Shinn was the U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia between 1996 

and 1999, and currently serves as an Adjunct Professor of International Affairs at George Washington University. Mr. Ambassador, we hope that you will offer analysis of the regional and 

international dynamics relating to developments on the Horn, as 

well as your opinion of how the United States and the international 

community can most effectively address the challenges we face 

there. 

Last, we welcome Retired Colonel Thomas Dempsey, currently 

the Professor of Security Reform, at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping 

and Stability Operations Institute. Mr. Dempsey has served as a 

Strategic Intelligence Analyst for Africa at the John F. Kennedy 

Special Warfare Center, and as Chief of Africa Branch for the Defense Intelligence Agency. 

I’d like to extend a special welcome, also, to all those in the audience today who have personal ties and commitments to these countries and issues. I know many of you have traveled a long way to 

attend this hearing, and I’m pleased that you could be with us. We 

are seeking to obtain balance and insightful recommendations that 

will have lasting implications for the Horn of Africa and for United 

States and international security. 

I am looking forward to hearing from each of our witnesses about 

the nature and consequences of our actions and our inaction on the 

Horn, as well as what our long-term objectives and strategies 

should be. 

Now, I am pleased to turn to the ranking member of the full 

committee and the former chairman of the committee, and really 

find it impossible not to mention his consistent commitment—not 

only his famous work on African issues, but he is almost always 

at this subcommittee’s hearings, showing his continued devotion to 

working on issues related to African countries. 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let 

me just mention again the commendation you’ve given to our witnesses, and likewise to the distinguished audience that has joined 

us today, as you pointed out, many from long distances, but all 

with very compassionate and constructive interests in Africa. 

And I appreciate so much your leadership, your willingness to 

have extensive hearings discussing all parts of the continent and 

the various dimensions of what we can do. So I will forgo any opening statement. I will be in and out of the hearing, as will be the 

case of many Senators, I suspect today, trying to cover several 

bases, but I really look forward to the hearing and the witnesses. 

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank you, Senator Lugar. And, with that, 

we’ll start with our first panel. 

Secretary Frazer, please. 

4 

STATEMENT OF HON. JENDAYI FRAZER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. FRAZER. Good morning. And thank you, Chairman Feingold, 

Senator Lugar, and members of the committee, for calling the hearing on this important subject. 

I am especially pleased to have this opportunity to meet with you 

shortly after the President’s overwhelmingly successful visit to Africa and the critical peace agreement in Kenya. The President’s 

trip saw an extraordinary outpouring of support for the United 

States and the American people, and appreciation of the President’s initiatives funded by the U.S. Congress. 

At points in their history, the five countries the President visited—Benin, Tanzania, Rwanda, Ghana, and Liberia—experienced 

some of the turmoil now facing countries in the Horn of Africa, that 

is, societies torn apart by war, and conflict with neighbors, and experiencing political strife. Yet today, these countries stand as 

transformative models, and we foresee the same in the Horn of Africa. Today, the Horn of Africa is a crucible in which many of our 

most important priorities for Africa are being addressed in their 

most raw forms. We will continue to work for U.S. interests in the 

Horn, as elsewhere in Africa, to promote regional stability, facilitate economic growth, eliminate any platforms for al-Qaeda or 

other terrorist operations, provide humanitarian assistance to the 

people in need, and work with governments in the region to transform the countries to invest in the people and good governance. 

Our strategy focuses on a regional approach working in partnership with African countries. 

The situation in Somalia remains the key challenge to regional 

stability and security in the Horn of Africa. Somalia has been characterized as a complex emergency, both in humanitarian and political terms, since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in January 

1991. For the last 17 years, Somalis have struggled to establish 

credible governance and stability in their country. 

During 14 reconciliation conferences, and numerous civil conflicts 

during the intervening years, U.S. strategy for Somalia aims to advance four key policy objectives. 

First, encourage inclusive political dialog to further the transitional political process outlined by the Transitional Federal Charter and leading to national elections in 2009. 

Second, provide humanitarian and development assistance for 

the Somali people, and help build the capacity of the Transitional 

Federal Government to better govern and deliver services. 

Third, facilitate the full deployment of the African Union Mission 

in Somalia, AMISOM, to stabilize the country and create the conditions for Ethiopia’s withdrawal. 

And fourth, deny terrorists the opportunity to find save haven in 

Somali territory. 

Over the past year, we pursued our objectives coordinating closely with the Transitional Federal Government, or TFG, and regional 

countries, and working multilaterally, especially through the International Contact Group on Somalia. 

Mr. Chairman, the committee requested an update on our core 

objectives. Since we submitted the comprehensive regional strategy 

5 

on Somalia to Congress in February 2007, we have made important 

progress. But we still have a ways to go, as expected, and working 

to transform Africa’s one, true failed state. 

First, we have worked closely with the Transitional Federal Government leadership and the U.N. Special Representative to the 

Secretary General, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, to continue the political dialog process and encourage additional outreach to key Somalia stakeholders. The TFG successfully held a National Reconciliation Congress in Mogadishu in July through August 2007 that 

was attended by 2,600 delegates, and funded by the United States 

and other donors, and backed by the African Union, the Arab 

League, and the United Nations. 

The conference recommendations were also blessed by Saudi Arabia, recognizing the inclusive participation of Somali clan leaders, 

business, civil society, women’s groups, and the religious leaders, 

among others. Only the truly extremists refused to take part, as 

noted in the GAO Report on Somalia. 

In more recent months, we have seen the emergence of a very 

positive momentum with President Yusuf’s appointment of a new 

Prime Minister in November 2007, and that Prime Minister’s selection of a more representative Transitional Federal Government 

Cabinet. Prime Minister Nur ‘‘Adde’’ Hassan Hussein has promoted 

reconciliation by engaging in extensive outreach to elements of the 

Somali opposition, working closely with humanitarian agencies, 

and preparing the ground for the key tasks that remain to be completely before elections in 2009. 

However, time is short for this 2009 transition, and significant 

tasks remain ahead. Needed among them are effective and inclusive security and justice mechanisms that will allow Somalis to live 

in peace and security. Given financial support, the neighboring 

countries are prepared to provide training to assist the TFG to create viable and responsive security forces, to establish a more secure 

environment in which the political process can move forward. 

Second, as correctly noted in a GAO Report, Somalia’s chronic 

humanitarian emergencies continue today, following almost two 

decades of civil conflict. Localized droughts and flooding have exacerbated the deteriorating humanitarian conditions. We will continue to pressure all parties to allow unfettered delivery of humanitarian aid to effective populations. We have to develop greater leverage over extremists, especially groups like al-Shabaab that attack humanitarian relief staff and facilities. 

We will continue urging the Transitional Federal Government 

and Ethiopians to do all that they can to protect fluencies and prevent further deaths and displacement of innocent people. In 2007, 

the United States was the leading donor of humanitarian assistance, providing more than $140 million to assist the Somali people. 

Third, at the time of the Somali Strategy Report to Congress, 

AMISOM was but a concept on paper. One month later, in March 

2007, Uganda deployed two battalions, and today, Uganda and Burundi have deployed more than 2,500 soldiers as part of AMISOM. 

Burundi deployed its first battalion of approximately 850 soldiers 

in January 2008, and has an additional battalion that awaits only 

funding to deploy. Uganda also plans to deploy an additional two 

6 

battalions of 1,600 troops, if the necessary financial support is provided. 

Nigeria has pledged a battalion as well. Once deployed, this 

would bring the total number of troops in AMISOM to almost 

6,000, closer to the authorized strength of 8,000. To date, the 

United States has allocated $59.1 million to support this critical 

mission. We continue to work with the United Nations on contingency plans to support AMISOM, and a possible rehatting as a 

U.N. force, as conditions permit. 

Fourth, while the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab is more isolated 

than ever, we remain deeply troubled that al-Qaeda operatives are 

treating Somalia as a safe haven. The United States remains committed to neutralizing the threat that al-Qaeda poses to all Americans, Somalis, and others in the Horn of Africa. 

We have been clear that we will therefore take strong measures 

to deny terrorists safe haven, as well as the ability to plan and operate from Somalia. Fighting terrorism in Somali is not our sole 

priority, but rather is part of a comprehensive regional strategy to 

improve governance and the rule of law, stabilize the country and 

the region, and create the conditions for economic growth and development. 

Finally, since the report to Congress, Secretary Rice has appointed a special envoy for Somalia based in Nairobi and has increased the staff of our Nairobi office, working exclusively on Somalia. 

Our effectiveness will be further enhanced with the ability to 

regularly travel to Somalia and establish offices in the country. I 

have traveled to Baidoa in Somalia, and Hargeisa in Somaliland, 

to pave the way for regular, in-country, diplomatic engagement. 

This is a difficult and long-term effort in Somalia. As we encourage 

political dialogue, we will continue to seek to isolate those who out 

of extremism refuse that dialog and insist on violence. 

This dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea regarding demarcation of their common border poses an additional threat to regional 

stability. However, the current standoff is not comparable to the 

1998 to 2000 war that claimed the lives of 120,000 combatants. 

Our diplomatic goals are for Eritrea and Ethiopia to work together 

in good faith to implement the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission’s Delimitation Decision, and for both parties to engage in talks 

to normalize relations. 

Unfortunately, recent efforts to resolve the boundary impasse remain stalled. Ethiopia refuses to demarcate the border without 

broader normalization talks, and Eritrea’s longstanding restrictions 

on the U.N. Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, UNMEE operations, 

and the more recent refusal to allow UNMEE to obtain fuel have 

caused the U.N. to begin withdrawing UNMEE personnel. 

The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission’s virtual demarcation decision by map coordinates has not brought the parties closer 

to resolution. The result has been a hardening of positions on both 

sides, and increased tension between them. We will continue to 

seek opportunities for progress, especially supporting U.N. efforts, 

but we do not expect this impasse to be resolved in the near future. 

With Eritrea, while publicly claiming to seek peace and stability 

for the region, the Government of the state of Eritrea has privately 

7 

undermined nearly all efforts for broad-based inclusive dialog and 

reconciliation in the region, most notably in Somalia and Sudan. 

Its activities include supporting and hosting Hassan Dahir 

Aweys, a United States and United Nations designated terrorist; 

supporting Somalia extremists elements associated with the nowdefunct Council of Islamic Courts; and supporting the Ogaden National Liberation Front, ONLF, in Ethiopia-Somalia region. 

In addition to its destabilizing activities in the region, the Government of Eritrea has stamped out political freedom at home. Fifteen years after independence, national elections have yet to be 

held, and the constitution was never implemented. The Eritrean 

people deserve better. The United States has repeatedly pressed 

the Eritrean Government on these issues, but the Eritrean people 

continue to suffer. 

Ethiopia is the oldest independent country in Africa, one of the 

poorest countries in the world, and one of America’s staunchest 

partners, especially in countering terrorism in the Horn of Africa. 

In Ethiopia, the Somali region commonly called the Ogaden, is both 

a humanitarian and an emergency problem, complicated by Eritrea’s support for the ONLF and the periodic infiltration of alQaeda-trained terrorists, like Aden Ayro. 

Our objectives in Ogaden are to assist the Government of Ethiopia to prevent famine in the short term by reopening commercial 

trade routes and ensuring food deliveries, to push for improvement 

in the human rights conditions, and over time support efforts to integrate the Ogaden into national strategy for better health, education, agriculture, and economic development. 

The United States is deeply involved in the persistent diplomacy 

to ensure that humanitarian conditions in Ogaden do not deteriorate into famine. Our Ambassador in Addis Ababa coordinates the 

humanitarian response from the international community. I visited 

the Ogaden in September to push for increased commercial food deliveries, greater access, and respect for human rights. 

USAID Administrator Henrietta Fore and my colleague, Kate 

Almquist, also traveled to the region in November. It is not easy 

to ensure access for humanitarian workers for parts of the Ogaden, 

at the time, remained mired in conflict to ONLF attacks and 

counterinsurgency measures by the Ethiopian National Defense 

Forces. 

We acknowledge the government’s right to defend its territory, 

including against insurgents, but equally, I’ve made clear to the 

Government of Ethiopia its responsibilities toward noncombatants 

during its operations, and have expressed our concerns about the 

impact of the insurgency and counterinsurgency on the civilian 

population. 

In promoting improved governance, we were encouraged by the 

Government of Ethiopia’s release of political detainees in July and 

August of 2007. Again, this achievement was the result of persistent diplomacy. Although Ethiopia has a long and proud history, 

its democratic governance institutions are still young. We have conveyed directly our expectations for improvement on human rights 

and democracy issues, but also recognize the progress made over 

the past 15 years. 

8 

We are confident that Ethiopia will work through its challenges, 

and will work with the government and opposition to find them— 

to help them find common ground as they work toward the elections in 2010. 

Djibouti is in a region fraught with instability, yet Djibouti is a 

peaceful, tolerant, democratic country serving as a valuable partner 

for both its neighbors and the United States. Though challenged by 

poverty and chronic food insecurity, Djibouti is rapidly becoming a 

vital hub for regional economic growth. 

President Guelleh recognizes that Djibouti knows that its future 

success depends on regional stability and economic integration, and 

with successful elections, it will continue to serve as a model for 

several of its neighbors. 

Somaliland: In early February, I also had an opportunity to visit 

the city of Hargeisa in the self-declared Republic of Somaliland. 

Somaliland has achieved a commendable level of stability, largely 

without external support or assistance. However, Somaliland’s democracy remains fragile, and it is important to maintain the success of the past. 

We will continue to urge Somaliland’s political parties to demonstrate the level of political will that ensured the previous Presidential elections in 2003 were credible and transparent, and to 

work together to ensure a peaceful result, regardless of who wins 

the elections. 

Although not a focus of this hearing, Kenya is an integral part 

of our policy in the greater Horn of Africa, and has long been a productive force of peace and stability in this region. We are encouraged by the February 28 political agreement reached by President 

Mwai Kibaki and opposition leader, Raila Odinga. And we believe 

that that agreement will allow Kenya to play its traditional leadership role in the region. 

In conclusion, despite continued instability in Somalia, and persistent tensions along the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, the Horn of Africa as a whole is making some progress. Our policy objectives remain consistent with our international and regional partners, but 

as always, we are constrained by limited resources, and to date, an 

inability to regularly travel to and set up offices in Somalia and 

Somaliland. 

Despite these constraints, we will continue to work with our 

partners to bring lasting stability to areas of conflict in the Horn 

of Africa, and to maintain stability and good governance where 

these goals have been achieved. 

Thank you. And I would be happy to take your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Frazer follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JENDAYI E. FRAZER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR

AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

INTRODUCTION

Good morning, and thank you, Chairman Feingold and members of the committee, 

for calling a hearing on this timely and important issue. I am especially pleased to 

have this opportunity to meet with you shortly after the President’s tremendously 

successful visit to Africa, and in the wake of the critical peace agreement in Kenya. 

The President’s trip saw an extraordinary outpouring of support for the United 

States and the American people. We are working closely with our African partners 

9 

in a way that brings credit to our country. Our objectives in the countries the President visited—Benin, Tanzania, Rwanda, Ghana, and Liberia—are similar to those 

currently dominating our agenda in the Horn: Helping Africans resolve conflict and 

rebuild societies torn asunder by war; promoting ethnic tolerance and reconciliation; 

encouraging economic growth and job creation; improving health conditions; and ensuring democratic institutions and values prosper, including in nations with significant Muslim populations, for Islam is clearly compatible with democracy. 

The Horn of Africa today is the crucible in which many of our most important 

priorities for Africa are being addressed in their rawest forms. The issues are not 

conceptually different in the Horn than in the countries the President visited, but 

in some cases they present starker challenges in societies confronting ongoing conflict, where delivering state services and entrenching democratic values and institutions remain major challenges. 

Somalia’s challenges have frustrated its citizens, neighbors, and friends for decades. Following the appointment of Prime Minister Nur ‘‘Adde’’ Hassan Hussein, we 

are now seeing greater and more effective outreach to elements of the Somali political opposition, isolation of terrorist and extremist elements, efforts to repair and 

strengthen relationships with the humanitarian organizations, and concrete plans 

and timetables to accomplish the required transitional tasks under the Transitional 

Federal Charter. In Somaliland, we are witnessing the patient, methodical emergence of representative institutions. 

While Ethiopia and Eritrea have been as yet unable to resolve their many differences, the parties have controlled their militaries and largely refrained from reckless behavior on the border. Ethiopia has a unique history and is making the transition from two millennia of autocracy to a modern state. Djibouti is stable and 

preparing to be an important regional hub centered on its strategically located port. 

Eritrea remains the tragic exception to this picture. We have strong relations and 

mutual interests with the countries of the Horn of Africa, except Eritrea. President 

Isaias sponsors instability in Ethiopia, Darfur, and Somalia and is undermining the 

integrity of United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations. His contempt for his 

neighbors and the U.N. is not new but it is particularly egregious at this sensitive 

time and sets a dangerous precedent. 

We will continue to work in the Horn, as elsewhere in Africa, to promote regional 

stability and representative government; facilitate economic growth, increased prosperity and jobs; eliminate any platform for al-Qaeda or other terrorist operations; 

provide humanitarian assistance in the wake of drought, flooding, and 17 years of 

near-constant conflict in southern and central Somalia; and work with governments 

in the region to transform the countries through investing in people and good governance. 

SOMALIA

The situation in Somalia remains a key challenge to regional stability and security in the Horn of Africa. Somalia has been characterized as a complex emergency, 

both in humanitarian and political terms, since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in January 1991. For the last 17 years, Somalis have struggled to return lasting governance and stability to their country, enduring 14 reconciliation conferences 

and numerous civil conflicts during the intervening years. 

U.S. strategy for Somalia remains centered around four key policy priorities. 

First, encourage inclusive political dialog with the goal of resuming the transitional 

political process outlined by the Transitional Federal Charter and leading to national elections in 2009. Isolating terrorist and extremist elements is a key component of this priority. Second, provide development and humanitarian assistance for 

the Somali people and help build the governance capacity of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Third, facilitate the full and timely deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to stabilize the country and create the 

conditions for Ethiopia’s withdrawal. And four, deny terrorists the opportunity to 

find a safe haven in Somali territory. 

Over the past year, and particularly since President Yusuf appointed Prime Minister Hussein in November 2007 and Hussein’s subsequent appointment of a new 

TFG Cabinet in January 2008, we have worked closely with the TFG leadership and 

the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General (SRSG) to 

continue this dialog process and encourage additional outreach to key Somali stakeholders, including clan leaders, business and civil society, women’s groups, and religious leaders, among others. It is also important to continue the efforts begun during the National Reconciliation Congress in Mogadishu held in July–August 2007 

in moving toward national elections in 2009. 

10 

As a result of the efforts of the President, Prime Minister, and SRSG, we have 

seen the emergence of a new, positive, yet fragile, momentum in recent months. The 

Prime Minister has promoted reconciliation by engaging in extensive outreach to 

elements of the Somali opposition, working closely with humanitarian agencies, and 

preparing the ground for the key tasks that remain to be completed before elections 

in 2009. Similarly, and as a consequence of its own extremist tendencies, the alQaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab is more isolated than ever. However, time is short for 

the 2009 transition and significant tasks remain ahead, among them building effective and inclusive security and justice mechanisms that will allow Somalis to live 

in peace and security. 

The United States remains the leading donor of humanitarian assistance in Somalia, with approximately $140 million provided to date over FY 2007–FY 2008. Working with our international and regional partners in the International Contact Group 

on Somalia, we continue to call on all parties, including the TFG, to ensure unfettered delivery of humanitarian aid to affected populations, and encourage all Somalis to protect civilians and prevent further deaths and displacement of innocent 

people. We continue to work closely with our international partners and the donor 

community to improve humanitarian access and respond to the humanitarian needs 

of the Somali people. 

Similarly, additional deployments under AMISOM will help create a more secure 

environment in which this political process can move forward and the TFG can create viable and responsive security forces. Since I last appeared before this subcommittee to discuss Somalia, Uganda has deployed more than 1,800 soldiers as 

part of AMISOM, and was joined by a battalion, or approximately 850 soldiers, from 

Burundi in January 2008. Uganda plans to deploy an additional 1,600 and Burundi 

an additional battalion. Nigeria has pledged a battalion as well. Once deployed this 

would bring the total number of troops in AMISOM to almost 6,000, closer to the 

authorized strength of 8,000. 

To date, the United States has allocated $49.1 million over FY 2007–FY 2008 in 

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funds to support this critical mission. We have also 

contributed $10 million in deployment equipment and transportation as part of the 

Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) to help Burundi and Uganda deploy to 

AMISOM. We continue to work closely with the African Union (AU) and troop contributing countries to encourage additional troop deployments under AMISOM. 

At the same time, we remain deeply troubled that foreign terrorists associated 

with al-Qaeda have received safe haven in Somalia. The United States remains committed to neutralizing the threat that al-Qaeda poses to all Americans, Somalis, and 

others in the Horn of Africa. We have been clear that we will therefore take strong 

measures to deny terrorists safe haven in Somalia, as well as the ability to plan 

and operate from Somalia. 

Fighting terrorism in Somalia is not our sole priority, but rather is part of a comprehensive strategy to reverse radicalization, improve governance, rule of law, democracy and human rights, and improve economic growth and job creation. This is 

a difficult and long-term effort in Somalia. As we encourage political dialog, we will 

continue to seek to isolate those who, out of extremism, refuse that dialog and insist 

on violence. Unchecked, terrorists will continue to undermine and threaten stability 

and the lives of civilians inside Somalia and throughout the region. Therefore, we 

will remain engaged in working with our regional partners, Somali stakeholders, to 

ensure a successful political process leading to the return of effective governance 

and lasting peace and stability. 

ETHIOPIA–ERITREA

The dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea regarding demarcation of their common 

border poses an additional threat to regional stability. Unfortunately, recent efforts 

to resolve the boundary impasse are stalled and the situation has deteriorated. Eritrea’s refusal to allow the U.N. mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) to obtain 

fuel and continued restrictions on UNMEE operations have caused the U.N. to begin 

to withdraw UNMEE personnel. 

Eritrea’s restrictions on UNMEE have been nearly universally perceived as an assault on the integrity of the U.N. with dangerous consequences for other U.N. missions and activities. The U.N. Security Council and other interested governments 

have strongly condemned Eritrea’s actions. We are now supporting the U.N. to ensure the safe withdrawal of UNMEE and avoid a further escalation in tensions. 

The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission’s (EEBC) demarcation decision by 

map coordinates has not brought the parties closer to resolution of the impasse. Eritrea accepts the decision, while Ethiopia rejects it as inconsistent with international 

law. The result has been a hardening of positions on both sides and increased tenVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:15 Dec 11, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\45700.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
11 

sion between them. Eritrea and Ethiopia will have to work together in good faith 

to implement the delimitation decision of the EEBC, a decision that both parties 

have accepted. 

It is essential for both parties to engage in talks on issues that prevent normalized relations. We strongly support the U.N.’s efforts to achieve such talks and expect that these efforts will resume after the situation involving UNMEE has been 

resolved. At the same time, we continue to press both parties to respect the Algiers 

Agreement and implement concrete steps on the border to reduce tension and avoid 

renewed conflict. We will continue to seek opportunities for progress, but do not expect this impasse to be resolved in the near future. 

ERITREA

While publicly claiming to seek peace and stability for the region, the Government 

of the State of Eritrea has pursued a widespread strategy of fomenting instability 

throughout the Horn of Africa and privately undermined nearly all efforts for broadbased, inclusive dialog and reconciliation in the region—most notably in Somalia 

and Sudan. Its activities include supporting and hosting Hassan Dahir Aweys, a 

U.S.- and U.N.-designated terrorist; supporting Somali extremist elements associated with the now-defunct Council of Islamic Courts; and supporting and training 

the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) in Ethiopia. Last year, Eritrea also 

suspended its membership in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 

(IGAD) and did not support the region’s strategy for achieving a long-term solution 

in Somalia. 

In addition to the Government of Eritrea’s increasingly destabilizing activities in 

the region, its domestic human rights record remains deplorable and is steadily declining. Last year and this year it was listed in the Human Rights Report among 

the ‘‘world’s most systematic human rights violators.’’ This is no surprise as several 

thousand prisoners of conscience are detained indefinitely without charge and without the ability to communicate with friends and relatives. There is no freedom of 

press, religion, speech, or assembly. Tight government controls on the financial system and private sector have destroyed the economy. 

The United States has repeatedly pressed the Eritrean Government on these 

issues, but Eritrea remains unresponsive and the Eritrean people continue to suffer. 

Fifteen years after independence, national elections have yet to be held, and the 

constitution has never been implemented. The Eritrean people deserve better. 

ETHIOPIA

In Ethiopia, the United States was deeply involved in the persistent diplomacy 

that ensured humanitarian conditions in the Ogaden did not deteriorate into famine. I visited the region personally, as did USAID Administrator Henrietta Fore, 

and our Ambassador in Addis Ababa coordinated the humanitarian response from 

the international community. It was not easy to ensure access for humanitarian 

workers, for parts of the Ogaden at the time remained mired in conflict, with 

Ogaden National Liberation Front attacks and counterinsurgency measures by the 

Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF). We have made clear to the Government 

of Ethiopia its responsibilities toward noncombatants during its operations and have 

expressed our concerns about the impact of the insurgency and counterinsurgency 

on the civilian population. 

While the humanitarian situation in the Ogaden is not deteriorating, access remains a key challenge. Commercial trade in and out of the region has improved in 

the past several months, although poor rains, drought, and security restrictions provide a continued risk of famine. Our Embassy in Addis Ababa is leading the international effort to work with the government to get food distributed throughout the 

region by March and April before the rainy season in an effort to prevent a famine 

from emerging. 

The United States has committed approximately $53 million in emergency assistance to the Ogaden since August 2007, accounting for 98 percent of all international 

emergency assistance. Since January 2008, a USAID-sponsored Humanitarian 

Assistance Team has been in place in Ethiopia, traveling through much of the 

Ogaden, assessing needs and working closely with Ethiopian and international organizations to coordinate relief efforts. 

In promoting improved governance, we were encouraged by the Government of 

Ethiopia’s release of political detainees in July and August 2007. Again, this 

achievement was a result of persistent diplomacy, unheralded in public at the time 

but without which the detainees might not have been released. Although Ethiopia 

has a long and proud history, its democratic governance institutions are still young. 

It is frequently forgotten that Ethiopia is a country emerging from almost two milVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:15 Dec 11, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\45700.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
12 

lennia of autocracy. We have conveyed directly our expectations for improvement on 

human rights and democracy issues, but also recognize significant progress made 

over the past 15 years. 

Ethiopia is still working through the aftermath of the 2005 elections, which saw 

a vibrant political culture emerge. This is a talented people, destined by dint of population, location, and energy to play a prominent leadership role on the continent 

for a long time to come. We are confident Ethiopia will work through its challenges 

and we will work with the government and opposition to help them find common 

ground as they move toward elections in 2010. 

DJIBOUTI

In a region fraught with instability, Djibouti is a peaceful, tolerant, democratic, 

Muslim country, serving as a valuable partner for both its neighbors and the United 

States. Djibouti plays a key role in supporting regional efforts to reach a lasting solution in Somalia. I visited Djibouti in early February, just prior to its parliamentary elections. Despite a boycott call from a rival coalition, the elections were peaceful and voter turnout was over 72 percent. 

Though Djibouti is challenged by poverty and chronic food insecurity, it is rapidly 

becoming a vital hub for economic growth in the region. Current significant foreign 

investment into Djibouti’s port and infrastructure will likely allow Djibouti to serve 

as a regional transshipment hub. Djibouti’s expanding port capacity speeds regional 

trade, and its livestock quarantine and export facility (launched by USAID) permits 

legitimate exports from the Horn to key Middle East markets for the first time in 

decades. 

President Ismail Omar Guelleh is committed not only to expanding Djibouti’s role 

in the global economy and increasing foreign and private investment, but has also 

emphasized education and health care, so the Djiboutian people can realize the benefits of the country’s economic growth. Djibouti knows that its future success depends on regional stability and economic integration, and it serves as a model for 

several of its neighbors. 

SOMALILAND

In early February, I also had an opportunity to visit the city of Hargeisa in the 

self-declared Republic of Somaliland. Somaliland has achieved a commendable level 

of stability, largely without external support or assistance, which the international 

community must help to sustain regardless of the question of formal recognition. My 

visit in February provided a chance to witness Somaliland’s progress regarding economic development, but also to hear about the challenges that Somaliland faces in 

its democratic process. 

During my visit, I met with members of the Somaliland administration, as well 

as representatives from Somaliland’s three political parties to discuss the municipal 

and Presidential elections expected to take place in July and August of this year. 

The United States has provided $1 million through the International Republican Institute (IRI) to support training for members of Parliament elected in Somaliland’s 

September 2005 parliamentary elections, as well as capacity-building programs for 

Somaliland’s three political parties. We also plan to contribute an additional $1 million in support of the upcoming municipal and Presidential elections. 

Despite some recent delays in beginning a voter registration process, we are hopeful that the recent decision by President Dahir Rayale Kahin to authorize the voter 

registration process proposed by the National Electoral Commission will enable the 

elections to take place on schedule. At the same time, Somaliland’s democracy remains fragile and it is important to maintain the success of the past. We will continue to urge Somaliland’s political parties to demonstrate the same level of political 

will that ensured the previous Presidential elections in 2003 were credible and 

transparent, and to work together to ensure a peaceful result regardless of which 

candidate wins the election. 

KENYA

Although not a focus of this hearing, Kenya is an integral part of our policy in 

the greater Horn of Africa and has long been a productive force for peace and stability in this troubled region and I just want briefly to address it. As chair of the 

Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Kenya has had a leadership 

role in supporting the peace processes in southern Sudan, Somalia, and northern 

Uganda. 

Kenya is the economic anchor of the region, with food aid, fuel, and commercial 

goods for Horn countries passing through Kenya. The Kenyan Government continues to support and pursue our joint efforts to counter the threat of terrorism in 

13 

Kenya and elsewhere in East Africa. Kenya’s recent political crisis has somewhat 

diverted Kenya’s focus on this effort, but we expect this will quickly be resolved. 

Kenya’s recent political crisis following the December 27 elections harmed its 

economy (and thus, the economies of the Horn countries) and impeded Kenya’s ability to play its traditional leadership role in the region. We are encouraged by the 

February 28 political agreement reached by President Mwai Kibaki and opposition 

leader Raila Odinga, and we will continue to monitor implementation of the agreement closely. We believe one of the most important reasons the parties decided to 

sign this agreement was the skilled mediation of Kofi Annan and strong private 

messages to both parties from the United States. 

To support implementation of the agreement and economic recovery, Secretary 

Rice has committed an initial assistance package of $25 million that will focus on 

three key areas: Peace and reconciliation, institutional reform, and restoring livelihoods and communities. With the continued support and assistance of the United 

States and the international community, we are confident that Kenya will soon be 

back on the path of democracy, prosperity, and stability, and will be once again in 

the position to support and advocate for peace initiatives in the Horn of Africa. Implementation is critical, and we will remain closely engaged with the government, 

opposition, and civil society. 

CONCLUSION

Despite continued instability in Somalia and persistent tensions along the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, the Horn of Africa as a whole is making progress toward improved regional stability and governance. Our policy objectives remain consistent 

with our international and regional partners, but as always we are constrained by 

a lack of resources. Despite these constraints, we will continue to work with our 

partners to bring lasting stability to areas of conflict in the Horn of Africa, and to 

maintain stability and good governance where these goals have been achieved. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank the Assistant Secretary. It is clear 

from the range of issues you raised, how important it is to try to 

look at this region as a whole, as well as the individual difficulties, 

because the challenges are so interrelated. And I certainly take 

your point about Kenya as being very relevant to the region, as 

well. 

So we thank you. And now, we turn to Ms. Almquist. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KATHERINE ALMQUIST, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. ALMQUIST. Thank you, Chairman Feingold, and members of 

the committee, for the opportunity to appear before you today to 

discuss USAID’s programs in the Horn of Africa. 

Like elsewhere in the world, USAID’s efforts to promote economic development, strengthen democracies, and provide lifesaving 

humanitarian assistance in the countries of the Horn will ultimately contribute to greater stability in the region. I have prepared 

a longer statement about our programs, which I would request be 

entered today for the record. 

The Horn of Africa continues to face numerous humanitarian 

challenges which constrain our development opportunities. Thus 

far in fiscal year 2008, USAID has spent over $265 million in food 

and nonfood to humanitarian assistance in Ethiopia and Somalia 

alone. 

In addition to drought, which has contributed to near-famine conditions in the Horn during 6 of the past 10 years, ongoing tension 

between Ethiopia and Eritrea, prolonged civil and clan conflict in 

Somalia, and the multifaceted conflict in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region 

continue to drain the human and financial resources of these counVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:15 Dec 11, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\45700.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
14 

tries, undermining national and international development efforts 

and the stability of the region as a whole. 

Providing effective humanitarian assistance in these environments is enormously difficult, and attacks targeting humanitarian 

personnel in both Somalia and the Ogaden highlight the risks our 

partners face on a daily basis. The unexpected crisis in Kenya, the 

stable anchor country in the Horn and East Africa region, has also 

added further challenging dimensions. 

As Somalia enters a projected transition to a democratically 

elected government in 2009, United States foreign policy objectives 

in Somalia are to eliminate the terrorist threat, promote political 

stability by supporting the establishment of a functioning central 

government, and address the humanitarian needs of the Somali 

people. U.S. assistance is helping to build the capacity of the Transitional Federal Government, the components of which are known 

as the Transitional Federal Institutions, to provide social services 

and support the transitional process leading to national elections 

and the establishment of permanent, representative government institutions. 

Despite the difficult environments and the limited timeframe, the 

outcome of the National Reconciliation Congress, and the appointment of the new Prime Minister and Cabinet in the late fall, provide an opportunity for reviving the constitutional process. 

USAID is also encouraging the continued democratization and 

development in the regional administrations in Somaliland and 

Puntland. 

The continued insecurity, localized drought conditions, and increasing numbers of internally displaced persons have generated 

deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Somalia, even while this 

transition takes place. Multiple attacks on humanitarian relief 

staff and facilities in January and early February have led to the 

withdrawal of some international staff and temporary travel restrictions, further complicating efforts to provide critical assistance. 

According to the United Nations, the number of people requiring 

humanitarian assistance and livelihood support has increased from 

1.5 million as of mid-2007 to nearly 2 million people in early 2008, 

which includes both new and long-term internally displaced populations in rural areas of southern and central Somalia. 

These figures do not represent the sizeable but unknown number 

of vulnerable households in urban settings, which also are affected 

by record high prices for staple foods, disruptions in market and 

commercial activities, and the ongoing conflict. In response to growing concern over food insecurity among displaced and affected 

households, relief agencies are reviewing current response plans 

and food stocks. 

The United States and other donors are working with the Prime 

Minister and his Cabinet to help address bureaucratic and security 

impediments to delivery of humanitarian assistance and help improve access for humanitarian relief. We are heartened by the 

Transitional Federal Government’s recent commitment to work 

with donor partners and NGOs to improve access, but urge the 

Transitional Federal Government to further implement the necessary steps as soon as possible to ensure that aid reaches those 

in need. 

15 

Ethiopia is one of the world’s poorest countries, with severe malnutrition and health problems affecting up to one-tenth of the population of over 77 million. The country nevertheless has experienced robust economic and export growth in recent years, around 

8 percent annually, but subsistence agriculture is prevalent and 

vulnerable to seasonal flooding and cyclical droughts. 

While the country is experiencing growing pains, sometimes severe, in its march toward democracy and a market economy, with 

U.S. support, Ethiopia continues to undertake ambitious programs 

to reduce poverty, advance political reform, boost sustainable economic growth, and increase the quality and coverage of health, 

education, and other service delivery. 

U.S.-supported governance, judicial and conflict mitigation programs help improve political dialog, strengthen civil society, and 

lessen ethnic conflict. U.S. assistance will continue to help the government tackle the underlying causes of food insecurity through 

employment generation and enterprise growth. And we have a robust development program working with the Government of Ethiopia and our donor colleagues on all of these areas. 

In terms of the humanitarian situation, overall food security in 

Ethiopia has improved over the past several years. And the main 

agriculture season between October and December which represents 90 to 95 percent of total crop production countrywide, was 

above the recent 5-year average. 

However, an estimated 8 million chronically food insecure people 

across Ethiopia receiving food assistance and cash transfers while 

building productive assets through the Productive Safety Net Program, continue to confront a food security crisis. In addition, approximately 1.3 million people require emergency food assistance, 

including nearly 1 million people in the Somali region. 

Although slowly improving, recent restrictions on trade and 

movement in the Somali region have disrupted livelihoods and increased food insecurity among pastoralists and agropastoralists in 

the five zones under military operations. And 1.5 million people living in these restricted areas are estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance between now and June of this year. 

The inability to access markets, combined with high food commodity prices, has decreased food availability and dietary diversity, 

contributing to increased levels of malnutrition in affected areas for 

local populations’ dependant on the sale and exchange of livestock 

for income. 

Delays and logistical constraints have limited actual food distributions, and the full resumption of commercial activities remains 

critical to improving food security in the region. 

In late November, the USAID Administrator and Director for 

U.S. Foreign Assistance, Henrietta Fore, and I traveled to Ethiopia, 

including the Somali region. As a result of Administrator Fore’s 

meeting with Prime Minister Meles, in December USAID deployed 

a Humanitarian Assistance Team to the conflict-affected zones of 

the Somali region to assess nutritional and humanitarian conditions there and determine what steps could be taken to further facilitate delivery of aid. 

The Humanitarian Assistance Team concluded an initial assessment phase on January 31. While it did not observe indicators of 

16 

an immediate crisis within the areas it was able to visit, it cautions 

that humanitarian conditions and the food security situation could 

still significantly deteriorate in the next couple of months due to 

poor seasonal rains, continued restriction on commercial trade and 

disruptions to livestock movement, poor delivery mechanisms for 

food aid being employed by the Government of Ethiopia’s Disaster 

Prevention and Preparedness Agency, limited access to and delivery of essential health services, and ongoing insecurity and overall 

reduced humanitarian access. 

In order to address obstacles to effective food and humanitarian 

aid distribution, USAID is urging the Government of Ethiopia to 

improve access to affected populations for further needs assessments and response activities. 

We look forward to working with the Government of Ethiopia, 

beyond this humanitarian situation in the Ogaden, on a recovery 

and a development strategy for this region, which is critical to addressing some of the underlying causes behind this conflict. 

In Eritrea, chronic drought conditions continue to negatively impact food security, health, and nutrition indicators, as well as 

water availability. Economic and political challenges, including a 

lack of human resources due to high levels of military conscription 

and shortages of agricultural inputs, have also contributed to the 

disruption of agricultural production and economic development, 

exacerbating existing poverty and deteriorating humanitarian conditions. In addition, political constraints prevent comprehensive assessments and monitoring, and have led to a significant reduction 

in the number of humanitarian agencies operating in Eritrea. 

Indeed, USAID is not currently providing any development or 

humanitarian assistance, as we closed our mission at the end of 

2005 at the request of the Government of Eritrea. 

In Djibouti, United States assistance programs support health, 

education, governance, food security, and economic development. 

United States-funded programs serve as catalytic agents, helping 

Djibouti ensure that it stays safe from security threats; its health 

care and education programs reach rural and large urban areas; it 

is prepared to respond to the food emergencies and other food insecurity, and help its people obtain the tools they need to secure jobs 

in a rapidly changing economy. U.S. investments also contribute 

substantially to achieving our own security and development objectives in the region. 

And finally, I would just like to note how critical stability in 

Kenya is to avoiding massive instability in the entire Horn of Africa region. The crisis in Kenya has already affected its neighboring 

countries in the region through the sharp increases in fuel prices 

and transportation blockades. We are extremely encouraged by the 

breakthrough in negotiations and the agreement reached on February 28, but are very mindful that our attention will need to stay 

focused on Kenya, as this will be a long-term process of national 

healing and reform. 

The political and security challenges in the Horn of Africa are 

significant, as are the development and humanitarian needs. 

USAID is deeply engaged with our partners to help to address 

these challenges and support emerging opportunities. 

17 

Thank you for the opportunity this morning, and I look forward 

to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Almquist follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. KATHERINE J. ALMQUIST, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR

FOR AFRICA, USAID, WASHINGTON, DC 

Chairman Feingold and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity 

to appear before you today to discuss USAID’s programs in the Horn of Africa. U.S. 

Government objectives for the Horn of Africa are to promote stability, combat terrorism, and advance democracy and economic development while addressing the humanitarian needs of the region’s people. Like elsewhere in the world, USAID’s 

efforts to promote economic development, strengthen democracies, and help people 

fulfill their human aspirations in the countries of the Horn of Africa will ultimately 

contribute to greater stability in the region. 

The Horn of Africa continues to face numerous humanitarian challenges. Thus far 

in FY 2008, USAID has spent over $265 million in food and nonfood humanitarian 

assistance in Ethiopia and Somalia alone. In addition to drought, which has contributed to near-famine conditions in the Horn during 6 of the past 10 years, ongoing 

tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea, prolonged civil and clan conflict in Somalia, 

and the multifaceted conflict in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region continue to drain the 

human and financial resources of these countries, undermining national and international development efforts and the stability of the region as a whole. Providing 

effective humanitarian assistance in these environments is enormously difficult, and 

attacks targeting humanitarian personnel in both Somalia and the Ogaden highlight 

the risks our partners face on a daily basis. The unexpected crisis in Kenya—the 

stable ‘‘anchor’’ country in the Horn and East Africa region—has also added further 

challenging dimensions. 

SOMALIA

Somalia has struggled to reestablish effective central governance following nearly 

two decades of civil conflict. As Somalia enters a projected transition to a democratically elected government in 2009, U.S. foreign policy objectives in Somalia are to 

eliminate the terrorist threat, promote political stability by supporting the establishment of a functioning central government, and address the humanitarian needs of 

the Somali people. U.S. assistance is helping to build the capacity of the Transitional Federal Government, the components of which are known as the Transitional 

Federal Institutions, to provide social services and support the transitional process 

leading to national elections and the establishment of permanent, representative 

government institutions. The United States also works closely with other donor 

partners and international organizations to support the development of an effective 

and representative security sector, including the military, police, and judiciary, 

while supporting ongoing peacekeeping efforts in Somalia. The deteriorating humanitarian situation continues to be a significant concern to which the United States 

is providing substantial assistance. 

Peace and Security 

USAID will continue to provide training and support in conflict mitigation and 

reconciliation to political, clan, and civil society leaders in order to promote stability 

conducive to social and economic development. In FY 2007, the United States supported the successful convening of the National Reconciliation Congress, which 

brought together more than 2,600 delegates to Mogadishu. The National Reconciliation Congress succeeded in producing concrete recommendations on the transitional tasks ahead, including the drafting of a constitution and preparations for 

elections, as well as calling for the Transitional Federal Parliament to ratify an 

amendment to the Transitional Federal Charter that allowed for ministerial positions to be held by nonmembers of Parliament, paving the way for enhanced representation in the Transitional Federal Government. USAID, in concert with the 

State Department, is working closely with other donor partners to support the efforts of Prime Minister Nur ‘‘Adde’’ Hassan Hussein, under the leadership of President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, in promoting reconciliation at all levels across Somali 

society. 

USAID is also supporting quick impact community-based projects to provide tangible, practical benefits; in FY 2007, 65 quick impact projects were supported benefiting over 6,000 households. Complementary support is being provided to civil sociVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:15 Dec 11, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\45700.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
18 

ety and media programs to enable government-civil society collaboration and 

promote transparency and accountability. 

Governing Justly and Democratically 

USAID assistance both supports the transitional political process, as well as programs to build the capacity of government ministries and train public sector executives in the transparent and accountable management. USAID recently contributed 

to a multidonor package of minimum needs that will allow the new Transitional 

Federal Government Cabinet to establish itself in Mogadishu over the next 6 

months. Programs are providing assistance for the Transitional Federal Institutions 

to help reestablish appropriate executive functions, including ongoing training of 30 

directors general from selected ministries, provision of basic equipment, and deployment of technical advisors in the office of the President and other key ministries. 

Support also includes the launching of a Public Administration and Capacity Building Institute in Mogadishu and programs to strengthen the capacity of the Transitional Federal Parliament. Despite the difficult environment and the limited timeframe available for constitutionmaking, the outcome of the National Reconciliation 

Congress and the recent appointments of a new Prime Minister and Cabinet provide 

an opportunity for reviving the constitutional process. U.S. assistance is also encouraging continued democratization and development in the regional administrations 

in Somaliland and Puntland. USAID will continue to support existing and emerging 

civil society institutions, including independent media outlets, which are key stakeholders in Somalia. 

Investing in People 

USAID is also working with the Transitional Federal Government to support the 

delivery of critical social services, including basic education and essential health 

interventions. The integrated USAID program provides support for essential social 

services directly at the community level. The program is expanding assistance designed to increase student attendance and retention by rehabilitating community 

primary schools; training additional teachers, especially women; and increasing 

access to education. Health programs are focusing resources on delivering basic maternal and child health interventions at the health facility and community levels in 

collaboration with relevant line ministries and local government counterparts. U.S. 

assistance will also provide funds to develop safe water points and latrines in community schools and health posts. 

Humanitarian Assistance 

Continued insecurity, localized drought conditions, and increasing numbers of internally displaced persons have generated deteriorating humanitarian conditions in 

Somalia, particularly affecting Mogadishu and Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle, 

Hiran, and Central regions. Multiple attacks on humanitarian relief staff and facilities in January and early February have led to the withdrawal of some international 

staff and temporary travel restrictions, further complicating efforts to provide critical assistance. According to the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization’s Food Security Analysis Unit, the number of people requiring humanitarian assistance and 

livelihood support has increased from 1.5 million as of mid-2007 to nearly 2 million 

people in early 2008, which includes both new and long-term internally displaced 

populations in rural areas of southern and central Somalia. The Food Security Analysis Unit notes that these figures do not represent the sizeable but unknown number of vulnerable households in urban settings, which are also affected by record 

high prices for staple foods, disruptions in market and commercial activities, and 

the ongoing conflict. In response to growing concern over food insecurity among displaced and affected households, relief agencies are reviewing current response plans 

and food stocks. 

The United States and other donors are working with the Prime Minister and his 

Cabinet to help address bureaucratic and security impediments to delivery of humanitarian assistance and help improve access for humanitarian relief. We are 

heartened by the Transitional Federal Government’s recent commitment to work 

with donor partners and NGOs to improve humanitarian access, but urge the Transitional Federal Government to implement the necessary steps as soon as possible 

to ensure that aid reaches those in need. 

In FY 2007 and to date in FY 2008, the U.S. Government has provided more than 

$139 million for health, nutrition, agriculture and food security, livelihoods, coordination, protection, and water, sanitation, and hygiene programs, as well as for emergency food assistance, peace-building activities, refugee assistance, and air operations in Somalia. 

19 

ETHIOPIA

Ethiopia is one of the world’s poorest countries, with severe malnutrition and 

health problems affecting up to one-tenth of the population of over 77 million. The 

country nevertheless has experienced robust economic and export growth in recent 

years (around 8 percent annually) but subsistence agriculture is prevalent and vulnerable to seasonal flooding and cyclical droughts. The country is experiencing growing pains in its march toward democracy and a market economy. With U.S. support, 

Ethiopia continues to undertake ambitious programs to facilitate peaceful change, 

reduce poverty, advance political reform, boost sustainable economic growth, and increase the quality and coverage of health, education, and other service delivery. 

U.S.-supported governance, judicial and conflict mitigation programs help improve 

political dialog, strengthen civil society, and lessen ethnic conflict. U.S. assistance 

will continue to help the government tackle the underlying causes of food insecurity 

through employment generation and enterprise growth. Support to the Productive 

Safety Net Program and Pastoral Livelihoods Initiatives will continue to build resilience among the most vulnerable. Three Presidential Initiatives—the President’s 

Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the President’s Malaria Initiative, and the recent 

Education Initiative—will provide assistance for integrated programs for the prevention, treatment, and care of HIV/AIDS and malaria, and improve access to education 

for all Ethiopians, particularly underserved girls. Regional foreign assistance programs will continue to support refugee flows, including repatriation programs, as 

well as projects which combat environmental degradation. 

Peace and Security 

Conflict mitigation and reconciliation programming is designed to help stabilize 

border regions with Eritrea, Sudan, and Somalia by addressing tensions arising 

from competition over scarce resources and expanding openings to resolve longstanding disputes between the Government of Ethiopia and insurgent groups. 

USAID is working to build the capacity and support the interventions of joint government-civil society conflict management partnerships at the local, regional, state 

and national levels to prevent and manage conflict in violence-prone areas, including assisting with the development of a national conflict management policy. 

Governing Justly and Democratically 

USAID programs are supporting constructive dialog among Ethiopians who represent diverse political perspectives and ethnic groups to build consensus on key 

issues. Funds are also being used to support multilateral efforts to facilitate the 

ongoing restructuring of elections and political processes and build capacity in preparation for the May 2010 national elections. USAID is helping to strengthen the capacity and role of civil society; improve independent human rights monitoring, investigation and reporting; and improve the respect the judiciary and police have for 

international, national, and institutional human rights standards. U.S. assistance is 

also used to ensure a U.S. role in the ongoing multidonor support program to 

strengthen the federal and regional Parliaments operating in the new, multiparty 

environment, and build the capacity of the National and Regional Judicial Training 

Centers and selected law schools. Capacity-building efforts are also assisting the 

Gambella and Somali Regional State Governments to improve governance through 

better service delivery. 

Investing in People 

Ethiopia’s health services and education are slowly improving but are still among 

the poorest quality in the world. USAID programs continue to support and improve 

management and quality of health care services including family planning services 

to meet the growing unmet demand in order to reduce Ethiopia’s very high population growth rate to sustainable levels. Investments in health and education are 

enabling Ethiopians to take advantage of expanded economic opportunities. USAID 

is supporting activities that expand access to sustainable reproductive health care 

and high-quality, voluntary family planning services and information contributing 

to poverty reduction. USAID provides support in maternal and child health to help 

mitigate the effects of external shocks, foster a healthier workforce, and focus on 

both child and adult education in the hinterlands. Funds are also used to help combat tuberculosis and reduce the incidence of malaria, major sources of morbidity and 

workforce absenteeism, and improve access to safe water supplies and basic sanitation, ultimately improving rural household health and food security. Africa Education Initiative assistance and other USAID support will improve the quality and 

equity of primary education through training teachers and administrators, strengthening planning, management, and monitoring and evaluation systems, and fostering 

community partnerships and school governance through capacity-building of parentVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:15 Dec 11, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\45700.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
20 

teacher associations and management of school grants. Scholarship support is assisting girls and HIV/AIDS orphans to succeed in school. Ethiopia is receiving significant support to scale up integrated prevention, care, and treatment programs 

throughout the country and support orphans and vulnerable children, thereby forging linkages with the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief funded programs. 

New assistance in FY 2008 under the President’s Malaria Initiative will expand 

efforts to scale up proven preventive and treatment interventions toward achievement of 85 percent coverage among vulnerable groups to support the program’s goal 

of reducing malaria-related morbidity by 50 percent. 

Economic Growth 

The U.S. Mission in Ethiopia is using a range of assistance to leverage investment, export and private sector growth. USAID programs help to drive economic 

growth and promote a more enabling environment for agriculture, the private sector, small and medium enterprises, and trade and investment in general. Focus will 

continue on developing commodity exchanges, improving access to finance, and establishing policies to enable private-sector-led economic growth. Programs also focus 

on enhancing the productivity and competitiveness of key sectors, especially in rural 

areas. This includes investments in the tourism sector, agribusiness expansion, support to African Growth and Opportunity Act exports and World Trade Organization 

accession, continued support to pastoralist areas, and support to the livestock and 

agriculture sectors which employ 85 percent of the workforce and contribute 45 percent of GDP. These programs are continuing to increase economic prosperity 

through exports and job and wealth creation. The U.S. mission will continue its 

focus on the most vulnerable populations, providing impetus for new and alternative 

livelihood programs, improved agricultural practices, better livestock husbandry and 

meat and dairy marketing, and phyto-sanitation. Along with other major donors, the 

United States supports the Government of Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program to reduce food insecurity, which affects 44 percent of the population. Investments in the Safety Net Program and related policy, regulatory, and administrative 

systems are serving to protect vulnerable populations and contribute to poverty reduction and rural economic growth. USAID funding is also helping to strengthen 

small enterprise and other poverty reduction efforts related to the Productive Safety 

Net Program. 

Humanitarian Assistance 

The United States is the major donor assisting the Government of Ethiopia to anticipate and respond effectively to any natural or manmade disaster. USAID will 

continue to work closely with the Ethiopia Disaster Prevention and Preparedness 

Agency, to increase capacity for early warning and to provide humanitarian assistance of emergency food and nonfood aid. 

CURRENT HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

Ongoing trade and access restrictions in Somali region—though they have eased 

just slightly over the last few months—coupled with insecurity and recent drought 

conditions in Southern Ethiopia have increased humanitarian needs and food security concerns. In Somali region, insecurity, reduced humanitarian access and now 

poor rainfall are leading to deteriorating humanitarian conditions and increased 

malnutrition. Distributions of food aid and commercial food deliveries in some areas 

are subject to inadequate delivery systems or are being disrupted, impeding the 

ability to address the needs of affected populations, according to USAID’s Famine 

Early Warning Systems Network. 

Food Security and Agriculture 

Overall food security in Ethiopia has improved over the past several years, and 

the main agricultural season between October and December, which represents 90 

to 95 percent of total crop production countrywide, was above the recent 5-year average. However an estimated 8 million chronically food insecure people in Afar, 

Oromiya, Amhara, Tigray, Somali, and Southern Nations regions receiving food assistance and cash transfers while building productive assets through the Productive 

Safety Net Program continue to confront a food security crisis. In addition, approximately 1.3 million people require emergency food assistance, including nearly 1 million people in Somali region, 84,000 people displaced by last year’s flooding, and 

more than 260,000 people in Oromiya region affected by localized crop failures, according to Famine Early Warning Systems Network. 

21 

Somali Region 

Although slowly improving, recent restrictions on trade and movement in Somali 

region have disrupted livelihoods and increased food insecurity among pastoralists 

and agropastoralists in the five zones under military operations—Warder, Korahe, 

Gode, Fik, and Degehabur. The inability to access markets combined with high food 

commodity prices has decreased food availability and dietary diversity, contributing 

to increased levels of malnutrition in affected areas for local populations dependent 

on the sale and exchange of livestock for income. 

The December 2007 deyr rains assessment mission in Somali region identified approximately 1.5 million people living in restricted areas of Warder, Korahe, Gode, 

Fik, and Degehabur zones in need of humanitarian or livelihood assistance between 

January and June 2008. As of February 19, humanitarian agencies had distributed 

approximately 10,000 of the estimated 52,000 metric tons of food aid required to the 

region, according to the U.N. World Food Program. The Government of Ethiopia has 

approved 21 nongovernmental organizations to operate in the five Somali zones 

under military operations, but few organizations have been able to initiate programs 

to date, according to field reports. In addition, the Government of Ethiopia has approved 186 food distribution points—a 38-percent decrease from the previously utilized 300 distribution points. However, delays and logistical restraints have limited 

actual food distributions, and the full resumption of commercial activities remains 

critical to improving food security in the region. 

From November 23 to 26, USAID Administrator and Director of Foreign Assistance Henrietta H. Fore and I visited Ethiopia, including Somali region, to discuss 

humanitarian conditions and efforts to facilitate emergency assistance to affected 

populations. On December 4, we met with Prime Minister Meles to discuss our concerns and offer USAID’s assistance in response to his expressed need for better nutritional data for the region. Administrator Fore formally offered to Prime Minister 

Meles that USAID could deploy a Humanitarian Assistance Team to the conflictaffected zones of Somali region to assess nutritional and humanitarian conditions 

there and determine what steps could be taken to facilitate delivery of food and 

other humanitarian assistance. The Prime Minister accepted and the team deployed 

to Ethiopia on December 20. 

The Humanitarian Assistance Team concluded an initial assessment phase on 

January 31 and while it did not observe indicators of an immediate crisis within 

the areas of travel to date, it cautioned that humanitarian conditions and the food 

security situation could significantly deteriorate in March or April. Among the factors that signal potential deteriorating conditions in the region are: 

• The poor performance of the 2007 gu and deyr rains; 

• Current restrictions on commercial trade and disruptions to livestock movement; 

• Poor delivery mechanisms for food aid being employed by the Government of 

Ethiopia’s Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency; 

• Limited access to and delivery of essential health services; and 

• Ongoing insecurity and reduced humanitarian access. 

In addition, Ethiopia’s National Meteorological Agency is predicting an 80-percent 

chance of average or below average rains beginning in the March through May rainy 

season, with a 45-percent chance of below average rains. The Somali Regional Government has just appealed to donors for help due to poor rainfall and the U.N. is 

pressing the Government of Ethiopia to formally acknowledge the drought conditions and need for assistance. 

Some of the key recommendations from the team’s initial assessment phase were 

that: 

• The capacity of the Government of Ethiopia’s Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency to target, monitor, and deliver assistance needs to be enhanced to address obstacles to effective food aid distribution; 

• USAID should support the current joint UNICEF and Government measles vaccination campaign, given a serious outbreak in the region; 

• The Government of Ethiopia should allow qualified U.N. or nongovernmental 

organization partners to conduct standardized nutritional surveys in conflictaffected areas; and 

• The Government of Ethiopia should work to improve humanitarian access to 

affected populations for further needs assessments and response activities. 

The Humanitarian Assistance Team remains engaged in the conflict-affected 

areas of the Somali region, and has shifted focus from assessment to advocacy, monitoring, and program management. The team plans to undertake ongoing targeted 

field visits to Somali region to enhance findings and monitor humanitarian condiVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:15 Dec 11, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\45700.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
22 

tions, and assist the USAID/Ethiopia mission, partners, and host-country government ministries to implement response programs. OFDA has committed $5.3 million in Nutrition, Health, Water/Sanitation, Livestock and Market interventions in Somali region to date in FY 2008. 

ERITREA

We are not currently providing any development or humanitarian assistance to 

Eritrea. We closed down our mission in Asmara on December 31, 2005, in response 

to a request from the Government of Eritrea that we do so. In FY 2007, however, we did provide nearly $3 million in humanitarian assistance 

for ongoing programming in the areas of health, nutrition, humanitarian coordination and information management, and water, sanitation, and hygiene. 

Chronic drought conditions continue to negatively impact food security, health, 

and nutrition indicators, as well as water availability in Eritrea. According to the 

U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, only 32 percent of rural 

populations have access to protected water sources. Economic and political challenges, including a lack of human resources due to high levels of military conscription and shortages of agricultural inputs, have also contributed to the disruption of 

agricultural production and economic development, exacerbating existing poverty 

and deteriorating humanitarian conditions. In addition, political constraints prevent 

comprehensive assessments and monitoring and have led to a significant reduction 

in the number of humanitarian agencies operating in Eritrea. 

DJIBOUTI

U.S. assistance programs supporting health, education, governance, food security, 

and economic development are helping Djibouti build on its demonstrated will to 

achieve its goals. U.S.-funded programs serve as catalytic agents, helping Djibouti 

ensure that it stays safe from security threats, that its health care and education 

programs reach rural and marginalized urban areas, that it is prepared to respond 

to food emergencies, and that its people obtain the tools they need to secure jobs 

in a rapidly changing economy. U.S. investments will also contribute substantially 

to achieving our own security and development objectives in the region. 

Peace and Security 

Djibouti is on the mainline between the Middle East and Africa and faces steady 

pressure aimed at radicalizing its people and changing its polity. U.S. security cooperation is intended to ensure Djibouti has the tools to resist the threat of terror 

and instability. Department of State-funded programs promote stabilization operations and security sector reform, fight transnational crime, and support counterterrorism activities. 

Governing Justly and Democratically 

Assistance for improving governance, provided by USAID, is helping promote a 

more transparent and efficient government at the national, regional, and local levels, increase confidence in the electoral process, and advance Djibouti’s decentralization. It also helps to increase political participation, guarantee civil liberties, promote government accountability, and strengthen civil society. The democracy and 

governance program addresses major obstacles to Djibouti’s capacity to sustain private sector development by promoting dialog between government, civil society, and 

the private sector. Popular frustration over the lack of jobs, inadequate public services, and obstacles to political participation must be overcome to ensure Djibouti’s 

long-term success and stability. Leadership education and training will constitute 

a major focus of the democracy and governance program. 

Investing in People 

To ensure Djibouti’s continued stability in the volatile Horn of Africa region, U.S. 

assistance programs promote improved quality of life for Djiboutian citizens. 

USAID-funded health and education activities combat low life expectancy, maternal 

and under-5 child mortality, and the transmission of infectious diseases such as 

HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. In addition, USAID activities continue to assist Djibouti 

in responding to food and other humanitarian emergencies. The health program continues to focus on expanded access to quality health care by improving maternal and 

child health services, and on the prevention of the spread of HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. The education program continues its essential focus on basic education, promoting expanded access, particularly for girls and rural children, and an emphasis 

on preparation for employment opportunities. Support for teacher training, the provision of pedagogic materials, expanded community participation in education, the 

improvement and decentralization of education sector service delivery, and improved 

23 

sector information systems and management capacity are also priority targets for 

U.S. assistance. 

KENYA

It is important to note how critical stability in Kenya is to avoiding massive instability in the entire Horn subregion. The crisis in Kenya has already affected its 

neighboring countries region through the sharp increases in fuel prices and transportation blockades. 

We are extremely encouraged by the breakthrough in negotiations and the agreement reached on February 28 but are very mindful that our attention will need to 

stay focused on Kenya as this will be a very long-term process of national healing 

and reform. 

The political and security challenges in the Horn of Africa are significant as are 

the development and humanitarian needs. USAID is deeply engaged with our partners to help to address these challenges and support emerging opportunities. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Ms. Almquist. And 

now, Ms. Whelan. 

STATEMENT OF THERESA WHELAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 

WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. WHELAN. Good morning, Chairman Feingold, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the invitation to 

speak to you today about the situation in the Horn of Africa, and 

the Department of Defense’s activities in the region. 

Africa, and the Horn of Africa in particular, is a region of great 

strategic importance to the United States. At the crossroads of subSaharan Africa and the Near East, the Horn presents a series of 

complex threats to U.S. national security, including weak governance, lawlessness, territorial disputes, and safe havens for terrorism. 

If ignored or unaddressed, all of these issues will have dire consequences for the people of the Horn, for the broader region, for our 

friends and allies on the continent, and for the United States. We 

believe that a coordinated U.S. foreign and national security policy 

in the Horn of Africa, of which our defense relations are a component, is of critical importance to U.S. security interests. 

The Department of Defense’s activities in the Horn are a subset 

of U.S. national security strategy for Africa, as outlined by the 

President in the National Security Presidential Directive 50. And 

we also support the Department of State’s foreign policy goals of 

countering terrorism and building local capacity. Our activities 

with African partners focused on issues of mutual strategic concern, including the elimination of terrorist safe havens, prevention 

of arms and human trafficking, and ensuring access to land and 

sea lines of communication. 

We addressed these security interests by working with African 

partners to promote civilian control and defense reform, and to 

build local military capacity. This is achieved by ensuring their 

militaries are appropriately sized and funded, by professionalizing 

militaries through training to develop and maintain well-trained 

and well-led and disciplined forces, with respect for law and human 

rights, and by building capacity of African partner militaries that 

positively contribute to combating terrorism, and that prevent and 

respond to national and regional crises. 

24 

Theater Security Cooperation remains the cornerstone of our 

strategy to enhance partner capabilities and to promote these relationships and common interests. Within the Horn, our engagement 

and activities are governed by the realities of regional instability 

and our bilateral relationships. 

In Ethiopia, the security situation remains challenging and complex, with profound regional implications. One area of significant 

concern is the ongoing border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea dedicate a significant portion of the 

military resources and efforts to manning the border region, and 

we remain concerned about the possibility for renewed hostilities 

along the border. We believe that any return to conflict between 

Ethiopia and Eritrea would undermine stability throughout the entire region. 

Beyond the border, Ethiopia is facing genuine security concerns 

in the Ogaden region. The Ogaden National Liberation Front continues to wage a separatist insurgency in the Ogaden region with 

outside support, including from neighboring Eritrea. 

Following the April 2007 attack, that killed 9 Chinese oil workers and more than 70 Ethiopians, the Government of Ethiopia increased its operations in a coordinated counterinsurgency campaign 

in the region. As a result, we have seen increased military operations, coupled with restrictions on commercial traffic and humanitarian access. 

We continue to monitor the situation in the Ogaden, but given 

that we in DOD no longer have the level of direct access that we 

previously had to the region, we are unable to confirm the actual 

facts on the ground. We are, however, acutely aware that for a 

counterinsurgency campaign to be successful, the military must respect the local civilian populace. 

We continue to pursue the strategic bilateral relationship with 

Ethiopia and the Ethiopian National Defense Force, a partner in 

regional counterterrorism activities. We believe that promotion of 

a professional ENDF, committed to human rights and rule of law, 

is best achieved through engagement, rather than isolation. And 

we have invested in training and supporting the professionalization 

of the Ethiopian forces. 

Our engagement with the Government of Ethiopia and the 

ENDF emphasizes our expectations that any military partner of 

the United States behave in a professional manner with respect for 

the rule of law and citizens’ rights. Our training engagement is 

particularly important with the ENDF, a 200,000-person military 

that is professionalizing and restructuring into a more conventional 

force. This transformation has been challenged and made all the 

more necessary by the border conflict, the counterinsurgency campaign in the Ogaden, and Ethiopia’s military activities in Somalia. 

Our relationship with the ENDF includes military education, 

counterterrorism capability development, and funding for nonlethal 

equipment purchases and maintenance to support the ENDF’s 

modernization. Our Security Assistance Office in Addis works 

closely with the embassy to ensure our assistance complies with 

Leahy Law requirements. Until last year, the United States conducted military-to-military training in basic soldiering and commando skills at small outposts in Central Ethiopia. All of this 

25 

training emphasized the rule of law. While this training ceased in 

2007 at the request of the Ethiopian Government, we continue our 

activities at the Ethiopian Command and Staff College, where we 

have two uniformed instructors who have trained over 120 midand senior-level Ethiopian military officers. We believe that continued robust security cooperation, including military-to-military 

training, is critical to the development of the ENDF and to U.S. 

foreign and national security policy in the region. 

Although we currently do not have a bilateral relationship with 

the Eritrean Defense Forces, we believe that there are areas of 

strategic security interest to the United States, including maritime 

security in the crucial shipping lanes in the Red Sea and the transformation of the ENDF from a guerilla force to a smaller, professional military. 

Since the closure of our Security Assistance Office in Asmara in 

early 2006, based on indications from the Government of Eritrea 

that it no longer wished to maintain a bilateral military relationship, we have had little to no contact with the Eritrean forces. 

The Government of Eritrea continues to undermine security in 

the Horn of Africa by supporting destabilizing elements in the region. We are concerned about Eritrea’s actions, including the decision in November 2007 to deny the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea on the right to purchase or import fuel, de facto 

forcing UNMEE’s current relocation of forces out of the TSZ and 

into Asmara. 

We continue to monitor the situation with UNMEE, and particularly whether UNMEE—now that it has started to withdraw from 

Eritrea—will be allowed to take with it all its equipment. If 

UNMEE were not allowed to take its equipment out of the country, 

Eritrea in essence would receive a windfall of military equipment 

left by departing U.N. troops. 

Another area of concern for us is the situation in Somalia. Although we have no bilateral military cooperation with the Transitional Federal Government, we are watching the security situation 

in Somalia and the implications of its continued instability for the 

region as a whole. 

Although recent efforts of the new TFG Prime Minister to reach 

out to elements of the opposition appear promising, there are serious and ongoing concerns about the security situation throughout 

Somalia. There is sporadic violence between Somaliland and 

Puntland forces. The lack of a representative security force impedes 

the TFG’s efforts to extend its authority and control over all of Somalia, including portions of Mogadishu and the southern border 

area. Terrorist and extremist elements, including the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab militia, continue to exploit TFG weaknesses 

and are attempting to undermine any efforts toward peaceful dialog process and to seek safe haven in Somalia. 

The ability of al-Qaeda operatives and their affiliates to continue 

to use Somalia as a base for operations is a real and severe threat, 

not only to Somalia, but to the entire region and to the United 

States. We continue to work with our partners, particularly 

Djibouti and Kenya and Ethiopia, to develop regional 

counterterrorism capability to respond to terrorists and extremist 

26 

elements in Somalia that threaten United States interests and the 

security of the region. 

Security assistance, including through traditional funding 

streams like foreign military financing and international military 

education training, and the DOD 1206 authority, have allowed us 

to support partners as they develop the capability to respond to the 

terrorist threat emanating from Somalia. 

Kenya’s progress in developing a counterterrorism capability, 

with United States assistance, has been critical to regional security. Continued and increased assistance to these frontline states is 

crucial to ensuring that the instability in Somalia does not impact 

its neighbors. There may also be opportunities to make progress in 

Somalia by working with those parts of Somalia, including 

Somaliland, that are relatively stable. In addition to our partner 

relationships, the United States also has ongoing operations in the 

region that respond to the presence of identified al-Qaeda terrorists 

in Somalia. 

We remain committed to promoting security and stability in the 

Horn of Africa, and believe this is in the best interests of the people and governments of the region, and of the United States. The 

Department of Defense’s relations and policies in the region are 

subordinate to our foreign and national security policies, and consequently, we continue to support and work closely with the embassies and USAID missions in the region to ensure our activities are 

consistent with and support the U.S. foreign policy objectives in the 

Horn. 

Thank you very much, and I would be happy to take your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Whelan follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THERESA WHELAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR

AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

INTRODUCTION

Good morning, Chairman Feingold, distinguished members of the committee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today about the situation in the Horn 

of Africa, and the Department of Defense’s activities in the region. 

Africa, and the Horn of Africa in particular, is a region of great strategic importance to the United States. At the crossroads of sub-Saharan Africa and the Near 

East, the Horn presents a series of complex threats to U.S. national security, including weak governance, lawlessness, territorial disputes, and safe havens for terrorism. If ignored or unaddressed, all of these issues will have dire consequences 

for the people of the Horn, for the broader region, for our friends and allies on the 

continent, and for the United States. We believe that a coordinated U.S. foreign and 

national security policy in the Horn of Africa, of which our defense relations are a 

component, is of critical importance to U.S. strategic and security interests. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN THE HORN

The Department of Defense’s activities in the Horn are a subset of the U.S. national strategy for Africa, as outlined by the President in National Security Presidential Directive 50, and support the Department of State’s foreign policy goals of 

countering terrorism and building local capacity. Our activities with African partners focus on issues of mutual strategic concern, including the elimination of 

terrorist safe havens, prevention of arms and human trafficking, and ensuring enduring access to land and sea lanes of communication. We address these security 

interests by working with African partners to promote civilian control and defense 

reform, and to build local military capacity. This is achieved by ensuring their militaries are appropriately sized and funded, by professionalizing militaries through 

training to develop and maintain well-trained and disciplined forces with a respect 

27 

for law and human rights, and by building capacity of African partner militaries 

that positively contribute to combating terrorism, and that prevent and respond to 

national and regional crises. 

Theater security cooperation remains the cornerstone of our strategy to enhance 

partner capabilities and to promote these relationships and common interests. Within the Horn, our engagement and activities are governed by the realities of regional 

instability and our bilateral relationships. 

ETHIOPIA

The security situation in Ethiopia remains challenging and complex, with profound regional implications. 

One area of significant concern is the ongoing border dispute between Ethiopia 

and Eritrea. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea dedicate a significant portion of military resources and efforts to manning the border region, and we remain concerned about 

the possibility for renewal of hostilities along the border. We believe that any return 

to conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea would undermine stability throughout the 

entire region. 

Beyond the border, Ethiopia is facing genuine security concerns in the Ogaden region. The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) continues to wage a separatist 

movement in the Ogaden region with outside support, including from neighboring 

Eritrea. Following the April 2007 attack that killed 9 Chinese oil workers and more 

than 70 Ethiopians, the Government of Ethiopia increased its operations in a coordinated counterinsurgency campaign in the region. As a result, we have seen increased military operations coupled with restrictions on commercial traffic and humanitarian access. We continue to monitor the situation in the Ogaden, but given 

that we no longer have the level of access that we previously had to the region, we 

are unable to confirm the actual facts on the ground. We are, however, acutely 

aware that for a counterinsurgency campaign to be successful, the military must respect the local civilian populace. 

We continue to pursue a strategic bilateral relationship with Ethiopia and the 

Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF), a partner in regional counterterrorism 

activities. We believe that promotion of a professional ENDF, committed to human 

rights and rule of law, is best achieved through engagement, rather than isolation, 

and we have invested in training and supporting the professionalization of the Ethiopian forces. Our engagement with the Government of Ethiopia and the ENDF emphasizes our expectation that any military partner of the United States is to behave 

in a professional manner with full respect for the rule of law and citizens’ rights. 

Our training engagement is particularly important with the ENDF, a 200,000-person military that is professionalizing and restructuring into a more conventional 

force. This transformation has been challenged and made all the more necessary by 

the border conflict, the counterinsurgency campaign in the Ogaden, and Ethiopia’s 

military activities in Somalia. 

Our relationship with the ENDF includes military education, counterterrorism 

capability development, and funding for equipment purchases and maintenance to 

support the ENDF’s modernization. Our security assistance office in Addis works 

closely with the Embassy to ensure our assistance complies with Leahy law requirements. Until last year, the United States conducted military-to-military training in 

basic soldiering and commando skills at small outposts in central Ethiopia. All of 

this training emphasized the rule of law. While this training ceased in 2007 at the 

request of the Ethiopian Government, we continue our activities at the Ethiopian 

Command and Staff College, where we have two uniformed instructors who have 

trained over 120 mid- and senior-level Ethiopian military officers. We believe that 

continued robust security cooperation, including military-to-military training, is critical to the development of the ENDF and to U.S. foreign and national security policy 

in the region. 

ERITREA

Although we currently do not have a bilateral relationship with the Eritrean 

Defense Forces (EDF), we believe there are areas of strategic security interest to 

the United States, including maritime security in the crucial shipping lanes in the 

Red Sea and the transformation of the EDF from a guerilla force to a smaller, professional military. Since the closure of our Security Assistance Office in Asmara in 

early 2006, based on indications from the Government of Eritrea that it no longer 

wished to maintain a bilateral military relationship, we have had little to no contact 

with the Eritrean forces. 

The Government of Eritrea continues to undermine security in the Horn of Africa 

by supporting destabilizing elements in the region. We are concerned about Eritrea’s 

28 

actions, including the decision in November 2007 to deny the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) the right to purchase or import fuel, de facto 

forcing UNMEE’s current relocation of forces out of the TSZ and into Asmara. We 

continue to monitor the situation with UNMEE, and particularly whether UNMEE, 

now that it has started to withdraw from Eritrea, will be allowed to take with it 

all its equipment. If UNMEE were not allowed to take its equipment out of the 

country, Eritrea in essence would receive a windfall of military equipment left by 

departing U.N. troops. 

SOMALIA

Another area of concern for us is the situation in Somalia. Although we have no 

bilateral military cooperation with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), we 

are watching the security situation in Somalia and the implications of its continued 

instability for the region as a whole. 

Although recent efforts of the new TFG Prime Minister to reach out to elements 

of the opposition appear promising, there are serious and ongoing concerns about 

the security situation throughout Somalia. There is sporadic violence between 

Somaliland and Puntland forces. The lack of a representative security force impedes 

the TFG’s efforts to extend its authority and control over all of Somalia, including 

portions of Mogadishu and the southern border area. Terrorist and extremist elements, including the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab militia, continue to exploit TFG 

weaknesses and are attempting to undermine any efforts toward a peaceful dialog 

process and seek a safe haven in Somalia. 

The ability of al-Qaeda operatives and their affiliates to continue to use Somalia 

as a base for operations is a real and severe threat not only to Somalia, but to the 

entire region and to the United States. We continue to work with our partners, particularly Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia, to develop a regional counterterrorism capability to respond to terrorists and extremist elements in Somalia that threaten U.S. 

interests and the security of the region. Security assistance, including through traditional funding streams like foreign military financing (FMF) and international military education training (IMET), and the DOD 1206 authority, have allowed us to 

support partners as they develop the capability to respond to the terrorist threat 

emanating from Somalia. Kenya’s progress in developing a counterterrorism capability, with U.S. assistance, has been critical to regional security. Continued and increased assistance to these front-line states is crucial to ensuring that the instability 

in Somalia does not impact its neighbors. There also may be opportunities to make 

progress in Somalia by working with those parts of Somalia, including Somaliland, 

that are relatively stable. In addition to our partner relationships, the United States 

also has ongoing operations in the region that respond to the presence of identified 

al-Qaeda terrorists in Somalia. 

SUMMARY

We remain committed to promoting security and stability in the Horn of Africa, 

and believe this is in the best interests of the people and governments of the region, 

and of the United States. The Department of Defense’s relations and policies in the 

region are subordinate to our foreign and national security policies, and consequently we continue to support and work closely with the Embassies and USAID 

missions in the region to ensure our activities are consistent with and support U.S. 

foreign policy objectives in the Horn. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Ms. Whelan. 

Even if there is not a Defense Department presence in the 

Ogaden we can, or we could at least, hope that you’re talking to 

State and USAID through the interagency process to get the facts 

on the ground. Perhaps your staff can confirm some of these reports that way, instead of simply suggesting that you’re unable to 

get it any information because the United States does have some 

presence there. 

But I do thank you for your testimony. I allowed much longer 

testimony than usual, because this is such a broad and intricate 

subject. So I thank all of you, and I will begin 10-minute question 

rounds at this point. 

Dr. Frazer, the U.S. Government Accountability Office recently 

released a report I requested in 2006, analyzing U.S. policy in SoVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:15 Dec 11, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\45700.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
29 

malia, which found that the administration’s strategy has been insufficient, incomplete, and ineffective. Now this comes not really as 

a surprise. As you know, I had a requirement passed into law that 

same year requiring the administration to detail its Somalia strategy. The document that Congress received, which was received long 

past the deadline, was badly insufficient. The Pentagon has acknowledged the need for a detailed interagency strategy, but the 

State Department did not respond to the GAO’s recommendation. 

Do you agree with the GAO’s assessment that a more specific coordinated and comprehensive plan for restoring security and stability in Somalia is necessary? 

Dr. FRAZER. I read the GAO Report, Senator, in great detail, and 

I came away with a very different take than the one that you just 

described. 

I felt that the GAO, based on their interviews both in the region 

and in Washington, did a really excellent job of describing a very 

complex situation in Somalia that creates many barriers to transforming that country into what we both would share as our goals 

of well-governed, developed, without humanitarian crisis. The GAO 

talked about the weaknesses of the Transitional Federal Government. The GAO Report talked about the need to have more African 

troops deployed. And so, I didn’t take the report the way you characterized it. 

I do recognize that the GAO gave one or two recommendations. 

One, that we should have used their six characteristics of an effective national strategy in our report of our strategy. And so, they 

compared our strategy—which answered the mandate of the legislation that you put forward—versus their six criteria that they’ve 

used in many other cases. And then, they broke those six criteria 

into another 27 component elements. And so, I think they were 

comparing apples and oranges. 

We, in our strategy, did what the legislation asked us to do. If 

the legislation had asked us to use the six criteria from the GAO 

Report, then we would have done so. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, do you think the current strategy—if 

we can call it that—is actually working? And why do you think the 

Pentagon believes interagency planning and coordination on Somalia policy is insufficient? 

Dr. FRAZER. I think I outlined in my testimony that in each of 

the four areas of our strategic objectives, we have seen significant 

progress, over the last few years, and more progress than we’ve 

seen over the previous 17 years. 

And so, yes; I do think our strategy is working. I don’t think you 

can fix a country that’s been broken for at least 17 years—and 

much longer, in fact, because it was under an authoritarian regime—in just 2 years. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, why do you think the Pentagon thinks 

that interagency planning and coordination in Somalia policy is insufficient? 

Dr. FRAZER. I think the GAO probably interviewed a low-level 

Pentagon official, because Secretary Gates was the principle at the 

Principles Committee who blessed the interagency policy and strategy on Somalia. 

30 

And so, sure, whenever you go around any government, you’re 

going to find some person who’s going to say that they don’t feel 

that it accurately——Senator FEINGOLD. Dr. Frazer, it is my understanding that the Pentagon’s response to the GAO Report was written by Deputy Assistant Secretary Whelan. 

Dr. FRAZER. Well, I know what——Senator FEINGOLD. And we’re 

fortunate to have her with us. I’d like to ask you, Ms. Whelan, to 

explain why you not only accepted and agreed with the GAO’s recommendation for a more detailed U.S. strategy on Somalia, but actually asked that the recommendation be strengthened. 

Ms. WHELAN. Since the strategy came out in—last spring—April, 

almost a year ago, there have been numerous developments in Somalia, to include: A new Prime Minister, Prime Minister Nur Hussein, or otherwise known as Nur Adde; President Yusuf and the 

TFG has confronted some health challenges that have raised questions about his future, at least, it raised questions in some of the 

Somali’s minds; there have been some tensions between the President and the Prime Minister that have been reflected in Somali 

press; Ethiopia’s posture in Somalia has changed considerably over 

the course of the past year; there have been splits noted in the 

Shabaab militia; and we also have seen, unfortunately, only two of 

the nations that had pledged to pull their troops to AMASOM follow through. 

So our contention is simply that the situation has evolved over 

the course of the last year. And in such circumstances, it always 

is healthy to review one strategy to take into account the evolving 

situation. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me go back, Secretary Frazer, and you 

can respond to that, as well. But let me also ask you—I had been 

pleased to see Somalia’s new Prime Minister Nur Hussein calling 

for inclusive negotiations and a renunciation of violence by all 

sides, but I’m not aware of any concrete measures he has taken 

since his appointment last November. 

So let me ask, what is your assessment of his potential and 

progress to date as a unifying and credible leader of the TFG? And 

also, what steps have we taken to ensure that this rhetoric of the 

Prime Minister has tangible outcomes? I’m a little concerned that, 

once again, we based our policy on one man, or one leader, one person, as opposed to seeking opportunities to build and bolster institutions. 

Dr. FRAZER. Thank you Senator. I think we’re trying to do both. 

I think the very, very first test of the Prime Minister was in the 

false start that he had in appointing his first Cabinet, or floating 

names for a Cabinet. 

He quickly reversed himself, and appointed a Cabinet that by all 

accounts is extremely representative, and far more credible than 

the previous Transitional Federal Government. And so, I think 

that’s a very first important step that he put in place—people who 

could be more representative. 

Second, he has certainly reached out to the NGO community. He 

has, in fact, reversed decisions of some of the security officials to 

end the arrest of certain media, certain reporters, as well as humanitarian aid workers. And so, he’s gotten them out of jail. That’s 

an important step. 

31 

Third, he has reached out effectively to the international community particularly in establishing a very strong relationship with the 

U.N. Special Representative to the Secretary General. And so, he 

has credibility internationally. 

It’s going to take a much longer time to build the capacity of his 

ministry. Yes; he has ministers, but to get civil servants and others 

who can really work in these ministries is going to take some more 

time. But I do think that his early steps have been promising. 

Senator FEINGOLD. On another topic, Dr. Frazer, last fall the 

U.N. conducted an assessment mission of the Ogaden and released 

publicly its humanitarian assessment, but did not release its 

human rights assessment. 

Have you seen this report and would you recommend that it be 

released? 

Dr. FRAZER. I haven’t seen the report, but I would imagine that 

our Ambassador in Ethiopia, who is a coordinator of the international community in Addis Abbaba, may have seen the report. 

But I have not personally seen that report. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I would ask your assistance in having 

this reviewed. And if there’s not a reason to release that part of 

it, we would like to see that happen. 

Ms. Almquist, what is the U.S. Government doing to hold the 

TFG and Ethiopians accountable for their promise to facilitate humanitarian access? For example, I’ve heard reports of checkpoints 

run by TFG-appointed officials, and then secured by Ethiopians 

and TFG militia on the road leading from Mogadishu, that are taxing humanitarian aid shipments. What is being done to reduce 

these kinds of activities? 

Ms. ALMQUIST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question. We 

are working closely with the Prime Minister and his Cabinet to 

raise these issues and to seek a humanitarian focal point from him 

and on behalf of the TFG. He has committed to appointing one. 

That has not happened yet, but we understand that it will be 

forthcoming soon, so that we can address each of the blockages and 

the taxation issues, and other hurdles that are coming up from the 

TFG, or those elements that the TFG might influence directly in 

Somalia. 

We also have more engagement now with the Prime Minister. 

He’s met with the donors and the humanitarian community in 

Nairobi several times. He’s seeking to have more interaction in 

Mogadishu itself. It’s complicated for us, since we aren’t present in 

Somalia as American officials, but our partners are there, and the 

United Nations is there, and so we’re actively working on the agenda of this issue. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Also on the issue of accountability, earlier 

this month there were reports of TFG troops looting the country’s 

bustling Bakara Market in broad daylight. The Prime Minister 

apologized for the soldiers’ misconduct and promised to take immediate action against those that had committed these crimes. 

Do you know if any action’s been taken yet? 

Dr. FRAZER. No, Mr. Chairman; I do not have information on 

that. 

Senator FEINGOLD. If you could get back to me on that, and I 

thank my colleagues for their patience. 

32 

[Dr. Frazer’s response to Senator Feingold follows:] 

Dr. FRAZER. Unfortunately, due to the rather loose chain of command in the TFG’s 

security forces, there was no structure within which to investigate, identify, and 

hold accountable the perpetrators of the misconduct in Bakara market. As a result, 

in order to address this problem and prevent future incidents, the TFG leadership 

opted for a systemic remedy. 

Following the incident in Bakara market, TFG Prime Minister Nur ‘‘Adde’’ Hassan Hussein engaged in discussions with the Benaadir Business Council, which includes the key business leaders of Bakara market, with the goal of establishing a 

private security force of 200 persons who would be paid by the traders in Bakara 

market to guarantee security in the area. In exchange, the business leaders agreed 

to deny safe haven for extremist elements within Bakara market. Since the establishment of this private security force, violence in Bakara market has decreased, 

and there have been no further looting incidents. 

To address the broader problem of a lack of an effective chain of command within 

some of its security forces, the TFG is working to create effective security institutions to prevent and address misconduct in the future. The Prime Minister and his 

cabinet, under the leadership of President Yusuf, have launched an overhaul of the 

security forces, removing clan-based militia leaders from positions of power and 

sending troops to participate in training that will integrate them into a broader national force. While this will be part of a longer-term security sector reform process, 

we are hopeful this institutional action will help i prove accountability within the 

TFG security forces and prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I note that Senator Isakson has joined us. I 

understand that you will be the ranking member of the subcommittee? 

Senator ISAKSON. Pending a vote admitting, yes. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I wish you good luck on the vote. And, obviously, I look forward and would be delighted to work with you. 

Of course, Senator Cardin, very active on the subcommittee, as 

well as the whole committee, and I know Senator Nelson of Florida 

has already been here, so this is a long hearing, but we have had 

a fair amount of interest. 

And, with that, I turn to Senator Lugar for his round. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I will 

welcome, along with you, Senator Isakson, as our ranking member, 

pending the election which is to occur about noontime, and which 

appears to, I hope, be a unanimous vote for him. 

Let me just ask you, Secretary Frazer, about the election of 2005 

in Ethiopia. At least, for many of us, it was a setback for democratic efforts, and I think you’ve testified to that effect in previous 

hearings. But the opposition did make some gains in the Parliament. 

Can you trace what that has meant in governance in the country, 

and specifically speculate what the position of the opposition is 

with regard to Ethiopia’s military deployment in Somalia? 

Dr. FRAZER. Thank you, Senator Lugar. The opposition took up 

their seats; they hold now 173 out of 547 seats in Parliament. And 

it’s been important to move toward what Senator Feingold just 

asked for, ‘‘greater institutionalization of good governance.’’ 

The rules and procedures of Parliament have been modified to 

accommodate the opposition to allow opposition members to initiate 

legislation. And so, we think that taking their seats in Parliament 

is key to the continued development and the strengthening of the 

quality of Ethiopia’s democracy. 

And we will continue to work with the opposition members in 

Parliament. We will continue to work with the Government to have 

33 

effective electoral campaign regulations, including for the local elections, which are going to be taking place this year. 

On the issue of what the opposition feels about Ethiopia’s deployment in Somalia, I’ll have to come back to you, Senator, with a specific answer to that. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, I was just hoping for some speculation 

down the trail as to whether there is an active debate going on in 

the country. Can you characterize that? Is this—is Somalia discussed in the Ethiopian Parliament? 

Dr. FRAZER. Somalia is discussed, and certainly it was discussed 

in Parliament. It’s also discussed within the ruling party itself. 

There are definitely differences of views about whether Ethiopia 

should have deployed into Somalia. 

Senator LUGAR. Now, let me ask, what justification does Ethiopia 

have to perceive Eritrea as a threat in the region? You’ve characterized these free border disputes in Eritrea as serious, with regard 

not just to Ethiopia, but certainly to Somalia and Sudan. 

Describe, will you, that relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea? 

Dr. FRAZER. Well, Ethiopia perceives Eritrea as a threat, because 

Eritrea has been funding, and perhaps training and arming insurgents within Ethiopia, including the ONLF, but not restricted to 

the ONLF. 

Eritrea, of course, not only doing this in Ethiopia, but is also 

doing it in Sudan, so it has a long history of doing this. Eritrea also 

continues to essentially almost hold hostage Somalis who were part 

of the Somali Courts, and so that’s part of the concern of Ethiopia. 

Also, Eritrea has moved its forces into the Temporary Security 

Zone, so it’s moved it closer to Ethiopia’s border, leading to some 

speculation about Eritrea’s real intentions in pushing to get the 

UNMEE forces out of that border region. 

So I think that Eritrea, on several fronts, support for 

insurgencies, past support for extremists, as well as the deployment on the border has led the Ethiopians to feel threatened. 

Senator LUGAR. What do we counsel with regard to that? In 

other words, in dialog with leadership of Ethiopia vis-a-vis Eritrea. 

Dr. FRAZER. We’ve been very clear, especially regarding the border, that Ethiopia should do nothing to provoke any type of attack 

by the Eritreans. We, of course, counseled them that they have the 

majority of forces, and that they really should use all restraint necessary. 

We, of course, with their insurgency, continue to push as we do 

around Africa for a political solution for reaching out to these insurgent groups, to the extent that the insurgents will also reach 

out. And we’ve pushed them also with Eritrea to try to normalize 

the relations through allowing the demarcation of the Ethiopia-Eritrea boundary delimitation decision. 

Senator LUGAR. Senator Frazer, we now have an Ambassador to 

the African Union headquartered in Ethiopia. Would you give us 

some further information about what kind of institutional assistance we provide to the African Union, and how that mission is progressing. 

How does that particular Ambassador fit into the scheme of all 

that you have commented on this morning? 

34 

Dr. FRAZER. Well, our Ambassador to the African Union, our mission to the African Union (AU) is extremely important. We are providing assistance to try to strengthen the AU’s institutional capacity, including on the peacekeeping front. We have planners there 

working with the AU planners for the deployment of the AMISOM 

force, as well as for the deployment of the UNAMID force in Sudan. 

We are also working to strengthen a democracy unit, so that they 

can better train observers who can go to, for instance, hopefully to 

Ethiopia, also to Zimbabwe and other countries. The mission has 

grown. It’s growing slowly. We have a——Senator LUGAR. How 

many people do you have there? 

Dr. FRAZER. We have the Ambassador, a DCM, a Public Affairs 

Officer, a Health Attache ́, an Office Management Specialist, and 

three or four locally engaged staff. 

So it’s growing. And we anticipate that it will grow further, but 

certainly we arehelping the African Union to be able to deploy 

these peacekeepers, to plan these peacekeeping operations, as well 

as to support countries in what are the fundamental basis for peace 

and stability, which is democracy. The USAU mission is certainly 

playing a positive role. 

Senator LUGAR. In your judgment, that’s the proper place for 

that Ambassador to be headquartered? In other words, our relationship with Ethiopia is such that working from that point and 

with regard to all these democracy efforts, that that’s the—at least, 

the right spot for the Ambassador? 

Dr. FRAZER. It is. It’s much like the U.N. in New York. It is the 

headquarters of the AU. All of the permanent representatives to 

the AU are based in and out of Addis Ababa, and so it’s the appropriate place for our Ambassador to the AU to be located. 

Senator LUGAR. Now, finally, let me just ask one further question 

of you. The Combined Joint Task Force for the Horn of Africa has 

now been in place since May 2003, with the support of the Maritime Task Force and Special Operations Task Force. 

Now, granted the complexity that you and the other witnesses 

have described today, what sort of added value has this given to 

our diplomatic efforts in the Horn of Africa? 

Dr. FRAZER. The Combined Joint Task Force has been absolutely 

critical. I can say that they have planners who are at our USAU 

headquarters, again assisting the AMISOM deployment. In addition, they have helped me personally with my diplomatic missions, 

providing left and sitting right with me in meetings with heads of 

state, Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers, as we have coordinated this regional approach to the challenges in the Horn of Africa. So they’ve played a fundamental role. 

They’re also working in civil affairs in areas to try to prevent 

these crises. For instance, in Comoros, a place that very few people 

get to—I went myself to Comoros—there are a number of Seabees 

there who are building schools and painting the schools. So they 

have an important presence and, I believe, a stabilizing presence, 

and certainly help our diplomatic efforts. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Senator Lugar. 

Senator Cardin. 

35 

Senator CARDIN. Well, first, Mr. Chairman, let me thank you for 

holding this hearing. The Horn of Africa represents significant 

challenge for the international community and for the United 

States, and I very much appreciate this opportunity of hearing 

from our key people as to the strategy related to the countries of 

the Horn of Africa. And I would ask that my full statement be 

made part of the record. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Cardin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to hear testimony from the administration and expert analysts about the Horn of Africa. 

Without a doubt, the Horn of Africa is the most volatile subregion in all of Africa. 

The potential for the outbreak of war, terrorist activity, and complex humanitarian 

emergencies are all serious threats in this area. 

As we witnessed recently in the aftermath of Kenya’s elections, long-seeded tensions can take a turn for the worst almost overnight because mechanisms for resolving conflict are either inadequate or nonexistent. 

In the Horn of Africa, millions face starvation, displacement, and political marginalization. While the world watches little is, or can be, done from the outside. 

If we take a brief survey of the region, we see that Somalia is still a failed state 

without a central government. Following Ethiopia’s December 2006 invasion and removal of the Islamic Courts, Somalia is even more dangerous than ever. Added to 

that, some 600,000 people had to flee their homes in Mogadishu during fighting in 

2007. 

The small nation of Eritrea continues to act in an obstructionist manner. Relations between the United States and Eritrea are not good. Issues pertaining to religious freedom and Eritrea’s alleged links to funneling weapons into the region is 

worrisome. 

Mr. Chairman, perhaps no other nation in the Horn of Africa is more complex 

than Ethiopia. Ethiopia is an important U.S. ally in our war on terror and peacekeeping operations in the region. 

However, Ethiopia’s recent activities have caused many observers to question 

their commitment to democracy and human rights. The May 2005 elections in Ethiopia and the subsequent crackdown on political opponents was a major cause of 

international concern for a nation which views itself as a regional power. The level 

of secrecy and intimidation worried many friends and analysts of this ancient and 

proud nation. 

As a Senator who is concerned about human rights, I am particularly concerned 

about Ethiopia’s activities in the Ogaden region. It is my understanding that international human rights groups have raised concerns about human rights abuses, perpetrated by the Ethiopian military in the Ogaden. 

These allegations include public executions, disappearances, arbitrary arrests, 

rape, torture and other inhumane treatment. Additionally, there are allegations of 

burning villages and denying food and water to the civilian population. 

For some time the International Committee of the Red Cross was denied access 

to the area. I understand now this situation has been corrected, but I am under the 

opinion that humanitarian corridors must be maintained to assist the most vulnerable populations during humanitarian crises. 

To conclude, I am very interested in learning from the Assistant Secretary of 

State what the U.S. position is regarding Ethiopia’s Ogaden region. Additionally, I 

wish to learn from the USAID what findings the DART (Disaster Assistance Response Team) team concluded from its recent assessment mission to the region. 

In the end, a workable solution to the situation in the Ogaden must be found and 

I believe the United States can help Ethiopia reach a solution that is in the best 

interest of all parties. 

Senator CARDIN. I want to deal with the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, and talk a little bit more about what our strategy is there. 

It seems to me that the communities are at risk. The underlining 

problems do not appear to be addressed. There are fundamental 

36 

issues that need to be dealt with for the safety of the people of that 

region. 

And I would just like to get a better assessment from the panel 

as to what the U.S. policy is in regards to the rights of the people 

in that region, our involvement, how we’re protecting the safety, or 

how we’re participating in protecting the safety of the people of the 

region, and providing the appropriate type of international attention. 

Whomever would like to take that question. I see that 

everybody’s volunteering all at once. 

Ms. ALMQUIST. Senator Cardin, maybe I have in some ways the 

easiest job to answer what we’re doing on the humanitarian assistance side. And from our foreign assistance perspective, we have 

certainly, all of us, in fact—Assistant Secretary Frazer, and other 

senior officials, as well as USAID Administrator Fore, and myself— 

been raising concern over the humanitarian situation in the 

Ogaden, and trying to follow it as closely as possible. Access to the 

area is difficult, and we’ve seen some improvement in that as a result, I think, of our engagement with the Government of Ethiopia 

in terms of the ability to even monitor what’s happening on the 

ground for the condition of the civilian population. 

Additional access is still needed in order for us to truly respond 

to the humanitarian situation. There are nearly 1 million people in 

the Ogaden that are in need of food assistance, and 1.5 million people in the Ogaden region are in need of some sort of humanitarian 

assistance, including the food assistance, and more broadly in the 

Somalia region, 4.5 million people are—the region as a whole is 4.5 

million people. 

So this is a significant proportion of the population that we 

would like to be able to address more directly. 

We have seen some increase in the delivery of foods to the region; 12,000 metric tons out of about 36,000 metric tons that have 

been allocated by WFP for the Ogaden have been distributed. 

There are 186 distribution points. Unfortunately, the World Food 

Program cannot reach all of those distribution points to monitor delivery of food assistance, and this is something that we would still, 

and are selectively, pursuing with the Government of Ethiopia so 

that we can get monitors out, and ensure that food is reaching the 

intended beneficiaries. 

The Ambassador has been very engaged on behalf of the humanitarian community in Addis Abbaba. And when briefing these issues 

with the Government of Ethiopia, a number of us have visited the 

region ourselves to draw more attention to the situation there and 

try and understand it better. We think that the coming—in fact, 

this month and next month are crucial, because of the projections 

for poor rainfall, which is critical right now given the vulnerability 

of the population in that area. And we hope that increased access 

will enable us to provide a better immediate response to the situation. 

In the longer term, we look very much forward to working with 

the Government of Ethiopia on a recovery and a development strategy for the Ogaden, and addressing the needs of the pastoralist 

population there. And we have some experience with this already 

in the Somalia and Afar regions in Ethiopia, and we think there 

37 

are a number of interventions that would be very beneficial in recovering the assets of the livelihoods of the population that have 

been affected by conflict and security, as well as the cyclical 

droughts and other conditions aggravating the situation that they 

have right now. 

Senator CARDIN. Is this as a result of findings of the DART assessment? What were the key findings within the DART assessment? 

Ms. ALMQUIST. Yes. We feel that the Humanitarian Assessment 

Team, more or less the same thing as the DART, although we 

chose a different title for bureaucratic reasons. 

Senator CARDIN. We can’t keep up with all your titles. 

Ms. ALMQUIST. I know, I’m sorry. We try and limit the number 

of acronyms these days. 

So far, the Humanitarian Assessment Team did not find famine 

conditions in the region. They were able to visit a number of areas, 

but insecurity and time prevented them from visiting all of the 

areas that we think are affected by this situation. They found that 

there are some improvements in humanitarian and commercial access, but overall, the situation is still quite concerning, in terms of 

the distribution process for humanitarian food assistance. 

They looked at what the Ethiopia Government, DPPA, Disaster 

Prevention and Preparedness Agency, is able to do with WFP. They 

looked at what international NGOs are able to do, in terms of delivery of health services and other nonfood assistance. And they 

tried to assess the level of commercial trade, and the prices of foods 

in the markets, and that sort of thing, and livestock movements, 

in order to understand the livelihoods of the people in the region. 

They came away with an impression that there is a serious humanitarian situation that could deteriorate significantly if there is 

another shock, such as poor rains forthcoming, or even worse, further reduced humanitarian access, so that food aid cannot get out. 

There are a number of things that could be done to improve that, 

in terms of movement of humanitarian organizations, working to 

increase the capacity of the local government agency responsible for 

working with World Food Program on distribution of aid, as well 

as trying to ease the restrictions on commercial trade. And those 

would all benefit the people of the region. 

Senator CARDIN. I take it when you mean access to humanitarian 

assistance that you’re talking about the safety of operating within 

that area, and the operations of either government officials or those 

that are for independence in that region. Is that right? 

Ms. ALMQUIST. Right now, the humanitarian organizations, to 

operate in the region, they must be registered with the government, and then they have to have essentially travel clearances 

from the government to move about the area. The Somali regional 

government, as well as the military, given its operations, are relevant actors in that regard. 

And so, there are efforts to coordinate movements of humanitarian aid with both of those parties. Now, obviously, if there’s an 

ongoing military or security situation, it’s not appropriate or it’s 

much more difficult for humanitarian actors who are unarmed to 

move freely in those areas. Now, we would encourage in our working with the United Nations to see if, through their Department of 

38 

Security, they can put more staff on the ground in the Ogaden to 

work with the Ethiopian authorities in assessing the security conditions, so that in the maximum number of cases we can get out 

and deliver humanitarian aid. 

Now, that’s the stuff that is under discussion right now, both 

with the United Nations and with the Government of Ethiopia, and 

we only hope very much that we can move forward. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, let me just turn to the political situation 

and the future of that region, as far as stability and respect for the 

communities. Is there a game plan? Is there an end game here that 

appears to be moving forward? 

Dr. FRAZER. Senator, in terms of the Somali region, it is very difficult. What we’ve been pushing for, of course, is on the humanitarian side, primarily. But in addition to the humanitarian side, 

we’ve sent signals to the ONLF to renounce violence, and we’ve 

also pushed the Government of Ethiopia to positively respond to 

the ONLF should the ONLF actually renounce violence. So that’s 

on the internal dynamics. 

We’ve also pushed for the Government of Ethiopia to treat the 

Ogaden in a more integrated fashion. As all of us have said, it’s 

important to win over the civilian population. And so, the only way 

to do that is to bring development to that region. And so, there 

needs to be a real focused effort, and an increased effort on the 

part of the Government of Ethiopia. 

Senator CARDIN. Do you see that happening? 

Dr. FRAZER. We’re pushing for it. I think that the focus is on 

counterinsurgency, and also to allow for more humanitarian aid to 

come in. But we need more development, as well. 

And then, the third part of that strategy is, of course, one that 

is far more difficult, which is that you have to get the normalization between Ethiopia and Eritrea, because Eritrea is continuing to 

arm and finance and train the insurgents. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Senator Cardin. 

Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I 

look forward to working with you on the subcommittee, and I appreciate the opportunity to be here. And I apologize to our panelists 

for having missed your testimony. This is an unusually bad day for 

me with commitments. I’m overcommitted and underprepared. But 

I’m glad to be here. And I want to make a couple of comments, if 

I can. 

First of all, to Dr. Frazer, I just returned from Djibouti. I was 

there visiting Ambassador Symington, and the military installation 

that we have there, and the deployments that we have there assisting people in Africa. And I would like to note that last month when 

the President made his trip to Africa, there were a couple of African leaders that made outspoken statements not wishing any 

American military personnel in their country. 

But the people of Djibouti, and the Governor of Djibouti, seemed 

not only to be very hospitable, but very welcoming to our investment there. Was I correct in that judgment? 

Dr. FRAZER. Yes, sir. Without a doubt. 

39 

Senator ISAKSON. The folks I talked to, the ones who were going 

out and drilling wells and providing infrastructure assistance, said 

they were being received very well in the outlands of the countries 

they were going visiting. Is that correct? 

Dr. FRAZER. That’s correct. And I think it’s true of our military 

forces throughout Africa, where they’re doing civil affairs projects, 

bringing assistance and development to many regions that are typically not reached. So, yes; that is correct. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, the reason I raised the point with you is 

I read Ms. Whelan’s testimony, ‘‘We believe that a coordinated U.S. 

foreign and national security policy in the Horn of Africa is of critical importance to the United States’ both strategically and regarding our security interests.’’ 

Having now been there and seeing firsthand, I wholeheartedly 

echo that statement. And I think what’s going on in Djibouti is a 

perfect combination of both the national security aspect, as well as 

America helping those people to have a better life. And it was very 

impressive. 

Ms. Almquist, I also had the privilege to spend a week in Ethiopia a few years ago with the Basic Education Coalition, Save the 

Children, and CARE, organizations all of which I know USAID 

works with. 

I was impressed with the progress that was being made in educational assistance in Ethiopia. That was 2002, so that’s been— 

well, 51⁄2 years ago now. Is that still progressing through USAID? 

Ms. ALMQUIST. Yes, sir. We still have a Basic Education Program 

there. And, in fact, Ethiopia is part of the President’s most recently 

announced International Education Initiative, which he announced 

last year. And so, we’ll be further adding to our basic education 

funding for Ethiopia in support of that initiative. 

[Additional information submitted by Ms. Almquist follows:] 

WHAT KIND OF BASIC EDUCATION PROGRAMS IS USAID SUPPORTING IN ETHIOPIA?

Assistance from the Africa Education Initiative and other USAID support has 

helped to improve the quality and equity of primary education. Programs with the 

Ministry of Education improve the quality of primary and secondary education by 

improving teaching methods and curriculum, strengthening school-community empowerment, and fostering civic education. 

These programs support the training of teachers and administrators; the provision 

of textbooks and other learning materials; strengthening of planning, management, 

monitoring, and evaluation systems; and the fostering of community partnerships 

and improved school governance through capacity-building of parent-teacher associations and management of school grants. USAID is working closely with the Ministry of Education to produce Ethiopia’s first primary grade English as a Second language textbook with integrated HIV/AIDS messaging. 

Scholarship support will assist girls and HIV/AIDS orphans to succeed in school 

through integrated coordination and implementation between the USAID basic education program and PEPFAR. There is a special focus on increasing access to education for girls and on schools in Muslim areas. Ethiopia received $7 million for 

basic education in FY 2007; the FY 2009 request level is $18 million. FY 2008 levels 

are not yet final but are expected to be on par with or higher than the FY 2009 

request level. 

Senator ISAKSON. And CDC out of my hometown of Atlanta, GA, 

is operating in Addis Abbaba, and in Africa, on the American AIDS 

Initiative, if I’m not mistaken. 

Ms. ALMQUIST. Yes, sir. The President’s Emergency Plan for 

AIDS Relief, PEPFAR, is also present in Ethiopia. And USAID is 

40 

implementing a substantial portion of that program, as well as the 

President’s Malaria Initiative. 

Senator ISAKSON. Has there been a decline in the AIDS infection 

rate in Ethiopia over the last few years? They were one of the 

worst at one time, I know. 

Ms. ALMQUIST. Yes, sir. I unfortunately don’t have those statistics off the top of my head, but I would be happy to get back to 

you on that. 

[Ms. Almquist’s response to Senator Isakson’s question follows:] 

Ms. ALMQUIST. The most recent HIV prevalence rates for Ethiopia are indeed 

lower than those published in previous years. However, this reflects a change in the 

way that prevalence is being measured rather than a true decrease in HIV infection 

rates. 

The new estimate is a calibration of both antenatal clinic (ANC) sentinel surveillance and the 2005 population-based Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). The 

2005 ANC estimate was about 3.5 percent; the 2005 DHS prevalence was 1.4 percent (with an urban prevalence of 5.5 percent and a rural prevalence of 0.7 percent). 

The Government of Ethiopia conducted a data synthesis exercise in conjunction with 

the World Bank in 2006, and the official prevalence rate of the Government of Ethiopia was derived from that exercise. The Government of Ethiopia states that the 

national prevalence is 2.1 percent. The range published by UNAIDS, which shows 

the range of 0.9–2.5 percent, rather than a single number, is a ‘‘confidence interval’’ 

that reflects the statistical precision of the estimate. 

Through linkages with the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 

(PEPFAR), Ethiopia will receive significant support to scale up integrated prevention, care and treatment programs throughout the country and support orphans and 

vulnerable children. These programs leverage and complement resources of other 

international partners, Ethiopia’s public and private sectors, and the Global Fund 

to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. 

USAID PEPFAR programs support HIV/AIDS prevention, care and support, and 

treatment at primary care facilities and include prevention of mother to child transmission of HIV, activities that strengthen the health system and develop its human 

resources, HIV education activities, community care for people living with HIV and 

AIDS, and provision of food, safe water, education, protection, and health care services for orphans and vulnerable children. PEPFAR provided close to $230.2 million 

for Ethiopia in FY 2007; the FY 2009 request is $337 million. FY 2008 levels are 

not yet final but are expected to approximate the FY 2009 level. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I 

look forward to serving with you. Thank you. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I share that, Senator. Thank you for your 

participation. We do need to get to another panel, so I’ll only use 

a portion of my second round time. 

Ms. Whelan, I noted in your testimony that you referred to alShabaab as al-Qaeda-affiliated. What are the implications of this 

designation, in terms of DOD’s activities? 

And then, I’d like Dr. Frazer to indicate if she agrees with this 

assessment. And what are the implications of such a designation 

on U.S. counterterrorism policy, Ms. Whelan? 

Ms. WHELAN. Thank you, Senator. The al-Shabaab, we believe, 

is affiliated with al-Qaeda in that certain elements of the alShabaab militia have sought to gain financial support from the alQaeda organization. 

In the context of our counterterrorism policy, we continue to see 

our counterterrorism approach in the Horn, and particularly in Somalia, in a holistic fashion, in that we need to work with our partners in the Horn to develop their capacities to deal with the terrorist issues inside their borders, particularly with the Kenyans, 

and we have had great success there. 

41 

We also need to work directly where we can to go after al-Qaeda 

terrorists, particularly those who were engaged in the bombings in 

Mombasa, and the bombings in Nairobi, and Dar-us-Salam. So the 

fact that al-Shabaab is courting—or at least elements of alShabaab are courting al-Qaeda for greater support, somewhat 

along the lines of the al-Qaeda in the lands of Islamic Maghreb in 

Northern Africa, that relationship, this to us is a very disturbing 

development. 

And it could lead to further entrenchment, potentially, of alQaeda elements in the Horn. So we are continuing to monitor this, 

and we will continue to work with our partners in the region to attempt to address it, if it develops along those lines. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Dr. Frazer, your comments on this? 

Dr. FRAZER. Yes. The al-Shabaab is very much linked to alQaeda. Leaders, like Aden Hashi Ayro, trained with al-Qaeda in 

Afghanistan prior to 2001. He’s issued statements praising alQaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, and inviting foreign fighters to 

come to Somalia to participate in holy war against Ethiopians and 

Ugandan forces. 

He’s also responsible for the assassination of Somali peace activists in July 2005, and multiple targeted assassinations, and harassment of civil society figures, government officials, and journalists. 

He is also implicated in the murder of an Italian nun in Mogadishu 

in September 2006. 

Mukhtar Robow is another senior military commander, a spokesman of al-Shabaab who has provided logistical support for al-Qaeda 

operatives inside Somalia. And I can go on with others who were 

in the leadership of al-Shabaab, with ties and membership in alQaeda. 

I believe that their role in attacking civilians and their connections with al-Qaeda terrorists will further isolate them from the Somali people, who are very pragmatic and who are not linked and 

tied to terrorists and to extremists. And so, I think that clearly 

going after al-Shabaab and designating them is an important part 

of our strategy to isolate them further, and to be able to take direct 

action against them. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. Back to Ms. Whelan. Are we at 

war in Somalia? And, if so, who is the enemy? 

Ms. WHELAN. The United States is not at war in Somalia. And 

I think that our enemy in that region, Senator, are the al-Qaeda 

operatives who are utilizing that region to plan and execute terrorist operations that kill civilians, innocent civilians. 

Also, any individuals associated with those al-Qaeda operatives, 

who facilitate their operations, are those that we have an argument 

with, but we are not at war in the region. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, the Department acknowledged a strike 

last week against a terrorist target in Somalia. And I appreciate, 

of course, that there are some very bad actors in the region, whom 

we should be pursuing, and I support those efforts. 

But from the point of view of military strategy, are our operations in Somalia simply part of a global manhunt, or do we have 

broader goals? 

Ms. WHELAN. I think we have broader goals, but there are elements—there are individual elements and objectives that try to 

42 

achieve our broader goals. Our operations in Somalia have been 

quite limited in the scheme of things. In the last year, 5—about 

half of our top 10 individuals have been either captured or are 

dead. 

Most of that has been through the support of our partners in the 

region. And so, our efforts in the region are really not necessarily 

focused on U.S. military action, per se, although there are some 

very limited circumstances in which we have found it necessary to 

take action ourselves. 

But, for the most part, our efforts in the region have been coordinated with and supported by and, in some cases, the 

counterterrorism campaign has been directly executed by our partners in the region who share our goals to eliminate global extremism. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Ms. Whelan, only about one dozen sub-Saharan African countries receive foreign military financing. And the 

total amount requested for bilateral military assistance to these 

countries has fallen significantly in recent years. 

However, the administration’s fiscal year 2009 request includes 

the seven-fold increase in EMF money for Ethiopia. Why are you 

asking for such a large increase? I am very concerned by the fact 

that we’ve received reports from a range of sources citing serious 

human rights abuses committed by Ethiopian security forces, particularly in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, even though the Ethiopian Government certainly has legitimate security concerns in that 

part of the country. 

What steps has the administration taken to investigate these reports, and convey to the Ethiopian military and political leadership 

that such misconduct is not acceptable? And what steps have the 

Ethiopians themselves taken to investigate these reports? 

Ms. WHELAN. Thank you, Senator. With regard to overall FMF 

numbers for Africa, certainly we hope that in the future that FMF 

numbers will increase, in that FMF is critical to capacity-building, 

long-term capacity-building. It is through such long-term capacitybuilding that we see positive change in not only the capability of 

African militaries, but also their professionalism and their behavior 

in difficult and challenging combat situations. 

We have seen, for example, our capacity-building training with 

Nigeria, some years ago, in preparation for their deployment to Sierra Leone to support the U.N. And Sierra Leone resulted in the 

Nigerian battalions that deployed to Sierra Leone performing in a 

much better way than previously untrained battalions. So capacity 

building is critical to ensuring professional militaries on the continent. 

With regard to the Ethiopian request, the Ethiopian Government 

has been a strong supporter of the United States. We have strong 

military relations with the United States. And, as I mentioned in 

my statement, the Ethiopian military is a 200,000-man military. It 

is a military that the intention of the Ethiopians has been to transform that military into a much more professional force. 

This is the force that Ethiopia’s inherited, essentially, from its 

years of conflict against the Dergue. And, subsequent to that, instead of having the opportunity to restructure and reform the military, the Ethiopians found themselves in a border conflict with EriVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:15 Dec 11, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\45700.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
43 

trea. And, since then, of course, there have been numerous other 

issues in the Horn. 

So the Ethiopians have not necessarily had the time to focus on 

the reforming and professionalization. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, what are we doing to investigate these 

reports of human rights abuses by the Ethiopian forces? 

Ms. WHELAN. I have met with both Human Rights Watch and 

Amnesty International, and we have encouraged them to provide 

us in the Defense Department with as much specificity as possible 

with regard to allegations of Ethiopian forces committing human 

rights violations in their operations in the Ogaden. 

I think—and we are waiting for both of those organizations to get 

back to us with that specificity. General accusations are not helpful. Specific accusations can be helpful. We believe that the Ethiopian military understands just as much as we do that a successful 

counterinsurgency campaign requires taking into account the local 

populous, and not turning the local populous into your enemy. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I would urge you, and the Department, 

and the administration, and Ethiopia, with all respect, to make 

this a high priority. It’s very important on the merits, and also for 

credibility. 

Well, this has been a very long panel, and I appreciate your patience. Thanks so much. I’d ask the next panel to come forward. 

All right, we will begin the second panel. Ms. Fredriksson, please 

proceed with your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF LYNN FREDRIKSSON, ADVOCACY DIRECTOR 

FOR AFRICA, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, WASHINGTON, 

DC 

Ms. FREDRIKSSON. I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and 

distinguished members of the committee, for this important opportunity for Amnesty International to share our concerns about violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, and the need for a consistent recentering of human rights in U.S. foreign policy on the Horn of Africa. 

Amnesty International is deeply concerned by widespread egregious human rights violations being perpetrated against civilians 

throughout the Horn. Ending current violations and preventing future violations in these three countries is perhaps one of the greatest challenges of our time, requiring immediate action and longterm planning, attention to domestic conditions within the context 

of a regional perspective. 

Each set of country concerns must be considered independently, 

as with Ethiopian Government repression of its domestic opposition, journalists and human rights defenders, and the humanitarian crisis in the Somali region. 

In Eritrea, an authoritarian government maintains a stranglehold on freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and press freedom, while detaining thousands of dissidents, many in the harshest 

conditions. 

In Somalia, a transitional government without popular mandate 

has not only failed to protect over 1 million displaced civilians, but 

has failed to hold its own troops accountable for violations against 

them. Compounding these challenges is the intervention of EthioVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:15 Dec 11, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\45700.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
44 

pian forces in Somalia, and recent threats of renewed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea along their disputed border. Further 

compounding these challenges is what I consider a flawed—what 

Amnesty considers a flawed U.S. foreign policy, which has placed 

counterterror concerns at the forefront of U.S. involvement in the 

region, often at the expense of human rights and humanitarian 

concerns. 

In large part, because of the capable and resilient civil society 

throughout the region, despite these conditions, the situation is far 

from hopeless. But the United States, the International Contact 

Group, regional donors, and the U.N. Security Council, and the 

U.N. Human Rights Council, as well as other international organizations cannot simply maintain their current priorities and refuse 

to shift course. 

Crucial to this course shift is a recentering of humanitarian and 

human rights in U.S. foreign policy. On Ethiopia, that means more 

consistent and more public denunciations of ongoing restrictions on 

civil society and the private media, demands for the release of remaining prisoners of conscience, and the requirement of a demonstrated opening of commercial and humanitarian access to the 

Somali region. 

Eritrea represents a different type of situation. The U.S. administration should seriously reconsider any plans it might have to add 

Eritrean opposition groups to the United States list of foreign terrorist organizations, or to add an already isolated regime to the 

United States list of state sponsors of terrorism, but should consider opportunities to provide essential humanitarian assistance. 

The international community must also decide where it stands 

on the Border Commission ruling, thereby denying Ethiopia the 

ability to continue to flout its findings, and Eritrea the excuse to 

interfere with UNMEE. On Somalia, if the United States intends 

to alleviate, not worsen, the anti-American sentiment on the Horn, 

it must first and foremost cease all land and air assaults intended 

to ‘‘take out’’ presumed al-Qaeda or other terrorist operatives. 

Since early 2007, four such assaults have been launched in Somalia, leading to civilian casualties, destruction of civilian property 

and livelihood, and the widespread belief that the United States 

protects the TFG and backs the Ethiopian forces, without genuine 

concern for civilians. 

In addition, the United States Government must exert significantly more pressure on the governments of Ethiopia and Somalia 

to prevent human rights abuses and ensure accountability for the 

conduct of their armed forces. 

Additional specific recommendations from Amnesty are included 

in an extensive written testimony, which I ask to be included in the 

record. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Without objection. 

Ms. FREDRIKSSON. I will use my remaining time to just briefly 

outline a few of the most disturbing aspects——Senator FEINGOLD. 

I would ask you to conclude within a minute or two. 

Ms. FREDRIKSSON. OK, I will do that. I want to mention simply 

a few of the most egregious violations in Somalia, Eritrea, and 

Ethiopia. 

45 

In Somalia, witnesses describe disproportionate military responses by Ethiopian forces after opposition groups launch attacks 

against them, most often using small improvised explosive devices. 

These forms of human rights abuses include rape and unlawful 

killing referred to by Somalis locally as ‘‘slaughtering like goats.’’ 

And we have collected scores of testimonies regarding men whose 

throats were slit and left in the street. Displaced civilians are also 

facing abuses on the road, and they are facing abuses within the 

IDP settlements and camps. 

I just also want to mention that the contrast between 

Somaliland, Hargeisa, and Mogadishu is striking. I don’t want to 

admit that from the testimony, but the longer testimony includes 

further information. 

On Ethiopia, I want to skip from our concerns regarding ongoing 

incarceration of prisoners of conscience to the Ogaden region, 

where the Government of Ethiopia, initially in response to attacks 

by the ONLF, has maintained a blockade of commercial aid and 

trade, and that has had a devastating impact on conflict-affected 

areas in the region. And, in addition to that, we have not seen the 

type of human rights access that is necessary to actually understand whether or not progress has been made, as the first panel 

indicated it might have been. 

In terms of Eritrea, the situation is simply that one would be 

hard-pressed to find a country in sub-Saharan Africa in which 

United States foreign policy has had less impact. The government 

maintains a stranglehold on basic human rights and perceived protection against threats to the President’s rule. Eritrea’s human 

rights record remains abysmal, including persecution for religious 

beliefs, arbitrary detention, and cruel and unusual punishment. 

I’d like to just conclude by saying that the dearth of consideration of serious human rights and humanitarian concerns throughout the Horn of Africa by United States policymakers has dire consequences. As described, these violations in all three countries are 

not improving, as indicated by some on the first panel. It is time 

for a shift in policy that puts civilians, and particularly vulnerable 

civilians, at the center of our foreign policy. 

We have welcomed the opportunity to present longer recommendations in our written testimony. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Fredriksson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LYNN FREDRIKSSON, ADVOCACY DIRECTOR FOR AFRICA, 

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, WASHINGTON, DC 

I would like to thank Chairman Feingold and distinguished members of the subcommittee for this important opportunity for Amnesty International to share our 

concerns about violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in 

Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, and the need for a consistent recentering of human 

rights in U.S. foreign policy on the Horn of Africa. 

INTRODUCTION

Amnesty International is deeply concerned by widespread egregious human rights 

violations being perpetrated against civilians throughout the Horn of Africa. Ending 

current violations and preventing future violations in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea 

is perhaps one of the greatest challenges of our time, requiring immediate action 

and long-term planning, attention to domestic conditions within the context of a regional perspective. Each set of country concerns must be considered independently— 

as with Ethiopian Government repression of its domestic opposition, journalists and 

46 

human rights defenders, and the humanitarian crisis in the Somali region (known 

as the Ogaden). In Eritrea an authoritarian government maintains a stranglehold 

on freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and press freedom, while detaining 

thousands of dissidents, many in the harshest conditions. In Somalia a transitional 

government without popular mandate has not only failed to protect over 1 million 

displaced civilians, but has failed to hold its own troops accountable for violations 

against them. Compounding these challenges is the intervention of Ethiopian forces 

in Somalia, and recent threats of renewed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea 

along their disputed border. Further compounding these challenges is a flawed U.S. 

foreign policy which has placed short-sighted counterterror concerns at the forefront 

of U.S. involvement in the region, while human rights and humanitarian concerns 

are routinely pushed aside. 

In large part because of capable and resilient civil society throughout the region, 

despite these conditions, the situation is far from hopeless. But the United States 

and the International Contact Group, regional donors, and the U.N. Security Council, the U.N. Human Rights Council, and other international organizations cannot 

simply maintain their current priorities and refuse to shift course. Crucial to this 

course shift is the recentering of humanitarian and human rights in U.S. foreign 

policy. On Ethiopia, that means more consistent and more public denunciations of 

ongoing restrictions on civil society and the private media, demands for the release 

of remaining prisoners of conscience, and the requirement of a demonstrated opening of commercial and humanitarian access to the Somali region. Eritrea represents 

a different type of situation which requires a reversal in current policy. The U.S. 

administration should seriously consider any plans it might have to add Eritrean 

opposition groups to the U.S. list of foreign terrorist organizations or to add an already isolated regime to the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, but should consider opportunities to provide essential humanitarian aid. The international community must also decide where it stands on the Boundary Commission Ruling, denying 

Ethiopia the ability to continue to flout its findings, and Eritrea an excuse to interfere with UNMEE. On Somalia, if the United States intends to alleviate, not 

worsen, anti-American sentiment on the Horn, it must first and foremost cease all 

land and air assaults intended to ‘‘take out’’ presumed al-Qaeda or other terrorist 

operatives. Since early 2007 four such assaults have been launched in Somalia, leading to civilian casualties, destruction of civilian property and livelihood, and the 

widespread belief that the U.S. protects the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and backs up Ethiopian forces, without genuine concern for civilians. 

In addition, the U.S. Government must exert significantly more pressure on the governments of Ethiopia and Somalia to prevent human rights abuses and ensure accountability for the conduct of their armed forces. 

I will note additional specific recommendations from Amnesty International after 

outlining a few of the most disturbing aspects of recent findings. This information 

was obtained on a November/December 2007 mission to Nairobi, Kenya, and 

Hargeisa, Somaliland to meet with international actors and interview refugees from 

southern and central Somalia, as well as recent reporting on the state of human 

rights in Ethiopia and Eritrea. A short report on the targeting of journalists in Somalia, entitled ‘‘Journalists under Attack,’’ is already available, and a full report on 

our findings on Somalia, entitled ‘‘Who Will Protect Human Rights in Somalia,’’ will 

be made available in the coming weeks. 

RECENT FINDINGS ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN SOMALIA: 

ABUSES BY ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT

Amnesty International has documented ongoing human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law by all parties to the conflict in Somalia, including unlawful killings, rape, arbitrary detention, and attacks on civilians and civilian property. Some 6,000 civilians are estimated to have been killed in Mogadishu 

and across southern and central Somalia in 2007. Over 600,000 are reported to have 

been displaced in 2007, and a further 50,000 so far this year, joining some 400,000 

already displaced from previous periods, for a total of over 1 million internally displaced persons in southern and central Somalia today. In addition, an estimated 

335,000 refugees fled Somalia in 2007, seeking safety in other countries. On February 14, 2008, UNICEF announced that some 90,000 children could die in the next 

few months if the international community doesn’t increase funding for nutrition, 

water and sanitation programs in Somalia. 

Our findings from November and December included testimony and other information reporting frequent incidents of rape and pillaging by the TFG, a recent surge 

in violent abuses by Ethiopian Armed Forces in Somalia, and the targeting of Somali journalists and human rights defenders by all parties to the conflict. HouseVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:15 Dec 11, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\45700.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
47 

to-house searches and raids in neighborhoods around Mogadishu were carried out 

by both TFG and Ethiopian forces, as were violent abuses against individuals and 

groups on the streets. 

‘‘Armed groups’’ in Somalia constitute a range of nonstate combatants fighting the 

TFG, including remnants of the Islamic Courts Union, supporters of the Alliance for 

the Re-Liberation of Somalia, and Shabab youth militia. Subclan and other local political leaders have also acted outside of the law, as have bandits and clan militia 

conducting raids, robberies, and violent attacks on civilians. While the command 

structures within these entities are opaque, and nonstate armed groups and criminal elements are more difficult to identify by dress, vehicle, or appearance, some 

leaders have made themselves known and should be held responsible for the conduct 

of their forces. 

Those fleeing armed violence in Mogadishu have faced violence on the roads north 

toward Puntland and west toward Afgooye and Baidoa, including theft, rape, and 

shootings. Once they arrive at displacement settlements and camps, IDPs and refugees have faced further violence, and a lack of access to essential services, including 

clean water, medical care, and adequate food supplies. Humanitarian operations attempting to deliver these services have frequently been impeded by the TFG and 

other parties to the conflict and armed criminal groups, as well as overall high levels of insecurity throughout Somalia. 

Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law by TFG and Ethiopian Forces 

From testimonies we have collected, Amnesty International has concluded that 

until mid to late 2007 TFG forces are believed to be responsible for the majority 

of incidents of theft, looting, beatings and rape in and around Mogadishu. For example, one eyewitness reported seeing TFG soldiers seizing mobile phones from Somalis outside of a mosque as men were leaving Friday prayers. Somali civilians reported that they were more afraid of TFG forces than Ethiopians. This situation 

shifted in late 2007 with growing reports of increased incidents of theft, looting, 

beatings and rape, as well as unlawful killings, by Ethiopian forces. 

This shift followed fighting in early November 2007 when several Ethiopian soldiers’ bodies were dragged through the streets, recalling images of Somali gunmen 

dragging the bodies of American marines through the streets of Mogadishu after 

clan militia downed two Black Hawk helicopters in 1993. The shift also followed reported deployments of new Ethiopian troops to Somalia as more seasoned veterans 

were reported to have been transferred to Ethiopia’s border with Eritrea when 

threats of renewed conflict along the border intensified in November. 

In some instances involving rape and killing, the Somali Government and Ethiopian forces have targeted individuals and small groups of civilians. In other cases 

they have targeted entire neighborhoods in disproportionate response to smaller 

scale attacks by armed opponents, sometimes decimating or emptying entire areas, 

and often resulting in injuries and unlawful killings of civilians. 

Somali refugees in Nairobi and Hargeisa described incidents of attacks on their 

homes and in the streets. In some cases TFG and Ethiopians forces were searching 

for named individuals believed to have collaborated with armed groups, and in several such cases, they beat, arrested, or killed someone other than the person they 

were looking for. TFG and Ethiopian forces would also ‘‘sweep’’ entire streets, moving door to door in areas believed to be insurgent strongholds. 

Witnesses described military responses by Ethiopian forces after opposition armed 

groups launched attacks against them, most often using small improvised explosive 

devices. Among the most commonly reported abuses were gang rape, mass rape, and 

a form of unlawful killing referred to by Somalis we interviewed as ‘‘slaughtering 

like goats,’’ which refers to the slitting of throats. AI collected scores of testimonies 

regarding incidents where bodies of men whose throats had been slit were left lying 

in pools of blood on the street until combatants, including snipers, had cleared the 

area. 

Somali refugees noted specific characteristics, including uniforms, by which they 

identified their attackers as Ethiopian. They often referred to Ethiopian soldiers by 

language as ‘‘Amharic,’’ describing situations in which they said they pleaded for 

their families and their own lives but could not make themselves understood. 

Violations by Antigovernment Armed Groups 

Many survivors of violence in Mogadishu reported that ‘‘militias’’ are not visible, 

but known to launch small scale attacks to which the TFG and Ethiopian military 

respond with heavy artillery fire. There was a clear reluctance among many displaced Somalis to provide information about abuses by armed groups, presumably 

out of fear of retribution. Many were aware of rocket fire, shelling, or gunfire they 

48 

assumed came from armed groups, but said they never saw the attackers. Others 

received threats from armed groups by telephone, text message, or letter delivered 

by a third party. 

Targeting Journalists and Human Rights Defenders 

Journalists and human rights defenders have been specifically targeted for their 

professional activities in exposing human rights violations by multiple parties to the 

conflict. Amnesty International spoke with scores of journalists among many who 

fled Somalia in the last few months of 2007 when attacks against them increased. 

While international journalists and human rights organizations have been able to 

document some violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, we 

can assume that the majority of violations are not being documented, given restrictions on, and closures of, independent media by the TFG, and the general silencing 

of journalists and human rights defenders reporting on military operations by TFG 

and Ethiopian forces and antigovernment armed groups. 

Some reporters and other media workers reported staying for days, sometimes 

weeks, in their offices because of general insecurity, specific threats, and fear of 

TFG forces. At other times they were unable to reach their offices for fear of violence by all parties to the conflict. Journalists reported arbitrary detentions by TFG 

and Ethiopian forces, lasting from a couple of hours to 11 days. 

Since the intensive fighting in March–April 2007, local human rights organizations active in Mogadishu have also been largely silenced. One local women’s organization was raided by TFG soldiers who asked, ‘‘Are you the ones giving us a bad 

name?’’ 

Attacks on Civilian-Populated Neighborhoods 

Shelling and mortar fire have destroyed buildings and other civilian infrastructure, resulted in deaths and injuries of civilians, and often emptied entire neighborhoods, as residents fled for safety. In early December 2007, five Mogadishu districts 

were reported ‘‘completely empty’’ by humanitarian organizations providing emergency assistance in IDP settlements in Somalia. 

All parties to the conflict are reported to have carried out attacks on civilian-populated areas, but TFG and Ethiopian artillery is generally capable of causing much 

heavier damage, while armed groups with less military support resort to small mortar fire and improvised explosive devises. At times TFG and Ethiopian strikes were 

reported to have targeted civilian-populated areas after armed group attacks had 

been launched from specific locations within those areas. A number of refugees told 

Amnesty International that they had left their homes (to collect water, food, or other 

necessities) and when they returned their houses were simply gone, destroyed by 

rocket-propelled grenades or mortar fire. 

Under international humanitarian law, civilians are unlawful targets for attack, 

unless they take a direct part in the hostilities. Amnesty International is not in a 

position to determine whether each of the intended targets in the incidents reported 

meet these criteria, but care was clearly not taken to avoid civilian casualties in 

most if not all of these cases. 

Attacks on Civilians on the Road 

Displaced civilians from southern and central Somalia frequently reported being 

attacked on the road from Mogadishu to several destinations to the north and the 

southwest as they sought safety. Unidentified robbers stole money, food, and other 

possessions. IDPs were attacked or forced to pay fees at multiple check points and 

road blocks. One of the most dangerous areas reported was between Jowhar and 

Beletweyne on the route to Somaliland. 

The number of reported attacks on displaced Somalis on the road fleeing 

Mogadishu rose in late 2007, as did the level of brutality exhibited by perpetrators, 

most notably in cases of rape and other forms of sexual violence, as well as shootings, beatings, and ‘‘disappearance.’’ AL received reports of violations against IDPs 

on the road in Somalia committed by Ethiopian and TFG troops, antigovernment 

armed groups, clan gangs, and common bandits. At times perpetrators would cover 

their faces to mask their identity, but often survivors believed they could still identify them by language or appearance. While in September 2007, some drivers were 

able to travel though certain areas by virtue of their clan affiliation, this changed 

in late 2007 when clan affiliation no longer offered any assurance of favoritism in 

an attack. IDPs were increasingly targeted even in cases where they shared clan 

affiliations with their attackers. 

Conditions for Somali Refugees 

Despite the Government of Kenya’s closure of its border with Somalia since January 2007, a significant number of Somali refugees have managed to find refuge in 

49 

Kenya. Kenya’s border closure has served particularly to keep the most vulnerable 

from reaching safety. Individual Somali men can now reach Kenya much more easily than women and children, so families are being separated, with women and children stranded in overcrowded IDP settlements in southern and central Somalia. 

While some Somali refugees in Nairobi have been receiving basic assistance from 

local NGOs, others are completely dependent on the good will of clans and neighbors 

for food and shelter. 

In Hargeisa, there are approximately six major displacement settlements. While 

the Government of Somaliland does not officially accept displaced persons from 

southern Somalia, it has allowed thousands or more to find refuge on its territory, 

particularly in Hargeisa. 

The U.N. reports there are now over 1 million IDPs in southern and central 

Somalia. Yet, as one source told us, ‘‘Everyone is in denial—denial of the scope of 

the problem. We say there are 600,000 newly displaced from Mogadishu and we’re 

accused of distorting reality. The mention of [numbers] starts everyone shouting.’’ 

Risks were grave for humanitarian organizations in Somalia in 2007. Every day 

humanitarian workers face checkpoints, extortion, car jacking, a lack of acceptance 

of the impartial nature of assistance, and lack of authority and command structure 

among local security officials. The provision of humanitarian assistance is made difficult by unacceptable bureaucratic impediments, restricted access, restricted movement and overall insecurity, but also by the contempt for humanitarian operations 

indicated in recent speeches by TFG authorities. In October TFG security arbitrarily 

detained the director of the World Food Program for nearly a week. Staff from 

CARE (in May), Medecins Sans Frontieres (in December) and a French reporter (in 

December) were abducted, and later released, in Puntland. MSF staff were also abducted in Puntland, and several were killed in Kismayo early this year. 

The situation has been so dire that humanitarian organizations made a rare public statement in October 2007, calling for urgent support for increased humanitarian 

space. Forty international aid organizations wrote: ‘‘There is an unfolding humanitarian catastrophe in South Central Somalia . . . International and national NGOs 

cannot respond effectively to the crisis because access and security are deteriorating 

dramatically at a time when needs are increasing. The international community and 

all parties to the present conflict have a responsibility to protect civilians, to allow 

the delivery of aid and to respect humanitarian space and the safety of humanitarian workers.’’ 

SOMALILAND: A STRIKING CONTRAST WITH THE SOUTH

It’s important not to omit formal mention of self-declared independent Somaliland. 

While overall human rights and humanitarian conditions continue to worsen in 

southern and central Somalia, and more recently Puntland, a stable Somaliland has 

devoted attention to democratization, institutional capacity and development in its 

decade and a half long pursuit of international recognition for independence. The 

contrast between Hargeisa and Mogadishu is striking, and the international community should consider what the Government of Somaliland needs to maintain peace 

and stability, including bilateral assistance to ensure it has the capacity to institutionalize human rights protections. Somaliland is not without its own set of human 

rights concerns. Its border with Puntland is contested, with unfortunate outbreaks 

of fighting in late 2007, and it has not established a monopoly on power in its 

boundary regions of Sool and Sanaag. In 2007 it held a journalist and unrecognized 

fourth party opposition leaders in prison for several months after unfair trials. And 

the Government of Somaliland issued an expulsion order for 24 young southern 

Somali journalists seeking refuge in Hargeisa in late 2007. To its credit that order 

was never carried out, and the Government of Somaliland has also allowed itself 

to become the de facto refuge for thousands or more southern Somali displaced persons fleeing armed conflict in Mogadishu, despite a near-total lack of international 

assistance to meet their basic needs. 

HUMAN RIGHTS IN ETHIOPIA: POLITICAL RIGHTS, THE SOMALI REGION, 

AND THE ERITREAN BORDER

In early 2005, leading up to the May 15 elections, Ethiopia appeared to be turning 

a corner with respect to international human rights. The Government of Ethiopia 

was allowing some—albeit limited—international press access and space for political 

opposition rallies in Addis Ababa. Yet since the disputed 2005 elections, plagued by 

accusations of electoral fraud and mass protest demonstrations, political repression 

greatly increased. As reported by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and 

the U.S. Department of State, these violations have included mass arbitrary arrests 

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dation of students and teachers, suppression of press freedom, and the less reported 

practice of targeting peaceful political opposition in the countryside. In several days 

of demonstrations in June and November 2005, government security forces shot and 

killed 187 people and wounded 765, including 99 women and several children. Six 

police officers were also killed in clashes with demonstrators. 

In its most recent Country Report for Ethiopia, the U.S. Department of State’s 

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and labor reported human rights abuses including: Uunlawful killings, and beating, abuse, and mistreatment of detainees and 

opposition supporters by security forces; poor prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and 

detention; restrictions on freedom of the press; restrictions on freedom of assembly 

and association; and discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities. 

Prisoners of Conscience and Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) Trials 

While allowed very limited access to observe the trials in Addis Ababa, Amnesty 

International has nevertheless closely monitored their progress as a means to gauge 

overall human rights conditions for journalists, Coalition for Unity and Democracy 

(CUD) opposition leaders, and human rights defenders in Ethiopia. 

Defendants have been held in different sections of Kaliti prison on the outskirts 

of Addis Ababa. Conditions in the worst sections have been harsh, with severe overcrowding, inadequate sanitation, and poor hygiene. Correspondence has often been 

prohibited, and private consultation with lawyers not allowed. 

Amnesty International has consistently called for the immediate and unconditional release of those defendants whom it classified as prisoners of conscience, because they did not use or advocate violence but were peacefully exercising their 

right to freedom of expression, association and assembly, as guaranteed by the Ethiopian Constitution and international human rights treaties which Ethiopia has ratified. Several trials of CUD leaders, journalists, and human rights defenders began 

in spring 2006, with the prosecution resting its case in April 2007. More than 30 

defendants were acquitted. In June 38 others, including human rights leader Mesfin 

Woldemariam and parliamentarian Kifle Tigneh, were convicted and sentenced to 

life, but they were pardoned and released in July, after a Presidential pardon was 

negotiated by Ethiopian elders and other parties. 

Two civil society activists and human rights lawyers, Daniel Bekele, policy manager of the Ethiopian office of ActionAid, and Netsanet Demissie, founder and director of the Organization for Social Justice, who refused to sign documents requesting 

pardon, were convicted in a trial which failed to meet international standards of justice, and sentenced to 2 years and 8 months. Their convictions were based on evidence that did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that they committed a crime 

under Ethiopian law. While their release, after time served, was expected in early 

January they are still in prison. Yalemzawde Bekele, a human rights lawyer working for the European Commission, was charged in July 2007 with conspiring to commit outrage against the constitution, but granted bail pending trial in late March 

2008. 

Over 17,000 prisoners, mostly convicted criminals, were released in September 

2007, by Presidential amnesty upon the occasion of the Ethiopian millennium new 

year, while hundreds more CUD members detained in 2005 are still being held 

without trial. 

Separate from the CUD trials, a parliamentary inquiry was established in December 2005 to investigate the demonstration killings. This body initially concluded that 

Ethiopian security forces had used excessive force. However, the Chair and other 

members of the inquiry commission were later forced to flee the country, after receiving threats that they must alter their findings. The remaining members of the 

commission subsequently endorsed a report accepted by the Parliament in October 

2006 that the actions of the security forces had been ‘‘legal and necessary.’’ No member of the security forces has since been arrested or charged with any offense in connection with the demonstration violence. 

Ethiopia’s Border Dispute With Eritrea 

Despite the Government of Ethiopia’s stated acceptance, the international boundary commission ruling in 2002, following the 1998–2000 border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, it has resisted the implementation of this ruling and called for 

further negotiations. Not surprising, Eritrea has refused to allow the commission’s 

ruling to be reexamined and demanded international enforcement instead. The ICB 

was dissolved in November without any further progress toward formal demarcation. The potential for mass abuses of human rights and international humanitarian 

law in the event of renewed combat along the border is grave, with new deployments by both sides in late 2007. Instability and threats of violence have already 

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lations. Though the mandate for the U.N. Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea 

(UNMEE) was renewed in December 2007, Eritrea has created such severe obstacles 

to its function that U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon is temporarily disbanding 

UNMEE pending further UNSC consideration. 

Ethiopian Blockade in the Somali Region (the Ogaden) 

The Government of Ethiopia, initially in response to attacks by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) on an oil installation in Obole in April 2007, which 

reportedly killed 65 Ethiopian and six Chinese oil workers, stepped up counterinsurgency operations in the Somali region, including a blockade of aid and commercial trade that has had devastating impact on conflict-affected districts of the region, 

including food shortages. It has also further injured Ethiopia’s overall relationship 

with the people of Somalia. 

Amnesty International has received reports of mass arrests, lengthy detentions 

without trial, beatings, rape and other forms of torture, forcible conscription and 

extrajudicial executions of alleged ONLF supporters by Ethiopian forces. And the 

ONLF has reportedly assassinated some civilian officials. 

A U.N. fact-finding mission in August 2007 reported on the humanitarian crisis, 

but a subsequent mission to assess human rights conditions in the Somali region 

has not yet materialized. In addition, Sultan Fowsi Mohamed Ali, a clan elder and 

mediator, was detained in August, reportedly to prevent him from speaking with 

members of the U.N. fact-finding mission, and he is still being detained without 

trial. Amnesty International considers him to be a prisoner of conscience. 

While some reports indicate a partial lessening of abuses in the region, most particularly a partial lifting of Ethiopia’s blockade, there is no way to assess this information without full access for human rights monitors throughout the Somali region. 

Armed Ethiopian Intervention in Somalia 

Please see related human rights concerns about Ethiopian violations of human 

rights and international humanitarian law addressed under Somalia above. 

Renditions and Forcible Returns 

In January and February 2007 Ethiopian forces in Somalia rendered at least 85 

political prisoners to Ethiopia. Most had been arrested in Kenya when Kenya closed 

its border to people fleeing Somalia. Foreign nationals from some 14 countries were 

released after some months and sent back to their countries of origin. In May the 

Ethiopian authorities acknowledged holding 41 detainees in military custody, but 

authorities have still not released their charges or their whereabouts. These detainees included Somalis who are Kenyan citizens, two conscripted Eritrean journalists, 

and alleged members of armed Ethiopian opposition groups. Detainees from Kenya 

and Somalia were reported to have been tortured or ill-treated in secret military 

places of detention in Addis Ababa. 

Fifteen refugees forcibly returned to Ethiopia by Sudan in August 2007 were detained in Ethiopia, and five people from the Somali region were forcibly returned 

to Ethiopia by Somaliland in October 2007 and their whereabouts are unknown. 

HUMAN RIGHTS IN ERITREA: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, POLITICAL

PRISONERS, AND MILITARY CONSCRIPTION

One would be hard pressed to find a country in sub-Saharan Africa in which U.S. 

foreign policy currently has less impact than Eritrea, where the regime of President 

Issayas Afewerki maintains a stranglehold on basic human rights in perceived protection against multiple threats, domestic and regional, to his rule. International relations for Eritrea have not been improving—from the Government of Eritrea’s conduct toward UNMEE to its support for Ethiopian and Somali opposition groups. And 

its human rights record remains abysmal, including persecution of Eritreans for 

their religious beliefs, arbitrary detention, cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment 

of detainees, and forced conscription. The government, supported by remittances 

from the Eritrean diaspora, maintains its bellicosity on the Horn and its international isolation, with the ready excuse of the unenforced border commission ruling, and in retaliation for years of neglect by an international community biased 

against independence claims. No independent or private news outlets have been 

allowed since 2001, and university education is no longer available in Eritrea. 

Political Prisoners 

There is no tolerance for dissent in Eritrea, evidenced by frequent arrests of suspected government critics, the absence of any authorized forums for assembly and 

association, and government violations of telephone and Internet privacy. Since authorities have taken reprisals against detainees’ families if they made inquiries or 

52 

communicated with international human rights organizations, it is very difficult to 

obtain information on their cases. 

In addition to religious detainees (mostly evangelical Christians), 11 former government ministers, and Eritrean liberation veterans, who called for democratic reform and were charged with treason, remain in secret detention since 2001. They 

have not been seen by their families since their arrest in 2001. Ten journalists, determined to be prisoners of conscience, have been held in incommunicado detention 

since 2001 for supporting the detained government ministers. Journalist and educator Fessahaye ‘‘Joshua’’ Yohannes is reported to have died in detention, as have certain of the former government leaders. Aster Yohannes, arrested in 2003 when she 

returned from the United States to see her children, also remains in incommunicado 

detention, as does her husband, who was detained in 2001. Thousands of other political detainees have been held incommunicado for years. 

Prison conditions are extremely harsh and constitute cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. Many prisoners are held in overcrowded shipping containers, with no 

protection against extremes of heat and cold. Torture by means of painful tying, 

known as ‘‘helicopter,’’ is routinely employed as punishment and a method of interrogation for religious and political prisoners. Evangelicals have been tortured to 

make them abandon their faith. 

Freedom of Religion 

Some 2,000 members of minority religions arrested since their faiths were banned 

in 2002, including women and children, have been held in incommunicado detention 

without charge or trial. Some members of authorized religions (including the Eritrean Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Lutheran Church and 

Islam) were also detained. Government officials closed churches and seized church 

property. In one notable example, Patriarch Antonios, head of the Eritrean Orthodox Church, aged 79 and in poor health due to diabetes, was placed in secret detention and deposed in May 2007 after having been under house arrest since January 

2006, for protesting the detention of three priests and the government’s intervention 

in church affairs. 

Conscription 

National military service has been compulsory for all citizens aged 18–40, with 

women over 27 informally exempted. Relatives of young people who eluded conscription, by hiding in Eritrea or leaving the country, are detained and forced to pay 

heavy fines. They remain in indefinite detention if they can’t pay the fine. Legal 

challenges to this system are not allowed. Thousands of young people facing conscription and conscripts have fled the country seeking asylum. Conscientious objection is not recognized, and three Jehovah’s Witnesses have been detained by the 

military since 1994. 

Forced Returns 

Despite guidelines from the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, 

that rejected Eritrean asylum seekers should not be returned to Eritrea on account 

of its serious human rights situation, several recognized refugees were returned by 

Sudan and detained by Eritrea in late 2007. One asylum seeker from the United 

Kingdom was also forcibly returned and detained. Hundreds of detained Eritrean 

asylum seekers in Libya remain at risk of forced return. Asylum seekers forcibly returned from Malta in 2002 and from Libya in 2003 remain in incommunicado detention. Recent threats to add Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) groups to the U.S. list 

of foreign terrorist organizations will only serve to harm refugees seeking asylum 

based on serious human rights concerns, where previously affiliations with these 

groups constituted reason for consideration of asylum. 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: A HUMAN-RIGHTS-BASED

APPROACH TO U.S. POLICY ON THE HORN

There has been a dearth of consideration for serious human rights and humanitarian concerns throughout the Horn of Africa by U.S. policymakers, with dire consequences. As described in this testimony, trends indicate that violations of human 

rights and international humanitarian law in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea are 

worsening, not improving. It is now time for a shift in approach—to make the immediate protection of vulnerable civilians central to an effective U.S. foreign policy on 

the Horn. This means holding individual governments accountable for protecting the 

rights of civilians and controlling the conduct of their armed forces. It also means 

taking a step back to gain a regional perspective on interlocking crises on the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, in southern and central Somalia, and in the Somali region of 

Ethiopia. Toward these ends, Amnesty International is grateful for the opportunity 

53 

to offer the following recommendations on how to recenter human rights in U.S. foreign policy on the Horn of Africa. 

Foreign Policy Recommendations on Ethiopia 

• The U.S. Government must make human rights central to U.S. relations with 

the Government of Ethiopia and Ethiopian civil society. • The U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia and other U.S. officials should press the Government of Ethiopia to release all prisoners of conscience immediately and unconditionally. • The U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia and other U.S. officials should actively monitor all political trials and visit political detainees in Addis Ababa and other 

places in Ethiopia, insist that trials and prison conditions adhere to international standards, and actively monitor the treatment of all prisoners of conscience and political detainees. • U.S. Government officials, including the U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia, must 

ensure that steps are taken by the Government of Ethiopia to fully remove all 

remaining obstacles to unhindered humanitarian assistance and commercial 

trade in the Somali region of Ethiopia. • U.S. Government officials must press the Government of Ethiopia to do everything in its power to avoid armed conflict with Eritrea. • The Appropriations Committees of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives should provide humanitarian assistance at appropriate levels to meet the 

basic needs of the people of Ethiopia. • The U.S. Congress should actively fund and support judicial and security sector 

reform in Ethiopia. • In the spirit of current notification requirements for IMET and FMF funding 

to Ethiopia, the Appropriations Committees of the U.S. Senate and House of 

Representatives should consider withholding a portion of both programs’ assistance until the Secretary of State certifies that assistance under these programs 

is not being used by Ethiopian security forces against Ethiopian civilians, including students and political opposition groups, with special attention to the 

Somali, Oromia, and Gambella regions of Ethiopia. • The United States Government should establish investigations to determine 

which units of the TFG and the Ethiopian Armed Forces are responsible for 

mass human rights violations, and military assistance should be conditioned for 

those units. • The U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N. should call for the establishment of a long-overdue U.N. fact-finding mission on human rights conditions in 

the Somali region. 

Foreign Policy Recommendations on Eritrea 

• The U.S. Government should make human rights central to U.S. relations with 

the Government of Eritrea and Eritrean civil society. • The U.S. Ambassador to Eritrea and other U.S. officials should press the Government of Eritrea, directly and through mutual bilateral partners, to release 

all prisoners of conscience immediately and unconditionally. • The U.S. Ambassador to Eritrea and other U.S. officials should actively monitor 

all political trials and visit political detainees in Asmara and other places in 

Eritrea, insist that trials and prison conditions adhere to international standards, and actively monitor the treatment of all prisoners of conscience and political detainees. • The U.S. Government must press the Government of Eritrea, directly and 

through mutual bilateral partners, to do everything in its power to avoid armed 

conflict with Ethiopia. • The Appropriations Committees of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives should provide humanitarian assistance at appropriate levels to meet the 

basic needs of the people of Eritrea, with special emphasis on the needs of displaced persons along its borders. • The Appropriations Committees of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives should consider initial ESF funding to support Eritrean diaspora projects 

in the United States, to provide disenfranchised expatriate Eritreans with an 

effective means to promote human rights and democracy in their home country. 

Foreign Policy Recommendations on Somalia 

• U.S. Government officials should strongly condemn human rights abuses and 

violations of international humanitarian law in all documents and statements 

pertaining to Somalia. 

• The United States and other countries to which Somali refugees have fled persecution must ensure that they are afforded protection, as required under interVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:15 Dec 11, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\45700.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
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national human rights standards and international standards governing the 

treatment of refugees. • U.N. agencies and bilateral partners, including the U.S. Government, should 

fund and implement programs to provide vulnerable groups, including women, 

young people, and minorities, with education, employment, and training opportunities, in addition to fully funding and staffing emergency assistance programs throughout Somalia. • The U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations should work within 

the U.N. Security Council to give the human rights and humanitarian crisis 

in Somalia a higher profile, beyond the question of a peacekeeping force, 

strengthen human rights components of UNPOS, and ensure authorization of 

resources necessary to support human rights assistance for Somalia through the 

Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights. • The U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations should work within 

the UNSC to strengthen and enforce the U.N. arms embargo. • Any U.S. military or police assistance to the TFG should require a vetting process to ensure that violators of human rights are not placed in positions of authority in Somalia. 

• The U.S. Congress should consider conditioning plans for further security sector 

assistance to the TFG on the inclusion of mechanisms to monitor the human 

rights performance of its security forces and hold individual leaders, soldiers 

and units responsible for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law accountable for their actions, according to international standards of 

justice. 

• The United States should establish investigations to determine which forces of 

the TFG are responsible for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. 

• The U.S. Government and the international community are strongly encouraged 

to fulfill all commitments made in UNSC Resolution 1745 to fund and support 

full deployment of AMISOM, as part of the process required to facilitate the 

withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia, while acting to encourage 

AMISOM to extend its operational mandate to include civilian protection. 

• As national reconciliation efforts continue, diplomatic initiatives must ensure 

that human rights and humanitarian assistance are made central to the dialog 

among all political actors and parties to the conflict in Somalia. 

Foreign Policy Recommendations on Somaliland 

• The Appropriations Committees of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives should consider initial ESF and Development Assistance to support democratization, elections, institutionalization of human rights protections, police and 

security sector reform and judicial capacity-building in self-declared independent Somaliland. Such assistance need not address the question of international recognition, but would ensure the support of the Government of 

Somaliland requires to continue to build democratic institutions and a secure 

environment for its citizens. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Of course, we will put that in the record. And 

I thank you for your important testimony. 

Dr. Shinn. 

STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID SHINN, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR OF 

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE ELLIOT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, 

WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador SHINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I also have 

a longer statement that I would like to include in the record. 

I think there are essentially four issues that are of great concern 

today, potentially and actual, in the Horn of Africa. The first, by 

far, is the situation in Somalia and the continuing violence there. 

Another is the potential breakdown of the Comprehensive Peace 

Agreement (CPA) in Sudan. A third is the situation in Darfur, although the implications for the Horn are not that great. And lastly, 

is a possible conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, although I don’t 

believe that will happen. 

55 

The situation in Somalia is particularly worrisome. The humanitarian situation is worsening. It impacts directly all of its neighbors, but also has brought Eritrea very much into the picture. The 

United States is treating Somalia primarily as a counterterrorist 

threat, and I think this raises some serious questions about the 

best way to approach the problem. The possible resumption of civil 

war between northern and southern Sudan would, in fact, have far 

greater consequences for the Horn of Africa than does, for example, 

the situation in Darfur. 

And the absence of normal relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea contributes significantly to instability in the region. As I say, 

I don’t subscribe to the school of thought that suggests there will 

be a return to war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. 

Efforts by governments in the region to solve the problem in Somalia, to keep the CPA on track, and to encourage the normalization of relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea are sometimes at 

counter purposes with American objectives. The United States 

seeks stability in the region, and wants to mitigate or even eliminate the terrorist threat. Regional governments do not necessarily 

share these priorities. 

For its part, the U.S. obsession with counterterrorism emphasizes short-term objectives aimed at tracking down terrorists. It 

gives insufficient attention to working with regional governments 

on ameliorating the long-term causes that lead to support for people who use terrorist tactics. 

The United States, I think, has the most leverage with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of all of the actors outside the 

neighborhood. Although its assistance is modest, the TFG exists at 

the mercy of Ethiopia and the United States. The United States 

has also expended considerable political capital in helping to 

achieve the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and as a result, has 

some leverage there. The rocky relationship with Khartoum, however, limits United States leverage to affect policy change, either 

in Darfur or to ensure implementation of the CPA. 

Washington has virtually no leverage with Eritrea. But even in 

the case of Ethiopia, leverage is a relative concept. The leaderships 

in both Ethiopia and Eritrea, since they assumed power in their respective countries in 1991, are notably resistant to outside pressure, even when large amounts of assistance are at stake. Both 

Prime Minister Meles and President Isaias will change positions on 

a policy only after they have concluded it is in the long-term interest of their respective governments. 

Mr. Chairman, I ended with a very long list of proposed recommendations. I certainly won’t take time here to go through them 

all. I will only cite a few of them. 

I think, mostly importantly, United States policy should work in 

a stronger way to encourage the Transitional Federal Government 

of Somalia to create a government of national unity that includes 

moderates from the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia and 

from some clans in the Mogadishu area that now oppose the TFG. 

On a contingency basis, I think it should request, if it hasn’t already done so, the United Nations to draw up plans for a peacekeeping operation that would eventually replace the small African 

Union presence in Somalia. It should help both Ethiopia and EriVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:15 Dec 11, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\45700.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
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trea identify confidence-building measures that may eventually 

lead to Ethiopian acceptance of the Boundary Commission’s decision, followed by practical adjustments along the border that are 

acceptable to both. And it should encourage both Ethiopia and Eritrea to end support for groups whose goal is to destabilize the situation in the other’s country. 

Finally, I would urge that the United States put front and center 

counterterrorism programs that mitigate the root causes of terrorism and the environment in the Horn that sustains but domestic 

terrorists and those coming from outside the region. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Shinn follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID H. SHINN, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR OF INTER- NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GEORGE

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC 

I thank Chairman Feingold for inviting me to testify on U.S. policy objectives and 

options on the Horn of Africa. The Horn has long been one of the most conflicted 

regions of the world and, as back door to the Middle East, is strategically important 

to the United States. It merits close attention by both the administration and 

Congress. 

The Subcommittee on African Affairs asked me to assess the current security situation in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia, and to identify the most serious threats to 

regional and U.S. security, It also solicited my analysis of efforts by governments 

in the Horn and by the administration to address these threats. It then urged that 

I offer recommendations on how the United States can better contribute to security, 

stability, growth, and democracy in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. In particular, 

the subcommittee asked what tools and leverage the United States possesses that 

would be most effective in achieving U.S. objectives in the Horn of Africa. 

CURRENT SITUATION IN ETHIOPIA, ERITREA, AND SOMALIA

The serious challenges facing Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia are longstanding and 

have implications for neighboring Djibouti, Kenya, and Sudan just as developments 

in those countries impact the situation for the three countries discussed in this testimony. With approximately 75 million people and located in the center of the Horn, 

Ethiopia is in many ways key to peace and security (or lack thereof) in the region. 

But the cross-border linkages are so important in the Horn that any one of the countries has the potential to destabilize or make more stable the other countries in the 

region. 

Turning first to Ethiopia, the country is still recovering from the aftermath of the 

2005 general election. The runup to the election and the actual balloting were 

deemed to be generally free and fair. It was a major improvement over all previous 

elections. Charges by some opposition parties that the ruling Ethiopian People’s 

Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) stole the election during the ballot counting process resulted in violence that continued sporadically for the subsequent 6 

months. In some cases the opposition provoked a strong reaction by government 

security forces. Nevertheless, the security forces clearly used excessive force in 

responding to a number of challenges. 

With local elections (districts and kebeles or wards) and those for some 40 vacancies in the national legislature scheduled for April 2008, the internal political situation approaches another potentially significant turning point. Unfortunately, opposition political parties are demoralized, arguing that the government has shut down 

most of their regional offices and arrested some of their supporters. Several of the 

opposition parties may not even contest seats for local offices, which in Ethiopia are 

actually very important. The current internal political dynamic surrounding these 

elections does not auger well for enhancing democracy in the country. Traditionally, 

there are no international observers for local elections. In any event, because of the 

size of the country and large number of contests, it would be difficult to mobilize 

a sufficient number of international observers. Nevertheless, the local elections are 

an opportunity for advancing democracy in Ethiopia. If they fail to achieve this goal, 

it will be an enormous lost opportunity. 

Turning to Ethiopia’s relations with neighboring countries, Addis Ababa has close 

relations with Kenya and Djibouti, which now serves as the principal port for all 

57 

Ethiopian imports and exports. Relations with Sudan have fluctuated since the 

EPRDF took power in 1991, but have been good following the outbreak of conflict 

in 1998 between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Addis Ababa is particularly hopeful that the 

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended conflict between northern and 

southern Sudan not collapse. From the perspective of Ethiopia’s security, maintaining peace in southern Sudan is more important than ending the conflict in Darfur. 

Nevertheless, Ethiopia has offered both helicopters and troops to the United 

Nations/African Union peacekeeping operation in Darfur. This has ingratiated Ethiopia with the United States and presumably with Sudan. Ethiopia has also earned 

praise in Washington for supporting U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the region. 

Ethiopia has established a good working relationship with Somaliland, which declared its independence from Somalia in 1991 but has not been recognized by any 

country. Ethiopia’s military intervention in Somalia in 2006 at the request of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has been opposed by virtually all Somalis except those aligned with the TFG. If Ethiopian troops left Somalia tomorrow, 

however, the TFG would almost certainly collapse. The leaders of most Somali 

groups opposing the TFG are in exile in Asmara, Eritrea, where they formed the 

Alliance for Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) and receive support from Eritrea. 

Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia has also led to increased conflict in its Somaliinhabited Ogaden region in the southeastern part of the country. There is strong 

evidence that Eritrea is supporting the dissident Ogaden National Liberation Front 

(ONLF) in the Ogaden. The withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia and the 

end of Eritrean support for the ONLF would reduce, but not eliminate, conflict in 

the Ogaden between ONLF and Ethiopian Government forces. 

The situation in Somalia remains extremely volatile. The TFG has limited support 

of Somalis, most of whom see the Ethiopians as an occupying force. Almost 300,000 

Somalis have fled the violence in Mogadishu since last October, raising the total 

number who has left the capital to about 700,000. A UNHCR representative commented at the end of January that Somalia ‘‘is the most pressing humanitarian 

emergency in the world today—even worse than Darfur.’’ The African Union force 

is unable to take control of the situation in Mogadishu as a replacement for Ethiopian troops. The U.N. is debating whether the security situation even permits planning to send a U.N. peacekeeping operation to replace the African Union force. An 

affirmative U.N. decision, which does not seem likely anytime soon, would be followed by many months of delay before the U.N. could mobilize such a force. In the 

meantime, Somali animosity against the Ethiopians increases. 

Two spoiler groups, which may have concluded it is in their interest for conflict 

to continue, are also benefiting from the current deadlock. The al-Shabaab militia, 

which once served as the muscle for the Islamic Courts, is by most accounts gaining 

strength. Some key al-Shabaab leaders now operate independently of the Islamic 

Courts while others reportedly still follow its lead. Mogadishu’s warlords, some of 

whom now support the TFG, are notorious for switching sides or operating completely independently when that serves their purpose. Often backed by businessmen, some of them actually benefit financially from continuing conflict. Neither they 

nor al-Shabaab can be counted on to work for peace or to serve the broader interests 

of the Somali people. 

The positive development in this otherwise bleak analysis of Somalia was the appointment in 2007 of Prime Minister Nur ‘‘Adde’’ Hassan Hussein by President 

Abdullahi Yusuf. Nur Adde has stated that he supports a broad-based reconciliation 

process that takes into account Islamists and clan-based factions that now oppose 

the TFG. He said the TFG is ‘‘ready to talk to those who are fighting in Mogadishu. 

Nobody is exempted from negotiations.’’ International envoys who have met with 

Nur Adde believe he is sincere in reaching out to disaffected Somali groups. There 

are still concerns, however, whether President Abdullahi Yusuf is as committed to 

a reconciliation process with the enemies of the TFG. Nor is it clear that the ARS 

is prepared to join a government of national unity before the departure of all Ethiopian troops. Such a precondition would result in even more chaos in Mogadishu 

than exists now. Nur Adde has for the first time raised the possibility of real accommodation with the TFG’s opponents. A sequenced departure of Ethiopian troops 

agreed upon by both the TFG and ARS should not be ruled out. 

The U.S. role in Somalia is focused primarily on countering terrorism, although 

it deserves credit for providing significant amounts of emergency assistance to Somalis through international and nongovernmental organizations. So long as the U.S. 

effort in Somalia remains essentially to capture and kill bad guys, and there are 

some in Somalia, the United States marginalizes its ability to impact in a positive 

way any long-term solution to the Somali problem. U.S. aerial attacks against suspected high value terrorist targets inside Somalia can be justified if there is a very 

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58 

ligence. Going back many years, however, the U.S. record for accurate intelligence 

in this part of the world is, unfortunately, not very good. The United States has conducted four aerial attacks inside Somalia since January 2007. The most recent one 

occurred early in March. If there was any success against high value targets as a 

result of these attacks, this information has not become public knowledge. Anecdotal 

evidence suggests the aerial attacks accomplished little. In the meantime, each 

American attack only increases the anger of most Somalis toward the United States, 

Ethiopia, and the TFG. 

Developments in Eritrea present special challenges for U.S. policy. The internal 

Eritrean situation leaves much to be desired. While Ethiopia has had a long series 

of controversial elections, Eritrea has not even had a national election since it 

became independent in 1993. It is subject to growing criticism in the West for a concentration of power around the Executive, a lack of press freedom, a faltering economy, support for the Islamic Courts and opposition groups in Somalia, and effectively ending the ability of the U.N. Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) to 

operate in Eritrea. It supports a number of organizations that are trying to destabilize the Government in Ethiopia while Ethiopia provides sanctuary to Eritrean 

dissidents who wish to do the same in Eritrea. On the other hand, for a country 

that is approximately half Christian and half Muslim, it has managed to preserve 

cordial relations between these two major religious groups. Eritrea has good relations with neighboring Djibouti and Sudan and even played the principal role in 

brokering a peace agreement between dissident groups in eastern Sudan and the 

Government in Khartoum. 

A close friend of the United States until the outbreak of conflict with Ethiopia 

in 1998, relations between Washington and Asmara subsequently steadily deteriorated. Eritrea has been particularly frustrated by the inability of the United States 

to convince Ethiopia to accept the 2002 ruling of the Ethiopia Eritrea Boundary 

Commission. This disagreement largely accounted for a series of decisions by 

Asmara that have worsened the United States-Eritrea relationship. At one point recently, there was even a suggestion in Washington that Eritrea might be added to 

the list of states that support terrorism. This would have been an unwise decision. 

It is more important to find ways, as difficult as it will be, to encourage Eritrea to 

support initiatives that improve peace and stability in the region. 

MOST SERIOUS THREATS TO REGIONAL AND U.S. SECURITY

The most serious threats to the Horn of Africa, and indirectly United States, security are in order of priority the continuing violence in Somalia, a breakdown of the 

CPA in Sudan, the conflict in Darfur, and a possible but unlikely resumption of conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Other issues of concern are instability in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region, ethnic conflict in Kenya, opposition to the EPRDF by the 

Oromo Liberation Front, continuing violence by Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army, 

and a possible resumption of conflict in eastern Sudan. 

The situation in Somalia is particularly worrisome because the country has effectively not been governed since the early 1990s. It has attracted a number of movements that do not represent mainstream Somali thought, including some affiliated 

with terrorism. The humanitarian situation is worsening. The Somali conflict either 

impacts directly or has drawn in Ethiopia, Kenya, Eritrea, and Djibouti. The United 

States treats Somalia primarily as a counterterrorist threat and is especially anxious to capture or kill three persons (all non-Somalis linked to al-Qaeda and believed to have taken refuge in Somalia) who were involved in the 1998 bombings 

of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Even if counterterrorism were not, 

a key to the U.S. agenda, Somalia would pose a major threat to regional stability 

and, hence, American interests in the Horn. 

The United States played a significant, positive role in helping to broker the CPA 

in Sudan and bring an end to the civil war. This was the most significant political 

achievement of the Bush administration in Africa. The international community 

and, at least until recently, the United States have allowed the conflict in Darfur 

to monopolize their collective energy while paying insufficient attention to a possible 

breakdown of the CPA. As serious as the situation is in Darfur and its negative impact on neighboring Chad and the Central African Republic, the possible resumption 

of civil war between northern and southern Sudan would have far greater negative 

implications for the Horn of Africa. Consequently, it is critical that all parties, including the United States refocus attention to assure the successful implementation 

of the CPA and the avoidance of a return to war both between the north and south 

and among rival southern factions. 

The absence of normal relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea contributes to instability in the region. When these two countries resolve their differences and reVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:15 Dec 11, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\45700.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
59 

sume their important economic relationship, all neighboring countries will benefit. 

I do not subscribe to the school of thought that war is likely between Ethiopia and 

Eritrea because of the failure to implement the border agreement. I believe both 

countries have concluded that it is not in their interest to initiate conflict, although 

both sides support groups that have hostile intentions against the other. Any diminution in effectiveness of the UNMEE operation increases slightly the possibility for 

conflict along the border. Therefore, it is important, even as UNMEE is forced to 

leave Eritrea, that it maintain a presence, however modest, on the Ethiopian side 

of the border. Independent UNMEE observers would be in a position to identify 

quickly and point the finger at whichever party might initiate a border incursion. 

ANALYSIS OF EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THESE THREATS

Efforts by governments in the region to solve the problem in Somalia, keep the 

CPA on track, and encourage a normalization of relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea are sometimes at counter purposes with American objectives. The United States 

seeks stability in the region and wants to mitigate or even eliminate the terrorist 

threat. Regional governments do not necessarily share these priorities. Eritrea and 

Ethiopia support each other’s opposition groups; this does not encourage stability. 

The TFG has been more interested in retaining political power than encouraging 

reconciliation among all Somalis. It is not even clear how committed the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and especially the Bashir government in Sudan 

are to implementing the letter and spirit of the CPA. All governments in the Horn 

give lip service to countering terrorism, but with the possible exception of Ethiopia 

their support for this goal is not always convincing. 

For its part, the U.S. obsession with counterterrorism emphasizes short-term objectives aimed at tracking down terrorists. It gives insufficient attention to working 

with regional governments on ameliorating the long-term root causes that lead to 

support for groups that use terrorist tactics. Nor has there been a meeting of the 

minds on what constitutes terrorism in the region. The United States is primarily 

interested in international terrorism instigated by al-Qaeda and groups affiliated 

with it like the now moribund al-Ittihad al-Islami in Somalia. It is much less interested in terrorist tactics used by local groups such as the Lord’s Resistance Army, 

which is not affiliated with al-Qaeda. Ethiopia, for example, ascribes terrorist acts 

to groups such as the ONLF and the Oromo Liberation Front that are not on the 

U.S. terrorist list. It should come as no surprise that regional governments are more 

concerned with these groups that have a domestic objective than they are with alQaeda. 

All international and regional efforts since the early 1990s to solve the Somali dilemma have failed, although not for lack of trying. The United States essentially 

abandoned Somalia following the departure of American troops in 1994 and the end 

of the U.N. peacekeeping operation in 1995. It reengaged sporadically only after 

9/11 and the invasion of Afghanistan for fear that the Taliban might move to Somalia. It became much more involved about 2 years ago as the Islamic Courts began 

to assert authority in Mogadishu, but again with an overwhelming focus on 

counterterrorism. The United States ill-advisedly supported an alliance of warlords 

in Mogadishu that led directly to a military victory by the Islamic Courts. Ethiopian 

military intervention, at some point encouraged by the United States, resulted in 

the defeat of the Islamic Courts, but did not contribute to a solution that allowed 

Somalia to establish a government that has the support of most Somalis. From the 

standpoint of regional stability, the situation in Somalia today is no better, and arguably worse, than during the period of control by the Islamic Courts. 

Sudan’s CPA nearly collapsed in 2007 when the SPLM withdrew its representatives from the government of national unity. This occurred at a time when the international community was far more engaged in the situation in Darfur. Fortunately, 

the SPLM and the Bashir government resolved their differences. The CPA is back 

on track but remains in a highly fragile state. In recent months, the United States 

appears appropriately to be giving this issue greater high-level attention. Ethiopia 

is also taking steps that encourage peace and stability between northern and southern Sudan. 

Since the outbreak of conflict in 1998 between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the United 

States worked hard to end the war and made considerable effort to convince both 

countries to normalize their relations. The major stumbling block has been the unwillingness of Ethiopia to implement the decision of the Boundary Commission. Eritrea has not helped its case by taking a series of steps aimed at destabilizing 

Ethiopia. The international community, including the United States, seems to have 

concluded in the past year that there is little it can do to resolve the impasse. 

60 

U.S. LEVERAGE AND RESOURCES

Of the major challenges facing the United States in the Horn, it probably has the 

most leverage with Somalia’s TFG. Although total American assistance to Somalia 

is modest and not likely to influence the TFG, its political leverage should be enormous. The TFG is heavily dependent on Ethiopia and the United States for its very 

survival. If the TFG chooses to ignore advice from Ethiopia and the United States, 

it does so at its peril. The United States has also worked hard to stand up the African Union force to replace the Ethiopians in Somalia. 

The United States has brought substantial financial resources to bear in Sudan 

for both implementing the CPA and alleviating suffering in Darfur. It expended considerable political capital in helping to achieve the CPA, but has been much less 

successful in resolving the conflict in Darfur. The United States has far better relations with the SPLM than it has with the Bashir government, with whom relations 

are strained. The rocky relationship with Khartoum limits U.S. leverage to effect 

policy change in Darfur or to ensure implementation of the CPA. 

The United States provides Ethiopia substantial assistance, although most of it 

in recent years has been emergency aid and support to counter HIV/AIDS. Washington also has a close working relationship with Addis Ababa. In theory, therefore, 

the United States has considerable leverage with the Meles government. At the 

same time, the close relations with Ethiopia have contributed directly to a worsening of relations with Eritrea. The Isaias government accuses Washington of favoring Ethiopia on the border question. As a consequence, it asked the USAID mission 

to leave Eritrea. Washington has virtually no leverage with Eritrea. But even in the 

case of Ethiopia, leverage is a relative concept. The leaderships in both Ethiopia and 

Eritrea since they assumed power in their respective countries in 1991 are notably 

resistant to outside pressure even when large amounts of assistance are at stake. 

Both Meles and Isaias will change positions on a policy only after they have concluded it is in the long-term interest of their respective governments. 

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Taking the above analysis into account and as requested in the invitation to testify, I suggest the following recommendations for ways the United States can contribute to security, stability, growth, and democracy in Somalia, Ethiopia, and 

Eritrea. I have purposely omitted many desirable recommendations that are hopelessly unrealistic or beyond the ability of the United States to implement because 

of its limited leverage in one or more of the three countries. 

• Work closely with Ethiopia to encourage the TFG to create a government of national unity that includes moderates from the ARS and from subclans in 

Mogadishu who currently oppose the TFG. 

• Consult closely with the Somalia ‘‘Contact Group’’ and ask its members to follow 

the same approach with the TFG. 

• Ask the Arab League and its member governments to encourage the ARS to engage without preconditions in power-sharing talks with the TFG. 

• Encourage governments that have good relations with Eritrea to follow the 

same approach with Eritrea vis-a-vis the ARS. 

• If a government of national unity that is widely accepted by the Somali people 

actually materializes, be prepared quickly to mobilize a significant amount of 

development assistance for Somalia. 

• Likewise, push the wealthier Arab countries to make major contributions to 

Somalia’s development. 

• As security improves in Somalia, work with Ethiopia and the TFG to design a 

quick, sequenced departure of Ethiopian forces from Somalia so as to encourage 

broader Somali support for a new government of national unity. 

• On a contingency basis, request the U.N. to draw up plans for a peacekeeping 

operation that would replace the small African Union presence and would actually keep the peace rather than try to separate warring factions. 

• Be prepared to offer substantial logistical support for standing up a U.N. peacekeeping mission in Somalia. 

• Make a concerted effort to reach out to the Somali diaspora in the United 

States to solicit ways it can help to bring peace and stability to Somalia. 

• Help Ethiopia and Eritrea identify confidence-building measures that may eventually lead to Ethiopian acceptance of the Boundary Commission’s decision followed by practical adjustments along the border that are acceptable to both 

countries. 

• Encourage both Ethiopia and Eritrea to end support for groups whose goal is 

to destabilize the situation in the other’s country. 

61 

• Following the departure of UNMEE from Eritrea, insist that it maintain observers inside Ethiopia along the border so that it can assign blame for any military 

incursion across the Ethiopian-Eritrean frontier. 

• If requested by the U.N., assign a significant number of U.S. personnel to this 

effort, certainly more than the tiny number that has participated in UNMEE. 

• Continue and even increase the high-level attention devoted to ensuring implementation of the CPA in Sudan. 

• Initiate a working group of government and nongovernment experts from the 

Horn, a few European and Arab countries, and China to identify and suggest 

solutions for the root causes of both domestic and international terrorism in the 

region. 

• Put front and center counterterrorism programs that mitigate the root causes 

of terrorism and the environment in the Horn that sustains both domestic terrorists and those coming from outside the region. 

• Engage governments in the region on their responsibility to reduce social and 

economic inequality and political marginalization as important ways to reduce 

both conflict and support for terrorist groups. 

• Engage governments and groups inside and outside the region to end their support for religious ideology of whatever persuasion that expressly encourages 

intolerance. 

• Increase support for democracy, good governance, and anticorruption programs 

in Ethiopia and be prepared to initiate funding for such programs in Somalia 

and Eritrea when the situation permits. 

• Provide additional funding for basic education programs, especially in the 

Somali language, conducted over the radio and which also contain useful civic 

lessons that include encouragement of religious and ethnic tolerance. 

• Identify and, where desired by host governments, fund programs, even on a 

pilot basis that help reduce youth unemployment. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, thank you so much, Doctor, for that information and testimony. 

Colonel Dempsey. 

STATEMENT OF COLONEL THOMAS DEMPSEY, USA (RET.), 

PROFESSOR, PEACEKEEPING AND STABILITY OPERATIONS 

INSTITUTE, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, 

PA 

Colonel DEMPSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to 

participate in the hearing. The views I’m about to offer are my 

own. 

I suggested almost 2 years ago that the U.S. response to terrorist 

hubs operating in African failed states, like Somalia, had been less 

than adequate. I noted that military strikes, which target terrorists 

directly, have enjoyed few successes in failed states, and that they 

tended to legitimate terrorist groups by providing them combatant 

status under the Geneva Convention. 

I also noted that law enforcement efforts have likewise enjoyed 

few successes in places like Somalia, largely because law enforcement agencies lack the capacity to access and operate in those very 

violent and austere environments. Integrating U.S. military capabilities and U.S. law enforcement, I suggested, offered a more effective strategy for countering terrorist in the kind of volatile environments that confront us in the Horn. 

The military forces can establish access to failed states and 

ungoverned spaces for law enforcement agencies, carve out a secure 

environment for those agencies to carry out their core function of 

identifying and apprehending terrorist suspects. I also suggested 

that once those suspects were apprehended, they ought to be delivered to an appropriate criminal justice system, discrediting their 

62 

activities through public trials that shine the light of international 

scrutiny on their terrorist acts and the consequences of those acts. 

In the 2 years since that study was published, I think events 

have borne out several of my original conclusions. As we have 

heard here today, failed states like Somalia continue to provide 

venues for terrorism. Our continued dependence upon military 

strikes has yielded a few tactical successes, but I would argue that 

the strikes have generated significant levels of controversy, skepticism, and outright mistrust among many of our key partners, especially within the AFRICOM AOR. 

The collateral damage, including the loss of innocent civilian 

lives, which are an unavoidable consequence of military strikes, no 

matter how carefully planned or carried out, threatens to undermine the moral authority of our counterterrorism campaigns, and 

arguably contributes to the ongoing recruitment by the terrorists 

themselves. 

On the positive side, however, the past 2 years have seen some 

significant progress in fostering cooperation and synergy between 

military and law enforcement agencies in the Africa region. Developments on the American side, like the promulgation of NSPD–44, 

the establishment of SCRS, the issuance of Department of Defense 

Directive 3000.05, and the emergence of whole-of-government approaches to stabilization and reconstruction that those initiatives 

represent—promoting rule of law and good governance, strengthening accountability mechanisms, supporting democratic processes—I would suggest to offer an opportunity to both implement 

an alternative strategy, combining military and law enforcement 

capabilities, and also offer an opportunity to improve our strategies 

across a broad range of agendas and objectives in the region. 

I’d note that especially in—and I’d add, this is not a pipe dream. 

This process is already underway in West Africa, and you can see 

significant progress in helping the northern tier of ECOWAS states 

deal with exactly these kinds of problems, and in the comprehensive security sector reform and governance programs that we can 

see being implemented today in Sierra Leone and Liberia. 

And especially encouraging development in this respect is the 

emergence of U.N. Integrated Missions as a key player in stabilization and reconstruction efforts. These U.N. Integrated Missions 

offer a vehicle for undertaking the transformative reconstruction of 

the security sector. It’s really necessary for the recovery of states 

that have failed completely, as is the case in Somalia, and can provide a means of pursuing an effective set of counterterrorism strategies. 

In that context, I would suggest that in Somalia, a quick transition from African Union Forces to a full-fledged integrated U.N. 

Mission could provide a key to jumpstarting a recovery process that 

will ultimately support counterterrorism initiatives, as well as 

broader governance and security agendas that Deputy Assistant 

Secretary Whelan and Assistant Secretary Frazer discussed earlier 

today. 

Thank you for the opportunity. I would ask that the full text of 

my statement be entered into the record. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Colonel Dempsey follows:] 

63 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF COLONEL THOMAS A. DEMPSEY, U.S. ARMY (RET.), PROFESSOR, SECURITY SECTOR REFORM, PEACEKEEPING AND STABILITY OPERATIONS INSTITUTE, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 

I thank the subcommittee and Chairman Feingold for inviting me to participate 

in this hearing. I have been asked to discuss recent developments in the Horn of 

Africa and their implications for U.S. military and counterterrorism policy toward 

this region over the past 2 years. I will also offer some comments regarding our 

efforts to improve regional security capacity more generally in this volatile area of 

the world. The views that I offer are my own, as an academic and former practitioner in African security affairs, and are not intended to be a statement on behalf 

of the United States Army, the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, or 

the current administration. 

COUNTERTERRORISM IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

I suggested almost 2 years ago that the U.S. response to terrorist hubs operating 

in African failed states, like Somalia, had been less than adequate. I noted that 

military strikes which target terrorists directly have enjoyed few successes in failed 

states, and have tended to legitimate terrorist groups by providing them combatant 

status under the Geneva Convention. Law enforcement efforts have likewise enjoyed 

few successes in failed states, as civilian law enforcement agencies lack the capacity 

to penetrate or operate effectively in the violent environments presented by countries like Somalia. Security assistance programs, while enjoying some remarkable 

successes elsewhere on the African Continent, require partnering with host nation 

security institutions that are simply not present in those areas of the Horn at greatest risk. While attempts to address the root causes of terrorism may offer an effective counterterrorism strategy, such efforts require extended periods of time in order 

to show results—time which appears to be running short in the case of the Horn. 

I argued in my original study of this topic that better integrating the efforts of 

the U.S. foreign intelligence community with U.S. military capabilities and U.S. law 

enforcement offers a more effective strategy for countering terrorist hubs operating 

in failed states and ungoverned spaces like those that confront us in the Horn of 

Africa. The foreign intelligence community is best equipped to identify terrorist hubs 

operating in these areas which may be developing global reach and directly threatening U.S. national interests. Once those threats have been identified, a synthesis 

of expeditionary military forces and civilian law enforcement agencies will be far 

more effective in dealing with the terrorist hubs than either element can be while 

operating independently. The military forces establish access to failed states and 

ungoverned spaces for law enforcement officers, and carve out a secure environment 

for those officers to perform their core function of indentifying, locating, and apprehending criminal, in this case terrorist, suspects. 

Dealing effectively with terrorist groups and activities requires more than just 

taking them into custody, however. Once terrorists have been located, identified, 

and apprehended, they must be screened to assure that they are, indeed, the terrorist suspects that the apprehending officers believe them to be, a task that I suggested was appropriate to a properly constituted and administered military tribunal, 

which could be provided by the supporting military force. Individuals whose status 

as a terrorist suspect is confirmed would then be delivered to an appropriate criminal justice system, whether national or international, for arraignment and trial. 

This strategy would avoid the legitimizing effect of treating terrorists as military 

targets, while discrediting their activities through public trials that shine the light 

of international scrutiny on their terrorist acts. 

In the 2 years since that study was published, I believe that events have borne 

out several of my original conclusions. Failed states and ungoverned spaces have 

continued to provide platforms for terrorist recruiting and operational planning, as 

events in Somalia have demonstrated. Our continued dependence upon military 

strikes as our primary approach to counterterrorism has yielded a few tactical successes, but has yet to demonstrate any long-term impact at the operational or strategic levels. Those strikes have, however, generated significant levels of controversy, 

skepticism, and outright mistrust among many of our key partners, especially within the AFRICOM AOR. The collateral damage, including loss of innocent civilian 

lives, which is an unavoidable consequence of military strikes, no matter how carefully or surgically delivered, threatens to undermine the moral authority of our 

counterterrorism efforts and arguably contributes to the ongoing recruitment efforts 

of the terrorist groups themselves. This is particularly problematic in a country like 

Somalia, where clan politics and the complex web of alliances and obligations among 

dia-paying groups lend unexpected consequences to the exercise of lethal force. 

64 

On the positive side, however, the past 2 years have seen some significant 

progress in fostering cooperation and synergy between military and law enforcement 

communities in the Africa region, including the Horn. Several developments on the 

American side have contributed to this progress, most notably the promulgation of 

NSPD–44, the establishment of the Office of the Department of State Coordinator 

for Stabilization and Reconstruction, and issuance of Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, which established stability operations as a core mission of U.S. military forces. The emergence of whole-of-government approaches to stabilization and 

reconstruction, both within the U.S. Government and among its international partners, is transforming strategies for dealing with transnational problems like terrorism and drug trafficking in failed states and ungoverned spaces. This transformation opens the door to pursuing an alternative counterterrorism strategy that 

leverages both military and law enforcement core competencies to identify, apprehend, and convict the planners and perpetrators of terrorist acts. The emergence of 

security sector reform as an effective tool of state, subregional, regional and international capacity-building can facilitate and support the pursuit of such alternative 

strategies. 

IMPROVING SECURITY CAPACITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

The same developments that offer opportunities to enhance regional counterterrorism strategies promise to enhance the building of security capacity in the subregion more generally. Integrated strategies that address capacity-building in a comprehensive way have the potential to fundamentally recast the security environment 

in the Horn. Promoting rule of law and good governance, to include strengthening 

accountability mechanisms and supporting democratic processes, can lay the foundation for a broader and more durable concept of subregional security. This is not a 

pipe dream: The process is already underway in West Africa, embodied in the 

ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Management and its Protocol on Democracy and 

Good Governance, and clearly evident in the comprehensive governance and security 

sector reform programs underway in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 

An especially encouraging development in this respect is the emergence of the 

U.N. Integrated Mission as a key player in stabilization and reconstruction efforts. 

U.N. Integrated Missions, the best examples of which are currently in Liberia and 

the Democratic Republic of the Congo, provide a comprehensive framework within 

which partners, to include the U.S., can develop and implement a complete restructuring of the security environment in collaboration with the host nation. An Integrated Mission can provide levels of resourcing and oversight that are not available 

from any other source, and can offer a vehicle for undertaking the massive, transformative reconstruction of the security sector that is necessary to the recovery of 

states that have failed as completely, as was the case in Liberia, and continues to 

be the case in Somalia. 

The rapid recovery currently underway in Liberia demonstrates clearly the potential of even the most devastated area to restore legitimate, functional governance, 

once a genuinely secure environment is created for the host nation and its partners 

to undertake reconstruction activities. In the context of Somalia, a quick transition 

from African Union forces to a full-fledged, Integrated U.N. Mission is the key to 

jump-starting a recovery process that will ultimately support counterterrorism initiatives as well as broader governance and security agendas. U.S. support to such 

a mission in a whole-of-government approach orchestrated through the mechanisms 

currently being developed by the U.S. interagency, under the leadership of S/CRS, 

can provide critical mass to this effort. Active involvement of AFRICOM, the new 

Unified Command for Africa, can also contribute significantly to helping U.S. agencies focus effectively on a broader security agenda in the Horn. Such an agenda, 

while it cannot neglect the other major issues confronting the subregion, must center, first and foremost, on addressing the ongoing challenges posed by the situation 

in Somalia. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Colonel, thank you for your candid and 

thoughtful testimony. In fact, thanks to all three of you for being 

able to do that in a rather brief period of time. I know it was a 

little rushed, so thank you. And now I will just ask a few questions. 

Ms. Fredriksson, you suggest that the United States should help 

alleviate Eritrea’s dire humanitarian situation. What kind of assistance do you think would be most effective? And given that the 

Eritrean Government has banished USAID from the country, how 

could this assistance best be provided and monitored? 

65 

Ms. FREDRIKSSON. Well, I think there are three different ways to 

approach this. One would be through our international agency 

partners, through bilateral partnerships, and others who have an 

ongoing relationship with the Government of Eritrea to encourage 

further assistance through those bodies. 

Another would be to consider options as to what we could provide 

without a presence physically on the ground. 

And, in addition to that, I think the specific type of assistance 

most desperately needed at this time is assistance to IDPs and refugees along the border. 

And I hope that that actually—consideration, serious consideration, by the administration of that need would improve to some 

degree the dialog that is at the moment pretty minimal. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Ms. Fredriksson, the U.N. Arms Embargo in 

Somalia is clearly failing. Can you provide the committee with 

some analysis of why this embargo is failing? And what can be 

done to strengthen and enforce it? 

Ms. FREDRIKSSON. Thank you, Senator. I am very glad to provide 

some thoughts on that. 

Currently, there is no enforcement mechanism for the U.N. Arms 

Embargo. There is a free flow of arms into Somalia from several 

different directions and several different funding sources. Some of 

those funding sources, according to our local partners, come 

through the UAE, through Saudi Arabia, through Kuwait, and 

other places. 

As you know, Eritrea has been accused of being one of the direct 

sources of arms transfers, as have Somalis based in Eritrea. And 

beyond that, the conditions on the ground are such that we’re seeing an increase in the market flow through Bakara, which is now 

split into three or four or five different markets, and this is ammunitions, this is small arms, and this is heavy arms. 

So the answer that I would like to suggest is that we consider, 

first of all, that no specific exemptions have actually been requested to the Arms Embargo and to make that process a stronger 

one. 

And, in addition to that, to look at means by which we could consider bans which have worked in other countries in Africa at different times on individuals, companies, or countries which are believed to have been providers. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. Ambassador Shinn, looking ahead 

to next month’s bielections and local polls throughout Ethiopia, 

what do you see as the best- and worst-case scenarios? And what 

can the United States and the broader international community do 

to encourage a positive outcome? And what measures should be 

taken in the event of a worst-case scenario? 

Ambassador SHINN. The elections are scheduled for April, so 

they’re coming very quickly. Unfortunately, at this late date, 

there’s relatively little that can be done to make them more successful. They’ve already been postponed a number of times. They 

were to have taken place about 2 years ago. 

The likely outcome is a rather a tepid outcome that will simply 

not allow a great deal of contestation by opposition groups. And 

that, in my view, will be unfortunate; essentially, a missed opportunity. There probably are a lot of players to blame for that, includVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:15 Dec 11, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\45700.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
66 

ing some of the opposition themselves, for not having either the 

ability or the capacity to mount a real serious threat to the EPRDF 

in terms of going to the ballot box. 

But part of it also certainly lies with the government, where it’s 

made life very difficult for the opposition to function in Ethiopia. 

And it’s just a shame, because the local elections are actually very 

important in the Ethiopian context. And it should be an opportunity for progress on democratization. 

My fear is that it’s not really going to change anything one way 

or the other; it will be a continuation of the same. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Colonel, the threats emanating from the Horn 

of Africa are real and need to be addressed properly, as you indicated. You mentioned in your testimony the importance of integrating foreign intelligence with military capabilities, but what 

about other elements of national power, like foreign and development assistance, or diplomatic engagement? How do these elements 

fit into the framework that you’ve delineated? 

Colonel DEMPSEY. Thank you for the question, sir. They fit very 

clearly into that format. The challenge of addressing 

counterterrorism is one of trying to address it in an environment 

where the accompanying government structures to support it aren’t 

present. 

And one of the keys to establishing those frameworks is a robust 

approach involving all agencies—not just of the U.S. Government, 

but of our inner-governmental partners, of our bilateral partners— 

so that we have a comprehensive approach, rather than trying to 

solve this a piece at a time. 

As I suggested in my testimony, the best vehicle that I can see 

for doing that is a U.N. Integrated Mission. It has the robustness, 

it offers a comprehensive framework in which all of the agencies 

of the U.S. Government that have a piece of this, can engage, engage effectively, and engage with a very high level of legitimacy. 

But going back to my original thesis, I would say the key here 

is addressing counterterrorism in a law enforcement context. Military capabilities can facilitate and support them. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Finally, Colonel, what role do you see for the 

new U.S. Africa Command, or AFRICOM, furthering the United 

States security agenda in the Horn of Africa? What do you think 

this new Command should and should not be responsible for? And 

how should it collaborate with the existing programs like CJTFHOA? 

Colonel DEMPSEY. I would suggest, sir, that there are two areas 

in which AFRICOM can be especially supportive of our agenda in 

places like the Horn of Africa. 

First, AFRICOM will bring to the table a focus on African issues 

in advising the President, the Secretary of Defense, and advising 

members of Congress. That is not distracted by responsibilities for 

other areas of the world. The AFRICOM Commander will not have 

to balance in his own mind how important his African concerns are 

with his European concerns or with his Middle Eastern concerns. 

That’s the significant—that’s significant progress that I think very 

important. 

Second, as AFRICOM has been presented by the Department of 

Defense, it seeks, I think sincerely, a much more collaborative role 

67 

with nonmilitary and non-OSD players in this arena. And my hope 

is that AFRICOM, as it emerges, will include a robust component 

from agencies like the Department of State, like USAID, like Department of Justice, that will be able to coordinate one of the second major shortfalls that I see, and that is a lack of resolution on 

exactly how the U.S. military can best support these other agencies 

in carrying out those duties. 

And we listened to that earlier today when we heard the difficulties the Department of State and USAID are having in accessing 

the Ogaden and finding out exactly what’s going on there. 

The U.S. military can do for those other agencies exactly what 

I suggest it can do for law enforcement. It can provide access, it 

can carve out a secure space, it can provide support for those agencies to fulfill their functions in very, very difficult, violent, and austere conditions. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. Well, you’ve articulated both the 

reasons why I’ve supported the general idea of AFRICOM, and the 

need to have concentrated focus on Africa, but also you’ve alluded 

to some of the real concerns I have about the new command. 

I have a chance in the last couple of weeks to speak directly to 

both the President of the United States and the Secretary of State 

about this issue. And I know that the President heard concerns 

when he was in Africa about this. This is an opportunity to get 

something right, but it is very complicated and requires a longterm view. 

I want to thank again this panel and I also want to thank everyone in the audience and everyone who would be reviewing the 

record of this. I hope that this hearing demonstrates, again, how 

seriously this committee takes this part of the world and how seriously we intend to follow the events there and give it the attention 

it deserves. 

I thank you and this adjourns the hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

Æ